ValuJet Flight 592 - ATC Recordings [IN-FLIGHT FIRE]

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• published: 30 Oct 2011
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On May 11th, 1996, ValuJet flight 592 pushed back from gate G2 in Miami after a delay of 1 hour and 4 minutes due to mechanical problems. There were 105 passengers, on board, as well as a crew of two pilots and three flight attendants, bringing the total number of people on board to 110. At 2:04 pm, the DC-9 took off from runway 9L and began a normal climb. At 2:10 p.m. the flight crew noted an electrical problem. Seconds later, a flight attendant entered the cockpit and advised the flight crew of a fire in the passenger cabin. Passengers' shouts of "fire, fire, fire" were recorded on the plane's cockpit voice recorder when the cockpit door was opened. Though the ValuJet flight attendant manual stated that the cockpit door should not be opened when smoke or other harmful gases might be present in the cabin, the intercom was disabled and there was no other way to inform the pilots of what was happening. By this time, the plane's interior was completely on fire. The crew immediately asked air traffic control for a return to Miami due to smoke in the cockpit and cabin. Captain Candi Kubeck and First Officer Richard Hazen were given instructions for a return to the airport. One minute later, the First Officer requested the nearest available airport. Flight 592 disappeared from radar at 2:14 p.m. and crashed in Browns Farm Wildlife Management area in the Everglades, a few miles west of Miami, at a speed in excess of 500 miles per hour. Kubeck, Hazen, the three flight attendants, and all 105 passengers aboard were killed instantly. Recovery of the aircraft and victims was made extremely difficult by the location of the crash. The nearest road of any kind was more than a quarter mile away from the crash scene, and the location of the crash itself was a deep-water swamp with a bedrock base. The DC-9 shattered on impact with the bedrock, leaving very few large portions of the plane intact. Sawgrass, alligators, and risk of bacterial infection from cuts plagued searchers involved in the recovery effort. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable causes of the accident, resulting in a fire in the Class D cargo compartment from the actuation of one or more oxygen generators improperly carried as cargo, were: The failure of SabreTech to properly prepare, package, identify, and track unexpended chemical oxygen generators before presenting them to ValuJet for carriage. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the FAA to adequately monitor ValuJet's heavy maintenance program and responsibilities, including ValuJet's oversight of its contractors, and SabreTech's repair station certificate; the failure of the FAA to adequately respond to prior chemical oxygen generator fires with programs to address the potential hazards; and the failure of ValuJet to ensure that both ValuJet and contract maintenance employees were aware of the carrier's no-carry hazardous materials policy and had received appropriate hazardous materials training. Information: http://aviation-safety.net/ Photograph: http://www.airliners.net/ Recording: http://www.planecrashinfo.com/lastwor...