



# Inquiry into the 2013 WA Senate Election

December 2013

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Report commissioned by the Australian Electoral  
Commission and produced by M J Keelty AO



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2 December 2013

Mr Ed Killesteyn PSM  
Electoral Commissioner  
Australian Electoral Commission  
PO Box 6172  
KINGSTON ACT 2604

Dear Mr Killesteyn

**Re: Inquiry into 2013 WA Senate Election process**

Attached is my report into the circumstances surrounding the loss of Senate ballots following the recent WA Senate election.

The report concludes that the processes used by the WA AEC office have created a situation where the ultimate fate of the missing ballots is not likely to ever be fully explained.

There are 32 findings and recommendations contained in the report that should go some way towards improving operations for the future.

Completing the report in a timely fashion was a priority so that some immediate steps can be taken in view of matters currently before the Court of Disputed Returns and in any event, ahead of the by-election in the seat of Griffith in Qld.

I have written separately about my findings in regard to the actions taken by individuals. I have also separately written to you to praise the efforts of the staff you selected to assist me with this inquiry and without whose help the inquiry could not have been completed in a timely fashion.

Yours faithfully



M J Keelty AC



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# 1. Executive summary

## 1.1 Background

The conduct of a Federal Election is a complex operation that by and large, is often not seen by the wider community in terms of the logistical challenges that it presents. This report is written through the prism of hindsight and is necessarily critical of decisions made and action taken by AEC staff in WA during the 2013 Federal Election. Having said that, it is important to maintain a sense of proportion.

Most Australians only ever see the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC) activities at the time of enrolment and then every few years at a polling place. This can give people a distorted view of the totality of the AEC's operations.

Given that challenges to election outcomes are rare and that the whole process involves thousands of people committed to correctly performing their particular role it is important to remember that most election processes occur successfully.

For example, there are 14.7 million Australians enrolled to vote. Ensuring that those who are enrolled and entitled to vote is but one of the on-going tasks of the AEC.

At the Federal level a House of Representatives and a half Senate election are held every three years.

While seemingly straightforward, the complexities with elections arise in a number of ways:

- Unlike other governments in Australia and overseas the 'general' timing of a Federal election is often known but it is the prerogative of the government of the day to select the final date; and
- Sometime in the lead up to a Federal Election suitable premises have to be secured in time for the election to provide for;
  - Polling places
  - Fresh scrutiny centres
  - Recount centres
  - Central Senate Scrutiny centres
  - Warehouses.

These physical spaces are often found and acquired on short term leases by the AEC. Not every location will be perfect and in this way, the AEC is totally in the hands of the property market and state and local governments who may also make premises available.

This means, as was the case with the 2013 Federal Election that if the government of the day changes the date of the election, much of the preparatory work can be to no avail. The acquisition processes then have to be repeated, especially for large centres where votes are scrutinised and counted.



As an aside, but relevant to the 2013 WA election, the previous Federal government had vacillated about combining the Federal Election with a referendum about the status of local government. A further complicating factor was that the printer contracted to the WA AEC office went into liquidation and action needed to be taken to novate the contract to a new provider and ensure that ballots could be printed in time for the election. A referendum also impacts upon the space required to conduct the count of ballots, store the ballots as well as package and transport the ballots.

The type of space available can ease the burden for AEC staff, temporary staff, scrutineers and others when it has, loading docks, large clear areas, amenities, good lighting and security. Sometimes, these commercial sites are not available or only available for limited windows of opportunity. Despite this, the premises have to be acquired and must be useable by large numbers of people performing an extremely important task on behalf of all voters.

Changes to Australia's demographic also adds to the complexity of the operations through:

- people living in remote areas within Australia
- an increasingly mobile population that includes 'fly in fly out' work forces
- travelling senior citizens who have vacated their normal place of abode
- large numbers of Australians living and working overseas.

There are logistical challenges around the transport of equipment to enable the setting up and dismantling of polling places and counting centres, the distribution of clean ballot papers, sorting of ballot papers, fresh counting and scrutineering of ballot papers and the final storage of ballot papers, for up to six years in the case of the Senate papers.

Seemingly innocuous issues such as the size of ballot papers, particularly Senate papers are exacerbating the challenges. For example, in the 2013 election the NSW and WA Senate ballot papers were over a metre long. The font used to print the names of all the candidates and their parties had to be decreased to enable all of the candidates to be listed on the same ballot paper. 130,000 special magnifying readers had to be distributed to enable voters to read the font size on the Senate ballot papers.

In the WA Senate election there were 62 candidates divided into 27 groups or political parties with one ungrouped candidate (See Annexure 1).

It follows that the size of the ballot papers determines the size of the box in which they are contained. For the 2013 WA Senate election 3,000 boxes of over a metre in length had to be distributed to 763 polling places. (Nationally, over 30,000 boxes of Senate ballots were distributed to approximately 8,000 polling places). These boxes are awkward to handle and do not necessarily stack neatly for transport. Once the ballot papers were completed by voters they had to be repackaged for transport to divisional returning centres where they were recounted and sorted into political party groups.

The process of counting and moving ballot papers for fresh scrutiny or a recount is comprehensively covered in Chapter 3 of this Report. It too is a complicated process where completed ballots are divided into what are called above the line (ATL) and below the line (BTL) groups. The ATLs and the BTLs take different transport routes, with ATLs going straight to the warehouse after the first and second counts and the BTLs going via the Central Senate Scrutiny Centre where staff unpack the boxes and ballot papers are manually placed in front of data input staff who upload the selections on the ballot paper. Each voting selection is then uploaded into the AEC system known as 'EasyCount'.

The data is subsequently uploaded onto the AEC's Virtual Tally Room through the main system used by the AEC for elections known as ELMS (Election Management System).

There are 850 permanent staff in the AEC who are supplemented by approximately 70 thousand temporary employees and volunteers for an election to be conducted.

The AEC's reputation and integrity have been maintained mainly through its ability to successfully undertake the complex range of tasks that make up a Federal Election. We have become accustomed to knowing the result of an election on Election Day largely through the efforts of the AEC and the many temporary staff and volunteers who actively support Australia's most important democratic event.

The AEC has successfully exported its capability to a number of developing democracies in the world.

Despite modern technology, the AEC's operations during an election remain largely labour intensive and manually performed. The system relies heavily upon people and their commitment to the task. It also relies heavily upon 'trust' at all segments of the process. The process can be described as 'organic' in that it is uniquely Australian with many millions of voters voting in either large city centres, large regional centres, by mail or in pre polling centres. All of the completed ballot papers make their way by cars, trucks and/or plane back to a central repository in each state.

The expectation of a successful election process has become part of the psyche of the Australian voting population. Much of the effort that goes into these large and complex operations goes unnoticed because most voters only ever see the polling station and then the outcome of the election.

It is also true to say that much of the work is conducted under the pressure of getting a result to the Australian people as soon as is practicable after the closing of polling places at 6pm but in any event, by the end of Election Night.

## **1.2 The 2013 WA Senate Election**

In January 2013 the then Prime Minister, Julia Gillard announced to Australia the date for the Federal Election would be September 14. During the course of the year Prime Minister Gillard was deposed and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was installed. Some six weeks out from the original election date of September 14 Prime Minister Rudd announced a new election date of September 7.

This new election date had a profound impact upon the AEC because premises that had previously been identified as being available for lease or available under some other arrangement had to be re-negotiated. A number of suitable premises then had to be found for the earlier election date.

The responsibility for running the election in WA rests with the State Manager of the AEC office in Perth. AEC State Managers organise and run the election on behalf of the Australian Electoral Commissioner. The role of State Manager, formally described as the Australian Electoral Officer (AEO), is a statutory appointment and is an important one for our Constitution in that State Managers can have the casting vote in a Senate election.

Polling places were established in all of the fifteen WA Divisions (See Annexure 2). In addition, polling places were maintained at Perth airport to cater for the 'fly in fly out' workforce commuting to and from mining communities in the state.

Despite the fact that a number of postal votes are made several days prior to Election Day the current legislation prevents those votes being counted before the close of the polling places on Election Day. Similarly, despite the fact that polling places open at 8am, the counting of any votes is not permitted to commence before 6pm in the jurisdiction within which the voting occurred.

This aspect of the legislation delays what is arguably the most important part of the days' work until the end of the day or early evening. This is a time when many staff, whether permanent or temporary, have already made a significant contribution to Election Day. Political party volunteers who offer their services as scrutineers are in exactly the same position because many of them have already spent the day outside working for their particular candidate.

It could not be established whether fatigue was a cause for mistakes made in the operation of the WA Senate Election but it is clear that the size of the population and various elements involved in elections is increasing year by year. Additionally, electoral boundaries and Divisions are constantly under review. In Western Australia, for example, there was an increase of 140,665 electors enrolled since 2007 and an increase of eight candidates for the WA Senate.

A series of many steps takes place once a polling place closes on Election Night:

- Pre polling votes that were stored are counted
- Polling place votes are counted
- Initial results are uploaded onto the AEC's computer system and the results begin to become public
- Polling place votes are parcelled into political party groups
- Informal votes are separated out for further examination and scrutiny
- Above the line Senate votes are packaged, sealed and marked for despatch to the appropriate divisional returning centre
- Below the line Senate votes are packaged, sealed and marked for despatch to the appropriate divisional returning centre and then separated out for subsequent despatch to the Central Senate Scrutiny Centre.

The following days are characterised by further steps in the process where:

- The ballots including the ATL Senate ballots are unpackaged and recounted at the divisional returning centres
- The AEC computer system is updated with any changes to the first count
- The Senate ATL votes are added to the AEC computer system and any major discrepancies between the first count and the count on the subsequent days are resolved under observation of the scrutineers
- The ballots are then repackaged and sent to a central warehouse for storing
- Divisional Returning Officers deciding on disputed or unclear votes in the presence of scrutineers.

In WA, the majority of the first counts were made at the polling places and the second counts were conducted at the premises used by the Divisional Returning Officers (DROs). However, six of the city Divisions in the Perth metropolitan area were combined and processed at a central location in Ascot. This is part of the AEC's strategy to centralise some of the activities by establishing larger working units (LWUs).

This is an important strategy because one of the findings of this report is that each time ballots are packaged and transported it increases the risk that a mistake will be made so reducing the movement and opening of packages will reduce the risk of mistakes.

It has long been the tradition, the law and the practice in Australia that an individual's ballot paper is not identified with the individual after they have marked their ballot. Screening by officials at the polling place ensures that a person is on the Electoral Roll but that is as far as the identification of an individual is taken. It is outside the terms of reference of this inquiry to go into any further examination of this practice suffice to say that the current law and practice rule out many modern alternatives such as biometric identification for validation of voters and electronic voting. Manual performance of what would otherwise be automated processes will continue to expose the AEC to human errors.

The process followed in WA was very similar to the practices followed elsewhere. Practical decisions were made regarding the transport of ballot papers in remote areas where staff collect and store ballots in their own vehicles. Colleagues will collect quantities of ballot papers to ensure that the ballots are at the Divisional office in reasonable time for the second count. It is a system that simply would not work without the support of the temporary staff to supplement the efforts of permanent staff. Again, it is important to note also that the system is built upon a bedrock of 'trust'.

For this reason, any mistake in the processes is magnified to such an extent that it could be regarded as being disproportionate to the actual event. For example, the loss of a number of ballot papers that have a face value of the paper upon which they are printed of only tens of dollars could disenfranchise thousands of voters who have taken the time to consider their decision and cast their vote. In some cases, it could also ultimately change the outcome of the election.

Guidelines are established to give direction to all staff and volunteers during an election. Given the infrequency of elections, it is necessary that clear and accurate guidelines are written and distributed to all personnel participating in the operation.

This did not occur in WA. The guidelines were not sufficiently detailed regarding the transportation and storage of ballots in non AEC centres. The transport and logistics operations were undertaken by an external supplier supposedly under contract to the AEC but the contract had in fact expired in July 2013. In all likelihood this may not have had any material impact on the outcome but it displays a deficiency in the logistics operation in WA.

Instructions around the use of the transport supplier were not clear and were not consistent with operating an accountable system. The instructions regarding point to point metropolitan area transfers of ballot paper boxes were ambiguous and in any event, interpreted by some as not requiring consignment notes. Consignment notes identified during this inquiry rarely went to any level of detail such as the number of boxes in a consignment. Instead, the majority of consignment notes simply accounted for pallet loads and the number of pallets.

Accounting for goods at the pallet level and therefore not accounting for them as individual boxes while being transported in and around Perth also extended to warehouse operations. This is poor practice when one considers the value of the goods to the electorate.

Sometime prior to the 2013 Election the contracted transport supplier offered the WA AEC office the opportunity to use their tracking system for boxes of ballots. While use of the system was supported at the local level in Perth, the AEC national office in Canberra raised questions about the connectivity of the tracking system to the AEC's ITC systems.

The questions asked by head office ITC staff remained unanswered at the time of the election and therefore, the transport operator's tracking system for parcels was never implemented. This was a significant lost opportunity to improve the accountability of those systems that were eventually used for the 2013 WA election. It was noted during the inquiry that one of the regional WA centres in Geraldton did in fact use the transport operator's system and no problems were encountered.

### **1.3 The Recount**

The closeness of the WA Senate result was well known on the night of the election and indeed was publicly elaborated upon by electoral experts in the media over the ensuing days.

It became clear during this inquiry that AEC staff in Perth felt that they were under some pressure to perform effectively. This is one of the challenges for the AEC in managing a workforce that for a significant part of the time is in 'preparation' phase performing routine duties and then suddenly it is thrust into 'operations' phase for a condensed period of a few weeks every three years.

The skill set required for the preparation phase is different to the skill set required for the operational phase. It was noted that there was a culture of complacency in some areas of WA which is a challenge for the AEC in the future to maintain a skilled and focussed workforce.

During the 2013 election process the WA AEC office secured a former retail centre in Northbridge as the location for the Central Senate Scrutiny Centre. The site at Northbridge had been leased by the WA (state) Electoral Commission for the conduct of local government elections on 19 October 2013.

The site had a loading dock area, and large central areas in which to place counting tables. It also contained other appropriate amenities such as bathrooms and a kitchen to house a large number of workers over a brief but intense working period. The building could be secured and in fact had security officers in place during its use by the AEC.

On 10 October 2013 the AEC Commissioner ordered a recount of the WA Senate votes following a petition from the Australian Sports Party candidate Wayne Dropulich and Greens (WA) candidate Scott Ludlam. The petition had earlier been declined by the WA State Manager of the AEC but that decision was overturned by the AEC Commissioner.

Once the recount was announced a suitable location for the recount and scrutineering was required. It was decided to sub let (again) the premises at Northbridge. Having the AEC and the WA EC conduct their operations out of the same centre at similar times was not ideal but may not have impacted upon the missing ballots.

A plan was put together to return the pallets of Senate ballot papers located at the AEC's warehouse in Welshpool and deliver them to the Northbridge premises which was identified now as the 'Recount Centre'. There the pallets were to be unwrapped, the boxes were to be removed and unpacked and the ballot papers placed on large tables to be recounted in the presence of scrutineers.

Several scrutineers were spoken to during this inquiry and while all of them praised the recount centre processes, many of them conceded that the role of scrutineers in counting Senate ballots is not well understood.

This inquiry found that the planning and instructions for this process were inadequate. A copy of the flowchart for this process is attached at Annexure 3.

The most poignant indication that arrangements at the recount centre were not ideal was the account given by one of the AEC staff who stated that after the arrival of several pallet loads of boxes containing Senate ballots to the loading dock at Northbridge, this individual realised that there was no one in charge of physically receiving and despatching pallets. This person then appointed himself to be in charge of the Northbridge dock.

A visit to the dock area during the recount process by one of the inquiry team clearly identified a breakdown in procedures where incoming pallets with boxes of ballots to be recounted were placed side by side with pallets of boxes that had been through the recount process. (See photos at Annexure 4)

Further, despite the recount plan identifying the sequence in which Divisional ballot loads were to be delivered from the Welshpool warehouse to the Northbridge Recount Centre and back again, the sequence was not followed and confusion existed between the warehouse and the recount centre about the status and sequence of consignments.

There were also lengthy periods of time where the Welshpool warehouse was left with its large roller door open to allow those working inside some fresh cooler air. The warehouse is located near Perth airport and is not covered by CCTV or alarms. Its isolation from the main AEC office in Perth gives rise to issues about the supervision of staff particularly if an accident were to occur while stacking and re-stacking large and heavy pallets of goods.

## **1.4 Discovery of Missing Ballots**

Early into the recount the loss of one complete box of ballots containing 231 votes from the Division of Forrest was discovered. The number of missing ballots is known because they were counted both on the night of the election at the polling place and again over the next days at Bunbury at a fresh scrutiny centre.

Despite exhaustive inquiries, that single box of Senate ballots from the Division of Forrest has never been located.

It was noted in this inquiry that the boxes of ballots handled by the staff at the Division of Forrest were packaged and marked to a good standard which left many people asking how that single box was missing. The DRO for Forrest is noted for his care in operations.

Two events may have had an impact on how that box went missing.

Firstly, the building selected for the assembly of packages and boxes was a former medical centre. Seemingly ideal for use for electoral purposes, it had a large central area and many smaller rooms that enabled ballots to be stored and counted in their polling place order (See Photos at Annexure 5). However, as boxes were formed and stored on two pallets, they were too large to move around the building so had to be un-stacked and stacked again on three occasions which disturbed the numerical order of the boxes.

Generally speaking, staff attempt to stack pallets evenly but there is invariably one or two boxes that do not make the stacking neat in terms of even distribution. Each full Senate ballot box weighed about six kilos.

There were two pallets of boxes formed at the Division of Forrest but one pallet was decidedly different to the other in that it had a larger number of boxes placed upon it. Despite being wrapped in plastic, the irregular size of the boxed Senate ballots meant that stacking on a pallet was not uniform and a number of witnesses gave accounts that one of the pallets was 'listing' to one side.

Further, a number of witnesses described how about three boxes of ballots were left over after stacking and therefore had to be placed on the top of the stack.

There are conflicting stories as to whether these three boxes were properly secured on top of the stacked pallet. While all accounts agree that plastic wrap was placed over the top of the stack to secure the loose boxes, versions of the effectiveness of this strategy differ from witness to witness.

Witnesses state that the weight of this pallet gave rise to concerns about whether the hydraulic lift on the back of the contractor's truck would be sufficient to lift the weight of the pallet.

The two pallets were transported to the Welshpool warehouse, but were placed on the floor for a number of days, rather than on racks for long term storage, and were then diverted to the Northbridge recount centre.

The second event that possibly impacted the transport and security of the boxes of ballots from the Forrest Division was that the Divisional Returning Officer, known for his care and professionalism was sent to the recount centre to assist the larger operation. This meant that he was not present when the load of boxes left the Forrest divisional returning centre. He was therefore unable to assist the inquiry further other than to say he recalled cross-checking that parcels of ballots were in the correct "polling place station" and that they were packed alphabetically and under strict supervision.

During the recount on 22 October 2013 it was discovered that 1,139 ballot papers were missing from the Division of Pearce. This approximates to three boxes of ballot papers.

Compared to operations elsewhere, the packing and marking of boxes containing ballots from the Division of Pearce was well below standard. Instead of each box being properly labelled, hand written felt pen markings depicted the origin and type of contents of these boxes. This part of the process is clearly inadequate given that printed labels were available and were used by other DROs (See photos at Annexure 6).

Some of the hand writing had been crossed out as the boxes were re-used after being:

- used to store the original ballot papers prior to use in the polling places
- repacked and used to return ballot papers after the count on Election Night
- unpacked and repacked again after the 'fresh scrutiny' in the days following the election

There were also conflicting versions of events as to how material was stacked for transport at the loading dock for the Division of Pearce. Some persons who were interviewed were critical of the fact that the loading dock had mixed stacks of used ballots, fresh ballots and cardboard rubbish stacked for transport to a recycling centre at Tamala Park which is near the Welshpool warehouse.

Placing refuse and 'live' ballots in proximity to each other is strongly advised against in the AEC's guidelines. Mixing loads is also advised against.

Another factor impacting the boxes of Pearce ballots was that following fresh scrutiny the Pearce boxes were moved to the Welshpool warehouse in three separate loads. Two loads were taken by the contract courier and one load was taken by the warehouse manager himself. Dividing a load in this way is contrary to all of the controls applied elsewhere to maintain some idea of the location of goods. Added to this confusion was the fact that the three loads were not on pallets. These boxes were individually transported.

During the inquiry it became obvious that some of the metropolitan couriers who were used to transport electoral material only had 'partial loads' so mixed loads are more likely to have occurred than not.

During this inquiry, it was also discovered that the attitude towards Senate ballots is different to those of the House of Representatives. There is less concern for the security and integrity of Senate ballots because it is considered that they have less of an impact on the election outcome and in any event are warehoused for six years. This is a cultural problem within the AEC and it needs to be addressed.

The fact that it had been thirty years since the last full recount of Senate ballots most likely added to the loss of care in routinely dealing with those ballots during the election.

Another problem that was evident in the conduct of the election operation was the type of boxes being used to store used ballots. When ballots are counted and placed into political party groups they will form various sizes and weight according to number. This means that some boxes will be almost empty while others are overflowing. The integrity of a stack of boxes and even a pallet load of boxes suffers under these conditions.

During a recount operation, effective communication between the warehouse, the transport provider and the recount centre is critical to the success of the operation. It appears that general communications during the process were less than ideal.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to write a set of standards that will fit all circumstances in these types of logistic operations. Common sense has to prevail and the process relies upon the experience and commitment of each of the persons involved meaning that there will always be a difference in standards.

## 1.5 The Outcome

After several exhaustive searches of warehouses, transport vehicles, transport distribution centres and the temporary storage areas it is impossible to determine whether the missing ballots were:

- a) physically removed during the many transport and storage processes
- b) lost during transport or transfer
- c) misplaced through repacking into incorrect boxes, or
- d) accidentally mixed with recycling material and disposed of as refuse.

Having said that, it is also very likely that had a recount not occurred, whether on direction by the AEC Commissioner or after petition by a candidate, then the fact that ballots were missing may never have been discovered. Likewise, had better consignment and warehousing practices been adopted, including installation of the system offered by the transport contractor, the ultimate destiny of the missing ballots would have been much easier to discover.

Given the multitude of steps through which ballot papers are processed, it remains that the inability to account for the ballots at each step of the chain of events is the single most significant failure in the 2013 WA Senate election processes. An ability to pin point the precise moment when the ballots disappeared after already having been counted twice would have enabled a subsequent inquiry to be more accurate about the ultimate destiny of the missing ballots.

It is now three months since the 2013 Federal Election. Significant publicity has been given to this case especially in WA. Nobody has come forward to say that they have found some ballot papers or boxes left over in a warehouse or on a truck. It is tempting to say that the ballots are most likely to have been mistakenly destroyed with recycling material but the system put in place by the WA AEC office was so parlous that such a conclusion would be difficult to prove.



## **1.6 Future State**

In fulfilling its terms of reference, this Inquiry noted a range of issues involving culture, planning, systems and practices that contributed to the loss of the ballots. The implementation of the various recommendations, findings and observations throughout this Report could assist the AEC in its future operations. The Inquiry believes that these could be achieved by pursuing a future state where the sanctity of ballots underpins all aspects of the AEC's operations, from planning to training, to materials management and all other aspects covered in this Report.

One way of achieving this would be complete inculcation of certain readily understandable, easily remembered, and immutable maxims to underpin all planning, training, systems and practices associated with a ballot paper. Examples of these maxims are provided in the body of this report.

## 2. Background

Issues associated with the 2013 WA Senate election must be viewed through a prism that encompasses the restrictions, statutory obligations, logistic challenges and demographic challenges with which the AEC contends in conducting elections. The AEC operates within a structured and regulated framework. This brief section looks at the operating, legislative, and policy environment of the AEC.

### 2.1 Operating environment

The successful history of the conduct of Federal Elections belies the complexities associated with the significant task; particularly where the consequence of realised risk can be manifestly disproportionate to the simplicity and apparent minor nature of a mistake. The loss of a box of ballot papers with a market value of perhaps a few dollars can have a multi-million dollar impact – particularly if a fresh election is called as a result of that mistake. These complexities are becoming more pronounced with each electoral event. There is significant and increasing pressure on the AEC's permanent and temporary workforce arising from, amongst other factors:

- a large increase in the number of enrolled electors (a growth of 1,076,215 since 2007)
- a large increase in the number of candidates and parties (162 more candidates contested the 2013 Senate election than 2007)
- a history of delivering a relatively mistake-free result
- a history and ongoing expectation of swift results on Election Night,
- the community's appetite for immediate access to information, and
- logistic challenges arising from the size of the Senate ballot paper in WA (the 2013 WA Senate ballot paper was the largest in that state's history).

The glue that holds the system together is trust – this needs to be built on a bedrock of adequate systems and planning. The AEC appears to have successfully worked within this environment, and has hitherto enjoyed an enviable reputation for the successful conduct of elections. The 'Australian method' of conducting elections has an international reputation and has been successfully exported throughout the world, and there is high demand for the AEC's assistance to emerging democracies within the region and further afield.

### 2.2 Legislation

The AEC operates as an independent statutory authority and conducts elections in accordance with the legislative framework of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (the Act). The AEC's functions are set out in section 7 of the Act. The Act is highly prescriptive with regard to the structure of the AEC as well as the conduct of elections. The Act provides for a number of statutory positions including the Electoral Commissioner, Deputy Electoral Commissioner and an Australian Electoral Officer

(AEO) for each state. Under the Act, AEOs are responsible for the conduct of Federal Elections in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and also serve as the returning officer for their state's Senate elections. By convention, AEOs perform the non-statutory role of state manager.

The manual nature of conducting Federal Elections is largely due to the requirements of the Act. Federal Elections are generally conducted every three years, however, unlike the majority of state and territory Parliaments (Queensland and Tasmania being the exceptions), the term of the federal Parliament is not fixed. Uncertainty relating to the date of an election presents planning and logistic challenges for the AEC.

## **2.3 Relevant Policy**

The Election Procedures Manual (EPM) is a comprehensive, interactive set of documents tailored for use by state and divisional offices and available to all staff on the AEC intranet.

The EPM provides practical guidance on policies, procedures and legislative requirements for the conduct of all stages of an election; this is supplemented by more specific documents, such as the Scrutiny Policy (see Annexure 7), which details the parcelling of papers following the fresh scrutiny. State offices issue guidelines, including Election Bulletins, to assist in the local application of these policies and procedures.

The recount process is prescribed in sections 278 and 279 of the Act. A recount may be undertaken, approved or directed at any time before the result of an election is declared. Section 278 of the Act provides that a recount of Senate votes may be requested by a candidate or ordered by the Australian Electoral Officer or the Electoral Commissioner. A request for a recount needs to identify specific ballot papers and associated significant counting process errors or irregularities that could change the result of an election within a division.

Since the AEC was established in 1984, there have been two Senate recounts, and nine House of Representative recounts. The Senate recounts in 1988 and 1998 were the result of the disqualification of Senators, and on both occasions, were ordered by the Court of Disputed Returns (CDR).

## 3. WA Senate Ballot

A detailed chronology has been prepared by the AEC and provided to this Inquiry and is attached as Annexure 8. That chronology provides the AEC's view of the entire sequence of events, including detailed descriptions of the missing ballots down to polling place and group level. Although important for background, and completeness, the Inquiry's report does not attempt to regurgitate that chronology. However, this report addresses several aspects within the chronology that require further narrative.

As with any ballot, adequate preparation requires meticulous organisation, including the development of a detailed plan and appropriate guidelines. By and large, the essential steps in this planning have remained the same or similar for many elections.

WA is divided into 15 electorates. Geographically, the smallest division in WA is the Division of Stirling, at 77 square kilometres, and the largest division is Durack, covering approximately 1.6 million square kilometres. The enrolled population in WA for the 2013 Federal Election was 1,453,866 electors. Of these, 1,348,797 (or 92.77 per cent) cast a vote in the Senate.

There were 906 polling places across WA (inclusive of early voting centres, remote polling locations and special hospital teams), with a temporary workforce of approximately 8,000 hired in addition to the 60 permanent employees in WA.

The Inquiry noted a number of issues relating to the planning and conduct of the WA Senate election that appear to be relevant to the missing votes.

### 3.1 The WA recount decisions

The first count following the distribution of preferences for the 2013 WA Senate Election resulted in the announcement of six successful candidates on 2 October. That afternoon, Australian Sports Party candidate Wayne Dropulich and Greens (WA) candidate Scott Ludlam made formal requests for a recount to the WA AEO. On 3 October the AEO announced that the recount request had been denied because no specific issues had been identified that would have warranted the conduct of a recount.

An appeal for a recount was made the following day, 4 October. The Australian Electoral Commissioner sought further explanation of the matters raised in the appeals from Senator Ludlam and Mr Dropulich. Other key affected parties, including Senator Louise Pratt (Australian Labor Party) and Mr Zhenya Wang (Palmer United Party), were given the opportunity to provide a written submission to the Commissioner.

Closeness of a particular count in the process of distributing Senate preferences is not of itself a basis for a recount under the Act. In addition to considering candidates' submissions, the Commissioner examined the criticality of particular Senate candidate exclusion points where the small margins involved were instrumental in determining the election of the final two Senators.

On 10 October the Commissioner announced his decision to direct a recount of WA Senate ballot papers where electors had marked their votes above the line. The recount was conducted between 17 and 31 October, and involved the scrutiny of approximately 96 per cent of the votes that were cast at the election. During that time, it came to light that 1,370 votes, all of which had been verified during the fresh scrutiny, could not be located, rechecked or verified in the recount process.

The distribution of preferences was conducted on 2 November to combine the recounted formal votes with all formal below-the-line votes that were not subject to the recount process. Following the distribution of preferences, Mr Dropulich and Senator Ludlam were identified as the fifth and sixth successful candidates, where originally Mr Wang and Senator Pratt were designated in those positions. The formal Declaration of the Poll was announced on 4 November.

On 15 November, the AEC lodged a petition with the CDR in respect of the 2013 Western Australian Senate election. This Inquiry and Report does not address the petitions before the CDR.

## **3.2 Issues in the preparation for and conduct of the ballot**

### **3.2.1 Issues relating to the planning for the movement of ballot papers**

The Inquiry established that, inherent in any election, there are a large number of movements of ballot components and that each movement increases the risk of loss or damage or the perception of loss, damage or tampering. The Inquiry concluded that many of the movements are unavoidable; however, the maintenance of ballot paper security is best achieved by restricting the movements of each component to those that are essential.

A cardboard box containing ballots appears to the observer to be a simple object over which to retain accountability. However, inside the box, ballot papers in whatever number can be separated by polling place, division or other categories such as formality. During any election, the counting process must discern what is a valid and formal vote for a particular candidate or party and what is an informal vote – the numbers in each category determine the outcome of the election. In this way, a box containing ballots is somewhat like a Russian nesting doll, with each component resting inside another.

### **3.2.2 Issues relating to the training and skill development of staff**

The AEC employs a significant number of temporary employees who supplement the permanent staff in performing the manual processes required to deliver an election. The churn of staff brought about by the need to recruit so many temporary employees for each event is a challenge.

The challenges presented by a large and episodic workforce can be overcome through timely and effective targeted training and assessment of temporary employees. Conversely, insufficiently robust training can have a significant negative impact on the performance of staff and electoral outcomes. Equally, staff who are experienced in delivering elections can introduce short cuts to the processes or inadvertently make assumptions that may lead to a lack of proper planning or the failure to follow due process, both of which can have detrimental effects on the outcome.

The Inquiry was made aware that training of particular individuals in the affected divisions was not delivered in a way that could reasonably be expected to provide an acceptable level of performance. Nor was the training and its delivery assessed to determine its effectiveness. The Inquiry concluded that a lack of appropriate training contributed to poor material management practices evident at critical points in the process.

The matters noted above relate to skill development for the 2013 WA election. In a broader context, the Inquiry has noted in the course of its investigations (but not had the capacity to explore in detail) that other benchmarked electoral management bodies such as the United Kingdom Electoral Commission have sought to codify accountability standards for key roles (an example is provided at Annexure 9). Adopting a similar approach in Australia is unlikely to be a simple process. Key positions such as Divisional Returning Officers and AEOs are codified in the Act and the UK experience indicates that such a change could have industrial and financial ramifications should it be introduced in Australia. Nonetheless, the AEC may wish to explore the practicality of adopting similar measures.

### 3.2.3 Issues relating to the contract for transport services

An essential part of any election is the reliance on third parties to deliver a wide range of products and services ranging from the production of ballot papers through to the distribution of material. It is critical to the success of these arrangements that the AEC applies highly developed skills to the management and quality assurance of contracts.

The Inquiry noted a number of issues relating to the WA AEC office and its management of the contract for the provision of transport services, as outlined below.

- The guidelines for the movement of ballot papers in WA were not sufficiently detailed regarding the transportation and storage of ballot papers in non-AEC premises.
- Despite the existence of a relevant provision in the contract, the WA office did not ask the contractor to enquire as to the political neutrality of all persons under its control who were responsible for the transport of components (ballots, parcels, boxes and pallets).
- The contractor had applied security tape to boxes containing ballots at some stage during the chain of handling. In extensive discussions with the contractor, including relevant drivers, management and security staff, the Inquiry was advised that this tape is used to deliberately and transparently indicate to the receiver that the parcel has been handled by the contractor in transit. This is usually as a result of damage to the parcel or inadequate packaging. In the opinion of the Inquiry, WA AEC staff should have questioned the origin and use of this tape at the time it was observed. However, the Inquiry concluded that the use of the tape was not significant as to the destiny of the votes.
- The contract for provision of transportation services had technically expired. The Inquiry noted that while the contract had options for extension beyond the expiry date, these options had been enacted without any formal correspondence between the parties. The Inquiry also noted that various reports on the status of WA contracts, submitted at the request of the AEC national office, did not identify that this contract was due to expire during the election period (see Annexure 10).
- The Inquiry noted that prior to the election, the transport contractor offered the WA AEC a cargo tracking system, at no cost, to assist in the tracking of AEC material during the election. The WA AEC and the AEC national office did not pursue this offer and the Inquiry concluded that this was a missed opportunity to implement best practice materials management.
- The Inquiry believes that this may not have prevented the loss of the ballots; however, it would have provided the AEC with greater visibility of the movement, and therefore the destiny of the missing ballots.

- There were instances where the WA AEC office failed to insist on full adherence with provisions in the transportation contract. For example, pallets were transported in an open top truck on at least one occasion. This was an issue of non-compliance, and should have been questioned by WA AEC staff.
- The Inquiry concluded that the limited use of an open top truck had not impacted on the missing ballots as the pallet concerned was fully enshrouded in plastic and had additional strapping.

### 3.3 Election day and the first count

The AEC moves over a million parcels of ballot papers from polling places to divisional offices around Australia. In WA alone, over 80,000 parcels were moved. This mass migration of ballots across Australia and internationally is done in an ordered and regulated process under detailed guidelines issued by the national office, and is comparable to similar processes used by other benchmarked electoral bodies (such as the UK Electoral Commission).

In examining this process, the Inquiry noted that ballot materials are frequently moved in private vehicles by polling officials. The Inquiry also noted that on occasions electoral material may be stored overnight in private premises. The Inquiry further noted that many of the people who are involved in these activities may not have experience in transportation and logistics.

Despite the circumstances listed above not having a bearing on the missing ballots, the Report recommends that it may be prudent further guidelines be developed to strengthen governance in this area.

The Inquiry established that the missing ballots could be accounted for during the first count on Election Night and the subsequent counts at the relevant divisional premises. The votes were counted and the preferences recorded as appropriate on the relevant AEC systems, including the Virtual Tally Room.

### 3.4 Fresh scrutiny

Once the first count on Election Night is completed, a fresh scrutiny normally commences in the following days. The Inquiry established that all ballots, including those subsequently identified as missing, could be accounted for during the fresh scrutiny process. Again, the votes were counted, and the preferences recorded on the relevant AEC systems as appropriate. The Inquiry concluded that a decisive point in the fresh scrutiny process was the packaging and despatch of Senate Above The Line (ATL) votes to the AEC warehouse in Welshpool.

As mentioned elsewhere in this Report, it appeared that packaging, labelling and general material management practices varied markedly across WA. These practices, especially the lack of detailed consignment notes, poor labelling and the reuse of boxes, compounded by insufficient oversight of the process, contributed to an environment where the AEC could not subsequently account for all votes.

The parcelling, labelling and transportation arrangements in the two divisions from where votes were subsequently identified as missing differed markedly. The two affected divisions were Pearce and Forrest. Pearce is a Perth metropolitan division, while Forrest is a division that covers the Bunbury area.

From all accounts, and from the evidence available to the Inquiry, practices in the Division of Forrest appeared to be significantly more in line with AEC expectations. The practices adopted in the Division of Pearce were not in line with those expectations. Photos attached to this report (see Annexure 6) demonstrate the Division of Pearce's rudimentary labelling of boxes, compared to the more standardised nature of the Division of Forrest (see Annexure 11). The Inquiry team concluded that there was similar differentiation between the two divisions in terms of parcelling and transportation processes.

### 3.4.1 Culture of complacency re Senate and “live” ballots

Over time a general perception appears to have emerged that Senate ballot papers are less important than House of Representatives ballot papers: this electorally dangerous attitude became more pronounced after the fresh scrutiny. At that point, ballots were considered to be ‘dead’ and became subject to less rigorous handling procedures as they moved toward long term storage, and ultimately, destruction.

This attitude manifested itself at various times through indicators such as the inadequate segregation of used ballots, unused ballots, non-election material and rubbish, in particular at the Pearce Fresh Scrutiny Centre and recount centre. Additionally, despite the existence of boxes designed for parcelling of ballot papers, printer's boxes were reused for ATL votes which caused concomitant issues with storage, labelling, transport and accountability.

It should be remembered that much of the focus on Election Night is on the House of Representative ballot papers. The Senate ballots have traditionally received less attention. A result is seen to be less ‘acute’, as half the Senate remains in place regardless of the outcome and positions are not filled for a number of months (in this case, some eight months) following the election.

## 3.5 Material management and the packaging and transport of ballots

The ‘culture’ mentioned above regarding the status of ballot papers was clearly evident in relation to packaging and transport of ballots to the AEC's Welshpool warehouse. There was some confusion about the appropriate method of transport for components (ballots, parcels and boxes) from divisional offices and fresh scrutiny centres to the warehouse. WA executive staff indicated that the planning intent was for all ballot papers to be transported as consigned loads by the contractor, separately from other electoral material.

Despite that planning intent, unclear guidelines were issued, with some staff appearing to believe that ballots could be transported in courier vehicles. An example of these unclear guidelines follows.

*It is ok to give envelopes returning to Divisional Offices for screen based scrutiny & mail / forms going to other sites to the drivers, however return of election materials is out of scope. DROs are to make their own arrangements for return of materials to the warehouse following the return of materials advice in Election Bulletin 20.<sup>1</sup>*

This was compounded by an instruction given to staff<sup>2</sup> that consignment notes were not required for courier runs. These ‘couriers’ were provided by the contractor for transport of materials within the Perth metropolitan region. The Inquiry concluded that these couriers were regarded by AEC WA staff as AEC drivers and vehicles. The Inquiry concluded that the WA executive should have noted

<sup>1</sup> WA Election Bulletin No 22

<sup>2</sup> WA Election Bulletin No 1



that their initial intent was not realised and various managers should have, but did not, take action to rectify any misunderstanding or ensure compliance.

The Inquiry concluded that, at a minimum, a detailed, auditable consignment note should have been created for each movement of ballot papers.

General material management was further compromised through the reuse of boxes for storage of Senate ballot papers.

### **3.6 Warehouse operations**

The Inquiry noted that well-run warehousing is a central component in the logistics system that enables the AEC to discharge its electoral responsibilities. This system must be underpinned by sound processes, based on principles of security, accountability, efficiency, and reliability. Any failure to adhere to these principles can lead to significantly adverse electoral consequences.

The WA warehouse experienced a substantial level of throughput during all stages of the 2013 Federal Election, from the despatch and receipt of a large amount of electoral material to the return of ballots for secure long term storage. However, volume is not an excuse for poor practice. Rather, the importance of sound warehousing principles increases in proportion with volume. The Inquiry noted that the WA warehouse operations did not appear to adhere to sound warehousing principles. This included:

- inadequate control of access or egress from warehouse during peak periods of receipt and despatch of materials (especially when roller door was open)
- lack of appropriate warehousing management skills and ongoing training and the opportunity to develop those skills
- lack of engagement between the broader WA AEC workforce and warehouse staff
- isolated work environment with insufficient monitoring, raising workplace health and safety (WHS) risks, particularly given the need to move larger loads using machinery with no observers in place
- isolated work environment raising the risk of unauthorised access to materials including components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets)
- lack of systems to control access, receipt and general handling of all material, in particular components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets)
- insufficiently and inconsistently applied processes around the treatment of partial loads or portions of loads, and
- lack of CCTV and other security

A floor plan and general photos of the warehouse are at Annexure 12.

### **3.7 Recount operations and transport**

The conduct of a Senate recount is a highly unusual occurrence for the AEC: the last full recount occurred in 1984. A recount is, in itself, a complex event with a large number of variables, including the large scale movement of ballot papers, employment of temporary staff, and intense focus by party scrutineers, all of which contribute to a high pressure environment.

Given the rarity of Senate recounts, there is an absence of specific 'doctrine' regarding their conduct. The Inquiry noted that this is not necessarily an oversight; in such an instance, it is expected that normal Senate count procedures and House of Representative recount procedures would have been applied.

The Inquiry concluded that the focus of WA on the electoral and legislative aspects of the WA Senate recount led to insufficient attention on the detailed logistics, movement handling and security of the ballots during the recount. The Inquiry was unable to conclude whether the ballots were lost during this stage of the process, however, the lack of focus on the detailed logistic requirements created an environment where ballot security may have been compromised. Specifically:

- instructions and planning documentation relating to the conduct of the recount were not sufficiently detailed, followed and updated where necessary (as demonstrated by the lack of documentation other than the hand drawn flow chart at Annexure 3),
- roles and responsibilities were not adequately defined or allocated as exhibited by one staff member's assessment that he needed to appoint himself to physically receive goods,
- there was no apparent recognition of the need for detailed, trackable and accountable inventories for the transfer of components (ballots, parcels, boxes or pallets) between the warehouse at Welshpool and the recount centre at Northbridge,
- there appeared to be no formal process for issuing material from the receipt/despatch area to the recount preparation area and returning the material to that area once completed,
- there was inadequate segregation of used ballots, unused ballots, non-election material and rubbish at various stages in the process (photos of this can be seen at Annexure 13), and
- ballots were left in open, unsecured boxes at the recount centre overnight, in the custody of a lone security guard, who had not been vetted by the AEC for political neutrality, without CCTV coverage (photos of this can be seen at Annexure 14)

### 3.8 Discovery and response

The path of the ballot papers, the associated possible points of departure from standard practice, and the time of discovery represents a complex chain of events. While ultimately the processes for both the Pearce and Forrest ballot papers would have concluded in storage at the AEC warehouse at Welshpool, the pathway to Welshpool was different for each. Diagrams have been attached at Annexure 15 in an attempt to render this complexity into a more readily comprehensible summary. The information below sets out key steps in the AEC's discovery and response.

The AEC first became aware that ballots for the Division of Pearce may have been misplaced on 22 October 2013, when the staff member responsible for the ballot preparation area of the Northbridge recount centre could not locate them. WA staff believed, at that time, that there was still a possibility that the ballot papers would be located during a subsequent stage of the recount. A similar chain of events resulted in the discovery on 25 October 2013 that ballots were also missing for the Division of Forrest, with a similar prediction regarding their possible recovery.

There had been two unrelated incidences of ballot paper boxes being temporarily misplaced during the recount process, but these boxes were eventually located, so it was not unusual to expect that the Pearce and Forrest boxes may also have been temporarily misplaced.

At the point in time where it became apparent that the ballots were unlikely to be discovered, the WA staff undertook a number of actions, including informing the Electoral Commissioner and senior members of the national executive.

Following the discovery of the missing votes, steps taken by the AEC included:

- exhaustive searches of the warehouse and its contents on three separate occasions, which included AEC staff from interstate and labour hire staff
- searches of:
  - the recount centre
  - all 15 divisional offices throughout WA
  - the WA state office
  - the offsite premises for the affected divisions
  - a hire vehicle used to transport material between an affected division and the AEC warehouse
  - WA Electoral Commission premises, and
  - rubbish and recycling receptacles within workplace health and safety guidelines
- sending the Deputy Commissioner to provide assistance and support to the WA office
- requesting the examination of available closed circuit television footage and its conduct, and
- requesting thorough searches by the transport contractor of its relevant vehicles and premises – these were confirmed in writing by the contractor.

None of the steps taken by the AEC resulted in the discovery of the missing ballots, or shed light on their fate.

## 4. Future State

In fulfilling its terms of reference, this Inquiry noted a range of issues involving culture, planning, systems and practices that contributed to the loss of the ballots. The implementation of the various recommendations, findings and observations throughout this Report could assist the AEC in its future operations. The Inquiry believes that these could be achieved by pursuing a future state where the sanctity of ballots underpins all aspects of the AEC's operations, from planning to training, to materials management and all other aspects covered in this Report.

One way of achieving this would be complete inculcation of certain readily understandable, easily remembered, and immutable maxims to underpin all planning, training, systems and practices associated with a ballot paper. An example follows.

1. Ballots never 'die' – all ballots remain 'live' from printing through to statutorily authorised destruction;
2. The security, sanctity and accountability of ballots must be preserved at all times;
3. A ballot should be able to be accounted for at all times, including during transit and storage (by the AEC, contractors, or other third parties); and
4. These three principles of ballot paper handling must not be breached. Every individual within the AEC must integrate these maxims into every task – likewise, every AEC office must integrate them into all aspects of culture, planning and operations.

Adopting these or similar maxims will inculcate in all staff the importance of ensuring the detailed adequacy and accountability of all ballot paper arrangements. Additionally, the adoption of a common ballot paper 'doctrine' will provide a touchstone against which the planning and actions of staff can be henceforth judged.

## 5. Conclusion

The AEC operates in a highly complex and dynamic environment, with many variables, where even the most minor of errors or lapses can have quite dramatic electoral consequences. Many of the processes that the AEC uses to manage this complexity are essentially manual, and all stages of an election rely on participants' trust, goodwill, and a shared understanding of the importance of the integrity of the overall system.

There is nothing inherently inappropriate with a system built on trust – indeed, the implementation of a more automated process with less community involvement would not only require significant financial investment, but could also reduce transparency and therefore reduce the community's sense of ownership of the process and result.

Regardless of what system is implemented, trust is an inherent element in each stage of the process. In return for giving their trust to the AEC, and peacefully responding to and respecting election outcomes, the Australian community expects the AEC to take the utmost care in all of its actions, to be completely dependable, and to be a world leader amongst electoral bodies.

In the 2013 Senate election in WA, the AEC failed to meet its own high standards and damaged its reputation with the community and Parliament. The loose planning culture in WA and the complacent attitude toward ballot papers following the fresh scrutiny were manifested in: inadequate skill development and training, a series of minor errors, poor material management practices, flawed contract management and quality control, erroneous assumptions and lax supervision and enforcement combined to create an environment where these high standards could not be met.

It is likely that the fate of the ballots will never be known: whether they were simply lost, were the subject of deliberate human intervention, or suffered some other misadventure such as accidental disposal. Regardless, the system of control established by WA was simply not sufficient to minimise the risk of such an occurrence, or to then provide an auditable trail or evidence of a continuous chain of custody to enable the Inquiry to uncover, with certainty, what happened.

There are national material management policies and procedures that should be enhanced, strengthened, created or enforced, as appropriate. Greater national consistency in this area would likely provide the AEC with a higher level of assurance about the security and accountability of ballots. However, any lack of understanding of national standards does not excuse the lack of detail evident in the planning and conduct of operations in WA. This is all the more stark given that material management practices were identified as an area of weakness in the evaluation of WA's conduct of the 2010 Federal Election, but these findings were not incorporated into the WA office's planning of the 2013 Federal Election.

The loss of the ballots was in all probability the result of a chain of seemingly minor, but entirely and easily avoidable, errors and omissions. Each of these events on its own may or may not have been significant; but taken as a whole, they indicate a loose electoral environment in WA, in which the loss of ballots was more likely to occur and less likely to be detected.

The Inquiry noted that the culture of the WA AEC office and its compliance with operational policies and procedures was not subject to detailed monitoring. While a system of comprehensive internal audits was in place across the AEC, it did not identify issues with the culture, poor planning, failure to follow procedures or poor contract management in the WA AEC office that are outlined in this Report.

This report makes recommendations for the future, including an appropriate use of technology and the development of a doctrine that emphasises the security and integrity of the ballot papers. The Inquiry believes that the adoption of such a doctrine is of fundamental importance to changing the culture regarding Senate ballot papers, and preventing a recurrence of this situation outlined in this report.

# 6. Findings and recommendations

## 6.1 Findings

In accordance with the Inquiry terms of reference, these findings relate to the loss of Senate ballot papers in Western Australia (WA). The extent to which these findings may have broader applicability across the AEC is a matter for the Electoral Commissioner and his staff to determine.

The Inquiry's findings in regard to the treatment of WA Senate ballot papers during the 2013 Federal Election and the subsequent recount are that:

1. The conduct of the recount was the causal factor in determining the ballots were missing. In the absence of the recount it is unlikely the instances of missing ballot papers would have been established.
2. When conducting an election, the size of a mistake is disproportionate to its impact. The loss of a box of ballot papers with a market value of perhaps \$30 could, in the event of the High Court ordering a fresh election, have a \$13 million consequence.
3. The AEC has historically set high standards for itself, and most organisations would wish to be able to deliver a similar level of accuracy in a high pressure environment. However, delivery to this high standard is becoming increasingly difficult due a number of factors, including the increasing volume of work, demographic changes, a history, culture and expectation of immediate results on Election Night, and the electorate's increasing thirst for immediate access to information.
4. The system of handling and transport of ballots relies on trust. The trust however needs to be built on a bedrock of adequate systems and planning. These systems in WA were inadequate.
5. After significant searching and re-examination of the process used for the 2013 election in WA it is impossible to determine in relation to the missing ballots from the Division of Pearce if:
  - a) someone physically moved the votes;
  - b) boxes of votes were lost in transit;
  - c) ballots were placed in wrong boxes; or
  - d) ballots were accidentally destroyed along with other recycling.

In relation to the single ballot box from the Division of Forrest (marked 1 of 7) it is similarly impossible to determine the ultimate fate of that box, except to say it was present at the time of the fresh scrutiny count but failed to be accounted for at the recount centre at Northbridge.

6. Whilst the Inquiry did not exclude consideration of criminality nothing was discovered that would include that prospect as being more viable than a mere loss or misplacement of the ballots.

7. There was inadequate segregation of used ballots, unused ballots, non-election material and rubbish at various stages in the process (in particular at the recount centre and Pearce Fresh Scrutiny Centre)
8. Nationally mandated AEC parcelling policies and procedures were not consistently applied in the Division of Pearce following the fresh scrutiny.
9. Despite the existence of boxes designed for parcelling of ballot papers, printer's boxes were reused for ATL votes which caused concomitant issues with storage, labelling, transport and accountability.
10. The reuse of printer's boxes by Divisional Returning Officers in Western Australia may indicate a culture of resistance or miscommunication in regards to packaging of ballots into boxes.
11. The application of labelling procedures was not consistent across WA. Labels for the Division of Pearce were not in accordance with guidelines nor were they sufficiently legible or accurate (for example, some boxes had names of polling places written on them then crossed out).
12. Given the significant consequences of the inadvertent disposal of ballot papers, there was no apparent policy or process (including certification) to cross check rubbish and recycling before disposal from divisional premises, the warehouse at Welshpool or the recount centre at Northbridge.
13. Material management policies or procedures were inadequate, not properly documented or not consistently applied in WA, particularly in the Division of Pearce.
14. The number of movements of components (ballot papers, parcels, boxes, pallets) increased the risk of loss or damage or the perception of loss, damage or tampering.
15. Unclear guidelines were issued about the transport of ballots with some staff appearing to believe that ballots could be transported in courier vehicles. This was compounded by an instruction given to staff<sup>3</sup> that consignment notes were not required for courier runs; these 'couriers' were provided by the contractor for transport of materials within the Perth metropolitan region, and became to be viewed, and therefore treated, as an AEC vehicle.
16. There was inadequate accountability and tracking of Above the Line (ATL) components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets), including a lack of consignment notes tracking the despatch and receipt of materials for:
  - a) point-to-point transfer of ATL components (ballots, parcels, boxes) from some divisional centres to the warehouse
  - b) point-to-point transfer of ATL components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) from the warehouse to the recount centre, and
  - c) point-to-point transfer of ATL components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) from the recount centre to the warehouse.
17. There was no cross checking of the number of components (ballots, parcels, boxes) conducted at divisional offices, the warehouse or the recount centre.

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18. There were inconsistent and, at times inadequate, processes for:
  - a) securing boxes on pallets (the process of shrinkwrapping did not always provide total security); or
  - b) providing assurance that components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) had not been subject to tampering.
19. The guidelines around the movement of ballot papers were not sufficiently detailed regarding the transportation and storage of ballot papers in non-AEC premises.
20. The transport contractor applied security tape to a small number of boxes containing ballots. This is unlikely to have had a bearing on the fate of the ballots, however, AEC staff should have investigated the origin and use of the tape at the time it became apparent.
21. Courier vehicles provided by the transport contractor were treated as AEC vehicles – regardless, no ballots should have been moved without documentation (at a minimum, a consignment note).
22. There was a lack of contract management skill evident in the WA AEC office, including contract enforcement.
23. The contract for transportation services had technically expired: while it had been extended by custom, the WA state office had not taken formal action to execute the option to extend the contract. Furthermore, various reports on the status of WA contracts, submitted at the request of national office, did not identify that this contract was due to expire during the election period.
24. Quality assurance of contracts in WA did not appear to have occurred to a level that would guarantee consistent performance by contractors and seamless treatment of components in their path from the AEC to the contractor and back to the AEC
25. The AEC missed an opportunity to implement components of a better practice materials management system in Western Australia as offered by its major contractor.
26. A culture of complacency had emerged in the WA state office (and in the Division of Pearce) regarding the treatment of ballot papers after fresh scrutiny (or in the case of Below the Line votes, after the Central Senate Scrutiny).
27. The culture of the WA office and its compliance with operational policies and procedures was not subject to detailed monitoring. While a system of comprehensive internal audits was in place across the AEC, it did not identify issues with the culture, poor planning, failure to follow procedures or poor contract management in the WA State Office.
28. Warehouse operations in WA were inadequate in both process and personnel issues, including:
  - a) inadequate control of access or egress from warehouse during peak periods of receipt and despatch of materials (especially when roller door was open);
  - b) lack of appropriate warehousing management skills;
  - c) lack of engagement between the AEC workforce and warehouse staff;
  - d) isolated work environment with insufficient monitoring, raising workplace health and safety (WHS) risks, particularly given the need to move larger loads using machinery with no observers in place;

- e) isolated work environment raising the risk of unauthorised access to materials including components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets);
  - f) lack of systems to control access, receipt and general handling of all material, in particular components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets);
  - g) insufficiently and inconsistently applied processes around the treatment of partial loads or portions of loads; and
  - h) lack of CCTV and other security.
29. The WA office did not adequately assure itself of the political neutrality of all persons responsible for the transport and storage of components (ballots, parcels, boxes and pallets), in particular non-AEC personnel.
30. The lessons learned during the 2010 Federal Election regarding material management in WA appear not to have been integrated into WA's planning and conduct of the 2013 Federal Election.
31. Training of particular individuals in the affected divisions was not delivered in a way that could reasonably be expected to provide an acceptable level of performance, nor was it assessed to determine its effectiveness. The Inquiry concluded that a lack of appropriate training contributed to poor material management practices evident at critical points in the process.
32. The focus on the electoral and legislative aspects of the WA Senate recount led to insufficient focus on the detailed logistics, handling and security of the ballots at the recount centre at Northbridge. In particular:
- a) instructions and planning documentation were not sufficiently detailed, followed and updated where necessary;
  - b) roles and responsibilities were not adequately defined or allocated;
  - c) there was no apparent recognition of the need for detailed, trackable and accountable inventories for the transfer of components (ballots, parcels, boxes or pallets) between the warehouse at Welshpool and the recount centre at Northbridge;
  - d) ballots were left in open, unsecured boxes at the recount centre overnight, in the custody of a lone security guard, who had not been vetted by the AEC for political neutrality, without CCTV coverage, and
  - e) there appeared to be no formal process for issuing material from the receipt/despatch area to the recount preparation area and the returning of material to that area once completed.

## 6.2 Recommendations

These are recommendations based on the findings in WA. The report recommends that the Commissioner consider the implications of these findings and recommendations to the broader AEC.

### 6.2.1 Logistics/Material management

It is recommended that:

1. The AEC undertakes quality assurance and benchmarking of material management systems against national and international industry logistics standards, including other electoral authorities.
2. The AEC develops and applies national and state material management policies for all stages of a ballot paper's active existence (election, scrutiny, warehousing, transfers), including:
  - the application of national standards for the parcelling, and movement of components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets)
  - the tracking of components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets)
  - the use of detailed, trackable and accountable inventories to account for components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) at any point in time
  - the creation, maintenance and retention of transfer records including, as a minimum, accurate consignment notes
  - the secure packaging of boxes onto pallets at premises prior to shipment (whether by shrinkwrapping or use of other technology)
  - the counterchecking and countersigning of the number of components (ballots, parcels, boxes, pallets) as an additional assurance measure at critical points in the cycle of transmission, and
  - the segregation of used ballots, unused ballots, and other material identified for disposal at all times, including at count and recount centres, at fresh scrutiny centres and at warehouses.
3. The AEC introduces, where practical, systems that minimise the movement of ballot papers. This may include consideration of centralised processing options including the use of relevant technologies such as the scanning of ballot papers.
4. The AEC institutes controls around the movement of ballot papers acknowledging that some individuals will not be logistics 'professionals'; these controls should include guidelines regarding transportation of ballot papers in private vehicles and storage at non-AEC premises.
5. The AEC introduces a process for disposal of recycling or rubbish which ensures that no ballot material is inadvertently lost or destroyed.

### 6.2.2 Contract management

6. The AEC ensures that staff have developed skills in contract management, including contract enforcement.
7. The AEC conducts regular quality assurance to ensure contract suppliers are meeting their obligations.
8. The AEC conducts regular market research and testing to ensure that contract suppliers for material management are utilising industry best practice.

### 6.2.3 Ballot paper security

9. The AEC institutes a culture of security in ballot handling through developing a concept of ballots being 'live' until they are destroyed in line with statutory obligations.
10. The AEC institutes a concept of 'ballot secure zones' at all premises where 'live' ballot papers are handled or stored (including fresh scrutiny centres and non-AEC premises).
11. The AEC ensures all ballot secure zones are cleared before the arrival of 'live' ballot papers, and that they remain secured and 'sterile' at all times when ballots are present.
12. The AEC introduces processes and develops doctrine for the handling of ballot papers at all stages from 'cradle to grave'.
13. The AEC uses tamper-evident materials (eg bags and tape) for the transfer and storage of ballot papers, including the transport of materials to and from fresh scrutiny centres and for long-term storage in warehouses.

### 6.2.4 Processes, procedures and compliance

14. The AEC specifies and defines the role of employees (permanent and temporary) at every stage of ballot handling.
15. Once roles are specified, the AEC allocates these roles to individuals with instructions provided in writing.
16. The AEC establishes policy and procedures for the conduct of a Senate recount.
17. The AEC introduces a system of more proactive audits to determine compliance, performance and adherence with policies and procedures.
18. The AEC consider the benefit of cross-posting senior staff between states to assist in giving a consistent approach to performance.
19. The AEC develops and applies improvements to national and state warehousing management practices, including:
  - the standardisation of minimum required skill sets
  - the processes to engage warehouse employees with the wider AEC, particularly where warehouses are in isolated locations
  - the mitigation of WHS risks, including guidelines around unaccompanied visits to AEC warehouses and storage facilities
  - the application of systems to control ballot material access, receipt and general handling
  - the standards and processes around the treatment of partial loads or portions of loads, and
  - the installation and monitoring of CCTV and alarms at warehouses.
20. The AEC revises guidelines regarding the suitability of all storage and ballot handling facilities (whether AEC, temporary, or contractor premises), including security, egress, accessibility and exclusive use by the AEC.
21. The AEC ensures that all instructions and planning documentation for specific events (such as a recount) are sufficiently detailed, are followed and updated where necessary.

22. The AEC reviews labelling policies to ensure that labelling is tamper-proof, accountable, consistently applied and legible.
23. The AEC reviews packaging policies, particularly in relation to the cardboard standard for boxes used in the transport and storage of ballot papers and the repackaging of ballot papers and parcels into used boxes.
24. The AEC introduces minimum packing standards, including box and pallet integrity.
25. The AEC adopts a 'ballot paper doctrine' that emphasises the security and sanctity of ballots and underpins all aspects of the AEC's election operations.

### **6.2.5 Culture**

26. The AEC implements measures to ameliorate:
  - the pressure arising from the expectation that all results will be known on Election Day, and
  - the logistical issues arising from the size of Senate ballot papers.
27. The AEC should continue to assure itself, to the best of its ability, of the political neutrality of all persons, including subcontractors, having contact with a ballot paper (other than electors at the time of voting).
28. The AEC conducts regular reviews of the culture of its regional offices to ensure full adherence to national policies and procedures.

### **6.2.6 Other**

29. In view of the findings of this report, that the AEC conduct a check of storage and packaging of 'live' ballots currently in its possession.
30. The AEC ensures that lessons learned during post-election evaluation are sufficiently captured in the evaluation report and acted upon ahead of any subsequent election.
31. The AEC improves learning and development, including:
  - mandating the provision of training regarding ballot security and materials management
  - the accurate recording of courses successfully completed, and
  - the benchmarking of its training against that offered by like institutions.
32. The AEC consider bringing to the attention of the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters the impact of the statutory appointments of AEC State Managers on the ability of the AEC Commissioner to achieve national uniformity of approach and consistency of approach in the conduct of Federal Elections.

## 7. Definitions

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
<b>Australian Electoral Officer (AEO)</b>	The AEC's manager in each state and the Northern Territory. The AEO is the returning officer for the Senate election in their state or territory
<b>Above the Line (ATL)</b>	On the Senate ballot paper, electors may vote for a political party or group by putting the number 1 in any of the boxes above the black line. The number 1 goes in one box only.
<b>Below the Line (BTL)</b>	In the Senate, voters may put the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and so on in the boxes to the left of the individual candidates' names in the order of their choice. They must put a number in every box if they mark their vote below the black line. After the fresh scrutiny process these ballot papers follow a separate path to ATL votes, two data entry operators enter each preference into a system called EasyCount.
<b>Distribution of preferences</b>	The process used to determine the winning candidate when no candidate wins an absolute majority of first preference votes. This includes the distribution of preferences by the system called EasyCount.
<b>Division</b>	Divisions, also known as electorates, are geographical areas containing approximately equal numbers of voters as defined for federal electoral purposes.
<b>Divisional Returning Officers (DRO)</b>	The AEC officer responsible for maintaining the roll and conducting the election in each division. The DRO is the returning officer for the House of Representatives election in their division.
<b>Formal vote</b>	A vote cast in an election or a referendum that has been marked according to the rules for that election and can be counted towards the result. A ballot paper not marked correctly is called informal.
<b>Fresh Scrutiny</b>	The check and recount of ballot papers (that were counted in polling places on Election Night) after Election Day.
<b>Fresh Scrutiny Centre</b>	The premises at which the fresh scrutiny is conducted. This may be the divisional office or an offsite premises. A single premises may be used for fresh scrutiny of more than one division.
<b>Parcel</b>	A collection of ballot papers, separated into categories, for example polling place, division, candidate, party or formality
<b>Recount centre</b>	A premises used to conduct a recount of ballots. The premises used for the recount of the WA 2013 Senate election was in the suburb of Northbridge, and had previously been used for the data entry of BTL votes.

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# Annexure 1 Senate ballot paper

## YOU MAY VOTE IN ONE OF TWO WAYS

### Either:

**Above the line**  
By placing the single figure 1 in one and only one of these squares to indicate the voting ticket you wish to adopt as your vote

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SMOKERS RIGHTS	LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	AUSTRALIAN CHRISTIANS	HELP END MARIJUANA PROHIBITION (HEMP) PARTY	SOCIALIST EQUALITY PARTY	PALMER UNITED PARTY	SHOOTERS AND FISHERS	AUSTRALIAN VOICE PARTY	SEX PARTY	SECULAR PARTY OF AUSTRALIA	AUSTRALIAN INDEPENDENTS	THE WIKILEAKS PARTY	KATTER'S AUSTRALIAN PARTY	FAMILY FIRST PARTY	NO CARBON TAX CLIMATE SCEPTICS	STABLE POPULATION PARTY	STOP THE GREENS	AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS	THE GREENS (WA)	ANIMAL JUSTICE PARTY	THE NATIONALS	AUSTRALIAN FISHING AND LIFESTYLE PARTY	AUSTRALIAN MOTORING ENTHUSIAST PARTY	AUSTRALIAN SPORTS PARTY	RISE UP AUSTRALIA PARTY	AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	LIBERAL

### Or:

**Below the line**  
By placing the numbers 1 to 62 in the order of your preference

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	Ungrouped			
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
KATZ-BARBER Mick SMOKERS RIGHTS	FRYAR Lynn LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	van BURGEL Lynne AUSTRALIAN CHRISTIANS	BALDERSTONE Michael HELP END MARIJUANA PROHIBITION (HEMP) PARTY	SYMMONDS Peter SOCIALIST EQUALITY PARTY	WANG Christine PALMER UNITED PARTY	BOW Murray SHOOTERS AND FISHERS	PARKES Garry AUSTRALIAN VOICE PARTY	PALMER Shane SEX PARTY	ATKINS Richard SECULAR PARTY OF AUSTRALIA	HIGGINS David AUSTRALIAN INDEPENDENTS	GEORGATOS Garry THE WIKILEAKS PARTY	FELS Anthony James KATTER'S AUSTRALIAN PARTY	ROSE Lizbeth FAMILY FIRST PARTY	BYASS Richard NO CARBON TAX CLIMATE SCEPTICS	STRACHAN Peter STABLE POPULATION PARTY	FISHLICK David STOP THE GREENS	FERNANDEZ Chris AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS	LUDLAM David THE GREENS (WA)	LOVE Kathryn ANIMAL JUSTICE PARTY	MIRRPANDA David THE NATIONALS	EDWARDS Jay AUSTRALIAN FISHING AND LIFESTYLE PARTY	HOWLETT Pauline AUSTRALIAN MOTORING ENTHUSIAST PARTY	DROPLICH Wayne AUSTRALIAN SPORTS PARTY	FIREMAN Mark RISE UP AUSTRALIA PARTY	BULLOCK John AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	JOHNSTON David LIBERAL	FARMER Robert Malcolm THE NATION			
DI RADO David SMOKERS RIGHTS	HAMILTON Lynne LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	MOSELEY Lynne AUSTRALIAN CHRISTIANS	MOYLAN Tina HELP END MARIJUANA PROHIBITION (HEMP) PARTY	LOPEZ Lou SOCIALIST EQUALITY PARTY	TERBLANCHE Christine PALMER UNITED PARTY	PARKES Lynn David SHOOTERS AND FISHERS	BUTLER Shane AUSTRALIAN VOICE PARTY	COLEMAN Mark SEX PARTY	OUTREBEN Lynne SECULAR PARTY OF AUSTRALIA	IRVING Patrick AUSTRALIAN INDEPENDENTS	RAJAN Shane THE WIKILEAKS PARTY	HODDINOTT Shane KATTER'S AUSTRALIAN PARTY	HENG Henry FAMILY FIRST PARTY	DEWAR Theodore NO CARBON TAX CLIMATE SCEPTICS	BANKS Loren STABLE POPULATION PARTY	KIRKMAN Tim STOP THE GREENS	THIEL Robert AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS	DAVIS Paul THE GREENS (WA)	SUTTON Paul ANIMAL JUSTICE PARTY	EAGLES Shane THE NATIONALS	FINLAYSON Peter AUSTRALIAN FISHING AND LIFESTYLE PARTY	YOUNG Stewart AUSTRALIAN MOTORING ENTHUSIAST PARTY	LACKOVIC Paul AUSTRALIAN SPORTS PARTY	BENNETT Brendan RISE UP AUSTRALIA PARTY	PHATT Lynne AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	FOSTER Peter Allan AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	REYNOLDS Lynne LIBERAL	BROCKMAN Shane LIBERAL	THOMAS Shane LIBERAL	OUGHTON Chris LIBERAL



## Annexure 2 Polling places established in all fifteen WA divisions

Division	Polling Place	Premises
Brand	Baldivis	Tranby College
Brand	Baldivis East	Makybe Rise Primary School
Brand	Baldivis North	Baldivis Primary School
Brand	Bertram	Bertram Primary School
Brand	BLV Brand PPVC	BLV Brand
Brand	Calista	Calista Primary School
Brand	Cooloongup	Cooloongup Primary School
Brand	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Brand	Golden Bay	Coastal Community Centre
Brand	Greenfields (Brand)	Eastlake Church
Brand	Greenfields BRAND PPVC	Eastlake Church
Brand	Greenfields East	Riverside Primary School
Brand	Hillman	Hillman Primary School
Brand	Lakelands	Mandurah Baptist College
Brand	Leda	Leda Primary School
Brand	Madora Bay	Madora Bay Community Hall
Brand	Meadow Springs	Frederick Irwin Anglican School
Brand	Meadow Springs North	RAAFA Estate
Brand	Medina	Medina Primary School
Brand	Other Mobile Team 1	Casuarina Prison
Brand	Parmelia	North Parmelia Primary School
Brand	Perth (Brand)	City of Perth Council House
Brand	Port Kennedy	Port Kennedy Primary School
Brand	Port Kennedy East	Rockingham Lakes Primary School
Brand	Rockingham	Rockingham Senior High School
Brand	Rockingham Beach	Rockingham Beach Primary School
Brand	Rockingham Central	Bungaree Primary School
Brand	Rockingham PPVC	Robinson Place Complex
Brand	Rottnest (Brand)	Kingston Barracks
Brand	Safety Bay	Safety Bay Primary School
Brand	Safety Bay Central	Safety Bay Senior High School
Brand	Secret Harbour	Secret Harbour Primary School
Brand	Singleton	Singleton Primary School
Brand	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Brand	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
Brand	Waikiki	Charthouse Primary School
Brand	Waikiki East	Rockingham Baptist Church
Brand	Wandi	Wandi Resource Centre
Brand	Warnbro	Warnbro Community High School
Brand	Warnbro East	Koorana Primary School
Brand	Wellard	Kwinana South Fire Station
Canning	Armadale	Neerigen Brook Primary School
Canning	Armadale East	Armadale Primary School
Canning	Armadale North	Kingsley Primary School

Division	Polling Place	Premises
Canning	Armadale PPVC	Shop 2, 225 Jull St
Canning	Armadale South	Greendale Centre
Canning	Armadale West	Challis Primary School
Canning	Barragup	West Murray Community Hall
Canning	Bedforddale	Bedforddale District Hall
Canning	BLV Canning PPVC	BLV Canning
Canning	Boddington	Boddington District High School
Canning	Brookdale	Evelyn Gribble Community Centre
Canning	Byford	Serpentine Jarrahdale Community Recreation Centre
Canning	Carcoola	Carcoola Primary School
Canning	Coodanup	Coodanup Community College
Canning	Coolup	Coolup CWA Hall
Canning	Dawesville	Southern Estuary Progress Assn Hall
Canning	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Canning	Dudley Park	Dudley Park Primary School
Canning	Dwellingup	Dwellingup Primary School
Canning	Falcon	Falcon Community Pavilion
Canning	Forrestdale	Forrestdale Primary School
Canning	Greenfields (Canning)	Eastlake Church
Canning	Greenfields CANNING PPVC	Eastlake Church
Canning	Halls Head	Glencoe Primary School
Canning	Halls Head South	Halls Head Primary School
Canning	Halls Head West	Metro Church
Canning	Harrisdale	Carey Baptist College
Canning	Jarrahdale	Bruno Gianatti Recreation Centre
Canning	Karragullen	Karragullen District Hall
Canning	Kelmscott	Kelmscott Senior High School
Canning	Kelmscott East	St Mary in The Valley Anglican Church
Canning	Kelmscott North	Clifton Hills Primary School
Canning	Lake Clifton	Lake Clifton Community Hall
Canning	Mandurah	John Tonkin College - Tindale Site
Canning	Mandurah Central	Mandurah Primary School
Canning	Mandurah East	Billy Dower Youth Centre
Canning	Mundijong	Mundijong Primary School
Canning	North Dandalup	North Dandalup Community Hall
Canning	Oakford	Oakford Community Hall
Canning	Other Mobile Team 1	Karnet Prison Farm
Canning	Perth (Canning)	City of Perth Council House
Canning	Pinjarra	Pinjarra Senior High School
Canning	Preston Beach	Preston Beach Community Centre
Canning	Roleystone	Roleystone Hall
Canning	Rottnest (Canning)	Kingston Barracks
Canning	Serpentine	Serpentine Primary School
Canning	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Canning	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
Canning	Strawberry Fields	Cecil Andrews Senior High School

<b>Division</b>	<b>Polling Place</b>	<b>Premises</b>
Canning	Waroona	Waroona Senior Citizens' Centre
Canning	Westfield	Westfield Park Primary School
Canning	Westfield South	Grovelands Primary School
Canning	Yunderup	South Yunderup-Ravenswood Volunteer Bush Fire Brigade Station
Canning	Yunderup North	North Yunderup CWA Centre
Cowan	Alexander Heights	Alinjarra Primary School
Cowan	Alexander Heights West	Alexander Heights Community Hall
Cowan	Ballajura	Illawarra Primary School
Cowan	Ballajura Central	Ballajura Primary School
Cowan	Ballajura South	South Ballajura Primary School
Cowan	Ballajura West	Ballajura Community College
Cowan	Banksia Grove	Neerabup Primary School
Cowan	BLV Cowan PPVC	BLV Cowan
Cowan	Darch	Ashdale Primary School
Cowan	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Cowan	Girrawheen	Hudson Park Primary School
Cowan	Girrawheen East	Roseworth Primary School
Cowan	Greenwood	Greenwood College
Cowan	Greenwood East	Greenwood Primary School
Cowan	Hocking	Hocking Primary School
Cowan	Kingsley	Creaney Primary School
Cowan	Kingsley East	Halidon Primary School
Cowan	Kingsley South	Goollelal Primary School
Cowan	Koondoola	Koondoola Primary School
Cowan	Landsdale	Landsdale Primary School
Cowan	Madeley	Madeley Primary School
Cowan	Marangaroo	Marangaroo Primary School
Cowan	Marangaroo Central	Marangaroo Family Centre
Cowan	Marangaroo East	Rawlinson Primary School
Cowan	Pearsall	Pearsall Primary School
Cowan	Perth (Cowan)	City of Perth Council House
Cowan	Rottneest (Cowan)	Kingston Barracks
Cowan	Sinagra	St Anthony's School
Cowan	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Cowan	Tapping	Tapping Primary School
Cowan	Wanneroo	Lake Joondalup Pavilion
Cowan	Wanneroo East	Wanneroo Senior High School
Cowan	Wanneroo West	Crossways Uniting Church
Cowan	Warwick	Warwick Church of Christ
Cowan	Warwick West	Hawker Park Primary School
Cowan	Woodvale	Woodvale Secondary College
Cowan	Woodvale North	North Woodvale Primary School
Curtin	BLV Curtin PPVC	BLV Curtin
Curtin	Churchlands	Churchlands Primary School
Curtin	City Beach	City Beach Primary School

Division	Polling Place	Premises
Curtin	City Beach North	Kapinara Primary School
Curtin	Claremont	Freshwater Bay Primary School
Curtin	Claremont East	St Andrew's Church Hall
Curtin	Cottesloe	Cottesloe Civic Centre
Curtin	Cottesloe North	North Cottesloe Primary School
Curtin	Cottesloe South	Cottesloe Primary School
Curtin	Dalkeith	Dalkeith Primary School
Curtin	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Curtin	Doubleview (Curtin)	Doubleview Primary School
Curtin	Floreat	Floreat Park Primary School
Curtin	Floreat East	Floreat Park Pre-Primary Centre
Curtin	Jolimont	Jolimont Primary School
Curtin	Leederville	Central College of TAFE Leederville Campus
Curtin	Leederville North	Aranmore College
Curtin	Leederville West	West Leederville Primary School
Curtin	Mosman Park	Mosman Park Memorial Hall
Curtin	Mosman Park South	St Hilda's Anglican School for Girls Chidley Point Campus
Curtin	Mount Claremont	Mt Claremont Primary School
Curtin	Mount Claremont East	Moerlina School
Curtin	Mount Hawthorn	Mt Hawthorn Primary School
Curtin	Mount Hawthorn East	Mt Hawthorn Baptist Church Hall
Curtin	Mount Hawthorn West	Mt Hawthorn Community Centre
Curtin	Nedlands	Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital
Curtin	Nedlands Central	UWA Nedlands Campus
Curtin	Nedlands East	Tresillian Community Centre
Curtin	Nedlands North	Hollywood Primary School
Curtin	Nedlands South	Nedlands Primary School
Curtin	Perth (Curtin)	City of Perth Council House
Curtin	Rottnest (Curtin)	Kingston Barracks
Curtin	Scarborough Central (Curtin)	Scarborough Kindegarten
Curtin	Shenton Park East	St Aloysius Church Hall
Curtin	Shenton Park West	Shenton Park Community Centre
Curtin	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Curtin	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
Curtin	Special Hospital Team 3	Multiple sites
Curtin	Special Hospital Team 4	Multiple sites
Curtin	Special Hospital Team 5	Multiple sites
Curtin	Special Hospital Team 6	Multiple sites
Curtin	Special Hospital Team 7	Royal Perth Hospital Shenton Park Campus
Curtin	Special Hospital Team 8	King Edward Hospital
Curtin	Subiaco	Subiaco Community Centre
Curtin	Subiaco Central	Subiaco Primary School
Curtin	Subiaco North	Perth Modern School
Curtin	Subiaco PPVC	502 on Hay
Curtin	Swanbourne	Swanbourne Primary School
Curtin	Wembley Central	Wembley Church of Christ Hall

<b>Division</b>	<b>Polling Place</b>	<b>Premises</b>
Curtin	Wembley Downs	Wembley Downs Primary School
Curtin	Wembley North	Bold Park Community School
Curtin	Wembley West	Wembley Primary School
Curtin	West Perth (Curtin)	Greek Orthodox Church Hall
Curtin	West Perth Central	Constitutional Centre
Curtin	Woodlands	Woodlands Primary School
Durack	Argyle	Argyle Diamond Mine
Durack	Badgingarra	Badgingarra Community Centre
Durack	Ballidu	Ballidu Primary School
Durack	Beacon	Beacon CWA Hall
Durack	Bencubbin	Bencubbin Community Resource Centre
Durack	BLV Durack PPVC	BLV Durack
Durack	Bolgart	Bolgart Hall
Durack	Broome	Broome Primary School
Durack	Broome East	Roebuck Primary School
Durack	Broome PPVC	Paspaley Plaza
Durack	Broome West	Cable Beach Primary School
Durack	Calingiri	Calingiri Primary School
Durack	Carnamah	Carnamah District High School
Durack	Carnarvon	Carnarvon Community College (Secondary)
Durack	Carnarvon East	Carnarvon Community College (Primary)
Durack	Carnarvon PPVC	The Wool Shed
Durack	Cervantes	Cervantes Recreation Centre
Durack	Coorow	Coorow Community Hall
Durack	Coral Bay	Coral Bay Learning Centre
Durack	Cue	Cue Primary School
Durack	Cunderdin	Cunderdin District High School
Durack	Dalwallinu	Dalwallinu District High School
Durack	Dampier	Dampier Community Hall
Durack	Dandaragan	Dandaragan Primary School
Durack	Denham	Shark Bay School
Durack	Derby	Derby District High School
Durack	Derby Interstate PPVC	Derby District High School
Durack	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Durack	Dongara	Irwin Recreation Centre
Durack	Dowerin	Dowerin Community Hall
Durack	Eneabba	Eneabba Primary School
Durack	Exmouth	Exmouth Town Hall
Durack	Exmouth Interstate PPVC	Exmouth Shire Hall
Durack	Fitzroy Crossing	Fitzroy Valley District High School
Durack	Geraldton - Augustus	Geraldton Primary School
Durack	Geraldton - Beachlands	Beachlands Primary School
Durack	Geraldton - Bluff Point	Bluff Point Primary School
Durack	Geraldton - Cape Burney	Cape Burney Volunteer Fire Brigade
Durack	Geraldton - Drummonds Cove	John Batten Community Hall
Durack	Geraldton - Hermitage	St John of God Hospital

Division	Polling Place	Premises
Durack	Geraldton - Lester	Geraldton- Lester
Durack	Geraldton - Mount Tarcoola	Mount Tarcoola Primary School
Durack	Geraldton PPVC	222 Lester Ave
Durack	Geraldton - Rangeway	Rangeway Primary School
Durack	Geraldton - Shenton	Geraldton Regional Hospital
Durack	Geraldton - Spalding	Spalding Family Centre
Durack	Geraldton - Waggrakine	Waggrakine Primary School
Durack	Geraldton - Wonthella	Allendale Primary School
Durack	Goomalling	Goomalling Sports Pavilion
Durack	Halls Creek	Halls Creek District High School
Durack	Halls Creek PPVC	Civic Hall
Durack	Horrocks	Horrocks Community Recreation Centre
Durack	Jurien Bay	Jurien District High School
Durack	Kalannie	Kalannie Primary School
Durack	Kalbarri	Kalbarri District High School
Durack	Kalbarri Interstate PPVC	Kalbarri District High School
Durack	Karratha	Karratha Primary School
Durack	Karratha - Nickol	Tambrey Primary School
Durack	Karratha PPVC	Pilbara TAFE Skills Centre
Durack	Karratha West	Millars Well Primary School
Durack	Kellerberrin	Kellerberrin Memorial Hall
Durack	Koorda	Koorda SES
Durack	Kununurra	Kununurra Leisure Centre
Durack	Kununurra PPVC	Pinctada Kimberley Grande
Durack	Leeman	Leeman Primary School
Durack	Marble Bar	Marble Bar Civic Centre
Durack	Meckering	Meckering Primary School
Durack	Meekatharra	Meekatharra Shire Hall
Durack	Merredin	Merredin Court House
Durack	Merredin South	Merredin Senior Centre
Durack	Miling	Miling Primary School
Durack	Mingenew	Mingenew Primary School
Durack	Moonyoonooka	Moonyoonooka Pony Club
Durack	Moora	Moora Performing Arts Centre
Durack	Morawa	Morawa Community Hall
Durack	Mount Magnet	Mount Magnet Hall
Durack	Mukinbudin	Mukinbudin Shire Office
Durack	Mullewa	Mullewa District High School
Durack	Nabawa	Nabawa Community Centre
Durack	Newman	Newman Senior High School
Durack	Newman Interstate PPVC	Newman Primary School
Durack	Newman North	Newman Primary School
Durack	New Norcia	Benedictine Community
Durack	Northampton	Northampton RSL Memorial Hall
Durack	Nullagine	Gallop Hall
Durack	Nungarin	Nungarin Primary School

<b>Division</b>	<b>Polling Place</b>	<b>Premises</b>
Durack	Onslow	Onslow Primary School
Durack	Other Mobile Team 1	Greenough Regional Prison
Durack	Pannawonica	Pannawonica Primary School
Durack	Paraburdoo	Paraburdoo Primary School
Durack	Perenjori	Perenjori Primary School
Durack	Perth (Durack)	City of Perth Council House
Durack	Port Hedland	Andrew McLaughlin Community Centre
Durack	Port Hedland - Cooke Point	Port Hedland Primary School
Durack	Port Hedland Interstate PPVC	Andrew McLaughlin Community Centre
Durack	Remote Mobile Team 1	Multiple sites
Durack	Remote Mobile Team 2	Multiple sites
Durack	Remote Mobile Team 3	Multiple sites
Durack	Remote Mobile Team 4	Multiple sites
Durack	Remote Mobile Team 5	Kiwirrkurra Community
Durack	Remote Mobile Team 6	Multiple sites
Durack	Roebourne	Roebourne Community Shire Hall
Durack	Rottnest (Durack)	Kingston Barracks
Durack	Sandstone	Sandstone Primary School
Durack	South Hedland	South Hedland TAFE
Durack	South Hedland Baler	Baler Primary School
Durack	South Hedland PPVC	South Hedland Lotteries House
Durack	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Durack	Tammin	Tammin Lesser Hall
Durack	Three Springs	Three Springs Primary School
Durack	Tom Price	Tom Price Recreation Centre
Durack	Tom Price Interstate PPVC	Tom Price Recreation Centre
Durack	Trayning	Don Mason Community Centre
Durack	Useless Loop	Useless Loop Primary School
Durack	Walkaway	Walkaway Primary School
Durack	Watheroo	Watheroo Primary School
Durack	Wickham	Wickham Community Hall
Durack	Wiluna	Wiluna Remote Community School
Durack	Wongan Hills	Wongan Hills Civic Centre
Durack	Wubin	Wubin Town Hall
Durack	Wyalkatchem	Wyalkatchem District High School
Durack	Wyndham	Wyndham District High School
Durack	Yalgoo	Yalgoo Primary School
Forrest	Acton Park	Acton Park Hall
Forrest	Alexandra Bridge	Alexandra Bridge Hall
Forrest	Allanson	Allanson Primary School
Forrest	Augusta	Augusta Community Resource Centre
Forrest	Australind	Australind Community Hall
Forrest	Australind East	Riverlinks Community Centre
Forrest	Australind North	Parkfield Primary School
Forrest	Balingup	Balingup Primary School
Forrest	Binningup	Binningup Community Hall

Division	Polling Place	Premises
Forrest	BLV Forrest PPVC	BLV Forrest
Forrest	Boyanup	Boyanup Primary School
Forrest	Brunswick	Brunswick Primary School
Forrest	Bunbury	Bunbury Pre-Primary Centre
Forrest	Bunbury Central	Bunbury CBD
Forrest	Bunbury East	Cooinda Primary School
Forrest	Bunbury PPVC	Old Silo Markets
Forrest	Burekup	River Valley Primary School
Forrest	Busselton	Churchill Park Pavilion
Forrest	Busselton East	Busselton Primary School
Forrest	Busselton Interstate PPVC	Busselton Senior High School
Forrest	Busselton PPVC	Busselton Senior Citizens Centre
Forrest	Busselton South	Busselton Senior High School
Forrest	Busselton West	West Busselton Primary School
Forrest	Capel	Capel Community Centre
Forrest	Carbunup River	Carbunup River Hall
Forrest	Carey Park	Carey Park Primary School
Forrest	Carey Park South	Milligan House
Forrest	Clifton Park	Clifton Park Primary School
Forrest	Collie	Collie Senior High School
Forrest	Collie Central	Margaretta Wilson Centre
Forrest	Collie East	Fairview Primary School
Forrest	Collie Interstate PPVC	Margaretta Wilson Centre
Forrest	Collie North	North Collie Hall
Forrest	Collie PPVC	Collie Library
Forrest	Coral Park	Adam Road Primary School
Forrest	Cowaramup	Cowaramup Primary School
Forrest	Dalyellup	Dalyellup Primary School
Forrest	Dardanup	Dardanup Hall
Forrest	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Forrest	Donnybrook	Donnybrook Memorial Hall
Forrest	Dunsborough	Naturaliste Community Centre
Forrest	Eaton	Eaton Hall
Forrest	Eaton East	Eaton Community College
Forrest	Elgin	Elgin Hall
Forrest	Ferguson	Ferguson Hall
Forrest	Gelorup	Gelorup Community Centre
Forrest	Harvey	St Anne's Primary School
Forrest	Karridale	Karridale Primary School
Forrest	Kirup	Kirup Hall
Forrest	Leschenault	Settlers Hall
Forrest	Lowden	Yabberup Hall
Forrest	Margaret River	Margaret River Senior High School
Forrest	Margaret River Interstate PPVC	Margaret River Senior High School
Forrest	Margaret River PPVC	Margaret River Shire Council Office
Forrest	Nannup	Nannup Shire Office Function Room



<b>Division</b>	<b>Polling Place</b>	<b>Premises</b>
Forrest	Perth (Forrest)	City of Perth Council House
Forrest	Picton	Picton Primary School
Forrest	Rosa Brook	Rosa Brook Hall
Forrest	Rottneest (Forrest)	Kingston Barracks
Forrest	South Bunbury	South Bunbury Pre-primary Centre
Forrest	South West Health Campus	South West Health Campus
Forrest	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Forrest	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
Forrest	Special Hospital Team 3	Multiple sites
Forrest	Special Hospital Team 4	Multiple sites
Forrest	Special Hospital Team 5	Multiple sites
Forrest	Vasse	Vasse Primary School
Forrest	Wilson Park	Wilson Park Primary School
Forrest	Witchcliffe	Witchcliffe Druids Hall
Forrest	Withers	Maidens Park Primary School
Forrest	Wollaston	Bunbury Catholic College
Forrest	Yallingup	Yallingup Hall
Forrest	Yarloop	Yarloop Hall
Forrest	Yoongarillup	Yoongarillup Hall
Fremantle	Atwell	Atwell Primary School
Fremantle	Atwell South	Harmony Primary School
Fremantle	Beaconsfield	Beaconsfield Primary School
Fremantle	Beeliar	Beeliar Primary School
Fremantle	Beeliar West	South Coogee Primary School
Fremantle	Bibra Lake	Bibra Lake Primary School
Fremantle	Bicton	Bicton Primary School
Fremantle	BLV Fremantle PPVC	BLV Fremantle
Fremantle	Cockburn Central PPVC	Youth Centre
Fremantle	Coogee Beach	Coogee Primary School
Fremantle	Coolbellup	Coolbellup Community School
Fremantle	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Fremantle	East Fremantle	East Fremantle Primary School
Fremantle	Fremantle	St Patrick's Primary School
Fremantle	Fremantle PPVC	Woolstores Shopping Centre
Fremantle	Hamilton Hill East	East Hamilton Hill Primary School
Fremantle	Hamilton Hill North	Christ The King School
Fremantle	Hamilton Hill South	Southwell Primary School
Fremantle	Hilton	Hilton Primary School
Fremantle	Jandakot	Jandakot Primary School
Fremantle	Kardinya (Fremantle)	Kardinya Primary School
Fremantle	Kardinya West	North Lake Senior Campus
Fremantle	Lakeland	Lakeland Senior High School
Fremantle	Melville (Fremantle)	Melville Recreation Centre
Fremantle	North Fremantle	North Fremantle Primary School
Fremantle	Palmyra	Palmyra Primary School
Fremantle	Palmyra North	Anglican Church Hall

Division	Polling Place	Premises
Fremantle	Perth (Fremantle)	City of Perth Council House
Fremantle	Richmond	Tricolore Community Centre
Fremantle	Rottnest (Fremantle)	Kingston Barracks
Fremantle	Samson	Samson Primary School
Fremantle	South Fremantle	Fremantle Primary School
Fremantle	South Lake	South Lake Primary School
Fremantle	Spearwood	Spearwood Primary School
Fremantle	Spearwood South	Newton Primary School
Fremantle	Spearwood West	Phoenix Primary School
Fremantle	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Fremantle	Special Hospital Team 2	Fremantle Hospital
Fremantle	Success	Success Primary School
Fremantle	White Gum Valley	White Gum Valley Primary School
Fremantle	Willagee	Caralee Community School
Fremantle	Willagee East	Southern Districts Senior Citizens Centre
Fremantle	Yangebup	Yangebup Primary School
Fremantle	Yangebup South	Mater Christi Catholic Primary School
Hasluck	Bellevue	Bellevue Hall
Hasluck	BLV Hasluck PPVC	BLV Hasluck
Hasluck	Cannington HASLUCK PPVC	15 Leila St
Hasluck	Caversham	Caversham Hall
Hasluck	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Hasluck	Forrestfield	Forrestfield Primary School
Hasluck	Forrestfield North	Darling Range Sports College
Hasluck	Forrestfield West	Dawson Park Primary School
Hasluck	Gooseberry Hill	Gooseberry Hill Primary School
Hasluck	Gosnells	Gosnells Primary School
Hasluck	Gosnells Central	Addie Mills Centre
Hasluck	Gosnells South	Ashburton Drive Primary School
Hasluck	Gosnells West	Wirrabirra Primary School
Hasluck	Guildford	Guildford Primary School
Hasluck	Hazelmere	Hazelmere Hall
Hasluck	Helena Valley (Hasluck)	Helena Valley Primary School
Hasluck	High Wycombe	High Wycombe Primary School
Hasluck	High Wycombe South	High Wycombe Community & Recreation Centre
Hasluck	Huntingdale	Huntingdale Primary School
Hasluck	Huntingdale South	Huntingdale Community Centre
Hasluck	Kalamunda	Kalamunda Senior High School
Hasluck	Kalamunda North	Kalamunda Primary School
Hasluck	Kenwick	East Kenwick Primary School
Hasluck	Koongamia	Clayton View Primary School
Hasluck	Lesmurdie	Lesmurdie Primary School
Hasluck	Lesmurdie North	Falls Road Primary School
Hasluck	Maddington	East Maddington Primary School
Hasluck	Maddington East	Yule Brook College

<b>Division</b>	<b>Polling Place</b>	<b>Premises</b>
Hasluck	Maddington North	Bramfield Park Primary School
Hasluck	Maida Vale	Maida Vale Primary School
Hasluck	Middle Swan	Midland Sports Complex
Hasluck	Midland (Hasluck)	North Metropolitan Education Cntr (Formerly Old Midland School)
Hasluck	Midland HASLUCK PPVC	The Anglican Parish Of Midland
Hasluck	Perth (Hasluck)	City of Perth Council House
Hasluck	Rottnest (Hasluck)	Kingston Barracks
Hasluck	Southern River	Bletchley Park Primary School
Hasluck	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Hasluck	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
Hasluck	Special Hospital Team 3	Multiple sites
Hasluck	Swan View (Hasluck)	Swan View Senior High School
Hasluck	Thornlie	Thornlie Senior High School
Hasluck	Thornlie East	Thornlie Primary School
Hasluck	Thornlie South	Forest Crescent Primary School
Hasluck	Thornlie West	Yale Primary School
Hasluck	Walliston (Hasluck)	Walliston Primary School
Hasluck	Wattle Grove	Wattle Grove Primary School
Moore	Beldon	Beldon Primary School
Moore	BLV Moore PPVC	BLV Moore
Moore	Burns Beach	Jack Kikeros Hall
Moore	Carramar	Carramar Primary School
Moore	Clarkson (Moore)	Clarkson Community High School
Moore	Connolly	Connolly Primary School
Moore	Craigie	Craigie Heights Primary School
Moore	Currambine	Currambine Primary School
Moore	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Moore	Duncraig	Duncraig Primary School
Moore	Duncraig East	Davallia Primary School
Moore	Duncraig North	Glengarry Primary School
Moore	Duncraig South	Poynter Primary School
Moore	Edgewater	Edgewater Primary School
Moore	Heathridge	Poseidon Primary School
Moore	Heathridge East	Eddystone Primary School
Moore	Hillarys	Hillarys Primary School
Moore	Hillarys North	St Marks Anglican Community School
Moore	Iluka	Beaumaris Sports Association
Moore	Joondalup	Joondalup Primary School
Moore	Joondalup Central	Joondalup Public Library
Moore	Joondalup MOORE PPVC	Sanori House
Moore	Kallaroo	Springfield Primary School
Moore	Kinross	Kinross Primary School
Moore	Marmion	Marmion Primary School
Moore	Mindarie	Mindarie Primary School
Moore	Mullaloo	Mullaloo Heights Primary School

Division	Polling Place	Premises
Moore	Ocean Reef	Ocean Reef Senior High School
Moore	Ocean Reef North	Beaumaris Primary School
Moore	Padbury	Padbury Primary School
Moore	Padbury South	South Padbury Primary School
Moore	Perth (Moore)	City of Perth Council House
Moore	Rottneest (Moore)	Kingston Barracks
Moore	Sorrento	Sorrento Primary School
Moore	Sorrento Beach	Sacred Heart College
Moore	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Moore	Special Hospital Team 2	Anchorage Aged Care
O'Connor	Albany	Albany Primary School
O'Connor	Albany Centennial Park	Centennial Park Scout Hall
O'Connor	Albany Central	Albany Senior Citizens Centre
O'Connor	Albany Lockyer	Mt Lockyer Primary School
O'Connor	Albany Middleton Beach	Albany Surf Life Saving Club
O'Connor	Albany PPVC	Albany Senior Citizen Centre
O'Connor	Albany Spencer Park	Spencer Park Primary School
O'Connor	Albany Yakamia	Yakamia Primary School
O'Connor	Arthur River	Arthur River Hall
O'Connor	Bayonet Head	Flinders Park Primary School
O'Connor	BLV O'Connor PPVC	BLV O'Connor
O'Connor	Borden	Borden Primary School
O'Connor	Boulder	Boulder Primary School
O'Connor	Boyup Brook	Boyup Brook St John Ambulance Sub Centre
O'Connor	Bremer Bay	Bremer Bay Community Resource Centre
O'Connor	Bridgetown	Bridgetown Lesser Hall
O'Connor	Brookton	Brookton District High School
O'Connor	Broomehill	Broomehill Town Hall
O'Connor	Bruce Rock	Bruce Rock Emergency Services Centre
O'Connor	Castletown	Castletown Primary School
O'Connor	Condingup	Condingup Primary School
O'Connor	Coolgardie	Coolgardie Community Recreation Centre
O'Connor	Corrigin	Corrigin Senior Citizens Centre
O'Connor	Cranbrook	Cranbrook Hall
O'Connor	Cuballing	Cuballing Agricultural Hall
O'Connor	Dalyup	Dalyup Progress Assoc Hall
O'Connor	Darkan	West Arthur Community Resource Centre
O'Connor	Denmark	Denmark Recreation Centre
O'Connor	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
O'Connor	Dumbleyung	Dumbleyung Primary School
O'Connor	Duranillin	Duranillin Hall
O'Connor	Elleker	Elleker Hall
O'Connor	Emu Point	Albany Sea Rescue Hall
O'Connor	Esperance	Esperance Civic Centre
O'Connor	Esperance PPVC	Esperance Civic Centre
O'Connor	Frankland	Frankland Hall

<b>Division</b>	<b>Polling Place</b>	<b>Premises</b>
O'Connor	Gibson	Gibson Football Club
O'Connor	Gnowangerup	Gnowangerup Memorial Hall
O'Connor	Grass Patch	Grass Patch Community Hall
O'Connor	Greenbushes	Greenbushes District Hall
O'Connor	Harrismith	Harrismith Community Hall
O'Connor	Highbury	Highbury Hall
O'Connor	Hopetoun	Mary Ann Haven Centre
O'Connor	Hyden	Hyden Primary School
O'Connor	Jerramungup	Jerramungup District High School
O'Connor	Kalgan	Great Southern Grammar
O'Connor	Kalgoorlie	Goldfields Arts Centre
O'Connor	Kalgoorlie East	East Kalgoorlie Primary School
O'Connor	Kalgoorlie Eastern Goldfields	Kalgoorlie District Education Office
O'Connor	Kalgoorlie Hannans	Hannans Primary School
O'Connor	Kalgoorlie North	North Kalgoorlie Primary School
O'Connor	Kalgoorlie Piccadilly	Kalgoorlie Regional Hospital
O'Connor	Kalgoorlie Somerville	O'Connor Primary School
O'Connor	Kalgoorlie South	John Paul College
O'Connor	Kambalda	Kambalda Primary School
O'Connor	Kambalda West	Kambalda West District High School
O'Connor	Katanning	Katanning Leisure Centre
O'Connor	Katanning East	Katanning Senior High School
O'Connor	Kendenup	Kendenup Primary School
O'Connor	King River	King River Hall
O'Connor	Kojonup	Kojonup RSL Hall
O'Connor	Kondinin	Kondinin Primary School
O'Connor	Kukerin	Kukerin Health Centre
O'Connor	Kulin	Kulin Resource Centre
O'Connor	Lake Grace	Lake Grace Community Resource Centre
O'Connor	Lake King	Lake King Primary School
O'Connor	Laverton	Laverton Leonora Cross Cultural Centre
O'Connor	Leinster	Leinster Community Hall
O'Connor	Leinster Interstate PPVC	Leinster Community Hall
O'Connor	Leonora	Leonora Recreation Centre
O'Connor	Little Grove	Little Grove Primary School
O'Connor	Manjimup	Manjimup Town Hall
O'Connor	Manjimup East	East Manjimup Primary School
O'Connor	Manjimup PPVC	Manjimup Town Hall
O'Connor	Marvel Loch	Marvel Loch Hall
O'Connor	Mayanup	Mayanup Hall
O'Connor	Menzies	Menzies Shire Hall
O'Connor	Middlesex	Middlesex Hall
O'Connor	Mount Barker	Plantagenet District Hall
O'Connor	Munglinup	Munglinup Primary School
O'Connor	Muradup	Muradup Hall
O'Connor	Napier	Napier Hall

Division	Polling Place	Premises
O'Connor	Narembeen	Narembeen District High School
O'Connor	Narrikup	Narrikup Cricket Club Room
O'Connor	Narrogin	Narrogin Senior Citizens Centre
O'Connor	Narrogin East	Narrogin Regional Hospital
O'Connor	Newdegate	Newdegate Community Resource Centre
O'Connor	Norseman	Norseman Town Hall
O'Connor	Norseman Interstate PPVC	Norseman Town Hall
O'Connor	Northcliffe	Northcliffe District High School
O'Connor	Nulsen	Nulsen Primary School
O'Connor	Nyabing	Nyabing Town Hall
O'Connor	Ongerup	Ongerup Primary School
O'Connor	Other Mobile Team 1	Albany Regional Prison
O'Connor	Other Mobile Team 2	Eastern Goldfields Regional Prison
O'Connor	Parryville	Parryville Hall
O'Connor	Pemberton	Pemberton Sports Club
O'Connor	Perth (O'Connor)	City of Perth Council House
O'Connor	Pingaring	Pingaring Community Centre
O'Connor	Pingelly	Pingelly Town Hall
O'Connor	Pingrup	Pingrup Hall
O'Connor	Popanyinning	Popanyinning Community Hall
O'Connor	Porongurup	Porongurup District Hall
O'Connor	Quairading	Quairading C R C
O'Connor	Quinninup	Quinninup Community Centre
O'Connor	Ravensthorpe	Ravensthorpe District High School
O'Connor	Redmond	Redmond Hall
O'Connor	Remote Mobile Team 1	Multiple sites
O'Connor	Remote Mobile Team 2	Eucla Community Hall
O'Connor	Rocky Gully	Rocky Gully CWA
O'Connor	Rottneest (O'Connor)	Kingston Barracks
O'Connor	Salmon Gums	Salmon Gums Primary School
O'Connor	Scotsdale	Scotsdale Hall
O'Connor	Southern Cross	Southern Cross Community Centre
O'Connor	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
O'Connor	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
O'Connor	Special Hospital Team 3	Multiple sites
O'Connor	Special Hospital Team 4	Multiple sites
O'Connor	Special Hospital Team 5	Multiple sites
O'Connor	Special Hospital Team 6	Mount Barker Plantagenet District Hospital
O'Connor	Tambellup	Tambellup Lesser Hall
O'Connor	Tingledale	Tingledale Hall
O'Connor	Wagin	Wagin Wesley Hall
O'Connor	Walpole	Walpole Community Centre
O'Connor	Wandering	Wandering Primary School
O'Connor	Wellstead	Wellstead C R C
O'Connor	Westonia	Westonia Shire Office
O'Connor	Wickepin	Wickepin Primary School

<b>Division</b>	<b>Polling Place</b>	<b>Premises</b>
O'Connor	Williams	Williams RSL Hall
O'Connor	Woodanilling	Woodanilling Shire Hall
O'Connor	Yealering	Yealering Shire Hall
O'Connor	Yornup	Yornup Hall
O'Connor	Youngs Siding	Youngs Siding Hall
Pearce	Aveley	Swan Valley Anglican Community School
Pearce	Bakers Hill	Bakers Hill Primary School
Pearce	Bennett Springs	Beechboro Christian School
Pearce	Beverley	Beverley Lesser Hall
Pearce	Bindoon	Bindoon Hall
Pearce	BLV Pearce PPVC	BLV Pearce
Pearce	Bullsbrook	Bullsbrook District High School
Pearce	Butler	Butler Primary School
Pearce	Butler East	East Butler Primary School
Pearce	Carmel	Carmel Hall
Pearce	Chidlow	Chidlow Recreation Pavilion
Pearce	Clarkson (Pearce)	Clarkson Community High School
Pearce	Darlington	Darlington Primary School
Pearce	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Pearce	Ellenbrook	Ellenbrook Salvation Army Hall
Pearce	Ellenbrook East	Ellen Stirling Primary School
Pearce	Ellenbrook North	Arbor Grove Primary School
Pearce	Ellenbrook West	Ellenbrook Secondary College
Pearce	Gidgegannup	Gidgegannup Primary School
Pearce	Gingin	Granville Civic Centre
Pearce	Glen Forrest	Glen Forrest Hall
Pearce	Grass Valley	Grass Valley Hall
Pearce	Greenhills	Greenhills Hall
Pearce	Greenmount	Greenmount Primary School
Pearce	Guilderton	Guilderton Hall
Pearce	Helena Valley (Pearce)	Helena Valley Primary School
Pearce	Henley Brook	West Swan Hall
Pearce	Herne Hill	Herne Hill Primary School
Pearce	Joondalup PEARCE PPVC	Sanori House
Pearce	Lancelin	Lancelin Community Hall
Pearce	Ledge Point	Ledge Point Community Hall
Pearce	Lower Chittering	Immaculate Heart College
Pearce	Mahogany Creek	Mahogany Creek Hall
Pearce	Merriwa	Merriwa Primary School
Pearce	Merriwa North	RAAFA Estate Merriwa
Pearce	Midland (Pearce)	North Metropolitan Education Cntr (Formerly Old Midland School)
Pearce	Midland PEARCE PPVC	The Anglican Parish of Midland
Pearce	Mount Helena	Jar-Ree Guide & Scout Hall
Pearce	Muchea	Muchea Community Hall
Pearce	Mundaring	Mundaring Hall

Division	Polling Place	Premises
Pearce	Northam	Northam Memorial Hall
Pearce	Northam East	Northam Primary School
Pearce	Northam North	Avonvale Primary School
Pearce	Northam PPVC	Northam Recreation Centre
Pearce	Other Mobile Team 1	Multiple sites
Pearce	Parkerville	Parkerville Public Hall
Pearce	Perth (Pearce)	City of Perth Council House
Pearce	Pickering Brook	Pickering Brook Primary School
Pearce	Quinns Rocks	Quinns Rocks Primary School
Pearce	Quinns Rocks North	Quinns Rocks Beach Primary School
Pearce	Rottnest (Pearce)	Kingston Barracks
Pearce	Sawyers Valley	Sawyers Valley Primary School
Pearce	Seabird	Seabird Community Hall
Pearce	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Pearce	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
Pearce	Special Hospital Team 3	Multiple sites
Pearce	Stoneville	Stoneville Hall (Mundaring Fire Fighting School)
Pearce	Stratton	Stratton Community Hall
Pearce	Stratton North	Goodstart Early Learning Stratton
Pearce	Swan View (Pearce)	Swan View Senior High School
Pearce	Toodyay	Toodyay Memorial Hall
Pearce	Two Rocks	Phil Renkin Recreation Centre
Pearce	Upper Swan	Upper Swan Primary School
Pearce	Walliston (Pearce)	Walliston Primary School
Pearce	West Dale	Dale River Tennis Club
Pearce	Woodridge	Woodridge Community Centre
Pearce	Wooroloo	Wooroloo Primary School
Pearce	Wundowie	Wundowie Primary School
Pearce	Yanchep	Yanchep District High School
Pearce	York	York District High School
Perth	Ashfield	Ashfield Primary School
Perth	Bassendean	Anzac Tce Primary School
Perth	Bassendean South	Bassendean Primary School
Perth	Bayswater	Bayswater Senior Citizens Centre
Perth	Bayswater North	Hillcrest Primary School
Perth	Bedford Park	Beaufort Park
Perth	Bedford West	St Peter's Hall
Perth	Beechboro	Beechboro Primary School
Perth	Beechboro East	East Beechboro Primary School
Perth	Beechboro West	John Septimus Roe Anglican Community School
Perth	BLV Perth PPVC	BLV Perth
Perth	Camboon	Camboon Primary School
Perth	Dianella	Australian Islamic College
Perth	Dianella Central	Dianella Community Centre
Perth	Dianella North	West Morley Primary School
Perth	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office




Division	Polling Place	Premises
Perth	East Perth	Rod Evans Community Centre
Perth	Eden Hill	Eden Hill Primary School
Perth	Embleton	Embleton Primary School
Perth	Hampton Park	Hampton Park Primary School
Perth	Highgate	Highgate Primary School
Perth	Inglewood	Inglewood Masonic Hall
Perth	Inglewood North	Inglewood Primary School
Perth	Kiara	Lockridge Senior High School
Perth	Lockridge	Lockridge Primary School
Perth	Maylands	School of Instrumental Music
Perth	Maylands East	Maylands Peninsula Primary School
Perth	Morley	Morley Primary School
Perth	Morley North	Crimea Park
Perth	Morley PPVC	Coventry Village
Perth	Morley South	Hampton Senior High School
Perth	Mount Lawley	Mt Lawley Primary School
Perth	Mount Lawley East	Mt Lawley Kindergarten
Perth	Mount Lawley South	Central Institute of Technology (Mt Lawley)
Perth	Mount Lawley West	St Paul's Primary School
Perth	Noranda	Noranda Primary School
Perth	Noranda West (Perth)	North Morley Primary School
Perth	Northbridge	Central Institute of Technology - Perth
Perth	North Perth	Kyilla Primary School
Perth	North Perth Central	North Perth Primary School
Perth	Perth (Perth)	City of Perth Council House
Perth	Perth East Interstate Polling Centre PPVC	Council House
Perth	Perth Mclver	Royal Perth Hospital
Perth	Perth PPVC	QBE Building
Perth	Rottneest (Perth)	Kingston Barracks
Perth	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Perth	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
Perth	Special Hospital Team 3	Multiple sites
Perth	West Perth (Perth)	Greek Orthodox Church Hall
Stirling	Balcatta	Balcatta Primary School
Stirling	Balcatta Central	Balcatta Senior High School
Stirling	Balcatta North	Takari Primary School
Stirling	Balga	Balga Primary School
Stirling	Balga North	North Balga Primary School
Stirling	BLV Stirling PPVC	BLV Stirling
Stirling	Carine	Carine Senior High School
Stirling	Coolbinia	Coolbinia Primary School
Stirling	Deanmore	Deanmore Primary School
Stirling	Dianella Heights	Dianella Heights Primary School
Stirling	Dianella St Andrew's	St Andrew's Grammar School
Stirling	Dianella West	Sutherland Dianella Primary School

Division	Polling Place	Premises
Stirling	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Stirling	Doubleview (Stirling)	Doubleview Primary School
Stirling	Doubleview North	Newborough Primary School
Stirling	Hamersley	Glendale Primary School
Stirling	Hamersley East	East Hamersley Primary School
Stirling	Innaloo North	Yuluma Primary School
Stirling	Joondanna	St Denis Primary School
Stirling	Karrinyup	Karrinyup Primary School
Stirling	Karrinyup PPVC	Northcourt Building
Stirling	Lake Gwelup	Lake Gwelup Primary School
Stirling	Menora	RSL Menora Gardens
Stirling	Mirrabooka	Mirrabooka Senior High School
Stirling	Mirrabooka Central	Dryandra Primary School
Stirling	Mirrabooka East	Boyare Primary School
Stirling	Nollamara	Nollamara Primary School
Stirling	Noranda West (Stirling)	North Morley Primary School
Stirling	North Beach	North Beach Primary School
Stirling	North Beach Central	North Beach Community Centre
Stirling	Osborne	Osborne Primary School
Stirling	Osborne East	Osborne Park Community Centre
Stirling	Osborne Park	Osborne Park Hospital
Stirling	Perth (Stirling)	City of Perth Council House
Stirling	Rottneest (Stirling)	Kingston Barracks
Stirling	Scarborough	Scarborough Uniting Church
Stirling	Scarborough Central (Stirling)	Scarborough Kindegarten
Stirling	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Stirling	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
Stirling	Tuart Hill	Tuart Hill Primary School
Stirling	Westminster	Westminster Primary School
Stirling	Yokine	Yokine Primary School
Stirling	Yokine North	Vedanta Church of Universal Religion
Stirling	Yokine West	Yokine Community Playgroup
Swan	Beckenham	Beckenham Community Church Hall
Swan	Belmont	Belmont Primary School
Swan	Bentley	Bentley Baptist Church
Swan	Bentley Park	Swan Care Group
Swan	Bentley South	Bentley Community Centre
Swan	Bentley West	South Bentley Community Centre
Swan	BLV Swan PPVC	BLV Swan
Swan	Cannington	Sevenoaks Senior College
Swan	Cannington East	Gibbs Street Primary School
Swan	Cannington SWAN PPVC	15 Leila St
Swan	Carlisle	Carlisle Memorial Hall
Swan	Cloverdale	Belmont Park Tennis Club
Swan	Cloverdale North	Airport City Church
Swan	Cloverdale West	Belmont City College

<b>Division</b>	<b>Polling Place</b>	<b>Premises</b>
Swan	Cobham Airport PPVC	Cobham Airport
Swan	Como	Como P & C Hall
Swan	Como North	Collier Park Village
Swan	Como South	St Augustines Church Hall
Swan	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Swan	Ferndale	Damla College
Swan	Ferndale East	Lynwood Christian Church
Swan	Kensington	Kensington Primary School
Swan	Kewdale	Kewdale Primary School
Swan	Kewdale West	Carlisle Primary School
Swan	Langford	Brookman Primary School
Swan	Lathlain	Lathlain Primary School
Swan	Lynwood	Bannister Creek Primary School
Swan	Manning	St Pius X Parish Hall
Swan	Manning East	Challenger Reserve
Swan	Manning North	Curtin Primary School
Swan	Millen	Millen Primary School
Swan	Network Airport PPVC	Network Airport
Swan	Other Mobile Team 1	Boronia Pre-release Centre for Women
Swan	Parkwood (Swan)	Parkwood Primary School
Swan	Perth (Swan)	City of Perth Council House
Swan	Queens Park	St Norbert College
Swan	Redcliffe	Redcliffe Primary School
Swan	Rivervale	St Augustines Primary School
Swan	Rivervale North	Tranby Primary School
Swan	Rottnest (Swan)	Kingston Barracks
Swan	Skippers Airport PPVC	Skippers Airport
Swan	South Perth	South Perth Primary School
Swan	South Perth Central	South Perth Rotary Hall
Swan	South Perth North	South Perth Uniting Church
Swan	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Swan	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
Swan	Special Hospital Team 3	Multiple sites
Swan	Terminal 1 Perth Airport	Terminal 1 Perth Airport
Swan	Terminal 1 Perth Airport PPVC	Terminal 1 Perth Airport
Swan	Terminal 2 Perth Airport PPVC	Terminal 2 Perth Airport
Swan	Terminal 3 Perth Airport	Terminal 3 Perth AIRPORT
Swan	Terminal 3 Perth Airport PPVC	Terminal 3 Perth Airport
Swan	Terminal 4 Perth Airport	Terminal 4 Perth Airport
Swan	Terminal 4 Perth Airport PPVC	Terminal 4 Perth Airport
Swan	Victoria Park	Homestead Seniors Centre
Swan	Victoria Park Central	Leisurelife Centre
Swan	Victoria Park East	East Victoria Park Primary School
Swan	Wilson	Wilson Community Hall
Tangney	Applecross	Applecross Primary School
Tangney	Ardross	St Benedict's Primary School

Division	Polling Place	Premises
Tangney	Ardross West	Ardross Primary School
Tangney	Attadale	Attadale Primary School
Tangney	Bateman	Bateman Primary School
Tangney	BLV Tangney PPVC	BLV Tangney
Tangney	Booragoon	Booragoon Primary School
Tangney	Booragoon PPVC	Gateway Building
Tangney	Brentwood	Brentwood Primary School
Tangney	Bull Creek	Bull Creek Primary School
Tangney	Bull Creek East	Oberthur Primary School
Tangney	Bull Creek North	Air Force Memorial Estate, Admin Bldg
Tangney	Cannington TANGNEY PPVC	15 Leila St
Tangney	Canning Vale	Canning Vale Primary School
Tangney	Canning Vale Central	Canning Vale College
Tangney	Canning Vale East	Campbell Primary School
Tangney	Canning Vale North	Caladenia Primary School
Tangney	Canning Vale South	Ranford Primary School
Tangney	Divisional Office (PREPOLL)	Divisional Office
Tangney	Kardinya (Tangney)	Kardinya Primary School
Tangney	Leeming	Leeming Primary School
Tangney	Leeming East	Banksia Park Primary School
Tangney	Leeming West	West Leeming Primary School
Tangney	Melville (Tangney)	Melville Recreation Centre
Tangney	Melville East	Melville Primary School
Tangney	Melville South	Melville Senior High School
Tangney	Mt Pleasant	Mt Pleasant Primary School
Tangney	Other Mobile Team 1	Multiple sites
Tangney	Parkwood (Tangney)	Parkwood Primary School
Tangney	Perth (Tangney)	City of Perth Council House
Tangney	Riverton	Riverton Primary School
Tangney	Rossmoyne	Rossmoyne Primary School
Tangney	Rottnest (Tangney)	Kingston Barracks
Tangney	Shelley	Shelley Primary School
Tangney	Special Hospital Team 1	Multiple sites
Tangney	Special Hospital Team 2	Multiple sites
Tangney	Willetton	Willetton Primary School
Tangney	Willetton East	Rostrata Primary School
Tangney	Willetton North	Herald Ave Senior Citizens Centre
Tangney	Willetton South	Willetton Senior High School
Tangney	Winthrop	Winthrop Primary School

# Annexure 3 Flowchart of recount operations



## Annexure 4 Photos of the dock area during the recount process





## Annexure 5 Photos of the Forrest Fresh Scrutiny Centre








## Annexure 6 Photos of the labelling on Division of Pearce boxes









# Scrutiny Policy

April 2013



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## Date Last Reviewed

January 2013

## Purpose of Policy

The purpose of this policy is to ensure scrutiny of ballot papers are conducted in accordance with the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (the Act).

## Detailed Policy Statement

### 1. Arrangements for scrutinesies

- 1.1 The DRO has the responsibility for determining when and where a scrutiny will be conducted. The DRO also has the responsibility for determining the number and types of scrutinesies to be conducted.
- 1.2 The DRO will make arrangements to hire suitable premises (if required) and to employ an adequate number of suitable staff. The DRO may appoint a staff member to be an Assistant Returning Officer responsible for conducting a particular scrutiny.
- 1.3 Wherever practicable, DROs should avoid conducting a large number of small scrutinesies. A small number of relatively large scrutinesies that can each be completed in a day is preferable for reasons of efficiency and secrecy of the ballot.
- 1.4 Before polling day, DROs will have advised all candidates in writing of general scrutiny arrangements.
- 1.5 In addition to scrutineers, the DRO may approve other persons (e.g. observers) to be present at a scrutiny.

### 2. Conduct of the scrutiny

- 2.1 The DRO has the responsibility to conduct a scrutiny in an impartial and professional manner. Before starting the scrutiny and briefing scrutineers, the DRO should brief the scrutiny staff. In addition, written instructions should be supplied to all scrutiny staff in order to ensure that the scrutiny is carried out strictly in accordance with the DRO's requirements.
- 2.2 The DRO should carefully monitor the progress of the scrutiny and pay particular attention to security arrangements so that no unauthorised person will touch or interfere with ballot papers or other election material.
- 2.3 The DRO should ensure that scrutiny staff follow the instructions for the scrutiny.
- 2.4 Scrutiny staff should not attempt to resolve queries and challenges themselves. General enquiries for information on formality should be answered by the DRO or the officer conducting the scrutiny. If a scrutineer wishes to challenge the



acceptance or rejection of a particular ballot paper, this must be referred to the DRO or the officer conducting the scrutiny for a decision. Challenged ballot papers should be dealt with throughout the scrutiny. (See EPM DO Part 13 Subpart 2).

- 2.5 The DRO should ensure that scrutiny staff conduct themselves in an orderly manner during the scrutiny. Any issues should be dealt with immediately.
- 2.6 The DRO should continually assess the time required to complete a scrutiny and should advise scrutiny staff and scrutineers of any changes to the expected finishing time.

### 3. HoR Fresh scrutiny

- 3.1 A fresh scrutiny of ordinary House of Representatives ballot papers will include a fresh scrutiny of the “two candidate preferred” (TCP) distribution and must be undertaken by the DRO (s. 274(2A) & 274(7)(b) *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (the Act)).
- 3.2 Although not required under the Act, it is AEC policy to conduct a fresh scrutiny of all declaration vote ballot papers.
- 3.3 The DRO, as the officer-in-charge of a scrutiny, has the responsibility to ensure that the scrutiny is conducted in an orderly manner, strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act. All persons present are subject to the control of the DRO. The DRO must establish and maintain this control throughout the scrutiny and ensure they are conducted in a spirit of courtesy and co-operation.
- 3.4 The fresh scrutiny of all votes from polling day must be completed before the declaration of the poll can occur.
- 3.5 A DRO must arrange for an Assistant Returning Officer (ARO) to count and record all ballot papers pertaining to mobile polling after the close of poll at 6pm on polling night. The ARO will advise the DRO of the results of the scrutiny. Alternatively, the ballot papers may be counted by the DRO in the divisional office after 6pm on polling night.

### 4. Distribution of preferences

- 4.1 The distribution of preferences must not take place until after the fresh scrutiny of all ordinary and all declaration ballot papers on hand has been completed or the approval of the Electoral Commissioner or AEO has been received (s. 275 the Act).
- 4.2 Before starting the distribution of preferences, the DRO must be satisfied that any outstanding declaration votes (which could be included in the further scrutiny) will not affect the result of the election or the order of exclusion of candidates (i.e. the number of outstanding declaration votes will be less than the difference between any two candidates at each exclusion).
- 4.3 Because it will not always be clear at the start of a distribution of preferences how close the results for candidates will be at the various stages, it may be found that the distribution will have to be adjourned if there are eligible declaration votes outstanding. If so, the ballot papers are to be parcelled up and sealed, pending the processing of sufficient of the outstanding eligible declaration votes to allow the distribution to resume.

- 4.4 If it is necessary to adjourn the distribution of preferences, all parcels must be re-sealed.

## 5. Scrutiny for information

- 5.1 If the last two candidates after a HoR distribution of preferences are not the government and major opposition party candidates the Electoral Commissioner or delegate may direct the DRO to conduct another distribution, called a scrutiny for information (s. 277 the Act).
- 5.2 The scrutiny for information is in effect a transfer of preferences to achieve a Government/Opposition (i.e. major opposition party or coalition) result.
- 5.3 The procedures to be followed may be the same as those for HoR Distribution of Preferences, but the direction from the Electoral Commissioner or delegate will advise the method to be used (s. 277 the Act). Currently, this is conducted as a TCP count, substituting one of the candidates.
- 5.4 A scrutiny for information may be conducted to examine the second and later preferences in the manner specified in the notice from the Electoral Commissioner or delegate.

## 6. Senate Fresh Scrutiny

- 6.1 The fresh scrutiny is conducted by the DRO and commences on the Monday after election day in divisional offices or designated counting centres.
- 6.2 Each polling place, mobile team and declaration vote scrutiny should be sorted, counted and bundled separately. At no point should polling places, mobile teams and declaration vote scrutinies ever be amalgamated. To this end, scrutiny teams must only be allocated the ballot papers from one declaration scrutiny count, polling place or mobile team at a time. A further issue must not take place until ballot papers for the current polling place, mobile team or declaration scrutiny count have been parcelled and sealed.
- 6.3 Declaration vote admitted Senate ballot papers must undergo two scrutinies – a further scrutiny and a fresh scrutiny – for which separate returns are required and must be scrutinised and parcelled by declaration type and count – declaration votes from different scrutinies and counts in ELMS must not be amalgamated.
- 6.4 All above the line (ATL) and obviously informal ballot papers are retained in the divisional office. All below the line (BTL) and not obviously informal BTL ballot papers are sent to the Central Senate Scrutiny (CSS).
- 6.5 SO will issue instructions regarding despatching of ballot papers to the CSS.

## Policy Contacts

Director, Election Policy & Procedures

## Related Policies and References

[Scrutineers and Party Workers Policy](#)

[Recount Policy](#)

[Ballot Paper Formality Policy](#)

[Ballot Paper Formality Guidelines](#).

## Helpful Hints

**Distribution of preferences:** The process used to determine the winning candidate when no candidate wins an absolute majority of first preference votes.

**TCP (Two Candidate Preferred):** Refers to a distribution of preferences to the two candidates who are expected to come first and second in the election.

**Scrutiny:** The process following the close of polling. Acceptability of votes is determined and the votes are sorted and counted to determine the outcome of the election.

**Fresh Scrutiny:** a second count of all votes

**Scrutineer:** Person appointed by a candidate to observe the voting, and counting of the votes.

**Recount:** A further count of votes in an election in accordance with S278 and S279 of the Act.

**Scrutiny for information:** After the election of a Member of the HoR, the Electoral Commissioner may direct the DRO to carry out a scrutiny of the second and later preferences of the candidates to achieve a Government/Opposition result. This information is used to calculate a 'two party preferred' figure.

## EPM Procedures relevant to this Policy

[EPM DO Part 13, Subpart 2 – HoR Fresh Scrutinies](#)

[EPM DO Part 13, Subpart 3 – HoR Distribution of Preferences](#)

## Annexure 8 Detailed chronology

### General chronology

The 2013 Federal election commenced with the issue of the writs by the Governor-General on 5 August, with election day designated as 7 September. In Western Australia, the Senate distribution of preferences occurred on 2 October. Prior to the declaration of the result, which was due to occur on 3 October, two Senate candidates requested, under section 278(1), that the Australian Electoral Officer for WA conduct a recount of the ballot papers. The AEO declined this request on 4 October, and two candidates, under section 278(2) appealed this decision to the Electoral Commissioner. On 10 October, the Electoral Commissioner directed that a recount of all ATL Senate votes, together with informal votes determined by DROs under *Commonwealth Electoral Act 273A* (3) be conducted. The recount commenced on 10 October, and concluded with the distribution of preferences on 2 November, and the declaration of the poll on 4 November. The writs for the WA Senate were returned on 6 November.

On 22 October, it became apparent that 1139 ballot papers for the Division of Pearce could not be accounted for as expected. On 25 October it became apparent that 231 ballot papers for the Division of Forrest could not be located.

Searches of all AEC premises (all divisional offices, scrutiny centres, the AEC warehouse and the recount centre), as well as all Toll IPEC facilities and equipment (the Hazelmere transshipping location), and all trucks, vehicles (including a rented vehicle from Hertz used by Toll) commenced. In most instances, sites were searched several times, by different teams of staff, including both staff from AEC offices in NSW and Canberra, plus contracted staff brought in specifically for the task. Staff from Toll who had transported ballot paper material were interviewed and statements received from them during this time.

On 31 October, at the conclusion of the recount, and when all other ATL Senate ballot papers for Forrest, Pearce and all other WA divisions had been counted, and it was clear that the missing ballot papers could not be accounted for, the AEC announced that it was missing 1375 ballot papers for the Divisions of Forrest and Pearce (subsequently revised to 1 370 following final reconciliations). Scrutineers at the count centre were informed by the AEO, shortly after which a press release was issued and all candidates were advised in writing.

The press release also announced the appointment of Mr Keelty to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the missing ballot papers, and Mr Keelty commenced his enquiry on Tuesday 5 November.

### The WA recount decisions

The first count following the distribution of preferences for the 2013 WA Senate Election resulted in the announcement of six successful candidates on 2 October. That afternoon, Australian Sports Party candidate Wayne Dropulich and Greens (WA) candidate Scott Ludlam made formal requests for a recount to the WA AEO, Peter Kramer. On 3 October Mr Kramer announced that the recount request had been denied because no specific issues had been identified that would have warranted the conduct of a recount.

An appeal for a recount was made the following day, 4 October. The Australian Electoral Commissioner, Mr Killesteyn sought further explanation of the matters raised in the appeals from Senator Ludlam and Mr Dropulich. Other key affected parties, including Senator Louise Pratt (Australian Labor Party) and Mr Zhenya Wang (Palmer United Party), were given the opportunity to provide a written submission.

Closeness of a particular count in the process of distributing Senate preferences is not in itself a basis for a recount under the CEA. Mr Killesteyn carefully considered candidates' submissions in addition to the criticality of particular Senate candidate exclusion points where the small margins involved were instrumental in determining the final two Senators' elect.

On 10 October Mr Killesteyn announced his decision to direct a recount of Western Australian Senate ballot papers where electors had marked their votes above the line. The recount was conducted between 17 and 31 October, and involved the scrutiny of approximately 96% of the votes that were cast at the Election. During that time, it came to light that 1 370 votes, all of which had been verified during the initial WA Senate count, could not be located, rechecked or verified in the recount process.

The distribution of preferences, announced on 2 November, combined the recounted formal votes with all formal below-the-line votes that were not subject to the recount process. The formal Declaration of the Poll was announced on 4 November.

At 2:30pm on 15 November, the AEC lodged a petition with the CDR in respect of the 2013 Western Australian Senate election. The petition seeks an order from the Court that the WA Senate election of six senators be declared void. Given the closeness of the margins that favoured the final two declared candidates, the petition is based on the premise that the inability to include 1 370 missing ballot papers in the recount of the WA Senate election means that the election was likely to be affected for the purposes of s 362(3) of the CEA.

## **Detailed chronology of events relating to the division of Forrest**

### **Bunbury East Ballot papers**

Following the announcement on 10 October of the decision to conduct an ATL Senate ballot paper recount, staff commenced packing Forrest Senate ballot papers at the Forrest fresh scrutiny centre on Monday 14 October 2013.

Packing was conducted on a polling place by polling place basis in alphabetical name order.

Ballot papers were packed into senate ballot paper cartons with cover cards. These cartons were then sealed with AEC security tape with the polling place name handwritten onto the carton along with the number of cartons for the polling place (where multiple cartons were required). A label describing the name and contents was then affixed to the carton.

Once all polling places had been packed and the total number of cartons established (180), the cartons were then placed on two separate pallets and shrink wrapped by Toll Ipec (the AEC's contracted shipping company for WA).

The pallets were loaded onto the truck on Wednesday 16 October 2013 for delivery to the AEC warehouse at Welshpool, via the TOLL depot at Hazelmere. The pallets were transferred to another TOLL truck on Friday 18 October for delivery to the AEC Warehouse that morning.

The two shrink wrapped pallets were collected from the AEC warehouse on 24 October 2013 and delivered that day to the recount centre where they were stored in the receiving bay of the building.

The actual recount of the Forrest Senate ballot papers commenced on Saturday 26 October 2013. Shortly after the commencement of the recount a discrepancy was identified in regard to the Bunbury East polling place wherein boxes marked 2 of 7, 3 of 7, 4 of 7, 5 of 7, 6 of 7 and 7 of 7 were located but 1 of 7 appeared to be missing.

The Bunbury East cartons were marked as 43/180 and 45-49/180. The correlation between the Bunbury East cartons as part of the Forrest total consignment is as follows:

- Bunbury East 2/7 – Consignment Number 43/180
- Bunbury East 3/7 – Consignment Number 45/180
- Bunbury East 4/7 – Consignment Number 46/180
- Bunbury East 5/7 – Consignment Number 47/180
- Bunbury East 6/7 – Consignment Number 48/180
- Bunbury East 7/7 – Consignment Number 49/180

As a result ballot papers for groups H (0), J (1), K (3), L (6), M (2), N (11), O (1), P (0), Q (3), S (112), T (12) and Informal (80) were not accounted for. The total number of missing votes was 231.

It was decided to progress with the recount and continue to monitor that the polling place recount figure balanced with the anticipated vote figure stated on the tally sheet for each polling place. At the completion of the recount all polling place anticipated and recount figures were reported to have balanced out indicating that there had been no extra ballot papers inadvertently amalgamated with another polling place to warrant a sizable discrepancy.

The Bunbury East cartons were immediately quarantined and over the ensuing days a number of searches were conducted of the loading area and all other areas of the Count Centre, the AEC Warehouse and other AEC premises

On Sunday 27 October 2013 staff conducted a search of the Forrest offsite premises building but found neither the missing 1 of 7 carton nor any individual / group Senate ballot papers that may have been inadvertently left behind.

Following a preliminary search on 25 October, two full searches of the AEC Warehouse were conducted on Saturday October 26th by staff and again on Tuesday October 29th by different staff, including Forrest and Pearce's unused Senate ballot papers and their HoR ballot papers in the event that they had inadvertently been placed in an incorrect package of ballot papers.

Additional searches of all other AEC premises in WA were conducted on October 29. These included the Ascot Count Centre, used by Divisions of Perth, Hasluck, Stirling, Curtin, Tangney and Swan.

The Western Australian Electoral Commission's warehouse was searched by Senior AEC staff on October 31.

A Meeting with TOLL Ipec Manager was conducted by Senior AEC staff on Tuesday October 29th. Consignment notes were proved and TOLL ITrace confirming two Pallets received at TOLL Depot Hazelmere and then transferred to AEC Warehouse. The Toll Manager undertook to urgently conduct an investigation that included contacting TOLL Bunbury Manager, relevant TOLL drivers and viewing CCTV footage of their drop off/pick up delivery area. This investigation was conducted that day and no discrepancies were identified in the process of transporting two Pallets from Bunbury to AEC Warehouse via Hazelmere TOLL Depot.

## **Detailed chronology of events relating to the division of Pearce**

### **Mt Helena, Henley Brook, Wundowie, Provisional 1**

In the week of September 9, Senate ballot papers for the Division of Pearce were packaged at Division of Pearce off site premises at Winton Road Joondalup using recycled Senate boxes from Election Day (September 7) as large Senate boxes did not arrive until September 11.

Following their arrival, large Senate Boxes were packed to capacity. If part of a polling place was included in a Large Senate Box then this detail was written on the box.

On October 1, prior to the distribution of preferences and therefore prior to any request for a Senate recount, the packed Senate ballot papers were collected by TOLL and by an AEC staff member, to be transported to the AEC Warehouse at Welshpool.

TOLL staff made two separate trips from Joondalup to the AEC Warehouse to complete this exercise, while an AEC staff member made a single trip.

On 22nd October, at Senate Recount Centre, all Cartons containing Senate Ballot Papers for the Division of Pearce were removed from their Pallets and compared with the list of Counts for the Division, in preparation for counting to begin for the Division.

In this process it became apparent that there were missing ballot papers for three polling places and one declaration count in this Division – Mt Helena, Wundowie, Henley Brook and Provisional 1.

It was established for Henley Brook, there was a total of 1304 ATL and Informal ballot papers. The expected total for group AA was 636, but there were only 286 AA Votes in the box, meaning that 350 ballot papers could not be located.

For Mt Helena a total of 1027 ATL and informal votes were recorded. Votes for all groups were accounted for except for G, T and AA. The Fresh Scrutiny Result Sheets and ELMs, show that G had 14, T had 9, and AA had 370 votes, meaning that 393 ballot papers could not be located.

Wundowie had a total of 597 ATL and Informal votes were recorded. Votes for all groups were unpacked except for A, C, D, K, L, M, O, Z, AA, and Informal. The Fresh Scrutiny sheets show that there should have been 8 for A, 3 for C, 7 for D, 1 for K, 5 for L, 1 for M, 1 for O, 164 for Z, 166 for AA, and 29 for Informal. Therefore, 385 ballot papers could not be located.

For Pearce Provisional 1, there were 418 ATL and obviously informal votes recorded. Votes for all groups were unpacked except for informal. Eleven informal ballot papers could not be located.

There are therefore a total of 1139 missing votes when compared to the Fresh Scrutiny Result Sheets.



These four polling places with missing ballots were immediately quarantined and over the ensuing days a number of searches were conducted of the loading area and all other areas of the Count Centre, the AEC Warehouse and other AEC premises. In addition, TOLL Ipec used a hire vehicle from Hertz for transport of Pearce ballot papers, and Hertz were contacted by TOLL Ipec to check for any election material that may have been left in the vehicle used on October 1. No materials were found.

AEC also investigated with Thrifty to check if any election materials had been left in the Thrifty 1 Tonne Vehicle used by the AEC staff member to collect election materials on 1st October.

Searches of the Pearce offsite facility at Joondalup and the Pearce Divisional Office were conducted on 25th and 28th by AEC staff. A further search of the Pearce offsite facility and Divisional Office was conducted on 29th October by different AEC staff. A final search of the Pearce offsite facility and Divisional Office was conducted on 30th October by a further set of different AEC staff.

As noted earlier, additional searches of all other AEC premises in WA were conducted on October 29, including the Ascot Count Centre, used by Divisions of Perth, Hasluck, Stirling, Curtin, Tangney and Swan.

## Annexure 9 Accountability standards for key roles in the United Kingdom Electoral Commission



The UK Electoral Commission report *Consultation on new performance standards for Returning Officers* can be found at: [http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0010/162199/Consultation-on-new-performance-standards-for-Returning-Officers.pdf](http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/162199/Consultation-on-new-performance-standards-for-Returning-Officers.pdf)

The UK Electoral Commission report *Performance standards for Electoral Registration Officers* can be found at: [http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0003/162588/New-performance-standards-for-EROs-September-2013.pdf](http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/162588/New-performance-standards-for-EROs-September-2013.pdf)



## Annexure 10 Report from the WA AEC office on the status of contracts

### Contracts Status

The below table outlines a summary of the contracts' status required for an election. A more detailed report of expired and expiring contracts is at Attachment A.

Area Responsible	CONTRACT STATUS		
		Expiring in next 4 months	In Place
Education & Communications			10
Information Technology	2		6
Roll Management	1		10
Elections			8
Finance & Business Services			3
People Services			1
NSW/ACT	1		3
Victoria			5
Queensland	1		3
Western Australia			6
South Australia	2		1
Tasmania			4
Northern Territory			5
TOTAL	7		65
		<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>72</b>

### Memorandum of understanding with DHS

The Head Agreement has been signed. The status of each schedule follows.

#### **Schedule 1 – Data service for data matching purposes**

- Target completion date is end of February.

#### **Schedule 2 – Contact centre service schedule (Election call centre)**

- In the process of being finalised. Target completion date is end of February.

#### **Schedule 3 – Display of enrolment forms, reply paid envelopes, promotional material and acceptance of enrolment forms**

- Target completion date is end of February.

#### **Schedule 4 – Election service centres**


- Draft MoU has been provided to DHS for comment/endorsement and costing. Target completion date is end of February.

#### **Schedule 5 – BLV voting services**


- Costing assumptions and draft service schedule has been agreed. Target completion date is end of February.


The next meeting of the governance committee is scheduled for 19 March and progress towards signing off on all schedules will be discussed at that meeting.

Annexure 11 Photos of the labelling on Division of Forrest boxes



Annexure 12 Floor plan and general photo of the Welshpool warehouse





**Annexure 13 Photos of inadequate segregation of material at the recount centre**





Annexure 14 Photos of unsecured ballots at the recount centre










# Annexure 15 Diagrams tracing the path of the ballots in the divisions of Pearce and Forrest

## Ballot paper tracking: Division of Forrest



### Departures from expected procedures

- 1 Use of original (unused) boxes for repackaging
- 2 Second pallet overloaded and listing
- 3 Toll staff did not count boxes, only pallets,
- 4 Senate scrutiny supervisors did not complete formal training
- 5 Pallets loaded onto open truck for transfer from Toll Hazelmere to Welshpool
- 6 Boxes not counted on receipt at Welshpool
- 7 Boxes were not counted on despatch from Welshpool to Northbridge
- 8 Consignment notes were not created or signed for transfer from Welshpool to Northbridge
- 9 No deliveries at Northbridge signed for
- 10 Only pallets counted on receipt at Northbridge

### 11 Recount centre:

- a) lack of detailed written instruction
- b) no person was appointed to manage receipt/despatch area
- c) no clear demarcation in Northbridge receipt/despatch area
- d) no formal process for issuing material to recount prep area
- e) no formal process for checking off completion of recount for each polling place/division
- f) no formal process for re-issuing completed recount material to receipt/despatch area

### Things to note/points of interest

- 1 OICs having material overnight
- 2 No national process for getting completed election ballot papers into long term storage
- 3 DRO not being present for packing
- 4 Some polling places put in the same box, each separated and secured (ie not amalgamated).
- 5 Boxes stacked, then re-stacked twice
- 6 Boxes shrink wrapped at premises
- 7 Pallets transferred at Bunbury depot; 2 hr delay
- 8 Pallets at Hazelmere overnight
- 9 Forrest pallets not loaded onto storage racks at Welshpool warehouse – kept aside until they were sent to the recount centre

location


points to note

procedure departures

above the line BPs

below the line BPs

# Ballot paper tracking: Division of Pearce




## Departures from expected procedures


- Senate scrutiny supervisors did not complete formal training
- Use of original (unused) boxes for repackaging – no fresh boxes until the Wednesday
- Polling places amalgamated in boxes following fresh scrutiny without being securely separated
- Varied use of labels on boxes following fresh scrutiny – most did not have labels, rather the boxes were marked with a texta and polling places were crossed off
- Transfer of material by a mixture of Toll couriers and AEC staff
- Number of boxes for despatch from Pearce offsite premises to warehouse not counted or recorded
- No consignment notes or other record of transfer from Pearce offsite to warehouse
- Staff keeping rental truck at house overnight

## Things to note/points of interest

- OICs having ballots overnight
- No allocated bags for return of material from PPs
- No record of arrangements for despatch of material to warehouse
- Some contention as to how orderly the material was stored at the docking area at Joondalup
- Some contention about the orderliness of the pickup of material
- Unclear when rubbish from Pearce offsite was taken to Tamala Park rubbish/recycling depot





Geographical map of path of ballot papers for the Division of Forrest



**Division of Forrest**



- A – Bunbury East Polling Place; Coinda Pre-Primary School, 10 Allen Street, Bunbury, WA, 6230
- B – Forrest Senate Fresh Scrutiny Centre; Corner of Clifton Street and Casuarina Drive, Bunbury WA 6230
- C – Toll Perth Office; Lot 401 Bushmead Rd, Hazelmere WA 6055
- D – AEC Warehouse; units 4-5/14 Fargo Way, Welshpool, Western Australia, 6106
- E – AEC Recount Centre, 30 Beaufort Street, Perth, Western Australia





COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL DIVISION OF

# FORREST



Note: Forrest includes adjacent islands

- Divisional boundary
- Adjoining divisional boundary
- Division area 12 781 sq km
- Railway

**Note:**  
 Federal redistribution finalised in December 2008  
 Local Government Area (LGA) descriptions are current at April 2008




**2009**  
VC00061



COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL DIVISION OF

# PEARCE



**Description:** a line, Quinns Rd, Marmion Ave, Hester Ave, Wanneroo Rd, Wattle Ave, Old Yanchep Rd, Pinjar Rd, Neaves Rd, Swan LGA, Gnangara Rd, Beechboro Rd Nth, Marshall Rd, Tonkin Hwy, Reid Hwy, Great Northern Hwy, Jane Brk, James Rd, a line, Roe Hwy, Blackadder Ck, railway line, Great Eastern Hwy, Ruby St, Mundaring LGA, Scott St, Clayton Rd, Hudman Rd, a line, Victor Rd, a line, Tormart Brk, a road, Kalamunda National Park bdy, Roach Rd, Mundaring Weir Rd, a line, Stanhope Rd, Jackson Rd, Lesmurdie Rd, Gladstone Rd, Palmateer Dr, Halleendale Rd, Lawnbrook Rd, Halleendale Rd, Canning Rd, Pomeroy Rd, Welshpool Rd, Crystal Brook Rd, Kalamunda LGA, York LGA, Beverley LGA

- Divisional boundary
- Adjoining divisional boundary
- Division area 14 401 sq km
- Railway

**Note:**  
Federal redistribution finalised in December 2008  
Local Government Area (LGA) descriptions are current at April 2008



## 2009

VC00061