China may be ahead in land power but a confrontation involving air and sea power would be a different matter altogether.
Leave aside economic growth parameters and astounding leaps in infrastructure that only increase the disparity between
India and China with every passing day, the story is repeated about the increasing gap between the military capabilities of the two countries.
China's expenditure on defence is three times ours -- if we accept disclosed figures -- and could actually be more. It has improved its
India's border infrastructure considerably, thereby enabling quick mobilisation and redeployment of troops. China's land forces mustered on the border outnumber those of India, whose own quite dismal efforts in improving infrastructure inhibit mobilisation and effective conduct of operations.
Modernisation of its air and naval power are key ingredients of China's objective to be able to fight "high technology limited wars", and steady progress is apparently being made in both these sectors. An old
Soviet aircraft carrier, initially bought by the
Chinese for conversion to a recreational platform, has now been refurbished as a full-fledged aircraft carrying ship -- no small achievement -- and more such platforms can be expected to be built locally in the years to come. China has realised that credible distant operations are impossible without access to organic air support and surveillance.
India, on the other hand, is languishing -- unable either to build or to develop, and indeed, even to buy, as most recently seen in the chopper deal.
Enough money is not being provided, say some; what is provided is not being spent, say others. Insufficient focus on indigenisation is given as one reason for this state of affairs -- as if that is something that can be achieved with simple changes of policy. The number of countries that can build their own tanks, guns, planes, ships and submarines and fit them with their own weapons and sensors can be counted on the fingertips.
The US, the UK,
France,
Russia,
Italy,
Germany and
Japan have not been in this business for just decades -- they have been turning out major warships for more than
100 years.
Quite clearly, in terms of land power, the Chinese are ahead of us not just in numbers, but in their ability to move forces quickly and in the required numbers, both force multipliers. That said, this does not immediately make our cause a lost one.
We are not about to see a war being fought a la
World War II in which the fight will go on until one side is, ultimately, forced to surrender.
What is more germane is whether, in a limited conflict, like the one in
Kargil, we have the capability to inflict a degree of punishment that the adversary might not find acceptable -- militarily and politically. In 1978,
Vietnam achieved this objective against the invading
Chinese army easily, despite being seriously outnumbered and outgunned. The moot question, therefore, is whether we are equipped and able to do something similar or not. Frankly, not even the most cynical among our military will doubt the
Indian Army's ability to do much more to the adversary than what Vietnam could do more than three decades ago. Our capabilities may not deter in the absolute sense, but are sufficient to dissuade the Chinese
.
In the air, the situation is different.
The Chinese have many more aircraft, but a good number are relatively old and unsuited to today's war fighting.
Even though they have lengthened and strengthened airfields in the
Tibetan plateau,
Chinese aircraft are more constrained in their operating parameters, such as endurance and weapon loads, compared to ours operating from airfields located at sea level. So, if it comes to a fight in the air, do not expect the Chinese air force to have a free ride.
On the contrary, India has enough in its inventory to give the Chinese a run for their money, and more.
Despite delays in inducting more fighter aircraft, the
Indian Air Force, in its Sukhois, MIG-29s and
Mirages has a quite potent punch. In short, in air power, the equation is pretty even.
At sea, the equation is decidedly tilted towards us
. In the Indian Ocean region, India has advantages that the Chinese will be hard put to match. Availability of organic air power through dozens of airfields strung across the
Indian coast and island territories enable not just credible operating capability across the large water space, but also surveillance over critical energy and shipping routes. Not only do the Chinese have limited resources to facilitate credible operations, their access to the Indian Ocean is constrained by the narrow channels of the
South East Asian archipelago. These potential vulnerabilities in this maritime theatre must weigh heavily in
Beijing.
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- published: 02 Jan 2014
- views: 27307