Korean War Documentary Film: The United Nations Forces Cross the 38th Parallel
http://thefilmarchive.org/
With Lieutenant-General
Matthew Ridgway assuming the command of the
US Eighth Army on
26 December, the
PVA and the
KPA launched their
Third Phase Offensive (also known as the "
Chinese New Year's Offensive") on
New Year's Eve of
1950. Utilizing night attacks in which
UN Command fighting positions were encircled and then assaulted by numerically superior troops who had the element of surprise.
The attacks were accompanied by loud trumpets and gongs, which fulfilled the double purpose of facilitating tactical communication and mentally disorienting the enemy. UN forces initially had no familiarity with this tactic, and as a result some soldiers "bugged out," abandoning their weapons and retreating to the south.
The Chinese New Year's Offensive overwhelmed UN forces, allowing the PVA and KPA to conquer
Seoul for the second time on 4 January 1951.
These setbacks prompted
General MacArthur to consider using nuclear weapons against the
Chinese or
North Korean interiors, intending radioactive fallout zones would interrupt the Chinese supply chains. However, upon the arrival of the charismatic
General Ridgway, the esprit de corps of the bloodied
Eighth Army immediately began to revive.
UN forces retreated to
Suwon in the west,
Wonju in the center, and the territory north of
Samcheok in the east, where the battlefront stabilized and held. The PVA had outrun its logistics capability and thus was forced to recoil from pressing the attack beyond Seoul; food, ammunition, and materiel were carried nightly, on foot and bicycle, from the border at the
Yalu River to the three battle lines. In late January, upon finding that the PVA had abandoned their battle lines, General Ridgway ordered a reconnaissance-in-force, which became
Operation Roundup (
5 February 1951). A full-scale X
Corps advance gradually proceeded while fully exploiting the UN Command's air superiority, concluded with the UN reaching the
Han River and recapturing Wonju near
Seoul.
In mid-February, the PVA counterattacked with the
Fourth Phase Offensive and achieved initial victory at
Hoengseong. But the offensive was soon blunted by the IX Corps positions at Chipyong-ni in the center. Units of the
US 2nd Infantry Division and the
French Battalion fought a short but desperate battle that broke the attack's momentum. The battle is sometimes known as the
Gettysburg of the
Korean War. The battle saw 5,600
Korean, American and
French defeat a numerically superior Chinese force.
Surrounded on all sides, the US 2nd Infantry Division
Warrior Division's
23rd Regimental Combat Team with an attached French Battalion was hemmed in by more than 25,
000 Chinese Communist Forces.
United Nations Forces had previously retreated in the face of large Communist forces instead of getting cut off, but this time they stood and fought. The allies fought at odds of roughly
15 to 1.
In the last two weeks of February 1951, Operation Roundup was followed by
Operation Killer, carried out by the revitalized Eighth Army. It was a full-scale, battlefront-length attack staged for maximum exploitation of firepower to kill as many KPA and PVA troops as possible. Operation Killer concluded with
I Corps re-occupying the territory south of the Han River, and IX Corps capturing Hoengseong. On 7 March 1951, the Eighth Army attacked with
Operation Ripper, expelling the PVA and the KPA from Seoul on 14 March 1951. This was the city's fourth conquest in a years' time, leaving it a ruin; the 1.5 million pre-war population was down to
200,000, and people were suffering from severe food shortages.
On 1 March 1951 Mao sent a cable to
Stalin, in which he emphasized the difficulties faced by Chinese forces and the urgent need for air cover, especially over supply lines.
Apparently impressed by the
Chinese war effort, Stalin finally agreed to supply two air force divisions, three anti-aircraft divisions, and six thousand trucks. PVA troops in
Korea continued to suffer severe logistical problems throughout the war. In late April
Peng Dehuai sent his deputy,
Hong Xuezhi, to brief
Zhou Enlai in
Beijing. What Chinese soldiers feared, Hong said, was not the enemy, but that they had nothing to eat, no bullets to shoot, and no trucks to transport them to the rear when they were wounded.
Zhou attempted to respond to the PVA's logistical concerns by increasing Chinese production and improving methods of supply, but these efforts were never completely sufficient. At the same time, large-scale air defense training programs were carried out, and the
Chinese Air Force began to particip
ate in the war from September 1951 onward.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War