Beachhead Anzio pt2-2 1963 US Army World War II The Big Picture

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• published: 22 Apr 2012
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more at http://quickfound.net/links/military_news_and_links.html "DOCUMENTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALLY BEACHHEAD AT ANZIO IN WORLD WAR II." Public domain film from the National Archives, slightly cropped to remove uneven edges, with the aspect ratio corrected, and mild video noise reduction applied. The soundtrack was also processed with volume normalization, noise reduction, clipping reduction, and equalization (the resulting sound, though not perfect, is far less noisy than the original). Split with MKVmerge GUI (part of MKVToolNix), the same software can recombine the downloaded parts (in mp4 format): http://www.bunkus.org/videotools/mkvtoolnix/doc/mkvmerge-gui.html part 1: http://youtu.be/sAhGKjDOkK4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Shingle Operation Shingle (January 22, 1944) was an Allied amphibious landing in the Italian Campaign against German forces in the area of Anzio and Nettuno, Italy. The operation was commanded by American Major General John P. Lucas and was intended to outflank German forces of the Winter Line and enable an attack on Rome. The resulting combat is commonly called the Battle of Anzio. The success of an amphibious landing at that location, in a basin substantially comprising reclaimed marshland and surrounded by mountains, depended completely on the element of surprise and the swiftness with which the invaders could move relative to the reaction time of the defenders. Any delay could result in the occupation of the mountains by the defenders and the consequent entrapment of the invaders. Lieutenant General Mark Clark, commander of the U.S. Fifth Army, understood that risk, but Clark did not pass on their appreciation of the situation to his subordinate General Lucas who preferred took time to entrench against an expected counter attack. The initial landing achieved complete surprise with no opposition and a jeep patrol even made it as far as the outskirts of Rome. Despite that report, Lucas, who had little confidence in the operation as planned, failed to capitalise on the element of surprise by delaying his advance until he judged his position was sufficiently consolidated and his troops ready. While Lucas consolidated, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German Italian theatre commander, moved every spare unit to be found into a ring around the beachhead, where his gunners had a clear view of every Allied position. The Germans also stopped the drainage pumps and flooded the reclaimed marsh with salt water planning to entrap the allies and destroy them by epidemic. For weeks a rain of shells fell on the beach, the marsh, the harbour, and on anything else observable from the hills with little distinction between forward and rear positions. After a month of heavy but inconclusive fighting Lucas was relieved and sent home, replaced by Major General Lucian Truscott. The Allies finally broke out in May but instead of striking inland to cut lines of communication of the German Tenth Army's units at Cassino, Truscott on Clark's orders reluctantly turned his forces north-west towards the prize of Rome which was captured on 4 June. As a result, the forces of the German Tenth Army at Cassino were able to withdraw and rejoin the rest of Kesselring's forces north of Rome, regroup and make a fighting withdrawal to his next major prepared defensive position on the Gothic Line... At the end of 1943, following the Allied invasion of Italy, Allied forces were bogged down at the Gustav Line, a defensive line across Italy south of the strategic objective of Rome. The terrain of central Italy had proved ideally suited to defense, and Field Marshal Albert Kesselring took full advantage. Operation Shingle was originally conceived by Winston Churchill in December 1943, as he lay recovering from pneumonia in Marrakesh. His concept was to land two divisions at Anzio, bypassing German forces in central Italy, and take Rome, the strategic objective of the current Battle of Rome... Aftermath ...most commentators agree that the initial Anzio plan was flawed, questioning whether the initial landing of just over two infantry divisions with no supporting armour had had the strength to achieve the objective of cutting Route 6 and then holding off the inevitable counterattacks which would come as Kesselring re-deployed his forces. Volume 5 of Churchill's The Second World War is riddled with implied criticism of Lucas, blaming the failure of Operation Shingle on his caution. However, Kesselring after the war was to opine " it would have been the Anglo-American doom to over-extend themselves. The landing force was initially weak, only a division or so of infantry, and without armour. It was a half-way measure of an offensive that was your basic error." Furthermore, Alexander in his Official Despatch was to say "the actual course of events was probably the most advantageous in the end..."