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- Published: 2008-06-21
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Name | Air Canada Flight 143 |
---|---|
Occurrence type | Accident |
Caption | Air Canada flight 143 landed on an auto dragstrip at Gimli, MB |
Date | 23 July 1983 |
Type | Fuel exhaustion, Maintenance error |
Site | over Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba, Canada |
Passengers | 61 |
Crew | 8 |
Aircraft type | Boeing 767-233 |
Operator | Air Canada |
Tail number | |
Origin | Montreal-Dorval International Airport |
Stopover | Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport |
Destination | Edmonton International Airport |
Injuries | 10 |
Fatalities | 0 |
Survivors | 69 (all) |
The Gimli Glider is the nickname of the Air Canada aircraft that was involved in a notable aviation incident. On 23 July 1983, Air Canada Flight 143, a Boeing 767-200 jet, ran out of fuel at altitude, about halfway through its flight from Montreal to Edmonton via Ottawa. The crew was able to glide the aircraft safely to an emergency landing at Gimli Industrial Park Airport, a former Canadian Air Force base at Gimli, Manitoba.
The subsequent investigation revealed corporate failures and a chain of minor human errors that combined to defeat built-in safeguards. In addition, fuel loading was miscalculated through misunderstanding of the recently adopted metric system, which replaced the imperial system.
The 767 was one of the first airliners to include an Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS), a system that required the electricity generated by the aircraft's jet engines in order to operate. With both engines stopped, the system went dead, leaving only a few basic battery-powered emergency flight instruments. While these provided basic but sufficient information with which to land the aircraft, a vertical speed indicator that would indicate the rate at which the aircraft was sinking and therefore how far it could glide unpowered was not among them.
In airliners the size of the 767, the engines also supply power for the hydraulic systems without which the aircraft cannot be controlled. Such aircraft are therefore required to accommodate this kind of power failure. As with the 767, this is usually achieved through the automated deployment of a ram air turbine, a generator driven by a small propeller, which in turn is driven by the forward motion of the aircraft. As the Gimli pilots were to experience on their landing approach, a decrease in this forward motion means a decrease in the power available to control the aircraft.
Without power, the pilots had to try lowering the aircraft's main landing gear via a gravity drop, but, due to the airflow, the nose wheel failed to lock into position. The decreasing forward motion of the aircraft also reduced the effectiveness of the Ram Air Turbine (RAT), making the aircraft increasingly difficult to control because of the reduced power being generated.
As the runway drew nearer, it became apparent that the aircraft was too high and fast, raising the danger of running off the runway before the aircraft could be stopped. The lack of hydraulic pressure prevented flap/slat extension. These devices are used under normal landing conditions to reduce the speed of the aircraft for a safe landing. The pilots briefly considered executing a 360 degree turn to reduce speed and altitude, but came to the conclusion they did not have enough altitude for the maneuver. Pearson decided to execute a forward slip to increase drag and lose altitude. This maneuver is commonly used with gliders and light aircraft to descend more quickly. At the time Pearson executed the slip, the aircraft was flying over a golf course.
As soon as the wheels touched the runway, Pearson "stood on the brakes", blowing out two of the aircraft's tires. The unlocked nose wheel collapsed and was forced back into its well, causing the aircraft's nose to scrape along the ground. The plane also slammed into the guard rail now separating the strip, which helped slow it down.
None of the 61 passengers were seriously hurt. A minor fire in the nose area was soon put out by racers and course workers armed with fire extinguishers. As the aircraft's nose had collapsed onto the ground, its tail was elevated and there were some minor injuries when passengers exited the aircraft via the rear slides. These were treated by a doctor who had been about to take off in an aircraft on Gimli's remaining runway.
It was also subsequently investigated by the predecessor of the modern Transportation Safety Board of Canada; while concluding that Air Canada management was responsible for "corporate and equipment deficiencies", the report praised the flight and cabin crews for their "professionalism and skill". It noted that Air Canada "... neglected to assign clearly and specifically the responsibility for calculating the fuel load in an abnormal situation", finding that the airline had failed to reallocate the task of checking fuel load that had been the responsibility of the flight engineer on older (three-crew) aircraft.
After inconsistencies were found with the FQIS in other 767s, Boeing issued a service bulletin for the routine checking of this system. An engineer in Edmonton duly did so when the aircraft arrived from Toronto following a trouble-free flight the day before the incident. While conducting this check, the FQIS failed and the cockpit fuel gauges went blank. The engineer had previously encountered the same problem earlier in the month when the same aircraft had arrived, again from Toronto, with an FQIS fault. He found then that disabling the second channel by pulling the circuit breaker in the cockpit restored the fuel gauges to working order albeit with only the single FQIS channel operative. In the absence of any spares he simply repeated this temporary fix by pulling and tagging the circuit breaker.
On the day of the incident, the aircraft flew from Edmonton to Montreal. Before departure the engineer informed the pilot of the problem and confirmed that the tanks would have to be checked with the floatstick. In a misunderstanding however the pilot believed that the aircraft had been flown with the fault from Toronto the previous afternoon. That flight proceeded uneventfully with fuel gauges operating correctly on the single channel.
On arrival at Montreal, there was to be a crew change for the return flight back to Edmonton. The outgoing pilot informed Captain Pearson and First Officer Quintal of the problem with the FQIS and passed on his mistaken belief that the aircraft had flown the previous day with this problem. In a further misunderstanding, Captain Pearson believed that he was also being told that the FQIS had been completely unserviceable since then.
While the aircraft was being prepared for its return to Edmonton, a maintenance worker decided to investigate the problem with the faulty FQIS. In order to test the system he re-enabled the second channel, at which point the fuel gauges in the cockpit went blank. He was called away to perform a floatstick measurement of fuel remaining in the tanks. Distracted, he failed to disable the second channel, leaving the circuit breaker tagged (which masked the fact that it was no longer pulled). The FQIS was now completely unserviceable and the fuel gauges were blank.
A record of all actions and findings was made in the maintenance log, including the entry; "SERVICE CHK – FOUND FUEL QTY IND BLANK – FUEL QTY #2 C/B PULLED & TAGGED...". This reports that the fuel gauges were blank and that the second FQIS channel was disabled, but does not make clear that the latter fixed the former.
On entering the cockpit, Captain Pearson saw what he was expecting to see; blank fuel gauges and a tagged circuit breaker. He consulted the aircraft's Minimum Equipment List (MEL), which told him that the aircraft could not be flown in this condition. However, the 767 was still a very new aircraft, having flown its maiden flight in September 1981. was the 47th Boeing 767 off the production line, delivered to Air Canada less than 4 months previously. In that time there had been 55 changes to the MEL, and some pages were still blank pending development of procedures.
As a result of this unreliability, it had become practice for flights to be authorised by maintenance personnel. To add to his own misconceptions about the condition the aircraft had been flying in since the previous day, reinforced by what he saw in the cockpit, he now had a signed off maintenance log that it had become custom to prefer above the Minimum Equipment List.
A litre of jet fuel weighs 0.803 kg, so the correct calculation was:
7682 litres × 0.803 = 6169 kg
22300 kg − 6169 kg = 16131 kg
16131 kg ÷ 0.803 = 20088 litres of fuel to be transferred
Between the ground crew and flight crew, however, they arrived at an incorrect conversion factor of 1.77, the weight of a litre of fuel in pounds. This was the conversion factor provided on the refueller's paperwork and which had always been used for the rest of the airline's imperial-calibrated fleet. Their calculation produced:
7682 litres × 1.77 = 13597 kg
22300 kg − 13597 kg = 8703 kg
8703 kg ÷ 1.77 = 4916 litres of fuel to be transferred
Instead of 22,300 kg of fuel, they had 22,300 pounds' on board — only a little over 10,000 kg, or less than half the amount required to reach their destination. Knowing the problems with the FQIS, Captain Pearson double-checked their calculations but was given the same incorrect conversion factor. He checked their arithmetic, inevitably coming up with the same erroneous figures.
The Flight Management Computer (FMC) measures fuel consumption, allowing the crew to keep track of fuel burned as the flight progresses. It is normally updated automatically by the FQIS, but in the absence of this facility it can be updated manually. Believing he had 22,300 kg of fuel on board, this is the figure the captain entered.
Because the FMC would reset during the stopover in Ottawa, the captain had the fuel tanks measured again with the dripstick while there. In converting the quantity to kilograms, the same incorrect conversion factor was used, leading him to believe he now had 20,400 kg of fuel; in reality, he had less than half the required amount.
It has been reported that, following Air Canada's internal investigation, Captain Pearson was demoted for six months, and First Officer Quintal was suspended for two weeks. Three maintenance workers were also suspended. Nevertheless, in 1985 the pilots were awarded the first ever Fédération Aéronautique Internationale Diploma for Outstanding Airmanship. Quintal was promoted to Captain in 1989, while Pearson retired in 1993.
, fin 604, was patched at Gimli and flown out two days later. It remained in service with Air Canada until almost a quarter century later. In an ironic replay, Capt. Pearson and F.O. Quintal, once reinstated to flight duty following the successful appeal of their suspensions, found themselves once again assigned as crewmembers aboard another Air Canada flight. As they boarded the aircraft they realized it was the same, exact airplane they'd landed that fateful day at Glimli, and they lightly joked about not repeating the performance. However, during the climbout, to their momentary horror, once again the aircraft blasted the cockpit with a low fuel warning. However, this time it turned out to be only a false warning from a defective warning system, and the flight continued uneventfully to its destination. After 25 years of service, the airplane flew its last revenue flight (AC951 from Port-au-Prince, Haiti to Montreal, Canada) on 1 January 2008. Air Canada still uses Flight 143 for its Montreal-Ottawa-Edmonton route.
The Gimli Glider retires to the desert. On Thursday, 24 January, fin 604, the Boeing 767-200 better known as the Gimli Glider, will undertake its final voyage from Montreal to Mojave Airport (MHV) before it is retired to the desert. Employees and retirees (bring valid employee ID) are invited to come and say goodbye to the aircraft, which has now become part of Canadian aviation history. Fin 604 is set to depart as flight AC7067, at 9 a.m. from the Montreal Line Maintenance hangar - Air Canada Base, 750 Côte Vertu West; Building 7, Bay 8/13 (West end), Gate entrance 5. Captain Robert Pearson and First Officer Maurice Quintal, the flight crew who landed the aircraft to safety in Gimli on 23 July 1983 are expected to be on hand for the aircraft's departure. The hangar will be open to well-wishers from 8:00 a.m.
Flight AC7067 was captained by Jean-Marc Bélanger, a former head of the Air Canada Pilots Association, while Captain Robert Pearson and Maurice Quintal were on board to oversee the flight from Montreal to California's Mojave Airport, its final resting place. Also on board were three of the six original flight attendants who were on Flight 143. Flight tracking services FlightAware and FlightView indicated on 24 January 2008 that 604's initial flight was from Montreal (CYUL) to Tucson International airport (KTUS), having a planned cruise altitude of FL400. According to FlightAware, 604 landed at 12:53 P.M. (MST) at Tucson International airport (KTUS). The Gimli Glider was then scheduled (but delayed) to depart Tucson and make the final flight to the Mojave Airport (KMHV) for retirement.
On the 25th anniversary of the incident in 2008, pilots Pearson and Quintal were celebrated in a parade in Gimli, as a mural was dedicated to commemorate the landing.
Category:1983 in Canada Category:Air Canada Category:Airliner accidents and incidents caused by fuel exhaustion Category:Aviation accidents and incidents in Canada Category:History of Manitoba Category:In-flight airliner loss of all engines Category:Metrication Category:Individual aircraft Category:Aviation accidents and incidents in 1983 Category:Accidents and incidents involving the Boeing 767 Category:Mojave Air & Space Port Category:Air Canada accidents and incidents
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