

EXPANDED ISSUE

PEACE DOSSIER 7

Debate on the ANZUS Alliance

Joe Camilleri and Harry Redner

INTRODUCTION
GARY SMITH

SECURITY TREATY

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Noting that the United States of America has made arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has stationed its armed forces and advanced bases in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of this Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in Australia to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,



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A Publication of the Victorian Association for Peace Studies

INTRODUCTION

What position should Australian disarmers, dismayed with the course of the arms race and our extensive nuclear entanglement with the USA, take towards the ANZUS Alliance?

The ANZUS Treaty was signed in September 1951, and ratified in April 1952. This Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America formally established the Australian-American Alliance. In the decades since, an accelerating pattern of nuclear involvement between Australia and the United States has developed. The 1950s saw the export of uranium for weapons production and the first US installation – a nuclear test monitoring facility – established in complete secrecy at Alice Springs.

This was followed by a dramatic extension in the 1960s with the establishment of the major US installations in Australia which have been discussed in *Peace Dossier 1*, 'American Bases in Australia'. These installations communicate with missile-firing submarines, and with the series of satellite systems which are an integral part of America's nuclear weapons programs. Over the last decade, the functions of these installations have continued to expand. And in the mid-1970s, Australia opened up its ports to frequent visits by American nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered vessels, and its airfields to B52 bombers capable of carrying the new Cruise missiles.

On the rather rare occasions when steps in our extensive integration into US nuclear weapons systems have been discussed by Australian governments, they have been presented as logical extensions of the ANZUS alliance. They are said to be the premiums we pay to ensure American protection, and our contribution to the defence of the West. Previous issues of *Peace Dossier* have focussed on the dangerous predicament for humanity which the nuclear-armed powers have created through their arms race, and on the costs and risks for Australians in particular. Given the link that our governments have asserted between nuclear cooperation and the ANZUS alliance, should the alliance be opposed?

In this issue, Joe Camilleri argues that Australia's nuclear disengagement requires a sharp break from the ANZUS alliance and that a non-aligned Australia would be better able to pursue regional disarmament initiatives. Harry Redner argues that we can be a far more effective force for peace and disarmament from within the ANZUS alliance, and that to challenge the alliance directly is undesirable and likely to be counterproductive.

The two authors first confronted each other at a public meeting sponsored by the Victorian Association for Peace Studies in 1982. These versions of their positions were finalized in September 1983.

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TOWARDS A NON-ALIGNED AUSTRALIA

– Joe Camilleri

Our relations with the United States are once again the subject of controversy. The alliance is viewed with increasing suspicion and concern in many quarters. A reassessment of costs and benefits is gradually emerging not only in academic writings and discussions, but in political debate, in shifting public attitudes, and even in the pages of our conservative press. This development will come as no surprise to anyone acquainted with the dangerous drift of American strategic thinking and its implications for Australia. Only by severing the military alliance with the United States can we as a nation hope to enhance our security and assist the process of regional and global denuclearisation.

Historical Background

Whatever the motive of the Menzies government which was elected in December 1949, it is clear that American policy at that time was to create in Asia a Western security system in which Japan would play a key role. The American plan, as conveyed to Australia through Dulles, envisaged 'a chain of Pacific defence' stretching from the Aleutians through Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines, to Australia and New Zealand. American forces in Japan and the Northern Pacific, the US presence in the Philippines, and some acceptable security arrangement with Australia and New Zealand were regarded as the 'three spokes of a wheel', the centre of which would be the United States.

By the end of 1950 Australia's incorporation into the American strategic orbit was an established principle of American policy. The ANZUS treaty, which was signed in September 1951 and ratified in April 1952, gave effect to that policy. Contrary to the conservative apologia for the ANZUS treaty, the document was then, and still is today, primarily an expression of American interests. As a politically stable continent, strategically situated between the Indian and Pacific Oceans with a small but not insignificant military capacity, Australia has provided a secure base for American military installations in time of peace and a useful springboard for forward operations in time of war.

Whereas the United States has been able to use the alliance as a lever with which to obtain Australian military involvement in the rimlands of Asia (e.g. Korea, Thailand and Vietnam), US commitments under ANZUS have been remarkably vague. According to the letter of the Treaty, in the event of an armed attack against Australia the United States is simply required to 'act to meet the common danger'. Moreover, such action must be in accordance with US 'constitutional processes'. In other words, the United States can discharge its obligations in any way and in any area that it sees fit.

It is worth noting that from the outset the US Chiefs of Staff went to considerable pains to ensure that

ANZUS did not require the establishment of a military planning organisation and that the Council created by Article VII did not provide for strategic co-ordination. Accordingly, the United States engaged in little consultation with Australia on the conduct of military operations in the Korean War, and on several occasions failed to communicate major policy decisions on its military involvement in Vietnam, despite Australia's supporting role in the conflict. From the American vantage point, consultation has not been an essential ingredient of the partnership. The disparity in economic and military power between the two allies is such that the United States expects to dictate overall alliance strategy. Australian governments have no doubt been especially compliant, but the alliance framework has been so designed as to minimise the opportunity for diplomatic or strategic independence.

The Consequence of ANZUS

The primary objective of ANZUS was to reinforce America's containment strategy aimed at resisting communist governments and revolutionary movements wherever and however they might arise. As a consequence conservative governments in Australia rapidly adopted the domino theory which then formed the basis of US policy in Southeast Asia. Under the guise of forward defence, they pursued an interventionist course in Vietnam, which helped to engulf Australia in a protracted and unwinnable war.

The potential for such entanglements still exists today. For a few years, after its costly and humiliating defeat in Vietnam in 1975, it seemed as if the United States would scale down its interventionist policies in the Third World. But since 1979 we have seen the revival of global policing strategies, in particular the establishment of rapid deployment forces and the introduction of military facilities and personnel in several regions, notably in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and Central America. Australia's continuing alignment cannot but encourage the expectation that it will remain America's faithful ally in many of the troubled areas of the world, and perhaps participate in further military expeditions on the side of its 'great and powerful friend'.

But if the strategy of forward defence is the premium Australia has had to pay to maintain this insurance policy – that is 'protection' by military alignment – it is by no means the only cost we have incurred. The close strategic nexus tying Australia to the United States has reinforced the threat syndrome underlying Australia's traditional perception of the outside world, and fuelled the politics of fear. To that extent, it has limited the scope for rational debate about available foreign policy options.

The alliance with the United States has consistently been used by conservative parties to achieve short-term electoral advantage. It has seriously im-



paired a genuine appreciation of our regional interests and, more often than not, encouraged attitudes and policies which have served to exacerbate tensions in the Asian-Pacific region. Our failure during the 1950s and 1960s to recognise the political reality of China, our costly involvement in the Vietnam war, our continuing inability to achieve a constructive relationship with the Indochinese states, our active support for repression in the name of development in the ASEAN countries, our timid response to the Indonesian annexation of East Timor - all of these bear in varying degrees the imprint of our indecently close relationship with the United States.

The American alliance, however, carries with it yet another danger. Although inherent in the relationship from the outset, it is only in recent years that its alarming implications have become fully apparent. The secret agreement reached with the United States in 1955, which provided for the building of a defence intelligence station at Alice Springs, was merely a taste of things to come. In subsequent years several other installations, representing key links in the US global military network and operating under effective US control, were established on Australian soil. Of particular importance are the North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar stations, which became operational in 1966, 1969 and 1971 respectively. Quite apart from the North West Cape's capacity to transmit a nuclear firing order, these installations are known to play a major part in identifying Soviet targets and in enabling US submarines to pinpoint their position with remarkable precision. They have become central to America's growing commitment to 'limited nuclear war' options and the use of nuclear weapons as warfighting weapons, thereby contributing to the increased risk of nuclear war.

Nuclear Disengagement

It is now increasingly recognised that the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons is morally unjustified, irrational and ultimately self-defeating. Nuclear deterrence is at best an exercise in competitive risk-taking based on brinkmanship and bluff, which accentuates the conditions of hostility, suspicion and tension in international relations, thereby hastening the very holocaust it is designed to prevent. If we accept this simple but far-reaching proposition, then the policies of any nation or government which endorses or facilitates the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons must also be considered immoral and irrational since they contribute directly to the threat of a nuclear war and to heightened national insecurity. By virtue of the ANZUS connection, which over time has been transformed from a regional security arrangement to a global nuclear alliance, we as a nation have become both agents and victims of the nuclear arms race. The need to reconsider ANZUS in all its ramifications has thus acquired a new sense of urgency.

If disarmament is to become an important Australian objective, a policy of nuclear disengagement will need to be given high priority. Several initial steps immediately suggest themselves. An Australian government could be reasonably expected to

1. Forego any intention to acquire a nuclear component for Australia's armed forces. We have already assumed this obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
2. Prevent at all times and in all circumstances the stationing of nuclear weapons on Australian soil. We have yet to make such a commitment;
3. Deny potentially nuclear-armed aircraft of any other country access to Australian airfields or to the use of Australian facilities by US B52 bombers contradicts this principle;
4. Refuse the nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered vessels of any foreign government the right to sail in Australian territorial waters or berth in Australian ports. An attempt by Bill Hayden, when leader of the Opposition, to revise ALP policy along these lines, provoked a swift and sharp reaction from the United States which led him to abandon the initiative;
5. Reduce the ever-increasing risk of nuclear proliferation by putting an end to the mining and export of uranium. Foreign pressures have thus far successfully thwarted such a policy change.

Although all five measures are eminently feasible, desirable and within the purview of Australia's jurisdiction, only the first step has thus far come to fruition. Several factors have stood in the way, but there can be little doubt that the diplomatic and institutional pressures arising from the US alliance have been the major stumbling blocks to this limited programme of denuclearisation.

In any case, if the intention is to ensure that Australian territory in no way contributes to current preparations for nuclear war, the objective must be to remove all nuclear-related military installations. The presence of these bases is incompatible with any commitment to nuclear disarmament, and greatly increases the probability of Australia's involvement in the event of a nuclear war. Given their strategic importance, the bases must be considered probable targets, particularly in the event of an attempted limited nuclear strike. Indeed, it is conceivable that Australian population centres could become targets as part of a Soviet demonstration strategy. On the other hand, in the absence of these bases there would be little incentive for a Soviet strike against Australia.

Enough has been said to indicate that the bases are an integral part of the strategic rivalry between the superpowers, hence of Australia's military alignment with the United States. The maintenance and upgrading of US communications facilities on Australian soil, like the encouragement and support we give to the US military presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, our readiness to provide nuclear warships and B52 bombers access to Australian facilities and the close collaboration of our intelligence agencies with the US ones, are not simply manifestations of the ANZUS connection but are now its very *raison d'être*. The pervasive nuclear relationship not only dominates our defence and foreign policies but shapes our domestic political process. The intrusion of the American strategic-industrial complex into the political fabric of our society has now reached such proportions that it inhibits the kind of initiatives Australia could and

should take to maximise national self-reliance and promote regional co-operation and stability.

Nor can we be under any illusion as to the value of the alliance for Australian security. The United States will come to Australia's assistance when and only when it is in America's interest, and within its power, to do so. In the event of conflict with regional powers (e.g. Indonesia, Japan), there is no certainty that the United States would side with Australia against other allies. The Indonesian policy of confrontation with Malaysia, the subsequent incorporation of West New Guinea and more recently the annexation of East Timor have all provoked widespread anxiety and hostility in Australia, yet in each instance the United States opted for an accommodating attitude towards Indonesia's rulers. Similarly, American actions in other parts of the world since 1945 - the refusal to support France and Britain in the 1956 Suez crisis, the withdrawal from South Vietnam, the abandonment of the Shah of Iran and the failure to assist Argentina in the Falklands War are particularly revealing examples - would suggest that alliances do not always ensure support.

Following a review of ANZUS by the three Treaty partners in July 1983, it was made clear that, in the event of an attack or threat against Australia, there was no guarantee of an automatic military response by the United States. Furthermore, the *communiqué* issued at the end of the meeting went on to state that 'the ANZUS treaty (did) not absolve each government from the primary responsibility to provide for its own security to the extent that its resources allow'. This redefinition of obligations was widely interpreted as encouraging and justifying a policy of greater military self-reliance.

Non-Alignment

The time has come, then, to reconsider the policy of military alignment and to develop a new foreign policy which takes full account of our geographic, cultural and racial situation. As a non-aligned nation we would be better placed to pursue an equidistant policy towards, and more effective lines of communication with, all great powers, in particular the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. We would have a more objective view of the so-called Soviet threat. We could more actively encourage the process of détente, both in our bilateral relations and through our membership of the United Nations and other international organisations. We would provide dramatic evidence of the declining appeal of nuclear alliances and of the increasing hostility of the world community to the strategic doctrines of the superpowers.

On the other hand, so long as Australia remains firmly tied to the American camp, it is difficult to see how we can make our voices heard in opposition to the production and deployment of new weapon systems which increase the probability of nuclear war (e.g. Cruise missiles, Pershing II missiles, the neutron bomb, the MX missile, the Trident submarine and space-based military systems). Demands for the non-deployment of such weapons have been the basis for massive disarmament campaigns in Europe and the United States. They provide a useful launching-pad for more substantial disarmament measures. They represent a morally justified and politically effective strategy, and as such deserve Australian support.

Other proposals with which Australia could associate itself include: the establishment of nuclear free zones, limitations on defence spending, a comprehensive test ban treaty, international agreement on the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons and total prohibition on the development and production of chemical and biological weapons. A non-aligned Australia would have the necessary freedom of action to pursue these initiatives, to support a wide range of disarmament initiatives not only philosophically but practically.

To achieve any credibility, however, these proposals must be grounded in a regional context. The regions of most immediate interest to Australia are Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. Here again, a policy of non-alignment would offer Australia unique opportunities. In Southeast Asia, support for a zone of neutrality would seem particularly appropriate. In the long-term a self-sustaining South-east Asian balance is likely to prove more effective than any American sphere of influence in preventing escalation of regional conflicts, minimising the risks of great power intervention, and limiting the effects of superpower rivalry.

There are many nations regarded by the United States as part of the broader Western Alliance which do not act as host nations for joint facilities. The joint facilities are not necessarily part of Australia's obligation under the ANZUS pact, although their presence here undoubtedly flows from its existence.

The ANZUS Alliance, Report from the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 1982, p. 58.

With regard to the Indian Ocean, a non-aligned Australia could mount a concerted and effective campaign in support of the creation of a Zone of Peace. Though we have in the past paid lip service to this concept, we have not been willing to exert vigorous diplomatic pressure in support of it. Nor have we actively co-operated with other littoral states intent on reducing the naval presence of the two superpowers and on removing foreign military bases from the region.

In the South Pacific, Australia could, by virtue of its size and influence, make a major contribution to the establishment of a Nuclear Free Zone. No country in the region stands to benefit from the stationing and transport of nuclear weapons, the carrying out of nuclear tests or the introduction of any aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Nuclear Free Zone proposal already has the support of many Pacific governments, of the South Pacific Forum, of the Pacific Trade Union Forum, and of the various independence movements trying to wipe out the last vestiges of colonialism in the region. If US strategic interests did not weigh so heavily in the formulation of our foreign policy, there is every reason to think we could become credible and effective champions of all three zoning proposals.

Few would dispute the compelling case that can be made for non-alignment as the basis for a comprehensive peace policy. Non-aligned countries such as Sweden, Austria, Yugoslavia, and even tiny Malta have certainly demonstrated the positive value of their

diplomatic freedom of action. Some have nevertheless argued that Australia should persevere with the alliance for tactical reasons. Rather than invite the full force of American displeasure or needlessly antagonise deeply ingrained pro-American sentiment in Australia, might it not be more pragmatic to focus on specific demands (i.e. removal of nuclear bases, creation of nuclear free zones, etc.), take advantage of widespread public anxiety about the nuclear arms race, and at the same time neutralise the embarrassing charge of anti-Americanism?

This tack may seem plausible at first sight, but it is unlikely to succeed. On the one hand, there is little reason to believe that a policy of nuclear disengagement would not provoke accusations of anti-American or anti-Western bias from those who support the status quo, even if such a policy did not call for the abolition of ANZUS. On the other hand, so long as our current subservience to the ANZUS myth is not challenged directly our capacity to reshape our foreign and defence policies will be greatly diminished. Over the last three decades our so-called contractual and moral obligations under ANZUS have been used with great skill and monotonous regularity to entangle Australia ever more deeply into America's nuclear strategy.

If the process is to be reversed, we will need to delegitimise the sacrosanct quality which the American alliance has acquired in the minds of our military and political elites. Fortunately, public attitudes and perceptions are changing, influenced by events at home and abroad. The futility and danger of nuclear armaments are more clearly appreciated - 72 per cent of Australians are apparently opposed to their use in all circumstances (*Age*, June 21, 1982). Furthermore, whereas 32 per cent of Australians consider that the alliance with the US increases the risk of an attack on Australia within the next ten years, only 27 per cent believe that it reduces such a risk (*Age*, June 30, 1981). The same opinion survey found that 38 per cent of the population thought an actual attack on Australia was likely, while 57 per cent thought it unlikely or very unlikely.

In other words, two of the most potent factors that have traditionally underpinned the alliance with the United States - its value as an insurance policy and the obsession with external threats - appear to be receding. This shift in public opinion suggests that the ground for a thorough reappraisal of traditional policies may be more fertile than many of us would have dared to imagine even a few years ago.

It is, of course, true that governments and major political parties are prisoners of the stereotypes they have helped to create. They are anxious to exploit, or fearful of upsetting, what they perceive to be the natural conservatism of the Australian electorate. More profound political forces will have to come into play if a transformation of the kind proposed here is to prove positive and durable. This may well be the unique contribution of the emerging disarmament movement in Australia. If we can harness the energies and resources of this rapidly growing movement, if we set out resolutely and imaginatively to cultivate the politics of survival, it may well be possible to build in the years to come a nonaligned, internationally-minded, nuclear-free Australia.

REPLY TO JOE CAMILLERI

- Harry Redner

Joe Camilleri adopts the simple expedient of ascribing everything he dislikes in Australian foreign policy for the last 33 years to ANZUS. There is certainly much to criticize in that policy. But it was conceived and executed by Menzies and the successive Liberal governments elected by the Australian people, not foisted on us by ANZUS or exacted by the Americans. The fault lies not in the stars (and stripes) but in ourselves. Thus, it was not ANZUS or the Americans that compelled us to go into the Vietnam war. Rather it was we (in the person of Menzies) who did everything in our power to entice them in, against our real mutual interests, even promising them more support than we were eventually prepared to give. (See Michael Sexton, *War for the Asking*.) Technically speaking, we did not even enter the war under ANZUS but under SEATO, a quite different involvement of ours, and that treaty had to be stretched at our choosing to make it fit.

Camilleri's positive proposals for an alternative foreign policy are unfortunately vitiated by a failure to recognize our necessary and legitimate national interests. Agreed, it is not in our interest to be persistently hostile to the USSR. But ANZUS does not prevent us having good relations with it. The real question is, is it in our interests or those of peace that we go so far as to adopt an 'equidistant policy' between the USSR and the US, the former a regime with which we have little in common, the latter our closest partner in nearly everything? Does this make political sense?

The same point holds for the proposal that we should be equidistant between ASEAN and Vietnam. Indeed there is an implied suggestion that we should tilt to the latter. We are enjoined to be averse to the 'repression in the name of development' of, say, Singapore and Malaysia - countries with whom we have close trading and diplomatic relations and which have attained a high standard of living and maintained considerable civil liberties. Yet we are to 'promote constructive relations' with Vietnam - a totalitarian regime whose people are starved to finance its military expansion. Is this a policy designed 'to promote regional co-operation and stability'? I do not think so, though it is not my intention to recommend the opposite, that we be hostile to Vietnam and uncritical of our friendly neighbours, especially Indonesia whose regime is repressive.

Camilleri's final proposal that 'the unique contribution of the disarmament movement in Australia' is to 'delegitimise... the American alliance' has inverted the means and ends of peace movements. For it now seems that the true end of the movement is to destabilise ANZUS, regardless of whether this would help or hinder efforts for disarmament in an international context. In my view, to mobilize the movement against ANZUS will be self-defeating and counter-productive to efforts for peace.

INDEPENDENT PEACE INITIATIVES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

- Harry Redner

It is crucial to distinguish between a treaty and an alliance. A treaty, such as the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States entered into on 29th April 1952, is a formal document with declarations, clauses and conditions spelling out the relationship between the parties.

An Evolving Bond

An alliance, such as the Australian-American alliance (New Zealand can henceforth be taken as a joint party with Australia) is an evolving bond, establishing ties, associations and institutions for joint and reciprocal action, and mechanisms for consultation and information at all kinds of levels. Built into an alliance are strong as well as weak expectations as to what either party would be held bound to do under certain future contingencies. The fact that such expectations cannot be exactly specified does not go against the force of an alliance; and in some cases, such as for example, how the US is bound to come to our aid, it is even better to leave them vague to deter would-be aggressors.

A treaty is not essential to an alliance nor always present. Once an alliance has been eroded or destroyed by some act that goes against its spirit, the treaty that remains is worthless - no more than a scrap of paper. The Australian-American alliance existed before the ANZUS treaty and would still exist without it. This is why a too finicky attention to the treaty is pointless.

A treaty is a dead document that cannot change; an alliance is a living reality that waxes and wanes, going through changing phases and stages. So the issue as it presents itself is whether the Australian-American alliance should remain as it is, be strengthened, weakened or altogether nullified. Australian political parties and their supporting sections of the public adopt different stances on this issue. The Liberal Party argues that the alliance should be strengthened and when in government acts to do so; the new Labor Government is maintaining the alliance as it is, though some factions within the party (e.g. the Victorian Left) would like it weakened. A weakening to the point of eventual abolition is advocated only by those on the far left and by radical pacifists, neutralists and supporters of non-alignment. This last option has so little public support that it will not in the foreseeable future constitute an electoral issue, so debating it is, strictly speaking, academic.

Better Options Than Non-Alignment

Before embarking on this academic debate on the option of abolition, it is essential to show that there are other, better, options as well. There are features of the alliance that have been allowed to develop over the last two decades that are not completely in Australia's

interest and could in some eventualities constitute dangers to world peace. The most obvious of these are the US installations on our soil which could potentially serve to prepare and unleash a nuclear war, and over which Australia has never had full control.

But at the same time, as Andrew Mack acknowledges, these installations and the satellites linked to them 'play a stabilizing role - reducing the probability of nuclear war' - in that they 'provide independent confirmation of attack warnings - an essential safety check given the alarming number of false alerts within early warning systems', and also 'contribute to arms control verification' (*National Times*, 3 June 1983). Hence, Mack concludes that 'whether or not Australia should continue to support the presence of these ground stations is not as simple as either the peace movement or the neo-conservatives would have us believe'. But obviously, greater control and vigilance by Australia is necessary and can be achieved without unduly disturbing the alliance.

Bases Not Required By ANZUS Alliance

As the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence reports, 'the joint facilities are not necessarily part of Australia's obligations under the ANZUS pact...' (*The ANZUS Alliance*, p. 58). Historically speaking, we have only ourselves to blame for the way they were set up under the mistaken policy of successive Liberal Governments, acting on the belief that the US will be more committed to our defence if it has bases on our soil. Because of this policy - staunchly opposed by Labor, but nevertheless confirmed by the Australian people at successive elections - what started out as an alliance to defend us against threats in the region has become one which in its present form places us at some risk of nuclear retaliation.

There was a chance that these unfortunate developments would be corrected by the Labor Government in office from 1972 to 1975. The world situation then was opportune for such a move. Detente was in the ascendancy. If Labor had retained office and forcefully pressed this and other issues such as the de-nuclearization and de-militarization of the South Pacific and Indian oceans, with the incoming President Carter, an amicable settlement could have been reached. Carter himself supported the latter proposal but the Fraser Government was not disposed to listen. In the present worsening world situation and with the Reagan Administration it is all going to be much more difficult, but in the longer term not impossible.

If the alliance can be adjusted does it serve any purpose to abrogate it? Is there anything we could do diplomatically outside the alliance that we cannot do within it? Within the alliance Australia can undertake regional and world initiatives for peace - e.g. canvass

support for a nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere, a total test-ban treaty, a US commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons – with a better chance of being heeded – but it cannot join the non-aligned movement or declare itself neutralist. Furthermore, it is difficult to see what benefit non-alignment would bring given the ineffectualness of such gestures. The non-aligned movement is divided and many of its members have military links with the USSR. Within the alliance Australia could on some issues exert an influence for moderation on the US.

The Costs and Risks of Non-Alignment

Leaving the alliance would do nobody any good, but it could cause us harm and possibly bring instability to our region. Let us first consider the economic consequences of such a move before going on to the political and military ones. It would be naive wishful thinking not to expect economic repercussions at least as severe as New Zealand suffered when Britain joined the E.E.C. We would be denied preferential treatment in the US market, and under US instigation Japan would switch its import of raw materials away from Australia. Investment by the multinationals would be curtailed so that parts of our economy would collapse. In the present world economic climate such risks are not to be contemplated.

Our standard of living would drop and our capacity to muster the resources for an independent defence effort would be severely reduced. Such an effort would be made even more difficult due to the military consequence of being cut off from supplies of advanced weaponry, back-up spares, training arrangements, intelligence co-ordination, and, what is most crucial, resupplies in case of war, all benefits we now enjoy due to the alliance.

What Defence Policy Outside The Alliance?

Those who see only the supposedly favourable diplomatic opportunities awaiting us outside the alliance tend not to face the issue of defence squarely. Even neutral and non-aligned nations have defence policies, so what would ours be? To assume that Australia, a country covering a continent, can be lightly defended, like neutralized Austria in the middle of Europe, because there are at present no perceptible threats, is not a serious defence proposal. It would not be acceptable to the majority of Australians or to the military establishment. If Australia were to abandon the protection of the alliance, Australians would insist on the kind of self-reliance in defence that neutralist Sweden possesses. Australia's problems would be worse than Sweden's, for as well as a huge coastline and long sea-lanes we also have defence responsibilities for Papua-New Guinea and, together with New Zealand, for many Pacific island states which could not be allowed to fall into hostile hands.

A credible conventional defence force for all these purposes would be economically ruinous, especially if our economy shrank due to US reaction to our disengagement from the alliance. It would certainly call for mass conscription, which no peace movement would relish. The only affordable solution would be to go nuclear and threaten retaliation to any would-be

aggressor, as the pro-nuclear lobby has already proposed. Such moves in armament would probably alarm Indonesia and could easily result in a conventional and nuclear arms-race in the region.

Thus in pursuance of a foreign policy dedicated to peace and disarmament the advocates of leaving the alliance might unwittingly contribute to pushing Australia into a defence policy that would be perceived as a threat by our neighbours, bringing about instability if not eventually war in the region. On the other hand, as Robert O'Neill said in testimony to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 'our friends in South East Asia take some note of the fact that Australia has this security relationship with the United States and, as far as the ASEAN group of countries are concerned, it is something they welcome'. (*The ANZUS Alliance*, p. 52) They neither see us as too strong on our own, nor with the backing of the US as too weak to be able to resist pressures – which is all the more reason to leave the alliance alone.

Debate About Alliances Elsewhere

In the present state of world affairs other alliances are not about to be disbanded. NATO, unlike ANZUS, is a formal nuclear alliance yet even within the European peace movement, there are widely different views about the value of pressing for non-alignment. The notable peace activist Alva Myrdal does not contemplate a general winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Myrdal writes that 'the call to free Europe from nuclear arms does not constitute any advocacy for dissolution of the military blocs ...' (*Dynamics of European Nuclear Disarmament*, Spokesman, UK, 1981, p. 238). Dutch peace groups are urging their government only to establish its right to dissent from particular decisions made by NATO allies within the Nuclear Planning Group. They oppose the new US missiles, but support the alliance itself.

In Australia those who advocate the dissolution of ANZUS in the cause of peace are embarking on an easily misunderstood and Quixotic quest. To attack such a powerful symbol of our national tie to a popularly admired power is as futile as tilting at windmills and is bound to drag one's cause into the political mire.

Action Within The Alliance

Yet, there is much that we could achieve for peace if only we clearly recognized the nature of the alliance and its hidden possibilities, and could act resolutely as a nation to shape them. One such possibility, as yet unexplored, lies in Australia's relation with Japan. As Jill Redner and I have extensively demonstrated in our book *Anatomy of the World*, the ANZUS alliance is implicitly a triangular relation in which Japan was involved from the start as a silent partner. Evatt, then our Minister of External Affairs, extracted the ANZUS treaty from the US as the price for our co-operation in the Japanese peace treaty and in order to protect us against the possibility of a militarily resurgent Japan. But such fears proved groundless; Japan became the closest de facto ally of the US and our economic partner.

So Japan, through its links to the US and Australia, is in effect a tacit party to ANZUS. The Joint

Committee report recognises this fact implicitly when it states that 'Japan is dependent upon the sea-lanes across the Indian Ocean and any threat to Australia's major trading partner is a direct threat to vital Australian interests' (*The ANZUS Alliance*, p. 65). Significantly enough, Japan was included with the ANZUS powers in the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval and air exercises in 1980. Instead of regarding such developments with alarm and working up residual Australian fears of the Japanese, the peace movement should recognise the strength of the post-Hiroshima peace consensus in Japan, try to co-operate with the peace forces there and assist the Australian government in building a relationship which will give us more flexibility within the alliance.

Australia could move closer to Japan diplomatically, just as we have economically, within the bounds of ANZUS. Together with Japan we could exercise a Pacific, and let us hope also a pacifying, influence on the US, especially in its present mood. Japan has even less inclination to court nuclear war than we, following its experience of the A-Bomb in World War II. It is, furthermore, a close neighbour of the USSR, and conscious of being vulnerable to nuclear attack. It is one of the more peaceful nations, given to trade and with only a modest self-defence capability in proportion to its economic power. It has a unique Constitution enshrining anti-militarism and has eschewed aggressive policies and nuclear weapons. Australia and Japan could co-operate in the Pacific region and in relation to ASEAN and other countries of South-east Asia, and use their mutual ties with the US to press together for American restraint in projecting its nuclear presence in the region.

Adjusting the Alliance in Pursuit of Peace

In the process of developing its long-term strategies for adjusting the alliance, Australia could begin with some immediate tactical policies:

1. We could initiate closer diplomatic consultation with Japan, especially to develop common policies for jointly resisting US pressure for further nuclear-related facilities.
2. We could plan to renegotiate the terms of the existing facilities as they come up, with the purpose of achieving surveillance to prevent them being misused to endanger Australia or threaten world peace. In keeping with diplomatic efforts to persuade the US to espouse the principle of 'no first use of nuclear weapons' we should refuse to allow firing orders for a first strike to be transmitted through facilities on our soil. Negotiations to establish our right to monitor communications through the North West Cape base should begin immediately.

The functions of Pine Gap and Nurrungar are more complex. They monitor nuclear tests and so facilitate arms control agreements. They provide early warning of ballistic missile launches and so discourage surprise attacks. These are stabilising functions. But they are also able to track missile flights, establish which Soviet ICBM silos have been used and permit re-targeting, and so they contribute to US nuclear-

war fighting capabilities. They collect information for the CIA. As it is difficult to separate these positive and negative functions technically, political supervision is essential. The Australian Government must ensure that these facilities are not used to initiate a nuclear war.

3. The US dependence on us for such facilities and for other aid we can extend as allies gives us some leverage to press it not to obstruct proposals which are crucial to us, such as the denuclearization of the South Pacific and a comprehensive test ban treaty. A nuclear-free South Pacific would ban nuclear weapons tests and nuclear waste dumping, and refuse port entry to nuclear armed or powered vessels.

Bans on visits by nuclear vessels may be less controversial than presently appears. Australia does not need US permission to impose safety regulations on city harbours. American cities protect their citizens – New York forbids nuclear ships and at Hawaii there is a ten-mile safety zone. The Wran Government in N.S.W. had successfully discouraged US nuclear-powered ships from using Sydney ports two years before Fraser deliberately made a political issue of Victorian attempts to do likewise in 1982.

We need to make a clear break with Liberal government interpretations of the alliance which sometimes gave the impression as if Australia would put US interests first. One example is Fraser's offer of Cockburn Sound as a home-port for the Trident submarines, which should be withdrawn. Withdrawing this offer would unavoidably bring us into diplomatic conflict with the Reagan Administration, but not necessarily with another President. Let us remember that Carter was in favour of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. Fraser disagreed. The recent Joint Committee report on ANZUS states unequivocally: 'Australia must not be afraid to criticize its ally' (*The ANZUS Alliance*, p. 74). In the spirit of President Nixon's Guam declaration of 1969, Australia must continue to develop its own defence capabilities so as to be prepared to face all low-level eventualities, short of all-out war, without US involvement.

5. We must practise an independent diplomacy in relation to countries outside the Western alliance, particularly the Pacific powers China, Vietnam and the USSR, and follow our own trade policies.

Conclusion

If the Australian peace movement is to become a credible and effective political force, capable of winning broad support among the Australian people, it must as a matter of principle select policies that an Australian government genuinely committed to nuclear disarmament could conceivably adopt as its own policies, and in the foreseeable future actually implement.



REPLY TO HARRY REDNER

— Joe Camilleri

Harry Redner's contribution to the ANZUS debate does little more than rehearse well-worn and now largely discredited arguments. The piece overlooks the rapidly changing character of Australia's participation in American strategic planning, even though the trend has been apparent for the best part of two decades. The nuclear implications of the alliance are now so well understood that even the staunchest advocates of ANZUS have had to shift their ground. These days we hear much less about the value of ANZUS for Australia's regional defence and much more about its contribution to the so-called strategic balance and to the defence of Western (rather than Australian) interests and values.

Redner gives a most lurid account of the dangers involved in defending Australia without the ANZUS umbrella. Forgetting, it seems, that most countries manage quite well without alliances, that Australia's size, terrain and geography represent a decisive advantage in dealing with any would-be invader, and that our current defence policy leaves much to be desired. Over the past ten years our defence spending has almost trebled from \$1,218 million to \$4,622 million. But this vastly increased expenditure, much of which has been devoted to carrying out the role allocated to us under ANZUS, has not improved our capacity for territorial defence.

By contrast, a non-aligned Australia, freed from the obligation to provide logistic, aerial and naval support for American strategic interests, would be better able to concentrate on lower-level threats emanating from the region proper. It would focus on the direct defence of the Australian continent, Australia's island territories and its maritime and air approaches.

We need to pay attention particularly to the proposal to establish a territorial defence structure whose primary aim would be to raise the costs incurred by an opponent intent on invading and occupying Australian territory. For this purpose, it would be necessary to develop a force comprising well-trained, dispersed but co-ordinated small units, which could be complemented by the widespread organisation and planning of civil resistance techniques. Such a defence policy would be less costly regionally and globally offensive; and it would be more effective in dealing with contingencies likely to arise in the foreseeable future.

The dilemma implicit in Redner's position is sharply reflected in his discussion of US military installations in Australia. He finds it necessary to play down both the threat they pose to Australia's security and their contribution to global nuclear instability. As for the argument that they have a positive aspect by helping to verify compliance with arms control agreements, that is hardly compelling at a time when the Reagan Administration has refused to ratify

SALT II, rejected the nuclear weapons freeze proposal, adopted an intransigent position in arms control negotiations, and embarked on the largest peace-time expansion of the US defence budget. In any case, the verification argument has to be weighed against the fact that the same US installations here are contributing to dangerous nuclear war-fighting options. The uncertain gain in relation to arms control is amply offset by the current threat to Australian and global security.

In so far as Redner concedes that ANZUS has any liabilities, he tends to treat them as extraneous to the alliance. We are led to believe that a resolute government could gain control of the bases. But we are not told how such control would be achieved or what form it would take. Nor is much said about Australian force deployments in the Indian Ocean, combined military exercises, increased availability of Australian naval and air facilities for use by American vessels and aircraft, military aid to the ASEAN governments, or Australia's consistent support for the US strategic posture. Are we to think that all these military links could be severed and the alliance somehow preserved?

We may bemoan the fact that the Whitlam government did not pursue a more assertive foreign policy, that Hayden, while in opposition, fudged the issue of the bases and yielded to American pressure on the question of nuclear warships. Similarly, we may be disappointed that the Hawke government has yet to challenge any significant aspect of the nuclear connection with the United States. (Even the Pacific Nuclear Free Zone proposal has been so sanitised as to render it virtually innocuous.) But these are not accidental developments. They are the inevitable outcome of the dependent relationship the American alliance has created and reinforced over a period of three decades.

As for greater co-operation with Japan, it is unlikely to prove a rewarding peace initiative so long as Japan, like Australia, remains closely aligned to the United States. It is this very alliance which is currently pushing Japan along the path of rearmament and encouraging the Japanese military to challenge the spirit and letter of Japan's peace constitution. On the other hand, much could be gained from increased dialogue and co-operation between our peace movement and the Japanese one. Both of these movements are sharply critical of existing alliance arrangements and increasingly drawn to the conclusion that non-alignment presents the only viable alternative.



Further Reading

For more extended works by the authors of this Peace Dossier see:

Camilleri, J.A., *An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy* (4th edn), Brisbane, Jacaranda Press, 1979.

Camilleri, J.A., *Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence*, Melbourne, Macmillan Company of Australia, 1980.

Harry Redner and Jill Redner, *Anatomy of the World: the Impact of the Atom on Australia and the World*, Melbourne Collins/Fontana, 1983.

Two recent reports from the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Australian Parliament address some of the issues raised by the ANZUS alliance:

The ANZUS Alliance: Australian-United States Relations, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1982.

Threats to Australia's Security: Their Nature and Probability, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981.

Ball, Desmond, *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia*, Sydney, Hale and Iremonger, 1980. This is the most comprehensive study available on U.S. bases in Australia, with a shorter version published as VAPS Peace Dossier 1, *American Bases in Australia*.

Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and The United States of America

The Parties to this Treaty . . . declare and agree as follows:

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Beazley, Kim, *House of Representatives Debates* (Hansard), 5 May 1981, pp. 1974-1979. An account of existing avenues for negotiation of differences of interest and perception between Australia and the U.S. on nuclear issues.

O'Neill, Robert, and Horner, D.M. (eds) *Australian Defence Policy for the 1980s*, St Lucia, Queensland, University of Queensland Press, 1982. A collection of articles on defence issues including a discussion of the ANZUS alliance.

Renouf, Alan, *The Frightened Country*, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1979. A history of Australian foreign policy by a former Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Sexton, Michael, *War for the Asking*, Penguin, Sydney, 1981. Examines the Australian government's enthusiasm for the Vietnam war commitment of the mid-1960s.

Smith, Gary, 'From ANZUS to Nuclear Alliance', *Social Alternatives*, vol. 3, no. 1, October 1982, pp. 10-14. A survey of changing debate on the alliance accompanying its nuclearization.

Teichmann, Max, *Australia Alone: A Case against Alignment*, Victorian Fabian Pamphlet 35, 1981. An argument for non-alignment by a well-known commentator on international affairs.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

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ISBN 0 949687 06 5

Typeset by Courier Typesetters, La Trobe University.
