

## THE WORKERS' PARTY

### Foreword.

The working-class movement in Australia is faced with the increasing acuteness of the struggle, a worsening of conditions, and the dangers of Fascism and war. These conditions call for an active and intelligent revolutionary lead. This manifesto endeavours to show that such a revolutionary lead does not come, and can no longer be expected to come, from the Communist Party, which, in its frantic efforts to retain legality, evades the struggle at every point.

The bureaucracy of the Communist Party makes it impossible for a revolutionary opposition to function any longer within the Party; the slightest evidence of militant activity and the stirring up of mass actions is made the occasion for expulsion and a campaign of abuse.

Only by the formation of a new party can a lead be given to the masses. THE WORKERS' PARTY calls on the masses for active struggle, and already, in associating itself with the Bateck Defence Committee, is organising revolutionary mass action. The case of the Workers' Party is here presented to all militant workers as a rallying ground for struggle.

### SPECIAL NOTE

The contents of this document are an elaboration of the decisions arrived at during a conference held by various groups on 13th, 14th, and 21st of May 1933.

While realising that this analysis is incomplete, more especially in view of recent momentous happenings in the International arena; this is a defect that the Prov. Secretariat of the Workers' Party (Left Opposition) proposes to remedy at an early date by the publication of further pamphlets.

The crushing of the German working class organisations under the heel of Fascism, brought about by the criminal failure of the Communist International to give a decisive lead to the German Party; the pandering to pacifism at the World Congress Against War in Amsterdam; the statements of the Soviet Delegation at the World Economic Conference; add further proof to the contention that the teachings of Lenin have been distorted by the present Stalinist bureaucracy into a utopian theory of establishing Socialism in one country, with a consequent sacrifice of International revolutionary struggle.

In the near future we will endeavour to present to the workers of Australia, a complete and full analysis of the International situation up to date, in order that a correct ideological basis may be laid for the development of a real revolutionary movement in this country.

### THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION.

The world-wide character of the crisis has undoubtedly intensified the conflict among the several big capitalist powers, and between the capitalist powers and Soviet Russia, over a redistribution of the sources of raw materials and of the available markets. Already the capitalist world has been neatly divided among the capitalist powers of Great Britain, U.S.A., France and Japan. All countries are either directly controlled by, or under the dominance of, one or other of these great powers. Japanese imperialism, owing to its late growth, its lack of resources, (coal, iron ore), and the far-reaching effects of the depression on primary and secondary industry, feels more than the other powers the need for new sources of raw materials. Japanese imperialism is the aggressive force that menaces peace, and extends its influence over China as the most logical outlet for its restricted development. But here Japanese imperialism comes into conflict with Soviet Russia. The influence of the Soviet in Manchuria, the half-interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway, are obstacles to Japanese progress. The policy of the Soviet Government is claimed to be one of non-aggression, but that of Japan must be the opposite. Having gained control of Manchuria, the next step is into Siberia. At what stage war breaks out is to be determined by the extent to which the Soviet Government is willing to retreat before Japanese imperialism.

### ON WHAT BASIS WILL THE CAPITALIST POWERS UNITE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION?

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With the exception of Japan, it cannot be said that any of the other powers are menacing Soviet territory. As far as a conflict of trade is concerned, Russia has shown herself only too willing to provide a

market for the product of heavy industry from the capitalist countries. Certainly conflict exists owing to the need for Russia paying for these imports by primary products when the world's markets are already glutted with food-stuffs. But the main trade of the Soviet is carried on with the Central European countries which need Russian exports. True, Russian oil comes into competition with the English and American product, but if the possibility of building a self-contained Socialist State in Russia is correct then conflict will tend to die out as the need for trade with the capitalist countries becomes less.

The only basis on which the capitalist powers would be forced into uniting against the Soviet Union, would be by the development of the international revolutionary movement to such an extent as to become a menace to world capitalism. The utilisation of the vast resources of the Soviet Government for building the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries, would undoubtedly, in view of the present crisis, have caused an extraordinary growth in the revolutionary movement the world over, to a degree that might precipitate an attack on the Soviet Union. But this is not the policy of the Communist International. The policy of the C.I. is that of "Socialism in one country". The Soviet workers declare through their government, that they will not interfere in the "internal affairs of the capitalist countries". Assistance of the Soviet workers in the struggles of the German workers, for instance, would undoubtedly result in a rupture of the Trade Agreement between the two countries, and consequently be detrimental to the Second Five-year Plan.

It is this contradiction between the line of "Socialism in one country" and the aim of Socialism in all countries followed by the Communist Parties, that is responsible for the retarded growth of the Communist sections in the capitalist countries, and for the development of "left-opposition parties".

#### EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS WITHIN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

While the maintenance of tariff barriers in Australia, Canada etc., against British manufacturers, indicates the conflict between these parts of the Empire, there have nevertheless been strenuous attempts to provide greater cohesion (Ottawa, etc.).

In Australia, the influence of British imperialism remains dominant. The struggle of the local financial and manufacturing interests, (struggle between the Lang Government representing N.S.W. manufacturing interests and the Federal Government representing interests of British imperialism and the big primary producers), has resulted in a temporary victory to British imperialism, but not without making concessions to the local capitalists in order to win their support. (Maintenance of tariff).

We have witnessed a hardening of the power of British financial interests in Australia; a greater unity against the workers; a definite drive for more power to the Federal Govt. The greater portion of Australia's trade is carried on with Great Britain. British capital is heavily invested in Australian Govt. concerns. We can then expect that Australia will remain bound to the British Empire, and that through the development of the crisis will come a weakening of the power of the small manufacturer, and through the greater centralisation of capital a more planned economy, with an end to both free competition and parliamentary influence on industry. This will mean eventually sweeping aside democratic traditions and customs (introduction of Fascism).

#### INCORRECTNESS OF THE THEORY OF SOCIAL FASCISM.

Recent events have shown that organised social-democracy has now become an obstacle to the development of Fascism. (Attacks upon social-democratic organisations in Germany. Antagonisms toward Labor Party by Fascist elements in Australia.)

While it is correct to state that for a period the social democratic parties and the Trade Unions in a number of countries assumed the role of open supporters of the capitalist State, the situation is now altered. Supporting the theory that it was possible to reform capitalism in the interests of the workers, the social democratic parties in the early stages of the present crisis acted logically enough as a bolster for capitalism. It is true that there was a tendency for the Labor Party and the Trade Unions to play an increasingly important part in the capitalist State apparatus, but such a situation could only be fraught with grave danger to capitalism.

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The failure of the Labor Party to relieve the effects of the crisis upon the workers brought about an increasing disillusionment among them that would have eventually resulted in movements menacing the Capitalist State itself. Also, the petit-bourgeois and small manufacturing elements supporting the Labor Party soon lost confidence in the ability of that party to protect their interests, and were forced over to the support of the U.A.P.

In N.S.W. the Labor Party lost office because social democracy had by that time shown that it was no longer capable of stabilising the system, and that it had become in fact, a menace to the further maintenance of capitalism. While it was correct to state that social democracy paved the way for Fascism, inasmuch as a social democratic/~~regime~~ a number of countries, preceded the introductions of forms of open bourgeois dictatorship; it was incorrect to believe that the mass social democratic organisations of the workers could be gradually hardened into permanent organs of the capitalist state.

The fact that the Labor Party now lacks support from many considerable sections of the bourgeoisie, and the fact that the basis of reformism has now been destroyed, (owing to the crisis making it impossible, in the main, for capitalism to grant any new concessions to the workers without menacing the system), forces the leadership of the Labor Party and the Trade Unions to make the choice, either of fighting for the continuance of social democracy, (which is becoming more and more discredited daily, and yet is an obstacle to the development of Fascism), or of openly linking up with the U.A.P. (Lyons and others chose the latter course, Lang and Garden the former).

This is not to suggest that we can expect a different line from the Labor Party leaders from that previously followed. They will still fulfil the role of misleading the workers by advocating constitutional action against Fascism and for the saving of democracy, and as such, constitute a brake upon the revolutionary struggles of the workers.

THE REASON FOR THE SLOWING DOWN IN THE TEMPO OF THE ATTACK AGAINST THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

The intensive propaganda against the Party prior to the last elections, the activities of the New Guard and the subsequent framing of anti-communist legislation, was partially due to an attempt to influence large sections of the petit-bourgeoisie, industrialists, and the backward sections of the workers against the Lang administration which was detrimental to imperialist interests, and partially as preparation for coming attacks on the working class. That the drive against the Party was temporarily dropped, was, and is, due to its continual retreat before the capitalist offensive, and to the absence of any large spontaneous strike movements, or movements under the control of the social democrats.

THE REASON FOR THE GROWTH OF AN OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY.

The development of an opposition, which has taken place almost spontaneously in widely separated areas and without any co-ordination between individuals; the extraordinary growth of numerous factions and groupings within the Party; has been due to the development of attacks against the workers, and from a confusion arising from a condition never before experienced by the workers of this country.

The increased radicalisation of the workers has resulted in a revolt on the part of the "leftists" against obvious right-opportunism. On the other hand, the political confusion existing among the petit-bourgeois elements has been reflected within the Party in the formation of vacillating and hesitating groups. A factor that is not insignificant, is the desire of opportunists who have gained some measure of economic security in less troublous times -- in the Party and fraternal organisations -- to maintain a peaceful existence.

It cannot be denied that the existence of factionalists within the Party offers a golden opportunity to agents-provocateur to weaken the movement. The opportunity for agents-provocateur to gain admittance, and distort the line of the Party is enhanced by the expulsion of many experienced members, and the ease with which new members are allowed to gain important positions.

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### THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

What is the matter with the Communist Party? Why is it, that at a time when the discontent of the workers is expressed more openly, and they show an increasing willingness to struggle, that the influence of the Party is on the wane?

Why is there such a great disproportion between the Party's organisational and ideological influence?

In the following pages we will attempt to answer these questions, and show by a clear analysis of the situation, that the struggles of the workers are being retarded owing to the opportunist errors committed by the leadership of the party that professes to develop and lead these struggles. We will also attempt to show by a comparison of the tactics of the Central Committee of the Communist Party with the objective situation, how and why the Party has failed to win the leadership of the masses, and what could be achieved by concrete leadership and fearless mass work.

In order to present our case as clearly as possible, we will first of all deal with ...

#### THE LOSS OF INFLUENCE BY THE PARTY.

The number of votes cast for Communism in the State elections of N.S.W. can, to a certain degree, be taken as an indication of the ideological influence of the Party.

While the Party polled approximately 13,000 votes in the aggregate, we can only take about 9000 of these from which to formulate an accurate analysis of the influence of the Party. That is to say, that in order to arrive at a true estimation of the Party's ideological influence, we can only make a comparison between the votes obtained in those electorates that were contested in both elections. (1930-32). For instance, the 1540 votes polled by the Party candidate in Nepean cannot be taken into consideration, as no Labour candidate stood for that electorate. The following table will show the increase and decrease in the electorates that were contested at both elections ..

<u>ELECTORATE</u>	<u>1930</u>	<u>1932</u>	<u>GAIN</u>	<u>LOSS</u>	<u>%GAIN</u>	<u>%LOSS</u>
Annandale	362	472	-	110	-	32%
Arncliffe	204	153	-	51	-	25%
Auburn	198	112	-	86	-	43%
Balmain	233	386	153	-	65%	-
Bankstown	192	287	95	-	49%	-
Botany	167	153	-	14	-	8%
C. River	147	198	51	-	34%	-
Glebe	166	346	180	-	108%	-
Hurstville	132	134	2	-	1%	-
King	277	313	36	-	13%	-
Kogarah	145	135	-	10	-	6%
Lakemba	140	136	-	4	-	2%
Marrickville	89	124	35	-	39%	-
Newtown	224	204	-	20	-	8%
Paddington	272	281	9	-	3%	-
Parramatta	122	166	44	-	36%	-
Phillip	296	330	34	-	11%	-
Redfern	224	160	-	64	-	28%
Ryde	96	182	86	-	89%	-
Bulli	331	375	44	-	13%	-
Cessnock	1200	807	-	393	-	32%
Hamilton	325	175	-	150	-	46%
Illawarra	231	318	87	-	37%	-
Hartley	400	276	-	124	-	31%
Kurri	816	1582	766	-	93%	-
Maitland	54	84	30	-	55%	-
Mudgee	76	35	-	41	-	53%
Newcastle	176	351	155	-	86%	-
Sturt	685	629	-	56	-	8%
Waratah	183	291	108	-	59%	-
Totals:	8163	8875	Apparent increase: 712 or 9%			

Note: These figures are the final figures published in the S.M.H. 13/6/32. They do not include postal votes.

It is significant that where the Party has been established for a long period, as in places like NEWTOWN, REDFERN, ANNANDALE, AUBURN, LAKEBA, and KOGARAH (Sydney), CESSNOCK, HAMILTON and HARTLEY (Coalfields), actual losses are recorded. It is no argument to say that the Party vote was greatly increased in certain country areas, for the Party had not been established long enough in these areas for its oppos/ line to be recognised.

LOSS OF INFLUENCE IN FRATERNAL ORGANISATIONS.

Party influence in the fraternal organisations is also on the wane. The U.W.M. which once embraced thousands of workers is now out of existence, and has not been replaced by another mass organisation or by Party fraction work in the existing social democratic organisations. Nor has any real attempt been made to set up unemployed committees on a mass scale.

Other fraternal, the Workers International Relief, League against Imperialism, International Labour Defence and Minority Movement are stagnating. The membership of the Friends of the Soviet Union is declining and the Pastoral Workers Union has but a small membership in spite of good objective conditions for development. Other fraternal which have existed on paper only cannot be considered.

PARTY'S OFFICIAL REPORTS SHOW DECLINE OF INFLUENCE.

The greatest proof of the Party's declining influence is contained in the organisation report of the District Committee submitted to the October Conference 1932. In this report it was stated that the strength of the Party in Nr. 1 District was 1040, and the combined strength of the fraternal 1080, which figure includes party members. The Org. report at the Xmas Plenum showed a membership of 800 party members in Nr. 1 District, and since that date the figures for No.1 District have declined still further. It must be remembered also, that only a small percentage of the Party membership is ever really active.

ORGANISATIONAL FAILINGS

While the decline of ideological influence among the masses is very apparent, nevertheless, the influence still remaining is gradually being lost owing to the Party's failure to organisationally crystallize that influence.

The organisational weakness of the Party is exposed by the fact that only a few hundreds of the votes cast for Communism have been won to membership of the Party. If we examine the figures of some of the more industrialised areas, we shall find definite proof of this.

<u>ELECTORATE</u>	<u>VOTE</u>	<u>INCREASE</u>	<u>STATE OF PARTY AND FRATERNALS</u>
Glebe	346	108%	Only about 10% in Party or Fraternal.
Balmain	386	65%	Party membership about 10. Only W.I.R. under Party influence.
Leichhardt	313	247%	A very small unit exists augmented by members from other areas. No fraternal.
Bankstown	287	49%	No Party activity. No fraternal.

Such areas as Drummoyne and Marrickville with Communist votes of 115 and 124 respectively, are allowed to remain dormant. Similar conditions can be said to exist to a greater or lesser degree throughout the State, and indeed, throughout the whole of Australia. (Election figures quoted do not include postal votes).

DEMONSTRATIONS ETC.

The falling off in the numbers attending demonstrations is a further proof, not only of waning influence, but of organisational weakness. On May 1st, 1932, a careful check gave the number as 800. (About the number of Party members in Nr.1 District according to the report of the Xmas Plenum.)

Despite being banned, the demonstration on August 1st 1932 was well attended, but owing to the confusion brought about by the lack of an organised plan, and the failure of the leaders to lead, nothing was achieved, and the Party lost prestige in the eyes of the workers. On November 7th 1932 the change of plan at the last moment also caused confusion, and the demonstration was a fiasco. The failure of Aug. 1st and Nov. 7th were reflected in the attendance on International Unemployed Day, Feb. 27th, 1933, which although better organised around popular demands, only succeeded in attracting a few hundreds of workers.

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#### WORK IN UNITS

While the number of factory units is said to have increased, the work they indulge in is organising study circles and selling papers. intervals a lot of whitewash is spread around in the form of slogans, but no real mass work is undertaken. The Socialist competition supposed to have been completed on April 1st, 1933, set the task of organising new factory units and increasing the sales of the "Red Leader" and "Workers' Weekly". The suggestion of an improvement in mass work cannot enter into a competition of this nature.

#### WEAKNESS IN VARIOUS STRUGGLES.

In the struggles that have occurred, Glass Workers, Wool Workers, Textile Workers, the Party has not been able to exercise any appreciable influence. Indeed, so divorced from the struggle was the M.M. that the Glass Workers strike had been on for two days before the M.M. knew about it! And this despite the fact that their central office was a short distance from the scene of trouble. When the Young Communist League (Disguised as the M.M.) eventually appeared on the scene, the strikers repudiated them.

The organisational weakness of the Party was never more apparent than during the Questionnaire struggle, the campaign was not planned, and the sporadic outbreaks which occurred in several districts (Coalfields, Lithgow, Broken Hill, Glebe) were not co-ordinated. At the height of the campaign, when there was an opportunity of extending it, the Party vacillated, and the enthusiasm of the unemployed for the struggle was allowed to abate. A plan of campaign put forward by a lower Party organ advocating the organising of a series of synchronised meetings throughout the Metropolitan Area in order to break down police concentration, was termed "adventuresome" by the leadership of the Party, and those who put it forward were dubbed "anarchists".

In the foregoing paragraphs we have briefly outlined the facts showing the loss of influence and organisational weakness of the Party. We will now proceed to deal with the cause of these weaknesses.

While the fundamental cause must be traced to the political errors of the Party leadership, with which we shall deal later, their immediate cause can be discovered within the Party itself, and can be dealt with under the heading of ...

#### THE ABUSE OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM.

The weakness of the Party in mass work is only a reflex of inner Party weaknesses. The abuse of democratic centralism by the present leadership, which takes the form of a complete stifling of criticism, has developed in the Party membership a "fear complex" that retards initiative and makes for apathy in the lower Party organs. Honest criticism is met with cries of "disruption" and "agents provocateur", and those who have the temerity to stand up to their statements are summarily expelled and branded as anti-working class.

At Nr.4. District Conference in 1932, criticism of the Exam. Board's recommendations, although invited, was termed disruption and the gag applied. (King and Higgins). At this Party Plenum held in Sydney Xmas 1932, the criticism presented by the Melbourne delegates was termed "disruptive" and its withdrawal demanded under pain of expulsion. At the Section Conferences held in No.1. District in 1932, the out and dried nature of the proceedings was evident. The Exam. Boards, picked by the Section Committees under the supervision of the D.C., were composed of strong supporters of the D.C. Any potential opposition was intimidated by questions being put as a demand for those against to state their disapproval. Those speaking in opposition were shut down and their criticism distorted by the D.C. representatives.

At the D.C. Conference held in Melbourne, Feb. 1933, to deal with Jackson & Co, the working of a fraction in support of the Central Committee was evident, and worked successfully by the simple method of eliminating known Jackson supporters from the conference.

The resolution passed by the Port Melbourne Section in July 1932 was responsible for the expulsion of those who supported it. Similar resolutions passed by the Ballarat Section (Vic) at the same time were only rescinded under threat of expulsion.

A criticism of the C.C. prepared by Morts Dock Unit, (Sydney), was responsible for the expulsion of Sylvester and numerous others in Balmain who supported it. Other prominent members of the Party, Wilson, (S.Sydney Section), Batty (Parramatta Section), Eatock (Bankstown), and Hitchins, (South Coast) were expelled for criticism of the leadership made at unit meetings and conferences.

A similar condition exists in the Young Communist League of Australia, L.Short (Sydney) and Dick Eatock, (Bankstown), being particular examples of how critics of the leadership are dealt with. On the other hand, plenty of criticism is allowed as long as it does not damage the prestige of the leading organs. The reports at conferences and plenums of the Party teem with self-criticism. W. Orr, who has at conferences and through the "W.W." indulged in scathing and correct criticism of the Party failures, stops short when it comes to doing anything to overcome the mistakes he is criticising, and is thus himself guilty of the worst form of opportunism.

"Right-opportunism" is a favourite cry of the leadership in order to whitewash their own brand. Examples of this are the expulsions of Jackson and Co. as "right-opportunists" and criticism of right-opportunism in South Australia. (W.W. May 5th, 1933).

"Left-opportunism" is also severely condemned by the leadership, itself guilty of some of the most glaring leftist errors under the influence of the C.I. representative. (Bankstown and Newtown evictions, attack on Trades and Labor Council delegates, etc.)

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ERRORS PLACED ON INDIVIDUALS.

When it becomes absolutely necessary for mistakes to be admitted, they are fastened on to individual members.

MOXON has been accused of numerous errors including errors in the early days of unemployed agitation in Melbourne, although he was under the control of the Polit-bureau of the Party at all times.

SHAYLOR & WILSON These comrades were charged with mistakes in Nr.4 District, although not publicly. WILSON was accused of being responsible for the mistakes on the waterfront and was withdrawn. (Since when the International Seamen's Club has closed down.)

McKENZIE was accused of turning the U.W.M. into an organisation for fighting the class struggle through the Capitalist Courts.

JACKSON & CO After the expulsion of these comrades the mistakes of District 4. were placed on their shoulders.

TRIPP & CO. were made to take the blame for the failure of the F.O.S.U. demonstration on Nov.7th 1932.

The fact that the deputation to the Government "took too much time" is said to be the reason that the arrangements for the demonstration on Feb.27th (International Unemployed Day) were not carried out. As a matter of fact, all the mistakes of the Party can be traced to the opportunism which manifests itself in the C.C. in the failure to adequately combat opportunism throughout the whole Party.

THE LINE OF THE C.C. HAS CHANGED FROM A "LEFT-SECTARIAN" TO A "RIGHT-OPPORTUNIST" LINE.

From the period of 1929 to the last State elections of June 1932, the line of the Party was marked by rigid sectarianism. In their propaganda work among the masses the individual Party members were overbearing and insulting.

This sectarianism was very apparent in the fraternal organisations. The U.W.M. was regarded as a section of the Party, and the lecturers sent around the U.W.M. Halls and meetings were mostly Party members, and their subjects were unconnected with the needs of the workers, and indeed did not deal with any concrete questions at all but the class struggle in the abstract. The same conditions existed in other organisations which at that time were termed auxiliaries. The Party fractions worked mechanically and overcame the arguments of their opponents by branding them as "Social-fascists" and "anti-workingclass".

To show how this sectarian line was supported by the C.C., reference can be made to the article appearing in the "W.W." May 6th, 1932, wherein it was stated that certain expelled members of the Party should not be allowed to enter the halls of the fraternal organisations. ...8

About the time of the N.S.W. elections of June 1932 the result of sectarianism became apparent in the attacks that took place on Party candidates by social democratic supporters. (Millers Point, Surry Hills, Auburn).

Nowadays great pains are taken to show that the fraternal organisations are not connected with the Party. The members of the Anti-war Executive are spoken of as "Misters" instead of "comrades". ("W.W.5/5/33"). The Workers Sports Federation develops merely as a bourgeois Sports Club in which no mention of Communism is allowed. The Party platform in the Referendum campaign was open to all as long as they were prepared to oppose the Referendum proposals of the government. It was not demanded that they should support the Party attitude towards the Referendum.

At the Anti war Conference held in the Adyar Hall, April 8th 1933, pro-fist speeches went unchallenged and were echoed by a leading Party member, Nugent, who said that "war was a question for humanity, not for the working class alone".

The Party co-operates with, yet fails to attack, the opportunist Chapman of the A.R.U. and Campbell of the A.L.P. Glebe break-away section, and others of the same type. The Party has ceased to oppose the opportunism of the Labor Party leaders through the columns of the "Workers Weekly". We are told in the issue of May 5th 1933, "that a successful Committee has been formed in the Referendum campaign, composed of equal representation from the C.P. and the A.L.P."

#### APPOINTMENT OF RIGHT-OPPORTUNISTS TO LEADING POSITIONS.

One of the most outstanding examples of the opportunism of the C.C. has been the appointment to leading positions of members with comparatively little experience in the struggle. With the important task of building the Party in the industries, and the need for gaining the confidence of the workers in the everyday struggles, we would expect to find those who had proved themselves occupying the leading positions. But not so! Party members who have distinguished themselves in actual struggles, eviction fights, demonstrations and industrial activities, are passed over, and preference given to petit-bourgeois types. (Aarons, Devansay, Nugent, etc.). In Nr.4. District, proletarian types like Jackson, Andrews, etc. are replaced by individuals like Burns and O'Day. These are only examples. Throughout the whole Party there has been a decided move to fill all important posts with right-opportunists, of whom there are any number owing to the conditions under which the Party has grown.

The foregoing is a brief analysis of the present position of the Party and its weaknesses, but in order to arrive at a complete understanding of the fundamental cause of these weaknesses, and their relation to the international revolutionary situation in general, it is necessary to deal exhaustively with the political errors of the C.C. and their relationship to the Communist International.

#### THE POLITICAL ERRORS OF THE C.P. OF A. AND THEIR RELATION TO THE C.I.

The political errors of the C.C. of the C.P. of A. must be studied in relation to its general political line. This line will be understood, not by accepting the statements of policy issued through the "W.W." or made by leading Party members, but by examining the concrete work of the Party in all spheres of activity over a sufficient period of time to ensure that our observations are generally correct.

##### (1) THE PRESENT LINE OF THE C.P. OF A.

The C.C., as has been shown in the foregoing, has swung from a left-sectarian to a right-opportunist line. This means the acceptance of the indefinite stabilisation of World Capitalism. The previous over-estimation of the crisis, which was responsible for exaggerated and distorted application of the line of independent leadership of the workers, and for the extent to which the Labor Party was regarded as responsible for the introduction of Fascism, isolated and discredited the Party among the workers, and provided a basis for the extraordinary growth of defeatism among the membership, when the revolutionary wave, expected to begin in Germany and end in Australia, failed to materialise.

This defeatism now characterises the whole line of the Party, since the policy is, that it should function only as a portion of a united front with the fraternal organisations and the A.L.P., in which its independent identity will be obscured. While verbally maintaining an opposition to Fascism the C.C. is here adopting a reformist line.

The acceptance of the indefinite stabilisation of World Capitalism means the acceptance of the indefinite partial stabilisation of Australian Capitalism, and thus of the approach of a period in which it



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all be possible to win small concessions from the capitalists. At the same time, it means in practice, in spite of denials, the inevitability of Fascism in Australia and other countries.

The sinking of the independence of the Party and the capitulation to Fascism follows directly from the line of Socialism in one country, which is accepted, not only by the C.C., but by the C.I., and which is only possible with a continued stabilisation of capitalism. Any immediate and sudden deepening of the crisis is, in this view, out of the question, and it is implied that the best thing that the Australian and other parties can do for the time being, is to enlighten the workers concerning conditions in the Soviet Union. That this is generally accepted by the C.P. of A. is shown by the following facts :-

- a. The prominence given to F.O.S.U. propaganda in the "W.W."
- b. The important place given to the F.O.S.U. in Party work.
- c. The fact that without exception, the students returning from the Soviet Union have only one idea of assisting the revolution, and that is by spreading propaganda about the conditions in Russia.
- d. The setting up of anti-war committees to support the peaceful development of the Soviet Union, without any connection with local struggles.

The policy of the C.C. has thus as its two main features a verbal demand for a united front against capitalism and an actual decline to a reformist position. This vacillating and defeatist policy is connected, as has been shown, with the subordination of the World Revolution to the building of Socialism in one country, and is further exemplified in the Party's attitude toward illegality.

#### (2) THE OVER-ESTIMATION OF THE ILLEGALITY DANGER

The policy of the C.C. in regard to illegality has also combined an actual retreat from struggle with a pretence at maintaining a revolutionary front. It has resulted --

- a. In the isolation of the leadership from the rank and file (childish conspiratorial work being indulged in, such as the hiding of prominent members of the C.C. instead of the building of an alternative leadership of the party composed of comrades unknown to the authorities as leading Party members).
- b. In a frantic campaign of expulsions in order to maintain a "united Party front" against the attacks of the bourgeoisie.
- c. In the almost complete dropping of independent work. (United front instead of Party meetings.)
- d. In a complete denial of bolshevik self-criticism and democratic centralism.

The C.C. took up the attitude that the Party was entering a period of crisis when it was necessary to maintain an iron discipline, and unswerving loyalty and confidence in the C.C. was demanded. Actually this demand for loyalty was a demand to allow the C.C. to "protect" itself and the Party from the bourgeoisie, by watering down the Party policy!

It can be understood that in a period of crisis, when a revolutionary party is being attacked from all sides and being driven underground, it would be necessary for instructions to be issued and carried out without the rank and file of the Party fully understanding the reasons for such instructions. Moreover, except for the purpose of deciding the best manner of putting them into effect, such instructions would be carried out without discussion. But such a position is only possible with a leadership which has gained experience in the struggle; that has the confidence of the rank and file; and that maintains contact with it however difficult this may be; and continually takes into consideration the experience and opinions of the lower organs of the Party and of individual members.

What will be the result, when a leadership, long isolated from the struggle, lacking courage, that has failed to win the confidence of the workers - or even have contact with any considerable section of them in the days of legal development of the Party - finds itself confronted with the possibility of illegality?

PANIC!

An overestimation of the danger!  
A mechanical attempt to apply a very theoretical knowledge of illegal work!

A decided tendency to liquidate the Party in order to provide an excuse for saving their own skins! Complete isolation of the higher from the lower organs! Hysterical appeals for "loyalty", and the branding of the critics of their spineless actions as provocateurs and renegades!

(3) THE INCORRECT POLICY IN REGARD TO THE FRATERNAL ORGANISATIONS

a. The liquidation of the Party by means of the fraternal organisations

Whatever role they are supposed to fulfil in theory, experience in Austria shows that the building of the fraternal organisations (in their present form) checks the growth of the Party, particularly in industry. They create organisational confusion and bureaucracy; cause the maintenance of social democratic forms of organisation etc.

Only one fraternal organisation, the U.W.M., can be said to have gained real mass support or to have been born of struggle. In fact, from the ranks of the U.W.M. have come the majority of the members of the Party, and it has supplied the forces for the building of the other fraternal organisations. With the exception of the F.O.S.U., which will be dealt with later, all the other fraternal organisations, Workers Defence Coms, Workers International Relief, League against Imperialism etc., have existed as mechanically set up propaganda groups. These organisations have seldom extended from their centres, which have provided safe harbours for opportunists and place-seekers. We find that, when the fraternal organisations re functioning, their activities overlap and that little independent work is left for the Party. At a time when the energy of the Party should have been turned in the direction of establishing itself in the factories and among the unemployed, it was wasted in the formation of fraternal organisations.

When the fraternal organisations were first set up, they were regarded merely as appendages of the Party, and were mechanically controlled by the Party fraction. Now it is the policy to deny the identity of the Party with the fraternal organisations, without however deceiving anyone or making for the building of the fraternal organisations by such opportunism.

The very nature of their organisation makes it impossible for the fraternal organisations to become anything but isolated sects, with no contact with the workers and therefore no connection with the struggle.

The setting up of these organisations is an example of mechanical instructions from the C.I., mechanically repeated by the various Communist Parties. Their centralised form and detachment from the masses that reflect corresponding features, not only in the Communist Parties, but in the C.I., which has never taken sufficient account of the conditions of the movement in each country.

b. Friends of the Soviet Union

This organisation has in Sydney and Melbourne gained a fairly large following. This does not mean that such justifies the need for a separate organisation to spread "the truth about the Soviet Union". The reason for its rapid development is found in the curiosity of the workers, regarding conditions in the Soviet Union, a curiosity that remained unsatisfied until the formation of the F.O.S.U. lecturers recently returned from Russia were speaking on a popular subject, and so could get a good hearing. The Five-Year Plan was something new, something to be discussed by even the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the F.O.S.U. provided a haven for those worn out and romantic revolutionaries, whose idea of the class struggle was dwelling in a golden day-dream about the building of Socialism in Russia, ready to applaud the achievements of the Russian workers, but not ready to do anything for Socialism in their own country.

The failure to connect the propaganda of the F.O.S.U. with local struggles, has led inevitably to the falling away of the popular interest which was at first aroused. The Second Five-Year Plan, despite the claims made for it, in obviously exciting less interest among the workers than the first. This is because it can not be shown that the Russian workers are fighting alongside the rest of the world's workers for a common object. The relationship of the internal and foreign policy of the Soviet Union to the World Revolution, has not been demonstrated. We have merely had exposures of the wicked bourgeoisie, who wish to sabotage the Soviet industry and destroy international peace. Even these exposures have not been put in a form readily understandable by the average worker. The F.O.S.U. thus appears as a non-revolutionary organisation - a provider of popular lectures - and as such is bound to decline still further. ..11

The question might be raised as to why the M.M. has stagnated, when, as distinct from the other fraternal, it was supposed to be based on industry and to be in the forefront of the class struggle. It is enough to say that the M.M. has failed to play a decisive part in any struggle, although its line has often been adopted spontaneously by the workers. The M.M. reflects all the evasion of struggle shown by the C.P. of A. It has suffered, and still suffers, from excessive centrism, and has been mechanically set up from above. It has been an ineffective substitute for the working of Party fractions in the factories (the latter being, as Piatnitsky shows, the settled policy of the bolsheviks), and has merely provided Party members with an excuse for evading struggle on the job.

(a) The U.W.M. and the United Front.

If the line laid down by Piatnitsky had been followed in the building of the U.W.M., many errors would have been avoided. Piatnitsky said that in countries where the Red Trade Unions (and the M.M.) are closely connected with the Party, there the unemployed organisations should be entirely apart and free.

The M.M. in this country, is and always has been identified with the Party. Yet we have the spectacle of the Party openly building the U.W.M. and then proclaiming it far and wide as a component part of the M.M. Well-known members of the Party were placed in control and changed whenever the Party thought fit without any consideration for the views of the rank and file of the U.W.M. Was it any wonder that the organisation became labelled "communist" and developed sectarianism?

When the sectarianism of the Party had so impregnated the U.W.M. that most of the social democratic members had been driven away in disgust, and the A.L.P. leadership had taken the opportunity of declaring it a "banned" organisation the Party decided to abolish it and set about building a loose form of organisation on the line of the united front as then conceived by the C.C. The way in which this was carried out is another instance of the arrant stupidity with which they approach all problems concerning the rank and file of the fraternal. Despite the fact that the U.W.M. was widely advertised as a "non-party" organisation under rank and file control, the decision to abolish it came from ABOVE -- FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY! No attempt was made to call a national conference of the U.W.M. to decide the matter - no attempt was even made to acquaint the remaining branches of this decision, instead, the executive committee of the U.W.M. was deliberately sabotaged by the C.C. and put out of existence, while the leadership of the unemployed was mechanically transferred to the "United Front of Employed and Unemployed" set up under the guidance of S. Moran at 107 George Street West.

The whole significance of the united front tactic was lost to the Party leadership. Instead of following the line laid down by Piatnitsky, who advocated that where the organisational machinery existed among the unemployed, that machinery should be used as a basis for the building of the united front; we find the Party setting up the "united front" as a parallel organisation to the U.W.M.

All the mistakes made by the Party in the U.W.M. were repeated and magnified in their application of the united front tactic. Comrade Moran, a prominent Communist candidate at the time, was mechanically placed in the leadership. The "U.W.M." came out with columns of material about the new organisational form of the unemployed. Regardless of the fact that the theory at the time was for a United Front from Below, national committee, state and district councils were set up from ABOVE, without any concrete mass work being done among the workers to gain support for the new organisational form. The consequence was that various Councils etc. were set up representing only a very small section of the unemployed, and the organisation was more sectarian than ever.

Later, it was suddenly discovered that the "united front" was a "tactic" and much rationalising was indulged in regarding the incorrect application of the united front from below; but instead of abolishing the so-called State Committee of the U.F. of E & U. and getting down to the concrete work of forming unemployed committees around the rick shops, etc., (building from below) they once more mechanically changed the name of the organisation to the State Unemployed Council, and carried on as before - building from above.

Through the criminal errors of the Party leadership, the unemployed today are in a state of disorganisation more chaotic than ever before. They have gone back to the days prior to the formation of the U.W.M. and the members of the few existing organisations are confused and

confused and bewildered as to what is being done. So thoroughly has the unemployed movement been disrupted that it could be said without exaggeration, that paid agents of the bourgeoisie could have done no better!

(4) Growth of Bureaucracy.

The most damning indictment that can be levelled at the C.C. is their dishonesty of criticism; their adoption of correct resolutions and theses yet their refusal to put them into effect, even to the extent of sabotaging the desire of the rank and file to apply the instructions and directives sent out to them.

A few examples of this dishonest criticism are :-

- (a) Criticism of right opportunism and bureaucracy.
- (b) Talk of factory organisation.
- (c) Talk of the need for struggle.

The machinery of the Party makes it possible for a leadership of right-opportunists to maintain control under the cloak of "correct" resolutions and directives. The Party organisation is not only over-centralised, but has created such a variety of organisational forms that the main activity of the membership has become that of maintaining an organisational routine. Mechanical directives from the centre filter through finally to the units without having received any concretisation on the way. Until recently, (though an attempt is now being made to correct this) there has been a multiplication of departments, which, instead of making for a "division of labour", merely make for a lack of co-ordination of activities, most of the time of the active Party functionary being spent in attending useless meetings, at which precisely the same questions are brought up.

This over-estimation of the role of the apparatus has resulted in the Party machinery becoming an obstacle in the way of further progress, an unhealthy growth that, while preventing the independent activity of the Party, must eventually react upon itself and destroy the Party. The formation of the fraternalists still further intensifies the position, makes for hosts of functionaries, stupid duplication of work, and numerous offices, until, when carried to its logical conclusion we find that the whole movement turns within its own radius instead of spreading out amongst the workers. But long before this process is complete, decay has already set in and the machine begins to tumble under its own weight.

Why is it, it may be asked, that this over-estimation of the role of the apparatus has not been overcome by the pressure of the rank and file of the Party, when so many become sick of endless meetings and soon realise that something is wrong? The answer lies in the undemocratic centralism developed within the Party.

The machinery of the Party tends to create a special kind of bureaucrat who is a product of his environment and training, and who cannot see any other need than that of attending to the functions of the machine that has created him. Therefore, revolts on the part of those whose experience in mass work has developed their initiative and understanding are easily suppressed, because criticism is only allowed if it will not damage the machine; only if it will not menace the power of the bureaucrats. The C.C. enforces obedience without discussion. For this reason the leading positions in the Districts and Sections must be filled by those who are distinguished by one thing only -- a blind acceptance of directives from above!

Gradually, as the mistakes become evident, those Party members who are capable of thinking for themselves, realise that the fault lies with the C.C., and so they are slowly eliminated from all positions, or expelled from the Party to make way for newer and more subservient elements. Thus in time the main activity of the leadership becomes directed towards preserving a gradually weakening structure, for without weakening the structure they must surely be overthrown.

All this involves the denial of inner Party democracy. Had Party democracy been observed, had it been possible for criticism of the leadership to be made by lower organs of the Party, if questions were allowed to be discussed fully before a decision was made, then we would not have had the weakening of the movement through the growth of factions, and the expulsions of numerous Party members. Instead of a violent and long suppressed revolt that splits the Party in two, and must eventually result in the formation of a new Party, the change would have come about more gradually and naturally.

The bureaucracy of the Party reflects the bureaucracy of the C.I., and indeed, was largely brought about .. along with the transition from left-sectarianism to right opportunism .. under the influence of the C.C. representative. From the C.I. also, formal instructions are sent out without sufficient understanding of the special problems of each area, and without provision for the development of initiative on the part of the sections, and thus for the concrete carrying out of the instructions. In the C.I. as in the C.P.of.A. no congress is held, discussion on fundamental issues is not carried through the sections, no local contributions to method or theory are allowed for, and divisions in the organisation (especially the position of expelled members) are explained to the sections either inadequately or not at all.

It is to be emphasised, that the bolshevism of the sections can take place only if there is local initiative, and not by the mere laying down of conceptions, lines of action, and forms of organisation from above. (5) Opportunism and the mechanical lead for struggle.

(a) Failure in mass work.

The mass work of the Party is characterised by consistent opportunism, expressed in a dependence upon the spontaneous upsurge of the masses. Instead of giving a lead, of calling for struggle, the Party line is to leave the question for the workers to decide. Notable examples are the Questionnaire struggle and the line of the P.W.I.U. Instead of an intensive campaign against the Dob Questionnaire to culminate in a demand that the paper should not be signed; a picketing of the dumps on the first day; and a continuation of the agitation, if the first round failed to rally mass support, ..instead of this line of organised resistance, the workers were merely asked to burn the forms, and it was pointed out at the same time, that if sufficient could not be organised to do this, nothing would be done. "The militants shall not be victimised" it was stated. Naturally, such a suggestion of defeat in the beginning of the campaign prevented the possibility of success and gave an opportunity for Gardiner to attack the leaders of the agitation.

The P.W.I.U. under the leadership of Norman Jeffery, has twice approached the question of a strike in the pastoral industry (1932-33) by circularising the various centres, asking for the opinion of the shearers on the question. The intention was, of course, to call a strike should the majority decide that way. What an opportunistic substitute for the work of energetically preparing a campaign under the leadership of the P.W.I.U. with a definite call to action.

Another form of this opportunism is shown by the substitution of deputations to the Government for local mass work around immediate demands. Outstanding examples are the deputations on Feb. 27th, 1933 (I.U.D) and the deputation of the W.I.R. on May 17th, 1933. In both cases a list of immediate demands was presented and gracefully received by the government. The organisers admit that nothing can be gained by such a procedure, but say: "We must first convince the workers that deputations are no good, and then we will take other action." This in spite of the fact that the vast majority of the workers are unaware that a deputation is taking place, and therefore are not likely to be disillusioned when nothing results, nor are they likely to rally to a call for struggle given by those who so lack confidence in the workers and in their own revolutionary line, as to not only support, but to organise around a line of action that they know to be futile.

On the previous International Unemployed Day (1932), weak tactics were also employed. Two thousand responded to the call for a demonstration, and speeches were made to them in the Sydney Domain whilst a deputation waited on the Government. The Govt. refused to see the deputation, and the workers, when this was reported to them, desired to demonstrate before Parliament House. No lead was given them, however, by the leading Party members present, they merely advised the workers to go back to their respective districts and organise.

Opportunism is also shown by the adoption of indefinite slogans, and the issuing of confused and contradictory directives. While creating an impression that a lead has been given, these tactics actually sabotage any possibility of struggle. The slogan "AGAINST 48 HOURS - STRIKE!" put forward some months ago, was so confusing that the average worker could not understand it. Instead of a positive lead, following a clear analysis of the position, and a review of the work already done, the April 1933 issues of the "W.W." came out with a negative slogan: "DON'T WORK 48 HOURS!"

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...14

When, following a "left" lead, the Glebe agitation against the Questionnaire developed unexpected mass support, everything that could be done to sabotage the struggle was done by the Party leadership. Contrary directives were sent out. Calls to support the Thursday night meeting (Oct. 27th) were made and cancelled at the last moment by the D.C. Secretariat, who apparently vacillated when faced with concrete struggle, and attempted to prevent the meeting being held.

It was obvious that the best way to call off the meeting (if they realised that the meeting was an incorrect move) was to come to the place of assembly and cancel it. This they failed to do, but adopted the opportunistic tactic of attempting to alienate mass support by notifying units and sections at the last moment of the cancellation. However, this belated change of front did not succeed in preventing the workers from rallying, and so the Party members (now in opposition) who were present, knowing nothing of the last minute decision, carried on until the meeting was smashed up by the police. On the following night (Oct. 28th), a mass meeting assembled at the Glebe Town Hall. This meeting, which was much larger than that of the previous night, was resentful of the terrorist tactics of the police, and could have been utilised to raise the struggle to a higher plane. Once more, however, the Party leadership vacillated, and when told to move on by the police, led the retreat to the Post Office corner and held a "tolerated" meeting, from which, disgusted with the timidity of the leaders, the workers soon drifted away. Thus, what should have been a mere incident in the struggle, terminated in an ignominious climax.

The campaign of sabotage has continued with the clumsy handling of the Eatock "frame-up" (loss of funds, petition forms with only Payne & Moran's names etc., declaring of mass united front committees "Bogus".) Taking recent work as a whole, there has not been the same tendency as before to issue periodical calls for action without taking any definite steps to see that the campaign is developed. Rather, the tendency now is to drag in the tail of the workers struggles, and, instead of making any improvement in Party mass work, to drop even a pretence of mass work.

#### (b) The Eatock Case

This case bids well to go down in the annals of revolutionary movement as one in which the Party surpassed itself in exposing its bureaucracy, sectarianism and opportunism. Briefly, the facts of the case are these ...

Noel Eatock, a member of the Opposition, was awarded 2½ years imprisonment for the part he was alleged to have taken in the Glebe Questionnaire struggle of October 1932. This sentence is the heaviest that has been inflicted on a class-war prisoner since the I.W.W. "frame-up" in 1917. Despite the fact that this sentence marked the beginning of the new Fascist methods being adopted by the government, nothing was done by the Party or the I.L.D. (under the control of the Party) to develop mass support around this case. For seven months nothing was done in the way of setting up Defence Committees to fight for the release of Eatock. Certainly the need for these committees was stressed in the "Workers Weekly" and "Red Leader" mechanically at intervals, but the only activity of the Party and the I.L.D. was to appeal for cash, presumably for the payment of legal expenses and the upkeep of the apparatus.

Owing to the vacillation and sabotage of the Party when the Glebe struggle was at its height, the resentment of the workers was allowed to abate as shown in the previous section. This made the task of re-awakening interest in the case much more difficult, especially as no concrete attempt had been made during the struggle to set up mass Defence Committees.

As the struggle occurred in Glebe, it was obvious that Glebe should form the centre of the campaign around the release of Eatock and the other comrades who were arrested and faced with him. Working upon this assumption, (in an absence of a lead from the I.L.D.) the Glebe Unemployed Association decided to organise a welcome home to Ordes Payne, Moran, and Southco, who had been arrested at the same time as Eatock but who, having received only short sentences, were soon to be released. This welcome home was a huge success, more than 550 workers attending. Volunteers were called for to form a mass Eatock Defence Committee, and the motion for the setting up of this Committee was seconded by the Nat. Secretary of the I.L.D.

thirty-three workers offered their services and held their first meeting a few days later. About three Party members were on the committee and put forward an argument that the I.L.D. Nat. Committee be recognised as the controlling body and that all cash collected be forwarded to them. After discussion this was rejected by the mass committee, because, as was pointed out by various members it was the duty of the I.L.D. to work as part of a united front committee, and, by virtue of its superior ability and example, gain ideological control. It was also pointed out that as the I.L.D. had failed to organise any mass support around this case during the seven months at its disposal, it could hardly expect to mechanically take control of a committee that had been set up without any assistance from the I.L.D. When this decision had been reached by the mass committee the sectarian attitude of the Party members became manifest in their refusal to take any further part in the proceedings. Instead of remaining on the committee and working as a fraction and attempting to prove that their line was correct, they acted like pampered and spoilt children.

The following week a slanderous article appeared in the "Red Leader" describing the Eatock Defence Committee as bogus and anti-working class, and stating that members of it were police agents. This article was based upon a resolution that was carried at a "stacked" meeting of the Central Committee of the I.L.D. Whereas previously the I.L.D. Central Committee was composed of only a few members, on this occasion no less than 13 Party members were present, presumably for the purpose of ideologically controlling the 5 nonparty members who were there! Comrade Moran, under instructions from the Party, sabotaged the Defence Committee's appeal to the Trades and Labour Council and reiterated the allegations of the "Red Leader" before Council. Collection lists sent out by the committee were confiscated by Party members and the money sent in to the I.L.D. central office. Members of the Globe and Balmain I.L.D. locals were instructed to withdraw from the Defence Committee, and expelled because they refused to do so. Comrade Sharkey, a leading member of the Party, stated at Balmain 21/5/33 that "The reason that the Eatock Defence Committee had been declared anti-working class, was because there was a police agent in its ranks". Because a member of the committee made an appeal for Eatock from the platform of Donald Grant in the Balmain on Sunday 4/6/33, a vicious attack was launched against the committee from the I.L.D. platform, the defence committee being taunted with speaking from a "Social-Fascist" platform.

It is very clear from the foregoing that the C.C. has no desire that Eatock should be released. We cannot admit that they are so incapable, so politically backward as to misunderstand the line of the International Red Aid. There must be other and deeper reasons for their apparent stupidity. It is no mere petty spite against individuals that compels them to smash a committee that they fail to control mechanically, rather it is the inherent fear of struggle, based upon opportunism, that forces them to swing further and further to the "right" in their frantic attempts to avoid anything in the nature of concrete action.

It is well-known to the C.C. that certain expelled members of the Party on the Eatock Defence Committee are putting forward a line of mass struggle, and are actively organising a mass demonstration around the case. So the C.C. must hurry along with its work of sabotage in order to avoid the repercussions that might centre around themselves, resulting from this demonstration. However, so futile are their tactics in dealing with the position, that this case alone may become the pivot around which the leadership of the Party will whirl to destruction. Day by day, as the more persistent work of the Eatock Defence Committee becomes more apparent, the hypocrisy of the C.C. becomes clearer to the rank and file of the Party and the militant workers. Harassed on all sides, they are driven into making the most feeble statements in defence of their attitude. Comrade Sharkey's statement at Balmain is a fair example. To say that it is necessary to declare a mass committee anti-working class because there is a police agent on it, would be humorous if it were not tragic. We will not produce proofs that this man is a police agent. If you will not accept OUR ASSERTION WITHOUT PROOF then we will declare you anti-working class! That is the inference that can be taken from these statements. Thirty-three workers are declared anti-working class because they have not sublime faith in the infallibility of the leadership of the Communist Party. And so the Party withdraws its docile members from the mass campaign!

What majestic isolation!  
 What super-sectarianism!  
 What an opportunistic method of evading the struggle! ... 16

ORIGINAL SUPPORT OF THE I.L.D.

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Logically, the bourgeoisie have only to place an agent of the police on every committee or fraction set up by the Party, in order to cause the Party members to retire horror-stricken from the scene.

While taunting the Eatock Defence Committee with using the platform of Donald Grant they obviously forget that they themselves are seeking to form a united front with this same Donald and the Party to which he belongs, and their infantile jealousy because the Eatock Defence succeeds where they fail, is unbecoming to say the least of it, among revolutionaries.

Above all, their insincerity is shown by the fact that while the Eatock Defence is organising around a definite plan of action, they, the C. C. are doing nothing but vent their spleen against the only mass committee set up.

The sudden activity of the Party and the I.L.B. in the Eatock case is an admission of their previous criminal neglect, and is a direct reflection of the activities of the Eatock Defence Committee.

Perhaps the reason for the indifference of the Party leadership in this case may be found in the fact that members of the "Left Opposition" to the Russian Communist Party are being exiled and gaoled in the efforts of the Stalinist Bureaucracy to establish Socialism in one country, at the expense of the World Revolution.

(c) Anti-War Conference April 8th, 1933

This was a good example of a mechanical lead, a pretended call to the masses, but actually leading them away from the important issues of struggle. (Basic wage -cut, increased hours, etc.)

Pacifist conferences were held in all centres, representative of only a very small section of the workers, which accomplished nothing save the carrying of useless resolutions condemning war.

These conferences of all peace-loving citizens were obviously organised on C.I. instructions, but were merely social democratic in character and had no organisational force. If they were intended to initiate an "all national exposure" (to use Lenin's phrase), they were doomed to failure, because they were not linked with any demands except the vague demand for peace. There is a clear connection between this non-revolutionary activity of the F.O.S.U. and the policy of Socialism in one country.

Only the revolutionary strength of the movement on the ships and around the waterfront, in the industries and in the militia, will prevent Australian capitalism from participating in war; - but this work has been wilfully neglected for years.

(d) The attitude of the C.P. towards the Crimes Act.

The frank opportunism of the leadership of the Party is exposed very clearly in their conduct before the capitalist courts. A pathetic dependence on bourgeois "justice" was made manifest in the failure to organise mass support around the Devanny trial. Again, in their oft repeated statements that on the result of the Devanny trial depended the legality of the Party, they deliberately misled the workers. They were well aware at the time that the only issue was the liberty or otherwise of Devanny, but they attempted, by capitalising the Devanny trial, to convince the workers that the C.P. of A. was an immediate menace to Australian capitalism; while at the same time allowing all a titation around the Bankstown eviction case to lapse, since the Party, in its concern for legality, wished to cover up its adventurism in the eviction struggles. The release of Devanny by the capitalist court was a proof that the ruling class of this country realises the impotence of the C.P. had done anything to make itself a danger to capitalism in Australia, not only Devanny, but many other members of the Party would have been placed behind the bars, even if it became necessary to manufacture the evidence required for the purpose.

There is again an obvious similarity between the legalistic attitude adopted in this and other cases, and the policy of peace between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world.

6. THE APPEAL TO THE LABOUR PARTY

This appeal ("W.W." 21/4/33) shows in a striking way the opportunist, liquidationist and bureaucratic nature of the CC line. There has been no suggestion of discussion of the appeal throughout the party before such an

Actually, it is the only logical step to take in view of the collaboration which has already occurred with the social democrats under the plea of the united front, and in view of their persistent dragging in the tail of the struggle. But as a tactic, such action could only be correct, when, after a period of independent and fearless



leadership of the workers, the Party had convinced large sections of these workers that unity with the Labour Party was vitally necessary, and when it had itself such a mass following that the rank and file of the Labour Party would also demand co-operation, and would bring pressure to bear on their leaders with that end in view. Then, any refusal by the Leaders of the Labour Party would expose them before the masses, and in any case, real mass co-operation would be established.

Can it be said that such a situation exists today? The C.P. is largely discredited among the workers, especially in N.S.W. Instead of flocking towards the C.P., radicalised workers who are disgusted with the A.L.P. are talking of forming a new Labour Party. If, as is so often repeated, "the C.P. is the vanguard of the working class" and the workers had been convinced of this by a concrete application of the statement, would they not have instinctively swung over to the Party that had proved itself a real workers Party? The attempted formation of a new Party by the radicalised workers (Glebe break-away from A.L.P.) is a definite proof that it is insufficient to merely talk about being the vanguard of the working class.

To propose unity with the Labour Party under these conditions, simply means a further step to the right, and a further sinking of the independent political role of the C.P. It is creating in the minds of the workers the idea that the Labour Party leaders are capable of leading mass struggle, and is a complete denial of the role of "social Fascism" as previously laid down by the Party.

It is obvious that if the programme of demands as published in the "N.W." of 21/4/33 is accepted by the A.L.P. leaders, the fight must continue right up to the overthrow of capitalism. To say that "We will agree not to attack the leaders of the A.L.P. during the common action against the capitalist offensive," thus means a complete renunciation of any further exposure of these reactionary leaders. Moreover, the appeal for a common stand against Fascism could only be effective if Fascism was felt by the masses to be an immediate danger. Just as the catch cry of "social fascism" was mechanically adopted by the Party without explanation or discussion, so this appeal will fail to arouse the masses owing to the neglect of the Party to educate the rank and file.

The C.I. appeal to the Second International, which is printed with the local appeal, and has obviously inspired it, is the best possible illustration of the opportunism of the C.I. itself. The document contains no criticism of the C.P. of Germany, no explanation of its failure to take effective action against Hitler. It is said for example, that the "C.P. of Germany repeated its proposal for common action at the moment of the arrival of Hitler to power, and called on the central committee of the Social Democratic Party and the executive of the C.G.T. to organise the resistance to Fascism, but, this time also, it was rejected."

Despite its six million votes at the previous election, it would appear that the C.P. of G. had no resource at the moment of crisis except to call upon those whom it had denounced as "social fascists", and who, as it knew from long experience were incapable of organising the workers for struggle. The C.I. offers no criticism of this apparent inaction, and "Pravda" states that the Communist vote of four and a half millions at the subsequent elections "is a worthy answer to Fascism."

The C.I. and its various sections show their opportunism by endeavoring to gain support for a united front on the basis of the Fascist attacks on the social democrats, whilst at the same time, concealing the errors of the C.P. of G. in the moment of crisis, and is a sure sign of the abdication of the C.I. as the vanguard of the revolution. It is obvious that this posthumous alliance can offer no advantages to either the S.D.P. Bureaucrats or the masses to whom the C.P. has failed to give a lead, for only a new record of independent leadership can secure future mass support.

It may be added that even if mass co-operation is achievable in Germany where Fascist terror is raging, the appeal issued by the C.P. of A. to the N.S.W. Labour Party would still be of no account politically. The leader of the A.L.P. has more to fear from the assistance of the C.P. than from its opposition, and the rank and file of the Labour Party will not rally to a Communist Party which is divorced from the masses and gives no concrete lead.

The errors existing in the C.I. are ultimately traceable to the divergence of the policy of building Socialism in the U.S.S.R. from the policy of the World Revolution, a divergence which has been criticised, Russia has shown herself only too willing to provide a

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by the description of the U.S.S.R. as "The Workers' Fatherland", though the workers in the capitalist countries are well aware that they have no control over it, and that it can be of no material benefit to them.

In the C.I., throughout its history, there has been an over-emphasis on Russian problems, and an attempt to apply Russian experience mechanically to other countries. There is no comparison between the revolutionary position of the Bolshevik Party in Russia and the present position of the C.I. in the world, yet an attempt has been made to organise the latter in the same way, and to impose the same discipline. The expectation of an early revolution led to many shortcomings being overlooked in the past, but this, in view of the failure to deal effectively with the Fascist menace, is no longer possible. A sounder basis than ever before must be laid in mass work, and the present opportunist defeatism, - due to reaction from undue optimism - must be corrected on all fronts, by the development of initiative on a basis of continuous struggle.

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#### THE POSITION OF THE WORKERS PARTY

We, the members of the Workers Party (Left Opposition) believe that:

The past failure to combat right-opportunism in the C.P. of A is responsible for the fact, that when the working class of this country is faced with the introduction of Fascism, and a consequent worsening of conditions, the proletariat finds itself without an experienced revolutionary party capable of leading it in the struggle.

We unhesitatingly condemn the Executive Committee of the Communist International for failing to insist that its directives re the bolshevisation of the Party are properly carried out; for its support of the present right wing leadership of the C.P. of A. composed mostly of right-opportunists censured by the E.C.C.I. in 1929; and for the super-controlism that has stifled the initiative of the Party in this country, and in all sections of the Communist International.

The political basis for this failure can be traced to the contradiction that exists between the foreign policy of the Soviet Union (which dominates the C.I.) and the policy of World Revolution which the Communist International professes to uphold.

We declare that the main task of the Workers Party is to fight for the building of the revolutionary party in the factories and places of work; for the liquidation of the present social-democratic forms of organisation, and for the fearless leadership of the mass struggles of the workers.

We also declare our determination to carry on, before the whole working class, a relentless struggle against all forms of opportunism both within and without the Communist Party.

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