

TOWARDS A CITIZENS' MILITIA

The thought of war and oppression is unpleasant to decent people the world over, both East and West. Yet, if you want to survive the worst with dignity then you must be least imagine the very worst, and try to think how you would act. The government knows this only too well. This year they will spend £10,500,000,000 of our money to prevent the country falling to the enemy, without and within. But what happens if they've got it all wrong!

Suppose the Russians or — heaven forbid! — a cabal of army and police officers took power tomorrow at 4.00 a.m.? Having lived for centuries in a society rooted in obedience to authority we can assume that by midday there would be people clapping them in the streets ...by three we'd have citizens loading other citizens on to three ton lorries ... on the nine o'clock news there'd be a well-known personality oozing assurances that it is all for the best and it is our constitutional duty to accept the new order ... and by 10.30 the following morning we'd have respected members of the bench setting the seal of legality on the authority of the new regime and packing the opposition off to the uranium mines in Orkney, or to Wembley Stadium to await whatever authoritarian delights lay in store for them.

However, if you are one of those people who feel it your civil duty to defend whatever freedom you feel you have, and haven't bet your all on IBM, the KGB, or any other power obsessed minority, then it is your responsibility to be aware of the many ways bad people can be harmful when angry, acquisitive, or generally out of sorts. You, of course, are one of the Great Pumpkin's loftiest creations, so we are safe in putting this book in your hands. We hope you'll never need the information contained here, but it is your inalienable right to share with your enemies the knowledge of this useful publication.

Cover illustration by Michael Miller

TOWARDS A CITIZENS' MILITIA

ANARCHIST ALTERNATIVES
TO NATO & THE
WARSAW PACT



CIENFUEGOS PRESS

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IRSM | 1ST OF MAY GROUP

Closing remarks

Towards a citizens' militia anarchist alternatives to NATO & the Warsaw Pact

This manual has only managed to skim the surface of a subject hitherto considered by many to be the sole domain of a professional elite, upon whose skill and political reliability depended upon the safety and security of all peoples throughout the world.

The tactics and strategies outlined in this manual may never have to be used - we hope not, as every act of violence no matter how "justifiable", diminishes our humanity - but it is clear to us that the possibility of a conflict such as is postulated in the preceding pages does exist (after all, each and every nation state spends a considerable part of its budget on preparing for such an eventuality), and when diplomacy, persuasion, discussion, and military coercion have all failed in wars of national domination or struggles for freedom and social justice, then guerrilla warfare and civilian resistance (both armed and non-violent) will be the inevitable outcome in the final stages.

In the final analysis the responsibility for defending our lives, our freedom and our hopes for a better world lie in our own hands - not those of a professional military elite subject to the vagaries of power politics or class justice. We end with a quote from Buenaventura Durruti: "You will be sitting on top of a pile of ruins even if you are victorious. - We have always lived in slums and holes in the wall. We will know how to accommodate ourselves for a time. For, you must not forget that we can also build these palaces and cities, here in Spain and America and everywhere. We, the workers. We can build others to take their place. And better ones. We are not in the least afraid of ruins. We are going to inherit the earth. There is not the slightest doubt about that. The bourgeoisie might blast and ruin its own world before it leaves the stage of history. We carry a new world here, in our hearts, and that world is growing in this minute."

Suggestions for further reading:

The Poor Man's James Bond, Kurt Saxon, £7.00, California.
The Poor Man's Armourer, Clyde Barrow, £7.00, California.
(These two books are occasionally available through C.P. Bookservice, but are in great demand and quickly go out of stock).

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Individual guards along the periphery of the "restricted area" will be replaced as soon as possible by barbed wire entanglements. This will conserve personnel and will be even more effective.

Disarmament

A certain cut-off date will be set for turning over weapons, ammunition, explosives, and hand grenades; until then the people are assured of not being punished if they turn over these weapons. This guarantee will be adhered to at least in the beginning so as not to frighten anyone away.

Should you be so trusting and turn over your weapons you will be put on a "black list" in spite of everything. The enemy will always need hostages or forced labourers later on and will gladly make use of the "black lists".

After the deadline, raids coupled with house searches and street checks will be conducted.

Searches

On the evening before or during the night, a scout in civilian clothes (official of the State Security Service, military, etc) will conduct a reconnaissance to determine good routes of approach, roadblocks needed, number of personnel required.

Approach, encirclement and blocking off the area will be done at dawn. The enemy will conduct this operation as quickly as possible to prevent you from taking counter measures such as organising resistance, hiding out, escaping, etc.

The house search begins at daylight before people go to work (early shift).


Whenever possible, movable barriers (concertina wire) will be used to conserve personnel. The barrier is to prevent a coming and going of persons from one side to the other. At the same time the enemy provides security for his search elements by using barriers.

Buildings standing alone (villas, etc) do not offer any particular difficulties. Row houses, however, are more complicated. Here he has at the same time to close off several buildings on both sides of the "target."

Normally, an infantry squad of ten to twelve men will be accompanied by one or two members of the State Security Service. Two sentries will be stationed immediately in the attic to prevent escapes via roofs. One guard will be posted in the stairwell on each floor; he will watch the doors. Three men will be on the bottom floor. One each will guard the front and rear house entrance, while the third man will guard the entrance to the basement.

As a rule, all inhabitants will be herded together in a place which can be easily guarded (yard, corner of a wall). The owner or janitor must indicate if all are present, who is missing and who does not belong among the inhabitants.

Then the inhabitants are called up individually when it is their turn to have their apartments searched. Doors which



cannot be opened will be broken open. The systematic search requires a lot of time. In this case the specialists of the State Security Service will render good services in various respects.

The presence alone of the hated and feared organ of the political police will have a paralysing and intimidating effect upon the inhabitants.

The individual soldier, on the inside entirely disinterested in the whole operation, is forced to great activity and harshness by the presence of the representatives of the regime if he does not want to run the risk of being considered politically unreliable.

The following will be searched carefully: small water tanks of various types of toilets, closets, suitcases, boxes, stoves, stove pipes (suitable weapons cache), chimneys (hiding places for persons), beds, etc. In addition, they will check the floors to see if they have been tampered with.

Heaps of rubble, waste, wood or coal piles in basements and yards will be probed.

reserve on the side which provides the most cover. One or two tanks or assault guns will advance with the infantry to provide fire support.

At least one squad of the reserve platoon will be committed on both sides to search the houses passed by the lead platoon to prevent a flare-up of the fight in the rear. Individual officials of the State Security Service are also assigned to the reserve platoon as specialists. Since a search of houses requires more time than the advance of the lead element, the reserve platoon will dictate the speed of advance. When the lead element engages in a fire fight, personnel further back in the column will step behind and into houses to prevent losses.

The advance will halt at each street intersecting the direction of advance and the unit will regroup. You can see by the above that the advance of the enemy will be very difficult and, above all, time-consuming.

Eliminating barricades

The enemy will attempt to destroy barricades from a great distance by using his superior heavy weapons, i.e. tanks, assault guns, direct artillery fire.

Where you have so installed your barricades in such a manner to prevent this, the enemy will never attack the barricade frontally but advance to the left and right through the houses with infantry (raiding parties). The barricade will then fall almost by itself.


Clearing large buildings

The entire area concerned will be surrounded. Routes of access will be closed off by barbed wire (concertina wire) and soldiers with submachine guns. Tanks will drive up and guard the buildings concerned with machine guns and cannon. Automatic weapons will be positioned in and on the neighbouring buildings to control the roofs of the target area.

An assault party, i.e. elements of the State Security Service, penetrates into the buildings, searches and cleans them out systematically. Suspicious persons and prisoners will be taken away immediately. Trucks and officials of the State Security Service will be kept ready for the transportation of prisoners. A reserve element will wait under cover in order to handle arrested persons or reinforce the assault element. Loud-speakers will broadcast announcements and appeals to the "enemy." Searchlights will be positioned to assist the operation at night, if necessary.

Clearing an open area

To disperse mass demonstrations of the desperate population in front of government buildings, party and administration seats, monuments, etc., the enemy will do the following:



The troops of the occupation power will want the assembled crowd to leave as quickly and unhindered as possible.

Consequently they will:

- Give orders through loudspeaker trucks to have the doors of the surrounding houses open, but to close the windows facing

the square, thus allowing a considerable portion of the crowd to disperse into the houses but at the same time make it difficult for the escapees to fire from closed windows upon troops and police.

b) Keep many streets open on purpose to provide the crowds with avenues of escape.

c) Clear the square from only one side, selecting that side from which the least streets lead into the square.

In order to clear the square the enemy will use primarily tanks, armoured personnel carriers or at least trucks. They will advance slowly in one line at a consistent pace - often with one flank slightly ahead which facilitates observation - and thus push back the crowd.

Infantry will be mounted on the vehicles to prevent the crowd from tearing down antennas, tools, flags, etc., from the vehicles or throw Molotov cocktails at them.

Behind the tanks follow reserve elements at some distance with trucks. They have the mission:

To close off immediately side streets passed by the tanks with movable wire obstacles and guards to prevent portions of the crowd from returning and attacking the rear of the clearing elements.

To take charge of persons arrested and transport them to the rear in trucks.

Occupying the city

After entry and clearing operations are completed, "restricted areas" will be established which will support the occupation troops. In these areas the occupation troops will be strictly separated from the population. This way the troops can be protected and removed from the political influence of the population.

Areas adjacent to "restricted areas" will be patrolled by infantry and tanks. Infantry patrols will hide in armoured personnel carriers, if possible, or at least on trucks carrying machine guns.

Strong points will be established in the adjacent areas to support the patrols. They will be few in number so as not to disperse forces, but will be able to withstand attack.


They are always installed in solid buildings which can be easily defended. Often they will be situated in places which have to be guarded anyhow, i.e. power companies, arsenals, bridges etc.

Patrols will be led by officers. Only within the immediate vicinity of the restricted area (several hundred metres) are these patrols of squad strength. Otherwise, they will consist of at least one platoon with machine gun mounted on a truck.

Officers leading the patrols are usually the best the enemy has to offer (read: "the most ruthless" and "trigger happy").

Officers are above all to prevent any contact between the population and the soldiers and to make sure that the latter are not disarmed by the population. They will not refrain from firing even in the presence of women and children.

Patrols are especially dangerous since they will open fire quickly out of fear; at any rate, sooner than a large closed unit. The smaller a patrol and the farther away from the restricted area, the sooner it will make use of its weapons.



Part 1: Principles of armed resistance

Part 2: Organisation and conduct of guerrilla warfare

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Fighting techniques used by the enemy while suppressing uprisings

Entering towns in the area of an uprising

The enemy will select primarily the early morning hours between 0200 and 0400 hours. The last "night revellers" will then have gone to bed and those who have to go to the early shift have not yet got up. Towns and villages are thus surprised "in bed" so to speak.

If for any reason at all the morning hours cannot be taken advantage of, for instance, transportation difficulties, he will select the late forenoon hours (1000-1100) when people are at work.

While he is entering, the civilian telephone system will be disrupted to prevent you from reporting his strength, organisation and direction of advance via the civilian net to your underground movement.

Siege; Martial Law

Immediately after entry into the area of unrest the enemy will declare martial law. You also must know something about this so as not to be surprised and impressed too much.

a) Taking over command:

A military command will take over in place of the civilian occupation administration or the "puppet administration" and will institute the following:

b) Individual measures:

Restaurants and clubs will be forced to close before dusk. Curfew at night. In his own interest the enemy has to issue "passes" valid for the curfew hours to doctors as well as employees most needed in public installations such as gas works, power works, water supply, hospitals etc. By clever falsifications you may be able to get hold of such passes and thus be able to circulate more or less freely as a member of the resistance movement. Here is a wide-open field for the activities of the counterfeit section.

Congregations of more than ten persons will be prohibited. Clubs and associations will be prohibited. Court-martials and quick trials will be initiated. It will be announced publicly that anyone apprehended with a weapon will be shot on the spot.

All house owners and janitors are responsible for house doors, cellar and attic doors being closed at all times. Strangers may only enter after a check. The house owner or janitor will be jointly responsible for any hostile acts committed by those strangers against the occupation forces from their house (basic rule: each is to watch and shadow the other out of fear and self-preservation).

All shutters and blinds facing the street must be open. However all windows must be closed. Patrols will fire into open windows without any warning.

c) Proclamation of a siege:

A state of siege will be advertised by posters, loudspeakers, trucks, radios and leaflets dropped from planes.

Sealing off an area of unrest

a) General:

Armoured and mechanised troops encircle the city by closing off the main arterial roads, in order to prevent an escape of the insurgents, and to prevent help and supplies from reaching the insurgents from the outside.

Individual armoured raiding groups will attack along main routes in the direction of the centre of the city in order to occupy individual, important points and split up the insurgents into several, separate fighting groups.

Most of the enemy infantry will comb the various city sections, blocks and buildings slowly and systematically.

A motorised main reserve will be kept ready outside the town in order to counter attempts to break out, relieve tired units, replace losses, reinforce, if necessary, the spearhead units, and to eliminate later especially tenacious defended pockets of resistance. Co-ordination and direction of the operation will be facilitated by radio, helicopter and light planes.

b) Detailed organisation:

The occupation powers will organise basically their units as follows: "forces to seal off"; outer perimeter, inner perimeter, and "mopping-up" forces.

All forces (military, party militia, regular police forces, State Security Service) are placed under one command.

Chief of entire operation.

High military commander, per-

haps police commander or State Security Service, NKVD

If the commanding officer is from the military, then he will be a party "follower" who is absolutely true to the party line.

Chief of perimeter organisation

Military Police

Chief of mopping-up operation.

Military State Security Service

"Outer Perimeter force": Will prevent unauthorised traffic in the area of the uprising (rerouting traffic). Will protect mopping-up forces against operations from the outside, i.e. attacks from guerrilla units supporting the insurgents. Main element of the outer sealing-off force is the party militia supported by individual policemen who regulate traffic and "screen" persons and vehicles passing through. Individual tanks and infantry elements of the occupation power serve as a battle-ready back-up force. The "outer seal-off force" only blocks main routes of access at the periphery of the area of uprising. This is a tight little net which can be easily bypassed by using secondary roads.

"Inner Perimeter force": Will prevent escape of insurgents. Thus is as tight and close as possible. Main tactical element is the infantry. Areas with wide field of fire (parks, canals, large streets, open squares) are selected to save on personnel for the sealing-off operation since combing the area thoroughly requires many personnel.

"Mopping-up forces": Raiding elements - infantry and individual armoured personnel carriers - will knock out pockets of resistance. Fire support elements will assist the advance of the raiding elements, i.e. self-propelled guns, tanks, mortars, machine guns. Search detachments will consist of infantry as well as specialists of the State Security Service. Reserves will support the attack as well as guard and transport prisoners.

The enemy assembly area

The enemy likes to use open, easily controllable areas (RR marshalling yards, larger interconnecting parks, etc) as assembly areas. He will be able to do this since you do not possess any heavy weapons (artillery, planes, mortars) to smash known assembly areas and troop concentrations. Assembly in open and easily controlled areas will make it easier for the enemy to assemble and organise his units, brief subordinate unit commanders on the terrain and position heavy support weapons (guns, mortars) which in spite of "high-angle fire" will not be able to be effective from narrow streets.

Thus remember: Large open areas near your defensive front are dangerous. As long as you still have freedom of movement you must position yourself in such a manner that such areas (parks, open spaces, railroad tracks) are to your rear. Where you have been unable to do this your few mortars must be able to concentrate on these points.

Point of penetration

The tactical rule in city fighting is to select the point of penetration in such a way so that the depth of the area to be penetrated is as short as possible.

You must continually enter on your situation map any reports about newly installed enemy sealing-off posts. As time goes on you will obtain a pretty good picture of the development of the inner perimeter. You can now easily see where the area occupied by you shows the smallest depth. Make your preparations accordingly by increasing observation at this point, relocating reserves, etc.

Advance in the streets


The enemy will normally use a reinforced company for each main street.

Two platoons will probably advance together next to each other; one on the street itself, the other via gardens and backyards. The enemy will select that side of the street which offers the best cover. The third platoon follows as reserve, sealing off and searching the area.

On the main street, one squad will advance in file to the left and right along the houses. One squad will follow as

Read no more odes my son, read timetables:
they're to the point. And roll the sea-charts out
before it's too late. Be watchful, do not sing,
for once again the day is clearly coming
when they will brand refusers on the chest
and nail up lists of names on people's doors.
Learn how to go unknown, learn more than me:
to change your face, your documents, your country.
Become adept at every petty treason,
the sly escape each day and any season.
For lighting fires encyclicals are good:
and the defenceless can always put to use,
as butter-wrappers, party manifestoes,
Anger and persistence will be required
to blow into the lungs of power the dust
choking, insidious, ground out by those who,
storing experience, stay scrupulous: by you.


Hans Magnus Enzenburger




Anti-tank obstacles should be set up using vehicles like buses and trucks. Tear up the street with mechanical diggers and construct obstacles. Barricades should be erected at strategic positions. Ammunition and food should be stored at strong points and molotov cocktails should be filled.

At strong points only occupy buildings which are of strong construction, such as schools, administration buildings and factories. Avoid modern brick buildings. Reinforced steel structures will better withstand firing from security forces.

The various buildings which compose the strong points should be able to give themselves fire support and together control a significant point.



Anti-tank obstacle placed out of tank's direct line of fire forces enemy to approach obstacle to clear it. This allows close combat with tank and enemy infantry.



READ THIS FIRST

This book needs to be placed in context because its subject matter is sure to encourage a reaction of contrived hysteria from authoritarians of differing political colours. Tactics and methods of resistance are explained here so that libertarians can start to consider seriously a situation which is becoming less and less hypothetical. The unrelenting greed of the industrialised nations is hastening the day when governments will no longer be able to proffer an escapist diet of materialism as the anaesthetic to conceal the cancerous state of our society. We have already seen a sudden increase in the baying of the 'Law and Order' lobby over the last few years and this is no temporary phenomenon. The democratic facade of the Parliamentary State will soon be little more than a coat of flaking paint. It would be naive to be shocked at this development because a look at the way our 'democracy' came about by being conceded in gradual doses to stave off serious unrest, demonstrates clearly that it is no 'natural right of true-born Englishmen'. In fact the great success of the whole exercise was to convince the majority of the population that they had everything they needed, and that any further concessions would only lead to 'anarchy' (in the derogatory sense of the word which they corrupted). But the current has now turned and with such subjective terms as 'public safety' and 'common' and 'national interest,' the State is starting to haul the line back in.

This book does not and cannot attempt to define at what point dictatorship succeeds cosmetic democracy, or at what point a libertarian is morally obliged by his beliefs to take up arms (or other methods) and resist totalitarianism in its various political forms, whether a domestic government or a foreign invader. All it does is to recognise that such a day is not far off and that we must be ready to fight before the unending darkness of an all-powerful state sets in. However, we must not fall into the trap of two fatal fallacies. One being a cry of

desperation - "the time is not yet ripe, but it is too dangerous to wait". The other being the theory that provoking the state into over-reacting will create a spontaneous resistance. These rationales for engaging in the armed struggle immediately must be seen against the obvious and fundamental Anarchist objective of developing a libertarian society. In fact it should not take long to realise that such a society can hardly come about when isolated groups follow a policy of resistance for the sake of resistance. Unless we can first prove that Anarchism works through creating libertarian communities, the critical level of support that we need will never materialise for the mass of workers will otherwise continue to be influenced by authoritarian propaganda. We can never ignore Krópotkin's saying that no armed action should be undertaken unless its purpose can be clearly understood by the average worker.

The other reason for developing a libertarian social and work structure is that it is only bulwark against authoritarian groups when the upheaval comes. If we have not yet learnt the lessons of the Russian and Spanish revolutions when the Communists savagely attacked the freedom of Anarchism, then we do not deserve to survive as a movement. We start at a severe disadvantage vis a vis our authoritarian 'comrades', and they will easily destroy us again unless the shoots of libertarianism are already pushing through the crumbling remains of the old society.

One of the fundamental rules of guerrilla warfare is to spread the struggle to every piece of territory and to every facet of life. Unless the seeds of Anarchist freedom have already been sown there, we are doomed to perish however good our military preparations might be. The authoritarians have more in common with each other than with us. But if we are ready in every respect, and have shown the sort of life people can create for themselves, then we can win.

Introduction

A number of books dealing with irregular warfare, also known as unconventional or guerrilla warfare, have been written. Most of these were written by military men involved in suppression of insurrection in a colony, military men concerned with instigating insurrection in other peoples' colonies, conventional commando tacticians or conventional military leaders chosen to prepare resistance among a population faced with failure of regular military defence from an invading foreign army. In all of these cases, the main problems to be solved were adaption of conventional military tactics to new and difficult circumstances and training of civilians unused to military discipline or procedure. A side issue in some instances was rapid manufacture of small arms and ammunition to arm the partisans and effective use of very young boys, men considered too old for military service, women and girls as combatants.

For the purpose of this book we can discard the experiences of military leaders primarily involved in terrorising native or peasant populations (except as an example of what a successful guerrilla may expect from his adversaries) and the experiences of military men concerned with instigating insurrection in someone else's colonies. This book is aimed at people who, through social conscience or political belief, must themselves resist an authoritarian domestic government. The tasks of such a freedom fighter are substantially different from those of, for example, a partisan resisting an invader in the name of an exiled government, or an agent of a foreign government attempting to subvert the order and authority of an enemy country.

Traditionally, guerrilla movements and organisations have achieved a marked degree of success when they were resisting and harrasing a foreign army on their own soil, when supply was plentiful from a powerful ally, on the eve of a massive conventional invasion by their allies and when the domestic "puppet" government was too weak nationally to prevent the guerrillas from usurping the activities and duties the populace normally expected the government to perform such as police functions, co-ordination of food, water and medical supplies, organisation of national security from invasion, etc.

The nature of the social motivation or political ideology that drives the true freedom fighter may dictate to some extent the

methods by which the tasks of resistance are carried out. This book is written by, and directed to, anarchists, libertarian socialists, revolutionary syndicalists and all lovers of freedom and foes of tyranny and oppression.

It is not the authors' intention to try to justify anarchism in this book. Much has already been written of anarchist theory and practice. The application of libertarian principles of organisation is a sound and intelligent manner by which you may assemble your comrades to do the work of anarchist revolution. Many terrorist groups are mislabelled as anarchists. The people who designate as anarchist authoritarian para-military groups which espouse a belief in state socialism and employ kidnapping and mass terror as a vehicle to gain their ends display their total ignorance of our ideology and their own fear of liberty.

I implore all who read this book to avoid acts or propaganda which contribute to the myth of violence surrounding anarchism in the minds of the uneducated public. The dignity of our struggle must match the importance and integrity of our creed. If we must use "armed struggle", that euphemism for physical force, let it be in clear response to despicable action on the part of our oppressors and not for publicity and notoriety or someones' peculiar desire for violence.

In any case, physical force is a coercive means of obtaining an end. Hours of debate have led us back to where we started - a free society is unlikely to be born from a coercive measure, and just as unlikely to be born of an oppressive, authoritarian regime. If we choose physical force, our obligation to society, and to ourselves, becomes magnified a hundredfold to maintain and advance a theory and practice of social organisation which will never enslave, imprison, conscript or tax. Our example must be of a nature that leaves no person unconvinced of the sincerity of our goal. That goal is a society of freedom and a world of true liberty.

Part 1: Principles of armed resistance

Organisation and libertarian authority

Although this book is essentially intended as a technical manual, there are aspects of armed struggle, which cannot be classified as technical.

We are bound by our social and political beliefs to modes of working that further our goals. The manner in which we carry out our task is as important as the task itself. Our means cannot, must not, be separated from our ends. We must create a working model of the new society.

The smallest unit of that model is the small affinity group. Much as a single cell contains the chromosomes detailing the larger animal, so must our group contain the spirit and attitudes of freedom which we wish to live with should our oppressors be overthrown.

It has become fashionable among authoritarian (if not anarchist) revolutionaries to name their organisations after various fallen or imprisoned comrades, or with officious titles representing their political aspirations. Essentially, this is a propaganda function, as they usually seek representation in the news media and their name is their game, so to speak. Anarchists also tend towards this inflated image game, and hopefully will return to the policies of the thirties and forties of naming groups after their locality, such as the "Brussels Group."

While propaganda remains a vital function of anarchist praxis it should never be allowed to become the driving force behind armed action. If some distinctive name is irresistible, keep in mind that people will associate your actions and your ideology with the name you present to the world, (or that the press presents for you). The state will make every effort to reduce your image, and therefore your status and ideology to the level of criminal against society. An ominous name only assists them in that effort.

The size of the affinity group is crucial. Too small and you will be unable to mount actions above a certain military capability, too large and logistics and communication, coupled (as it always is) with leadership and "command" conflicts will present crippling effectiveness problems. To state that the group must work blindly, without guides, in a search for maximum group effectiveness may be trite, but it is, nevertheless, the truth.

It is better to be too large than too small. Optimum size is attained through teamwork - "From the Bottom Up". When the communications problems become a liability to security it is time to form two groups.

The basic group can be termed the Fire Team. The number of members may be as small as five or as large as ten or so. Better to have two fire teams of six each than one of twelve. Under poor circumstances, a fire team may be composed of all inexperienced fighters, armed with whatever weapons may be obtained. Under better conditions, the fire team may be led by an elected delegate, green comrades teamed with old-timers, and a high degree of weapons standardisation attained.

For purposes of this discussion, groups of fire teams may be termed Bands. The terms used hardly matter. The military call groups of fire teams "platoons" and groups of "platoons" "companies." The CNTers were organised into "centuries" (of 100 persons in each) during the Spanish Civil War. Actually it isn't too smart to betray the numbers of people per unit by designating the unit with a numerical label (such

as Dozen, Century or a true use of military unit names). If the government has any intelligence planted within the organisation, they will know, or find out eventually, but why give them any help?


Whatever titles one chooses to designate revolutionary units by, it will not carry the same connotation that that title (or its counterpart in the military) carries in an authoritarian military or para-military organisation. In an authoritarian military structure, legitimate authority flows from the top down. In the U.S., the President is the Commander of the Armed Forces. This is chain of command. It only works as long as the chain is not broken. Once all the officers of a unit are killed, the enlisted men are supposed to follow the Non-Commissioned Officers in order of rank, or if no one is left but privates, in order of time-in-grade. In practice, if the fighting is heavy enough to dust all the officers, the private or corporal follows whoever seems to be the most capable of leading the unit out of the kill zone. Later, if anyone manages to get out at all, the "commander" is selected from amongst the survivors. During WWII, often units fought for days or even months with an enlisted man as "Company commander." Wherever a unit is operating beyond the direct control of superiors, such as the SEALs, Commandos or Recon, the unit usually holds rank in little regard and instead follows whoever is most knowledgeable in a particular aspect of the operation. The unit commander is almost a figurehead.

These units deal in unconventional warfare. Thus their unorthodox structure and mode of working. Units deployed for conventional warfare, however are loaded down with a command structure that boggles the mind. Every detail must be covered by a command directive or it doesn't get done. Traditional military commanders control every stage of a developing military engagement save one - as the troops actually engage the enemy, command goes to the platoon leader, and the PL may alter the battle plan at that point as he deems necessary. Circumstances often require extreme deviation from the "game plan," but PLs are protected from censure because command control was turned over to them. In the event the platoon leader is killed or severely wounded, the chain of command goes into it's authority changes. If a squad or fire team loses contact with the command chain, they simply follow whatever orders they were issued before they lost contact, but in practice this is only a token gesture, and usually they do whatever the squad or fire team leader thinks is appropriate under the extant circumstances they find themselves in. Successful completion of orders in extreme circumstances without command supervision is highly valued in the military.

Conventional military commanders utilising a semi-autonomous strike force, such as the Royal Marines, Commandos or U.S. Marine Recon have often unofficially allowed subordinates to dispense with most of the petty regulations (saluting etc.) to effect a close working relationship between officers and their men. In some instances, non-coms and corporals were all but elected by whatever group they were in command of. The corporals and sergeants being the actual leaders in combat, it helped immeasurably for their troops to believe they had been allowed to select the NCO among them best suited for the job.

Libertarian military structures operate in reverse of

The last phase of resistance: the general uprising



Neighbouring countries, sympathetic to the resistance, might provide support such as the supply of weapons and ammunition as well as allowing personnel from the guerrilla to pass through their zone.

During the phase of 'open uprising' the civilian resistance will serve as the stationary, local fighting units whereas the guerrilla will constitute the mobile fighting units.

The population should attempt to block the security forces' routes of communication and routes of access/withdrawal whilst the mobile guerrilla units defeat them in open fighting.

The maximum use has to be made of the terrain. Uprisings should be concentrated in the large towns and cities which are more difficult for the security forces to suppress. By using the most of the terrain, the guerrilla movement will ensure that the security forces cannot use its maximum force.

Tactics: City maps should be obtained for all units. Important intersections should be covered by personnel who have rented nearby apartments or shops.

Church steeples and high buildings should be checked for their use as observation sites. Prepare and camouflage such

sites. For instance, internal resistance telephone links can be installed. Weapons racks should be installed at the appropriate heights in buildings of strategic importance.

During an uprising, the occupation of all buildings will not be essential. Strong points at the most important junctions, bridges, train stations, airports and fuel depots should be established.

Weapons and ammunition: at strong points should be concentrated all machine guns, molotov cocktails, explosives and mines for anti-tank defence, approximately one fifth of ammunition available and approximately one fifth of hand grenades.

Raiding parties should possess the majority of sub-machine guns and machine pistols, rocket launchers, approximately one fifth of available ammunition, three fifths of hand grenades.

The main reserve force should have all captured vehicles, weapons, etc., approximately three fifths of all ammunition and one fifth of grenades.

Consolidation of strong points: wire mesh should be stretched over the windows of buildings used as strong points to deflect hand grenades and gas cannisters.

political situation. This news should be spread and behaviour for the immediate future agreed upon. Non-political prisoners should not be shunned but care should be taken to ensure that they are not informers.

Organise some form of aid service. This is more of a psychological problem so that the absence of medical equipment isn't so important. If there is no equipment available and the sick are not being treated then the following can be useful:

In the summertime give the sick the coolest place; in winter the warmest place in the prison;

Food and water which has been saved by those in good health;

Give them something to smoke;

Cool the sick with wet cloths or give them additional blankets from those in better physical condition;

Assign them the lightest duties if sick individuals have to work;

Generally take care of them.

There is usually someone with some sort of medical experience who can give guidance on the best remedies.

Guards will consist of two types, the sadists and those who go along with everything because they have no option. Prisoners must take advantage of this. Drive a moral wedge between the two types of guard. Find out who is reasonable and talk to them, preferably during work. Never talk to a group of guards.

Groups are always more aggressive than individuals. In a group, the individual is first 'a member of an organisation' and then only a 'human being.' As an individual the guard is more amenable to conversation.

Action by civilians

Although the civilian resistance acts mainly as an urban rear-guard providing logistical support, new personnel and an information system - for the guerrilla movement itself it will sometimes have to carry out specific actions. These might be to free an imprisoned member of the guerrilla unit, to free hostages, capture files or destroy key industrial installations and transportation facilities.

All participants in the action who are employed should have a valid reason for staying off work with a suitable document from a doctor (who will probably also be part of the civilian resistance).


In a larger city the sewage system should be prepared as a hiding place should things go wrong. It should be stocked with food, drink, first air equipment, clothes, ammunition, maps etc.

A detailed reconnaissance of the area should be carried out, and routes of withdrawal prepared.

Fire support elements should take over houses neighbouring the target. For this, apartments and shops may have to be rented. If necessary, fire support elements may have to occupy these places several days before the action and live there.

Disassembled machine guns, machine pistols, rifles, pistols, hand grenades and ammunition can be transported to the selected positions in briefcases, tool boxes or suitcases.


With the start of the action, block traffic routes by simulating a traffic accident or road-works so that the escape vehicle has a safe route. Plans for withdrawal will also have to take



Withdrawal from target

account of any possible failure. Routes of withdrawal should be covered by resistance personnel. The ensuing security force reaction will undoubtedly be a long one with numerous searches and arrests. Resistance members must be prepared for this.

To protect the driver of the escape vehicle the back of the driver's seat should be covered with armour - a steel plate about 10mm thick will suffice.



Raid on a fixed target

authoritarian military structures. Libertarian authority comes from the rank and file, to the delegated combat leaders. Without this facet of anarchist combat organisation, it would be impossible for small numbers of combatants to effect the losses they

do on the more cumbersome, unmotivated regular soldier. Technical proficiency is of utmost importance here, because guerrillas must be not only more dedicated and more motivated than their adversaries, they must also be more proficient at the job. Anything less is unacceptable.

Fundamentals of combat operations

Military tactics are moves and plays the military unit uses to carry out warfare. They have been changed and adapted sometimes revolutionised, by changes and advances in technology, social structure, and political philosophy. Military tacticians over the ages have tried to set these basics down into a set of "rules". Some of these "rules" have remained constant for years, some have been long forgotten. The major points have been refined and they are known as the 'Principles of War.'

No matter what mode or style of warfare is being waged, these functions are being considered. They are modified, different for libertarian social organisation than for authoritarian social organisation, but they still must be considered.

In addition to the Principles of War, one should study the Functions of Land Combat. For a detailed, if somewhat antiquated study of both of these, the writer recommends Clausewitz. He is, if not the first, certainly, one of the best produced by western society. He is an authoritarian deluxe, but he is, nevertheless, one of the most brilliant military tacticians.

The Principles of War include the major factors whose proper application is essential to the exercise of combat authority and successful conduct of warfare. They are: Objective Offensive Mass Economy of Force Manoeuvre Unity of Command Security Surprise Simplicity.

This discussion will be an extremely cursory treatment of each of these. A more detailed study is highly recommended.

Objective

A clear objective, whether physical or figurative, is necessary for any effective planning of action. For anarchists, the ability to rapidly make a group decision (especially under stress) is crucial. A target must be chosen, and the reasons for the decision must be clearly understood by all. This is much more difficult than it sounds. The objective must be chosen for its suitability to the groups' capability and its value to the struggle.

Offensive

Guerrilla forces must only attack when they can achieve their objective and get away. Suicide attacks are the admission of defeat. When the unit is on the offensive, its fighters must be resolute and confident. Such a force attacking the correct objective will cause many more casualties than it will receive. Guerrilla groups should always suffer less than 10% dead or wounded when they do not violate the principles governing their conduct of warfare. The unforeseen circumstance that causes 50% casualties comes from a serious mistake in the first function of combat - intelligence. A guerrilla unit which is forced onto the defensive will immediately begin to receive casualties.

Mass

Always concentrate the main body of your attack on one spot. Diversions are used to draw the enemy away from the main force, never as an auxiliary attack on a different objective. Diversions are only that. If you allow your force to be split by the enemy you will have broken three principles - economy of force, unity of command, and mass.

Economy of force

Don't use more force than is necessary for an attack. Ammunition will be wasted, combatants that could be held in reserve will be tired, lives and supplies and vehicles will be unnecessarily jeopardised. On the other hand, if you attack with a force unequal to the task, there is a great risk to lives and material.

Manoeuvre

Many battles and wars have been won by a smaller, weaker force which out-manoeuvred a stronger enemy, placing the enemy in such jeopardy that a surrender, rather than a slaughter, was effected. Basic military manoeuvres include penetration, envelopment, double envelopment, encirclement and (the "Banzai charge") frontal attack. Generally, the more crude the manoeuvre, the more costly in lives. Frontal attack is to be strictly avoided in most instances. The classic military manoeuvre is the double envelopment (outflanking the enemy on both sides of his position) exposing him to "enfilade" or "Flanking Fire" from two directions. Manoeuvre is the crucial aspect of guerrilla warfare, as one is bound to be outgunned and outnumbered if one tarries too long. Good communications and sound operational planning beforehand are an absolute necessity. Speed is of the essence, and an unfit guerrilla will soon be a dead guerrilla.

Unity of command

Anarchists are likely to balk at this one. "Command" of a military force by a committee is not advisable. People engaged in armed combat have little time for a summit meeting. Delegated commanders selected from the ranks must agree beforehand on tactics and choose the best qualified among them to assume command.

However temporary, there must be unity of command during the engagement and withdrawal. Every combatant should be clearly aware of his or her role during the engagement, and agree to carry out the necessary actions to bring it to completion. To achieve unity of command, radio communications is a very valuable tool. Strategic unity of command had entirely different implications. It affects regional or national operations, and is something beyond the scope of this work, as it involves the ultimate goals of all the anarchists over a wide-spread area. Tactical unity of command must be effected while a particular group (or groups) is engaged, and pertains to the immediate situation.

Security

In an anarchist group, security has a special meaning. Obviously, an anarchist group must maintain a certain degree of clandestine operations just to survive. However, if we dispense with the formal authoritarian chain of command, then the need-to-know credo must be altered. Can every member of X group be trusted to keep security? If recruitment is being carried out directly within a working group (an extremely unadvisable idea) the answer is no. There is the question of informers, of course, but more relevant in the light of the disclosure of recent police practices is the possibility of arrest and torture. In addition to the danger of simple arrest and imprisonment is the possibility of ambush or traps.

The authoritarian mode is "Don't tell the troops anything, and they'll have nothing to confess," but a philosophy of freedom demands higher standards of personal responsibility than one of totalitarianism. We must face up to the fact that this issue confronts us with a serious dilemma and we must never lose sight of the matter.

Surprise

Surprise is the essential ingredient to success in guerrilla warfare. It is solely a product of the right offensive plan being teamed with security and good intelligence. If one lacks surprise, one lacks everything. The main defence of the group (that is the safety with which it operates) lives in the fact that we have no static position against which the mighty weapons of the state can be brought to bear. However, if the state can be sure we will be somewhere at a certain time, on a certain date, we might as well be sitting in a foxhole somewhere, waiting for a bomb to fall on us.

If we lack surprise, we lack the sole advantage of the guerrilla for we are weaker in numbers and material.

Simplicity

The operational plan for a particular action should be as simple as possible. In combat, under fire, communications may break down. Leaders may be wounded or killed, the plan may be delayed or disrupted. The action stands a better chance of being brought to a successful completion if there are

The functions of land combat

The "Functions of Land Combat" pertain to the actual application of combat power. They are not unbreakable rules but handy categories for arranging information. They include: 1) Intelligence; 2) Mobility; 3) Firepower

Intelligence

In a small group, every member may be responsible for intelligence functions, supply and so on. This is a question for the group itself. Generally, it is unwise for one person to know all aspects of the groups' operation, for if each person only knows a certain amount he or she can only betray a certain amount.

In larger groups, intelligence functions may be designated to comrades in a position to accomplish these tasks easily (such as a police typist or clerical worker, collection agency or security and patrol company) or by comrades who hold some other special position in the community which makes inquiries acceptable. New recruits and all original members of the group should be investigated thoroughly. If someone objects to a background investigation it is really unlikely that they may be trusted, and should not be allowed any further contact with the group directly. It would be wise to watch them in the community, however, and attempt to ascertain whether or not they are a police agent. Any unexplained period in the history of a potential recruit should be carefully examined, as well as military service, alleged prison time or hospital stays. Identification is easily manufactured by the state authorities, as well as life histories and references. Be especially wary of anyone with an unaccounted for or unusual income or anyone who takes regular absences from the group for a repeated number of days. Several infiltration agents in the U.S. were caught when they began disappearing at weekends to visit their families.

False identification that will pass inspection by a casual police check should be obtained for every member of the group, especially those who are involved in the purchase of munitions, rental of hotel or housing accommodations, or generally any activity that could compromise their identity to the police.

Several methods for obtaining ID are:

Theft - stolen ID is the most reliable; assuming the person from whom it was stolen isn't a criminal to begin with. Never use stolen credit cards or cheques, as this sets into motion a methodical records check which can go on for months, and could result in the arrest of a comrade using that ID for something unrelated to the essential struggle. The Angry Brigade in Britain made this mistake and were consequently arrested and imprisoned.*

Fake Birth Certificate - although this method is getting more and more difficult, it is still possible to look up a death in old obituary columns and request a copy of the deceased person's birth certificate. Select a person who was born within a few years of yourself. Armed with the certificate you may now obtain a drivers' licence, a Social Security card, a bank account and other good identifications. Voter registration receipts are good proof of "solid citizenship."

Manufacture - this requires a good deal of proficiency in photography and printing, but is quicker to obtain, once the routine has been established, than either stolen or falsified ID. Totally forged ID, from the right craftsman, can actually be better than state-issued ID. One group in New York used a Polaroid camera and a large reproduction of the drivers' licence form to scale peoples' photos to size. They then typed in the information and sealed the photo in plastic. It looks nearly identical to the New York State drivers' licence. Write to Eden Press, PO Box 8410, Fountain Valley, CA 92708, for details on identification manufacture.

Written records should never be kept. The most incriminating evidence possible in court is a diary in the defendant's own hand. Never allow anyone to record operations in photographs on tape or any other mechanical means. If financial records are absolutely necessary, blend them with some legitimate business enterprise to make them more difficult to recognise. Any legal purchases of arms or ammunition should be done in a manner

* Source of funds. More urban guerrillas have been caught by fraud investigations than as a result of offensive actions.

fewer things to remember. There are, obviously, fewer things to go wrong, fewer mistakes to be made with a less complicated plan. That does not mean every conceivable problem should not be considered and discussed, but the plan itself should be kept simple. As the group becomes more experienced, and has better training, weapons, etc. more complicated plans may be introduced.

that conceals their eventual use, either through the use of aliases or the use of a "blind," a person who buys the items for a fee, without knowing where they are going to.

Safe houses, arsenals and communication methods should be kept strictly secure. Meetings, conferences and operational planning sessions should be held under strict security also. Do not leave a pattern when meetings are scheduled or where they are held. Once operations begin, it is wise to avoid gathering more than two or three members in one spot at any one time, except for actual operations.

Mobility

Mobility is a key aspect of guerrilla warfare. Group members should be trained in basic automobile and truck (lorry) mechanics. Simple repairs and adequate driving skills are a must for every member. Advanced driving skills under stress, as well as diesel and gasoline "semi-"drivers should be sought for comrades employed as transport drivers. Drivers should always have appropriate forged licences for the vehicles they are operating. A network of safe houses, sympathisers and contacts in other cities and countries should be maintained and nurtured to enable the safe transport of wanted fugitives across country and international borders if need be. Transport vehicles designed to conceal heavier weapons, such as light machine-guns (LMG), mortars or rocket launchers (RPG) should be available if such material is likely to be transported. Explosives should never be transported on public conveyances such as buses or trains. The risk of an explosion in a crowded or populated area is to be avoided with determined vigilance. Auto transport should be stolen, either taken at gunpoint shortly before the action, or lifted off the street at the most likely opportunity. A vehicle with the keys still in it is best, but a hot-wired vehicle will suffice. Early model cars can usually be hot-wired under the dash with little more than a pair of wire cutters as tools. Late model cars with the steering lock may be expropriated with the use of a heavy hammer to knock the keyway off the steering column and the insertion of a large screwdriver into the resulting aperture to manipulate the starter switch. With police ability to check any vehicle in less than 30 seconds through the computer a "legal" vehicle should always be used where possible. Also motor bikes are a useful alternative.

Mobility is the key to survival in urban guerrilla warfare. If the police can successfully inhibit your ability to move from place to place, they can, by selective search, eventually narrow down the area which you are in. In any case, it is not a good idea to "hole up" in one spot. In light of the fact that in a static offence-defence situation the Government will always win through greater firepower and numbers, we must avoid such a situation at all costs, or face capture or death.

The other side of this coin is the group that operates with such effective security that they may carry on perfectly normal lives in the daylight and operate as guerrillas during part of the night. With proper concealment of weapons these comrades will be safe in event of such a search, provided their identities are unknown to the police. Obviously these comrades must avoid any contacts with what may be termed the "above ground" radical movement or organisation. They must remain absolutely above suspicion.


Mobility and morale are both affected by sustained casualties. Transporting a wounded comrade is a reality which every guerrilla should be prepared to handle. No casualty should be left behind unless it is clear they are dead or dying and extraction means certain capture or death for any rescue party. Comrades should train themselves in combat first-aid (first-aid or wounds caused by bullets differs substantially from the standard broken-leg variety) and practice their technique often. The formula to keep in mind is "Stop the Bleeding, Restore the Breathing, Bandage the Wound, Treat for Shock." Survival of the group and success of the operation take priority over evacuation of casualties. Do not abort the operation and withdraw unless the group receives casualties (that could survive) in excess of 40% of the combatants. Any reserves that could be committed should be if their assistance could give the original party enough grace to accomplish the mission and withdraw with the wounded. If the original objective

Communications

It is essential to develop a communications system. Clandestine radio transmitters can be used if the logistics of the resistance are sufficiently sophisticated. It is safer to use some form of code. Never use the radios during a tactical situation. The monitoring of radio transmissions is a relatively simple procedure and needs a fraction of the number of personnel needed to intercept a courier network.

The use of public telephones can be hazardous. Never use the same phone box repeatedly. If possible, use a phone with another directly beside it so that when expecting a call at a pre-arranged time there is always an alternative for the caller if the phone is being used by someone else.

Couriers should be given some suitable purpose for their travels to avoid suspicion. For instance, when travelling in rural areas they can masquerade as travelling salespeople or as vets. In urban areas they can be collectors for gas and electric companies, van drivers, employees of the post etc.




It is important that the courier who has to be exposed during the operation should know nothing of the sender and receiver of the message. Some person will have to act between them.

Members of the security forces who have infiltrated the resistance, if they have been discovered, can be neutralised by passing on false information. But if the security forces recruit someone who is already within the resistance then it is practically impossible, except by chance, to discover them. Their role as provocateur will not be restricted to the purely verbal but will undoubtedly extend to help with logistics. The stage where the security forces provide the resistance with weapons has already been reached in certain conflicts.

Behaviour during interrogation

If knocked down by a number of security force personnel during interrogation don't remain in their midst. This way

Security of clandestine radio station



they can all strike at the same time. Attempt to reach a corner of the room where only a couple can be effective.

Don't attempt to remain upright as long as possible. Play the role of 'dead' or 'injured'. Fall onto the floor and roll on to your stomach. In this position kicking and clubbing cause less damage. Also attempt to pull in your chin and attempt to protect the kidneys by pulling in your elbows.

Always answer in a vague and indeterminate way. Say as little as possible. Deny and refute everything, even when the accusations can be proven. Avoid mentioning names. If you are an enemy of the security forces then anyone you name automatically becomes one too. Shouting, threats and mistreatment are all methods used during interrogation. Members of the resistance must realise and accept this. Do not be deceived by the 'friendly' approach. This is only a technique to throw you off your guard - their true face will be revealed soon enough.

Behaviour in prison

Take care of new arrivals. They are naturally more demoralised. Instruct new arrivals on the general prison conditions and appropriate behaviour. If they are left alone their will to resist will collapse. This, of course, is the intention of the security forces. Experienced inmates should therefore take preventive measures. The feeling of a sense of solidarity is most important.

Establish 'package groups' in which each member will put their package at the disposal of the group. Even those who are most isolated will then share in tobacco and food and perhaps even clothing.

News will filter through from the outside about the general

Operation of security force terror

When the appeal of ideology fails to convert the mass of people the security services will use terror to instill fear. Terror is used to force the civilian population to stop providing personnel to the guerrilla units and to remain inactive in the resistance movement.

The following will all be part of a careful plan of terror: surveillance of telephone and mail, arbitrary arrests, prison sentences out of all proportion to the charges, brutalisation and torture of detainees, and the careful and premeditated murder of selected members of the population or arbitrary killing. Members of organisations sympathetic to the resistance will either be imprisoned, murdered or they will simply disappear. It is increasingly common today for opponents of unjust systems of control to commit 'suicide' whilst imprisoned.

Methods of torture vary throughout the world. In some countries it is unsophisticated, consisting of beatings, deprivation of food and drink, lack of sleep and electric shock treatment. Other systems have evolved more sophisticated, less obviously inhumane forms of torture such as hooding and noise techniques and extra-sensory deprivation with the use of white cells and prison furniture, segregation units and other forms of psychological torture. This latter system is much more effective in reducing the resistance of those imprisoned

Activities of the civilian resistance movement

Hiding weapons & explosives

The best method of concealing munitions is by burying them. Weapons have to be protected from damage due to humidity. Ensure that the weapon is completely dry before covering it with a heavy layer of grease. Close off the muzzle by means of a stopper made of grease or wax. Wrap a rag soaked in oil round the bolt. Wrap the entire weapon in a large cloth. Tie the cloth securely. Place the weapon in a wooden box. Cover the joints of the box with wax and wind a piece of tar paper round the box. Bury the box in a dry building, preferably in the cellar of a safe house. Check, clean and grease the weapon about once every two or three months. Individual packages of ammunition should be wrapped in about ten layers of newspaper. Place the package in a wooden box which has about 5 cms. of dry sawdust at the bottom. Close and wrap the box in the same way as for the weapons container. Ammunition is particularly sensitive to humidity. As a result, therefore, change the newspaper and sawdust about once every two months and air the ammunition for a while.

Illegal printing

Individuals can produce several hundred copies of leaflets with typewriter and roneo duplicator. This equipment is small enough to be inconspicuous and can be easily hidden. The advantages of this type of operation is that the raw materials needed, the ink and paper, are easily obtained. There is relatively little noise during printing. By working alone the individual is relatively secure. Circulation will necessarily be small but with a number of individuals working together this disadvantage can be circumvented. The arrest of one will not compromise the others.

Larger machines, however, will be more difficult to hide because of the nature of the process involved, silence will not always be maintained. But there are advantages. A large circulation can be effected in a short space of time. Publication will not be restricted to a single sheet.

Security will be more difficult as several people will have to be brought into the operation. The quantities of paper, ink, type (if used) and photographic equipment will not be easily obtained.

After production, it is important that all evidence should be disposed of. Carbons should be thoroughly burned as should stencils, rough-drafts and manuscripts. Ashes should be stirred because they can still be read in such a condition.

In the design of material, it should be noted that anyone whose style of work is recognisable should only be used in the early stages, such as in the supply of ideas and rough copies. Another unknown individual should prepare the master copy whether it be a drawing or a piece of writing.

The manufacture and distribution is of primary importance during any period of resistance. With censorship of the radio, television and the press a steady supply of counter information

and can always be backed up by appeals to 'legal' necessity. A recent report has mentioned the use of taquiflaxin, a derivative of curare combined with sodium pentothal. After an initial session of beatings and electric shocks the prisoner is hooded and subjected to 'white noise' which induces a nightmare world of hallucinations. Taquiflaxin is then injected intravenously, with immediate effect. Muscles start to contract from head to foot until paralysis is total. Respiration grows weaker until only an imperceptible movement of the diaphragm indicates life. Throughout this the prisoner remains fully conscious. The life of the prisoner depends on the application of oxygen, which takes ten minutes to work. After this, the injection of tiny doses of sodium pentothal as a sedative reduce conscious defences sufficiently for a speedy and simple interrogation.

In such a way the security forces can extract information simply and efficiently, with the addition that the prisoner who has been forced to undergo such treatment usually also suffers heart attacks, epileptic fits, paralysis and mental disturbances.

The security forces usually work outside the accepted legal structures. Their creation leads to the development of a state within a state where the boundaries of responsibility are sufficiently unclear for there to be no sense of restriction of action. The use of terror then begins to evolve a dynamic of its own.

Security of safe houses

is invaluable. The lies and distortions of the security forces have to be countered with the objectively related truth.

Propaganda

Leaflets should not be distributed to individuals on the street for obvious reasons. Instead, they should be spread via house post boxes by someone wearing postal uniform. They can be left on rooftops to blow away randomly or spread, as in one celebrated case, with the use of a mortar.

Newspapers which have to appear clandestinely should be passed on from one friend to another. Contents can be reproduced on a duplicator to be spread even further.

Graffiti is the most direct form of communication. And, if the right materials are used, very difficult to erase except by over-painting. Appearing night after night, graffiti can be a very effective morale booster.

Concomitantly, the poster communications of the security forces (such as wanted notices) should be removed and destroyed as quickly as possible. Humorously defacing the propaganda of the security forces can be as useful as destroying it outright.

Security of safe houses

Indication must be provided which allows those who know the location of a safe house and who wish to visit it to know that it is still 'safe.' Design a system of simple signs.

No one member of the resistance should know the location of all the safe houses. If possible, no written material should be kept there and if it is designed on the lines of the Uruguayan Tupamaros - a house within a house - then food and water should be stored so that activists can hide for days.

Conferences, or gatherings of a number of individuals from the resistance should not be staged in houses which are isolated - these can be easily surrounded and isolated. Use instead one amongst a row of houses where the conditions will be more difficult and time-consuming for the security services.

Rules for walking on the street or using public transport and services are simple. The important thing is to be inconspicuous and to act as any other member of the community. Make sure that your house is not being watched and that you are not being followed as you walk or travel. Here it should be noted that shortish hair and conservative clothing attract less attention. Security services in the past have allowed members of resistance groups to escape, despite the fact that they were under surveillance, because their physical appearance was too 'respectable' for a member of such a group.

When gathered at a meeting, it must be decided beforehand what response to adopt if there is a raid. There must be predesignated escape routes.

cannot be accomplished in any case, the reserves should only be committed to protect the retreat, such as harrassing actions on the pursuit or a diversion, such as triggering an explosion in the wake of the withdrawal. To commit the reserves to direct combat in the case of an aborted mission is unjustified jeopardisation of fighters and equipment.

Abandoning a wounded comrade is a serious action. The act of leaving one's comrades is demoralising in itself, but there is the additional consideration of the wounded comrade being murdered on the spot by police, or his evacuation to a hospital being delayed until he expires, or his being tortured for information either promptly after his capture or later, after his transfer to a jail or prison.

Comrades sustaining massive head wounds, chest wounds involving the respiratory system or abdominal wounds of any type are unlikely to survive more than an hour or two without surgery. Shock resulting from head or abdominal wounds is likely to be severe. Shock kills more often than the effects of the wound itself. Treatment for shock includes (once the bleeding has been stopped and breathing assured) elevating the feet (in the instance of a head wound, elevate the head and upper torso) and covering with a blanket or some other clothing, and reassuring the victim. The environment conducive to lessening shock is unlikely to be found at the site of a guerrilla operation, so evacuate the wounded at the earliest possible moment. Decisions to transport wounded should be made with the following things in mind:

- 1) Is the comrade conscious?
- 2) Can the comrade walk? With assistance?
- 3) Are the wounds superficial or grossly traumatic?
- 4) Is the comrade in great pain or likely to be before a physician can be obtained?
- 5) Is the comrade more likely to survive being evacuated or being left at the scene?

Comrades sustaining any injury to the spine are best left unmoved, as any movement to an injured spine is certain to result in paralysis if the original wound has not already caused it. The idea of sustained casualties should be in everyones mind during operational planning. It is very likely that we will receive casualties. The question is will the group be able to maintain combat status in spite of them. If the possibility of being wounded with no aid available bothers comrades to the extent their morale, and thus their combat effectiveness is substantially reduced, then obviously some steps must be taken to provide that aid.

Firepower

Firepower determines to a great degree the combat capabilities and effectiveness of a guerrilla force. The securing of adequate arms and ammunition, and the correct training in the use of and application of those weapons is what the rest of our organising and planning leads up to and culminates in. Logistics and supply supports combat application.

What we desire and plan for and what is actually accomplished are often two different things. We must set goals and attempt to meet them. We cannot always do so, but the attempt will make our overall accomplishment better. Some basics to consider in arming ourselves are:

1) Standardise all calibres and styles of weapons. This means that each group tries to obtain weapons that fire the exact same calibre ammunition for each weapon type. Example: all pistols to fire .45 ACP, all carbines to be US .30 M1 calibre,

all rifles to fire 7.62 NAT^o, all shotguns to fire 12 gauge. In actual practice this may be difficult to arrange, especially where arms are scarce or illegal. But, given a choice, obtain weapons that meet your standardisation formula.

2) Use Large Calibre Handguns.

Tactically, small calibre handguns are inferior to large calibre handguns. Small calibre weapons do not have the traumatic effect that large calibre weapons do. .32ACP is about the smallest acceptable calibre for military purposes. Some handgun calibres (in order of desirability) are: .45 ACP (11.25 mm), .38 Special or 357 Magnum, 9mm Parabellum, also for use on sub-machine guns, 9mm Kurz (9mm short or .380), .32 ACP (7.65mm). Weapons chambered for hard to obtain calibres or antique weapons are to be strictly avoided.

3) Adapt Sporting and Legal Arms for Guerrilla Warfare.

Legally obtainable arms should be purchased first. Many sporting arms may be adapted to suit guerrilla needs. Barrels may be shortened, stocks cut down, carrying straps added to enable concealment under clothing. The US .30 M1 carbine is particularly suitable for this type of adaption. The sear and disconnector in most semi-automatic self-loading weapons may be altered to convert them to full-automatic sub-machine guns or SMG. Sporting versions of many assault (or "automatic") rifles may be altered similarly to convert them to full-auto assault rifles (AR). Copies of military weapons for commercial civilian sales usually accept the larger capacity military magazine. Conversion is not simply a matter of filing off the sear of the weapon. Usually the sear and disconnector work in concert to provide a specific rate of fire for the weapons design, and delay of the cartridges' ignition must be provided for until the action is securely locked to insure safety in operation. In addition to that, filing the sear may result in a "runaway" gun, which cannot be stopped until it jams or exhausts its ammunition supply.

4) Obtain Military Arms or Manufacture Your Own Weapons.

Try to buy them first. If legal arms and ammunition are unavailable, then either underground purchase or theft of military weapons and use them to obtain more weapons has always been a major feature of resistance movements.

The military capability of the group may be insufficient to mount a raid on a police arsenal or army outpost or vehicle so manufacture is the more likely source for adequate weapons supply. The most simple repeating weapon is the blow-back sub-machine gun. Design and manufacture of this weapon has been effected by resistance movements in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Russia, Germany and China during the Second World War. In more modern times workshop-made weapons based on the British Sten gun have been produced in Indonesia, Vietnam, Northern Ireland and various other countries where rural and urban guerrilla war has been waged. Over two million British Stens were manufactured in 9mm, during the war. Quite a few are still available in Europe.

I recommend two books, "Improvised Weapons of the American Underground" by Desert Publications, P.O. Box 22005, Phoenix, AZ 85028 and "Home Workshop Guns for Defence and Resistance" by Bill Holmes, Paladin Press, Box 1307, Boulder, Colorado. Both of these include exact detailed plans for manufacture.

"Improvised Weapons" has plans for a .45 calibre gun patterned after the Sten somewhat. "Home Workshop Guns" has plans for a 9mm version of the Sten design, modelled after the US M&A1 "grease gun." Of the two, Holmes' book is the superior, but the Desert Publications book has merit and should be read.

Part 2: Organisation and conduct of guerrilla warfare

Purpose

The purpose of guerrilla warfare is to continue resistance in the cities and in the countryside following the takeover of a country by an enemy occupying force, or following the breakdown of consensus politics with a corresponding increase in the repressive powers of the State and the criminalisation of the anti-authoritarian opposition.

Guerrilla detachments cause fear and confusion behind enemy lines; force the enemy to initiate complicated security measures thus wasting his strength and inflict losses on both personnel and material.

Those areas occupied by the guerrilla units must be pushed into a state of constant unrest so that none of the security forces may move about freely.

The final phase will be a general, open insurrection. Specific targets will be:

1. Transportation routes (roads and railway lines)
2. Communications (telephone lines above and below ground, telephone, radio and television stations).
3. Power systems (electricity generating stations, coal depots, nuclear sites).
4. Vital industrial plants.
5. Repair shops and depots.
6. Headquarters and bases of the security forces.
7. Transportation convoys.
8. Couriers, messengers and liaison officers.

During conventional warfare opposing forces are supplied by the factories, warehouses and supply depots; guerrilla units, however, live on the war.

Every guerrilla unit has an incomparably larger amount of autonomy and freedom of action than it would have as a component of a standing army during a conventional war.

Organisation

Formation

Without the support of the civilian population, guerrilla warfare will in the long run fail.


The security forces will not initially commit their strongest and best prepared units against early guerrilla actions. Rather, they will tend to underestimate the calibre of the guerrilla units partially compensating for weaknesses at the beginning of the resistance. However, with the growth of the guerrilla resistance the security forces will prepare specialist groups trained in anti-subversive tactics. Witness the numerous AID programmes initiated in South America during the sixties by the United States to train local security forces in counter-insurgency strategy.

The idea behind guerrilla warfare is to conduct local

resistance operations, particularly sabotage and counter-propaganda. At the same time, it is necessary to create certain liberated areas held by mobile guerrilla units. However, these areas are not to be held rigidly. They will be changed constantly in accordance with the foremost rule of guerrilla warfare which states that "no terrain is held permanently."

As a rule, liberated areas can only be held for a few weeks or months, until the security forces have concentrated sufficient troops to initiate large-scale counter-guerrilla operations.

By means of continuous small-scale operations the security forces will be scattered and the organisation and development of the mobile guerrilla units protected.



Part 3: Organisation and operation of the civilian resistance movement

Organisation

Functions of the civilian resistance

- 1) Collect and conceal weapons and explosives for use by the guerrilla movement and for when an open insurrection can be staged.
- 2) Develop an intelligence system which will assist guerrilla units.
- 3) Publication of an underground newspaper, posters and the printing of all communications from the guerrilla.
- 4) The broadcast of propaganda over illegal radio stations.
- 5) Establishment of a network of safe-houses and an efficient escape route.
- 6) Production of counterfeit money and forged identification.
- 7) Organise sabotage and the assassination of torturers.
- 8) Organise civilian fighting units for the future insurrection.

Recruitment

Not everyone is suitable for active participation in the resistance movement. Selection will have to be careful for the success of the guerrilla campaign will ultimately be dependent upon careful selection.


The security forces, if they are aware of such a resistance, will waste no time in selecting their own recruits to infiltrate the resistance itself. There are numerous examples throughout history of guerrilla warfare which testify to the profoundly debilitating effects such infiltration has.


Careful screening will be necessary, although this is not always going to be foolproof. Recruitment should come, therefore, from sources which are trustworthy. Friendship and affinity ties can be used, organisations sympathetic to the aims of the resistance can be approached and fronts can be set up to attract potential recruits.

Activity

Funds for the emergent guerrilla movement and the civilian resistance will be one of the first concerns. Actions to provide funds will necessarily have to be undertaken whilst activists are not fully trained and (generally) inexperienced. They are, however, unavoidable and losses at this stage must be expected. Bank and similar raids can be supplemented by the counterfeiting of money to provide for the first elements who go underground.

Either during the initial organising phase or when there are sufficient funds, a reliable printer must be found with the right equipment to provide such things as forged passports, IDs, driving licenses and other similar information. Here, it is important that members of the guerrilla unit themselves do not deal with such matters; liaison personnel from the civilian resistance should handle all communication.





If you can't sneak or break through encirclement, occupy well-camouflaged hideouts. Divide unit into groups of 3-4 people. Each group hides on its own in its own area, reducing the possibility of whole group being caught. Each group leader camouflages his/her group then conceals her/himself, possibly by climbing a tree.

Camouflage cover over lath or log frame

Approx 1M

Approx 60cm

You have a good chance of escaping detection if the enemy doesn't use dogs — they are your greatest enemy. Scatter pepper to confuse them. During fire fights, concentrate fire on dogs and their handlers. Once a hole is discovered, all other members of that group throw off cover and fight.

An attempt can be made to sneak through the encirclement, but if this is impossible well camouflaged hideouts should be occupied.

After a successful break out assemble at pre-designated points and move as fast as possible from the area. Computers: it should be noted in this chapter on security force tactics that the single most important weapon used to gather information on and against any guerrilla unit today is the computer.

There is virtually no limit to the amount of information which can be stored. For instance, in the U.K. the Police National Computer Installation at Hendon used three Burroughs 7700s which have records on nearly thirty million people and twenty three million fingerprint records. Computers are also used for the decoding of intercepted messages, such as the IBM 370/195 at GCHQ in Cheltenham; and they can be used to simulate such things as windtunnel experiments and neutron bomb explosions. A highly sophisticated computer, the CRAY-1 is also to be installed at the Aldermaston Nuclear Weapons Research Centre, perhaps to help design Britain's cruise

missiles. Obviously, computers will play a less specialised role in the security forces' tactics against guerrilla units.


Computers are very expensive and vulnerable pieces of technology. As such any guerrilla action against them will be hampered by heightened security arrangements so that their weakness to high explosive will not be easily tested. Their dependence, as a mass of electronics at a central site, to a good supply of input data is a more significant weakness. Disinformation such as providing false rumours and randomness could effectively negate the computer. The guerrilla unit should ensure that no information should be 'given' to the security forces through lack of the careful use of messengers or through carelessness.

To effectively put a computer out of operation will require a careful analysis of its siting and the security measures round it. Obviously the most effective way would be to destroy it directly, but this might prove too difficult. To destroy its source of power, that is the electricity generating station which serves it (and its back-up), should be the first priority. Indirectly, the companies which provide the computers and the technology which surrounds them should be considered.

Organisational phase

The security forces will leave certain areas unoccupied because of their lack of importance or because of insufficient personnel.

Guerrilla units have to move into these areas. They must remain inactive until each unit is well organised.



Enemy controls towns and communications.
Guerrilla units operate outside these areas

A short training period is essential. This serves to allow members of the unit to get to know each other. Training also familiarises unit members with the basic tactics and techniques of guerrilla warfare such as living off the land; communications; security; reconnaissance; techniques of sabotage and demolition and with the use of weapons.

This training may take up to one or two months, depending on whether the unit is still organising unmolested, or whether operations have to be conducted immediately. The Tupamaros of Uruguay spent a number of years in this organisational phase. The longer the organisation takes the greater the chances of success as there will be fewer losses during future engagements. This in turn will increase self-confidence.


Reconnaissance of future targets and systematic observation of the security forces can be carried on concurrently with organisation and training.

Weapons, ammunition & explosives

Certain weapons, such as airguns, can be obtained legitimately. Other weapons, however, will have to be obtained either from gun shops or from the bases of the security forces by means of guerrilla action during the organisational phase (or can be constructed relatively easily in home workshops). Other weapons, such as hand-grenades, mines, rocket launchers, can be obtained in the same way. Explosives and detonators can be obtained from quarries. Other forms of explosives can be manufactured by the guerrilla units themselves.


It is most important, however, to construct a camouflaged weapons/ammunition cache. Humidity is the greatest enemy of ammunition; therefore the cache must be carefully constructed. Weapons which will not immediately be needed should be greased and wrapped in air-tight bags. Ammunition, explosives and chemicals should be carefully wrapped and put in boxes. Build a grate using boards and logs, so that the packages will not lie on the ground.

Leave an interval of about the width of a hand between boxes and containers to afford air circulation. If possible, air the cache by removing the roofing paper frequently.




Storing weapons and explosives. They must be kept dry and well aired as well as being safe from discovery by enemy searches.

Improvised, concentrated charges can be used to destroy fixed objects (railroad tracks, power line poles, transformers, etc).



An explosive is only effective if it is closely confined, for example by packing it inside a piece of scaffold pipe, solidly capped at either end. Systematic weakening of the pipe produces a vicious fragmentation grenade.



Using old antitank mines. Most have fusewell for insertion of fuse cap. If not attach 200 grams to outside of mine to act as primer.

Anti-tank mines are excellent, improvised, concentrated charges. The weight of explosive contained is always three to four kilograms.

Artillery projectiles, mortar rounds and aerial bombs can be used as improvised, concentrated charges to destroy hard targets.

It is best to attach the projectile to a board with wire. For a primer, use a small charge which is always attached near the detonator.

Maintenance facilities

Use contacts in legitimate repair shops to help with ordnance. Or, preferably, the guerrilla unit should have access to a clandestine repair shop where small jobs (such as welding up makeshift charges) can be carried out with the minimum of equipment.

Food

Guerrilla units ordinarily live off the land as well as from material provided by the population or stolen from shops.

The question of food supply, a difficult one to solve, has considerable bearing upon the tactics of guerrilla units.

If the unit has high-grade and non-perishable food supplies, keep them for the difficult times in winter. These include such items as canned milk, chocolate, smoked meat, bacon and hard sausages. It is advisable to store these in well-hidden depots.

Food supply suggestions: when the unit is being supplied by the population it should be careful not to expose itself any longer than necessary. In summertime, personnel should be sent out in advance to have the population prepare the food. Then have it picked up and taken out of the village or town so that the unit can eat in the open. In wintertime, wait under cover and only come to the houses to eat in a warm place when the food is actually ready.

Medical

It is difficult to say whether it is a mistake to establish an elaborate medical service or whether it is a positive advantage. If the guerrilla units in the countryside do not have a central base of operations, then it would clearly be an impossibility because of the continuous moving from place to place. The base set up by the Bolivian guerrilla movement in 1967 was equipped with a small field hospital, including operating table and a full complement of surgical instruments. But this cannot be taken as a general recommendation.

In most circumstances, therefore, provide only first aid. Take wounded and sick personnel to reliable persons among the population. Medical supplies and equipment should be procured from:

1. doctors;
2. pharmacies;
3. hospitals;
4. first aid stations

Tactics of guerrilla units

Early operations

It is important that the unit's first actions should have simple targets which can be mastered without any difficulties. A good example is the destruction of an electricity pylon.

Only after unit confidence has been established with the completion of a few simple operations should larger actions be undertaken, such as assaults on bridges, railway stations or an ambush of the security forces.

Operational security

The security of guerrilla units will normally be carried out by sympathisers through espionage and observation. Radio and telephone conversations can be monitored (the British Army in Northern Ireland were surprised and alarmed to discover that the Provisional IRA had installed taps on their telephone system at GHQ Lisburn); roads, railways and airports should be constantly observed for the assembly of counter-insurgency forces. Information gathered should be reported to the active guerrilla unit via radio transmitter or messengers should be used.

General behaviour

1. proceed with secrecy, care and cunning
2. use force only when the guerrilla unit has superior forces
3. avoid any action which might jeopardise the existence of the unit
4. the most important safety measure is secrecy

in large industrial plants; 5. private homes (systematically scrounge small quantities); 6. pharmaceutical industries (such as surreptitious delivery by the population).

The population

The population is your greatest friend. Without their sympathy and active support the guerrilla unit will be unable to exist for extended periods of time. As a result, the guerrilla forces must take great care not to alienate them by undertaking actions which are detrimental to their safety. Such provocation should never happen. The possibility exists that the guerrilla units may become a greater evil than the security forces.

If the guerrilla unit has to take anything it should be done not with a threat from a sub-machine gun but by an appeal to the common goal.

Because of the circumstances peculiar to guerrilla warfare every member of the population can cause great harm to the unit if they want to or, if too much has been revealed to them, through interrogation by the security forces. The guerrilla unit is, to a large extent, dependent upon the good will of the population.

Initially, they will be intimidated and without motivation. With the strengthening of the guerrilla units through prolonged conflict this will change.

An awakened, aroused population can help the guerrilla unit in many ways:

Passive support:


- a. observe the security forces continuously and systematically
- b. establish an inconspicuous security net for guerrilla units
- c. procure supplies
- d. hide and care for the wounded and sick
- e. conceal material and ammunition
- f. serve as guides for guerrilla units
- g. act as a communications network between the guerrilla and the population
- h. provide safe houses

Active support:

- a. supply technicians for guerrilla units
- b. replace wounded and killed personnel
- c. sabotage communications
- d. place explosive devices

Even if the population should act only half-heartedly for the guerrilla units, there will always be someone who will act as observer, scout or messenger.

Members of the guerrilla unit making contact with sympathisers amongst the population should be extremely cautious, even in those areas under guerrilla control. The guerrilla unit has always to shift its area of activity, whereas those who have not yet joined it are restricted to their locale. To expose their 'cover' would certainly mean their liquidation.



Tactics of the security forces


In order to be successful in counter guerrilla warfare in the long run, the security forces will have to occupy or guard all important points simultaneously at all times, and at the same time systematically carry out counter-insurgency operations in those areas occupied by the guerrilla. With their superior mobility, particularly with the use of helicopters, the security forces can control roads without having to maintain large concentrations of personnel.

A detailed and never-ending reconnaissance is essential.


Pursuit units will usually consist of between twenty and twenty five men (platoon size) and will only carry light weapons with them, i.e. assault rifles, light machine guns, grenades. Each unit will have the mission to search out and destroy one guerrilla detachment. There will be weeks allowed for each search. The security force unit will, therefore, be obliged to conceal its movements, and to do this it will have to live just as would a guerrilla detachment.

The guerrilla detachment, by their very actions, will inevitably give away their position.

Once the guerrilla detachment has been found, the area will be localised, helicopters will keep the detachment under observation and pursuit units will be directed to the correct location. Airborne reserves will be brought up.



Inevitably, the guerrilla detachment will have to encounter the pursuit unit or it will be driven into a blocking force which will have been previously positioned. Usually the blocking force will be placed along some unpassable terrain feature such as a river or mountain range.




It was in a position such as this that the guerrilla detachment led by Che Guevara was trapped and destroyed - the gorge at El Yuro - in October 1967.

The guerrilla detachment should not, when it has been discovered, attempt to break out at the beginning of a mopping-up operation because this is a time of high morale for the security forces.

Later, they will be more careless, more negligent and less attentive. They will tend to avoid more difficult and tiresome terrain features. Lighttime will offer the best opportunities for escape. Occasionally, pursuit units will gather to eat and reorganise. During these periods they will only have a thin screen of security guards which will increase the chances of escape.

Attack on an airfield



Attacking an airfield is an ambitious and dangerous operation. The field is spread over many acres, implying a coordinated assault by several guerrilla units simultaneously. Airfield defence is strong and can have quick reaction and great mobility. The flat and open terrain makes attackers vulnerable to pursuit, particularly when the enemy has armed helicopters. Primary targets will depend on the nature of the conflict. Destruction of radar and airfield defence will aid exiled or friendly forces. Where there are no such forces, general mayhem and the loss of 'antipersonnel' equipment — particularly helicopters and light planes containing electronic surveillance equipment — will hinder the enemy's programme of repression.

Assignment of guerrilla unit

- a) assault element will:
 1. interrupt communications
 2. eliminate guards
 3. eliminate flight and ground personnel in billets
 4. destroy anti-aircraft and searchlight installations
- b) demolition elements will:
 1. destroy planes as well as technical installations
- c) security elements will:
 1. isolate airfield being attacked
 2. engage reinforcements
 3. cover withdrawal

Priorities of destruction: if pressed for time, destroy only the planes on the ground. If sufficient time, also destroy radar and radio installations, fuel depots and repair shops.


Methods of destroying equipment and material:

- a) aircraft - detonate a charge of 1 kilogramme on the fuselage directly behind the cockpit. (It will be necessary to have a ladder at least 3 metres long for this).
- b) radar installations - detonate a charge of 3 kilogrammes on the rotation mechanism of the antenna; a 2 kilogramme charge on the instrument panel
- c) repair shops - detonate a charge of at least 5 kilogrammes in the middle of the repair shop, or set it on fire using petrol, oil and grease.
- d) anti-aircraft guns - throw a hand grenade into the barrel
- e) searchlights - fire into the mirror; place a 1 kilogramme charge on the turning mechanism; destroy the generator with a charge of 2 to 3 kilogrammes.

Destroying a bridge

The beams are the crucial points on wooden and metal bridges. When placing explosives, aim to blast: both of the lower beams, one upper beam, one diagonal strut on the same side and the roadway supports. By not destroying one of the upper beams the bridge will twist prior to falling. Removal of debris by the security forces will thus be much more difficult and the re-use of the main girders impossible.

It should be noted, however, that with the equipment for bridge-laying available today the interruption caused will only be relatively short. It is more important to destroy a bridge before a decisive action, even if it is technically primitive.



5. ambushes and raids are the unit's main fighting weapons
6. never engage a strong enemy and never accept an open fight
7. when meeting a superior force divide into small groups, avoid the security forces and reassemble later at a pre-arranged point.

If an engagement with pursuing forces cannot be avoided, do not engage in a decisive fight under any circumstances. Rather adopt delaying tactics and break contact with them as quickly as possible — certainly no later than nighttime which will conceal the guerrilla unit's movements.

Once the security forces have gained relief by means of a successful engagement and returned to their bases, harass them again. Guerrilla units should reappear from hiding once the security forces have disappeared.

March

After a successful large operation move to a new area. Before moving, establish contact with reliable people in the new area. A small group should reconnoitre the area thoroughly. Avoid main roads and villages on the march.

No long preparations are needed (such as moving ammunition and food supplies or large-scale reconnaissance) the exact location of the new area should not be revealed.

In order to intercept individuals who might inform the security forces of the guerrilla unit's plan, patrols should be sent out a few hours before the move to act as ambushes far ahead on roads and streets. During the critical period they will detain all people passing by. If necessary, telephone communications should be cut.

Nobody should be allowed to know where the unit comes from or where it is going. The next operational area should be kept secret from everyone not in the unit itself.

Deceive the population about the unit's strength. Always create the impression that it is larger than it actually is (i.e. the remark: "... we are only a group from a larger unit which follows over there.") If possible, only travel at night to minimise the possibility of discovery.

Since travel will have to be by foot, because of the need to avoid roads, there will be a lot of marching. However, avoid unnecessary forced marches. Keep fresh and conserve strength for any operation or movement.


If possible, always march in a closed formation. When everybody is close together quick decisions can be made and implemented better and faster. Provide front and rear security with unit members several hundred metres ahead and behind.

Rest

Move at night and rest in woods during the day.

Select woods for shelter. When forced to camp out in the open use high points which will provide good observation.

Security is most effective when guards are placed in the vicinity of the camp.



During the day keep a watch for aircraft. At night, guard each likely avenue of approach.

If camping after nightfall, keep the unit together and have guard posts at 50 or at the most 100 metres from the camp. As visibility increases after dawn security must be increased. Never use the same camp two nights in a row. Never spend the night in the same place as the day. Make sure there is an acknowledged rallying point for stragglers or for members of the unit who are lost. This applies also for members who are stationed elsewhere.

Simple communication

From time to time, the guerrilla will have to enter certain towns or villages to:

1. replenish food supplies
2. leave wounded and sick with sympathisers
3. use the telephone or postal system

Simple messages can be relayed to the guerrilla unit by non-combatant sympathisers by some of the following simple methods:


1. opening or closing pre-designated windows
2. hanging out clothes
3. displaying or concealing something prominent.

This matter is really one of individual imagination, but each method must be safe.

Road blocks

Felled or blasted trees are best suited for road blocks. Do not attempt to drop too big a tree in the hope of causing the security forces more work. This only wastes a lot of time and explosive.

If the unit cannot install booby-traps with the road blocks, at least simulate them. Separate, half-hidden wires leading from the tree branches into the ground simulate trip-wires to hidden charges. Loose and only partially covered pieces of earth next to the road suggest that the road may also be mined.




Cover main road block with automatic fire. Block secondary routes and mine or booby-trap these.

Install road blocks on open pieces of road, where the security forces must expose themselves to fire while removing them. Booby-traps on improvised road blocks are the most important thing and not the trees as such.

The security forces will not remove them by hand but will haul them away by vehicle. Where booby-traps are installed (or at least seen to be) an armoured vehicle will be necessary to do the hauling or specialists will have to be called for to disarm them. Whatever, all this will take time.

It should be noted, however, that road blocks on roads are less effective than blocks on rail lines because they can be easily bypassed by rerouting traffic.



Many small roadblocks cause maximum annoyance. They are easily avoided but must be cleared eventually.

Sabotage on the roads


Destroy, change or remove road signs. Place nails on the road. Only effective when used in large quantities. Sympathisers can be used in this type of operation. Again, the object is to waste the security forces' time. Co-ordination of this type of operation with actions elsewhere is indispensable since such sabotage is only of value when the security forces have to use the road continually.

Vehicles themselves can be sabotaged in the following ways:

1. sugar in the petrol tank
2. water in the petrol tank
3. loosen oil drainage screw
4. loosen screw on oil filter
5. loosen oil pressure lead.

Sabotage in these ways leads to lengthy and complicated repairs. On the other hand, cars can simply be destroyed by opening the petrol cap, tipping the car on its side and throwing a match into the spilled petrol. Larger vehicles can be destroyed by burning newspapers under the bonnet or by soaking rags in petrol or oil and throwing them lit under the bonnet. Of course, explosives make a much better job of this than petrol-soaked rags but why use valuable explosives when a much simpler method can do the job?

Metal spikes to blow tyres can be made from a small piece of steel about 12 to 15 centimetres long and 5 to 8 millimetres in diameter. File both ends to sharp points. Cut both ends with a hacksaw about 3 to 5 centimetres and the four parts (they are only held together in the middle section for about 5 centimetres) are now bent outward. Though the spike may fall to the ground in any position one point will always be up. The strength of the spike and the length of each point are sufficient to penetrate even the heaviest of tyres.




Ambush of single vehicles

Fire on the driver and any passengers with an air rifle. With this type of weapon the shot can hardly be heard.

By minimising noise, time is gained and material can be removed from the vehicle less hurriedly. If possible, drive the vehicle to a concealed location. Dead security force personnel must be removed and buried.

A collection section should follow the assault team. It should remove all usable items and quickly retire to a pre-designated point, often before the fight is completely finished. Thus the withdrawal of this section is covered by the continuing fire fight.



Initially the security forces will be unable to respond immediately to an action of this kind. But some form of response must be taken into consideration.


Consequently, the guerrilla unit must have a safe withdrawal route, either using difficult terrain or by sabotaging the roads. In mountainous terrain, raids with light machine guns, machine guns and mortars on transport columns, marching columns and trains can be very successful.

It must be made clear however, before the action how it is to be conducted. For instance, when firing is to be initiated:

1. upon orders
2. after fire from one lead weapon
3. automatically, when the head of the column has reached a certain point in the terrain

how the lead vehicle is to be stopped:

1. by felling a tree
2. mines




3. by firing upon it;
how to distribute fire throughout the column:

1. who is to fire on the front portion
2. who is to fire on the centre
3. who fires on the end (when using mortars, use them only when the whole column has stopped); and when firing is to be discontinued:

1. flares
2. according to time (for instance, five minutes after commencing fire).

Having made sure that all withdrawal routes have been fully reconnoitred members of the guerrilla unit should return singly, using separate paths, to a pre-designated point.

Attacking the power system




The power system can be attacked directly and indirectly. Directly, the large, cross-country high tension wires can be blasted or, when dealing with local high tension wires, the insulators can be shot down, a short circuit can be caused and poles can be felled by cutting or blasting. Indirectly, the turbines in power stations can be blasted as can the pressure lines.

In an assault of a traditionally structured transformer station, the guerrilla unit should be split into three detachments:

1. assault group - to breach the installation fence by cutting or blasting, to interrupt communications, shoot out any searchlights or high-powered observation lights, eliminate guards and guards employees.
2. demolition group - to destroy technical installations
3. security group - to isolate the installation and cover withdrawal.

If time is limited destroy the transformers. They are the nerve centre of the entire station. Since there are relatively few transformers this job will not take long. Transformers are protected by a metal wall about 10mm thick. Destroy them with small arms fire (or rocket launchers) or by detonating 4 kilogrammes of explosive on the transformer.

If more time is available for the action, also destroy the cooling elements with small arms fire or with 2 kilogrammes




of explosives which can be attached with rope, wire or hooks halfway between the top and the bottom of the cooling element.

If there is sufficient time, also destroy the insulators. Since there are lots of these, this will take a considerable amount of time. They are made of porcelain about 3 centimetres thick. Destroy them with small arms fire, blows from a sledge hammer or by detonating 200 grammes of explosive placed between each insulator disc.

If possible also destroy the switch installation and high tension wires carrying the power of the entire installation by detonating three individual charges of 1 kilogramme of explosive for each switch.


A fuel depot

This applies to fuel installations above ground. As a rule, fuel depots are located in the vicinity of railroad stations and are connected to them by means of railroad sidings.




The guerrilla unit should be split into three groups to carry out the following tasks: assault, demolition, security.

Again, the amount of the installation which can be destroyed depends largely on how much time the guerrilla unit has to carry out its action. If there is little time, destroy the surface and underground tank installations. If possible, also destroy the refuelling system for tankers and railway cars.



Destroy tank installations and tankers in the open with anti-tank rifle or rocket launcher, or detonate at least 4 kilogrammes of explosive at the bottom of each tank. If the tank does not explode it will be necessary to set fire to the fuel. This can be done by using tracer ammunition, flares, hand-grenades, anti-tank weapons or rocket launchers.

Normally, tanks are buried one to three metres underground. Detonate a charge in the manhole, directly on the tank wall. If the tank is full the explosion will rupture the tank walls since the liquid cannot be compressed. If the tank is not completely full, the empty space often contains fuel vapour-air mixture which may explode.




When interrupting rail traffic make sure that possible by-pass routes are also blasted. Nuisance value can be increased by attacking a line on subsequent days — a disruption a day for a week creates more problems for repair crews than seven disruptions on one day.

It is important to create confusion in the rail system by causing abnormal rail schedules and to delay traffic for increasingly long periods of time. This can be done by keeping the maintenance organisations continually busy by having something happen every day. Over the long run it is more demoralising and nerve wracking for the security forces to have to make numerous small repairs without interruption than infrequent major ones.

It is a mistake to destroy track on four different locations on the same day and during the same operation. The security forces simply repair one point after another.


It is much more effective to interrupt one length of track on four consecutive days. The entire maintenance organisation has to start anew each time. The traffic flow is impeded on four days. Confusion is thus greater, and the total period of interruption is almost twice as long.

Train traps




Surprise attacks

1. General
 - a) the object of the attack should be fully reconnoitred, through binoculars, with the aid of photos, maps and drawings and from information obtained from workers at the installation (the most critical targets, to determine the size of any necessary explosive charges, the most desirable firing positions).
2. Operational Plan
 - a) it must be as simple as possible
 - b) there should usually be three groups: a raiding party, to eliminate guards or at least keep them pinned down; a technical party, responsible for demolitions; a reserve, to isolate the scene of the action, to fire on reinforcements from well prepared concealed positions.
3. Implementation
 - a) the plan should not be revealed to the whole guerrilla detachment until shortly before the operation
 - b) approach the object quickly during the night, avoiding roads




- c) occupy a well covered position near the object to wait for the following night (to attack)
 - d) the most favourable time to start the operation is shortly after night sets in. Each guerrilla detachment should be briefed during dusk. The operation will be conducted under the cover of darkness. The largest portion of the night will then be available for withdrawal.
4. Reconnaissance of Security System
 - a) determine location of guard house
 - b) determine when the guard is changed. Observe changing of the guard during the day from a distance or at night from close up (rented apartment)
 - c) determine weapons emplacement.



Surprise attack on a small post

- Divide the guerrilla unit into three groups:
- a) 1. fire support group
 2. assault group
 3. technical group (wire cutting, obstacle demolition, mine clearing)
- b. demolition
 - c. material gathering group (light motor vehicles, animals, ruck sack).



Attacking a small post

With the beginning of the attack all communications between the security forces and neighbouring installations should be interrupted so that no reinforcements can be summoned. Cut all telephone lines out of the installation or cause a short circuit. Obviously, radio communications cannot be interrupted. Attempt therefore, to put the radio set or station out of action. Reconnaissance should have determined where it is situated.

Attack on a communications system

There are various methods of sabotaging a telephone net, and various types of telephone communication have to be considered. First, there is the interruption of underground cables.

Underground cables consist of several wires which are insulated against each other and against dirt.


The destruction of underground cables is complicated and dangerous, particularly when the cables are inserted into iron pipes or concrete boxes for additional protection. A hole has to be dug and cables are normally laid alongside the road system.

In order to obtain results which are to last some time do the following:

- a) Thorough procedure - dig up the cable which is usually 80 centimetres underground. Remove the insulation and cut the cable in two. Replace the insulation, fill the hole and eliminate any traces of digging.
- b) Quick procedure - dig up the cable and cut it. Prior to filling hole lay ends of cable in such a manner (if necessary, weigh down with rocks) so that they do not touch each other. Cover the hole and camouflage traces of digging. On the average, such an interruption will last three to four days.



Technically speaking, the best points of sabotage are where the cables cross a river. They are mostly mounted next to or underneath a bridge and can easily be cut. The disadvantage, of course, is that bridges are often guarded or at least in such constant use that it is difficult to carry out the sabotage.

To disrupt the telephone net overhead, cut or blast the poles in such a way that the wires break. Cut or blast trees so that they fall across the wires. Install a few stake mines as well as anti-personnel mines so that clearance and repair are made hazardous for the security services.



Break phone lines by cutting or blasting trees so they fall across the lines.

A simple method of damaging telephone lines is to attach a short piece of metal or rock on a strong, long rope and throw it over the wires. The rope will rap round the wires and all it needs is a pull to break them. It is best to do this in the centre, between the poles, since the wire will break easiest there.



To damage high tension cables simply establish connection with the ground, if there is not enough explosive to destroy the towers.


Here, a wire is needed at one end of which should be attached a rock or piece of iron. The other end is to be inserted into moist earth. Be sure to release the wire immediately after throwing.

To prevent accidents, make sure of the proper distinction between telephone lines and high tension cables. On the former, the individual wires run parallel and on the latter they are staggered.

Attack on a rail network

1. Damage electric wires: from an overpass, connect the protective railing with the track by means of a strong cable. Attach the wire cable (5-8mm) at the protective railing and at the other end attach a piece of iron (20cms) to act as a weight. Throw the cable onto the electric wires from the overpass, letting go of the cable immediately it has been thrown. Use only strong cables since thin ones melt at once causing only a slight voltage reduction.

This operation can also be carried out on an open stretch of track, by first attaching the cable weighted at one end to the track and then throwing the weighted end over the wire above. The disadvantage with this, of course, is that the overhead wires are usually installed high, making it difficult to throw over. Where possible, use an overpass.




The system can also be damaged by shooting down the insulators. If possible, do this on an open stretch and away from stations. The purpose of this method is to bring down the support wires by destroying the supporting insulators onto the support structure (i.e. tower). Maintain a safe distance (30 to 50 metres). On dual tracks, both wires must be destroyed.


2. Sabotage of the track itself: knock off the screw heads. These come off relatively easily with the help of a sledge hammer, particularly when it is very cold. Although this will not derail trains it will take time and energy to reinstall them. Explosives make a more efficient job. On an open stretch always destroy the tracks on a curve. Always blast the outer rail. If the driver has not noticed the sabotage and enters the curve without taking action, a piece of track about 30 centimetres is sufficient gap to derail the train. If the gap has been noticed, however, the train can cross gaps of up to 60 centimetres.

3. Sabotage of the tracks by 'greasing': grease on an incline with grease, oil or soft soap. Always grease both rails for a distance of at least 150 metres, otherwise the wheels of the train will skid over the place by means of its own momentum or short stretches can be sanded clear.


4. Train traps: these are hidden charges which are detonated the moment the engine passes the point where the charges are placed.




On an open stretch you must destroy tracks at a curve: bent tracks are more difficult to replace than straight ones; trains derail more easily on a curve. Always blast the outer rail. The centrifugal force of an approaching train will derail it more easily, and will throw debris onto neighbouring track.



By loosening the rails, the train can be derailed. Either loosen the tie mountings (key, screw, nails) on eight successive ties, or remove the fish-plate or apply leverage and move one rail towards the inside and jam the fish-plate in between.



5. Destruction of electric engines: either shoot off the insulators, or smash the instruments in the cab with a sledge hammer, or destroy the transformer oil containers on the engine bay (knock holes in the wall with a pick axe and set fire to the oil which flows out.)




6. Destruction of steam engines: by throwing a charge of one or two kilogrammes into the fire-box, by destroying the steering mechanism with a sledge hammer, by firing into the boiler with a light machine gun (aim for centre third of engine, about 1.5 metres from cab).

7. Sabotage of rolling stock: throw a handful of sand, abrasive powder or metal shavings into each grease box. No immediate results will be seen but the bearing will soon wear out.

8. Raiding a railroad station: the railroad station consists of the following targets - station building, tracks, overhead wires, signals and a communications centre.


The guerrilla unit should be divided into three detachments. a) raiding party, to interrupt communications, keep railway



Targets in assault on rail station

personnel under control and eliminate guards
b) demolition party, to destroy technical installations
c) reserve, to isolate the objective, ambush reinforcements and provide cover during withdrawal.

If there is only limited time, first destroy the switches with a kilogramme charge and the signals box with a hand-grenade. If time is not so crucial, also destroy the main line pole as well as other signals. Cut wires to switches, signals and gates.



The main line pole can be destroyed either by firing into the oil insulator or by explosive charge.