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**Federal Intelligence Service FIS**

# SWITZERLAND'S SECURITY



Situation Report 2012  
of the Federal Intelligence Service FIS



# Switzerland's Security 2012





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## Fit for the future

Since the last overview published by the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS), Switzerland's strategic environment has changed yet again. I would like to draw attention specifically to the upheavals in the Arab world. These have surprised all observers and revealed the limitations of predictions, and now present challenges to the Federal Council. It, too, must deal with the uncertainty resulting from the multiplicity of potential developments and risks. The 'Arab Spring' is an example of how unexpectedly, rapidly and fundamentally conditions can change. Our country's government needs tools that will enable it to categorize, analyse and reduce these uncertainties. The intelligence service provides just such a tool.

In this report, the FIS analyses these and other developments relevant to Switzerland's security and locates them on its new 'situation radar'. This time, the analysis is even less a report looking back on the past year, and more a comprehensive analysis of the threats at the time of publication. My intention has been to place greater emphasis on looking from the present to the future. At the same time, I am convinced that this overview is necessary in order to enable the early detection of risks and threats to Switzerland's security. It is the prerequisite for an effective security policy.

Two years after the establishment of the FIS, I regard our achievements to date as promising. In these, I include the resolution of outstanding issues in the area of data management, which is proceeding according to schedule. However, managing data in a way that is simultaneously lawful, efficient and effective is a constant challenge. It is also important now to make the service fit for the increased and growing challenges it faces. For this purpose, Switzerland needs a new intelligence service law. I am convinced that amendments to the current legal position are necessary in order for us to meet the new challenges. I am equally convinced that this improvement to the FIS's 'fitness' is compatible with the protection of the fundamental rights of all our citizens. Switzerland's security and the protection of fundamental rights are both high priorities. Reconciling these and defending both of them remain key functions of our state. The intelligence service law will have to provide the means for resolving the conflict of aims between security and the safeguarding of privacy in a measured way.

Federal Department of Defence,  
Civil Protection and Sport DDPS




Ueli Maurer  
Federal Councillor





# Switzerland's strategic environment





## Strategic environment in a state of flux

### The European debt crisis and the Arab Spring

Switzerland's strategic environment has changed during this reporting period. The debt crisis in Europe and the radical restructuring of Europe's southern neighbourhood by the Arab Spring have called long-held certainties into question and changed the outlook for the future.

The European debt crisis is jeopardising European integration, a strategic achievement which has been the cornerstone of half a century of peace and prosperity in Europe. It has placed European institutions under unprecedented market pressure, putting the stability of Europe's entire economic development at stake. The EU is fighting to save the single currency. Some member states are threatened with bankruptcy. The Eurozone is confronted with the prospect of drastic austerity measures and years of negative growth. European governments face the challenges of empty coffers and rising social tensions and populist tendencies. The crisis is also increasing the pressure to step

up political integration in order to stabilize the euro – be it within the framework of the EU-27, the economic and monetary union of the EU-17 or an even smaller core of Eurozone countries which are willing to cooperate. It is also foreseeable that there will be setbacks in the schedule for the integration of Eastern Europe and the Balkans into the EU.

Switzerland is in many respects an integral part of Europe: although it is cushioned from many problems by its extremely solid financial position, it cannot isolate itself from the continent's problems and it faces major challenges itself. The strong Swiss franc, the slowdown in economic growth and the considerable uncertainty in the financial sector are clear signs of this. Stabilization of the Eurozone is undoubtedly extremely important economically. Stronger economic and political integration in Europe would, however, also further widen the differences between the EU judicial area and that of Switzerland in certain sectors. In many areas, such as financial and fiscal policy, but also with regard to transport policy and collaboration on security policy, the pressure on our country to adapt will therefore remain generally high.


The Arab Spring has destabilized decades-old autocratic regimes in Europe's southern neighbourhood. The outcome of this process is still uncertain. In the best-case scenario, new governments will attempt to fulfil their populations' high expectations in terms of increased freedom, social justice and economic development, thus laying the foundations for a better



Edition of the al-Qaeda propaganda magazine published to mark the anniversary of the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001.

future for large sections of the population. In the worst-case scenario, instability, economic setbacks and violent confrontation will proliferate and possibly also lead to renewed international interventions of one form or another or to the emergence of new fundamentalist or authoritarian regimes. Switzerland supports the reforms. However, it is not immune from the risks emerging on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The priority here is the potential threat to the security of the Swiss community and of diplomatic institutions in this area. However, the risk of terrorism and the outflow of weapons resulting from the destabilization of states, disruption of trade and of energy supplies, the handling of international sanctions, clearing up the problem of dictators' assets, and migration from crisis areas to Europe are all becoming increasingly significant problems.

The long-term consequences of this change in the strategic environment are not yet totally clear. There are considerable risks, but also opportunities for positive developments. The consequences of the financial and economic crisis seem to be accelerating the trend toward multipolarity, yet they also pose risks for the economies of emerging powers. Furthermore, it should be noted that other strategic developments affecting Switzerland have remained stable during the current reporting period (for example as regards military threats and energy security) or have even taken a turn for the better (for example successes in combating terrorism). The following section will provide an overview of further important issues on the Federal Intelligence Service's (FIS) radar.



#### **New 'situation radar' tool**

Since 2011, the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) has been using a new tool called situation radar to represent the threats affecting Switzerland. This tool clearly shows, using a diagram and accompanying explanatory text, which threats to Switzerland's security FIS and other agencies of the Swiss National Intelligence Community assess as being current or as being likely to intensify in the near or more distant future. Although this tool does not permit direct conclusions to be drawn as to the scope of the threat or the scale of potential damage, it enables security-policy decision makers to gain an integral overview of the situation. For the present situation report, a simplified version of the situation radar has been produced, which does not contain any classified information. Unlike the situation radar produced for security-policy decision makers, this public version also omits some threats which do not fall within the FIS's core remit and are dealt with by other agencies (such as the general crime situation or the threat from organized crime).

**Proliferation: many and varied risks**

As far as efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems are concerned, the focus of attention remains on Iran and North Korea. In November 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressed its concern about Iran's activities in the clearest terms. In a credible and detailed report, it documented its suspicions that Iran was not using its nuclear project purely for civilian purposes, but had for years secretly been working to develop a nuclear weapon. In February 2012, the agency reported on further progress in the Iranian uranium enrichment programme.

The existence of different judicial areas complicates matters considerably where proliferation is concerned. Switzerland is integral to international efforts to contain the risks associated with proliferation and has a particular interest in doing so: as a centre of high technology, it is more exposed to procurement attempts than other countries. If sanctions make it more difficult to acquire critical components in the EU, there is an increased probability that transactions will be carried out via Switzerland to circumvent these difficulties. Switzerland therefore implements its international obligations and endeavours to coordinate its measures with those of the EU. In this way, it actively protects its industry from the misuse of these technologies and the attendant consequences. International sanctions against Swiss companies which – knowingly or unknowingly – have breached international rules of law have the potential to cause major systemic damage to

our economy: they would pose a threat to Switzerland as a centre of knowledge and ultimately even as a business location.

The financial and economic crisis further increases the risk of proliferation. On the one hand, the crisis is intensifying cost pressures and accelerating the outsourcing of production abroad. This carries with it the risk of the manufacturer losing a degree of control over the proliferation of his know-how. If a firm based in Switzerland has critical subsystems manufactured abroad, this may also undermine government non-proliferation measures. On the other hand, the financial and economic crisis is also causing increased cash-flow problems for industry and triggering cost-cutting efforts which can lead some suppliers to take greater risks in dealings with proliferation-sensitive countries in order to rescue crucial sectors of their business.

In addition to intensive international cooperation to combat illegal procurement attempts, the FIS continues to work closely together with cantonal and municipal police services on a prevention programme – Prophylax – with the aim of raising awareness in Switzerland's business and research communities of the threat posed by proliferation and espionage, as well as by cyber attacks.

### **The fight against terrorism: successes and continuing threats**

2011 marked a milestone in the fight against jihadist terrorist activity worldwide. The killing of Osama bin Laden and many of the core al-Qaeda leaders has left the organization in disarray. Many years of effort by the international community to combat the organization have reduced its capabilities, possibly permanently. Al-Qaeda's affiliates, however, continue to grow, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region, and have now themselves become a significant threat to Western interests. Switzerland has already had to deal with kidnappings in the Sahel region in the past and has now once more been confronted with abductions, this time in Pakistan and the Philippines. In April 2011, Swiss citizens were among the victims of a jihad-motivated terrorist attack in Morocco. In addition, jihad-motivated travel poses a considerable security risk both to the countries of destination and to the countries of origin, including Switzerland.

As far as foreign ethno-nationalist terrorist groups in Switzerland are concerned, activities depend very much on the situation in their respective countries of origin. In the case of the Kurdish PKK, the radical wing is opposed to negotiations between the Turkish government and moderate Kurdish organizations. Attacks on security forces remain the norm. However, there are also occasional attacks on tourist centres in Turkey. In Switzerland, the numerous protests generally pass off without violence.

Switzerland has adopted domestic measures and is supporting international efforts in the fight against terrorism as an important component of efforts to reduce the risks to the security of our country and its citizens.

### **Right- and left-wing extremism**

Violent extremism in Switzerland is not on a scale that poses a danger to the state. The huge publicity given to the attacks in Oslo and Utøya in Norway and the discovery of the so-called Zwickau cell in Germany makes it particularly important to state this. In Switzerland, right-wing extremism, unlike left-wing extremism, has not been notable for acts of violence for some time now. However, the potential for violence in both circles remains. The worst acts of violence here in Switzerland (letter bomb sent to Swissnuclear in Olten in March 2011,



Arson attack on the Federal Criminal Court  
in Bellinzona (Ticino), 17 January 2011

attempted bomb attack on IBM in Rüslikon in April 2010) revealed links with left-wing extremist / anarchist circles in Italy. It is not yet clear whether the ideologically heterogeneous left-wing extremist circles in Switzerland, who are prepared to use violence, intend to use such links to raise their violence level in Switzerland. So far, they have not managed to subvert any of the non-violent protest movements in Switzerland.

**Illegal intelligence:  
a changing environment**

Countering illegal intelligence activity is a key task for any state seeking to defend its sovereignty. This is at once an age-old challenge and one that is being played out in a constantly changing political, economic and technological environment. Switzerland is the scene of diverse operations by foreign intelligence services. These are either targeted directly against Switzerland and its capacity to act or are aimed at securing economic competitive advantages or at monitoring and putting pressure on their own citizens in Switzerland. Intensifying economic competition combined with political upheavals, the shifting economic balance and technological revolutions are making it necessary to pay more attention to all aspects of illegal intelligence.

**Energy security:  
focus on gas rather than oil**

Decades of oil crises, gas pipeline shutdowns and price fluctuations have all contributed to making the general public conscious of Swit-

zerland's dependence on raw materials and energy imports. The planned shift in energy policy away from nuclear power following the accident at Fukushima in Japan will continue to exacerbate this dependence for a long time yet. The aftershocks of the Arab Spring have increased volatility on the commodities markets. There were also temporary disruptions in the volume of oil exports from the region. These led to price rises. However, Switzerland's security of supply has so far not been affected in any way, thanks to a well functioning international oil market. Where natural gas is concerned, however, the pattern of dependence is quite different: there is as yet no integrated international market, and there is a prevailing dependence on fixed pipeline systems. Europe, and thus also Switzerland, is not as reliant on the Arab states for its gas supplies, but is heavily dependent on Russia, and in future will be increasingly so.

**Military threats of secondary importance**

The military threat to our country remains low. A conventional war in Central Europe, which might also affect Swiss territory, is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The FIS anticipates that in the event of the renewed emergence of such a threat, Switzerland could count on an advance warning period of around ten years. In Russia, after long years of indecision, a serious reform of the armed forces is now underway. However, this will not produce substantial improvements in conventional capabilities until around the end of the decade. The advance warning period regarding devel-

opments on the periphery of Europe involving the use of military assets could, however, be significantly shorter. Likewise, it would be possible for a threat from distant regions, based on weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems, to emerge as early as the middle of the decade. A key challenge for security and defence policy in Europe will be to adapt the mission, scope and operational readiness of military forces to the already strained financial conditions, which will continue to deteriorate further over the years to come. Additional dilution of troop strengths and materials, which can be compensated for only in part by qualitative improvements, will be hard to avoid. Further bilateral and multilateral cooperative ventures to exploit synergies will continue to be an attractive proposition in future.

### Cyber threats

In the wake of the rapid development of information and communication technologies, the global digital network which has led to the emergence of cyberspace has opened up hitherto undreamt-of possibilities: information and services can be called up anywhere in the world, easily, cheaply and quickly.


At the same time, this high degree of interconnectedness in the digital age brings new threats. In the virtual arena, too, vandalism, criminality, espionage, sabotage and even conflicts between states are now a reality. Many of the crises and conflicts of recent years have, to a greater or lesser extent, featured a cyber component. The increasing interconnectedness of electronic networks and the ever-increasing opportunities for

#### Swisscoy

October 2011 marked the twelfth anniversary of the initial deployment of the Swiss army in Kosovo (Swisscoy). In 2011, Parliament agreed to the Federal Council's proposal to extend their mandate to the end of 2014. On this basis, Swisscoy is once again adapting itself flexibly to the changing needs on the ground, at a time when the NATO operation is gradually reducing its troop presence in Kosovo. Swisscoy's core competencies, besides air transport, lie principally in the areas of engineering support, explosive ordnance disposal and intelligence and information gathering. They are deployed primarily where the need is greatest, i.e. in the north of the country. At the beginning of 2012, Switzerland took over the northern regional command in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) liaison and observation network, and its contingent has been moderately increased for a limited period for this purpose. 2012 will also see the closure of Camp Casablanca in the south of the country and relocation to a new site.

infiltrating such networks make it possible even for criminals who are purely financially motivated to carry out an act that could pose a threat to or be harmful to the state. It is also becoming apparent that states and their intelligence services will increasingly rely on cyber attacks to supplement or replace their traditional activities.

# Focus: Arab Spring





## SITUATION

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### Political map of the Arab world

One year after the outbreak of the protests and revolts, the political map of the Arab world has changed significantly. The protest movements have led to regime change and plans for reform, but also to bloody power struggles. Some countries, however, have been affected only marginally by the upheaval.

### Countries in a state of flux:

#### Tunisia, Egypt, Libya – and Yemen

In Tunisia, where the Arab Spring started, a transformation process which gives grounds for optimism is under way. The elections and the formation of a constituent assembly have taken place within an orderly framework. The top posts were allocated in a reasonably consensus-based way. Nonetheless, the Tunisian people are beginning to voice criticism of the slowness of the process. In the long term Tunisia should, given the favourable conditions there, manage the transition to a reasonably democratic system.

In Egypt, the political power struggle between the new political groups and the military leaders from Mubarak's time is dragging on. It has become clear that the military council is insisting on having a certain amount of control over the transitional government and the parliament. The actual balance of power in the parliament and government will not become clear until months after the elections, when the parties form coalitions. For the winners of the election,

the Muslim Brotherhood, an alliance with liberal/secular forces would be advantageous, as a government coalition with the Salafists would isolate Egypt internationally. Fundamentally, however, it must be assumed that the worsening socio-economic situation will severely restrict the room for manoeuvre of any future government.

In Libya, the new powers that be will face the challenge over the next few years of unifying what are in part centrifugal forces so that they can establish a new state together. One of the most urgent challenges is to restore and then maintain public security. In addition, a balance will have to be found between the regions and thus indirectly also between the tribes. The use of oil revenues and of the assets recovered from the former dictator will play a key role in the internal power struggle in Libya. This issue will define the pending constitutional debate and become an important parameter for shaping the future system of government.

In Yemen, the protests have led to the major players agreeing to accept a compromise solution. This provides for the country to be ruled temporarily by the former vice president and a cabinet made up of equal numbers of representatives of the former ruling party and members of the opposition alliance. Yemen is thus once again putting off finding an actual solution until a later date. Developments to date indicate that at best there will be an agreement within the political elite – excluding the new protest move-

ment, which is demanding genuine democratization. There is little hope of an improvement in the desperate socio-economic situation, so Yemen will remain dependent on foreign aid for years to come.

### **Ongoing power struggle in Syria**

Confrontations between regime forces and heterogeneous and apparently uncoordinated opposition groups are intensifying. The conflict increasingly resembles a civil war being fought along sectarian lines. External pressure on Syria has also increased. Sanctions have been imposed on the country not only by the West, but also by the Arab League, which has suspended its membership. In the short term (six to twelve months), the regime will be able to withstand the military, political and economic pressure. In the medium term, however, it is unlikely that the regime will survive in its current form. Foreign military intervention seems unlikely at the present time. If the regime collapsed, the transition process would probably be chaotic and violent, as there are no opposition forces that would be in a position to replace the current system immediately. Chaotic circumstances in Syria could in turn affect the security and stability of an entire region, from Israel to Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and into Turkey, and could have an as yet incalculable impact on the nuclear dispute with Iran.

### **Reformist monarchies: Morocco, Jordan and Oman – with Bahrain as a special case**

There have also been repeated protest demonstrations in Morocco, Jordan and Oman, particularly in the past year, although these have not escalated the situation. Here, too, the rulers responded in each case with a mixture of repression in order to restore public order, minor political concessions and economic measures to temporarily improve conditions for the lower classes. Fundamentally, however, these countries remain autocratic systems which are allowing only a very restricted amount of democratization. In addition, these relatively poor monarchies lack the material resources to solve their worsening economic problems. They are therefore also increasingly dependent on material assistance from other Arab countries and from the West.

Bahrain, a Gulf monarchy which also has only limited resources, has so far remained an exception. Demonstrations against the Sunni minority regime were quickly suppressed by the security forces. Troops from neighbouring states belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council took on the task of protecting the infrastructure. These states are intent on using all means necessary to prevent a transfer of power, as this could also affect their own regimes. The internal political divisions in Bahrain have since become entrenched.

### **Barely touched by the Arab Spring**

Other countries in the region have been only marginally affected by the revolts and revolutions. In Iraq, the withdrawal of US troops at the end of 2011 marked the beginning of a new era, which will most probably continue to be plagued by internal conflicts. In Lebanon, the various communities are keeping a very close eye on events in Syria. Thus far, at least, developments there have not significantly impacted on the fragile internal situation in Lebanon. As a major oil and gas producer, Algeria, which for years has been facing socially motivated unrest, is in principle in a position, if necessary, to implement the economic measures required to counter any possible escalation. Most of the Gulf monarchies are similarly able at any time to sustainably alleviate material hardship among those in need.

### **The role of players from outside the region**

The USA is still by far the most influential external player in the region. Of those countries where there has been a transfer of power, Egypt is the most important to US policy in the region. The normalization of relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, which will in future form part of the coalition, is a key process which has been set in motion by the Obama administration but which still faces considerable hurdles domestically in the US Congress. The USA is heading an intensive coordination process vis-à-vis Syria in order to increase regional and international pressure on the regime, but without exceeding what Turkey, the Arab League and the UN Security Council are prepared to go

along with. The maintenance of stability in the Arab Gulf states remains of prime importance to the USA; the operations in the fight against terrorism, particularly in Yemen, the curbing of Iran's influence and the stabilization of Iraq are all intended to contribute toward this. To date, these long-term US efforts have not been substantially hindered by the Arab Spring. Having decided to devote more attention to the long-term challenges in Asia, however, the USA will want to avoid embarking on costly new military operations or nation-building undertakings in the Arab world.

The European powers – with vital military support from the USA – have managed to conclude operations in Libya successfully, but further interventions on a similar scale in the Arab world are not on the agenda; the military capabilities for this must at least in part be called into question. Even the task of coping with a humanitarian crisis such as might still develop in Syria would be heavily dependent on US support.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has lost much of its influence in the region. Today, this is largely restricted to limited arms relations with Syria, linked to harbour rights, and the power of its veto in the UN Security Council. Moscow played this card in Libya, resolutely at first, but ultimately without success. With the increasing isolation of the rulers in Damascus, the costs of this policy in relation to Syria are also mounting.

China's foreign policy in the region is heavily influenced by economic interests. Its priority is the necessary political stability, even if in the

Arab world this has to be ensured by means of an autocratic regime. China only deviates from its creed of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country where multilateral bodies such as the African Union or the Arab League have first paved the way. It is to be assumed that China will essentially adapt to the new circumstances in the Arab World. It is not expected to lend active support to reform processes.

## ASSESSMENT

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### Young activists and traditional driving forces

One year after the protest movement began, the question of whether the Arab world is really undergoing an epoch-making change arises. The fall of three regimes within the space of a year (Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) coupled with ongoing political and military internal conflicts (Yemen and Syria) constitute a radical new departure for the region. In Tunisia and Libya, a return to the old regime is not an option. In Egypt, the political confrontation between the old and the new is continuing. A long period of violent struggle still lies ahead for Syria.

The young activists who started the protests with their demands for dignity and liberty have diminished as a social force. The driving forces are now traditional interest groups, which are exploiting the Arab peoples' desire for change and the weaknesses of the state authorities in order to implement their own political and social demands.

While the Islamists were not the driving force behind the revolts, thanks to their relatively high degree of organization, they are now best placed to profit from the situation. Their first election successes in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco prove that they are not only well organized but also have a broad base of popular support. Once in power, the exponents of political Islam will have to put their abilities and desire to find practicable solutions to the test. It is inevitable that this will lead to conflict with

secular forces. The accompanying debate on the compatibility of democracy and Islam is at best in its infancy and is still characterized by considerable haziness surrounding many fundamental questions. In the current period of upheaval, it appears that no political models have yet emerged as an alternative to an authoritarian state, an Islamist regime (Iran) or the division of the country along ethnic and religious lines (as is feared will happen in Yemen). Tunisia is on the way toward establishing new political conditions that are appropriate to its situation. It is not yet possible to foresee what the situation in Iraq will be like when its current development eventually stabilizes. Conversely, Turkey serves as a model of how to combine Muslim traditions with political and economic development in a contemporary way.

### Shift in regional power relations

The upheavals that have taken place in the Arab world will in the longer term also affect the region as a whole, with its hitherto relatively rigid power relations, and possibly lead to a complete realignment. As the turmoil has developed an unpredictable momentum, it is too early to talk of clear winners and losers. Nonetheless, it is already possible on a strategic level to identify the first signs of changes which will shape the situation in the region over the medium to long term.

In Egypt, the various players are currently putting most of their energy into the internal

power struggle. If a new Sunni Arab republic manages to establish itself in Cairo, Egypt can be expected to resume a leading role in the Arab world in the medium to long term. At the same time, a new, more self-confident Egypt would probably want to distance itself somewhat from the West, to the extent that the economic necessities permit it to do so.

This prospect is a cause for concern in Israel, particularly since it might lead to an Egyptian foreign policy more strongly influenced by Islamist tendencies. At the present point in time, however, it is not anticipated that Egypt will revoke its peace treaty with Israel. Israel fears that the Sinai will become an uncontrolled zone, which would have an adverse impact on Israel's security. It is too early to tell how a new regime in Syria would deal with the status quo in the annexed Golan Heights. Even before the Arab Spring, Israel had lost Turkey as a regional ally.

Saudi Arabia regarded the toppling of the Egyptian regime by the democracy activists as a threat to the regional order. However, with its determined intervention to protect the monarchy in Bahrain and its decisive exertion of influence in favour of a political solution in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has, at least for the time being, been able to assert itself as an influential power within the Arab world – not least with an eye to Iran, its rival in the battle for supremacy in the Muslim world.

Qatar, even more than Saudi Arabia, could be entitled to see itself as having gained from the recent changes. This small emirate was one of the major forces behind the ending of Gadd-

afi's rule and the isolation of the Syrian regime. Although the country has substantial financial reserves, it is still questionable whether in the longer term it will be able to play a decisive role in the upheavals in the Arab world. Despite its purist Sunni orientation, Qatar maintains relatively good relations with Iran and at the same time is home to the largest and most important US air force base in the Gulf region.

Turkey had already started to take a greater interest in its Arab neighbours even before the events of the Arab Spring and is now attempting to fill the power vacuum left behind by the revolutions. In doing so, it is relying first and foremost on its 'soft power': a dynamic economy and a realpolitik based in equal measure on basic Islamic values and a circumspect leaning toward the West. However, at the current point in time it is doubtful whether Turkey will be able to realize its ambitions. On the one hand, past experience has given rise to a certain amount of scepticism in the Arab world about Turkish influence in the region. On the other hand, there are doubts about Turkey's ability to maintain its current economic growth over the longer term.

The situation as regards Iran is rather different. The alliance between Tehran and Damascus, and possibly also the repression of the wave of Iranian protests following the 2009 presidential elections, have done considerable damage to Iran's reputation as the defender of Muslim interests. Contrary to official Iranian propaganda, no-one in the Arab world today wants to align themselves with the 'Iranian model'. If the regime in Damascus should

fall, Iran would not lose all its influence, but it would lose its direct hold over Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance organizations which are prepared to use violence. Iraq, where a Shiite-dominated, Iran-friendly government is in power, will not be able to replace Syria as an ally. Iran is thus likely to be among the losers of the Arab Spring.

## PROSPECTS

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### Change under difficult economic conditions

Tunisia and Egypt should, given their more consensus-based political cultures, be in the best position to create a new system. However, whether this will happen, and if so how and when, is highly dependent on the socio-economic conditions in each of the countries as well as on the international economic situation. These conditions have, in most cases, deteriorated over the past year. The EU as a possible donor is itself confronted with enormous financial and economic problems. Only the rich Gulf states seem still to be capable of providing generous financial support. In any case, it can be assumed that help, wherever it comes from, will come at a political price.

The demands of the impoverished population for an improvement in their material situation are a major cause of the political changes and power struggles in the Arab world. It is principally unemployed young men without any future prospects who are behind the forces for change. In the next two to three years, at least, their expectations will in the majority of cases be disappointed. The known causes of the Arab Spring – which include autocratic leadership and corruption, as well as demographic trends and socio-economic conditions – have all played a part in generating the tectonic stresses, so to speak, which have been erupting to the surface for a good year now. The upheaval in the Arab world does not follow historical patterns and will probably eventually be seen as

representing a *sui generis* model. It might perhaps one day come to be known as the ‘tsunami model’. This model implies that neither the moment at which the tensions will erupt, the momentum they will gain, nor the form the eruption will take at a specific location could have been or can be predicted. However, it also implies that if the underlying causes persist, tensions will build up again and then erupt once more. The effects of a tidal wave will not be the same everywhere, but will also depend on the location and the morphology of the coast it strikes. The medium- and long-term outlooks cannot be determined from this model, but the tectonic forces will not change decisively over the next two to three years. It must therefore be anticipated that following an initial phase of ‘wait and see’, dissatisfaction will increase once again and possibly manifest itself in new waves or phases of upheaval.

### Areas of risk

For Europe and Switzerland, the upheavals are an incentive to strengthen economic support and cooperation. Switzerland is committed to making a contribution to promote economic and social development. However, these are essentially areas which these societies must primarily tackle themselves.

In the next few years, continuing high levels of migration from the Arab states and – via North Africa – from sub-Saharan Africa are generally to be expected. The principal cause



is the weakening of the security services, which are no longer able or willing to combat illegal emigration. With the expiry of temporary residence permits in the Mediterranean countries of Europe and uncertainties about the extent to which the new leaderships in North Africa will be willing and able to prevent unwanted migration to Europe, migration pressure is expected to continue.

In other areas of risk, such as proliferation, terrorism and energy supply, the impact of the Arab Spring on our country has been minor. The effects in terms of terrorism, in particular, have so far been limited. In north Africa, the popular protests have put al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in a difficult position, since the aims of the demonstrators differ significantly from those of AQIM. However, smugglers have managed to purloin weapons, military vehicles and explosives from Libyan weapons depots. Some of the stolen material ended up in the hands of the AQIM terrorist groups operating in the Sahel region. Following the transfer of power in Libya, heavily armed Tuareg mercenaries have moved into the Sahel region, where a Tuareg rebellion has been underway in Mali since January 2012. In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) fighters have profited from the weakening of state structures but have so far been unable to destabilize the country.

The revolutions in the Arab world have had little effect on the energy sector. Only the prolonged destabilization of Saudi Arabia as the world's largest oil producer would adversely affect Switzerland's energy supplies. The crude

oil price, on the other hand, is generally very sensitive to the possibility of changes in supply and may rise to a level that would place a heavy burden on the Swiss economy even if the supply remained intact. ■





# 1. Ethno-nationalist motivated violent extremism and terrorism



## SITUATION

### In Switzerland, there are two organizations of chief concern: the PKK and the LTTE

For years, there have been two main organizations in the area of ethno-nationalist motivated violent extremism and terrorism that pose a threat to Switzerland's internal security: the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or what remains of it and any successor organizations.

### Sharp increase in PKK attacks in Turkey

In Turkey, a dialogue between the moderate wing of the PKK and the Turkish authorities was established some time ago. The radical wing of the PKK is opposed to these talks. As a consequence, Turkey once again saw a sharp rise in violent PKK activities on its soil in summer and autumn 2011: there were repeated guerrilla attacks, including some which caused particularly heavy losses for both the PKK rebels and the Turkish armed forces, abductions of soldiers and public officials, and attacks in urban and occasionally in non-urban tourist areas in the countryside. For example,

around ten tourists were slightly injured in an attack in Antalya at the end of August 2011. The PKK-linked Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) claimed responsibility for some of these attacks.

Since autumn 2011, in the wake of the Turkish military operations and reprisals and the refusal to allow the detained PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's lawyers to visit him, there have been numerous and occasionally violent protests, confrontations and occupations in Europe. In Switzerland, actions of this type have passed off largely without violence, despite small-scale rioting and minor incidents.

Isolated, unconfirmed reports of training camps in Switzerland suggest that the PKK remains active on Swiss territory. In summer 2011, an alleged leader of the PKK's youth organization in Europe, Komalen Ciwan, was arrested in Switzerland under a German arrest warrant. Arrests and house searches in connection with the PKK have taken place recently in a number of countries including Italy, France, Germany and Belgium.



**Few signs of activity by the LTTE and its successor organizations**

In the Tamil diaspora community, no major activity by the LTTE or its successor organizations has been recorded for some months. Isolated functions linked to the LTTE have taken place, and there are also signs that individual former LTTE cadres are continuing to distribute propaganda and raise funds. On 11 January 2011, ten persons of Tamil origin, including several suspected LTTE cadres, were arrested as part of a country-wide operation against Swiss affiliates of the LTTE. They are accused of belonging to and supporting a criminal organization, money laundering, blackmail and coercion. Eight people were taken into temporary detention. The criminal investigation launched in May 2009 by the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland is still ongoing.


## ASSESSMENT

### Broad trends depend primarily on situation in country of origin

Developments regarding foreign ethno-nationalistic terrorist and violent extremist groups in Switzerland primarily depend on the situation in the respective country of origin and the size of the diaspora community in Switzerland as a potential recruitment pool for extremist groups. Support for such groups may be voluntary, but members of diaspora communities are sometimes also put under enormous pressure to support a particular group. Escalation of terrorist or violent campaigns in the country of origin will not necessarily lead directly to an increase in activities in the diaspora. However, the well-developed networks and not least the youth organizations of such groups enable them to recommence violent extremist or even terrorist activities at short notice and with little or no warning, even after a long period of quiescence.

Where the PKK is concerned, there is still the threat that isolated violent actions will be carried out against Turkish demonstrators, groups, private businesses and official representatives. Conversely, however, Kurds may also fall victim to Turkish activists. In Turkish tourist areas, the threat of attack has increased since summer 2011. Tourists from Switzerland could also be victims of attacks.

In Sri Lanka, where the LTTE has largely been defeated, the security situation is now more stable. However, remnants at least of the international network of former LTTE members still exist, including in Switzerland.



Flyer for Heroes' Day celebration at Fribourg, 27 November 2011

## PROSPECTS

### **Kurds' impatience could lead to a radical PKK faction breaking away**

Despite the renewed wave of violence in the second half of 2011, the Turkish government is sticking to its dual strategy of, on the one hand, improving the situation of the Kurdish section of the population through negotiations and a process of constitutional change and, on the other hand, cracking down on the PKK, which is classified as a terrorist organization, while seeking to minimize the impact on the civilian population.

This dual strategy aims to weaken the PKK and, at the same time, to support official efforts to integrate the Kurdish population. A key question will be whether the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party will succeed in the next few years in distancing itself further from the PKK in order to enter into dialogue with the ruling Justice and Development Party as an autonomous player.

However, this strategy feeds tensions and power struggles in the PKK between the dialogue-oriented wing and those who advocate continuation of the guerrilla war. A split within the PKK leadership would lead to a heightened terrorist threat in Turkey with impacts on Europe and Switzerland.



Kurdish demonstrations in Switzerland pass off generally peacefully, Basle, 8 February 2012



### Key role of the diaspora community for the PKK

The Kurdish diaspora community in Europe continues to play a key role for the PKK in the areas of propaganda, fundraising, recruitment and training. The PKK is still in a position to mobilize its supporters in the Kurdish diaspora community rapidly and in large numbers, depending on how the conflict in Turkey develops. The organization's preferred tool for this purpose is Kurdish youth. It is therefore likely that any violent actions here in Switzerland would predominantly be carried out by groups of young Kurds. As long as the conflict in their home country does not escalate further, it is not anticipated that large-scale use of violence will occur either at rallies or in spontaneous actions.

However, deterioration of the situation in the short term, the impression that numbers of PKK victims in the Kurdish areas are rising and continuing news blackouts on Öcalan's condition could at any time once more lead to an increased willingness to use violence on the part of the Kurdish diaspora community in Europe and in Switzerland. If Öcalan's health deteriorates seriously or he dies in captivity, it is likely that there would be violent protest campaigns and attacks all over Europe.



Flyer for a Kurdish demonstration, Basle, 8 February 2012

### No clarification of the position of the minority population in Sri Lanka


There has so far been no clarification of the position of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. If the Tamil minority becomes persuaded that the economic and political situation is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future, this could once again find expression in violent protests and renewed support for a separatist and potentially terrorist movement. In such a case, the large Tamil diaspora community in Switzerland would probably once again show solidarity with the Tamil population and, to some extent, also with any new separatist group in Sri Lanka. ■



Poster calling on people to participate in a Tamil demonstration in Geneva, with image of the killed LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, 19 September 2011



## 2. Jihad-motivated violent extremism and terrorism



## SITUATION

### Two Swiss victims of jihadist terrorism

On 28 April 2011, a bomb attack was carried out on a popular tourist cafe in Marrakech. 17 people were killed in the attack, and over 20 were injured. The dead included a Swiss woman, a Swiss man and a Portuguese man resident in Switzerland. Nobody claimed responsibility for the bombing, and al-Qaeda issued a statement distancing itself from the attack. In the course of their investigations, the Moroccan police were able to identify the perpetrators as belonging to a local network inspired by the international jihadist movement and subsequently arrested them. The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland also instituted legal proceedings. At the end of October 2011, a Moroccan court of first instance sentenced the principal defendant to death, and several accomplices received custodial sentences ranging from two years to life imprisonment.

### Several Swiss citizens in the hands of jihadist groups

A Swiss couple abducted in July 2011 while travelling in Baluchistan (Pakistan) despite warnings in the travel advisories given by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), have regained their freedom in March 2012. In February 2012, another Swiss citizen was kidnapped in the Sulu archipelago in the Philippines, also an area which the travel advisories warn against visiting. The motivation behind abductions in the Philippines is often primarily criminal, but the Islamist terrorist group Abu Sayyaf is regularly involved in the kidnapping of Western citizens. In contrast to previous years, in the year under review there were no cases of attacks or abductions by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affecting Swiss citizens or Swiss interests. However, several European tourists were abducted in the Sahel, AQIM's area of operations, including one kidnapping in Timbuktu (Mali) in November 2011. A German man was killed during a kidnapping attempt.



Vehicle belonging to the two Swiss citizens kidnapped in Pakistan, July 2011

### Al-Qaeda still being relentlessly pursued following the killing of bin Laden

On 2 May 2011, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed by US special forces in Abbottabad (Pakistan). The members of core al-Qaeda, most of whom operate in the Afghan/Pakistani border area, are being relentlessly pursued by means of US drone attacks and Pakistani security force operations. Afghan/Pakistani border area On 22 August 2011, 32-year-old Libyan Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who following the death of Osama bin Laden was regarded as core al-Qaeda's number two, was killed in a US drone attack. Furthermore, according to media reports, Sheikh Younis al-Mauritani was arrested on 4 September 2011 and Abu Hafs al-Shahri was killed on 11 September 2011. All three had played an active role in core al-Qaeda's operations.

In September 2011, Anwar al-Awlaki, an internationally renowned jihad preacher and a leading member of AQAP, and Samir Khan, editor of AQAP's English-language 'Inspire' magazine, were both killed in Yemen. According to US statements, both were killed in drone attacks. Al-Awlaki had a US passport as well as a Yemeni one.

### Increase in jihad-motivated travel movements

Across Europe, an increase in jihad-motivated travel movements has been observed. The number of cases detected, including in Switzerland, is rising. Due to the fact that the number of cases remains small and the assumption that

some cases remain unreported, however, it is not possible to state conclusively that there has been an increase in travel movements specifically from Switzerland. The FIS is currently aware of several persons formerly resident in Switzerland who are currently in a jihad area, i.e. in Somalia or Afghanistan/Pakistan, in order to take part in hostilities.

### First Jihadist attack with fatalities in Germany

On 2 March 2011, a Muslim from Kosovo carried out an attack on a US military bus at Frankfurt airport. Two US soldiers were killed and two others were seriously injured. This attack was the first jihad-motivated attack in Germany to have resulted in fatalities. The 21-year-old perpetrator, who had been living in Germany since 1991, was employed as a temporary worker in the international postal centre at Frankfurt airport. Before the attack, he had no previous criminal record, nor were the authorities aware of any other security-related issues. According to a police statement, he had become radicalized via the internet.

Jihadism on the internet: screenshot, 2011



## ASSESSMENT

### Bin Laden's death a severe blow to al-Qaeda

With the death of Osama bin Laden, core al-Qaeda, based in the Afghan/Pakistani border area, and the jihadist movement in general have lost their key symbolic figure. Core al-Qaeda had already been weakened by the loss of several leaders and in future will be even more dependent on collaboration with local groups. Even without bin Laden, it will endeavour to continue to disseminate its ideology of global jihad on an international level via the internet and to maintain a dominant propaganda role as a source of inspiration for jihadist groups and individuals. AQIM, AQAP and Somali-based al-Shabaab (which officially declared itself to be part of al-Qaeda in February 2012 and was accepted as such by Bin Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri) all broadly follow core al-Qaeda's global guidance, but on an operational level act largely autonomously.



### Risk of abduction by AQIM in the Sahel region still very high

In recent years, AQIM has repeatedly abducted Western nationals. The security situation in the Sahel region has deteriorated further since the Arab Spring, as large quantities of weapons, including the stockpiles of the toppled Gaddafi regime, have flowed into this region, amongst others. In general, the risk of abduction in the Sahel region thus remains very high. AQIM's current financial needs mean that it is specifically on the lookout for Western kidnap victims from countries from which they hope to obtain ransom payments. The globally oriented rhetoric of the group may in future also radicalize people from the Maghreb who have settled in Europe. These individuals could attempt to establish contact with AQIM in order to put themselves at its service, or they could carry out violent actions independently of AQIM or core al-Qaeda.

### AQAP's professional propaganda

AQAP, another regional affiliate of al-Qaeda, has an openly anti-Western agenda. It will continue to carry out attacks on Western targets to attract media attention. Such attempts have included the failed attack on a US plane at Christmas 2009 and the parcel bombs which were seized at East Midlands Airport (UK) and Dubai airport in October 2010, thanks to information from intelligence services. It is not clear whether AQAP's professional propaganda – in particular the electronically published English-

Al-Qaeda propaganda magazine after the death of Bin Laden, summer 2011

language ‘Inspire’ magazine – will be able to maintain its significant role in the dissemination of jihadist ideology following the deaths of al-Awlaki and Khan.

### Returnees from training camps pose a considerable security risk


Jihad travellers also pose a considerable security risk to Western states. If jihad supporters spend time in conflict zones, there is the danger that they may take part in fighting against Western troops or even be used in attacks on Western interests and the local civilian population. In addition, jihadists damage both the reputation and the interests of their countries of origin, which may then come under pressure from those countries which have suffered direct damage. Returning jihadist travellers may use their training to inspire or recruit people resident in Europe and Switzerland and eventually build up networks here. Likewise, Europeans who have been trained in Pakistan or Somalia could in future carry out terrorist activities directly in Europe. A comparison of Swiss cases shows that jihad supporters do not have a uniform profile, which makes it correspondingly difficult to trace jihad-motivated travel movements.

### Threat from home-grown terrorists real, but difficult to assess

The jihadist threat to Europe comes not just from groups allied to or inspired by core al-Qaeda but also from autonomous groups and lone perpetrators, some of whom have become radicalized here in Europe. It is also possible that these could be motivated by the propaganda disseminated by core al-Qaeda and its affiliates and attempt to carry out attacks in Europe. The fact that the threat from lone perpetrators (home-grown terrorists) in Europe is a real one is illustrated by the suicide bombing on 11 December 2010 in Stockholm city centre and the attack on members of the US air force on 2 March 2011 in Frankfurt. The threat from terrorist attacks by lone perpetrators cannot be precisely assessed, and such attacks cannot always be prevented.

### Swiss interests at risk, particularly abroad

The death of Bin Laden has made no difference to the level of direct threat to Switzerland. According to the FIS’s latest assessment, Switzerland is still not a primary target for core al-Qaeda or its regional affiliates, although opportunist attacks remain a possibility. Al-Qaeda’s anti-Western propaganda could motivate indi-





vidual jihadists to take up action on Swiss territory against both Swiss and foreign interests. Although there is as yet no specific evidence of planned attacks, it is also important to prevent Switzerland being misused as a recruiting ground, or as a resting or attack preparation area. Likewise, the possibility that Swiss citizens could become victims of terrorist attacks abroad cannot be excluded, as the terrorist attack in Marrakech on 28 April 2011 has shown. The risk of kidnapping also remains very high in some areas of the world, particularly in the Sahel region and in parts of Pakistan and the Philippines.

#### **Jihadist radicalization on the internet**

Probably no other form of extremist ideology makes such intensive use of the internet as jihadism. Internet monitoring by the FIS and the Federal Office of Police (fedpol) shows the hugely important role of the internet in radicalization. For example, the attack by a lone perpetrator on US military personnel in Frankfurt on 2 March 2011 received a very positive response from visitors to jihadist internet forums. Unlike jihadist groups and networks, whose members remain in contact with one another for long periods of time in order to plan and carry out an attack, such lone perpetrators are very difficult for the security authorities to identify in advance. Core al-Qaeda and its networks also exploit this fact by disseminating anti-Western propaganda over the internet and calling on Muslims in the West to serve jihad by carrying out attacks in their country of residence rather than necessarily travelling to one of the conflict areas such as Afghanistan.

In Switzerland, too, in virtual social networks such as Facebook it is evident that there are people who have strongly Islamist world views although they have no obvious direct links to actual jihadist networks. The FIS and fedpol will continue the work they began in 2011 on expanding internet monitoring in relation to jihadism, in order to enable them to increase the scope of preventive countermeasures to combat jihadist violent extremism and terrorism.

## FDFA travel advice

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The FDFA's travel advice covers 157 countries, is consulted on the FDFA website around 1.6 million times a year and since August 2011 has also been available on Twitter. No travel advice is produced for Western European countries.

The travel advice provides a broadly-based assessment of the security situation, with an emphasis on politics and criminality.

- As travellers are sometimes faced with so much often contradictory information that it is hard for them to sort it out, the travel advice helps them to choose their holiday destination.
- Because the FDFA has good connections through its embassies and consulates abroad, it can make a balanced assessment of the situation. Information from other Federal agencies, for example the intelligence service, is also used in compiling the travel advice.
- Because the FDFA has no financial interests, it is considered by the tourism industry and the population to be independent and trustworthy.

The travel advice recommends taking precautionary measures in order to reduce the risks,

- because the Federal Council has given the FDFA the task of drawing people's attention to the potential risks involved in foreign travel;
- because it doesn't want people's dream holidays to turn into nightmares;
- and because you can only minimize the risks if you know what they are.

In extreme cases, the FDFA advises against travel to a particular region or country,

- because the FDFA assesses travel to that area as being too risky due to the particular danger level;
- and because the FDFA often has only restricted or even no access to crisis areas and can thus provide its citizens there with only limited or no support.

### Internet sites:

[www.eda.admin.ch/reisehinweise](http://www.eda.admin.ch/reisehinweise)  
[www.dfae.admin.ch/voyages](http://www.dfae.admin.ch/voyages)  
[www.dfae.admin.ch/viaggi](http://www.dfae.admin.ch/viaggi)  
[www.twitter.com/travel\\_edadfae](https://twitter.com/travel_edadfae)

## PROSPECTS

### Switzerland not a declared priority target for jihadists

Jihadist groups often form part of transnational networks and have sympathizers all over Europe. There is an increased threat of attack particularly in European countries which are involved in military intervention in an Islamic country. Switzerland, as a country with small military commitments abroad, is not a declared priority target for jihad-motivated attacks. Nonetheless, attacks, particularly by radicalized lone perpetrators, cannot be ruled out. However, acts of terrorism targeting Western citizens or interests outside Europe (bombings, murders, kidnappings etc.) are still more likely than a jihadist terrorist attack in Western Europe.

### Islamophobia could serve as an incitement for jihadists to carry out attacks, even in Switzerland

Besides military involvement, criticism of Islam – whether actual or alleged – is increasingly used as a justification for attacks. However, the threat situation for Switzerland has not changed

significantly since the proposal to ban the building of minarets was passed. Since the beginning of 2010, there has been a significant decrease in overall media coverage of the minaret building ban. The issue now crops up only occasionally, in connection with other issues perceived as Islamophobic. As before, jihadist internet forums do not pay much attention to this issue. If the impression that Switzerland and its inhabitants were hostile to Islam were to take hold among jihadists, this could provide them with a motive to attack. It cannot therefore be ruled out that in the longer term radical Islamic circles could make use of the minaret building ban in combination with other issues (such as a ban on burqas), to justify their activities, including violent acts. Still, the available information shows no concrete evidence of an increased threat to Switzerland.



Jihadist internet propaganda in Switzerland


**Jihad returnees pose a major challenge to the security authorities**

Although Switzerland has several jihad travellers, there are to date no records of any known returnees; however, it is entirely possible that it too will in future be affected by such cases. The authorities therefore need to address the problem of how to deal with any possible returnees.

Furthermore, Switzerland's reputation could be damaged by failure to prevent continued or even increasing travel movements from Switzerland to jihad areas. Restrictions on intelligence activities make preventive monitoring of radicalization and recruitment networks difficult. ■



### 3. Right- and left-wing extremism and animal rights extremism



**SITUATION**

**Decrease in the number of incidents**

The potential for violence among right-wing, left-wing and animal extremists in Switzerland has changed very little in recent years. However, currently it is almost exclusively left-wing extremists who are involved in violent action, while the potential for violence in other violent extremist circles is seldom realized.


It is almost impossible to describe this phenomenon using statistics, since the items that have to be categorized together are too heterogeneous. The gravity of a letter bombing, which at least accepts the risk of fatalities, cannot after all be directly compared with damage to the façade of a building. Nonetheless, the numbers do make it easier to gain an initial overview. In 2011, the FIS was aware of only 51 events connected with right-wing extremism, whereas the figure for left-wing extremism was 244; mere graffiti was not included in the figures. The trend in the figures for left-wing extremism shows a slight decline. The figures for right-wing extremism continue the long-term trend which has been even more pronounced since the second half of 2010.

Around 45 per cent of the events recorded in connection with left-wing extremism involved

violence, while the proportion for right-wing extremists was slightly more than one-third. Animal rights extremists did not commit any acts of violence in connection with their own campaigns in 2011, but there were isolated instances of individuals taking part in violent left-wing extremist campaigns. The spectrum of violence was very wide and the nature of the acts of violence varied. Forms of violence used included letter bomb attacks, brawls and paint attacks on property. The nature of the violence ranged from violence implemented in a targeted way as part of a campaign, through violence against targets selected more or less at random, exercised without any overarching strategy, to everyday situational violence which only marginally forms part of the phenomenon of violent extremism.

**Right-wing extremism: currently a seldom seen phenomenon**

At the present time, violence motivated by right-wing extremism is rare; besides clashes with left-wing extremists or damage to property, conflict involving right-wing extremists might occur in the middle of the night in pubs or at festive events. The FIS is aware of only a small



number of brawls that occurred in 2011. While these did include cases where the violence was provoked by right-wing extremists, directed against foreigners or ended in serious injury to the victim, it seems nonetheless that the use of violence was opportunist rather than strategic. It is years since there have been attacks in Switzerland which could be rated as strategic, for example forming part of a campaign of intimidation. Such attacks could be directed against targets such as refugee centres or foreigners. However, right-wing circles still engage in war games and combat games as well as so-called self-defence and comrade support courses, and in one case in 2011 it was discovered that a German citizen intended to import twenty truncheons and articles of military clothing without declaring them. Right-wing extremists' fondness for weapons persists; it can be assumed from the results of house searches in the last few years – generally chance discoveries – that there are substantial collections of working weapons in the hands of right-wing extremists. Right-wing extremist circles have been keeping a low profile for some years, but have continued with activities such as skinhead concerts and 'comradeship evenings'. However, only one skinhead concert was recorded in Switzerland in 2011, but the band Indiziert, contrary to its normal practice, advertised a performance publicly in mid-January 2012.

#### **Right- and left-wing extremism: few clashes**

The clandestine behaviour of right-wing extremists may be one of the reasons why, against the European trend, clashes between right- and left-wing extremists are also becoming rarer.

#### **'Zwickau cell'**

The so-called Zwickau cell, which referred to itself as the 'National Socialist Underground' was discovered in Germany in the first half of November 2011. The cell is thought to have been responsible for the murders of at least ten people (nine small business owners, of whom eight were Turks and one Greek, as well as a police-woman), two bombings in Cologne and an unknown number of bank raids. An extensive amount of material showing members of the cell claiming responsibility for these acts was discovered.

There have been links between Swiss right-wing extremists and right-wing extremists in Germany on a personal level for some time. For example, Swiss right-wing extremists are known to have links to Germany's National Democratic Party as well as to right-wing extremists in Thuringia. However, no direct personal links between Swiss right-wing extremists and the Zwickau cell suspects have yet come to light. Nonetheless, it is known that the weapon used in nine of the murders was of Czech manufacture and had been sold to a Swiss arms dealer. At the time of going to press, the route by which it arrived in Germany from Switzerland was still subject of investigation.



In the last twelve months there have been only isolated clashes between representatives of the two extremes, which is probably because there were no right-wing extremist rallies at official celebrations such as Swiss National Day or the 2011 commemoration of the Battle of Sempach. Where right-wing extremist activities were known about in advance, opposition was organized both by civil society groups and by left-wing extremists, as for example on 10 September on the occasion of the first Swiss meeting of European Action. Despite a police presence, the confrontation between the two sides resulted in a brawl. Violence between right- and left-wing extremists was frequently initiated by left-wing extremists, as for example on 6 March 2011, when around thirty left-wing extremists attacked six right-wing extremists from the Waldstätterbund with pepper spray. Due to the considerable potential for violence, police security precautions, which are designed to prevent clashes at advertised events, remain at a high level.

#### **Left-wing extremism: tendency to turn violent**

It is not only in clashes with right-wing extremists that the potential for violence of left-wing extremists is emphasized. For example,

left-wing extremists have carried out repeated attacks on the Swiss People's Party (SVP). On 21 January 2011, a well-known representative of the SVP was physically assaulted at a left-wing extremist demonstration. At the time of going to press, however, the circles with which the suspect associated were still being investigated. On 2 May 2011 there was an attempted physical assault on an SVP representative in Höngg (Zürich); generally, however, incidents were limited to disruptive activity not involving physical violence or damage to property. Apart from these physical assaults and in comparison with previous years, Swiss left-wing extremist circles are continuing to use violence frequently, but in a more low-key fashion. However, foreign left-wing extremists are suspected of carrying out letter bombings against – among others – Swiss targets in this country and abroad. These attacks by the Federazione Anarchica Informale, (FAI, Informal Anarchist Federation), together with two further crimes connected to solidarity campaigns, will be looked at in more detail below. The FIS knows of only two cases in 2011 where left-wing extremists set fire to vehicles – at the peak in 2009 there were 32 cases. The last crime where an improvised explosive or incendiary device (IED/IID) was used – apart from an attempted attack in June 2011 which



Unauthorized rally  
by the 'anti-capitalist  
campaign' in Bern,  
8 October 2011

could not be definitively attributed to left-wing extremists – dates back to 27 January 2011 and was targeted at a hotel in Davos (Graubünden). The attack was linked to the World Economic Forum (WEF). As in previous years, WEF 2011 passed off peacefully, although for the first time for years there were demonstrations in Davos itself involving 120 people, of whom 30 were left-wing extremists prepared to use violence. The potential for aggression at this event was higher than in immediately preceding years, with a few demonstrators throwing bottles and stones at the police. In 2012, there was a large amount of damage to property associated with the WEF, but for just the third time this millennium, the others being 2003 and 2010, the event was not marred by even a single IED/IID attack. In many places, such as in Bern on 21 January 2012, it was thanks to police intervention only that the accompanying demonstrations did not involve violence. The demonstrations on 1 May 2011 (Labour Day) also passed off peacefully, which in Zurich in particular was thanks to police security precautions. Mention must be made of the Riding School cultural centre in Bern, which in 2011 again served as the rallying point for violent actions, with minor causes leading to large-scale attacks on the police on several occasions.

### Left-wing extremism: trials a key element

The letter bombings as well as the way the situation developed generally were the consequence of the arrest on 15 April 2010 of two Italian anarchists, one male and one female, and a Swiss anarchist living in Italy. The three were arrested prior to a planned bomb attack on a

research centre for nanotechnology in Rueschlikon (Zürich), which at that time was still under construction. The investigation and trial of the three, who have now been sentenced by a court of first instance, as well as another trial of left-wing extremists which took place in 2011 (also at the stage of a first-instance verdict), are currently the key factors determining left-wing extremist activities:

- 19 – 22 July 2011: the trial of the three anarchists mentioned above took place at the Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona. The court found them guilty of the attempted bombing and sentenced them at first instance to several years' imprisonment and fines.
- 28 – 29 September 2011: the trial of two women from the organization Revolutionärer Aufbau Schweiz (RAS) and one of its sections, Revolutionärer Aufbau Zürich (RAZ), took place at the Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona. Both women were accused of arson. The leader of RAS was also accused of endangerment involving explosives and illegal possession of weapons. The offences



Letter containing threats against the Federal Criminal Court, 21 July 2011 ('Remain vigilant!!! If the three activists are sentenced, we will take violent protest action against you personally! RAS Switzerland')

in question were carried out between 2002 and 2007. The two defendants were sentenced on 8 November 2011, to 17 months' imprisonment and 14 months' (suspended) respectively.

A further trial against an extremist who had been expelled from RAS was not followed by any solidarity campaigns; in April 2011 the Federal Criminal Court handed down a partially-suspended custodial sentence for explosives-related and other offences, and the verdict is final. During the trial of the three anarchists, the level of interest from left-wing extremists was lower than had been anticipated based on previous experience. Between forty and eighty activists, mainly from Italy, were present at the court hearings in Bellinzona; the behaviour of the left-wing extremists in the courtroom and on the streets caused only slight disruption of the court proceedings. It was not until after the verdict, on the night of 23 July, that minor violent incidents took place in Zurich. A letter claiming responsibility for the attacks contained threats against the judge and the public prosecutor. There was a similar reticence surrounding the trial of the RAS activists; here too, there was little violence, and any violence that did take place was muted.

Prior to the trials, however, there was a wave of protests by left-wing extremists; there were regular street demonstrations and so-called 'prison walks' – demonstrations of solidarity outside the gaols where the suspects were detained. These were generally carried out by people wearing masks and overalls; slogans were chanted and fireworks were set off. Campaigns of solidarity with the three anarchists, but also with Marco Camenisch, a violent environmental activist and left-wing extremist serving a prison term for murder, and with the two RAS activists, also took place in other countries, namely in Italy and Germany. In addition to the attacks by foreign groups described below, there were two further attacks of major proportions: on 17 January 2011, an arson attack was carried out on one of the buildings of the Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona, for which anarchists claimed responsibility the following day. There had previously been an arson attack, on 12 December 2010, on a company in Chasse-sur-Rhône (France) which runs a research laboratory conducting experiments on animals. The Animal Rights Militia (ARM) claimed responsibility for this, simultaneously declaring its solidarity with the anarchists detained in Switzerland.



Letter bomb attack on Swiss-nuclear in Olten (Solothurn), 31 March 2011

### Letter bomb attacks by the Federazione Anarchica Informale

On 31 March 2011, a letter bomb exploded at Swissnuclear in Olten (Solothurn). It was the first attack of this kind carried out in Switzerland as part of the solidarity campaign for the three detained anarchists, but the third letter bombing overall to have been targeted against Swiss interests. The Swiss embassies in Athens and Rome had already been subjected to attacks in 2010. Responsibility was claimed in Greece by the group ‘Conspiracy of Fire Cells’, and in Rome and Olten by the FAI, which for years has been carrying out letter bomb attacks over the Christmas period, did so again at the end of 2011 – in December letter bombings were targeted against the chief executive of Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt, the director of the Italian tax collection agency Equitalia, and the Greek embassy in Paris. When responsibility for these recent attacks was claimed, there was no mention of solidarity with the detainees in Switzerland, and there is no evidence that the Swiss nationality of the CEO of Deutsche Bank could have been a motive for the attack. However, the letter claiming responsibility did suggest an increasing degree of international networking between perpetrators. It should be added that all letter bomb attacks on Swiss interests were accompanied by identical attacks on non-Swiss targets, so Swiss interests were never the sole focus of the FAI.

### Animal rights extremism

Some Swiss animal rights extremists took part in left-wing solidarity campaigns and are also suspected to have taken part in illegal actions abroad. The Swiss campaigns against the wearing of furs, against the use of animals in circuses and against meat processing (currently in particular against the sale of foie gras by a wholesaler) have so far been conducted without the use of violence. On eight occasions during 2011, responsibility for actions in Switzerland was claimed by the Animal Liberation Front (ALF); only half of these have been confirmed by the police. In all cases, there was only minor damage to property. However, isolated violent actions claimed by ALF or the Animal Rights Militia (ARM) had also taken place in Switzerland during the preceding years, not just as part of the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) campaign.



Arson attack on the Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona (Ticino), 17 January 2011

## ASSESSMENT

### Violent extremism: failure to establish links with moderate movements

During the year under review, Swiss extremists have been largely preoccupied with their own organizations and issues. Despite repeated attempts, they have failed to establish links with larger social movements or to exploit for their own ends either widely-debated issues such as the phasing out of nuclear power and the debt crisis or commemorative events held on public holidays.

### Right-wing extremists short of opportunities to put across their views

The security precautions at the Swiss National Day celebrations at Rütli and at the commemoration of the Battle of Sempach have meant that for some years now right-wing extremists have been deprived of high-profile opportunities to put across their views. The right-wing extremists prefer to conduct their own activities, such as skinhead concerts – including those involving Swiss bands which remain active – behind closed doors. Moreover, skinhead events are

currently generally held abroad; Swiss right-wing extremists attend such events not only in neighbouring countries, but also sometimes further afield in Europe. Swiss right-wing extremists also take part in demonstrations abroad, for example the commemoration of the allied bombing of Dresden in February 1945, which was misused by right-wing extremists for their own ends. This indicates that right-wing extremists still maintain an international network, but here it is mostly a question of personal contacts rather than institutionalized forms of networking.

Violent right-wing extremists have also attempted to exploit current issues and moderate movements, but with even less success than the left-wing extremists.



Invitation to a right-wing extremist paintball game, February 2012

### Left-wing extremists fail to profit from anti-capitalist mood

In recent months, left-wing extremist circles here have not managed to affiliate themselves with larger moderate movements in order to use these as a platform for their own cause. In past years, they had some success associating with the anti-globalization movement. However, this movement now has only limited mobilization potential. The protests against the WEF have for years remained at the same level, lower than in earlier years. In the last few years, the anti-nuclear movement had been seen as a possible substitute, but developments in the wake of the nuclear accident at Fukushima (Japan) have offered few if any extra opportunities for (violent) protest. Left-wing extremist circles have so far not even managed to profit from the increasingly anti-capitalist public mood and the worldwide Occupy movement, and they are currently also encountering rejection elsewhere. The most promising platforms for them to exploit as an opportunity to use violence are still the 'Reclaim the streets' events, apolitical events with dancing and entertainment. But here, too, violence has fallen short of 2010 levels.

### Animal rights extremist campaigns violence-free

As far as animal rights extremists in Switzerland are concerned, there is no sign of any trend toward the use of violence in current

campaigns or that they are planning a new violent campaign. As regards the fur trade, it is entirely possible that individual companies will be forced to abandon this area of business even without violent action being taken. On the other hand, the ongoing campaign against the use of animals in circuses shows no sign of success. Nonetheless, the use of the abbreviation ALF (Animal Liberation Front) suggests that large-scale sabotage campaigns may also lie within the realms of possibility, and in the case of the abbreviation ARM (Animal Rights Militia) even violence against people. Both abbreviations thus contain not just a statement of belief, but also a potential threat.

It is possible to identify a certain affinity between Swiss animal rights extremists and left-wing extremist circles and left-wing extremist ideology; like left-wing extremists, Swiss animal rights extremists are currently in contact with foreign groups and activists, principally in Italy. For example, animal rights extremists in Switzerland are involved in campaigns in support of alleged political prisoners. Moreover, they are expressing their solidarity not just with detained leftist extremists, but also in connection with arrests, trials and prison sentences against members of their own animal rights movement, for example in Spain, Austria, the UK and the Netherlands.

Flyer for a solidarity brunch, November 2011. The Barchem 4 are animal rights extremists who are suspected of having 'freed' around 5,000 mink in the Netherlands in October 2009. One of the suspects has a relevant previous conviction in Switzerland relating to SHAC.





### FAI and SRI

Solidarity campaigns are an expression not just of solidarity, but usually also of existing personal or institutional relationships. The declarations issued in Italy of solidarity with the three anarchists arrested in Switzerland can doubtless be explained by the contacts which the three, who have now been sentenced, had there. However, it is still not clear why the three planned to attack a target in Switzerland, of all places – there would have been plenty of targets connected with nanotechnology available in Italy. It is not known why the research centre being built in Rüslikon was selected, but it is possible that contacts in Switzerland may have played a role in this.

In addition to personal contacts, there are also institutional contacts within the framework of Secours Rouge International (SRI, International Red Aid). As its name indicates, SRI provides help to detainees from the left-wing extremist movement. SRI has Marxist-Leninist leanings and is used for networking and communication but also for concrete, i.e. violent, action. It has two central secretariats, one in Brussels (Belgium) and the other in Zurich. RAZ runs the Zurich secretariat and is the driving force. Its links extend into left-wing extremist terrorism circles, particularly in Italy. By contrast,

FAI, which claimed responsibility for the letter bombings, has anarchist leanings. It is an alliance of revolutionary campaign groups sharing an anti-Marxist ideology. According to FAI's own information, its targets are 'the control and suppression mechanisms of the main players on the democratic stage, the representatives and major institutions of the new European order'. EU officials were also sometimes among the attack targets. However, the quoted wording places very few restrictions on the range of possible targets.



Material seized at an unauthorized demonstration in Bern, including protective goggles, pepper spray, fire-works, 21 January 2012

## PROSPECTS

### Potential for violence and terrorist acts

There is no evidence that the three movements have undergone any major fluctuations; the potential for violence thus remains unchanged. In the short term, it is thus likely to take the forms currently favoured by the various movements.

Swiss violent extremists are less likely to use violence than their counterparts abroad. In 2011, the letter bombings by left-wing extremists, but also the attacks carried out by a lone perpetrator in Norway and the series of murders by a German network of right-wing extremists all showed that violent extremism can ultimately lead to terrorist actions being carried out by individuals or small groups. However, there are no indications that violent extremism in Switzerland is evolving in this direction. Nonetheless, here too there is still the potential for terrorist attacks carried out by lone perpetrators, who are difficult to identify in advance, as well as for links between Swiss extremists and terrorists abroad.

### Right-wing extremism: return to violence?

One possible explanation for the decline in violence motivated by right-wing extremism is provided by the attempts being made by segments of the right-wing extremist movement to engage in the Swiss political system and to gain election to political posts. Whether this will be sustained in the long term remains to be seen. It is to be assumed that the potential for violence will remain constant. The movement could in future also face competition from right-wing

populism, which is emerging across Europe and is mainly directed against Islam, insofar as this offers an alternative to right-wing extremism and promises greater success in the short term.

The increasing importance of social networks on the internet, known as social media, could also be put forward as part of the explanation for the decline not only in violence but also in any discernible activity by right-wing extremist groups altogether. However, at least where jihadism is concerned, experts counter this view by pointing out that the social nature of these media in itself rules out their use by extremists, since they would come into contact with people who think differently and therefore might stray from the ‘right path’.

The reason the movement tries to keep its own events secret is probably linked to the fact that a broad consensus in society has led to successful prevention measures against right-wing extremists. Moreover, the definition of ‘pub-



Skinhead concert in Milan also attended by Swiss right-wing extremists, January 2012



lic' under the racial discrimination law means that such events have to be held in secret. It has become difficult to hire premises, and the precedent set by the Federal Supreme Court in 2004 has made it impossible to declare a skin-head event to be a private function and therefore not a public event under Art. 261bis of the Criminal Code. Based on these considerations and an unchanged potential for violence, it is not anticipated that specific right-wing extremist events will take place in the public eye in the near future. However, they will exploit any platforms available for putting across their point of view – which in the light of the racial discrimination law are limited – and they may eventually return to more violent activities.

#### **Left-wing extremism: tactical restraint**

Solidarity with alleged political prisoners and the fight against alleged repression may have an important cohesive function within left-wing extremist circles. However, this will not achieve a degree of mobilization which extends beyond these circles. There are currently no obvious issues or widely supported movements which left-wing extremist circles could exploit and use for their own purposes. This assessment includes ecological themes, not least because of the currently reduced virulence of the nuclear issue. Although nanotechnology had been the grounds for the averted bomb-

ing, the research centre in Rüslikon (Zürich) opened on 17 May 2011 without any protest against it taking place. Experiments with genetically modified plants, though they have repeatedly led to illegal actions opposing them, are not a major issue for the movement. In the near future, 'Reclaim the Streets' events will continue to form the main platform for violent action, with events such as squatting taking place on a smaller scale and being much less effective.

It can therefore be assumed that left-wing circles will continue to be concerned primarily with their own issues, anti-fascism, the SVP, solidarity with prisoners and the fight against alleged repression. In particular, it is to be expected that they will show restraint in the methods they use and refrain from serious crime while the sentences imposed on the activists are not yet final and the suspects are still in custody. It remains to be seen what the specific and general preventive effects of the sentences will be, but they will probably be limited. There are no indications that left-wing extremists in Switzerland are likely to resort to methods such as those of the FAI, either currently or if the situation changes; the majority in Swiss left-wing circles are against such attacks on life and limb. Finally, it is still possible, especially while the custodial sentences remain in effect, that the FAI may carry out



RAS flyer about the trial of its two activists, September 2011

letter bomb attacks against Swiss citizens and Swiss interests. However, Swiss victims make up only a small proportion of the wide range of possible targets for the FAI.

**Animal rights extremism:  
not a mass movement**

The animal rights and animal liberation movements do not have the potential to develop into a broadly-based mass movement in the next few years. This would require that individuals, as well as committing themselves to some quite popular demands, also adopted a strict vegetarian or even vegan lifestyle, i.e. avoided animal products altogether. In addition, the left-wing extremist movement will support the animal rights extremists only on an ad hoc basis; their motivation to do so will be based more on anti-capitalism, which can of course always be invoked for attacks on large multinational corporations. Conversely, violent Swiss animal rights extremists are often extremely left-wing in their views, so such activists could be drawn into involvement in left-wing extremist issues.

The continued lack of success of a number of the campaigns running in Switzerland could give rise to reactions of frustration or precipitate a change in strategy following an evaluation of the respective campaign. From the point of view of prevention, it should be noted that the methods which have been employed for decades in violent campaigns are well known in Swiss animal rights extremist circles from other contexts such as the SHAC campaign. Apart from this campaign, such methods have been employed only in isolated instances and not in connection with other large-scale campaigns. They thus exerted only minimal pressure. However, it is normally only the methods which are imported, not the willingness to use violence itself. There are currently also no signs that violent foreign, predominantly British, activists from the SHAC campaign having been released from custody are now once again likely to become active in Switzerland.

Unauthorized rally by the  
'anti-capitalist campaign'  
in Bern, 8 October 2011



## The FIS's mandate in combating violent extremism

In accordance with the Federal Act on Measures to Safeguard Internal Security (BWIS), the federal government takes preventive measures to detect at an early stage and combat threats from terrorism and violent extremism (Art. 2 (1)). Terrorism is defined as 'efforts to influence or change the state and society, which are to be implemented or promoted by the commission or threat of serious criminal acts and by the spreading of fear and terror' (Art. 4 (1) (b), Ordinance on the Federal Intelligence Service (OFIS)) and extremism as 'efforts by organizations whose representatives reject democracy, human rights or the rule of law and commit, advocate or support acts of violence in order to achieve their goals (Art. 4 (1) (d) OFIS). The FIS has to operate within clear boundaries defined by BWIS. For example, it is only allowed to monitor events in public and openly accessible locations. Video and audio recordings may also be made only in public places. Coercive measures such as phone tapping can only be used by law enforcement agencies (police and public prosecution authorities) within the framework of criminal proceedings. The same is true of the monitoring of events on private premises.

In 2010, the Control Delegation (Joint Intelligence Oversight Delegation) made recommendations in its report on data processing in the computerized Information System for


Internal Security (ISIS) which, among other things, prompted the tightening up of recording procedures. Basically, the FIS no longer deals with neo-Nazis, holocaust deniers, racists or purchasers of propaganda material. Furthermore, the FIS can only become active if there is a specific link to violence (including incitement to violence) or if a known activist from an organization on the monitoring list is involved. The monitoring list categorizes violent right-wing extremist groups together under the heading 'skinheads'. This collective designation makes it possible to continue monitoring groups even when their names change and members come and go, without continually having to update the list. The collective designation for left-wing extremists is the 'black block', as in these circles, too, structures and networks are constantly changing. Right- and left-wing extremists who do not form part of the skinhead scene or the black block are monitored by the FIS whenever they engage in or incite violence.

For a clearer understanding, it should be added that the monitoring list annually approved by the Federal Council under Article 11 (2) (b) BWIS serves to identify those organizations and groups for which all observations on their activities and activists are required to be reported, i.e. for which the FIS is allowed to operate without the restrictions imposed on it

by Article 3 ( 2) BWIS. These restrictions relate to information on political activity and to the exercise of freedom of expression, association and assembly. The monitoring list is thus not a definitive list of all the organizations and groups the FIS has to monitor. ■



# 4. Proliferation



## SITUATION

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Attention in this area continues to be focussed mainly on Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programmes. While the Iranian nuclear programme is the most virulent problem facing the international community, North Korea's nuclear programme is technologically more advanced than Iran's and poses particular proliferation risks.

### **Iranian nuclear programme: landmark developments**

Despite sustained and intensifying international efforts to contain it, Iran's nuclear programme is making significant headway. According to a February 2012 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the stock of enriched uranium is growing steadily. The normal threshold enrichment level of 3.5 per cent for operating civilian reactors for generating electricity has been exceeded, and Tehran is concentrating increasingly on the process of enriching to twenty per cent (with the justification that it is running a civilian research reactor). This represents a further improvement in the basic preconditions for producing (if necessary rapidly) weapons-grade fissile material. The transfer of production from Natanz to the underground facility of Fordo near Qom will enhance protection against possible air strikes. Iran is also coming closer to the capability of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. External work at the heavy water reactor in Arak was completed in 2010. According to

the Iranians, the reactor is scheduled to enter into service in 2013. Furthermore, an IAEA report on the Iranian nuclear programme in November 2011 goes a considerable way towards substantiating the accusations against Iran that, in breach of its international obligations, it is working covertly on a nuclear weapon. The IAEA makes clear that until 2003, work had been carried out, as part of a structured military programme, on uranium metal production, hollow metal sphere implosion, detonator development and the integration of a nuclear warhead into the tip of a SHAHAB-3 missile, and that certain parts of this work have continued right up to the present time.


### **Iranian ballistic missiles:**

#### **advancement on numerous fronts**

Progress has also been made in recent months in the development of Iranian delivery systems, both in relation to liquid-propellant missiles, which currently form the backbone of Iran's operational capabilities, and in relation to higher-quality solid-propellant guided missiles. In the area of liquid-propellant missiles, extensive tests were conducted in the spring and summer of 2010 involving guided missiles from the SHAHAB series, a series which has been in use by the armed forces for some years and which includes, in the SHAHAB-3M, the currently available delivery system for a nuclear explosive device. There are numerous indications suggesting that Iran is attempting to

At right: Ranges of Iranian delivery systems

develop missiles with a range of over 3,000 kilometres, which would theoretically also cover central Europe. The space programme is a clear illustration of these advances. In summer 2010, Iran launched its second satellite into space using a launch vehicle based on the SHAHAB-3M. An even larger launch vehicle, which could in future be used as a technological base for delivery vehicles of intercontinental ranges (over 5,500 kilometres), is under development. The operationalization of the ASHURA/SEIJIL solid-propellant missile, which is currently at an advanced stage of development, would constitute a genuine quantum leap in military terms. This would give Iran a launch vehicle with a range of approximately 2,000 kilometres and the advantages of easy and therefore rapid deployment. However, reports of Iranian successes in the area of cruise missiles and silo-launched ballistic missiles are considered by the FIS to have been exaggerated for propaganda purposes.





**North Korean nuclear programme:  
first plutonium, now uranium enrichment**

North Korea has been building a new reactor in the nuclear complex of Yongbyon, north of the capital, since the summer of 2010. In November 2010, the regime also decided to display its uranium enrichment capabilities to the world. North Korea had previously restricted itself to producing fissile material from plutonium. According to information from the North Koreans themselves, its centrifuge facility for uranium enrichment has a separation capacity that is about twice that of Natanz in Iran, and uses just one-third of the number of centrifuges. Publicly available information about the North Korean nuclear programme remains fragmentary. However, Pyongyang's claim that the uranium enrichment is exclusively for generating fuel for the new reactor in Yongbyon carries little credibility. 2012, as well as being a jubilee year (centenary of the birth of the state's founder Kim Il-sung), marks an important transitional phase following the death of Kim Jong-il, in which North Korea could both send out signals to stabilize the external environment and present further 'new achievements' in the nuclear field.

**North Korean ballistic missiles: continuing  
development and testing activities**

The mainstay of missile construction in North Korea is a complete series of liquid-propellant guided missiles which are largely based on the technology of older systems from the Soviet SCUD series. The improved versions of the SCUD-B, C and D short-range missiles, as well as the medium-range NODONG model, have also successfully been sold on to a large number of countries. Pyongyang describes its even longer-range TAEPODONG-1 and 2 models as space rockets, raising the international profile of the country's achievements in missile development even further. So far, only limited information is available about a technically more advanced liquid-propellant guided missile. In terms of more modern solid-propellant missile technology, North Korea still lags behind Iran or Pakistan. The country is currently attempting to replicate a Soviet technology. North Korea is also active in the area of cruise missiles. In both areas, there is evidence of intensive and covert efforts to acquire relevant technologies from abroad.




Construction site of the new reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, North Korea [Geo-Eye; photo dated 5 September 2011]

## ASSESSMENT

### Growing potential crisis in the nuclear dispute with Iran

The development of major programmes of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems continues apace. In the international context, the Iranian nuclear programme is the most virulent and has the potential to trigger a grave crisis in the Middle East. Iran's statements that it is enriching uranium purely in pursuit of civilian objectives are becoming increasingly implausible. The expansion of enrichment to twenty per cent is alarming. In view of the possibility that the heavy-water reactor will come on stream in a few years, the possibility that plutonium will be produced for military purposes is also increasingly set to become a focal point of international concern. The substantiated indications of work on a nuclear weapon confirm the assessment which the FIS has repeatedly communicated over the past few years.

North Korea's uranium enrichment capabilities could, in the area of centrifuge technology, be significantly more advanced than Iran's and may thus present a considerable additional proliferation risk. Pyongyang is capable of supplying all the products needed for a nuclear weapons programme, from the production of fissile material, probably in both variants (uranium and plutonium), to the construction of a simple nuclear explosive device and the delivery system required. In the past, the regime in Pyongyang has had no qualms about selling its missile technology to numerous customers like Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Egypt and Syria, with no strings attached. North Korea also assisted with the construction of a reactor in Syria which was destroyed by an Israeli air strike in 2007.



Underground uranium enrichment plant in Fordo, Iran [Digital-Globe; photo dated 4 October 2011]

## PROSPECTS

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
### **Manifold risks for Switzerland, too**

The flow of European nuclear-related goods and technologies via third countries to proliferation-sensitive countries also poses a major challenge for Swiss export controls. Switzerland offers an attractive and, by international standards, open research location. More importantly: it has excellent industrial capabilities, for example in the vacuum industry and in the field of pressure sensors. Thanks to the outstanding quality of international cooperation and collaboration with industry, numerous procurement attempts have successfully been thwarted in recent months.

However, the challenges are mounting. In proliferation-sensitive areas there are signs of a trend whereby buyers are focussing increasingly on the acquisition of subsystems and components, because the export of complete systems is being subjected to tighter and ever more effective international controls. Subsystems are more difficult to identify and to shield from illegal trade. New procurement channels are thus constantly appearing, many of which pass through Asia. The increasing outsourcing of production abroad on cost grounds is also making it more difficult both for industry and for the authorities to monitor the flow of sensitive goods. Another disadvantage is that the FIS has no legal basis for controlling financial flows and is restricted to monitoring the flow of goods. ■



# 5. Illegal intelligence



## SITUATION

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### **Switzerland – a focal point for espionage**

Switzerland, both as a state and as an economic centre, is a target for illegal intelligence activities. Since it is the seat of various international organizations and a global trading centre, the interests of third parties are also threatened by espionage. Thus, the international institutions based in Geneva make it an ideal location for international negotiations, but also for demonstrators, for example, to call attention to the interests of the oppositions in exile of various states. Finally, Switzerland is also the place of residence and employment of many foreign diplomats and functionaries, some of whom are active intelligence agents under diplomatic cover.

Illegal intelligence focuses on the interests of international organizations and of the member countries of such organizations, the diaspora communities of certain states, and of course also the political and economic interests of Switzerland. In the wake of the current economic and debt crisis, it may increasingly happen that the interests of other countries do not coincide with those of Switzerland. This may result in various countries engaging in espionage on Swiss territory. Alongside intelligence services, foreign states may also be deploying other information gatherers. For example, Switzerland has on multiple occasions been confronted with unauthorized activities by foreign financial, tax and customs authorities. In some cases, it has been possible to furnish evidence of such activities to the law enforcement agencies.

Foreign regime opponents and opposition figures who have taken up residence in Switzerland are also targets for foreign intelligence services. This applies in particular to states in which freedom of expression and of the media is restricted and which have the resources at their disposal to track regime opponents worldwide.

### **Growing importance of cyber espionage in recent years**

As regards information gathering by foreign intelligence services, cyber espionage, in particular, is gaining in importance. Indeed, this method can be very useful as it allows information to be gathered without agents having to be deployed in the target country. It is also very difficult to establish who lies behind the espionage activities. In recent years, Western countries have repeatedly been the targets of cyber espionage attacks, some of which have been extensive. Targets for attack can include the government administration, the military or private companies, as well as political opposition movements from the country of origin of the intelligence service concerned.

### **Effective legal measures relating to foreign nationals**

Besides the option of discreetly approaching the countries of origin of functionaries engaged in intelligence activities and making the Swiss legal position clear to them, the most effective preventive measures of counter-espionage

include accreditation and visa refusals, expulsions, entry bans and, in the case of diplomats, persona-non-grata declarations on the grounds of detected intelligence activities. Above a certain level, differences are settled publicly so as to send the appropriate signal.

This can be illustrated by examples from Europe. In November 2010, Spain expelled two Russian diplomats for illegal espionage. In early December 2010, the UK also expelled a Russian diplomat because of his espionage activities. Russia responded by expelling two Spanish diplomats and one British diplomat.

### **Tensions between counterespionage and political interests**

Although administrative measures regularly have to be taken to keep persons from various states out of the country on the grounds of illegal intelligence activity, Switzerland's political and security interests continually have to be weighed up against one another, particularly in connection with international organizations and negotiations on Swiss territory. For example, the presence of known foreign intelligence officers at international negotiations may in individual cases knowingly be accepted, in order not to jeopardize the negotiations themselves.



## ASSESSMENT

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### Two examples

Two examples reveal how Switzerland itself, but also foreigners living in Switzerland or foreign organizations domiciled in Switzerland continue to be important targets for illegal intelligence.

### State-controlled cyber espionage

The identity of those behind electronic espionage attacks cannot usually be established with absolute certainty. Nonetheless, based on the origin of the attacks and in-depth analysis of them (methods used, degree of complexity of the attacks, victims of the attacks, type of information gathered), the FIS has clear indications that the authorities of various countries have been directly or indirectly involved in a number of cyber attacks or have at least tolerated on their territory hackers who were acting in the interest of those countries. It is, for example, plausible that intelligence services might orchestrate extensive hacker attacks as part of their monitoring of political opposition abroad. The financial resources and analytical skills which have been used in a number of cyber attacks go far beyond the capabilities of cybercriminal organizations or hacker groups. Furthermore, except in cases of economic espionage, the data stolen in such attacks has no economic value in the criminal world, but is exclusively of importance to clients in government circles.

Some of these cyber attacks can be ascribed not to intelligence services but to individuals or private groups. The latter may be state-

sponsored or employed by companies under state control, or they may be acting on their own initiative in order to subsequently pass on the stolen data to potential buyers. It is highly probable that government agencies or institutions collaborating with such agencies cooperate closely with private hackers in individual cases. The specific nature of the stolen data in some cases suggests that the end users are known to the hackers and that they have considerable technical resources and analytical capabilities at their disposal for evaluating the stolen data.

### Spying on the opposition

Attempts by a number of intelligence services to spy on, monitor and influence their own nationals and opposition groups have been identified in various European states. For example, in early February 2012 arrest warrants were issued in Germany against two Syrians alleged to have been engaged in illegal intelligence, and four Syrian diplomats were expelled. In Switzerland, too, there have recently been a number of unconfirmed reports of intelligence services spying on opposition movements.

The fact that foreign intelligence services are monitoring their respective diaspora communities in Switzerland does not pose a direct security risk. However, such activity constitutes illegal political intelligence activity contrary to the fundamental Swiss values of freedom of expression and democracy and is a criminal offence. Such activities may also pose a threat

to relatives of exiled opposition figures in their countries of origin, where they may be subjected to repressive measures by their respective governments.

As these examples show, illegal intelligence activities continue to pose a threat in Switzerland.

## PROSPECTS


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### **Preventive measures aimed at raising awareness among companies and research institutes**

Switzerland will in future remain an attractive target for information gathering by foreign intelligence services, due to the high technological standards of Swiss industry, Switzerland's status as an international centre for research, the presence of the UN and other international bodies, Switzerland's position as a financial centre, its role in energy and commodity trading and its central location in Europe and excellent infrastructure. Alongside the traditional methods of espionage, which continue to be directed against political and military as well as economic targets, the threat posed by cyber attacks, in particular, will remain a major problem for the foreseeable future. Cyber attacks are less risky than other forms of espionage, and large quantities of data which is otherwise difficult to access can be procured in this way.

Spying on foreign opposition groups will continue to be a problem. The upheavals in the Arab world have led to radical changes in or the dissolution of traditional intelligence services in those countries. How the institutions that succeed them will develop and how former intelligence service personnel will be integrated in these still remains to be seen and will depend on the political and economic development of these countries, their international ties and last but not least the democratic legitimacy of the new governments.


The FIS is obliged by law to take preventive measures to counter the espionage activities of foreign intelligence services. One such preventive measure is the FIS' Prophylax programme. Under this programme, the FIS is raising the awareness of companies and research and higher educational institutions of the risks of proliferation and espionage. In addition, the Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance (MELANI) informs the operators of critical infrastructure and other administrative agencies and companies about the threats to IT, in particular those due to cyber espionage. Generally, measures to counter illegal intelligence will increase in importance in future. ■



The accompanying brochure for the FIS's prevention and awareness-raising campaign is enclosed with the situation report.



## 6. Attacks on Swiss IT infrastructure



## SITUATION

### Distinct cyber component in many of the current crises

In the wake of the rapid and exponential development of information and communication technologies, the global digital network which has led to the emergence of cyberspace (internet, mobile networks, e-business, e-government) has opened up hitherto undreamt-of opportunities: Information and services can be called up anywhere in the world, easily, cheaply and quickly.

At the same time, the high degree of interconnectedness in the digital age brings new threats. In the virtual arena, too, vandalism, criminality, espionage, sabotage and even conflicts between states are now a reality. Many of the crises and conflicts of recent years have, to a greater or lesser extent, featured a cyber component.

Examples of such attacks in Switzerland and around the world include the espionage incidents in the FDFA in 2007 and 2009, attacks on armaments manufacturers in Switzerland and the Stuxnet trojan, which according to current assessments was used to sabotage Iran's nuclear programme. In all these cases, it may be surmised that a government actually initiated the attacks. However, private groups of internet activists can also cause major damage, as illustrated by the attack at the end of 2011 on the servers of the US company Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor), which specializes in global security analyses. Among the items stolen were the names of business clients and their credit card numbers, and those affected included Swiss private clients and some members of the Swiss federal administration.

Authentic-looking input masks like this one are used in attempts to acquire access data, in the process known as phishing.



### **Cyber attacks on the emissions trading registries of the EU**

Ever larger and more complex attacks on information infrastructures are also being carried out for purely criminal motives, as a recent example shows. Various European emissions trading registries in the environmental sector have suffered repeated electronic attacks in recent months. The first phishing attacks took place in early 2010 and led to emissions credits being unlawfully transferred. The European Commission then demanded that security standards at the emissions trading offices be tightened. Due to persistent attempts to attack and misuse the system, the Commission decided to suspend trading in emissions credits EU-wide on 19 January 2011 and to link the reconnection of national registries to compliance with minimum security requirements. It took until the end of April 2011 for these security requirements to be fulfilled.

European credits (European Union Allowances, EUAs), which have been those most affected by the fraud cases to date, were and are not tradable in Switzerland. The Swiss emissions trading registry was not therefore directly affected by the events in January. As of 21 January 2011, however, trading in credits was temporarily restricted to office hours as a precaution, to make it possible to respond quickly to irregularities of any kind. During subsequent security reviews, weaknesses were also found in the Swiss system, and this led to its immediate closure on 14 February. After the necessary security measures had been implemented and all passwords reset as a precaution, the emissions trading registry went back online on 27 April 2011. However, trading remained restricted to office hours. No losses in connection with the Swiss emissions trading registry have been identified – according to the Federal Office for the Environment, there are emissions credits with a value of around CHF 4 billion in the system.



## ASSESSMENT

### Electronic attacks – a common occurrence

Recently, there has been a discernible shift of phishing attacks away from online banking toward less well protected services and platforms, notably trading platforms. Particularly at risk are those services which are protected solely by a login and password and where money can be earned. Besides emissions trading, other services affected included online payment systems, auction platforms, e-mail providers and social networks.

In addition to untargeted, broad-spectrum attacks which are intended to infect as many computers as possible, targeted electronic attacks also occur regularly. It must be assumed that there will be daily attempts to enter protected networks in order to spy on them. The amount of energy invested in this will vary depending on the level of interest and sensitivity. Since the attack attempts are constant and varied, there is a high chance that sooner or later an attack attempt will be successful.

### Infected IT systems can be used for a wide variety of attacks

The intention behind an attack is seldom immediately recognisable. The use to which infected systems will be put will depend initially on the attacker. However, once a system has been infected, the attacker also has the option of changing or adapting his original intention. For example, an infrastructure that has been established by criminal networks for monetary gain can also be used for intelligence activities. Recently, we have seen that highly professional tools and techniques of attack which were originally used primarily against well-protected banking and payment systems have increasingly also been used for political purposes and, in particular, espionage. There is now a real market for techniques and know-how in the area of cyber attacks.

Due to the potential of cyber attacks to cause damage on many levels, early detection and, following from that, early preventive action by the state are required. Where cyber attacks are concerned, a state cannot afford to wait until after the event before allowing its law-enforcement agencies to respond. Critical attacks on the economy, population and state must be prevented or averted.



Internet forum used by Russian cyber criminals

## PROSPECTS

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### **Individual events often form part of larger clusters of cases**

It is important that private companies, the administration and international organizations should not only protect themselves against attacks but also prepare themselves for a damaging event. In addition to planning contingency scenarios and preparing appropriate corporate communications, provision must also be made for the best possible protection of vital company secrets. In concrete terms, this means that documents whose loss would jeopardize the survival of the organization or company should not be kept on a server that is connected to the internet or otherwise allows external access.

The perpetrators in such cases are often not satisfied with a single attack, since electronic espionage, in particular, is a long drawn-out process. It thrives on establishing and exploiting sources and constantly setting up new ones. Single cyber events may often on closer inspection turn out to be part of a larger cluster of cases. The aim of the FIS and MELANI is to establish such links in both the national and international arenas and thereby make it possible to combat the threats effectively.

### **Intelligence services play an important role in averting cyber attacks**

The issue of security in cyberspace is on the agenda of almost every country and international forum. This is evidenced by the countless initiatives, strategies and efforts at national and international level. It is clear that, at least in the detection, analysis, assessment and averting of cyber threats, successes will be difficult to achieve without a strong and focused intelligence component. Increasing interconnectedness and the resulting ever-increasing opportunities for infiltration are making it possible even for purely financially motivated criminals to carry out an act that could pose a threat to or be harmful to the state. It is also becoming apparent that states and their intelligence services will increasingly draw on the opportunities presented by cyber attacks to supplement or replace their existing operations. ■



## List of abbreviations

ALF .....	Animal Liberation Front
ARM.....	Animal Rights Militia
AQAP.....	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM.....	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BWIS .....	Federal Act on Measures to Safeguard Internal Security
EUA .....	European Union Allowance
FAI .....	Informal Anarchist Federation / Federazione Anarchica Informale
FDFA.....	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
fedpol.....	Federal Office of Police
IAEA.....	International Atomic Energy Agency
IED.....	Improvised explosive device
ISI.....	Islamic State of Iraq
ISIS .....	Information System for Internal Security / Informationssystem Innere Sicherheit
KFOR.....	Kosovo Force
LTTE.....	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MELANI.....	Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OFIS.....	Ordinance on the Federal Intelligence Service
PKK .....	Kurdistan Workers' Party
RAS.....	Revolutionärer Aufbau Schweiz
RAZ .....	Revolutionärer Aufbau Zürich
SHAC.....	Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
SRI .....	International Red Aid / Secours Rouge International

Stratfor .....	Strategic Forecasting
SVP .....	Swiss People's Party
TAK.....	Kurdistan Freedom Falcons
WEF .....	World Economic Forum



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