

"There are still not enough troops in Western Europe to stop a determined Soviet attack. . . . So far as Germany is concerned the success of the whole defense program depends largely on one man—Chancellor Adenauer."

EDITORIAL, *New York Times*, April 22, 1952

"Konrad Adenauer, hand-picked by Washington as the first chancellor of the Bonn Republic, has been an enthusiastic supporter of the State Department policy precisely because he was shrewd enough to see that it would make Germany the dominant West European power and place it in a position to play off Russia against the West, much as Adenauer's close friend, Gustav Stresemann, had maneuvered in the early days of the Weimar Republic."

JAMES P. WARBURG

"We must move very cautiously. We ought not to give the impression, either in Germany or in the United States, that we shall collaborate in any way with the Russians."

CHANCELLOR DR. KONRAD ADENAUER

[14]

Dr. Adenauer and German Realpolitik

THE INCREDIBLY RAPID REVIVAL OF GERMANY FROM TOTAL military defeat within a few years is closely linked with the name of Dr. Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Bonn Republic, and its most influential political leader. Even if we take into account that preparation was made for a German comeback by the German High Command long before the collapse, the work itself was accomplished through a tenacious struggle by a master of the political game who, during forty years, had learned every trick in the book of diplomatic finesse.

The collapse of the Nazi regime in 1945 confronted the Western Allies with the problem of reshaping the political structure of Germany in order to foster democratic ideas and acts in harmony with the vital interests of the West. Some old-

time political groups seemed to convey the idea that they were devoted to democratic principles and to the welfare of Europe. In the course of political maneuverings and elections, there emerged at the helm of the West German Government Konrad Adenauer. His stature as an individual and a representative of these so-called "better German" forces is for the most part unquestioned by the Allied authorities. Indeed, in the eyes of the Allies he stands for all the things which our Occupation was designed to achieve in Germany. Even when he has been criticized, the criticisms have been more or less subdued and reserved because the alternative to Adenauer's leadership appears to be nothing less than catastrophic to American interests in Germany. Apparently, there is no alternative to Dr. Adenauer—he is the great hope.

Yet, on closer examination of Dr. Adenauer, his past and the forces he represents, one cannot help but conclude that the calculations of the occupying authorities were based on superficial evidence at best, for the ideas of Dr. Adenauer and the strategy which he employs to carry out his goals are, in reality, designed to treat all powers alike—East and West—that is, by subordinating all such relations to the supreme and exclusive interest of Germany everywhere.

Dr. Adenauer represents the tradition of old imperial Germany that was defeated once and came back for a second try at world domination. After the second attempt ended in failure, the Germans could not have found a political leader more astute for the difficult task of restoring Germany's power than Dr. Adenauer. In him they have found a master of political strategy who derived his rich experience from Germany's past under the Kaiser, from the skillful maneuvering of the Weimar Republic, under Wirth, Stresemann, and Bruening, and from the political trickery of the Third Reich. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Chancellor is generally called the "Old Fox" not only by German politicians, but even in the columns of such a distinguished political writer as Walter Lippmann.

Dr. Adenauer's personality is deeply rooted in the old conservative and pan-German political views of the Reich. He was born in 1876 at Cologne. As a young lawyer his interest turned early to municipal politics. In 1906 he became an assistant and subsequently the deputy to the Lord Mayor of Cologne. From 1917 to 1933 he served as Lord Mayor of the great Rheinish city, but at the same time he wielded a great influence on all issues of domestic and foreign policy in the Weimar Republic. He was chairman of the Conference of German Cities; he served as president of the Prussian State Council from 1920 to 1933, and he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Catholic Center Party.

In addition to his political influence, Dr. Adenauer is regarded as a trusted representative and spokesman of the great financial and industrial interest of the Ruhr. He is a close friend of Dr. Robert Pferdmenges and of Dr. Herman Abs, both leading bankers in the city of Cologne, who were influential supporters of the Hitler regime. Dr. Adenauer's long-time standing as a leading politician in the Catholic Center Party has enhanced his reputation in the Vatican and among the high officials of the Roman Church.

The name of Dr. Adenauer was virtually unknown to the non-German world before he came into the limelight in 1949. However, in German politics Adenauer was a powerful and influential figure. How great his influence was, even on foreign policy, can best be seen from the fact that an outstanding statesman like Foreign Minister Stresemann saw fit to consult and take the advice of Dr. Adenauer on questions of foreign policy. For instance, on January 7, 1925, Dr. Stresemann wrote to the Mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, a long letter from which we quote:

"I hope that you will be in agreement with the terms of the German Reply Note. In a careful diplomatic form it contains the sternest reproaches to the Allied Powers . . .

from the text you will see that we accuse the Allied Powers of disloyalty to the carrying out of the treaty . . ."

By way of comparison one would have to accept as a matter of course Secretary of State Acheson writing to the Mayor of Cleveland or Rochester the following:

"I hope that you will be in agreement with the attitude I expressed in my negotiations with the NATO representatives last month in Lisbon . . ."

Yet, Adenauer, ostensibly a local political boss, wielded sufficient power to have an influential voice in the Reich's foreign policy.

Though he had been mentioned for important posts, including the Chancellor's Office in the Weimar Republic, Dr. Adenauer preferred the unassuming title of Mayor of Cologne. Evidently he found it to his advantage to remain in the background while influencing policy as a recognized leader of the powerful financial and industrial interests of the Ruhr. No wonder that many of the politicians in the Center Party feared Dr. Adenauer's ambitions.

Even today in his own party, the "Christian Democratic Union," Dr. Adenauer is disliked and feared for his adherence to authoritarian concepts of government. Frequently, German papers have complained about Dr. Adenauer's disregard of the wishes of the people and of democratic procedure. His extreme conservatism prevented him from going along with the Nazis, although there were no great differences in his own nationalistic outlook and the foreign policies of the Nazi Party. But he had contempt for the upstart in the Nazi movement, who ousted him from his office in 1933. Yet, it is significant that Dr. Adenauer surrounded himself in the Chancellery and in his foreign office with dozens of former Nazis who had served as top schemers under Ribbentrop and Dr. Goebbels.

When in 1945 Allied armies occupied Cologne, the Amer-

icans reinstated Dr. Adenauer in his job as Lord Mayor. After the Reich was divided into zones and the British took over in Cologne, Dr. Adenauer was dismissed from his office and his political activities banned for reasons which were never discussed publicly.

From the beginning, U.S. authorities placed great hope in Dr. Adenauer. His relations to Washington were very close long before he became Chancellor of the Bonn Republic in 1949. Dr. Adenauer was one of the first German politicians who was allowed to come to the United States in 1946 and to propagate his political views.

By now, the Western Powers have found out that it was an illusion to believe that Dr. Adenauer was "Heaven's gift to the Occupation powers." Dr. Adenauer has given the three High Commissioners plenty of headaches. They know today that the Chancellor has strictly followed Germany's time-honored political game of playing both ends towards the middle. Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy is based on the old pan-German concept of "Deutschland Über Alles in der Welt." *Times* correspondent Drew Middleton reported that American and British diplomats are sometimes baffled by Dr. Adenauer's "fondness for large, even grandiose, political conceptions and theories." They find it "difficult to reconcile these flights of thought with the urgency of Germany's needs at the moment."

These large, even grandiose, political conceptions of Dr. Adenauer's stem from the political schemes for which Imperial Germany went into the First World War. It was the concept of the "Greater Germany," the space theories of a European prosperity sphere ("Mittel Europa"), an overseas colonial empire, and the establishment of a powerful steel and coal combine as a stepping-stone toward the economic and political domination of Europe. A Germanized Europe was at that time already envisioned by the pan-Germans as the strategic center in the coming struggle for world domination. The aggressive ideas of pan-Germanism found their main backers among the industrial-

ists of the Rhine and the Ruhr who profited from the ever-increasing rearmament under the Kaiser. These same industrialists, twenty years later, helped the rabble-rousing agitator Hitler into power.

Among the backers of the pan-German program was the extreme nationalistic wing of the Catholic Center Party which had its main political bailiwick in Cologne. The most influential leader of this pan-German faction was the then young and ambitious Dr. Konrad Adenauer. The idea of pan-Germanism had been repugnant to a Party that had come into existence a few decades earlier as a heroic fighting unit against Prussian militarism and Bismarck's autocratic regime during the time of the "Kulturkampf." However, after the Vatican had made its peace with Bismarck and after the courageous leader Windhorst died, the Center Party, within a few years, became the main government party in Imperial Germany and acted as the most militant voice in the support of the militaristic and aggressive German policies which marked the twenty-year period before the First World War. The ambitious and "grandiose political conceptions" of Dr. Adenauer have their roots in the ideological setting of the pan-German Reich of Kaiser Wilhelm. It was this factor that the Washington policy planners overlooked when they thought they had found in Dr. Adenauer a representative of the "better Germany."

When, in the summer of 1949, Dr. Adenauer was elected, by a slim majority of one vote, as the first Chancellor of the West German Federal Republic, he declared that he would reserve the conduct of Foreign Affairs as his own domain. From the beginning, he proved to be a shrewd tactician in all matters of domestic and foreign policy. He started off with rousing nationalistic speeches, wherein he presented himself in the eyes of the German people as a "strong national leader." Simultaneously, he introduced in his dealings with the Allied High Commissioner a kind of blackmail diplomacy which, within a short

time, played havoc with the whole set of principles and policies of the Western occupying powers.

Let us sketch Dr. Adenauer's policy on the basis of his record. In his election speeches, he expressed his hatred for England, and he declared that the British "are our true enemies and they intend to block the resurrection of Western Germany." The *New York Times* quoted on August 14, 1949 the following passage from Dr. Adenauer's election oratory:

"A nation like Germany, with one of the first seats in mankind's history, has a claim to feel along nationalistic lines . . . The foreigners have got to understand that the period of collapse and unrestricted domination by the Allies is finished."

In the spring of 1949, before he was Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer created consternation in the Allied camp when he declared in a speech in Berne, Switzerland, that the German people had never surrendered to the Allies. The German military leaders who did so in May 1945 had "no mandate from the German people to submit to the terms of unconditional surrender." In the same speech he characterized Allied confiscation of German patents as "outright robbery." In 1950, Dr. Adenauer caused new embarrassment for the occupying authorities at a mass meeting in Berlin when, at his request and in the presence of Allied representatives, he led the crowd in the singing of "Deutschland Über Alles."

In his dealings with the Allied High Commissioners, Dr. Adenauer has proved to be a master in diplomatic strategy. The *London Observer* once called Dr. Adenauer "the best tactician on the German political scene."

Walter Lippmann has termed Dr. Adenauer "a shrewd and farsighted man who may yet prove to be the German Talleyrand if he survives long enough."

The *Frankfurter Rundschau* noted in an editorial that Dr. Adenauer hopes to enter the pages of history as Bismarck II.

Dr. Adenauer's immediate objective from the first day of his Chancellorship was to lull the suspicions which were still alive among the Allies toward Germany. His goal was to free Germany from the consequences of defeat, to gain back full sovereignty and make a resurrected Reich again attractive as a partner in a new alliance. In this grandiose political enterprise, he shrewdly exploited the tension between the East and the West.

There is a great similarity in Dr. Adenauer's diplomatic approach with the manner in which Dr. Stresemann handled the post-war political situation after Germany's defeat in the First World War. Foreign Minister Stresemann, like Dr. Adenauer today, was also regarded by the Western Powers as a "good European." Dr. Stresemann had the same objective of "restoring confidence among the Western Powers towards Germany," but there always was hanging over the head of Western diplomats the threatening possibility that Germany would conclude an alliance with the East.

Dr. Stresemann, like Adenauer, preferred to bolster his diplomacy by working with a "manipulated opposition." The more he was criticized by his political opponents, the easier it was for Stresemann to extract concessions by telling the British and the French: "Look what you have to expect from people that will come after me."

Stresemann always played the English against the French and was eager to gain the support from the financial circles in the United States. Under his diplomacy, the French were always the losers. Stresemann, like Adenauer, was filled with "grandiose ideas and schemes." Yet, the Western Powers forgot that Stresemann had also been one of the most fanatical pan-Germans before and during the First World War and that the political game he was playing was full of booby traps.

Like Dr. Stresemann, Chancellor Adenauer regards it as a good business proposition to sell Germany as a safe haven for American investments. Like Stresemann, Dr. Adenauer employs his diplomacy as the preliminary anesthetic for a major opera-

tion on the body of Europe which will be performed later with a resurrected German Wehrmacht.

Dr. Adenauer's main weapon is the diplomatic double talk, of which Stresemann was also a master. It was Stresemann who declared that "German policy must be one of finesse ('finassieren') and of avoiding the great decisions," and in 1925 he gave the following diplomatic gem: "Our policy of offering the Entente powers a security pact was undoubtedly correct . . . it broke up the Entente . . ."

Is it not exactly a repeat performance if we compare Dr. Adenauer's dealings with the High Commissioners with the complaint that Britain's Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain once made to Stresemann: "Whenever we make a concession to you, instead of acknowledging it you ask for more." The Western Powers learned nothing from the experiences during the Twenties which were followed later on by blackmail diplomacy of Adolf Hitler. Now comes Dr. Adenauer and uses the same tactics in his diplomatic strategy with the West.

In his diplomatic approach, Dr. Adenauer never places the whole menu of German demands on the table. He moves carefully, step by step, and whenever Western negotiators believe that they are over the hump after having granted a major concession, they are confronted with new demands from Adenauer—pushed by the boundless agitation of his "manipulated opposition."

In spite of the distasteful experiences with Dr. Stresemann and Hitler, the Western powers try again to calm down the crying German brat with one lollypop after another. When the French High Commissioner, François-Poncet, criticized the German tactic of consistently coming up with new demands, the leading newspaper in the pro-Adenauer camp, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, answered in an editorial that "all concessions in the direction of German equality were won only after Germany had exercised relentless pressure. According to François-Poncet, well-behaved children do not cry—but well-be-

haved children will never get anything . . ." (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, July 17, 1951.)

Dr. Adenauer has played the game in accordance with the prescription outlined by this German newspaper. It has reaped enormous dividends for the Germans.

Thus the dismantling of German surplus industry for reparations was stopped. Millions of militant Nazis were set free without investigation or trial. All measures to prevent a revival of German war industry were dropped; and with generous American help, Germany became again the most prosperous country in Europe. But, still the brat cries for more, and will get one "lolly-pop" after another, due to a peculiar set of circumstances to which only the American taxpayer can put a stop.

Nothing can be expected from the policy shapers in the Pentagon and the State Department, because these men who have always posed as stalwarts against "an appeasement policy" are, in the case of Germany, the most willing to grant one concession after another. It started early in 1946 when General Clay banned the dismantling of German industrial plants for reparations. According to a dispatch in the New York *Herald Tribune*, it was explained that "by this policy he seeks German goodwill for political purposes at the expense of Allied friends who desperately need surplus German industrial equipment." In addition, our military authorities presented the Germans with a gift of millions of dollars' worth of American surplus goods to assist Germany's speedy rehabilitation.

In 1949 Mr. McCloy was appointed as High Commissioner and introduced his policy of "calculated optimism." On February 19, 1950, *Herald Tribune* correspondent Don Cook quoted a high American official as follows:

"In six months here Mr. McCloy gave in tremendously to Chancellor Adenauer and the West German Government—gave in at what many felt was an alarming rate in the hope that demands would cease, but only to be confronted with other demands from other quarters."

On January 9, 1950, correspondent Ernest Leiser reported from Bonn that Dr. Adenauer had "seized the psychological initiative" from the United States High Commissioner and had managed "to put the commission on the defensive and reduce its role to largely a negative one . . . By this tactic, Dr. Adenauer has increased his prestige and authority in the whole field of politics and whittled away, simultaneously, at Allied prestige and authority."

Setting the Trap

U.S. POLICY SHAPERS HAVE BECOME THE PRISONERS OF THEIR own miscalculations. It is a policy of "Calculated Optimism" and insufficiently calculated risks that is ending in a situation characterized by fear and outright appeasement under the constant pressure of Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy. Our policy for Germany's revival sprang not from a compromise of mutual interests, it was the result of gambles which had no basis in realities. *Times* correspondent Drew Middleton has frequently pointed to the strength of Dr. Adenauer's position in his dealings with the

Western powers:

"He has been helped, of course, by the almost pathological fear on the part of some of the Occupation powers that if his requests were not met Germany would either fall to

Dr. Schumacher or drift along into a fatuous neutrality more helpful to the Soviet Union than to the Western powers."

(*New York Times*, September 30, 1951.)

What is the real cause for the fantastic success of Dr. Adenauer's post-war policy? We must first bear in mind that during the war the State Department had made plans to form a conservative government in Germany under the leadership of Dr. Bruening or a politician with a similar orientation. In 1946 Dr. Adenauer came to the U.S. to discuss his political views and to propagate, as the *N. Y. Staats Zeitung* stated, his ideas on a United Europe. Professor Hallstein, now Dr. Adenauer's Secretary of State, visited the U.S. to "lecture" at the Georgetown University in Washington. We can safely assume that as early as 1946 Dr. Adenauer and Professor Hallstein discussed in their talks with Washington policy planners the possibilities for the creation of a United Europe and for a reactivation of Germany's manpower potential. In 1948, a year before he became Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer asked General Hans Speidel to prepare a memorandum on German rearmament. It was during the time when an influential section of the American press ballyhooed the "need" to rebuild a strong Germany while the Pentagon was dreaming of a German army of 25 or 50 divisions.

It is of great import that we understand the real meaning of Dr. Adenauer's diplomatic maneuverings. From the beginning he stressed the point that the whole plan could only be realized within the framework of a "United Europe." Europe, especially Germany, must regain its economic strength, the policy of "punishment" had to be foregone, and Germany must be treated as an equal in order to gain the cooperation of the German people for a Western Alliance.

When Washington bought this rehashed scheme of the Twenties, Dr. Adenauer had only to engage in diplomatic finesse in order to accomplish the most fantastic shakedown. He knew that Washington was determined to arrange a "shot-gun wedding"

between France and Germany and that the Pentagon was set to reactivate the German military potential. In addition, certain American business interests were deeply devoted to the revival of a powerful Germany. In such a strong bargaining position, the "Old Fox" could constantly raise his price and squeeze the U.S. negotiators. This makes it clear why it is not Dr. Adenauer who must go "hat in hand" and ask for favors. In the context of political realities the victors appear in a far weaker position than the vanquished.

Dr. Adenauer's greatest diplomatic success was the selling of his "United Europe" plan to Washington. It is a double-feature hit because it will assure the realization of a 70-year-old pan-German dream of bringing Europe under the domination of Germany and simultaneously prove the easiest device to overcome the consequence of Germany's collapse. When Dr. Adenauer came forward with his suggestion, he performed a miracle for which the Nazi High Command had made long preparations during the last years of the war. The Nazis, fearing that the name "German" would be a stench in the nostrils of decent people for decades to come, decided to initiate after the war a clever worldwide campaign for the creation of a United Europe, in which the defeated Germans would give up nothing but would actually become the main winners. The Nazi theory was that if the Germans would lose their sovereignty, it would be a smart idea to talk the other nations into a scheme in which they would also have to give up their sovereignty and the Germans, allowed to participate, would automatically gain equality and thus the stigma would be removed from the Fatherland. It was the Nazi author Grimm who stated that Germany had lost territory and prestige but that it would profit in a European union tremendously by trade, industry, science, "Kultur-propaganda" and political schemes. The Germans are boasting today of being the champions of a new Europe. Hitler's Waffen SS is out in front in renewing the propaganda for a German-dominated Europe.

Obviously Dr. Adenauer's suggestion for the unification of

Europe has served various purposes. First of all, it will give the industrialists of the Ruhr an integrated market in Europe for which the pan-Germans had already agitated at the end of the last century. One of Dr. Adenauer's industrial friends, the I. G. Farben tycoon Dr. Duisberg, wrote in 1931 in a geo-political book by General Haushofer:

"Only an integrated trading-bloc, stretching out from Bordeaux to Sofia will enable Europe to gain that innermost economic strength which is necessary to uphold her leading position in the world . . . the longing for a thousand year Reich cries for a new approach. For such a purpose we can use the mirage of a pan-Europe."

Even such a "good" European as Count Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested, in 1932, in a fifteen-page "top secret" memorandum to the German government and the German General Staff, the unification of Europe, starting first with the creation of a German-French combine in economics, armament, and foreign policy. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi intended to use his plan as a means to overcome the consequences of German defeat in the First World War and as a lever to open the door for Germany to dominate the great trading areas in Europe and Africa. Twenty years later, the Germans acclaimed the Schuman Plan, which possessed all of the basic principles contained in the memorandum of Coudenhove-Kalergi.

Another essential point in Dr. Adenauer's "United Europe" plan is the speculation that Germany, after it has been put in the driver's seat by the United States, will not only have command over her own re-established Wehrmacht, but will also be able to control and dominate the non-German military forces. Finally, and most important, it was clear to Dr. Adenauer and his generals that the rearming of Europe can only be carried out with the financial help of the United States.

Thus, Dr. Adenauer is in the process of executing the Nazi blueprint of "Overcoming the Catastrophe." Of course, in all

his plannings, Dr. Adenauer had the help of the diplomats who once had served Hitler and Ribbentrop, and he is also backed by the geo-politicians.

Since 1950, when Dr. Adenauer began to organize the Foreign Office in Bonn, world public opinion has been frequently shocked by reports that his diplomatic staff consisted of old-line Nazi diplomats who had played a decisive role in the conspiracies of the Hitler-Ribbentrop gang. For a long time the charges that Nazis and Ribbentrop diplomats were filling Dr. Adenauer's Foreign Office were bluntly denied by the Bonn Government. No investigations were made by the Three High Commissioners.

The scandal broke after a courageous and independent German newspaper, the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, gave a detailed exposé in a series of articles in September 1951. It became known that nearly all key positions in Dr. Adenauer's Foreign Office were staffed with Nazi diplomats who had played a prominent role in the preparation of Hitler's aggressive warfare and who had even participated in planning and executing the mass extermination of the Jewish population in European countries. Among the diplomats named by the *Frankfurter Rundschau* were: Dr. Hans Globke, Dr. Theodore Kordt, Dr. Herbert Blankenhorn, Dr. Emil von Rintelen, Dr. Werner von Grundherr, Dr. Gottfried von Nostitz, Dr. Herbert Schwartzman, Hasso von Etzdorff, Dr. Albrecht von Kessel, Heinz Truetzschler von Falkenstein, Dr. Werner von Bargaen, and many others.

On October 16, 1951, Dr. Adenauer had to admit in the Bundestag that among the 383 officials and employees in his Foreign Office, 134 were former Nazi Party members, and 138 had served under von Ribbentrop. An investigating committee of the Federal Parliament admitted that some of the Nazi diplomats had such a black record that they regarded them as "absolutely inadmissible" to any position in the diplomatic service.

It seems that the percentage figures which Dr. Adenauer had given to the Federal Parliament had been kept rather low, for on March 17, 1952 the Associated Press reported from Bonn

that a German radio commentator declared that 85% of the personnel in Adenauer's Foreign Office were former Nazis.

How did these Nazi diplomats manage to escape investigation and punishment? According to the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and other newspaper reports, many of them went underground in 1945 or posed as members of the resistance against Hitler. They founded the "Evangelisches Hilfswerk" (Evangelical Relief Committee) before or right after the Nazi collapse. When they saw that nothing happened to them, they proceeded further by organizing in Stuttgart a more compact body, a sort of new foreign office, under the innocent title "Bureau for Peace Problems" ("Buro fuer Friedensfragen"). When Dr. Adenauer organized his foreign ministry, this whole Ribbentrop group was transferred from Stuttgart to Bonn.

The way this was done is best illustrated by the following example: One of the old Ribbentrop diplomats, Heinz Truetzschler von Falkenstein, who was appointed by Hitler on April 5, 1943, as Secretary of the Nazi top-secret "Europe Committee," was chosen in 1949 for a similar job by Dr. Adenauer. Hitler's "Europe Committee" was a setup assigned to organize a "New Europe" under the leadership of a "Greater Germany."

When Dr. Adenauer organized his diplomatic service, this same Nazi member who had the task of building a Hitler Europe was appointed by Dr. Adenauer as Director of the "European Division" of the Bonn Foreign Office. It is obvious that von Falkenstein carried on where he had left off in 1945—if he ever had left off! The whitewashing committee of the Bonn Parliament did not even press for the dismissal of this old Nazi hand.

There is another important sector in Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy setup: Germany's leading political press and the geo-political and economic research institutes and organizations are back in existence and are functioning again as under the Hitler regime.

Leading Nazi journalists, who played a prominent role under Dr. Goebbels and were the interpreters of Hitler's foreign pol-

icy, are today sitting in the editorial rooms of the reputable pro-Adenauer press. Dr. Rudolph Kircher, under Goebbels the editor-in-chief of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, is now editor of the *Deutsche Zeitung* in Stuttgart.

Dr. Gieselher Wirsing, former editor-in-chief of the Nazi paper *Munchener Neueste Nachrichten*, who was also the paymaster of the U.S. Nazi agent George Sylvester Viereck, is today editor of a leading political weekly. This paper has camouflaged its geo-political activities under a very innocent-sounding name, *Christ und Welt*. It was founded in 1947 by the same clique of Ribbentrop diplomats and geo-politicians in Stuttgart who had taken cover under the "Evangelical Relief Committee."

There is Dr. Karl Silex, another prominent Nazi journalist who publishes today the pro-Adenauer weekly *Deutsche Kommentare*. One of the "old hands" of pan-Germanism is Dr. Paul Rohrbach, who under the Kaiser helped to interpret Germany's "Drang nach Osten" (Drive to the East). Subsequently, he propagated Nazi foreign policy under Dr. Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Today he "explains" world political events under Dr. Adenauer.

Among the leading periodicals in Germany which carry on the old geo-political and Nazi ideologies are the following: the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik*; *Der Standpunkt*; *Nation Europa*; *Aussenpolitik*; *Ost-Europa*; and *Uebersee Rundschau*.

The very effective research and propaganda organizations of the Nazis are operating again. The notorious German Foreign Institute in Stuttgart, once the propaganda center for 30,000,000 "Volksgruppen" Germans, who were citizens of many lands, has been re-established as the "Institute for Foreign Relations." The new director is an old Nazi official, Dr. Franz Thierfelder. Formerly, the Nazis had one higher institution for foreign policy, the "Hochschule fuer Politik" in Berlin. Today there are three such organizations located in Berlin, Munich and in Dueseldorf. In addition, there is the Institute for History of National Socialism, the German Society for East European Problems, the

German Colonial Society, the Ibero-American Institute, and many others. The Carl Schurz Society is also functioning again. This organization played a decisive role in spreading Nazi propaganda in the U.S.A. under the leadership of the I. G. Farben director, Max Ilgner.

Many disciples of the German geo-politician General Haushofer have resumed operations, including such men as Dr. Klaus Mehnert, expert on Russia and Asia, Ernst Samhaber, the South American expert, Rupert von Schumacher, Dr. Heinz Kloss, Walter Pahl, Ferdinand Fried, etc.

Branching out from this hard core of geo-politicians and members of the former staffs of von Ribbentrop and Goebbels are the contacts to countless neo-Nazi organizations, research institutes, Officers' and Veterans' Societies, youth movements, flying clubs, Landsmen and Expellee Vereine, in which thousands of former Nazi officials and Wehrmacht officers have found a fertile soil for the old propaganda line that a new German Reich must have its "place in the sun."

The former Goebbels journalists and geo-politicians are today the main mouthpiece in the interpretation of Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy. Close contacts exist between the Geo-political Center in Madrid and those groups who are shaping and influencing today Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy. The recent discovery of a Nazi center in Switzerland revealed a broad network of contacts that has its ramifications not only in Germany but also in other countries.

It is edifying to compare the instructions which are issued from Madrid with the political views expounded by the German press not only in Western Germany but also in South and North America.

The main concern of the geo-political schemers in Madrid is that Europe should not become involved in a new war. According to the Madrid directives, Bonn's diplomacy must be conducted in such a way as to milk the United States as much as possible of money and resources, but never to commit Germany

to any irrevocable alliance with the West. If we compare the reputable German press with the Madrid policy blueprint, we will find, sometimes in a more subtle manner, the Madrid formula followed closely.

The Madrid Circular Letter contains the significant statement that German negotiators must, of course, have certain freedom of maneuvering in their dealings with the West. They should use promises and other devices in order to instill among the American negotiators the belief that Germany will fight on the side of the West against the East. They might even enter formal agreements in order to extort greater concessions or obtain more loans from the U.S.A., but they are admonished that they must always follow the basic policy of steering Germany and Europe clear from any entanglement of war on the side of the U.S.A. against the Soviet Union. The Circular Letter of the Geo-political Center in Madrid must have been used as a quasi directive for Adenauer's diplomacy because the Bonn Government is carrying out precisely the basic policies prescribed by the Madrid geo-politicians. Furthermore, the influence of the Madrid directive in the Bonn Government is also reflected in the discussions and editorials in the pro-Adenauer press.

The significant fact is that in spite of Washington's great eagerness for the reactivation of German manpower, the Bonn Government has handled the issue in such a cunning manner that up to date the United States has been unable to obtain from Germany the semblance of an armed force. Instead, the Adenauer Government has used the German "ghost army" since 1949 as a bargaining device to press relentlessly for political concessions. If the Bonn Government were honestly convinced that the danger of aggression was really threatening from the East, they would have told the German people and would have suggested an appeal to the masses that a few hundred thousand German ex-soldiers should voluntarily offer their services to the Western powers in order to help in the defense of German soil. Yet, the Adenauer Government does not regard the strengthening of the

Atlantic defense as the primary issue. Their aim is to regain German "Wehrhoheit," to eliminate the last feeble instrument of Western control over German affairs and to exploit America's diplomatic plight financially and politically. The guidepost in Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy was always: "The higher the difficulties pile up for the Americans, the more favorable becomes our prospects for successfully overcoming our defeat." Thus the directives given in the Madrid document were faithfully translated by the Bonn Foreign Office into practical politics.

Allied observers have stated that Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy follows a "grandiose concept" in the realm of world politics. In explaining his policies Dr. Adenauer has frequently stated that the main objectives are the unification of Europe and large-scale financial support from the United States, in order to make Germany again a going concern. Dr. Adenauer and his geo-political advisers place the main emphasis on the earliest creation of a United Europe with the help of billions of dollars from the American taxpayers.

In a recent interview, Dr. Adenauer stated that there is no alternative to his conception of a United Europe:

"It is a great mistake to think that the German military contribution is the main problem. The main issue is Europe herself. A United Europe would be a pressing need even if a Soviet danger did not exist."

In the same interview, Dr. Adenauer expounded the thesis that the age of national and sovereign states has come to an end, and that the future belongs to the great regional power blocs. As a matter of fact, Adenauer's ideas were advocated by the pan-Germans sixty years ago and they were rehashed more recently by Hitler.

In Dr. Adenauer's "grandiose concept" the second phase will be the consolidation of German economic, political and military hegemony over Europe, the expansion of German influence in Africa, followed by a close tie-up to the Arabic world and the

Latin American continent. Only after Germany has established a great third power bloc, acting in full independence of the East and the West, will she step into her third phase, which is foreseen as close political and economic cooperation with the East. Of course the Germans expect that Moscow will pay a high price for this cooperation. The Russians will pay that price because the realization of Dr. Adenauer's "grandiose concept" means the doom of Russia's present rival—the United States.

How do we know that Dr. Adenauer anticipates such a course of events? We know it from statements out of his own mouth, from his signed articles, from lapses of the tongue by his political camp followers, and from statements of the pro-Adenauer press.

Much of the hidden scheme became visible to the eyes of trained observers during the last two years, when the great debate in Germany was on between the promoters of the Adenauer policy for "integration" with the West, and the so-called school of "neutralism."

The pro-Adenauer press has frequently stated that the German Chancellor is the chief exponent of German "Machtpolitik" (*Stuttgarter Zeitung*, December 4, 1951). Dr. Adenauer prides himself on the fact that he is a great statesman of the stature of Bismarck. He is a shrewd political poker player, and plays for high stakes. He has the initiative and he uses his skill and will power to push things through. The French newspaper *Combat*, noting the similarity of Chancellor Adenauer's diplomacy with that of his predecessors Kaiser Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler, commented:

"Chancellor Adenauer has only one ambition: to follow in the footsteps of Bismarck and to bring others under his dictate."

Members of Dr. Adenauer's cabinet have often come out in favor of an aggressive German policy. His Minister for Unification, Jacob Kaiser, told the Catholic Party congress:

"No real Europe can be formed until the German bloc is reconstituted. I remind you that this bloc includes, in addition to Germany, Austria, a part of Switzerland, the Saar of course, and Alsace-Lorraine. When I think of the Strasbourg Cathedral, my heart hurts."

The Chancellor himself stated in a speech in July, 1951:

"The creation of a Europe which is politically and economically strong is the only path leading to the recovery of Germany's Eastern territories, which remains one of the essential goals of our activities."

On September 15, 1951, Dr. Hans Christian Seebohm, Minister of Commerce in the Adenauer cabinet, addressed a mass meeting of the Sudeten Germans at Stuttgart in which he spoke about the "monstrous crime the victors had committed against Germany, Europe and the whole world." He then pondered the question whether Germany must join the West or the West be dependent on Germany:

"Does free Europe want to join Germany? Germany is the heart of Europe, and the limbs must adjust themselves to the heart, not the heart to the limbs."

An illuminating picture of Germany's ambitious role in world politics was recently given in an article which appeared in the Swiss paper, *Wochen Zeitung*, of March 6, 1952, under the title: "Germany's aim for 1952." The article explained that Germany will not be content with the role of a satellite to the West. Declaring that the leading German industrialists learned their lesson during the last war, the article states that the potential of the Soviet Union has made a deep impression on German policy shapers. The industrial captains of the Rhine and the Ruhr, according to the *Wochen Zeitung*, have admitted that they "underestimated Russia's strength when they looked at the East through the ideological glasses of Nazism." Now, the German industrialists will follow their real interests, which they see best fostered

by collaboration with the East. While Chancellor Adenauer "has still to function as an ice breaker in order to remove the barrier that is blocking the road to full independence . . . the geo-politicians in the meantime have to study the problems and prepare the terrain for further diplomatic actions."

One of the leading magnates of the Ruhr told the paper:

"Indeed, Germany's prospects in the East are far more attractive than those which are offered us in the West."

The present situation, concludes the article, opens for Germany "many possibilities to reap rich bargains in her international negotiations." Russia's trump cards for Germany are the markets in the East and in Asia. In order to outbid Moscow, the West must "offer Dr. Adenauer a part in the colonial exploitation of Africa." Then the paper concludes:

"Stalin is willing to pay a high price for German neutrality . . . Seven years after unconditional surrender Germany holds most of the trump cards for the international poker game in her hands."

How does Dr. Adenauer plan to play his cards in his bid to unify Europe, attract huge American investments, and finally reach an understanding with Moscow? According to the geo-political planners in Madrid and in the Bonn Foreign Office, the United States has maneuvered herself into a trap through a "fatal mistake in the evaluation of the power potential of the European continent." Analyzing the American diplomatic debacle in Europe, the magazine *Der Spiegel* (February 13, 1952) has this to say:

". . . The banking group ('Konsortium') Harriman, Acheson, Draper, and McCloy intended to build a strong Germany into a strong Europe. However, the calculation on which they based their plans contains a fatal mistake . . . The Europeans, including the German potential, will never become strong enough to be able to stop a Soviet

invasion . . . Harriman and Acheson are deeply committed in their policies to strengthen Europe. In their opinion America's power politics stands or falls with its position in Europe . . . Harriman and Acheson risked the greatest unpopularity in order to keep up the principle of their Europe-First policy. If this policy, for which America has spent such a tremendous amount of money fails, then Truman, Harriman, and Acheson are finished for good."

It is the nearly unanimous opinion among German politicians and diplomats that the United States policy in Europe will end in a complete bankruptcy. Such a prognosis was already made in the circular letter of the Madrid Nazi Headquarters in September 1950. In that document, the German planners foretold that the Americans "after the failure of their amateurish policy in Asia will one day experience a far more painful and devastating smashup in Europe." Thus, by 1950, the Germans had concluded that the enormous difficulties confronting the United States would eventually "plunge the United States down from its present dizzy heights." While directing the Germans to grab as many billions of dollars from the United States as possible, the circular letter cautioned that under no circumstances should the Germans permit themselves to be committed to fight for American interests. By pursuing this tactic, geo-politicians in Madrid expressed confidence that Germany would be able to take over the leadership of Europe by isolating the United States and in this way create the principal conditions for a final agreement with the Soviet bloc.

Frequently leading German papers give veiled hints that the Chancellor's foreign policy is based on these tactics. On April 3, 1952, in the midst of the great debate about the Soviet Note on German re-unification, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the mouthpiece of the big Ruhr interests and the Bonn Foreign Office, stated in a front-page editorial:

"The Chancellor follows a tremendous bold plan: First re-armament, followed later on by talks with the Russians in

order to persuade them to remove their armies behind the Bug River. For this goal the Chancellor has been working tenaciously for some time. And because he sticks to his timetable, he is presently opposed to the Russian Note."

The meaning of these sentences is absolutely clear. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* tells its readers bluntly that Chancellor Adenauer is opposed to the Russian Note for German Reunification because in his opinion the moment for diplomatic talks with the Russians is premature. The geo-political planners in Dr. Adenauer's Foreign Office have set their course first on unification of Europe and in the process shaking down Uncle Sam for more billions of dollars. Only when the Germans have realized these plans for the creation of a Third Power Bloc will they feel the moment opportune to come to terms with the Soviets. It must be pointed out that this plan presupposes the political isolation and bankruptcy of the United States which will ultimately be crowned by an economic depression.

One wonders how such bold political plots can be openly discussed in leading German papers right under the noses of our Occupation authorities in Germany. The Adenauer blueprint of how to trap the United States was explained in detail on a full-page editorial in *Christ und Welt*, on November 1, 1951, under the headlines "German Foreign Politics in the Fall of 1951." The paper analyzed the four basic principles by which Dr. Adenauer's Foreign Policy is guided. The first principle is the duty to keep Germany and Europe out of war. The second one is the unification of Europe. The third one is European rearmament and the regaining of German equality ("Gleichberechtigung"). The fourth is re-unification of East and West Germany through a friendly agreement with Moscow.

It is clear that Dr. Adenauer's long-range foreign policy is set for a reorientation towards the East. German industry needs new markets and such outlets can only be offered by the Soviet Bloc. German diplomatic planning is motivated by a combina-

tion of economic and political schemes which in the end will create the long-desired Third Power Bloc. This political aim can only be accomplished by close cooperation with the rulers in Moscow.

The question arises: "Is Dr. Adenauer already involved in a secret deal with Moscow?" This question does not seem to be farfetched because the Bonn and Moscow diplomatic stratagems have given sufficient reason for suspicion.

It will be remembered that in the early part of 1949 secret meetings were held between German diplomats and industrialists which were addressed by the former German Ambassador in Moscow, Rudolf Nadolny. He had lived in the Soviet zone and according to newspaper reports was "used in the past by the Soviet Military Administration for compromise offers to the West." Among the participants of the secret meetings were such prominent personalities as Dr. Andreas Hermes, Dr. Hermann Puender and Professor Ludwig Erhard, all close friends and prominent co-leaders in Dr. Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union.

The reports about the secret negotiations between Count Nadolny and West German political and industrial key figures shocked United States officials. A half year later, when Dr. Adenauer was designated to become Chancellor of the newly created Federal Republic, he declared in an interview:

"We must move very cautiously. We ought not to give the impression, either in Germany or in the United States, that we shall collaborate in any way with the Russians."

Dr. Adenauer kept strictly to the line of this formula "not to give the impression . . ." In order to facilitate his "grandiose conception" of a diplomatic deal with the Americans, Dr. Adenauer had to prevent every move that could raise suspicion in the American mind. His task was to implant confidence among the Americans and to convince them that the Germans were full of hatred against the Russians and therefore trustworthy allies of

the West. In this diplomatic undertaking, Dr. Adenauer was successful to an amazing degree. He knew that without America's dollar grants and aids Germany's economic and political revival would have been impossible.

From the beginning, it was clear to Dr. Adenauer and his advisors that Germany would play a decisive role in Washington's containment plans, but he also knew that this would involve great dangers for Germany. In the fall of 1949, when Dr. Adenauer had become the first Chancellor of the Bonn Federal Republic, the Russians were vehemently opposed to all plans of German rearmament. Moscow declared bluntly that it would not tolerate German rearmament and that every German found in uniform would be shot as a partisan and conspirator.

When, at the outbreak of the Korean War, Washington pushed ahead with its plans to rearm the Germans, the Russian opposition had made such a deep impression on the German masses that the "Ohne Mich" movement became the genuine expression of German public opinion.

In the beginning of 1951 rumors were circulating among German political and industrial leaders that Moscow would welcome a secret understanding with Western Germany. A long list of events could be cited to prove that throughout 1951 Moscow pursued a policy of reconciliation between East and West Germany. We can safely assume that since the beginning of 1951, when West German industrial representatives had their secret talks in Moscow, a certain clandestine diplomatic contact was also established between the Adenauer Government and the Kremlin.

Diplomatic observers have wondered on what basis Dr. Adenauer, during the year 1951, could give firm assurances to the German public that Russia would not intervene in the proposed German rearmament within the framework of the Atlantic Pact Organization. Furthermore, in numerous editorials from Germany's leading newspapers, including the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Das Ganze Deutschland*, *Christ und Welt*, the

Russians were assured that they would have nothing to fear from German rearmament. These newspapers pointed out that, as a matter of fact, Russia's western borders would be greatly secured if the United States Armed Forces in Europe were replaced by a new German army. The German papers have even hinted that on this score there exists a perfect understanding between Russian interests and the diplomatic views of the Bonn Government.

In a review of events of the year 1951, Dr. Adenauer's mouthpiece, the *Rheinischer Merkur*, of January 4, 1952, pointed to the fact that the former widespread panic and fear of Russian aggression has completely receded due to "new facts which have taken the pressure from us." Then the paper stated: "The Chancellor had certain reasons to declare in his Christmas message that the threat for peace has lessened." Were the "new facts" of which the Adenauer paper spoke those which changed Russian policy towards the German problem, granting Germany reunification, remilitarization, full equality, freedom of trade and uncontrolled reinstatement of former Nazis and officers in public life? Did Dr. Adenauer have advance knowledge of Moscow's diplomatic bombshell? It is quite possible that Bonn and the Kremlin could have helped each other considerably in furthering their mutual diplomatic game by a secret understanding. This would explain also the fact why Moscow even encouraged Dr. Adenauer to continue his negotiations with the West, as was mentioned in the article in *Christ und Welt* of November 1, 1951.

The Russians could long ago have incorporated East Germany into the Soviet bloc for good. If they abstained from such a venture, they must have good reasons for it. Eastern Germany was certainly not a liability to the Russians but a source of good revenue. The 18 million Germans in the Eastern Zone worked hard and were exploitable. Therefore, why did the Russians decide to give Eastern Germany up, in face of the announced American plan to incorporate the Eastern Germans in a formi-

dable power unit together with West Germany? All German papers are convinced that Russia's offer for re-unification is seriously meant. Only Dr. Adenauer plays coy. Is that strange behavior part of his diplomatic game to put pressure on Washington in order to obtain a higher price from the West?

The diplomatic scene in Germany looks indeed very strange. We must bear in mind that Stalin already in May 1945 made an offer to the German people for unification and that similar offers followed in subsequent years.

Is it not clearly visible that Dr. Adenauer's diplomacy is shaped according to the blueprints of the geo-political planners in Madrid? As a clever tactician, Adenauer does not disclose his future plans to the Western powers. But nobody knows better than he that Germany cannot get along indefinitely on the crutches of financial assistance from the United States. As the political representative of the industrial captains of the Rhine and the Ruhr, he knows full well that Germany needs markets for her exports. These principal markets are in Russia, in Eastern Europe, in China and Southeast Asia. Therefore, Germany has to look towards the East for a solution of her future problems. In order to solve the problems of German Realpolitik, Adenauer has to strive for an immediate goal which at the same time will not hamper the realization of Germany's traditional long-range policy.

Exploiting American illusions while, at the same time, preserving the bridge leading to a rapprochement with the Soviets, is the heart of German policy today, as carried out by Chancellor Adenauer. An example of this diplomatic tightrope performance occurred during the period when the Contractual Agreement was up for consideration before the United States Senate in June 1952. At that time, U.S. High Commissioner McCloy and the State Department placed heavy pressure on the Senate to ratify the agreement promptly. Mr. McCloy's anxiety partially stemmed from the fact that Chancellor Adenauer, according to newspaper dispatches from Germany, had warned him that the

treaty must be signed and ratified as quickly as possible for, otherwise, the Chancellor would no longer be able to keep the German people in line vis-à-vis the luring offers of German re-unification coming from the Kremlin.

By raising this alarm, Dr. Adenauer strengthened Germany's bargaining position and forced our officials to move with such haste that the Senate was prevented from making a careful study of the voluminous treaty which consists of 400 typewritten pages. In contrast to Dr. Adenauer's arguments for the necessity of a speedy ratification of the Contractual Agreement, leading German newspapers, at the same time, were assuring the Kremlin in editorials that Bonn's long-range policy was directed with a view toward the establishment of German-Russo collaboration. For example, the influential *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, known for its close relations to the Bonn Foreign Office, stated editorially on May 30, 1952:

"We do not need to call the attention of the experienced men in the Kremlin to the fact that a strong and unified Western Europe can defend its independence against every side. Why should the Kremlin not be interested in such an independence? . . . If the world, which is split today in two parts, could be reshuffled into a number of independent power groups, it may prevent this horrible conflagration for mankind. A flexible and prudent Russian policy could, for instance, grant German reunification in exchange for the independence of Europe which could be defended against every side. In such a case the reunification of Germany would become a guarantee for peace. The treaties which are presently signed will not prove to be a curb toward reunification if the Russians remain interested in such a solution."

A few days later, in an editorial of June 5, 1952, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* declared:

"If we Germans would come to feel that the other powers, openly or tacitly, try to hinder German equality and re-

unification, the treaties would quickly turn out to have been built on quicksand. Our European neighbors must learn to forget their fear of the revival of German power . . . The fact that we are tied up with the NATO pact does not make it impossible for Europe, as soon as it is strong enough and the international situation has changed, to become one day independent from every side ('nach allen Seiten unabhaengig')."

Similar suggestions were made in other German newspapers. The political weekly, *Der Fortschritt*, representing the industrial interests of the Ruhr, published on May 16, 1952, an editorial under the significant title, "Courage Towards a Rapallo," from which we quote:

"Never before has the world political situation been so favorable for Germany as it is today . . . It is not for nothing that both power blocs concentrate their efforts on Germany in order to dominate it politically and economically. Therein lies our chance and our obligation. Our economy has to be kept independent from both sides . . . This is the way that leads towards sovereignty and equality which finally will eliminate all those clauses which were imposed upon us as a result of the lost war . . . While integration with the West restricts our industry to markets where we are subjected to a cut-throat competition, the Eastern bloc offers us markets where countless millions are hungry for our industrial goods. Here (in the East) is Germany's market. Here we have to sell our merchandise. Our industrialists should see to it that they do not arouse suspicions of being more interested in armament orders which usually bring a boom for a limited period only . . . Thirty years ago, on April 16, 1922, there were courageous men who, in Rapallo, through direct Russo-German negotiations brought a great turning point in Germany's post-war policy. . . . The situation in present day Germany should exhort our leading statesmen to show courage—courage towards a Rapallo Policy."

Few of the Senators who were responsible for recommending the treaty for ratification were aware of this strange contrast in German maneuverings. However, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, Senator Theodore Green did confront Commissioner McCloy with an excerpt from the editorial in the pro-Adenauer newspaper, *Christ und Welt*, which declared that Germany, in the name of a united Europe, would make an offer to the Kremlin that Continental Europe would break away from the Atlantic Pact if the Soviets would care to make territorial concessions on Germany's eastern frontier. This open manifestation of a policy of betrayal expressed by a leading political journal of the Adenauer camp was viewed by Mr. McCloy as unimportant and he added: "I simply say that this is not today the trend of German thinking."

In view of the editorial comment of leading German newspapers as quoted above, Mr. McCloy's statement might be easily adjudged as sheer wishful thinking. In any event, the overwhelming majority of the Senators who were called upon to ratify the Agreement were kept in the dark as to the real trend of German public opinion as reflected in the German press. Thus, through cunning maneuvering, German diplomacy was able to work both sides of the street. Dr. Adenauer succeeded in stampeding the United States into a hasty ratification, while, at the same time, the Russians received assurances that Germany's support for European integration was based on pure expediency and would ultimately be of advantage to both Russian and German interests.

When it was clear to the Germans that the State Department would have no trouble in obtaining a prompt ratification of the Contractual Agreement in the Senate, they seized this opportunity to demand new concessions as their price for ratification. The German press and leading German politicians joined in one chorus in denouncing the agreement as "another Versailles" and insisted on the immediate release of war criminals and on obtaining additional billions of dollars from the U.S. Treasury.

Even the pro-Adenauer press openly recommended that this was the time to insist on immediate revisions of the treaty and that ratification of the agreement would in no way prevent West Germany from coming to terms with the Russians.

Ordinarily, one would have expected the State Department to "stop, look and listen." However, having succumbed to Adenauer's bargaining strategy, our officials proceeded full steam ahead on the business of ratification, ignoring the danger signals. It is true that some Senators voiced concern whether the U.S.A. should have been the first to ratify the treaty. They pointed to reports from Germany that the Germans "are not going to be in any hurry to ratify these treaties." Again, Mr. McCloy came to the rescue of Chancellor Adenauer by assuring the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he had received "in the last 24 hours" from "direct contacts with the Cabinet and the Chancellor" assurances that all was well. Thus, the Senate went ahead and ratified an agreement which abolishes all effective controls over Germany's economic and political capabilities and has thereby created a situation where the Germans are now in a position to execute their strategic design based on a future agreement with the Soviets.

Mr. McCloy has not only failed to provide the Senators with the real facts concerning German public opinion, but he made another profound error in judgment for which, one day, other millions of American youths may have to pay with their lives. We quote from the stenographic record of the hearings:

SENATOR SMITH: Mr. McCloy, do you feel that these agreements when they are executed, will tend to calm down the upsurge of the old Nazi points of view?

MR. MC CLOY: I think so. I firmly believe that with the fundamental non-Nazi attitudes which exist today in Germany, and when they are buttressed by a closer association of the Germans with the free peoples of the

West, the influence of the Nazis will decrease rather than increase.

Every informed observer of the political scene knows that Mr. McCloy's reply to Senator Smith's query is contrary to the facts. Indeed, if the Senators had made a thorough investigation of this question, they would have found overwhelming evidence attesting to the fact that Germany is in the process of being re-Nazified. German nationalism, as every informed observer knows, is on the upsurge. The Prussian militarist and Hitler's generals are coming back to power. Thousands of Nazi war criminals have been or are being released and many of them have reappeared in positions of power. Neo-Nazi movements are gaining strength daily and many of them boast that by 1956 a Nazi dictatorship will be re-established. As a matter of fact, Dr. Adenauer's coalition cabinet is anchored on two right-wing parties of the German industrial war lords who fattened themselves on Hitler's wars of conquest. This is a picture decidedly at variance with Mr. McCloy's description of "democracy" in Germany.

The consequences of our unrealistic policy in Germany may lend itself to a similar catastrophe as we experienced a few years ago in China. This fear was expressed by one of the most alert and farsighted among the foreign policy experts in the U.S. Senate, Senator Guy M. Gillette (D.—Iowa), who, on April 17, 1950, introduced a resolution calling on President Truman to appoint a Commission in order to re-examine our German policy.

Two days later, Senator Gillette, in a speech at the Town Hall in New York, warned:

"A day of reckoning will come over Germany just as it came over China. I suspect that the resulting explosion in the U.S. will make the outcry on China seem like a pleasant afternoon tea.

"For in Germany it will be seen that we have not only lost the second world war—and that the Nazis, rather than we,

were the victors—but that we have, unconsciously, prepared the way for us to lose a third world war if it comes.”

Unfortunately, the German problem is regarded as tabu in the State Department and in the Pentagon. Up to now, the American people have had to swallow every blunder of our policy shapers, and the taxpayers are confronted with the “necessity” to pump billions of dollars into feeding this Frankenstein. Yet, after the Germans have squeezed from us all possible concessions, after they have extorted additional billions of dollars and after we have relinquished important rights of control, the Germans will turn their backs on us and start their bargaining with the Kremlin. Such a development would not only spell the doom of our whole containment policy in Europe, but it would also result in a new threat by a German-dominated Third Power Bloc.

From the military victory of 1945, we have gone a long way towards losing the peace. Unless the United States casts away the hypnotic spell so artfully created by the “Old Fox,” Dr. Adenauer, the trap will be sprung.

[16]

Our German Appeasement Policy

DURING THE WAR THE GERMAN GEO-POLITICIANS DECLARED that if the campaign is lost *militarily* in Europe, the war must be won *politically* in the United States. Recalling how successful they had been after 1918 they were confident that they could repeat those accomplishments.

The geo-politician Dr. Colin Ross, who was the “Amerika” expert in Ribbentrop’s Foreign Office, suggested in his memorandum of July, 1943, that “the more the prospects of military victory diminish, the more urgent becomes the necessity for all-out psychological warfare.” An ideological offensive in the USA was recommended by Dr. Ross as “the order of the day.”

It is true that after each World War the victors made elaborate plans to demilitarize Germany. Yet the plans of the victors fell through. Why did they fail? The usual explanation is that the

war-time alliance after the cessation of hostilities "fell apart" because of basic contradictions within the Allied camp. However, this is only part of the answer for it does not take into account the active role of Germany in bringing about this split.

The captured German Foreign Office files contain a wealth of evidence on this score. Moreover, the files show that from 1943 to 1944 the diplomats in the Wilhelmstrasse felt absolutely sure that Germany, if defeated, would enjoy the protection of influential circles in the United States.

The Germans based their hope on the experience after World War I when German power was also resurrected mainly with the financial, diplomatic and propagandistic help of certain powerful groups in the U.S.A. In addition, they knew that the network that German agents had built up under Hitler in the U.S. remained relatively intact. Germany's influential friends in the U.S.A. had only temporarily restrained their pro-German activities after Pearl Harbor. They came out into the open when it became necessary to agitate in public for forgiveness towards Germany and to safeguard Germany's war potential.

Germany's success in overcoming military defeat is the fruit of German geo-political planning. The essentials of the pan-German scheme for world power were clearly recognized as early as fifty years ago by Theodore Roosevelt. Yet, it took the lesson of the Second World War for Western statesmen to recognize the main features of Germany's master plan. Germany had always applied the old principle of "divide and conquer." As after the First World War, Germany was the sole profiteer of disunity among the Allies after World War II. Our European Allies have not fared well under our post-war policy toward Germany. In addition, the French are exhausted, and the British are weakened. The United States, the most powerful victor at the end of the war, is laboring under great strain because it has over-extended its commitments. On the other hand, defeated Germany is now in a position to start afresh. Thus, the great American experiment of establishing a secure and peaceful

world may end in failure in Europe as it has in Asia. Germany, caught red-handed in the greatest crime of recorded history, was not made harmless. Within a short time, she will be set free to resume her intrigues and her diplomacy of the jungle. If it is true that Germany's resurgence is partially the result of a conscious plan to split her adversaries, how does it happen that U.S. policy in the post-war period played into the hands of the former enemy?

Since Roosevelt's death, fundamental aspects of our foreign policy have been shaped or influenced by a small circle in the Pentagon, composed mostly of top-level military planners and big-business representatives who served at that time in the Pentagon. This group, from the beginning, opposed Roosevelt's post-war policy which aimed to render Germany harmless once and for all. A few days after Roosevelt's death, his plans for Germany were dropped, and as Drew Pearson revealed in his column of April 25 and 26, 1945, the inside group "favored a soft peace for Germany with a view to making her a bulwark against Russia after the war." Instead of Roosevelt's post-war program, the Pentagon adopted ex-President Herbert Hoover's thesis of a "cooling-off period" and of a soft peace for Germany. A few months later the policy shaping group in the Pentagon found a political platform in the theories of a young State Department official, George F. Kennan, who had spent many years in Germany where he had absorbed the techniques and concepts of German geo-politics.

Early in 1946 George Kennan had attracted the attention of top officials in Washington with a memorandum on Soviet foreign policy:

"This dispatch was considered so lucid that Kennan was recalled to Washington to act as State Department deputy in the newly reorganized National War College. His lectures on international affairs quickly became 'musts' for all high-ranking officers in the armed forces."

(United Nations World—*March 1952*)

According to the well-informed *U.S. News and World Report* of July 25, 1947, George Kennan's ideas had "a profound influence" upon the decisions which led to policy changes in Germany and Japan:

"Under the new policies, the German people will get a chance to recover and to rebuild their industries, subject to supervision. That will be true as far as U. S. can influence policy. Steel capacity will be raised to at least 12,000,000 tons."

After the Kennan formula of rebuilding Germany as a "bulwark against the East" had been adopted, all the subsequent decisions made by the leading men in the Pentagon were carried out in accordance with this view. Yet this premise was a fallacy from the very beginning.

The top officials in the State Department were, in 1945, thoroughly aware of the issues involved. They knew that the German High Command, in 1943-1944, had made extensive preparations for a continuation of political warfare against the Allies after the anticipated military collapse. The State Department had also ample evidence in its files, showing that German authorities had laid the groundwork in foreign countries for the continuation of activities of German political brain trusts and for the preservation of Germany's economic war potential. That the Germans had also made plans for the continuation of German scientific research in foreign countries was also known to the State Department.

After Roosevelt's death, little of significance was done by the State Department to clarify the vital issue of Germany. The documents on Germany's post-war planning, supposedly in the safes of the State Department, were never made public. But a point was reached where even the policy-shapers in the State Department became skeptical about the direction of our foreign policy. In 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes made a last attempt to compromise between the course of a one-sided pro-German

policy and the political realities in our relations towards Russia and the friendly powers in Western Europe. Secretary Byrnes saw clearly the dangerous consequences arising from a resurrection of German power.

In order to eliminate Russian fears as well as the suspicions in London and Paris, Mr. Byrnes suggested, on October 3, 1946, a program of Allied control over the whole of Germany for a period of 40 years:

"Twice in our generation doubt as to American foreign policy has led other nations to miscalculate the consequences of their actions. Twice in our generation that doubt as to American foreign policy has not brought peace, but war.

"That must not happen again.

"France, which has been invaded three times in the last 75 years by Germany, naturally does not want to be in doubt as to American foreign policy towards Germany.

"To dispel any doubt on that score the United States has proposed that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States shall enter into a solemn treaty not only to disarm and demilitarize Germany but to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized for 40 years. And the treaty can be extended if the interests of international peace and security require.

"The treaty I proposed on behalf of the United States contains all the provisions of that agreement. It provides that all German armed forces, all para-military forces, and all the auxiliary organizations shall be kept demobilized. It provides further that the German General Staff and the staffs of any para-military organizations shall be prohibited and no German military or para-military organizations in any form or disguise shall be permitted in Germany. It provides for the complete and continued demilitarization of her war plants and for a continuing system of quadripartite inspection and control to make certain that Germany does not rearm or rebuild her armament plants or reconvert her civilian industries for war.

"So long as such a treaty is in force the Ruhr could never become the arsenal of Germany or the arsenal of Europe. That is a primary objective of the proposed treaty.

"The United States is firmly opposed to the revival of Germany's military power. It is firmly opposed to a struggle for the control of Germany which would again give Germany the power to divide and conquer. It does not want to see Germany become a pawn or a partner in a struggle for power between the East and the West."

(*Department of State*—Publication 2670.)

In retrospect, we see clearly that the Byrnes plan was the last attempt for the creation of a constructive U.S. post-war policy. At that time we still had a tremendous bargaining power against a weakened Russia, and we also had a big stick in order to enforce proper conduct on defeated Germany.

Byrnes was looking for a stabilizing element in our foreign policy. He was aware of the danger inherent in a policy based on wishful thinking and expediency. Unfortunately, after Byrnes our diplomacy became prisoner of that very policy.

Byrnes' attempts to reach a settlement with the Russians were opposed by the policy shapers in the Pentagon. One of the chief opponents of the Byrnes formula for a compromise with the Soviets was George F. Kennan, who held the position of Deputy for Foreign Affairs at the National War College during 1946.

After Byrnes was replaced by General Marshall as Secretary of State, the main policy shaping job in the State Department was put into the hands of George Kennan. As director of the Policy Planning Staff and Counselor to the State Department, he became the de facto Secretary of State. Together with the military, this young diplomat completely reversed the original program for Germany.

In the foreword of his book *American Diplomacy*, Kennan declares that "it fell to me to bear a share of the responsibility for forming the foreign policy of the United States in the difficult years following World War II."

George Kennan was a leading spirit among those in the Pentagon and in the State Department who were dabbling in the geo-political theories of General Haushofer. They were overawed by Haushofer's dictum that Germany was the key to Europe. Perhaps this may explain the strange attitude of Mr. Kennan even after Pearl Harbor. When Kennan was interned with other American diplomats in the Grand Hotel at Bad Nauheim, Germany, he gave lectures in which he expounded the thesis that Germany's defeat "would extinguish the 2,000 year old history of European civilization." (*Der Spiegel*, Hanover, December 5, 1951.)* During his years of study at Heidelberg and at the "Hochschule fuer Politik" in Berlin, he was taught to believe the geo-political gospel that Germany was the "bulwark against the East," and that without a strong Germany, the world would become a shambles.

* The report that an American diplomat should, in 1942, have deplored the possible defeat of an enemy who had ruthlessly engineered the attack and declared war on the United States, seemed so unbelievable to the author that he asked Mr. Kennan as well as the editors of *Der Spiegel* whether this particular incident was correctly reported.

In a letter to the author of August 19, 1952, Mr. Kennan did not reject the possibility that he could have made such a statement, but he pointed to a lack of recollection:

"The account of the lectures which I gave to my fellow internees at Bad Nauheim is somewhat inaccurate. It is true that I lectured to them about Russian history, but I never got beyond Catherine the Great, and I recall no discussion of contemporary problems as described in *Der Spiegel* article."

The editor-in-chief of *Der Spiegel* declared in a letter to the author, dated October 29, 1952:

"In regard to your inquiry about the Kennan discussion at Bad Nauheim, we can assure you that we received this information from a reliable person—an official of the former German Foreign Office—who had been especially assigned to take care of the interned personnel of the American Embassy in Berlin. After our staff members had an opportunity to talk extensively with Mr. Kennan about the article published in our magazine, we have no reason to doubt the accuracy of our source in regard to the reported events at Bad Nauheim."

It is known that some of Germany's leading geo-politicians have boasted of the close relations they had at one time or another with George Kennan. From these German geo-political writers we know that Kennan shared their opinion on major political problems. His outlook on world affairs was partially influenced by his education in Germany. He was born in Wisconsin in 1904, but he spent part of his formative years in Germany. The *New York Times* of December 11, 1949, reported that George Kennan "did post-graduate studies at the University of Heidelberg, the University of Berlin, the Oriental Seminary, and the Hochschule fuer Politik in Berlin." All these institutions were well-known for teaching extreme pan-German and geo-political doctrines.*

It seems that Kennan's views on Germany have been colored by the historical "truths" propounded at the Hochschule fuer Politik in Berlin. It is well known that this kind of "history" was tailored in Germany for foreign consumption and it had, during the twenties, its deepest impact on the "revisionist" school in the United States.

In order to discern clearly the elements on which "America's diplomatic Chief of Staff" built our foreign policy, it is necessary to trace in Kennan's book *American Diplomacy* his attitude toward Germany, the same Germany whose demoniacal spirit and

* The case of George Kennan is only one example of the influence of German thinking and education on diplomats, political leaders, and military men who have thought and acted along the geo-political tracks in which they were brought up and nourished in their formative years. There is little difference whether they were educated in Germany by pan-German professors or in the United States by professors with pan-German leanings. The influence of German education and its political consequences have been clearly visible for a long time in the U.S., Latin America and in many countries of Europe. The effects of German education have been well analyzed by Professor John L. Brown of Catholic University of Washington, D.C., who in an article in the *Journal of Legal and Political Sociology* traced the pan-German ideology in the United States to the growing German influence in the cultural and educational spheres of this country.

lust for power brought the free world to the brink of disaster twice within a generation.

Kennan, discussing the origins of both world wars, does not bother to make a critical analysis of Germany's war-making forces. The doctrine of pan-Germanism which dominated the saber-rattling policy of Imperial Germany is totally ignored by him. The documentary evidence attesting to Germany's guilt with regard to World War I is not mentioned. Kennan absolves Germany from being the main culprit of World War I by declaring: "You could not say that anyone had deliberately started the war or schemed it."

The following statement from Kennan's book has been especially emphasized in important sections of the German press:

"Both wars were fought, really with a view to changing Germany: to correcting her behavior, to making the Germans something different from what they were. Yet, today, if one were offered the chance of having back again the Germany of 1913—a Germany run by conservative but relatively moderate people, no Nazis and no Communists, a vigorous Germany, united and unoccupied, full of energy and confidence, able to play a part again in the balancing-off of Russian power in Europe—well, there would be objections to it from many quarters, and it wouldn't make everybody happy; but in many ways it wouldn't sound so bad, in comparison with our problems of today. Now, think what this means. When you tally up the total score of the two wars, in terms of their ostensible objective, you find that if there has been any gain at all, it is pretty hard to discern. Does this not mean that something is terribly wrong here? . . . We can only assume some great miscalculations must have been made somewhere." (*American Diplomacy*, p. 55)

Having paid his highest respect to the Germany of the Kaiser, Kennan glosses over the serious political defections of the Weimar Republic with the following remark:

"Events have moved so fast that we have almost lost sight of this intensely interesting period in German history—the period before 1933, with its amazing cultural and intellectual flowering, so full of hope and yet so close to despair. In the decade of the twenties, Berlin was the most alive of the capitals of Europe, and things were taking place there from which the Western democracies might have derived profit and instruction." (p. 80)

In clarifying the origins of World War II, it is absolutely irrelevant to dwell on the "cultural and intellectual flowering" in Germany. The point in question is only Germany's political honesty and reliability, and whether or not she was guilty of both world wars. Yet there is not a word of criticism in Mr. Kennan's book against the secret war preparations and the insidious foreign policies of the Weimar Republic under Drs. Wirth and Stresemann, and there is no mention of how Hitler was pampered and nourished by the financial and industrial circles, and the militaristic plotters in the Republic. In spite of the fact that we put defeated Germany back on her feet and restored her war potential to the tune of billions of dollars, Kennan blames America for not having given "greater understanding, support and encouragement to the moderate forces in the Weimar Republic." It is the same old illusion that with more favors, with greater concessions, and with additional billions of dollars you could satisfy the appetite of the always insatiable German eagle.

The world-shaking event of Hitler's aggressions is only dealt with superficially. Kennan's book is a belated justification for American isolationism. He is pained by the "great mistakes of the Western statesmen . . . which had permitted the development of a situation so grievously and fatefully 'loaded' against Western interests." And he adds:

"The thought at once suggests itself that the best way to win so inauspicious a war might have been to find some way in which one would not have had to fight it at all." (p. 77)

Kennan actually blames the Western powers for a development in Germany where "the German people found itself in such a frame of mind that it could, without great resistance or remonstrance, accept a Hitler as its leader and master." Having thus freed the Germans from responsibility for accepting the Fuehrer, Kennan blames the West for not having implemented a policy which "might have enforced a greater circumspection on the Nazi regime and cause it to *proceed more slowly with the actualization of its time table.*" [italics supplied]

Completely overlooking the inherent war-making forces in Germany, Kennan innocently asks "whether World War II was not perhaps implicit in the outcome of World War I." He has an answer for this too:

"Looking at these things, it is easy to conclude that World War II just could not help to develop, that it was nothing more than the inevitable aftermath of World War I." (p. 78)

There is not a word in Mr. Kennan's book about the outrages of German militarism during World War I or a condemnation of the unspeakable crimes committed against millions of innocent people by Nazi Germany. However, he blames the Western powers for their attitude of "distaste and suspicion" against Germany, "intermingled with a sort of social snobbery so grotesque that as late as 1927 a German could still be prohibited from using the golf links at Geneva, the seat of the League of Nations."

Here, the discrimination against a German on the golf course in Geneva, whether it ever happened or not, is duly noted, but the intoxicated frenzy of "Deutschland Uber Alles," the torture chambers, the extermination ovens, the murder of one million two hundred thousand Jewish children, and of many millions of other European peoples is not even mentioned in Mr. Kennan's book.

No wonder that this kind of "history," seen through the glasses of the Hochschule fuer Politik, could only end up in the resurgence of a strong Germany. Kennan declared in his book that he felt "very unhappy" about the conferences in Moscow, Teheran and Yalta in which Germany's fate was sealed. Was it then not logical for him, therefore, that when he became the most influential policy shaper in Washington, his immediate aim was to build Germany up again as the power house of Europe?

The *New York Times* of October 4, 1952, stated that Kennan's position as Director of the State Department Planning Staff made him "more than any other single person the architect of our foreign policy."

When George Kennan developed his containment policy, it was basically the sound application of the formula "no more appeasement." It was put to work only against Russia, but not against Germany. In regard to Germany, Kennan always favored a policy of appeasement. It was this policy that finally paved Germany's way out from defeat and again made Germany the strongest power on the continent. This policy will finally open the door to the coming rapprochement between Germany and the East. Kennan's policy deprived the United States of the "big stick," because his recommendation that we curry favor with the Germans in the cold war and that diplomatic intercourse with the Russians should be held at a minimum, provided the Bonn Government with an absolute guarantee that it could demand concessions from the United States without end. Thus, our containment policy towards Russia became simultaneously the basis for the successful operation of the blackmail policy pursued by the Bonn Government.

The Germans could only become the winners of the cold war because our policy was shaped and conducted in a way which, with mathematical certainty, had to end in a triumph for German geo-political planning. In the Madrid Circular Letter

of September 1950, the geo-politicians boast that Germany's quick resurrection was the consequence of their "superb planning," which caused "the first broad cracks in the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements":

"It is our great asset in the ledger of geo-political schooling and planning that five years after Potsdam, the aims of our enemies have been abandoned, Germany's strength has been preserved, and the Fatherland can look forward to a revival rich in possibilities. The revival of Germany was not a gift of the Americans but exclusively the result of our own far-sighted planning. . . . Five years after Potsdam, the Yankees are stuck deep in the mud; they are now seeking the advice of our generals whom they formerly called criminals; they come pleading for our help against Russia.

"The American policy of reconciliation with Germany was very advantageous because it gave us a breathing spell at the very beginning; it was precisely this policy which smashed the allied front. . . . Only Roosevelt's death opened the way to those forces who advocated a positive or, at least, a more moderate program towards Germany, and whose blueprint for a post-war world were entirely opposed to that of Roosevelt. These circles recognized in the Russian victory a strengthening of Communism, and they feared its complications and the shattering effects it entailed for the capitalistic system.

"These considerations resulted in a plan—first formulated secretly in Washington and later openly discussed, aiming at the creation of a united Europe as a bulwark against Russia with the proviso that a strengthened and rearmed Germany be incorporated in such a combination."

The fantastic result of German geo-political planning becomes clearly visible if we compare the following two sets of policies: the plan which Hitler and his General Haushofer once devised for the "Greater Germany," and the Pentagon-Kennan blueprint for a resurrected Reich.

HITLER-HAUSHOFER <i>Blueprint for Germany</i>	PENTAGON-KENNAN <i>Blueprint for Germany</i>
1. Liquidation of the Versailles Treaty.	1. Liquidation of the Potsdam Agreement.
2. German equality (Hitler's demand for "Gleichberechtigung").	2. German equality (Dr. Adenauer's demand for "Gleichberechtigung").
3. A prosperous German Economy.	3. A prosperous German Economy.
4. A powerful German Army.	4. Powerful German Armed Forces.
5. Economic integration of Europe with Germany.	5. Economic integration of Europe with Germany.
6. A strong European continent with Germany as the "bulwark against the East."	6. A strong European continent with Germany as the "bulwark against the East."
7. Build-up of Africa as a German-European hinterland.	7. Build-up of Africa as a German-European hinterland.

The first six points of the Pentagon-Kennan blueprint for Germany will be readily accepted by every newspaper reader because they constitute the often discussed basic formula of our post-war policy on Germany. If point seven seems to be vague, we refer the reader to the evidence on the German-Africa plan, presented in Chapter IX.

There is one feature in the Pentagon-Kennan blueprint which stands out as a novelty if we compare it with the original Hitler-Haushofer plan. Under Hitler, the financial burden for build-

ing up the German armed forces had to be carried entirely by the German taxpayer, and only later on was to be supported by the systematic plunder of the subjugated European nations. Under the Pentagon-Kennan plan the bill for Germany's resurrection "must be paid by Uncle Sam," as the pro-Adenauer press has stated with bold cynicism. And that is exactly what we are doing.

The Pentagon-Kennan blueprint for the rebuilding of Germany as a strong military power has become a nightmare for the nations in Europe. "Beware of Germany!" is the cry that echoes in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris as well as in the press all over Europe. The current plan for a resurrected Germany is not regarded by the Europeans as a means of protection, but as the opening of a new road towards aggression. No matter how great the fear of Communist aggression might ever be, the possibility that Germany will again become the master over Europe stirs up the memories of the recent horrors to which free Europeans were subjected. With the help and pressure of the United States, Germany may attain that tremendous position of power in Europe and Africa which she could not accomplish through the powerful Juggernauts of the Kaiser and der Fuehrer. The German schemers in Madrid are jubilant about the geo-political perspectives of the future:

"In this extended transitory period, it should prove possible for Germany to build up a new political bloc ('neue politische Einheit') out of Europe, Africa and Latin America. The economic advantages and the political possibilities in such a new power combination would put the United States against the wall. It would then depend entirely on our diplomatic and propaganda finesse when and how we would take over an America enfeebled by its foreign and domestic policies." (Madrid Circular Letter.)

It is a tragedy for the United States and the free world that the German geo-politicians were correct in their contemptuous

assessment of the inexperience of our Washington policy shapers. The clever Germans succeeded in selling their vicious schemes in the disguise of "American geo-politics." In the Madrid Circular letter they boast:

"We are not wholly innocent in the shift of America's post-war policy . . . Future historians will one day reveal the great vision with which responsible leaders of the Third Reich created with confident determination those measures which subsequently smashed the united front of the enemy and made Germany again a much desired partner in a new politico-strategic alliance . . . Thanks, however, to our correct decisions, the situation has changed entirely today. We are now once again in the position to influence the turn of events—today we are again making history. . . ."

Are the Germans wrong in their evaluation of post-war history? Are they not on the way to "possess unitedly" Europe and Africa? Germany's final triumph will sound the death knell not only of free Europe, but also of a free and independent America.

[17]

At the Crossroads . . .

AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THE FOREGOING CHAPTERS attesting to the fact that the Germans, due to their superior geo-political planning, are emerging as the political victors of World War II. As revealed in the German documents, Germany's political leaders show a great respect for the tougher Russians whereas they speak with utter contempt of the Americans, who, because of their unrealistic political attitudes, are regarded as "suckers."

The architects of our post-war policy have failed to recognize the flaws in their theories, though the Germans are fully aware of them. It is time that we discard the blinders which have led us to the present impasse. When we understand the fallacies underlying the present policy, we will then be in a position to devise a new approach to the German problem.

First of all, it is preposterous to believe that Germany, after having recently committed the greatest crime in history, could change within a few years into a peaceful and democratic nation or become a reliable ally of the Western world. How can Western statesmen, after decades of dreadful experiences with Germany, trust the lawless with a policeman's job?

Why did responsible statesmen assume that Germany would not again use her double talk, her trickery, and her intrigues in order to disrupt the unity of the West, to extort concessions without end from the victors and—"at the decisive moment"—would not hesitate to switch over to Moscow? Our failure to be on guard invited the consequences we now face.

The facts on Germany and the historic forces which made her an aggressive nation were clearly understood during World War II. The United States then resolved that it must not happen again. Our political leaders, many historians, experts on foreign affairs, and newspapermen with long and intimate experience in German politics, have told us repeatedly that Germany came back as an aggressive power, due to our failures after 1918. Hundreds of newspaper editorials, and articles, and United States policy statements, testify that during the last war the American people were firmly resolved that Germany must never again have a chance to disturb the peace. The former Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles discussed in his book *The Time for Decision* the stubbornness with which the German people had always followed their military leaders, and their obsession that "the master race will ultimately triumph."

He adds:

"It must be admitted that almost every act of the Allied nations, subsequent to 1918, strengthened this determination on the part of the German people. The policies of the Western nations played right into the hands of the German military authorities . . . Allied support was given time and again to the old line military organizations because it was thought that these alone could prevent Germany from going

Communist! . . . If the Allied Governments in the year 1919 had frankly gone into partnership with the German General Staff, in order to help it carry out its designs, they could not have succeeded better."

Sumner Welles' criticisms of Allied policy after World War I apply with equal force to what we are attempting today with regard to Germany's economic and military revival.

Walter Lippmann, one of our most experienced analysts in international affairs, stated during the war that American public opinion had become the victim of all kinds of fables and illusions regarding the German problem and that Allied mistakes after World War I were really responsible for the fact that Germany was able to restore her military power "on a scale greater than the Kaiser ever dreamed of." Mr. Lippmann further declared:

"I hasten to state that I shared all these illusions at the time and that it is by no means easy even now to find out what really happened." (*New York Herald Tribune, May 16, 1944.*)

In several of his columns in 1944, Mr. Lippmann named as the greatest misconception of the Allies after World War I, the naïve belief that Germany could be used as a "bulwark against Bolshevism." He warned strongly against repeating this error and stated:

"The paramount object of the settlement with Germany must be to prevent Germany from dominating the Continent and thereby holding the balance of power between the Western Democracies and the Soviet Union . . . For the Germans, to whom the mastery of the Continent is the supreme goal, the war would not have been fought in vain. If thirty years hence Germany dominates Europe and thus holds the balance of power between Russia and the English-speaking nations, German historians will not count this war as a true defeat."

(*Herald Tribune, March 30, 1944.*)

This is a truly prophetic statement. The only difference between the reality of today and Mr. Lippmann's fears of a resurrected Germany lies in the timetable. Walter Lippmann would never have dreamed that Dr. Adenauer could declare, five years after Germany's defeat, that Germany must lead a Third Power Bloc to hold "the balance of power between Western democracies and the Soviet Union."

If World War II was the result of the failures of Allied policy after 1918, as these experienced observers stated, what will then be the outcome of our present mistakes which are far greater than those committed by the Western powers between 1919 and 1939?

In previous chapters, it was shown how the realistic program for post-war Germany was virtually scrapped shortly after President Roosevelt died. The new approach was essentially no different from the Allied treatment of Germany after World War I. Those occupation officials who were responsible for the "new look" had accepted the German "line" that only Germany could be depended upon to block Moscow's drive toward the West. They had ignored completely the fact that the Germans, regardless of differing political faiths, were united in one principle, that is: Germany's special interest must be served above all else.

It is now becoming clear that the Pentagon-Kennan blueprint for Germany is undermining our position in that country. Let us recapitulate some of the many mistakes that our policy shapers made at the very beginning of our Occupation. Some of our leading generals thought that Nazism was not so bad and they did not regard the Nazi party as being very much different from the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. Consequently, premature elections were arranged in Germany on the theory that they would automatically infuse the German people with the democratic spirit. In the early days of the Occupation we preached a unified Germany, believing that the Germans would appreciate our solicitude. In like manner,

we extended a helping hand to an assortment of generals, geologists, Ribbentrop schemers, scientists, and technicians. This was followed with a general amnesty to millions of Nazis without prior investigation as to their fitness to return to public life. A "free press" was established for the Germans as another step in the so-called democratization program. However, this press has given its reply in the many articles and editorials which attack the Allies and in a subtle way encourage plots against the Occupation. These actions were capped by a multibillion-dollar rehabilitation program financed by American taxpayers to rebuild Germany's heavy industries. We created unprecedented prosperity in Germany, while the British and other Allied powers stewed in "austerity."

Of all the fallacious steps and plans we devised in regard to Germany, the following three proved to be the most dangerous to our own future:

- a) *The resurrection of an expanded German heavy industry.*
- b) *The plan for a United Europe with Germany as its main pillar.*
- c) *The reactivation of the German military caste and the planned building up of a new German army.*

The creation of a united Europe dominated by a people still obsessed by the traditions of aggressive pan-Germanism is tantamount to suicide for the free world. Twice within a generation, the USA went to war and made great sacrifices in blood and treasure in order to prevent the realization of the pan-German scheme. Now we are confronted with a program that yields to the Germans the very objectives for which the Kaiser and der Fuehrer warred in vain.

From the military point of view, limited rearmament of Germany will be of no value because it cannot defeat the overwhelming military might of the Soviets. Yet, if we create in Europe a strong military power in which Germany constitutes the backbone, this will become a threat to all.

There is another great psychological error in the Pentagon-Kennan blueprint. It is the height of naïveté to think that the Germans could appear as the "liberators" among the nations of Eastern Europe or in Russia. There is still the stench of the twenty million tortured and gassed human beings, the memory of the tens of thousands of destroyed villages and towns, and all the horrors with which the German master-race terrified the nations in the East. The rearming of the Germans by the United States is the surest way to unite 150 million people in Eastern Europe and 200 millions in Russia solidly behind Stalin. This development will also have its adverse effect on the free nations of Europe. Indeed our German policy acts as a spur rather than a deterrent to the growth of Communistic influence in the West.

From the strategic point of view, the resurrection of a strong Germany is also a cardinal error. Strength must never be created on the periphery, and not at all in an exposed strategic position such as Germany's.

From the commercial point of view, our efforts to build up Germany as a powerful competitor on the world market is shortsighted in the extreme. By giving the Germans excessive economic power and capacity, we are setting up a most dangerous and ruthless competitor who will use every opportunity to undermine and sap our economic strength. We must bear in mind that the rebuilding of German industry after World War I, with the help of American dollars, not only gave Hitler the basis for an army, but, after his defeat, opened the gates to Communist expansion. The prospect of German economic power breaking up the containment policy is before us. German industry will look out for markets and the Russians can offer German industry prosperous deals in Eastern Europe and in China. These are the fundamental flaws in our present policy toward Germany. If they were eliminated, the policy itself would have to go.

We have shown in the previous chapters that the Pentagon-

Kennan policy helps in fact to realize the plans which our most revengeful enemies, the German geo-political plotters and the Ribbentrop diplomats, proposed during and after the war. The free peoples of Europe and we in the United States are confronted with a daily mounting danger: The resurrection of a "new" Germany that continues to fight for the very goals set down by Hitler . . . From the German plans we know what is in store for us: The creation of a new Third Power bloc, stretching over Europe and the whole of Africa and branching out to Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The New Third Power bloc will bring, according to German plans, the economic ruin of the Anglo-Saxon world and ultimately "put the United States against the wall."

The urgency of the problem needs an immediate re-examination of our basic policies on Germany. It is clear that we are rapidly approaching a crisis and we shall have only ourselves to blame if we are unprepared to meet it. This is not the time for recriminations. It is time for action based on fact—and fact alone. Just as we must avoid appeasement, so must we develop a flexibility in our diplomacy which will enable us to maneuver and not be out-manuevered.

To obtain the facts requisite for a sound and long-range program, a re-examination of our German policy should be undertaken forthwith. It should be scrutinized by the Government with the full cooperation of the members of Congress who represent the interests of the American taxpayer.

We must not close our eyes to the sinister developments in Western Germany today. We must also be alerted to the fact that the element of conspiracy is a highly regarded asset in the diplomatic workshops of Germany as well as in the Kremlin. Both sides are following a time-honored pattern which has been proven very successful in the past.

The evidence of the conspiratorial trend is conclusive. It reaches from the secret negotiations of former Ambassador

Nadolny and ex-Chancellor Dr. Wirth to the open statements of betrayal against the West made by Count Rechenberg in the Bundestag—from the clever arguments of the pro-Adenauer spokesmen in *Christ und Welt* to the plotting of the geo-political master minds in Madrid and Buenos Aires—and from the more polished overtures in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* down to the blunt language of the "Open Letter to Stalin" in the Chicago *Buerger Zeitung*. We cannot disregard these actions as inconsequential or isolated incidents; on the contrary they are straws in the wind—manifestations of German Realpolitik.

Was Joseph Stalin "pipe-dreaming" when he announced to the world, in October 1952, that Germany and Japan would again become great powers and that war between the capitalistic countries is inevitable? Stalin obviously based his predictions on certain facts which, in all probability, will not be known to the West for some time to come. In any event, Stalin's speculations are based on Germany's plans for a Third Power bloc, the goal of which is to maintain close ties with the Soviets in order to obtain markets in the East, and at the same time isolate and undermine the United States.

Washington's fallacious post-war policy placed Germany in the driver's seat. Today, as in the past, Germany is driving towards Moscow!

Two years ago, we had a "Great Debate" on our Asia policy. Shall we delay the re-examination and investigation of the fallacies of our German policy until the lightning strikes again—until we read the front-page news of the reborn Berlin-Moscow Axis? Let us have a calm but profound debate on Germany now.

The American people have a right to ask for a review of our Occupation policy in Germany, the more so since the issues have never been discussed in any election.

When, in 1950, Senators and Congressmen asked for an investigation of our occupation policies in Germany, Mr. McCloy hurried from Germany to Washington in order to prevent such

a congressional review and investigation. When we made attempts to investigate our policies in Asia, we acted too late because the investigation came after the horse was out of the stable. In the case of Germany, however, we still have the opportunity to re-examine our experiment of "calculated optimism" before we lose complete control of the situation.

While a review of our occupation in Germany would be most helpful for the future, there are certain realistic steps which can be taken on the basis of what we now know in regard to German plans. For example, we still have it within our power to put an end to the blackmail diplomacy of the Bonn Government and we can enforce a housecleaning of the Nazi and neo-Nazis who have wormed their way back into positions of power.

It has not been the purpose of this book to present a new set of principles for a constructive U.S. policy in Europe which will best serve our national interests and those of our Allied friends. To develop such a policy will require a long and arduous process of re-examination, fact-finding, and constructive thinking.

However, insofar as Germany is concerned, we are faced with the following alternatives in the developing of a new policy. We can ask the Russians whether they would be willing to negotiate on Germany on the basis of Byrnes' proposals of 1946 or on some other realistic program that would not compromise our national security or our sense of justice. If we cannot reach an agreement with Moscow on the question of Germany, then we must follow the only other course open to us: That is, the United States should remain in Germany as an occupying power until there is clear proof that a new generation of Germans can be trusted or until we have made the other European powers so strong that they can prevent the resurgence of aggressive German militarism without our help.

One fact should have become clear by now: We cannot rely

on present-day Germany as a bulwark against the East. History has proven that to rely on such a policy would be suicidal.

The bulwark against aggressive Communism must be the United States—and not a people who—“at the decisive moment”—will make common cause with our enemies.

[APPENDIX I]

German Documents

Madrid Circular Letter

TRANSLATION FROM GERMAN

The document reprinted below is a secret memorandum issued by the German Geo-Political Center in Madrid. It constitutes a general analysis of the world political situation after the Korean war broke out. The Madrid Geo-Political Center issues secret memoranda of this type from time to time, which are distributed among key German circles in Bonn as well as in other parts of the world. There is no doubt that the Madrid document constitutes something like a blueprint for the foreign policy of the Bonn government. In a larger sense, the Madrid Circular Letter is a general staff plan for a new German approach to divide and conquer the world.

SG 23

Top Secret!

*The War in Korea and World Political Possibilities for
Germany and Europe*

1. *The World Situation Five Years After Potsdam*

The war in Korea has brought the world political situation to a climax with such momentum that we must reckon seriously with the possibility of a third world war. The repercussions and the impact of the Korea conflict are unforeseeable at the moment and no predictions can be made as to the possible turn of events.

Certain political and military factors stand out: Russia has used the five years' interval since the end of the war to strengthen her military preparedness in an extraordinary manner, whereas the United States and the western coalition have neglected their military establishment.

Among the unknown imponderables are the following: secret weapons, new tactics, planning for sabotage, extent of future destruction, choice of theaters of war, and of neutral zones.

The critical world situation compels unemotional and painstaking pondering of all these factors which, in a favorable or unfavorable manner, might influence the future of Germany and Europe. The war in Korea can bring great opportunities to Germany if she follows a prudent foreign policy; in fact, Germany has already gained many advantages thanks to the present war situation. Nonetheless, there is the danger that through false steps or through the chain reaction of events, the whole of Europe will be swamped by a tidal wave of unimaginable destruction. Such an event must be prevented at all cost. Everything today depends on a far-sighted, subtle and quick-shifting policy which must constantly bear in mind not only the future of Germany, but the destiny of Europe as a whole. We must, by all means, prevent a development whereby Europe will be destroyed between the Russian and the American millstones.

2. *The Role of Germany and Europe in the Present Crisis*

Not merely Germany, but the whole of Europe has been bled white and is not now in a position to act as a decisive factor in world politics. The aim of German policy, and that of Europe as a whole, must be to remain neutral in any new world conflict no matter the circumstances. This is especially important for Germany for she still has a long way to go until she can regain her political freedom and her economic strength to the fullest extent. Germany has exploited the tension between the East and the West to the utmost and she must continue her efforts in that direction. She must endeavor to influence discreetly the shaping of the future. Not only is it decisive how Germany acts in her own interest, but she in turn is also greatly affected by the policies of the other European powers. England and France today are perhaps more dependent on the United States than the still occupied West German Republic.

Europe, on the one hand, is today in an unenviable strategic position, but, on the other hand, it enjoys the advantage of being the geopolitical center astride the Soviet colossus and the U.S.A. Present circumstances make it therefore necessary for Europe to be on guard against both sides in order to avoid being swallowed up by one of the

two colossi. The dollar imperialism is certainly in no way less aggressive or reckless than communism. The British and French, although former "allies" and "victors" feel the impact of that arrogant dollar diplomacy to a greater extent than we Germans whose sympathy they (USA) hope to gain.

Today Western Europe is relegated to the role of a satellite acting on behalf of America. Schuman in France, and Bevin in England, dance to the tune of the piper in Washington. Europe is being used as the playground for the impudent and shameless dollar diplomacy. Thanks to their solid political education, middle class and labor in Germany have been able to grasp the whole situation in time. Occasionally there arises in France and England resentment against the United States also, but, unfortunately, it is too often linked with attacks against Germany.

During the forthcoming months, Germany's foreign policy must be geared to a subtler exploitation of the conflict between the eastern and western blocs. Our aim in the immediate future must be to regain full sovereignty for Western Germany which will eventually result in the restoration of freedom of action to the whole of Europe. With accelerated speed we are approaching the point at which we must liberate Europe from American control. It is Germany's task to take the lead in this campaign. It is up to us to determine the method and the timing.

There is the danger that France or England—perhaps even both jointly—will return to an independent policy. One or the other of these powers might come to an agreement with Russia and, in either case, this would be at the expense of Germany and the United States. Such a possibility must be avoided at all cost. Germany must remain the decisive factor in European politics and it is up to her to give the word at the right time.

German foreign policy must be directed with a view to steering Europe clear from another world conflict. Conditions for such policy are favorable. The European nations long for peace. The self-interests of France and England categorically demand that a new holocaust must be avoided. The interests of the Vatican run along the same lines. Our paramount attention must be devoted to the preservation of German strength and its native potential ("Erhaltung der deutschen Substanz"). World political events could take such a turn that

a situation may emerge in which Russia, North America and a great part of Asia may become the battleground for a third world war, whereas Europe might be spared. Were Russia to give a guarantee to the European countries that she would abstain from attacking them, then the whole of Europe could take a neutral stand in the event of a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The prevalent mood in every country of Europe is against war, and in England broad masses of the people are convinced that the next war will be one provoked by America. If, therefore, we were to succeed in obtaining from Russia a guarantee that she would respect the neutrality of Europe, then the United States could be confronted with a similar demand, and the war could thus be confined to the territories of both great victorious powers and their vassals. In this manner, German strength (*deutsche Substanz*) and the resources of Europe would be safeguarded against annihilation. Such an outlook may seem fantastic at the moment, but the policy recommended ("*realpolitische Zielsetzung*") is the only realistic one which should be followed by Europe today. A war of exhaustion between Russia and America, in which Europe could be spared, would automatically result in the upsurge of a third power bloc. If the continent of Europe succeeds in preserving its strength, it would thus regain the leadership in the world. There are reliable reports that such a policy would have the quiet but vigorous support of the Vatican. It is entirely to the interest of the Roman Catholic Church to see to it that the Orthodox Slavs ("*schismatisches Slaventum*") and the predominant Protestant North American continent, must be weakened for a long time to come.

In view of the present world political situation ("*realpolitische Lage*"), the policy of orientation towards the West has lost all meaning or sense. A conscious policy of neutrality, going hand in hand with close economic cooperation with the East, would, from a long range point of view, supersede a merely pro-Soviet orientation. The former would finally bring about our freedom, while the last would keep us in the status of vassals.

We must not forget that Germany has always considered orientation towards the West as a policy of expediency or one to be pursued only under pressure of circumstances. Such was the case in Napoleon's time, after 1918, and also after 1945. All of our great national leaders have constantly counseled the long-range policy of

close cooperation with the East; thus, Frederick the Great, Count von Stein, Bismarck, von Seeckt, Brockdorff-Rentzau, and, in the past 30 years, all our leading geopoliticians. By the end of 1940, Hitler's policy had run into a blind alley ("*Zwangslage*"), and the hard decision had to be made to ensure by means of the sword access to the gigantic sources of raw materials in the East, which Russia would never have delivered voluntarily, and without which we never could expect to force a showdown against the Anglo-American bloc.

Our present policy must be to overcome the consequences of our previous mistakes. An emasculated Germany should never allow itself to be used as a spearhead in an attack against the Russian colossus. This would be an insane act ("*Wahnsinnsexperiment*") and would spell our final doom, whereas Germany as the exponent of European neutrality could gain far-reaching concessions from the Soviets. As we have pointed out again and again, the Russians have no desire whatsoever to burden themselves with all the difficulties and complex problems of Europe; they would consider a neutral and well-intentioned Europe, exerting its influence also on the Arab world and Latin America, as the best solution.

We must not let ourselves become befogged by Washington's stupid and meaningless slogans about the "Struggle of Democracy versus Communism." The so-called American democracy does not deserve the sacrifice of the bones of even a single German soldier. In the age of regimented and militarized economy, the babbling about democracy and so-called "free enterprise" is such nonsense that we need not squander a single moment in refuting this American propaganda swindle.

What Germany needs in the future is not democracy but a system of statecraft similar to that of the Soviet dictatorship which would enable the political and military elite in Germany to organize the industrial capacity of Europe and the military qualities of the German people for the revival of the German race and the re-establishment of Europe as the power center in the world.

3. *Korea—A Risky Gamble for Washington*

American intervention in Korea is dangerous playing with fire. It could easily become the beginning of a third world war. Up to now Moscow has shown great restraint but it is difficult to guess

what is shaping up behind the façade of the accelerated "peace-offensive." The Americans have staked their whole prestige on the gamble in Korea. Even if the Americans should succeed in maintaining a foothold on the southern tip of the peninsula * for an undetermined period of time, they would find it difficult to pull out of the Korean adventure without damage to their prestige. After committing herself to intervention, the United States would not be able to pull out; she would have to show the world her determination to bring about her world order. From the military-strategic point of view, the Korean undertaking entails the greatest risk. Were war with Russia to break out tomorrow, then the Yankees ("Amis") would find themselves caught in the Korean mousetrap. However, from the political point of view, the Korean intervention—camouflaged as a U. N. undertaking—is a very bold move: it isolated Russia and at one stroke created a world coalition of the United Nations against Communism. If the Korean conflict were to expand tomorrow into a world war, then fifty nations would automatically be lined up on the side of the United States against the Soviet bloc. An extraordinarily clever feat!

There is, however, one doubtful element in American planning: do the interests of all countries, great and small, the European as well as the Asian, conform with those of the United States? There are indications that the British have supported United States policy in Korea only halfheartedly. If the Americans are thrown out of Korea, then British prestige in the whole of Asia would suffer; but even if the Yankees should prove victorious, then the hatred of all Asia would be roused with the same intensity against the British as against the Americans. The British view with great distaste the clumsy hand of Washington meddling in their Asiatic affairs. London remembers with great bitterness the noisy pro-Indian propaganda carried on in the United States during the war. London realizes that not Russia but the United States must be blamed as the gravedigger of the British Empire. The United States entered the world war supposedly to save England, but worked with great zeal to junk the British Empire.

* According to this, the memorandum was evidently prepared before the Inchon landing by MacArthur in mid-September, 1950.

The motives for the American adventure in Korea are still shrouded in mystery, but this much is known: Washington waited long for a good opportunity to put its economy on a war footing and to accelerate her mobilization with full speed. The effects of this step on world economy and its political consequences become clearer and clearer day by day: in the course of total mobilization for war, not much will be left of "democracy."

4. *The Political and Military Strength of the United States*

Reliable observers in the United States have pictured the present state of affairs in that country as follows:

The United States economy is not ready for war. Stockpiling of essential raw materials has only been pursued to a moderate extent. From the military point of view, the United States is not in best trim. Its armed forces are limited and extremely expensive; units ready for combat are barely available; the machinery of the various military services is luxurious and marked by squander and misadministration. The United States is by no means ready for war and has not even entered the phase of secret mobilization. Washington politics show all signs of confusion. There is no real planning, nothing has been thoroughly studied nor has anything been organized from a long-range point of view. According to reports received from the States, the Yankees ("Amis") have a lot to learn. Even in leading military circles there are abysmal illusions in regard to Russia's economic and military strength.

The United States can consider itself very lucky if the war remains confined to Korea. Should Russia desire war, then this would be a most opportune moment for it. Some incident or other could easily be brought about; but for Europe it would be a catastrophe. Today the Yankees ("Amis") have political headaches in every nook and cranny of the world. They are not only trapped in Korea, but they are also worried by the uncertain and hectic developments in China, Japan, Iran, Germany, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Africa. There are deep-rooted differences with Great Britain and France and, above all, the Russian bear is poised to spring at any moment.

The cowboys in the arena of world politics have gorged themselves in all respects. Although they can throw billions of dollars around, they do not possess top-notch statesmen, planners, military leaders,

scientists, nor a people willing to make sacrifices and capable of accomplishing great historic feats. They do not even have an attractive ideal. The crux of American miscalculation is the belief that allies can be bought with dollars. Alliances are not cemented with ideologies but rest squarely on common interests. Alliances too are respected as long as interests remain mutual. But America's interests do not run parallel with those of Asia or Europe, not even with those of Britain or Latin America. The slogan which stirs the world today is the word "anticapitalism."

The American people, who were untouched by the destructive course of two world wars, are constantly plagued by a guilty conscience. They are bothered by a gnawing doubt as to whether they always make the right decisions. Too often have they miscalculated and, when something goes wrong, they easily fall victim to a hang-over. Great decisions can only be made by a well-prepared people with strong nerves. This is the real reason why Americans have an inferiority complex when dealing with us Germans. The Amis in Germany realize that we Germans possess worthier qualities. No wonder then that high-ranking American officers in Germany and in Washington long for German rearmament. They would certainly feel much better if Germany would, within a short time, put 50 to 80 divisions at their disposal.

The higher the difficulties pile up for the Americans, the more favorable become our prospects for successfully overcoming our defeat. The Yankees are willing to pay a high price for our help. This is clear from all confidential reports which we have obtained from circles close to the American High Commissioner.

5. *Has Germany an Obligation towards the United States?*

Germany has emerged from the cold war as the chief beneficiary. That is our great asset in the ledger of the 5-year period since Potsdam. For the first time in the history of nations it has been proven that clever propaganda, especially when it is camouflaged and directed through other channels,* accomplishes far more than the mightiest army or the best diplomatic service of a smoothly-functioning state. It is a great mistake to assume that Western Germany

* Cf. our confidential report of May 1948: "The Vatican as a political factor in the cold war."

recuperated so quickly thanks to America's sympathetic concern for us. We repeatedly encounter, especially as expressed by some politicians in Bonn, the idiotic opinion: "But the Americans have put us back on our feet, should we therefore not show our gratitude?" To this our answer is as follows: The Americans put us back on our feet, not purely for altruistic reasons but for their selfish interests and on the basis of clever calculation. It must not be our worry but theirs if in the last resort their calculations prove to be abysmally stupid. We are not wholly innocent in the shift of America's post-war policy. For us the war has never stopped and, as is well known, in war every ruse is permissible. We cannot repeat too often that Germany never has ceased to carry on the war with political weapons and propaganda, with economic sabotage and other means. In order to protect Germany against total destruction of its military and economic potentials, as planned at Yalta, we blueprinted a bold plan and created a flexible and smoothly-working organization which, at the end of the war, provided the pre-condition for all the gains that by necessity emerged for Germany out of the chaos of the postwar period. All our calculations at that time were not fulfilled without a hitch. Some of our expectations proved faulty. We had to sail around dangerous cliffs and the German people had to suffer for a while even under conditions deliberately created by ourselves. It even seemed at times as though every effort was in vain and that all our hopes had to be given up. Today, however, five years after Potsdam, we can look back with pride on our accomplishments.

Future historians will one day reveal the great vision with which responsible leaders of the Third Reich created with confident determination those measures which subsequently smashed the united front of the enemy and made Germany again a much-desired partner in a new politico-strategic alliance. And all this was accomplished at the time when German leaders had to go through the severe crisis of the oncoming defeat. By no means did the political and military leadership of the Third Reich skid into the catastrophe in an irrational manner as so many blockheads and ignoramuses often tell us. The various phases and consequences of the so-called "collapse" ("Zusammenbruch") were thoroughly studied and planned by the most capable experts ("fachigsten Koepfen"). Nothing occurred by chance; everything was carefully planned. The result of

this planning was that, already a few months after Potsdam, the condition of the victors went on the rocks.

The decision for a Western or Eastern orientation was influenced by the factors of Realpolitik. In the light of conditions prevailing in 1945, we could expect from only the West—or rather from the United States—moderate conditions for an armistice, measures of relief, and a sympathetic understanding. Only in America did there exist at that time a small but influential group who had not fallen victim to the hate and revenge outcry of the Jewish triumvirate Rosenfeld *-Morgenthau-Baruch, but had maintained in a well-concealed but consistent manner throughout the war its sympathy for Germany.

The machinery which we had prepared so carefully in advance had consciously brought about conditions and situations which after the collapse confronted America's political leaders with the choice of accepting chaos and Bolshevism throughout Germany, or adopting a constructive program that would save Germany and the whole of Europe. Such a plan and such a bold program could only be successfully carried out by a politically well-trained people as the Germans. The twelve years of intense political schooling now proved to have been of paramount importance. When we take into consideration under what tremendous difficulties and dangers the organization had to work in an underground manner and directed from abroad without any protection or backing by any state, carefully watched and persecuted by agents of a revengeful enemy, then the successful outcome seems like a miracle. In order to bring the Americans back to reason and away from Potsdam, we organized chaotic conditions in a thorough and systematic manner ("haben wir mit gruendlicher Systematik das Chaos organisiert"). It was a subtle political resistance, seemingly unorganized and seldom visible, but nonetheless having a deadly effect. The peasants were delivering almost next to nothing to the cities; no coal was brought up from the pits, the wheels of industry were not turning, the people came near to starvation; the monetary systems were disintegrating—there

* The name "Rosenfeld" refers to the late President Roosevelt. It was frequently used by the Nazis, who tried to show in their propaganda that the President was a descendant of a Dutch Jewish family.

remained nothing for the Yankees to do but to give in and scrap the Potsdam program. Soon thereafter the Western Zone received food supplies, local self-government, extensive economic help, credits for currency reform and, finally, broad political self-determination. Today we are on the last stage towards complete sovereignty.

Through superb planning and disciplined use of the political weapon of quiet resistance, the German people have brought to naught the plans for revenge of the victors. By forcing the Americans to give in, the first broad cracks were caused in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. As a consequence, not only did the front of our enemies break wide apart, but the Soviets too were forced to abandon their mad program of destruction in Eastern Germany. Thus it was proven that the excellent political skill and remote control of a well-trained people can score such great successes even after total military defeat as have never before been recorded in history. This could only have been achieved by the leaders of the Third Reich through superb planning in the realm of psychological and political warfare within the United States before and even during the war.

Just as Clausewitz declared that war is merely an extension of action by other means, so the German people continued the war after the "collapse" by propaganda and other means. Despite sacrifice and hardship, the German people won this political war along the whole front. It is our great asset in the ledger of geopolitical schooling and planning that five years after Potsdam, the aims of our enemies have been abandoned, Germany's strength has been preserved, and the Fatherland can look forward to a revival rich in possibilities.

The revival of Germany was not a gift of the Americans but exclusively the result of our own farsighted planning. The first overwhelming success of this planning was achieved through our well-organized anti-Morgenthau campaign. We thereby succeeded in undermining Roosevelt's plans of revenge against Germany and created total confusion in Washington. By keeping Germany industrially strong and by gaining the support of influential senators and representatives in the American Congress for our propaganda against the dismantling of large industrial enterprises, we finally succeeded in preserving Germany as the leading industrial power in the heart of Europe. Thus the plans of Potsdam and Yalta came to naught and the period of the cold war began which developed

into a struggle between the East and the West on the decisive question as to who should exploit German industry and within whose orbit Germany's industrial potential should be incorporated. In this way, Germany gained valuable time for further maneuvering. Thus, without a doubt, the correctness of our earliest planning was proved, which anticipated that orientation towards the West would open up great possibilities for the speedy overcoming of our military defeat. In 1945, orientation towards the East would have been totally wrong. It could only have stirred up the West against us and, in view of the deep-rooted hatred of the Russians at that time against everything German, it would have brought common action of our enemies against us and would have spelled "finis" to all our aspirations. Thanks, however, to our correct decisions, the situation has changed entirely today. We are now once again in the position to influence the turn of events—today we are again making history.

Five years after Potsdam, the Yankees are stuck deep in the mud; they are now seeking the advice of our generals whom they formerly called criminals; they come pleading for our help against Russia. That of which we could never convince the world, namely: the injustice of the policy of revenge, was finally accomplished by the Americans themselves who, speculating on German help, have propounded the necessity for a revision of policy toward Germany. They have even convinced the French and the English of this.

The helplessness of the Americans in the midst of this chaotic situation has caused such confusion that, barely five years after Potsdam, we have obtained as much as—according to the most optimistic calculations—we had hoped to attain in only ten to fifteen years.

6. *The Expellees ("Die Heimatvertriebenen").*

The millions of expellees have to be regarded as a valuable trump card in our policy towards the restoration of German power. When our enemies were drunk with victory, they did not recognize the danger of their short-sighted policy of revenge which might one day arise from the banishment of millions of people. The expulsion of 10 million German racial comrades ("Volksdeutschen") was a blessing for the Reich. The expellees strengthened the biological substance of our race ("verstaerkten die deutsche Volkssubstanz") and from the beginning they became a valuable asset to our propaganda. The

expellees, discontented with their fate, infused a strong political dynamism in our demands. Very soon we were able to drown out the noisy propaganda about German "crimes" with our counter accusation about the heinous misdeeds ("zum Himmelschreicnde Unrecht") committed against 10 million German racial comrades. Today the existence of many millions of expellees constantly troubles the guilty conscience of our enemies. Without the pressing problem of the expellees it would certainly not have been so easy to set American relief work in motion on behalf of Germany. The refugees from the East constitute a valuable factor in our coming negotiations with Russia, especially if we will one day demand the return of the stolen territories in the East, or if we should insist on adequate compensation in the West.

Those Eastern refugees who settle overseas usually turn out to be good missionaries for our Germandom abroad. They constitute, even in countries far away, an asset for the German race, especially if they stay together in close settlements.

The distress of the refugees has created a common political ground among all Germans, regardless of political affiliation. The demand for the restitution of the stolen German territories keeps our political agitation alive. The militant elements among the refugees are working according to the best traditions of National Socialism, whereas the broad masses among the expellees are kept close together in well-disciplined homeland organizations ("landsmannschaftlichen Organisationen").

If the enemy would have kept our racial comrades after the war as second-class citizens, or even as disfranchised subjects in Poland, in Czechoslovakia and in other regions, it would be far more difficult for us today to bring the territorial issue of the east on the agenda again. The expulsion of millions of our racial comrades provides us with a heaven-sent opportunity to exacerbate the problem of the bleeding border ("blutende Crenze") and to hammer constantly for its revision.

7. *Weltanschauung and World Power Politics*

The great historical accomplishment which overshadows every other deed of Adolf Hitler was his decision, carried out with iron energy, to condition the German people into fighting for their great

world political task. The necessity to educate a whole nation for total war had been recognized long before Hitler, but Hitler was the first one who tackled the tremendously difficult problem of getting a firm hold on the people and of organizing them into a unified movement on the basis of National Socialism.

The training which the German nation received during the twelve years of National Socialist leadership has created a firm basis on which German world politics will be able to carry on again in the future. The National Socialist Weltanschauung furnishes the intellectual potential ("geistiges Potential") in the struggle for world supremacy.

The future of the world will be decided by the conquering force of a political ideology. "Democracy" is a wishy-washy term which has found no ear among the German people, notwithstanding the efforts made by the Americans for re-education. No German is willing to fight and die for democracy. The German people, well-trained and steeled under national socialist leadership, are dominated by two sovereign ideas: the concept of a German Reich, and Germany's mission of leadership in the world ("deutsche Fuehrermission in der Welt"). These two ideas have given our people a powerful driving force for the dynamic execution of their world mission. The mystical element and the religious tradition embodied in the concept of the Reich, sparks our political mission and is especially attractive within the Catholic world.*

Even after the collapse, the National Socialist Party continued to work in a camouflaged way ("getarnt") in dozens of seemingly innocuous societies and groups, in order to keep alive and undiluted the national outlook of the German people. In the same way as many small brooks go toward making a mighty stream, the various nationalistic and radical groups in the Zonen-Reich carried out, almost without exception, worth-while and powerful propaganda. Each of these groups had its special task and had to adjust its work in line with certain situations and circumstances. However, it was of chief importance to direct the underlying trend of the patriotic propaganda

* Obviously, this refers to the thousand-year history of the "Holy Roman Empire." There were times when the secular power of the Empire and the spiritual power of the Church interpenetrated each other.

towards the same goal. The more diverse and unconnected these groups appeared on the surface, the less they were apt to arouse suspicion (of the Occupying authorities) that they were directed and influenced by a central organization.

We have placed our confidential agents, observers, and representatives for special assignments in all groups and parties—even among Communist organizations and their fronts. The greater the number of organizations controlled and influenced by us, the more effective will be the results of our work.

The discontinuation of the Nationalist-Socialist press after the collapse deprived us of the most important weapon for national indoctrination. Secret circular letters and leaflets reach only a limited number of party comrades who, in most cases, already knew the directives to be followed and propagated in given situations. The victors had tried to suppress every expression of national feeling. They filled the editorial offices of the licensed newspapers with Jews and traitors. Nonetheless, there were some periodicals which—first abroad and then in the Zonen-Reich—did their best to fight courageously and frankly, sometimes in a cleverly camouflaged manner, for the national interests of Germany.

Praiseworthy work was accomplished by the German press in South and North America. In the past few years some papers in the English and American Zones achieved excellent results in line with our great national aim. The political articles in *Die Zeit* of Hamburg, and the intelligent advice given by the paper on delicate domestic problems deeply influenced the political thinking of the German people.

In Argentina, *Der Weg* and the *Freie Presse* have striven in an extraordinary manner to create a distinct political approach among Germans abroad, as well as in the Zonen-Reich.

The German press in North America, especially the *New York Staats Zeitung*, proved of great value in battling the hate-psychosis and in its efforts to re-establish close German-American relations. There are also numerous small papers in the United States which, in the midst of the most intense German hate-wave, interceded bravely and fought with unbelievable courage for the resurrection of a united fatherland.

It was most difficult for the German press to deal delicately with

the events of July 20, 1944. The less these events are discussed, the better it will be for Germany's future. A split among the German people on this question would prove disastrous. There are many angles which obviously cannot as yet be discussed openly. There were thousands who had reason, or were even ordered to protect themselves by camouflaging as "anti-Nazis" ("Hitlergegner"). Persons who were at that time reported as having been shot are still among the living today. Let us also bear in mind that Dr. Ley's statement about the "blue-blooded swine" * served the definite purpose of deceiving the enemy. Our leaders must see to it that the ever-recurring discussions about the events of the 20th of July be either stopped or, if possible, passed over lightly. Previous directives remained valid; no information whatsoever should be revealed about the background of that affair.

The convulsive effects of the military defeat have not broken the German spirit. The national tradition is carefully fostered among the youth and the veterans. The biological substance of the German people remained unshaken in its foundation. Our people are ready to be called upon for historic decisions. A nation which has lost two world wars in the short span of 30 years but is already again conscious of its future tasks, can never be defeated. National training and political schooling have conditioned the German people as a first-class instrument for the execution of world politics on a grand style. No other people on earth has such political maturity, fanatical faith, ironclad willpower and flexibility in tactics—not merely to overcome defeat but also to start again from scratch. German tradition and belief in a world mission uplifts the whole German nation. Everyone feels within his deepest consciousness that the great national task—the struggle for world domination—will ultimately be crowned with victory.

The Wehrhoheit † is the chief characteristic of the independence of a state and the freedom of its actions. A nation which has lost its

* This term "blue-blooded swine" was used by Dr. Ley in an inciting speech and refers to those aristocratic circles which were supposedly involved in the plot against Hitler's life on July 20, 1944.

† "Wehrhoheit" is the German term describing a country's exclusive prerogative to determine the size and disposition of its armed forces.

Wehrhoheit is no longer free. After the first world war the victor permitted the Reich a limited Wehrmacht, but our whole national struggle up to 1935 centered around the question of the re-establishment of a German Wehrhoheit. Only then, when we shall again be able to determine in unhampered freedom whether and to what extent we shall rearm ourselves, and when and against whom we may use our armed forces, will we have regained our Wehrhoheit.

We, in all probability, will have attained Wehrhoheit as a result of German rearmament, which will not only be permitted but even urgently desired by the Western powers. The problem of the re-establishment of a German Wehrmacht is a delicate one and requires great cleverness and astute statesmanlike minds in order to make the correct decisions at the right time.

Germany must concentrate all its efforts on regaining her Wehrhoheit. Washington's obstinate efforts to rearm the West German Federal Republic and to make it a strong military partner, within or outside the Atlantic Pact, come as no surprise. In previous circular letters we have frequently mentioned the plans of influential American circles who, even in the midst of war, opposed Roosevelt's policy of revenge and who strongly advocated the preservation of a mighty Germany as a bulwark against the East. The turn of historic events has, however, shown that all the hopes which German leadership placed in the friendly intentions of these personalities in the United States were grossly exaggerated. The systematically whipped up hatred toward Germany incited the American people so thoroughly that those personalities—high ranking military, church leaders, politicians, and captains of finance—who were working for a policy of reconciliation, could express their views only with the utmost circumspection and execute it through time-consuming detours.

The American policy of reconciliation with Germany was very advantageous because it gave us a breathing spell at the very beginning; it was precisely this policy which smashed the allied front. Moscow's goal was the annihilation of the German power-potential—military, political and economic—for good. Yalta proclaimed the aim of a brutal peace Diktat which left the vanquished no hope of revival. To our great misfortune three influential men in commanding positions in the West advocated the same idea of annihilation:

Roosevelt, Morgenthau and Baruch. These men were joined by the German-hater Churchill. Only Roosevelt's death opened the way to those forces who advocated a positive or, at least, a more moderate program towards Germany, and whose blueprints for a postwar world were entirely opposed to those of Roosevelt. These circles recognized in the Russian victory a strengthening of Communism, and they feared its complications and the shattering effects it entailed for the capitalistic system.

These considerations resulted in a plan—first formulated secretly in Washington and later openly discussed, aiming at the creation of a united Europe as a bulwark against Russia with the proviso that a strengthened and rearmed Germany be incorporated in such a combination. What the Americans therefore now expect from us are combat units and the manufacture of war material. That is why Washington, right from the beginning, was not in favor of dismantling the German war potential.

What consequences can be expected for Germany from Washington's present policy? At first we gained great advantages from America's policy. The Morgenthau plan was never really executed; instead, the Americans endeavored to make Western Germany a strong economic, and now even a military bulwark against the East. The help we obtained from America after the war—and this for egotistic and not for altruistic reasons—will bring us to a point where its further acceptance might create great danger for Germany. We are now approaching this point with giant strides. The Americans fondly hope that we will one day repay with our blood all the benefits we received from them. They want us to sign a pact whereby we, as mercenaries and vassals, will back American power politics. The West German Republic cannot and must never give its consent to such a tie-up, which is already proscribed by our exposed geographic position ("exponierte geopolitische Lage"). The American plan would make Germany the spearhead of an attack at the heart of Russia. Germany would thereby become the battlefield in a war of annihilation from which nothing would be spared of the German biological substance. A German statesman who would lend his help to such a criminal act would thus stamp himself automatically as a traitor of the German people. However long we may continue to milk the Americans

of millions of dollars, there must come the inevitable moment when we shall have to make it crystal-clear to them that we are not willing to join the fight against Russia for American interests. There probably is no danger that we shall become hated by the Yankees for this because they are businessmen and understand very well that we will act only in accordance with our own interests.

How should Germany proceed diplomatically in the present situation? It is openly stated in Washington that Europe cannot be defended without German help. The Americans are becoming insistent and we must give them some hope, but we must at the same time point to the fact that the German people are hesitant and not inclined to defend Europe so long as Germany is treated as a defeated nation. By constantly squeezing concessions out of the victors, we can best prepare the way towards the re-establishment of our Wehrhoheit. During the coming weeks and months we must extract the utmost in concessions. We will therefore not be able to avoid making promises. It is of the greatest importance for the resumption of Germany's respected standing in the world to fight for the re-establishment of German honor. We have to undo the shame of the judgments motivated by revenge (Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, etc.), which the victors executed on the military and civic leaders of the Third Reich. The offerings which the Americans could make in this respect would cost them nothing. To save a few dozen brave men from the gallows and to free a few hundred from the prisons, should not prove too difficult to accomplish if the Bonn Government would take a resolute stand. To obtain such a token of friendship from the Yankees, we could even give them some promises. But there is a difference between mere promises and such commitments as would bind us irrevocably. We must ultimately remain free in our decisions towards all sides, even if we are obliged for reasons of expediency to agree formally to such obligations. We should reap all advantages but never commit ourselves. The Yankees need us today more urgently than ever before. Clever political tactics today could bring about the conditions for the definite acknowledgment of our Wehrhoheit but it must not lead so far that, in case of a showdown, we would have to pull Washington's chestnuts out of the fire. We must pursue Realpolitik, i.e., our honor must be restored and we must regain freedom.

Prospects for the Future

The international unrest and the tension between the East and the West have greatly facilitated execution of our plans up till now. The surprising and rapid revival of the German economy and the debate on the Schuman Plan have, however, prematurely focused the attention of the world on a resurrected Germany. The war in Korea served as a desired diversion. The fact that the Americans would now like us to join them in the defense of Europe and become their ally will thereby enhance our bargaining power with the Russians. The Americans have lost the peace, the cold war, and their entire future, but they are not as yet aware of it. After the failure of their amateurish policies in Asia, the Americans will one day experience a far more painful and devastating smashup in Europe ("einen noch weit peinlicheren Kladderatsch in Europa"). The outcome will be as we predicted as long ago as 1944: they will rouse the whole world against them. Those dollar-diplomats and cowboys are too untalented to cope with the problem of world politics (Welt-politik). Their silly chatter that American troops are in Germany for the purpose of protecting occidental Kultur is so idiotic that it could not make the slightest impression even on the most humble stableboy in Germany. We should grab a few more billions from the Yankees' huge dollar-chest and then kick them out (eines Tages an die frische Luft setzen), or simply hand them over to the Russians. A few little hints and threats would perhaps make them scam in time (zum rechtzeitigen Absugbewegen).

The first phase of our policy of disruption (Sprengungspolitik) is behind us. America's financial assistance can never bring about a permanent solution; on the contrary, it will cause enfeeblement and lead to general corruption. These unpleasant by-products are becoming visible in France and Britain to an ever-increasing greater degree than in truncated Germany. The dollar-diplomats behave as though they were the true lords in the salons of Europe. Germany lost her sovereignty as a consequence of the military defeat. Paris and London, however, sold their birthright for a mess of pottage ("verkauften ihr Hausrecht gegen Dollaranleihen").

The struggle against American bossing (Bevormundung) of Europe will become Germany's main task in the future. We must not merely strive to shake off the shackles with which Washington has

bound us, and labor to regain our freedom of action in the East, but we must also prepare the whole of Europe for our future mission in the world. A well-filled breadbasket, sufficient sources of raw material and the necessary geopolitical space for strategic maneuverings ("Ausweichmoeglichkeiten im geopolitischen Raum") will one day prove more than ever before to be the most important factors in deciding Europe's struggle for world mastery.

The strategy of breaking the chains of our enthrallment (Fesseln-sprengen) is sometimes more daring and dangerous than the most dashing feat in war. We could, for instance, visualize that through secret negotiations with Moscow a situation would be brought about whereby the Yankees could overnight be eliminated as a power factor in Europe. Such a scheme of course always contains an element of grave danger. Not that such a plan would be impossible of execution, but there is always the question how far the Russians are to be trusted.

Other schemes would be preferable from a long-range point of view. We are passing through an interim period of a profound change in international power relations. Everywhere there emerges the desire for a new order and an outspoken aversion against dollar diplomacy. In this extended transitory period, it should prove possible for Germany to build up a new political bloc ("neue politische Einheit") out of Europe, Africa and Latin America ("Iberoamerika"). The economic advantages and the political possibilities in such a new power combination would put the United States against the wall. It would then depend entirely on our diplomatic and propaganda finesse when and how we would take over an America enfeebled by its foreign and domestic policies. Such a plan would have the advantage of preventing a third world war fought between United States capitalism and the Soviet bloc—a war which would have the most destructive consequences for the Western world. Such a design would still guarantee for some time the preservation of the resources of the Western world and then, greatly strengthened, we will enter—under Germanic leadership—the phase of a final showdown, between the white race and the slavish world. In the event of such a showdown, we must endeavor to bring to our side the Arab bloc and as many of the Asiatic peoples as possible. Germany is in the fortunate position of not having aroused the hatred of Asia. There we can step in as the leading spokesman for the underdog.

The tenacious work of enlightenment carried out by Germany and Italy in the Arab world is now bearing fruit. Anti-British and anti-American resentment is gaining momentum in the entire Middle East. Britain will not long be able to keep its hold on the Suez Canal, nor maintain her influence in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. The coming revolt of the Arab world will prove another setback for the amateurish world planners in Washington.

A correct evaluation of the Russian problem is important for Germany's future. World War II clearly proved that Germany was not in a position to mobilize the necessary manpower and the tremendous economic reserves to deal the knockout blow which would have destroyed the Slav world forever. Our surprising successes in the Polish and Western campaigns lured our political and military leaders into the belief that they could quickly overrun the Russian armies. And it was demonstrated anew how foolish it was to disregard the wise admonition of Bismarck who, throughout his life, warned us against making Russia our enemy. It will require the greatest diplomatic efforts to lull Moscow's profound distrust of us. The cold war has fortunately relegated the memory of Germany's march into Russia to the background far more quickly than we could ever have hoped. But we must not deceive ourselves: Moscow will not forget the Second World War so quickly.

The present power position of the Slavic world is a geopolitical reality which we must accept, at least for the time being. Germany's future policy should be the quiet penetration of Europe and must aim at consolidating our spheres of interest in Africa and Latin America.* We should avoid as far as possible dangerous propaganda ventures with the expellees which might antagonize the East. Russia may one day be willing to yield or negotiate, but we must never let it come to a struggle for prestige.

Germany's industry will regain its previous position: the markets in East and Southeast Europe, in Latin America and in Africa, China and the rest of Southeast Asia offer us a great future. There we can

* The German memorandum employs the phrase "*unsere* Interessensphere in Afrika und Lateinamerika," whereas in fact the Germans have not as yet any spheres of interest in these continents. Nonetheless, in their geopolitical speculations they have already made an "Anschluss" with Europe and other continents.

eliminate the British and Americans from competition, especially if we conduct our negotiations with the Soviets in a smart way. Our increasing economic power and ability to elbow our way politically, must be employed alternately. A prudent and undeviating policy will make it possible to establish some day a new political order in the world which will supersede the present colossi—the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Though we are powerless at present, we have nonetheless never permitted ourselves to be disarmed spiritually and scientifically. German scholars are working unremittingly in Germany as well as abroad on great scientific plans for the future. Favorable circumstances enabled us to keep alive the great research organization of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute through a change of name. First-class scientists are working in the fields of interplanetary navigation ("Raumschiffahrt"), chemistry and on cosmic rays. Our scientists, unhampered in their work, have sufficient time and are planning day and night for Germany's future. It is the German spirit ("Geist") that creates modern weapons and that will bring surprising changes in the present relationship of forces.

Economic difficulties will one day plunge the United States down from its present dizzy heights. Such a catastrophe can be brought about through crafty manipulations and through artificially engendered crises. Such maneuvers are routine measures which have already been employed in international power struggle and will be used again and again as long as economic rivals fight for power positions and markets in the world.

It is quite conceivable that America, weakened by a depression, will one day seek support from a resurrected Germany. Such a prospect would open tremendous possibilities for the future power position of a bloc introducing a new order in the world.

This must be our program: be constantly on the alert, evaluate future developments correctly, and miss no opportunities. It is the duty of a vanquished nation to learn from its defeat, to work with unremitting courage and with ever-increasing determination and endurance, and be prepared for a great world political task.

All these possibilities would come to naught if a new world war were to lay Europe waste. It must therefore be our supreme duty to place ourselves in the vanguard of the struggle to keep Europe out

of any future war. If we succeed in this, we will surely gain the trust of the people and undisputed leadership in Europe, not excluding Britain. In such a roundabout way we would be able to establish the foundation for future world leadership. The world is longing today for the millennium. In the role of champion for peace, we would gain stature in world public opinion and create for ourselves an unshakable moral position. The propaganda against German "militarism" would subside entirely, old charges would be forgotten and Europe would then be willing to follow German leadership. Such a policy can be pursued successfully, especially in view of the present attitude of the Vatican. The Pope is a realist in politics ("ist Realpolitiker genug") and knows well enough that, in the age of the Atom bomb, there is too much at stake for the Church and for Europe as a whole.

The Atlantic partners will always be able to find an opportunity to evade their obligations by pointing out that the provocative behavior of the United States has foolishly brought about a conflict for which the Russians cannot be charged as the aggressor and, therefore, all contractual obligations to help become void.

We must do everything possible in accordance with the directives and suggestions given above in order to influence in our favor the political attitude of all groups affiliated with us in Europe, Latin America and the United States. It should also be possible to make it clear to the German element in America what Germany's fate would be were a new world war to annihilate the substance of our race or if a victorious Russia were to upset or delay for a long time our plans for the future.

Completed:

MADRID, *Beginning of September 1950.*

Distribution (Verteiler):

Dr. M
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Directive of the German High Command on Political Warfare in the U.S.A.

The following directive was issued by the Chief of the Intelligence Division of the German High Command, Admiral Walter Wilhelm Canaris, in 1944. The document lays bare the basic German strategy of scaring the U.S.A. with Bolshevism but—at the same time—recommends a long-range policy of Russo-German collaboration.

SECRET STATE MATTER

OKW—Abwehr

March 15, 1944

At a meeting of the representatives of the Foreign Office, the Security Division, ("SD") and the Department of Defense, ("Abwehr"), the following resolutions were adopted for unified action by all our agents in foreign countries:

1. Utilize to the fullest extent all available possibilities in neutral and enemy countries, in order to support our military efforts with political and propaganda campaigns.

2. Our goal is to crush the enemy's plan whose object it is to destroy forever the German Reich militarily, economically, and culturally.

The new regulations put into effect by the political leaders for the dissolution and disintegration of the enemy bloc should be carried out more intensely. We must do our utmost to create a state of confusion and distrust among our enemies. Such a state of disunity would enable us to sue for a quick separate peace with either side. While it is true that the efforts made in that direction have failed so far due to the implacable hate policy of Roosevelt and Churchill, it does not mean that some day, under different conditions, the unnatural front of our enemies could not be broken. Roosevelt's electoral defeat this year could have immeasurable political consequences.

The political and military leaders are of the opinion that Germany cannot expect any mercy from the Soviets; on the contrary, should the war take a turn for the worse, we must assume that the Slavs will do everything in order to retaliate against the harsh treatment we have inflicted upon them. In spite of everything, no effort should be spared to stir up, through carefully directed propaganda, political animosity inside the Anglo-Saxon countries which would enrage the Soviets to such a degree that, as a consequence, they would welcome a chance to conclude a separate peace with Germany.

In the event of a negotiated peace, or should we be defeated, Germany would have everything to gain—in the long run—by joining the East.

Right now, the chances for a separate peace with the West are a little better, especially if we succeed, through our propaganda campaign and our "confidential" channels, to convince the enemy that Roosevelt's policy of "unconditional surrender" drives the German people towards Communism.

There is great fear in the U.S.A. of Bolshevism. The opposition against Roosevelt's alliance with Stalin grows constantly. Our chances for success are good, if we succeed to stir up influential circles against Roosevelt's policy. This can be done through clever pieces of information, or by references to unsuspecting neutral ecclesiastical contact men.

We have at our command in the United States efficient contacts

which have been carefully kept up even during the war. The campaign of hatred stirred up by Roosevelt and the Jews against everything German has temporarily silenced the pro-German bloc in the U.S.A. However, there is every hope that this situation will be completely changed within a few months. If the Republicans succeed in defeating Roosevelt in the coming presidential election, it would greatly influence the American conduct of war towards us.

The KO-leaders abroad and their staffs have innumerable opportunities of constantly referring to Roosevelt's hate policy. They must use in this campaign all the existing contacts and they should try to open up new channels. We must point to the danger that Germany may be forced to cooperate with Russia. The greatest caution has to be observed in all talks and negotiations by those who, as "anti-Nazis," maintain contact with the enemy. When fulfilling missions, they have to comply strictly with instructions.

(Sgd.) *Canaris*

*PLAN FOR AN IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN IN
THE UNITED STATES*

The Prerequisites for psychological warfare are:

1. Analyze the spiritual temper of world public opinion.
2. Evaluate correctly the ideological weapons available.
3. Put before the eyes of the world a strategic concept which will impress not only our own people, but also the neutrals and our enemies.
4. Select the most effective tactical methods for the accomplishment of the aim.
5. Co-ordinate the ideological campaign in support of our military and economic warfare.

The more the prospects for outright military victory diminish, the more urgent becomes the necessity for all-out psychological warfare.

In analyzing this problem we can disregard completely the possibility of total victory through military might alone, because in such a case psychological warfare is superfluous. However, in the case of total military collapse, we must continue the struggle by means of psychological warfare until the day arrives when weapons can speak again. In my opinion it is important to point to this ultima ratio now and emphasize it more than ever before. Psychological warfare will prove especially successful in the U.S.A. where many groups (weite Kreise) are fed up with the war. . . .

Under all circumstances we should prepare ourselves for the worst, not in a spirit of defeatism, but in order to cope more effectively with defeatism in the hour of collapse. It is important that we see to it that our enemies, especially the Americans, should not bask themselves in the sun of victory or that they enjoy the role of being the liberators of Europe. Therefore, it is necessary to set up a far-flung organization in every country which, under enemy occupation, must carry on the task from the underground. We must do everything possible to impress upon American public opinion that after the liberation of Europe they will become involved in an endless maze of insoluble contradictions. However great their sacrifices may be they will end up in a blind alley exactly as it happened in 1918 under Wilson's grandiose planning.

German Plan for Psychological Warfare in the U.S.A.

(Memorandum from Dr. Colin Ross to the German Foreign Office, 1943.)

On July 27, 1943, the German Foreign Office expert on the U.S.A., the politician Dr. Colin Ross, suggested in a fifteen page memorandum a "Plan for an Ideological Campaign in the United States."

Recognizing Germany's inability to bring the war to a victorious end, Dr. Colin Ross proposed the immediate implementation of a carefully planned psychological warfare to undermine the anticipated U.S. military victory. Dr. Ross regarded American public opinion as the weakest link because the American people seemed especially susceptible to scare propaganda hinting that a defeated Germany would join the ranks of Bolshevism. The memorandum, which was addressed to the German Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, von Steengracht, became the guidepost for Germany's highly successful black-mail diplomacy in post-war America. Here follow some significant parts of the memorandum.

We have to use the argument that if the enemy succeeds in stamping out "Fascism" or "Nazism" there will remain only Bolshevism. Thus, a Germany threatened by the Anglo-Americans with dismemberment, will throw herself completely into the arms of the Soviets, and in that way will make Bolshevism unconquerable.

This is the time to make up the balance sheet and to start with large scale preparation in order to meet the coming invasion. Our defense must not remain limited to military measures alone but must employ every available weapon of psychological warfare. *The ideological offensive is the order of the day.*

The German Master Plan of 1945

Under the title "Generalplan 1945," several documents had been drawn up in the closing days of the Third Reich which, in June 1945, were captured by the Allies together with the files of the short-lived Doenitz Government in Flensburg. The documents were initialed by Grand Admiral *Doenitz* and Field Marshal *Keitel*. The first document outlines a new political movement destined to preserve the German racial principles. Document # 2 sketches a new European Order ("Europaeische Friedensordnung") which shows a great resemblance with Dr. Adenauer's idea of a United Europe. In Document # 3, entitled "The Overcoming of the Catastrophe," the German High-Command emphasizes the mutual advantages of a Russo-German alliance against the West.

Document I

THE GERMAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT

Berlin, April 3, 1945

The German Freedom Movement is based on the racial concept. It was formed during the war as an expression of the front soldier who believed in the tradition of the old National Socialist movement. Faithful to the oath of the Fuehrer, and with fealty to his work, the movement dis-associates itself:

- a) From rotten party bureaucracy.
- b) From a self-deceiving Government caste.
- c) From a policy of adventure.
- d) From political narrow-mindedness ("Weltanschaulichen Starsinn").
- e) From falling back into the capitalistic system.

As much as our power position is endangered from the outside, the vital forces of resistance in our people are not extinguished. Conscious of our responsibility before history and our nation, the leaders of the German freedom movement are determined to struggle against helplessness, confusion, and treachery in order to secure for our children lasting peace during a period of re-construction in which Germany can develop her vital strength.

Document II

THE EUROPEAN PEACE-ORDER

1. Liberation of the German people from suppression and occupation.
2. Repatriation of the expellees (Heimholung der Verschleppten)
3. An integrated German racial community.
4. Elimination of all arbitrary acts by the enemy.
5. European Union on a federalistic basis.
6. Right to racial autonomy.
7. European Common-weal ("Gemeinnutz").
8. European Court of Arbitration.
9. Community of related peoples with the final aim to create a Germanic Reich.
10. Common-wealth between Germany and Bohemia and Moravia.
11. Guaranteed protection of racial groups ("Volksgruppenrecht").
12. Economic integration of Europe.

Document III

Annex to General Plan 1945

Berlin, April 5, 1945.

THE OVERCOMING OF THE CATASTROPHE

The first page of this document discusses the military situation on the Eastern and Western fronts and then goes on to ponder the chances for a separate peace with Russia:

While practically nothing can be offered to the Western Powers and while therefore negotiations are not possible, a development of vital necessity can be pointed out to the Soviet Union.

A German defeat by the Western Powers means for the Soviet Union only the prolongation of the war through a third World War.

The partition of Germany will be considered in the Soviet Union only as a temporary affair which, because it is unbearable, cannot last long. While Yalta gives Russia a limited influence in Eastern and Southern Europe—it will be constantly contested (by the USA), the influence of the Soviet Union in all of Europe can only be made possible by cooperation on the part of Germany.

A separate peace with Germany and Japan would mean relief for Russia in the East and an elimination of Anglo-American influence in China.

While Anglo-American deliveries to Russia probably will be stopped at the end of the war in spite of the granted credits (lend-lease) there will be considerable opportunities for the Soviet Union through economic cooperation with Europe and Eastern Asia for a long time to come.

While to remain in the coalition of the enemy would mean for the Soviet Union continuous friction with Great Britain and America in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Near East—a coalition with Germany would free for the Soviet Union the road from the Persian Gulf to the oilfields of Kirkuk and to the Mediterranean. Such a separate peace is possible only by considerable mutual assurances and it can be built up, as things now are, only along the following lines:

- a) Germany and the present Soviet Union join together in creating a "Socialist Union." Tying in with the independence of the sixteen Soviet Republics in 1943, the

European peoples form nationally defined, self-governing states, allied through a defense and economic union. Internal forms within the states are to be decided by the people.

- b) Germany recognizes the Soviet Republics of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Macedonia, Greece, and perhaps Turkey.
- c) The Western part of Upper Silesia and all the parts of the Warthegau and Western Prussia which were parts of Prussia until 1918 remain German territory. Furthermore, Germany gets a stronger influence in Old Bohemia and in the South-East.
- d) Mutual exchange of prisoners of war and civilians including all the deported Germans from Transylvania, Banat, Pommerania, Silesia, East Prussia, etc.
- e) Germany gets a free hand in Northern and Western Europe, especially against Great Britain.
- f) The whole "Socialistic Union" supports Germany, especially through deliveries of raw materials.
- g) Germany supports Soviet Russia in the reconstruction of the war-devastated areas.

Out of these developments the following perspectives for the future can be drawn:

A colossal bloc of world-dominating greatness, economic power, energy and numbers of population would be created from ocean to ocean.

Not only would the danger of future wars for generations be eliminated from Europe but also from the double continent of Eurasia.

The two great peoples, the Russians and the Germans, have extraordinary possibilities for development without collision of their interests.

The chief emphasis in this bloc will shift more and more to the racially superior, intellectually more active and more energetic (people); that means to Europe.

Thus would be formed an alliance between the young Socialist forces against the old rotten entrenched powers of the West.

[APPENDIX II]

Excerpts from the Pro-Adenauer Press

Deal with Moscow

Excerpts from a front-page editorial of the geo-political weekly *Christ und Welt* which was published on December 27, 1951, two months before the Soviet Note of March 10, 1952 offered Germany free elections, a reunified Reich and all the trimmings for renazification and remilitarization.

“If Moscow would agree to free elections and the restoration of an independent Germany, that would be a day of greatest joy (hoechster Freudentag) in German post-war history. All other things can then be settled by the newly elected German Government . . .”

(Discussing the prospects of a deal with Moscow, the editorial continues):

“Only under political pressure would Moscow show readiness to return those (Eastern) territories which Russia has already incorporated into her orbit. It would be necessary that we first create a united, healthy, and strong Western Europe in whose name the following offer to the Kremlin could then be made:

“Continental Europe would break away from the Atlantic Pact if the Soviets agree to withdraw their forces behind the Pripet-Marshes

and release not only the Eastern zone of Germany, but the whole of Eastern Europe into the European Union. A United Europe standing on its own feet and possessing its own powerful army, could begin with the development of its colonial empire in Africa. Such a Europe, whatever the ties might be with America, could afford to carry out such an independent policy because it will have the strength of a third power." *

* This statement, reflecting the core of Dr. Adenauer's "bold plan," is identical with the suggestion made in the Madrid Circular Letter of September 1950.

The Future of Middle Europe . . .

Excerpts from an editorial in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of March 25, 1952.

"Secretary of State Hallstein deserves the merit to have made visible in his famous Ural-statement * the current which becomes stronger and stronger in the approach of American as well as German foreign policy. . . . That such a current exists in the Bonn Foreign Office has been known for a long time. Occasionally the facts about it have even leaked out to the public . . . According to

* This refers to a statement made by the German Secretary of State, Walter Hallstein who, in March 1952, gave a press interview at the Georgetown University in Washington. When asked by a newspaper man whether his reference to "integration of the whole of Europe" included all the territories "up to the Ural," Herr Hallstein's answer was: "Yes, that is what we mean." The statement caused a sensation the world over. It was first corroborated as an adequate interpretation of Western policy in Dr. Adenauer's Official Party Press Service. After Hallstein was attacked as "irresponsible" by Social Democrats and by Dr. Adenauer's own following, Bonn called the incident "a misunderstanding."

the opinion of those who make top-level decisions, we have only the choice between neutrality and a policy of joining the west and re-arming. The latter policy will enable us, in the coming years, to start negotiations with the Russians on the future of the whole of Central Europe. It is, therefore, unjustified to blame the opponents of the Russian Note that they want to prevent reunification of the Reich. They certainly are for reunification, but only in a far greater framework in which Poland and Czechoslovakia are also mentioned."

The Great Design

Excerpts from an editorial "German Foreign Policy in the Fall of 1951," in *Christ und Welt* of November 1, 1951.

". . . There is no stronger notion in present-day Germany than the desire not to become involved in another war. Yet, how can we prevent such an entanglement? . . . The strengthening of Europe has to be continued until we have reached a certain degree of security. Military preparation alone will not be sufficient. The political and economic unification is of paramount importance and it will result in the growing self-assertion of the Western World.

"There are some advocates of the concept that Western Germany can serve the cause of peace more effectively by proclaiming her neutrality, than by joining the anti-Soviet coalition. We consider this concept to be erroneous under present circumstances . . .

"One of the arguments of the neutralists is that the strengthening of the Western world will bring nearer the danger that one day the Americans will launch a preventive war against the Soviets. Of course, it would be unrealistic to overlook the fact that there are

certain people in the Western World who play with the idea of a preventive war. Their number will certainly increase when, after two or three years, western rearmament has reached its peak . . .

"Nobody, however, can deny that the overwhelming majority of the people here in Europe are opposed to a preventive war, whether it is called for today or in the future, because the Third World War will mean the end of all civilization for Europe. Those who want to prevent such a war should therefore do everything in their power to make the restraining influence of Europe a decisive factor, which can best be done by making Europe strong . . .

"Europe must become healthy and strong in order to protect herself. Her voice should be heard not as a satellite of America, but as an independent in the Western World. The quicker we can achieve that, the better for our future. Only if Europe has a strong army of her own, can her influence tip the scales in the final decisions . . .

"In every community only efficiency will be crowned with success. Yet, who doubts the efficiency of the German people? Certainly not the French. On the contrary, they have the jitters from the thought that they must sit with us in the same boat. They fear that the German oarsmen will pull with such forceful strokes that the others will lose control over the boat . . . Nobody has to gain more from the unification of Europe than the Germans, the most numerous and vital among all European nations west of the U.S.S.R. . . .

"We join the European army not in order to please Monsieur Pleven or Mr. Eisenhower, but because we want a Europe in which we can rely on our own and not have to walk on American crutches . . . German political equality and the elimination of the last remnants of the policy of unconditional surrender will best be assured by the presence of 250,000 to 400,000 Germans in the European Army . . .

"Critics of the Adenauer policy declare that Germany's participation in Western defense will make the partition of Germany a lasting one. Does this argument hold any water? During the last two years, we found out that the policy of orientation towards the West has brought forward far reaching offers from the rulers in the East in regard to German reunification. Those who are really in favor of free election as a precondition for the reunification of Germany, should spur by all means the integration of Western Germany into the Western Community. At every point when the prospectives for

such development diminishes, Moscow immediately hesitates to yield on the question of the Eastern Zone . . .

"The West German Republic can best be compared with a sailboat cruising towards two islands far on the horizon and, in order to withstand strong-blowing winds, it sets its course alternatively to the left and to the right. Will the day then not arrive when we must make a decision on which island to land? Maybe, but it is not certain. Perhaps one of the islands will be washed away by the waves before we reach it . . ."

be in a position to launch an attack against Russia. Thus Russia would be granted the right to scrutinize the extent of European rearmament . . .

"The Chancellor himself follows a tremendous bold plan: First rearmament, followed later by talks with the Russians in order to persuade them to remove their armies behind the Bug River. For this goal the Chancellor has been working tenaciously for some time. And because he sticks to his timetable, he is presently opposed to the Russian Note."

Dr. Adenauer's Bold Plan

Under the caption "Foreign Policy Has to Be Flexible," the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of April 3, 1952, made the following statement on German re-unification and neutrality in a front-page editorial:

"Honest opinion has to admit that an armed German neutrality would please broad masses of the Germans, probably the majority. Yet, such a neutrality would not give an absolute guaranty but only a certain protection that Germany would not be dragged into the explosive controversies of the great power blocs . . . Switzerland is already a neutral, and so is Sweden. With a neutral Germany in addition, a broad belt of countries would come into existence stretching from the Alps high up to the Baltic Sea . . .

"There is another idea making the rounds in Bonn Government circles: a European Army should be created with German units included. Simultaneously, negotiations should be conducted to obtain Moscow's consent to German re-unification. The price to be paid to Russia is a guaranty that the European army will never be expanded over a certain limit of strength so that European forces would not

Russia Has Nothing to Fear . . .

The following excerpts are taken from editorials of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, which serves as the mouthpiece of the Bonn Foreign Office:

"Even after ratification of the treaties the door will not be closed for negotiations with the Soviets if they will solve the problem of German unity and Freedom."

"We do not need to call the attention of the experienced men in the Kremlin to the fact that a strong and unified Western Europe can defend its independence against every side. Why should the Kremlin not be interested in such an independence? . . . If the world, which is split today in two parts, could be reshuffled into a number of independent power groups, it may prevent this horrible conflagration for mankind. . . . A flexible and prudent Russian policy could, for instance, grant German reunification in exchange for the independence of Europe which could be defended against every side. In such a case the reunification of Germany would become a guarantee for peace. The treaties which are presently signed will not prove to be a curb

toward reunification if the Russians remain interested in such a solution."

(*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 30, 1952.)

"If we Germans would come to feel that the other (Western) powers, openly or tacitly, try to hinder German equality and reunification, the treaties would quickly turn out to have been built on quicksand . . . The fact that we are tied up with the NATO pact does not make it impossible for Europe, as soon as it is strong enough and the international situation has changed, to become one day independent from every side ('nach allen Seiten unabhaengig')."

(*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 5, 1952.)

"We cannot escape the necessity to tell the Russians what price we are willing to pay if they give up the Eastern Zone . . . It would be useful that we start to think about the price which we will have to pay for the re-establishment of German unity."

(*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 19, 1952.)

"The Chancellor is stubborn but he is a realist . . . It is obvious that he follows the correct thesis to do at the same time *one* thing, namely to increase our strength by cooperating with the West—and *not* to neglect the other, namely to come to an agreement with the East."

(*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 23, 1952.)

"Germany knows for sure that in a new war between the great power blocs it will suffer far more than all the others . . . Our foreign policy should assure the Russians that the West European potential will not be employed against the East, a suggestion that can be used as a trade-in for territorial concessions in the East . . . When Stresemann concluded his Locarno Treaty, he made it a condition that no foreign troops should be allowed to march through Germany. Thus Russia must feel sure that during peace time only German troops will be stationed in Germany."

(*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 10, 1952.)

"Western Germany should follow a policy of cooperation with the Western powers. But this must never lead to a situation in which Germany becomes the battlefield and the Germans the cannon fodder . . . When, however, against all expectations and reasons, the Americans should start an aggression against the East, disregarding our determination and probably those of other Europeans to stay out of the war, then we should not be forced into participation in a war just for the reason the Americans had helped us in our rearmament. In such a case, the superior strength of Europe should then be automatically directed against any disturbance of the peace that comes from the West."

(*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Sept. 4, 1952.)

[APPENDIX III]

American Documents

Germany's Preparation for a Comeback

I

On March 30, 1945 the U.S. State Department announced that "reliable information collected by Allied Governments clearly indicates that the Nazi regime in Germany has developed well arranged post-war plans for the perpetuation of Nazi doctrines and domination. Some of these plans have already been put into operation and others are ready to be launched on a widespread scale immediately upon termination of hostilities in Europe."

From the official release, the following parts are quoted:

"Nazi Party members, German industrialists and the German military, realizing that victory can no longer be attained, are now developing post-war commercial projects, are endeavoring to renew and cement friendships in foreign commercial circles and are planning for renewals of pre-war cartel agreements. An appeal to the courts of various countries will be made early in the post-war period through dummies for 'unlawful' seizure of industrial plants and other properties taken over by Allied governments at the outbreak of war. In cases where this method fails German repurchase will be

attempted through 'cloaks' who meet the necessary citizenship requirements. The object in every instance will be to re-establish German control at the earliest possible date. German attempts to continue to share in the control and development of technological change in the immediate post-war period is reflected in the phenomenal increase in German patent registrations in foreign countries during the past two years. These registrations reached an all-time high in 1944. The prohibition against exporting capital from Germany was withdrawn several months ago, and a substantial outflow of capital has followed to foreign countries.

"German technicians, cultural experts, and undercover agents have well-laid plans to infiltrate foreign countries with the object of developing economic, cultural and political ties. German technicians and scientific research experts will be made available at low cost to industrial firms and technical schools in foreign countries. German capital and plans for the construction of ultra-modern technical schools and research laboratories will be offered at extremely favorable terms since they will afford the Germans an excellent opportunity to design and perfect new weapons. This Government is now in possession of photostatic copies of several volumes of German plans on this subject. The German propaganda program is to be an integral part of the over-all post-war program. The immediate aim of the propaganda program will be directed at removing Allied Control measures by 'softening-up' the Allies through a subtle plea for 'fair treatment' of Germans and later the program will be expanded and intensified with the object of giving re-birth to all Nazi doctrines and furthering German ambitions for world domination. Unless these plans are checked they will present a constant menace to post-war peace and security."

II

Excerpts of statement by William L. Clayton, former Assistant Secretary of State, to the sub-committee of the Committee on Military Affairs, U.S. Senate.

June 25, 1945

"The second matter I should like to discuss relates to the current and urgent problem of frustrating German attempts to hide abroad a stake for another gamble at world domination.

"The Department of State has abundant evidence that the Nazis, in anticipation of military defeat, made careful plans to carry on in foreign countries a wide range of activities necessary to support an eventual resurgence of German power. For this purpose plans were made, and carried out in part, to transfer abroad sufficient funds and specially trained personnel to carry on pan-German activities, even while the Allied armies were in occupation of Germany.

"The success of German efforts to carry on in foreign countries activities inimical to the United Nations must depend on their ability to mobilize funds to support the execution of their plans. Consequently, they have made strenuous efforts to move abroad assets of all kinds, which can be converted into funds for the financing of hostile activities.

"Our safehaven program is a combined effort of the Department of State, the Treasury Department, and the Foreign Economic Administration to deny to Germany, in the interests of justice and future security, the economic power arising from (a) the organized looting of occupied countries, (b) the flight of German capital in anticipation of defeat, and (c) the German capital investment already located abroad when the war began.

"Our investigations have yielded a considerable amount of information which indicates the schemes and devices which the Germans planned to use in order to safeguard their foreign holdings and transfer additional property abroad. In many cases they have concealed their interests in foreign properties through holding companies as cloaks. In other cases they have abandoned formal voting control but retained a firm grip on manufacturing concerns through domination of technical processes. They have transformed their holdings into bearer shares in order to take advantage of the fact that the title to such shares can be traced only with extreme difficulty. Moreover, the Germans have also taken advantage in some countries of administrative inefficiency and corruption. The extent to which this can be said in every neutral country to have been the fault of private individuals alone is problematical.

"The Germans systematically looted all manner of valuable property, not only to satisfy the esthetic sensibilities of such celebrated collectors as Goering, but to acquire wealth cheaply for concealment abroad.

"Looting reached its all-time low when gold was picked from the teeth of gas-chamber victims. A more subtle form of outright looting was outright 'purchase' with occupation currency from fearful sellers."

The Baruch Plan for a "Sure" Peace

On June 22, 1945, Bernard M. Baruch made a statement before the Military Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, from which excerpts are quoted below:

". . . No more important question ever will come before you than this one—of how to prevent the revival of Germany's war-making might. It is the heart of the making of the peace: it is the heart of the keeping of the peace.

What is done with Germany holds the key to whether Russia, Britain and the United States can continue to get along.

Is it possible to control and transform a nation of more than 60,000,000 persons, with an economy as intricate and efficient as that of the Germans? I believe it can be done. I know it must be done.

Germany's Third Try

It will not be easy. But if not done, we face the certainty that Germany will make a third try to conquer the world . . .

Whether one wants to be "nice" or "harsh" to Germany makes no difference. War must be displaced as Germany's chief business . . .

I have not thought in terms of a "hard" or a "soft" peace. I seek a sure peace.

Therefore I recommend:

Economically, break once and for all Germany's dominance of Europe. Her war-making potential must be eliminated: many of her plants and factories shifted east and west to friendly countries; all other heavy industry destroyed; the junkers estates broken up; her exports and imports strictly controlled; German assets and business organizations all over the world rooted out . . .

Build up the strength of the United Nations in both Europe and overseas while reducing Germany's over-all industrial and technical power. Only when such a new equilibrium is established will it be safe to re-admit Germany to the family of nations.

We must ready ourselves for a long occupation of Germany—as long as it takes for her spiritual and economic rebirth.

Recover Secreted Assets

When defeat became certain, many of Germany's junkers, Nazi leaders and war industrialists sneaked abroad assets of every type as reserves for that day in the future when they could try it again. German business abroad has traditionally been an instrument of economic and propagandistic war. These assets and organizations should be rooted out and taken over—everywhere. No hocus-pocus. No falling for "dummy" contrivances.

Enemy assets in each country should be used to make restitution to nationals of that country for properties lost or damaged in enemy countries.

Cave Age versus Prosperity

To accept the view that the restoration of German industrial dominance in Europe is inevitable—something we can do nothing about—is to resign ourselves to the return to a new cave age. We might as well begin to put our factories and plants underground.

As a result of controlling Germany, great economic benefits will flow to all of the United Nations. It will open expanded industrial

opportunities to them and agricultural and other products which Germany will not use, will be taken up by other countries. Britain, which after the war will be confronted with a grave need for increasing the volume of her exports to pay for food and raw material imports, will fall heir to many former German (and Japanese) markets. Instead of trading with Germany, the United Nations will have more trade with one another.

The Soviets are bound to question Allied moves as dictated by a desire to rebuild Germany into a buffer against Russia. In turn, the Western democracies will suspect Russia of seeking to communize Germany. The Germans can be expected to resort to every imaginable trick to foment discord among the four occupying nations. They will play one nation against the others, one zone against the next, hoping to break the common unity of the Allies, so controls will be permitted to lapse, giving her a chance to recoup, as after Versailles . . .

In making my recommendations, I have sought only to stimulate action so that we will exercise the leadership which is ours. I would not want to see that leadership which we have held for 150 years now lost to others or wasted through disuse."

Report on Germany's War Potential

On July 10, 1945, Senator Kilgore of the Subcommittee on War Mobilization, submitted the following report to the Senate Military Affairs Committee, a part of which is below set forth:

Mr. Chairman, we have the honor to submit to you a preliminary report on the sub-committee's studies of German resources for a third world war. In its report of November 1944 on Cartels and National Security, your subcommittee found that the Germans systematically engaged in economic warfare as a prelude to military conquest. Our investigations even at that date supported the conclusion that—

The German aggressors have begun to pursue a strategy which they found successful a quarter century ago; they are already deploying their economic reserves throughout the world in preparation for a third attempt at world domination. . . .

I

Germany in defeat remains a major threat to the peace of the world. The Germans, who have twice within the century launched the most devastating wars, have already set in motion plans for a third attempt to enslave the world. No peace making can be successful which does not at the outset thwart these plans and destroy Germany's potential for war making. This is the indispensable condition to peace in Europe. Lasting world peace requires also the unconditional defeat of Japan and the smashing of her war potential . . .

II

Germany today is better prepared to implement her plot for world conquest than she was at the end of World War I. Her major resources include (1) the world's third strongest industrial economy; (2) tremendous industrial recuperative power; (3) a world-wide network of economic and political reserves and a system of commercial interrelationships penetrating the economies of other nations; and (4) the science of aggression perfected by her leading industrialists, militarists, and politicians to reverse the decisions of the battlefield.

The German War Economy

Germany is an industrial giant whose economy for half a century was developed by the Junker-industrialist clique as an engine of war . . . The strength of Germany's war machine lies not only in her over-expanded metallurgical and chemical industries, but in her enormous industrial flexibility and recuperative power, displayed before and throughout the war . . . It appears that if Germany had held out 6 months longer she would have been sending more destructive V-2 bombs to smash the heart of New York. Germany's recuperative power rests on her greatly expanded machine-tool industry, her reserves of skilled scientists and technicians . . . Except for the United States, Germany remains the outstanding machine shop in the world. German science provided the synthetic fuels and rubber which enabled her armies to drive relentlessly over Europe. German scientists and technologists created new and diabolical weapons. . . .

In the period between World War I and World War II, Germany created economic, political, and espionage outposts throughout the world. In the United States, Germany retrieved many of the properties which had been seized during the First World War. She penetrated so deeply into key industries of Latin-American countries that a State Department official testified before the subcommittee that liquidation of the German-controlled enterprises would have crippled the economies of a number of these countries. The Germans also made strong inroads into the economies of Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Portugal, Finland, Bulgaria, and Roumania . . . German-owned or dominated firms not only served to procure raw materials, increase German trade, and obtain much-needed foreign exchange for Germany, but they acted as centers of espionage and as intermediaries for the financing of Nazi political activities . . . During the war, in an endeavor to maintain intact its assets in enemy countries, it used the neutral countries as a cloak for German ownership or control . . .

Despite the strenuous efforts of the United States and the cooperation of a number of the Latin-American countries, the evidence is unmistakable that German influence is still strongly entrenched in this hemisphere, particularly in Argentina. The United States itself may be one of the most important safe havens for German assets. There is over a half-billion dollars of seized assets held in unnamed Swiss accounts, which are now blocked by the United States on reasonable suspicion that these assets may in fact be German. . . .

The Science of Aggression

. . . Leading German industrialists, militarists, and politicians have at their disposal a long and carefully developed science of aggression. This science rests on a series of major deceptions: (a) that the war of aggression is the product of a few Nazi fanatics; (b) that the German economy is a normal civilian economy and should be maintained as such; (c) that the entire network of relationships between German cartels and monopolies of other countries is essential to the conduct of international trade and industrial progress; (d) that German science and German scientists are an instrument of

human progress; and (e) that the Allies have less to fear from Germany than they have to fear from one another.

The evidence shows that German industry has been dominated by a number of combines and domestic monopolies, chiefly in the basic industries, and that the leaders of these combines, together with the Junkers and Nazis, were Germany's principal war makers. Constituting a kind of economic general staff, immediately after Versailles and with the assistance of the Weimar Republic which they infiltrated, they began to consolidate their position within the country and secretly to rearm Germany. By manipulating reparations, by planned bankruptcy, by Government subsidies and tariff protection, and by masterful use of international cartel relationships they disarmed their prospective victims and with the assistance of those prospective victims, perfected their own war machine. Hitler and the Nazis were late comers in these preparations. It was the cartel and monopoly powers—the leaders of the coal, iron and steel, chemical, and armament combines—who at first secretly and then openly supported Hitler in order to accelerate their ruthless plans for world conquest. By 1931 the coal cartel, one of the most powerful industrial combines in Germany, openly placed a royalty on every ton of coal sold, whether domestically or abroad, in order to finance the Nazi Party . . .

A witness before the subcommittee, who only recently interrogated some of Germany's key industrial leaders, now jailed, pointed out that these leaders confidently expect to be rescued from their present plight by powerful British and American friends who were their former cartel affiliates . . . These industrialists remain the principal custodians of Germany's plans for future war.

III

. . . Your subcommittee finds that the German economy was developed as a war economy, and that its vast industrial potential remains largely undamaged by the war; that Germany has a world-wide network—including even the United States—of commercial relationships and economic, political, and espionage outposts which she

could mobilize for another war; that the leading German industrialists are not only as responsible for war crimes as the German General Staff and the Nazi Party, but that they were among the earliest and most active supporters of the Nazis, whom they used to accelerate their plans for world conquest, and that these industrialists remain the principal custodians of Germany's plans for renewed aggression. . . .

The experience of the years following World War I demonstrates conclusively that without the active understanding, support, and participation of the people as a whole, the efforts of a few commissioners and even an army corps can avail nothing against the desperate schemes of a determined and skillful group of German leaders who have thoroughly indoctrinated their own people and systematically deceived the rest of the world.

[APPENDIX IV]

*Documents on the Russo-
German Relations*

In view of the fact that the Bonn Foreign Office appears as the actual continuation of the old Ribbentrop outfit, while Dr. Adenauer's government serves as the respected front playing the "pro-Western" ruse à la Stresemann, it seems appropriate to refresh our minds with a few documents which unmask the geo-political fundamentals that have governed German-Russo relations in the past, and which obviously will serve as a diplomatic guidepost in the future.

In his excellent study *German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars*, Prof. Edward Hallett Carr stressed the vital fact that "during the past two centuries, German-Russian relations have been a key-point in the international politics of the European continent." It is quite natural, therefore, that the former Ribbentrop diplomats in Bonn are conscious of the fact that Germany's greatest diplomatic triumphs were harvested in the days of August 1939, when a trembling Western world was confronted with the Berlin-Moscow non-aggression pact. No doubt Bismarck's re-insurance policy towards the

East, the Rapallo approach of 1922, and Ribbentrop's diplomatic coup of 1939 still determine the diplomatic outlook in the Bonn Foreign Office.

German diplomats are fascinated by the effectiveness of the old see-saw policy which, according to Professor Carr, allows the German government to "manoeuvre freely between east and west, playing off the two rivals against one another, disclaiming any firm or irrevocable commitment to either, extorting concessions from the one by threatening to fall into the arms of the other, and always keeping its own choice open."

This is exactly the formula which the Madrid Circular Letter recommended for Germany's comeback to power, and, in a more refined manner, was urged by the clever editorial writers in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

The Soviet leaders are well aware of the situation and they shape their planning along these world political realities. When General von Seeckt initiated his secret collaboration with the Soviets in the summer of 1920, it was easy for Lenin to make the following predictions before the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1920:

"This country (Germany), bound by the Versailles Treaty, lives in conditions which do not allow it to exist. And in this position Germany is naturally pushed into alliance with Russia . . . The German bourgeois government madly hates the Bolsheviks, but the interests of the international situation are pushing it towards peace with Soviet Russia against its own will."

Only a year after Lenin had made this statement, the world was stunned by the Rapallo Treaty.

In March 1939, Stalin made a speech with overtures to Germany which, according to Molotov, "had been well understood in Germany and brought about the reversal in political relations." Six months after Stalin's speech, Ribbentrop scored his amazing diplomatic hit in Moscow.

The Nadolny affair in 1949 and the subsequent negotiations between Dr. Wirth and Soviet representatives have laid bare the basic operational factors which determine the relations between West Germany and Russia. The Soviet leaders have a clear conception of the

course of international developments. On the eve of the 19th All-Russian Communist Congress, in October 1952, Stalin predicted that Germany and Japan would again become great world powers. On that occasion he analyzed the past and the future as follows:

"Let us proceed to the chief conquered countries—to [West] Germany, to Japan. These countries are squeezing out a pitiful existence under the heel of American imperialism . . . To think that these countries shall not try again to rise on their feet, to break the 'regime' of the United States and to break forth on the path of independent development—that means to believe in miracles . . .

"It is typical that it was none other than the United States and England which helped Germany raise herself economically and raise her military and economic potential. Of course the United States and England, helping Germany to rise economically, had in view to direct the risen Germany against the Soviet Union, to use it against the country of socialism. However, Germany directed her forces in the first place against the Anglo-American-French bloc, and when Hitlerite Germany declared war against the Soviet Union, then the Anglo-American-French bloc not only did not unite with Hitlerite Germany but on the contrary, was forced to engage in a coalition with the U.S.S.R. against Hitlerite Germany.

"One asks what guarantee is there that Germany and Japan will not rise again on their feet, that they will not attempt to break out from American slavery and live their independent life? I think that there are no such guarantees. But from this it follows that the inevitability of wars between the capitalist countries remains in force."

Stalin is not talking through his hat. His words will be "well understood" again—in Germany!

One of the ablest observers of the international scene, Walter Lippmann, saw in Stalin's thesis the handwriting on the wall:

"This latest work of Stalin enables us to understand, rather more clearly than before, the respective roles in Soviet meth-

od of conspiratorial secrecy on the one hand and of open disclosure on the other—and how the two apparently opposed procedures are related . . .

"Stalin lays down the thesis that Western Germany and Japan cannot prosper within the Western camp. They cannot prosper without access to his world markets—that is to say to the Soviet orbit. He says that the American policy of holding Japan and Western Germany within the capitalist market will cause great conflicts within the Western world . . .

"So much for the open disclosure of Soviet policy, and if we do not take it seriously, if we dismiss it as mere deception, we shall merely be deceiving ourselves . . .

"What remains quite secret, what is left hidden in the realm of intrigue and conspiracy, is how the Soviet government means to exploit the unsettled, highly problematical situation of Germany and Japan.

"The publication of this work of Stalin's is, in fact, an advertisement to the Germans and the Japanese that they may expect to hear more and more from Moscow and Peiping, to hear a lot publicly, and privately to be hearing even more . . .

"The stage is being set for a great political struggle—in which the big stakes are how Germany and Japan will align themselves as between the Soviet orbit and the Western world."

(*New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 7, 1952.*)

There is a well-established pattern in German-Russo relations which the Western world has to reckon with. The skilled observer knows that the volcano is smoldering again and that another world-shaking eruption is in the offing. In the present situation, it seems appropriate to refresh our memory with the following documents:

*The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador
in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)*

Telegram

MOST URGENT BERLIN, August 14, 1939—10:53 p. m.

Received Moscow, August 15, 1939—4:40 a. m.

No. 175 of August 14

For the Ambassador personally.

I request that you call upon Herr Molotov personally and communicate to him the following:

1) The ideological contradictions between National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union were in past years the sole reason why Germany and the U.S.S.R. stood opposed to each other in two separate and hostile camps. The developments of the recent period seem to show that differing world outlooks do not prohibit a reasonable relationship between the two states, and the restoration of cooperation of a new and friendly type. The period of opposition in foreign policy can be brought to an end once and for all and the way lies open for a new sort of future for both countries.

2) There exist no real conflicts of interest between Germany and the U.S.S.R. The living spaces of Germany and the U.S.S.R. touch each other, but in their natural requirements they do not conflict. Thus there is lacking all cause for an aggressive attitude on the part of one country against the other. Germany has no aggressive intentions against the U.S.S.R. The Reich Government is of the opinion that there is no question between the Baltic and the Black Seas which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries. Among these are such questions as: the Baltic Sea, the Baltic area, Poland, Southeastern questions, etc. In such matters political cooperation between the two countries can have only a beneficial effect. The same applies to German and Soviet economy, which can be expanded in any direction.

3) There is no doubt that German-Soviet policy today has come to an historic turning point. The decisions with respect to policy to be made in the immediate future in Berlin and Moscow will be of decisive importance for the aspect of relationships between the German people and the peoples of the U.S.S.R. for generations. On those decisions will depend whether the two peoples will some day again and without any compelling reason take up arms against each other or whether they pass again into a friendly relationship. It has gone well with both countries previously when they were friends and badly when they were enemies.

4) It is true that Germany and the U.S.S.R., as a result of years of hostility in their respective world outlooks, today look at each other in a distrustful fashion. A great deal of rubbish which has accumulated will have to be cleared away. It must be said, however, that even during this period the natural sympathy of the Germans for the Russians never disappeared. The policy of both states can be built anew on that basis.

5) The Reich Government and the Soviet Government must, judging from all experience, count it as certain that the capitalistic Western democracies are the unforgiving enemies of both National Socialist Germany and of the U.S.S.R. They are today trying again, by the conclusion of a military alliance, to drive the U.S.S.R. into the war against Germany. In 1914 this policy had disastrous results for Russia. It is the compelling interest of both countries to avoid for all future time the destruction of Germany and of the U.S.S.R., which would profit only the Western democracies.

6) The crisis which has been produced in German-Polish relations by English policy, as well as English agitation for war and the attempts at an alliance which are bound up with that policy, make a speedy clarification of German-Russian relations desirable. Otherwise these matters, without any German initiative, might take a turn which would deprive both Governments of the possibility of restoring German-Soviet friendship and possibly of clearing up jointly the territorial questions of Eastern Europe. The leadership in both countries should, therefore, not allow the situation to drift, but should take action at the proper time. It would be fatal if, through mutual lack of knowledge of views and intentions, our peoples should be finally driven asunder.

As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also has the desire for a clarification of German-Russian relations. Since, however, according to previous experience this clarification can be achieved only slowly through the usual diplomatic channels, Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the

name of the Führer, to set forth the Führer's views to Herr Stalin. Only through such a direct discussion, in the view of Herr von Ribbentrop, can a change be brought about, and it should not be impossible thereby to lay the foundations for a definite improvement in German-Russian relations.

ANNEX: I request that you do not give Herr Molotov these instructions in writing, but that you read them to him. I consider it important that they reach Herr Stalin in as exact a form as possible and I authorize you at the same time to request from Herr Molotov on my behalf an audience with Herr Stalin so that you may be able to make this important communication directly to him also. In addition to a conference with Molotov, an extended conference with Stalin would be a condition for my making the trip.

RIBBENTROP

During the following days, Ribbentrop urgently insisted on his immediate coming to Moscow in order to sign a non-aggression pact. Molotov, however, was dragging his feet and demanded sufficient time for a "thorough preparation" of such an important pact. A few days later, Ambassador von Schulenburg was instructed to deliver the following telegram from Hitler to Stalin:

*The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador
in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)*

Telegram

VERY URGENT BERLIN, August 20, 1939—4:35 p. m.

Received Moscow, August 21, 1939—12:45 a. m.

No. 189 of August 20

For the Ambassador personally.

The Führer authorizes you to present yourself to Molotov at once and hand him the following telegram from the Führer to Herr Stalin:

Herr Stalin, Moscow. 1) I sincerely welcome the signing of the new German-Soviet Commercial Agreement as the first step in the reordering of German-Soviet relations.

2) The conclusion of a nonaggression pact with the

Soviet Union means to me the establishment of a long-range German policy. Germany thereby resumes a political course that was beneficial to both states during by-gone centuries. The Government of the Reich is therefore resolved in such case to act entirely consistent with such a far-reaching change.

3) I accept the draft of the nonaggression pact that your Foreign Minister, Herr Molotov, delivered, but consider it urgently necessary to clarify the questions connected with it as soon as possible.

4) The supplementary protocol desired by the Government of the Soviet Union can, I am convinced, be substantially clarified in the shortest possible time if a responsible German statesman can come to Moscow himself to negotiate. Otherwise the Government of the Reich is not clear as to how the supplementary protocol could be cleared up and settled in a short time.

5) The tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable. Polish demeanor toward a great power is such that a crisis may arise any day. Germany is determined, at any rate, in the face of this presumption, from now on to look after the interests of the Reich with all the means at its disposal.

6) In my opinion, it is desirable, in view of the intentions of the two states to enter into a new relation to each other, not to lose any time. I therefore again propose that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, but at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister has full powers to draw up and sign the non-aggression pact as well as the protocol. A longer stay by the Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow than one to two days at most is impossible in view of the international situation. I should be glad to receive your early answer. Adolf Hitler.

Please deliver to Herr Molotov the above telegram of the Führer to Stalin in writing, on a sheet of paper without letterhead.

RIBBENTROP

On the next day, Stalin gave the following reply:

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
to the German Foreign Office*
Telegram

VERY URGENT MOSCOW, August 21, 1939—7:30 p. m.
SECRET

No. 200 of August 21

Supplementing my telegram No. 199 of August 21.

Text of Stalin's reply:

August 21, 1939. To the Chancellor of the German Reich, A. Hitler. I thank you for the letter. I hope that the German-Soviet nonaggression pact will mark a decided turn for the better in the political relations between our countries.

The people of our countries need peaceful relations with each other. The assent of the German Government to the conclusion of a nonaggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating the political tension and for the establishment of peace and collaboration between our countries.

The Soviet Government has authorized me to inform you that it agrees to Herr von Ribbentrop's arriving in Moscow on August 23. J. Stalin.

SCHULENBURG

Two days later, on August 23, 1939, Ribbentrop arrived at Moscow and, after a few hours' conference with Stalin, all former controversies between the two totalitarian powers, as well as the harsh epithets hurled at each other, were forgotten. A hastily drawn-up treaty was signed and the "Herren Stalin and Molotov drank repeatedly to the nonaggression pact, the new era of German-Russian relations, and to the German nation."

A week later, the German armies attacked Poland. Soon the conflict embroiled Europe and later dragged in the whole world.

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