19-01-1974 China Invaded Paracels Hoàng Sa - DMCS (Địt Mẹ Cộng Sản) - Contact VSA Vietnamese Student

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• published: 28 Jan 2014
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Vietnamese wave flags decorated with 6 stars in Ha Noi to welcome Xi Jinping. China's flag has only 5 stars, 1 big star surrounded by 4 smaller ones. Xi Jinping (Tập Cận Bình) được đón chào ở Phủ Chủ tịch tại Hà Nội với cờ Trung Quốc với sáu ngôi sao, trong lúc quốc kỳ chính thức của Cộng hòa Nhân dân Trung Quốc chỉ có năm ngôi sao - một ngôi sao vàng lớn được vây quanh bởi bốn ngôi sao nhỏ hơn. “Chúng ta phải chấm dứt hành động của những kẻ bán đứng tổ quốc Việt Nam, những kẻ đang tìm cách biến Việt Nam thành ngôi sao thứ năm của Trung Quốc.” https://youtube.com/watch?v=dlp5gLoiL-w . Việt gian CS từ chối ra một tuyên bố chung chống lại TQ đó là dấu hiệu nhìn nhận lý lẽ và hành vi xâm chiếm Hoàng Sa của TQ là chính đáng. CSVN mù lòa cuồng tín bị TQ xỏ mũi dắt đi như dắt 1 con bò Hy sinh Biển Đảo để nhận lại vũ khí mà TQ thì âm thầm gửi theo trong đó là chiến lược "TQ đánh Mỹ đến người VN cuối cùng" . On January 19, 1974, PLA swiftly exploited the naval victory with an amphibious landing in force to complete its control of all the Paracel Islands. Unilateral actions aimed at subverting the status quo in the South China Sea (SCS) by threat or use of force has continued to dominate. Recent video footage showed a standoff between CN and VN law enforcement ships off the Paracel Islands back in 2007. More recent, recurring incidents included the harassment of VN survey ships by CN vessels, the Sino-Philippine maritime standoff in the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 and, later, the show of force by CN surveillance ships and naval frigates off the Philippine-held Second Thomas Shoal. These episodes bear an eerie resemblance to the sort of naval jostling that led to the skirmish back in 1974. Even as the SCS claimants engaged in consultations on a Code of Conduct, upon unilaterally declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea (ECS) in December 2013, CN declared indisputable rights to create ADIZs in other areas if it so desired. An ADIZ over the SCS, if ever established, would undoubtedly strengthen CN hand over the disputed waters, augmenting regular unilateral fishing bans, an earlier expanded maritime law enforcement authority for the Hainan authorities as well as the latest CN fisheries law requiring foreign fishing vessels to seek permission from CN to operate in much of the SCS. These developments, if they continue unabated, will only heighten the risk of accidental or premeditated clashes in the disputed waters. The Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 highlighted the need to not just deny an adversary from blockading the SCS features but also to secure VN own access to those exposed and vulnerable garrisons. Only a shift from sea denial to sea control can hope to attain that. Given the durable peace along the land borders with her neighbors, VN should logically emphasize air-sea warfighting capabilities. The foreseeable combat scenario in a renewed SCS clash will encompass the need for VN forces to recapture seized features, or at least reinforce existing garrisons in the face of hostile attack. Under this scenario, VN defense predicament is perhaps no different from Japan's with respect to the ECS dispute. Tokyo has outlined in its recent new defense strategy the need for robust, integrated mobile defense, which envisaged the need for the Self-Defense Force to recapture the ECS isles in times of hostilities. Certainly VN cannot hope to muster the same range of capabilities as Japan could, given economic constraints. To build at least limited sea control capabilities, VN ought to focus on improving early warning and expanding amphibious sealift capacity. Existing VN early warning capabilities are vested in a static electronic surveillance network arrayed along the VN mainland coast and in occupied SCS features, augmented only in recent years by maritime patrol aircraft of the VN navy. These planes are mainly designed for surface surveillance, yet are handicapped in endurance and lack adequate anti-submarine warfare capabilities especially in view of the increasing PLA submarine challenge. A high-endurance maritime patrol aircraft fitted with longer-range sensors will be appropriate, and arguably more survivable than static installations. The VPN Infantry, which specializes in amphibious assault and has been streamlined over the decades, has become a leaner yet meaner force with the acquisition of better equipment. Still, it remains short on amphibious sealift capacity. VN fledgling naval shipbuilders have so far produced a small handful of new assault transports. https://youtube.com/watch?v=1vg5tom0h0g