Endnotes 4: Trying to dazzle us with bullshit

I have been reading Endnotes 4, when I came across an argument by the collective in Part 3 on why the industrial working class never became the majority of society and how this led to the failure of the working class movement. The argument the collective makes has my mind twisting:

“Revolutionaries’ belief that trends would continue to move in their favour was enshrined in the policy of abstentionism. Social Democratic parties became the largest factions in parliaments, even if they remained in the minority; but those parties abstained from participating in government. They refused to rule alongside their enemies, choosing instead to wait patiently for their majority to arrive: ‘This policy of abstention implied enormous confidence in the future, a steadfast belief in the inevitable working-class majority and the ever-expanding power of socialism’s working-class support.’ But that inevitability never came to pass.”

industrial_revolutionSo, the workers’ parties expected that a working class majority would soon arrive and produce a majority in favor of socialism. Is this the argument the Endnotes collective is trying to make? If true, where did this belief in inevitability go wrong?

What happened, according to the Endnotes collective, is that the working class met its external limit of growth long before it became a majority of society:

“The industrial workers never became the majority of society: “Even as industrial labour reached its furthest extent, long-term restructuring was already tipping employment toward white-collar and other jobs in services.” That was the movement’s external limit: it was always too early for the workers’ movement, and when it was not too early, it was already too late.”.

I haven’t any idea what that is supposed to mean, or what the collective thinks it signifies for Marxist theory. If the industrial working class was supposed to become the majority of society, why didn’t this happen? Mind you, I am not taking exception with the idea the industrial working class never became the majority of society, but I am asking for a clear theoretical explanation for why this occurred. It would seem Marxists of the day expected the industrial working class eventually would become the majority of society, but this did not happen for some as yet unexplained reason.

The explanation the Endnotes collective offers is that the industrial working class did not become the majority of society because of “the obstinate continuance of peasants in the countryside, and in the tenacious holding-on of artisans and small shopkeepers in cities.”

Pardon me, but, in my humble opinion this is not a credible explanation — it is bullshit. I want to hear the Endnotes collective explain to us how Marx got it so completely wrong, since he clearly expected the whole of the peasantry to go away eventually.

It would seems to me we have a chance to make some new science, but the Endnotes collective wants to offer us nonsense like this, “The co-existence of massive factories and small shops was not a bug, but rather, a permanent feature of the system.”

This statement is too cute by half — far from what we should expect from a collective of Marxist theorists. Seriously, is the Endnotes collective saying capitalism doesn’t work the way we think it does? The assertion capitalism does not abolish smallholders would be major news to most Marxists. However, since we cannot argue with the data, which indeed shows the persistence of small producers, this would seem to require an explanation consistent with historical materialism and, if at all possible, with the labor theory of value.

Once they get past their cutesy answer that the limitation on the size of the industrial proletariat is a feature of capitalism and not a bug, the collective asserts that rising productivity of labor reduced the demand for labor while greatly increasing output. As demand for labor fell, productivity increased and output increased still faster. For some (unexplained) reason, in the second half of the 20th century productivity still continued to increase, but aggregate output now also began to fall. As output fell, the decline of employment accelerated, presenting what the Endnotes collective argues is the “real limits to the workers’ power.”

An interesting hypothesis, but here is my problem with it: The Endnotes collective is adding nothing new to the discussion. We already knew the demand for labor would eventually fall. And we already knew the smallholders did not go away quietly.

The question is this: If, as the Endnotes collective believes, the demand for labor was falling during this period, why didn’t hours of labor fall with it? Why was it that instead of hours of labor falling, industrial employment began to collapse and small producers were able to cling to a place in the economy?

The answer offered by Endnotes collective seems to be:

“[In] spite of the fact that more and more of the world’s population was made dependent on the wage […] for the most part, this wage-earning population did not find work in industry. The appearance of factories in some places did not presage their appearance everywhere: ‘Dynamism actually required backwardness in [a] dialectic of dependency.’ The success of the workers’ movement — in single-industry towns, or industrial cities — was not the realisation of the future in the present. ”

What utter bullshit. You mean to tell me that you folks at Endnotes can’t do any better than this horseshit?

Okay, then tell me this: For what class did dynamism require backwardness? And what do you mean by “dynamism”?  Don’t you mean the production of surplus value? Which means, we can restate your argument this way:

“The production of surplus value produced a very large population of workers who could not find productive employment in industry.”

Didn’t Marx argue the falling rate of profit produced a mass of excess capital and a surplus population of workers? Didn’t this ultimately result in the Great Depression and the breakdown of production on the basis of exchange value – just a Marx had predicted decades before it happened? In other words, to maintain overly long hours of labor in industry in the face of rising productivity, didn’t capital required a growing mass of employed labor that produced nothing.

The Endnotes collective is basically trying to turn a strategic failure of the workers movement to reduce hours of labor into its opposite: “the obstinate continuance of peasants in the countryside, and in the tenacious holding-on of artisans and small shopkeepers in cities.” But the peasants resistance to proletarianization had nothing whatsoever to do with the problem.

This was a failure of the working class parties and them alone.

Indeed, in the middle of the Great Depression, even a bourgeois simpleton economist like Keynes had already identified the problem of the crisis as one where the rise in productivity was outpacing new needs for social labor. He argued society would require a reduction of hours of labor to ration the jobs that remained. And decades before this Marx had already observed that capitalism was headed into a crisis where,

“not enough means of production are produced to permit the employment of the entire able-bodied population under the most productive conditions, so that their absolute working period could be shortened by the mass and effectiveness of the constant capital employed during working-hours.

The problem was already known in the literature for decades and did not suddenly appear out of nowhere. Why then, at the depths of the Great Depression, did the workers’ parties in Germany and elsewhere not fight to reduce hours of labor? For one thing, historical evidence supports the view that they clearly did not think Keynes’ inflationary expansion made sense. But what alternative did they propose for the massive unemployment, except waiting it out and hoping for the next expansion?

For the Endnotes collective to now come behind the failed workers’ parties and explains stagnation of the productive forces as the result of obstinate peasants is, quite simply, utter nonsense.

5 thoughts on “Endnotes 4: Trying to dazzle us with bullshit”

  1. “This was a failure of the working class parties and them alone.”

    Hahahahahaha! Let me tell you what is really happening. Working class people have abandoned left wing parties, as they feel their interest are aligned with bosses and not other workers.

    Property speculation (fueled by government-sponsored private debt) is the single biggest, defining, central issue of the past 30 years of UK (and Australian etc.) politics and economy. Property owners want more capital gains to cash in via remortgages and cheap hired help that is docile and works long hours, especially if they are retired.

    And it is because the amounts of money involved are GIGANTIC… My usual “money shot” quote:

    http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19288208
    «In 2001, the average price of a house was £121,769 and the average salary was £16,557, according to the National Housing Federation. A decade on, the typical price of a property is 94% higher at £236,518, while average wages are up 29% to £21,330»

    That’s an average between the North and the South, and it does not really apply to the North.

    But even it taking it as it is, that means £12,000 a year for a decade of tax-free effort-free income for a working class family in the South earning around £16,000 after tax.

    £12,000 a year of tax-free effort-free windfall is GIGANTIC, especially if it recurs every year for 10 years as per the above numbers; and actually it has been going on for 20-30 years. And for the millions of people with a house in London it has been even bigger than in the rest of the South.

    Do people really realize what an extra £12,000 a year of (purely redistributive rentier) windfall going on for decades can mean on top of an earned after tax income of £16,000? For millions if not a dozen million families?

    Do readers here realize what that means to “aspirational” Southern voters and what they are prepared to vote for to keep it coming?

    And that most or all of that was due to government policy to bribe voters in the South and accordingly virtually none of that happened in the North? E.g. recently:

    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/houseprices/10812771/House-price-heatmap-its-still-winter-in-the-regions.html

    A large section of trade-union members are today middle-class rentiers, and in the past they were middle-income working-class ones that become very Thatcherized but only in the South.

    Many of both categories have safe jobs or good final salary pensions, bought houses in the 1980s and 1990s, feel quite smug about that.

    From E Currie’s diary quoted in “Events, dear boy, events”, 1987-09-09:

    «John Prescott on TV tonight that no, they knew it was unrealistic to take back shares without compensation, but that “compensation” will be the shares’ original price; and Alan Tuffin (of the UCW) pointing out that nine million shareholders will vote against that won’t they?»

    From T Blair’s famous speech:

    http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=202
    «I was canvassing in the Midlands on an ordinary suburban estate. I met a man polishing his Ford Sierra, self-employed electrician, Dad always voted Labour. He used to vote Labour, he said, but he bought his own home, he had set up his own business, he was doing quite nicely, so he said I’ve become a Tory. He was not rich but he was doing better than he did, and as far as he was concerned, being better off meant being Tory too.»

    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v09/n19/tony-blair/diary
    «Post-war Britain has seen two big changes. First, and partly as a result of reforming Labour governments, there are many more healthy, wealthy and well-educated people than before. In addition, employment has switched from traditional manufacturing industries to a more white-collar, service-based economy. The inevitable result has been that class identity has fragmented. Only about a third of the population now regard themselves as ‘working-class’. Of course it is possible still to analyse Britain in terms of a strict Marxist definition of class: but it is not very helpful to our understanding of how the country thinks and votes. In fact, of that third, many are likely not to be ‘working’ at all: these are the unemployed, pensioners, single parents – in other words, the poor. A party that restricts its appeal to the traditional working class will not win an election.»

    And so now the parties that carry the label of the “left” have ideas, and they have been actionable, and the main ones have been:

    * Push up asset valuations and balloon debt collateralized by assets via very loose regulatory and credit policy.

    * Push down wages and benefits for working age people via smashing of unions and unionized industries, effective abolition of the right to strike, and massive immigration of a reserve army of workers.

    These are the same actionable ideas that the rightist parties have.

    Because the reason is the same: that’s what “Blow you, I am allright Jack” asset owning swing voters in the South East want, and both parties want to win elections.

    Having ideas that make you unelectable is not what parties of the left or right want to boast about.

    Since the “idea” of pushing up asset prices via the debt-collateral spiral is uncontroversial, right and left parties differ only as to the zeal with which they pursue the other idea, to push down wages and welfare and up unemployment and insecurity.

    Liked by 1 person

  2. I don’t think Endnotes is saying the industrial working class did not become the majority of society “because of” the obstinate continuance…
    Instead they say this obstinate continuance is a reflection, a consecuence, of the stalled growth of the working class.
    The causal nexus is inverted.

    Like

    1. The peasants could carry on without the lords for they were already constituted as a community: they had “direct access to factors of production — land, tools, and labour — sufficient to enable them to maintain themselves without recourse to the market”.4 Under these conditions, the removal of external domination by lords would not release peasants into capitalist social relations. For that to happen, their communities would have to be dissolved. But it was difficult to make that happen. On the one hand, peasant communities did not dissolve themselves. On the other hand, they fought tenaciously against attempts to separate them from the land. Therefore, peasants — like every other non-capitalist social formation — do not necessarily become imbricated in markets. There is no historically inevitable tendency to proletarianise the world’s population.

      Perhaps I am misinterpreting this paragraph from Part 2?

      Like

      1. I think their position is more balanced. And all about timing. The tendency to proletarianization was only one tendency, confronted with resistance of landlords, peasants, craftmen, etc. And the complex dynamics of industrial sectors with rapid or slow mechanization.
        I think acceleration and rapid automation are part of developed capitalism. Before capitalism was mature its inner tendencies were not overall tendencies. That’s why there’s no historically inevitable tendency to proletarianise the world’s population…until capitalism comes to identifie with world economy.

        Like

      2. Nice try, but I am not buying it. Their argument is that there is no historical tendency toward proletarianization of the immediate producers. If true, this flies in the face of labor theory of value. If labor theory of value is removed, on what basis are they making any claims in the essay? You just cannot throw out labor theory (i.e., all of Capital), yet offer nothing in its place.

        Liked by 1 person

Leave a comment

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

Design a site like this with WordPress.com
Get started