The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods
of Warfare was signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. It found wide
acceptance in the international community but it had serious
shortcomings: the research, production and export of weapons were not
prohibited and the weapons themselves were so loosely defined that it
was easy to circumvent the protocol. Also, some signatory states -
including the United States, the USSR, France and Great Britain - had
insisted on retaining the right of retaliation in the event of
chemical attack.
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on their Destruction, based on a joint American-USSR draft, was
presented at the 26th meeting of the United Nations Assembly and
adopted on 12 April 1972. The provisions on verification are
inadequate. This Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons
entered into force on 26 March 1975 and has been ratified by 140
states (including Iraq). Eighteen states have signed it but not yet
ratified it.
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction was adopted in Paris on 13 January 1993. It introduces
binding measures on verification, accompanied by procedures for
inspection and investigation in the territory of states suspected of
failing to fulfil their obligations. In an area covering dual-use
products, i.e. products that may be used for civilian or military
purposes, the convention introduces specific measures on declaration
and verification relating to the “non-prohibited” use of chemical
products. Finally, very clear rules are established for the
destruction of stocks of chemical weapons (new or old) and production
facilities.
Under the terms of Article 21, the convention was to enter into force no later than two years after its signature in Paris and six months after the deposit of the 65th ratification. This measure gave the states signing in 1993 sufficient time to complete their national ratification procedures (normally approval by parliament). The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force officially on 29 April 1997, having been signed by 162 states. By the end of 1997, it had been ratified by 104 states. Sixty-four other states (including Iraq, Israel, Libya and North Korea) have not yet deposited their instruments of ratification with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was
signed in 1966, three years after the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 5 August
1963, and was ratified in 1970 for a period of 25 years. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically prohibited the five powers
officially possessing nuclear weapons - the United States, Russia
(then the USSR), the United Kingdom, China and France - to pass
material or information to other states, which in turn undertook not
to produce bombs. At the NPT Review Conferences held every five years
since 1975, the principal bone of contention has been the absence of
any prohibition on tests but, despite this, 170 countries decided on
11 May 1995 that the Treaty should continue in force
indefinitely.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed by 149
countries on 24 September 1996. To enter into force, it must be
ratified by the 44 signatories possessing nuclear facilities. On 6
April 1998, the only declared nuclear powers to have ratified the
treaty were France and the United Kingdom, though President Clinton
expects it to be ratified by Congress this year. India has not
signed. Until its tests in May 1998, it had been regarded as
belonging, with Israel and Pakistan, to a group of countries on the
threshold of becoming nuclear powers and it had argued during the
negotiations that the comprehensive test ban should be linked to
nuclear disarmament by the great powers.
