Aristotle or Galen? Islamic Philosophers on Animal Cognition

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• published: 20 Nov 2012
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Some Hellenistic philosophers—notably, Plutarch (later 1st to early 2nd cent. A.D.), Sextus Empiricus (2nd-cent. A.D.), and Porphyry (3rd-cent. A.D.)—were critical of some of Aristotle's views on animals in various works. With respect to the De anima in particular, they criticized his contrast between cognition of particulars by sense perception and cognition of universals by intellection, because it does not allow for a good account of some aspects of animal cognition and behavior. But Aristotle is more generous in treating of animal communication, "political" life, etc. in his zoological works; and he fleshes out his views on the inner senses and their complexity with greater subtlety in the Parva naturalia. Philosophers in the Islamic world read Aristotle as a systematic philosopher, and were puzzled by the tensions between his philosophical works, such as the De anima, and his zoological works. They also all read Galen who, they thought, in his De methodo medendi, claims that donkeys—the lowest kind of animals—know species and, therefore, some universals, because, when they are thirsty, they are looking for water in general, and not particular instances of water. Al-Fârâbî (870-950), Ibn Sînâ (Avicenna, before 980-1037) and Ibn Bâjjah (Avempace, d. 1138), well aware of tensions in Aristotle's works, strive to give a better account of animal cognition and behavior in developing the psychology of the inner senses. This move allows them to counter Galen's claim. Al-Fârâbî treats of animal communication, Ibn Sînâ of a certain level of self-awareness in animals, and Ibn Bâjjah of "general" cognition by animals.