Ultra was the designation adopted by
British military intelligence in June
1941 for wartime signals intelligence obtained by breaking high-level encrypted enemy radio and teleprinter communications at the
Government Code and Cypher School (
GC&CS;) at
Bletchley Park. Ultra eventually became the standard designation among the western
Allies for all such intelligence. The name arose because the intelligence thus obtained was considered more important than that designated by the highest
British security classification then used (
Most Secret) and so was regarded as being
Ultra secret.[2] Several other cryptonyms had been used for such intelligence.
British intelligence first designated it
Boniface—presumably to imply that it was the result of human intelligence.
The U.S. used the codename
Magic for its decrypts from
Japanese sources.
Much of the
German cipher traffic was encrypted on the
Enigma machine.
Used properly, the
German military Enigma would have been virtually unbreakable; in practice, shortcomings in operation allowed it to be broken. The term "Ultra" has often been used almost synonymously with "Enigma decrypts". However, Ultra also encompassed decrypts of the German
Lorenz SZ 40/42 machines that were used by the
German High Command, and the Hagelin machine[a] and other
Italian and Japanese ciphers and codes such as
PURPLE and
JN-25.[1]
Many observers, at the time and later, regarded Ultra as immensely valuable to the Allies.
Winston Churchill was reported to have told
King George VI, when presenting to him
Stewart Menzies (head of the
Secret Intelligence Service and the person who controlled distribution of Ultra decrypts to the government): "It is thanks to the secret weapon of
General Menzies, put into use on all the fronts, that we won the war!"[b]
F. W. Winterbotham quoted the western
Supreme Allied Commander,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, at war's end describing Ultra as having been "decisive" to
Allied victory.[3] Sir
Harry Hinsley, Bletchley Park veteran and official historian of
British Intelligence in
World War II, made a similar assessment about Ultra, saying that it shortened the war "by not less than two years and probably by four years"; and that, in the absence of Ultra, it is uncertain how the war would have ended.[4]
Since Ultra was revealed in the middle
1970s, historians have altered the historiography of World War II. For example,
Andrew Roberts, writing in the
21st century, states, "Because of the invaluable advantage of being able to read
Rommel's Enigma communications,
Montgomery knew how short the
Germans were of men, ammunition, food and above all fuel. When he put Rommel's picture up in his caravan he wanted to be seen to be almost reading his opponent's mind. In fact he was reading his mail".
There has been controversy about the influence of Allied Enigma decryption on the course of World War II. It has also been suggested that the question should be broadened to include Ultra's influence not only on the war itself, but also
on the post-war period.
F. W. Winterbotham, the first author to outline the influence of Enigma decryption on the course of World War II, likewise made the earliest contribution to an appreciation of Ultra's postwar influence, which now continues into the
21st Century — and not only in the postwar establishment of
Britain's
GCHQ (
Government Communication Headquarters) and
America's
NSA. "Let no one be fooled," Winterbotham admonishes in chapter 3, "by the spate of television films and propaganda which has made the war seem like some great triumphant epic. It was, in fact, a very narrow shave, and the reader may like to ponder [
...] whether [...] we might have won [without] Ultra."[84]
Debate continues on whether, had postwar political and military leaders been aware of Ultra's role in Allied victory in World War II, these leaders might have been less optimistic about post-World War II military involvements.[e]
Knightley suggests that Ultra may have contributed to the development of the
Cold War.[85]
The Soviets received disguised Ultra information, but the existence of Ultra itself was not disclosed by the western Allies. The Soviets, who had clues to Ultra's existence, possibly through
Kim Philby and
Anthony Blunt,[85] may thus have felt still more distrustful of their wartime partners.
The mystery surrounding the discovery of the sunk
U-869 off the coast of
New Jersey by divers
Richie Kohler and
John Chatterton was unraveled in part through the analysis of Ultra intercepts, which demonstrated that, although U-869 had been ordered by U-boat
Command to change course and proceed to
North Africa, near
Rabat, the submarine had missed the messages changing her assignment and had continued to the eastern coast of the
U.S., her original destination.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultra
- published: 07 Oct 2015
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