Afghanistan’s own national army

August 2010, by Chris Sands

As the sun set over the graves of a murdered president and his family in Kabul, two Afghan soldiers made a home video on their mobile phones.

With a Taliban song for the soundtrack, one of them wandered among the headstones while the other filmed. No music accompanied the beautiful rhythm of the words.

In July 2011, US troops will start to withdraw from a country they have been occupying for longer than they were in Vietnam. Then, by the end of 2014, Nato is due to have transferred responsibility for the nation’s security to the local army and police.

Both plans require Afghan soldiers to fill any vacuum that is left behind. Whether they do so will help shape the destiny of an entire region that is teetering dangerously close to meltdown.

In public at least, Barack Obama believes they will be ready. Many people on the ground are not so sure.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is beset by all the problems that exist in militaries across the world but it is also plagued by the same complexities and divisions that have caused so much damage here during the last three decades.

Estimates on desertion rates range from 9 to 19 percent. It is commonly alleged that soldiers from the north loot homes and shops in the south and east, and contribute to the detentions of innocent Pashtuns.

In recent years there have also been a number of friendly fire incidents, with Afghans killing or injuring their international colleagues. These actions are often blamed on disgruntled individuals. However, there is undoubted sympathy for the resistance among the troops.

Some of the soldiers say the Taliban are only interested in fighting foreigners and infidels and will not try to harm them on the battlefield. Others are almost certainly rebel infiltrators waiting for the right moment to launch an attack.

Pictures by Chris Sands, all photos copyright Makoto Photographic Agency and the photographer. Reproduction in any form without permission prohibited.

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When Barack Obama announced his plan to send 30,000 more American troops to the war last December, he pledged they would “reverse the Taliban’s momentum”, allow more Afghan soldiers to “get into the fight” and ultimately create the conditions for a transfer of security responsibilities. The bloodshed here has increased alarmingly since then. According to the UN, roadside bombings rose by 94 per cent in the first four months of this year.

The ANA has over 100,000 members. The aim is to have more than 171,000 by October 2011 and 240,000 in 2014.

Recruits from across Afghanistan are sent to Kabul Military Training Centre on the outskirts of Kabul, where they are put through their paces by US troops.

In a country with mass unemployment, the ANA is one of the few steady job options available to young Afghan men. They are paid roughly $165 a month, with a bonus if they are deployed to the more volatile provinces.

Although the minimum age for recruits is meant to be 22, the military tends to look the other way if anyone clearly younger wants to join. The overwhelming majority of soldiers are illiterate. Few know their real age.

A recent report by the International Crisis Group described the ANA as a “fragmented force, serving disparate interests, and far from attaining the unified national character needed to confront numerous security threats”. It went on, “Kabul powerbrokers are distributing the spoils of increased NATO spending on army development among their constituents in the officer corps, fuelling ethnic and political factionalism within army ranks.”

The US alone spent more than $10 billion on the ANA between 2002 and 2008. The first minister of defence under the US-led occupation was Mohammed Qasim Fahim, a notorious Northern Alliance warlord who is now vice president. According to the International Crisis Group report, 90 of the first 100 generals appointed to the new army at that time were from his home province of Panjshir.

Earlier this year Afghan President Hamid Karzai said he was considering reintroducing conscription, which previously existed during the Communist era.

Last October an Afghan soldier on guard at a base in Maidan Wardak province killed two American troops and wounded two others while they slept. In December, another Afghan soldier killed an American and injured two Italians in Badghis province. In April a Polish soldier was injured after being shot by a member of the ANA in Ghazni province, who then fled the scene. In July an Afghan soldier killed three British troops in Helmand province. In another incident, an Afghan soldier killed two US civilian trainers in the north of the country.

ANA personnel have also died at the hands of international forces. Last November seven Afghan soldiers were killed in a firefight with American troops in Badghis province. In January an air strike was called in on an Afghan army checkpoint in Maidan Wardak, killing four soldiers and resulting in the defense ministry here saying it “wants to bring those responsible to justice”. Meanwhile, in April German troops shot dead at six Afghan soldiers in Kunduz province. In July five more ANA members died in an air strike in Ghazni.

Zalmay, a father-of-nine, lost both his legs and much of his left hand while serving with the ANA in the southern province of Helmand. “It’s normal throughout the world. If someone wants to wear the military’s clothes, at the beginning he should think about everything he might face: about injuries, about death, about all these things,” he said. Speaking at the Late Sardar Mohammed Daud Khan Military Hospital in Kabul last year, Dr Mohammed Nazir Shirzay explained, “Usually the top diagnoses are gunshot wounds, mine explosion injuries on the legs and hands, and multiple trauma patients. Others are the accidental fracture and dislocation of limbs. “Both the number of injured and the severity of the injuries has increased.”

During a mission with British forces in Uruzgan province in 2007, one Afghan soldier shot himself in the foot. Another smoked drugs and refused to wear his body armour and helmet. Many complained that they were being asked to do too much walking.

Earlier this year, Afghan security forces were part of Operation Moshtarak in Helmand province. The high-profile assault received worldwide media coverage and was initially hailed as a success. However, an MP from the area complained the ANA and police had stolen chickens, rice, flour and sheep from local residents. After melting away, the Taliban have since returned.

With black humour, an Afghan general played down the sacrifice of ANA members. “In Afghanistan it’s not important if someone gets injured. And each family has five or six sons, so of course they will lose one or two,” he said.

Nato forces are increasingly keen to put an Afghan face on their operations, but that has its drawbacks. In Zabul province during the spring Afghan soldiers were noticeably reluctant to search local houses, much to the frustration of US troops accompanying them. In another instance, one Afghan soldier attacked a passer-by, knocking the turban off his head and beating him until he stopped to be searched.

Many Afghans fear their own soldiers are far from ready to keep security. In one fairly typical comment, a Sharia law student warned that a civil war could break out if foreign troops leave too soon. “It will be like last time. One tribe will fight another, one village will fight another, one province will fight another,” he said. “Our army and police are stronger than before, but they are not strong enough to defend the country.”


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