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INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 AMAD-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 CTME-00 C-01 OASY-00 OIGO-01 FBIE-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-19 JUSE-00 L-03 ADS-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 PM-02 OMB-01 TRSE-00 USIE-00 FMP-00 P-01SP-00 SS-00 /052W -----ACE9B3 292317Z /38

O 292305Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6458
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USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//CC/CV/SCJ3// IMMEDIATE
INFO JOINTSTAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
DIRONDCP WASHDC PRIORITY
COMDT/COGARD WASHDC PRIORITY
DEA WASHDC//OFL/OD// PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC//CANAS// PRIORITY
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
HQUSAF WASHDC PRIORITY
ANGRC ANDREWS AFB MD//CC// PRIORITY
HQNORAD PETERSON AFB CO//J3//

S F SECTION 01 OF 05 BOGOTA 04888

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: SNAR, CO

SUBJECT: BEYOND SUPPORT JUSTICE IV (SJIV)

REF: STATE 084858

THE COLUMN

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1. SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE, AND KEY FIGURES IN THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA (GOC), HAVE BEEN THINKING ON THE ISSUE OF WHERE WE GO BEYOND SJ-IV FOR SOME TIME AND HAVE DEVELOPED A PLAN TO MOVE SMOOTHLY INTO FUTURE STEADY STATE OPERATIONS.
BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE FIGHT IN COLOMBIA, WE HAVE DIFFICULTY FOCUSING SOLELY ON THE FUTURE OF AERIAL INTERDICTION AND AIR SOVEREIGNTY OUTSIDE OF THE CONTEXT OF OUR OVERALL COUNTRY TEAM (CT) STRATEGY. WE RECOMMEND

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: OSCAR J. OLSON DATE/CASE ID: 21 JAN 2003 200101981 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.6(6) DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 MAR 2018





EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THIS EFFORT TO INCLUDE THE FULL ARRAY OF MILITARY SUPPORT FOR COUNTERDRUG (CD) OPERATIONS IN COLOMBIA WHICH GO FAR BEYOND SJ-IV. INDEED, WE ARE FOCUSING ON MILITARY OPERATION IN GENERAL AS AN ADJUNCT TO POLICE OPERATIONS; A NECESSARY ELEMENT TO CREATE THE CONDITION FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR CD GOALS HERE.

3. WE ARE ENGAGED WITH THE GOC ON NUMEROUS CD AND NON CD ISSUES, MANY OF WHICH ARE NOT CONDUCIVE TO CONTINUING SMOOTH RELATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, OUR COFFEE AND TEXTILE POLICIES COULD BE A SOURCE OF FUTURE FRICTION, AS COULD DRASTIC CUTS IN FMF AND ESF. THE SJIV CD EFFORT IS AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM. IT HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY SUCCESSFUL AT BUILDING CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THIS INDUSTRIOUS, RELATIVELY WEALTHY NATION, WHICH IS ALREADY BUYING OR CONSIDERING CASH PURCHASES OF US MADE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, RADARS, AND HELICOPTERS. COOPERATION BETWEEN US AND COLOMBIA MILITARY PERSONNEL HAS GONE FAR TOWARD BUILDING VIABLE INSTITUTIONS

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SUPPORTIVE OF CONTINUING DEMOCRACY HERE, AS WELL AS
CONTINUING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE USG. COLOMBIA'S
CD FORCES ARE ALREADY THE BEST IN THE REGION, AND WE
MUST CONTINUE TO NURTURE THEIR VERY EFFECTIVE
COUNTERNARCOTICS CAPABILITY. THE DRUG WAR IS ALL
IMPORTANT TO COLOMBIA, AND THE GOC INTENDS TO CONTINUE
THE EFFORT AT THE EXPENSE OF ITS TAXPAYERS.

4. WHILE WE DON'T HAVE A FORMAL DOCUMENT UPDATING OUR JOINT COMPREHENSIVE CD PLAN, WE DO HAVE A COLOMBIAN RADAR PLAN IN DRAFT WHICH SHOULD BE RELEASED BY THE END OF APRIL. COLOMBIAN OVERALL THINKING HAS MATURED IN FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH US. THEY ARE INTENT ON WRESTING INFLUENCE FROM THE NARCOS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THEY LAUNCHED OPERATION AGUILA IN LATE JULY 1992 TO COMPLEMENT SJIV AND TO MILITARILY ENGAGE THE NARCOS' USE OF CIVIL AVIATION. THE

PROJECT WAS ORIGINALLY
SCHEDULED TO OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH OUR RADAR
DEPLOYMENTS IN SJIV AND THE KICKOFF OF AGUILA, BUT
DELAYS WERE CAUSED BY THE U.S. CONTRACTOR. THEY HAVE
WORKED HARD TO IMPROVE THEIR TACTICAL REACTION
CAPABILITY. WE SEE EVIDENCE THEY ARE READY TO COMMIT



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MONEY TO DEVELOP NEW INITIATIVES. THEY ARE BUYING BLACKHAWKS. THEY HAVE ASKED FOR P&A DATA FOR PURCHASE OF MD-500'S AND UPGRADING OF THEIR AC-47'S. BOTH WILL BE CASH FMS CASES. THEY ARE PLANNING TO CAPITALIZE ON THE GREAT STRIDES IN TACTICAL CAPABILITY (WHICH WE PROVIDED) MADE IN THE SEARCH FOR PABLO ESCOBAR. THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOC AND USG, AS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE ESCOBAR TASK FORCE, IS TREMENDOUSLY SUCCESSFUL.



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POST-PABLO, THE GOC INTENDS TO EXPAND TASK FORCE
OPERATIONS TO CALI AND THE NORTH COAST. CONTINUAL USG
SUPPORT WILL BE CRITICAL TO SUCCESS IN SHUTTING DOWN
NARCO OPERATIONS. OUR PLANNING FOR TRANSITION INTO THE
FUTURE TAKES COLOMBIAN CAPABILITIES INTO ACCOUNT.
OUTLINING OUR PLAN, WE BELIEVE, WILL ANSWER MOST OF THE
QUESTIONS POSED IN REF.




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INFO	LOG-00 C-01	ACDA-17	AID-01 OIGO-01	AMAD-01 FBIE-00		CIAE-00 INR-00	CTME-00 IO-19
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5. WITHIN THIS EXPANDED CONTEXT, AERIAL INTERDICTION AND



PAGE 02 BOGOTA 04888 02 OF 05 292317Z ENFORCEMENT OF COLOMBIAN AIR SOVEREIGNTY IS A DEFINITE AREA OF EMPHASIS AND FUNDING COMMITMENT FOR THE GOC. THE FIRST EXTENSION OF SJIV, IN DECEMBER 1992, WAS TO SHOW WHETHER THERE WAS MERIT TO DETECTION AND MONITORING (D&M) OPERATIONS USING RADAR AND OVERHEAD PLATFORMS IN COLOMBIA.

- 6. THE EXPANDED JOINT PLANNING ASSISTANCE TEAM (JPAT) IN COLOMBIA, WITH 45 TDY MILITARY PERSONNEL, IN CONJUNCTION WITH MOUNTING THE RADAR ON TOWERS AND INCREASED SOUTHCOM OVERHEAD PLATFORM ALLOCATIONS, PROVED THE CONCEPT VALID. DURING THE SECOND PHASE (JAN-MAR), OUR EFFECTIVENESS AT ENSURING END GAMES ON ACTIONABLE TRACKS INCREASED FROM AN AVERAGE OF 38 PERCENT TO ABOUT 60 PERCENT, AND THE OVERALL NUMBER OF TRACKS DECREASED WITH INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION GATHERED SIGNIFICANTLY. BY THESE RESOURCES, WE ALSO STIMULATED GROUND OPERATIONS IN THE VALLE DEL CAUCA, SERIOUSLY DISRUPTING NARCO IN TOTAL, COLOMBIAN FORCES WITH OUR SUPPORT OPERATIONS. CAPTURED 14 AIRCRAFT, 1700 KILOS OF COCAINE AND BASE, 12,400 GALLONS OF PRECURSOR MATERIALS, AND DESTROYED APPROXIMATELY 20 LABS, COSTING THE NARCOS WELL OVER USD 12 MILLION.
- 7. BUT THE REAL SUCCESS OF THESE OPERATION IN COLOMBIA HAS BEEN INSTITUTION BUILDING. THE COLOMBIAN AIR FORCE (FAC) AND ANTINARCOTICS POLICE (DAN) NOW WORK SIDE-BY-SIDE IN THE CENTRO DE NACIONAL VIGILANCIA (CNV). AN ARMY OFFICER WILL SOON BE INCLUDED. THIS WAS NOT EVEN CONCEIVABLE SIX MONTHS AGO. TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND POLICE AND





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OURSELVES IN THE CNV IS NOW ROUTINE AND HAS RESULTED IN THE CAPTURE OF NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE (MOD) HAS ENDORSED AND PROMISED TO FIND WORK SPACE FOR THE NEXT EVOLUTION OF THIS COOPERATION--A COMBINED US/COLOMBIAN CD OPERATIONS PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CELL DUBBED THE COMBINED PLANNING GROUP (CPG)

8. OUR CT PLAN IS TO CONTINUE BUILDING THIS INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION WHILE ENHANCING COLOMBIAN EQUIPMENT CAPABILITIES. OUR CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS TO THE END OF SJIV PROVIDES TWO MAJOR GOALS: (1) TO TRANSITION TO COLOMBIA-ONLY OPERATIONS, AS US MILITARY CD FORCES COMMENSURATELY DECLINE, AND (2) TO ENHANCE US/GOC.JOINT CD OPERATIONS. THE TRANSITION GOAL IS PERHAPS MOST DIFFICULT. OUR SHORT TERM OBJECTIVES FOLLOW:

A.
TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE MANPOWER SHORTFALLS OF THE AIR
NATIONAL GUARD AT THE LETICIA AND ARARACUARA RADARS, WE
ARE RESEARCHING THE POSSIBILITY OF COLOMBIA TAKING OVER
AT LEAST 50 PERCENT OF THE POSITIONS. WHILE WE CAN MAKE
NO PROMISES, WE ARE QUITE HOPEFUL THIS WILL COME TO
FRUITION. OVER THE LONGER TERM, POST-SJIV, WE ENVISION
THE COLOMBIANS WILL BE ABLE TO PICK UP EVEN MORE OF THE
RESPONSIBILITY AS THEY GAIN EXPERIENCE IN MAINTAINING
THE RADARS.

B.
AS MENTIONED EARLIER, OUR CPG HAS BEEN CHARTERED TO
CONDUCT CD OPERATIONS PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT,



PAGE 04 BOGOTA 04888 02 OF 05 292317Z WORKING AS AN INTEGRATED TEAM WITH COLOMBIAN PLANNERS. WE MUST EXPLORE MANNING WITH SOUTHCOM, CONSIDERING THAT THIS CELL WILL HAVE TO BE MANNED WITH TDY MILITARY PERSONNEL, BUT AS COLOMBIAN PLANNING EXPERTISE INCREASES, US MANNING CAN BE REDUCED. WE ARE LOOKING AT

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INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 AMAD-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 CTME-00 OASY-00 OIGO-01 FBIE-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-19 C-01 JUSE-00 L-03 ADS-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PM-02 /052W P-01 SP-00 \$S-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 FMP-00

O 292305Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6460
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//CC/CV/SCJ3// IMMEDIATE
INFO JOINTSTAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
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THREE OPTIONS:



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(1)
FULL JPAT-LEVEL OPERATIONS WHICH ENABLES CONTINUED D&M,
GROUND AND RIVERINE OPERATIONS AND PURSUIT OF VARIOUS
STAFF INITIATIVES ENHANCING CD OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS. THIS OPTION WILL INITIALLY REQUIRE 45
PEOPLE FOR 90 DAY PERIODS.

(2) A REDUCED CELL FOCUSING ON D&M ONLY, WITH NO GROUND OR RIVERINE SUPPORT. THIS OPTION WILL TAKE 23 PEOPLE.

(3)





A REDUCED CELL WHICH FOCUSES ONLY ON GROUND AND RIVER OPERATIONS WITHOUT ANY D&M SUPPORT. THIS OPTION REQUIRES 17 PEOPLE.


- C.
  NUMEROUS INITIATIVES ARE UNDERWAY TO ENHANCE JOINT COLOMBIAN CD OPERATIONS.
- OUR NEXT CONOPS AIMS TO CONTINUE PRESSURE ON THE NARCOS IN THE VALLE DEL CAUCA BY PROVIDING PLANNING ASSISTANCE AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT THROUGH THE CPG.



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WE HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED COLOMBIAN MILITARY LEADERS WITH A CONCEPT OF DEVELOPING JOINT, FAST REACTION CD TEAMS USING FAC HELICOPTERS MATCHED WITH ARMY AND DAN GUN TEAMS. AS THIS CAPABILITY IS DEVELOPED, WE INTEND TO DO STRIKE AND DENIAL OPERATIONS IN LA GUAJIRA.

- (3)
  WE ARE GOING TO GIVE MORE PRIORITY TO RIVERINE AND
  COASTAL OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT COLOMBIA, BUT PARTICULARLY
  FOCUSING ON LA GUAJIRA AND SAN ANDRES.
- (4)
  WE MUST DILIGENTLY PURSUE RESOLUTION OF LEGAL AND
  POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO OUR EFFECTIVENESS, E.G. CUSTOMS
  RELEASE OF FLIR TAPES TO THE GOC AND THE E-3 RIDER ISSUE.



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INFO JOINTSTAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
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HQUSAF WASHDC PRIORITY

MODDE WADNE FRIORITI

ANGRC ANDREWS AFB MD//CC// PRIORITY

HONORAD PETERSON AFB CO//J3//

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PAGE 02 BOGOTA 04888 04 OF 05 292318Z DEVELOPED WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK ON THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IN THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM.


WE PROPOSE EXPLORING THE TRANSFER OF THE LETICIA AND ARARACUARA RADARS TO COLOMBIA, PROVIDING CORE EXPERTISE ON OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE AND A SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS FOR A YEAR. RIGHT NOW, THE GOC IS OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF INHERITING THESE OLD RADARS PERMANENTLY, BUT THEY REMAIN A USEFUL DETERRENT TO THE NARCOS AND GIVE THE COLOMBIAN OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE. WITH OR WITHOUT THESE RADARS, THEY INTEND TO PURCHASE THEIR OWN WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR.

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WE EXPECT AN COLOMBIAN DECISION ANY DAY ON THE PURCHASE OF FIVE BLACKHAWKS BASED ON THE PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA PROVIDED EARLIER. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS, COLOMBIA HAS NIGHT VISION GOGGLE QUALIFIED INSTRUCTOR PILOTS WHO ARE TRAINING NEW PILOTS IN NIGHT OPERATIONS, AND WE PROPOSE HAVING THE USG SUPPLY MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS FOR MORE FORMAL NVG TRAINING. THE RADARS AND NVG CAPABILITIES PROMISE TO HELP RESOLVE SOME OF THE SERIOUS



PAGE 03 BOGOTA 04888 04 OF 05 292318Z SHORTFALLS FACING IN NIGHT REACTION CAPABILITY.

THERE APPEARS TO BE NEW RESOLVE TO ATTACK CORRUPTION, AT LEAST, WHEN IT COMES TO THE ATTENTION OF POLICY MAKERS. DURING SJIV, WE IDENTIFIED A DAN MAJOR IN CALI WHO WAS SUPPORTING NARCO TRAFFICKING THROUGH THE AIRPORT. THE PROBLEM STOPPED WITHIN A DAY AFTER THE AMBASSADOR SHARED THE INFORMATION WITH THE MOD. COLOMBIAN AIRFORCE OFFICIALS THEMSELVES SUGGESTED WE FILE FALSE INFORMATION WITH OUR OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE REQUESTS, SO THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM COULD NOT TIP THE NARCOS ABOUT OUR CD OVERFLIGHTS. WE SIMILARLY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISCIPLINE OR REMOVE TOWER CONTROLLERS IN CALI. WHEN WE

n/a



STARTED THE JANUARY PHASE OF SJIV, CALI WAS A VERITABLE SAFEHAVEN. AFTER A CONCENTRATED EFFORT ATTACKING CORRUPTION, WE CAPTURED AT LEAST THREE AIRPLANES AND TRAFFICKERS THERE IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS.

(10)
COLOMBIA HAS RESEARCHED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MANDATORY
AIRPORT OF ENTRY (AOES) AND WANTS TO DO SO. THE HOLD UP
AT THE MOMENT IS MANNING FOR THE OPERATION. RELATIVE TO
ITS POPULATION, COLOMBIA HAS A CONSIDERABLE VOLUME OF
TRAFFIC CROSSING ITS BORDERS DAILY, SO THE INSPECTION
REQUIREMENTS AT THESE AIRPORTS WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL.

(11)



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ENTRY AND EXIT CORRIDORS HAVE SIMILARLY BEEN EXPLORED
AND ARE A LONG TERM GOAL. THIS INITIATIVE WHEN COUPLED
WITH AOES WILL PROVIDE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ENGAGING
NARCO AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAW. THE RADARS COMING ON LINE



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INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AID-01	AMAD-01	ARA-01	CIAE-00	CTME-00
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	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PM-02
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USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//CC/CV/SCJ3// IMMEDIATE
INFO JOINTSTAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
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NSC WASHDC//CANAS// PRIORITY
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
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ANGRC ANDREWS AFB MD//CC// PRIORITY
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AND THESE LEGAL STEPS WILL ULTIMATELY BE THE TOOLS WITH




PAGE 02 BOGOTA 04888 05 OF 05 292318Z
WHICH COLOMBIA REGAINS SOVEREIGN CONTROL OF ITS AIRSPACE.

- 9. IN THE LONG TERM, THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY IS TRYING TO RESOLVE ITS INABILITY TO ATTACK NARCOS AT NIGHT AND IN REMOTE LOCATIONS.
- (A)
  THEY HAVE ASKED US TO CHECK AVAILABILITY OF D-MODEL
  OV-10'S WHICH ARE NVG COMPATIBLE AND FLY AS FAST AS THE
  TYPICAL NARCO AIRCRAFT. THEIR A-MODELS TOP OUT AT 170
  KNOTS AND ARE FREQUENTLY OUT RUN BY THE NARCOS. THEY
  INTEND TO MAKE MODIFY THEIR A-37'S FOR NVG OPERATIONS AS
  WELL.
- (B)
  THEY HAVE ASKED MILGP TO DEVELOP A PROPOSAL FOR A LOW
  COST MODEL OF AN AC-130 GUNSHIP. THE ENVISIONED
  AIRCRAFT WILL HAVE FLIR AND MINIGUNS BUT NOT THE COSTLY
  HOWITZERS, ETC., ON U.S. MODELS.
- (C)
  THEY ARE IN THE PROCESS OF UPGRADING THEIR AC-47
  GUNSHIPS WITH TURBOPROP ENGINES, EXTENDING THEIR LIFE
  AND PERFORMANCE SO THEY CAN GO AFTER THE NARCOS IN THEIR
  SAFEHAVENS, I.E., THE MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS.
- (D)
  ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT MENTIONED ANYTHING ABOUT IT, A
  FLIR-EQUIPPED, TRACK TO GROUND PLATFORM OF THEIR OWN
  WOULD BE A USEFUL SUPPLEMENT TO

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THE T-47 SYSTEM COULD PROVIDE THIS CAPABILITY.

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10. REFTEL RAISES POINTED CONCERNS ABOUT COLOMBIAN ABILITY TO AFFORD THEIR PROPOSED PROGRAMS. THE GOC AND MILITARY LEADERS DO NOT SHARE DETAILED FUNDING DATA WITH US, BUT MOST OF THEIR PURCHASES ARE CASH. OUR PROGRAMS SUPPLY LESS THEN SEVEN PERCENT OF THEIR MILITARY BUDGET, AND AFTER LONG-TERM OBSERVATION, WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THEIR FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY OR THAT THEY HAVE CONSIDERED LIFE CYCLE COST--NOT JUST INITIAL PURCHASE FOR ANY OF THIS EQUIPMENT. THEY ARE CAREFUL NOT TO BROACH SUBJECTS THEY CANNOT AFFORD.

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