Guided Emergence

John Robb recently posed an interesting question at his blog, Global Guerrillas: is it possible to leverage decentralized decision making (in order to get inside your opponent’s OODA-Loop) while keeping the organization as a whole responsive to direction from above? In other words, can you leverage the power of decentralized decision making without ceding control to the mob? I think the answer is “partially yes.” Here’s my notion of how this can be done—and its limitations—something that I call “guided emergence.”

First, what is an OODA-Loop? It’s a topic mentioned by Robb, and one that I’ve written about many times in the past (1 2).

It’s the decision making cycle within any organization as defined by the steps Observe – Orient – Decide – Act. This is how the military—and any organization—processes information. We observe events, orient our goals and intentions to the changes that these observations represent, decide what to do about it, and then act on those decisions. When two opposing groups are in direct competition with each other—whether military or otherwise—the group that can go through the OODA-Loop process both correctly AND more quickly than their opponent prevails (or at least gains the upper hand). Now consider two opposing groups with two different organizational structures both competing in this OODA-Loop game. Group one (US military) is a huge, hierarchal bureaucracy. Group two is a small, decentralized network (al-Qa’ida). Group one’s attempts to go through the OODA-Loop process is bogged down by the information processing burden of hierarchy (see my writings on this topic in these three posts, as well as in Chapter 9 of A Theory of Power).

So that’s the shape of the problem: the US military can’t get inside al-Qa’ida’s OODA-Loop because it’s hierarchal, top-down decision making structure prevents it from executing the loop more quickly than its decentralized opponent. So back to Robb’s question: if the US military (or any other hierarchal organization) wants to speed up its OODA-Loop, can it do so while maintaining control of the organization? Robb presents two options. First, the US military can try to get all the decentralized decision makers to share the same objectives, the same understanding of acceptable means to pursue those objectives, and the same background information, and hope that they make decisions that are aligned with what a hierarchal decision making process would decide—only faster. The second option—one that is a priori unacceptable—is to let the decentralized decision makers do what they want without any control at all. This will invariably result in an even faster OODA-Loop because there is no need to waste time or resources attempting to get all decision makers in harmony with senior leadership (an impossible task in any event). Therefore, for the US military, the answer is “no,” it is not possible to fully leverage decentralized decision making to speed up our OODA-Loop. The best option that is both acceptable and implementable is to loosen the reigns of control over lower-level decision makers and provide some kind of training in advance that aims at harmonizing their actions within the acceptable range of senior leaders. We’ve been doing this for a long time already: military academies are intended, for example, to harmonize junior leaders with senior leadership to exactly this end, but they largely fail at this task because of their equally important task of generating junior leaders who are willing to think outside the box, innovate, and question authority when necessary. I’ll offer myself as case in fact for this problem—the best “harmonization training” available didn’t work. Because harmonization isn’t a real solution—just a stop gap (kind of like forming a “tiger team” to address a problem isn’t the same as addressing the problem)—an adversary who is not constrained by the need to “harmonize” decentralized decision makers will continue to operate inside the OODA-Loop of the US military. Hierarchy demands centralized decision making, and is fundamentally, structurally incompatible with decentralization of decision making beyond some boundary. Because the location of that boundary sets hierarchy at a permanent disadvantage to decentralized networks when it comes to speed of innovation and decision making, there is no solution to getting a hierarchal structure inside a decentralized structure’s OODA-Loop.

My solution to the problem is not to fight these fundamentals, but rather to change the structure of the larger organization to a decentralized one—what I call “rhizome.” I recognize that the US military just isn’t going to accept this—I think that’s fine, and I think it serves as an example of how the era of the Nation-State is in decline (see The New Map). I also recognize that the world is never going to convert to a wholly decentralized structure, a perfect “rhizome.” Likewise, this is not how structures exist in nature—nature is a dynamic balance between hierarchal and rhizomatic structures (see Manuel de Landa’s 1000 Years of Non-Linear History). So this leads me to what I consider the really interesting question here: how to effectively balance hierarchal structures with decentralized, rhizome structures. My answer: guided emergence. Use a limited hierarchy to create, reinforce, and maintain institutions that generate a balanced, minimally self-sufficient, harmonized rhizome structure and then “let it go”—accept that you can’t affect the direction of such a structure, but that because a balanced structure is created in the first place, the emergent actions of that structure will remain “harmonious.”

That’s a lot of fancy-sounding theory that probably comes off as gibberish. Let me run through three examples of this in action: guided emergence in biology, for a terrorist organization, for a national military (notice I’m not calling it a “Nation-State” military), and for a local community.

Guided Emergence in Biology

Guided emergence already exists in nature. As one example, consider DNA. That molecule effectively guides the emergence of a vast diversity of life while simultaneously ensuring its own propagation. Perhaps an even more interesting example is that of mitochondria, specifically mDNA. mDNA maintains its basic structure quite consistently (though not statically) while facilitating its own propagation through the dynamic, innovative system of carbon-based life. Talk about getting inside the opponent’s OODA-Loop. Sure, this is a pretty theoretical example, but one that’s worth keeping in mind as we move on to a very concrete example in human society next…

Guided Emergence and the Terrorist Organization

Al-Qa’ida already implements the theory of guided emergence in its organizational structure. Currently, al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership acts as a “doctrine center” as well as sometimes provider of training, direction, and financing. Al-Qa’ida does not, however, exert direct, hierarchal command and control of its forces in the field. In fact, it’s really impossible to say who al-Qa’ida’s forces are—some openly pledge allegiance, such as al-Qa’ida in Iraq or al-Qa’ida in the land of the Islamic Maghreb, but many more, perhaps most, are only influenced to some degree by the core function of al-Qa’ida. In this sense, al-Qa’ida is an excellent example of guided emergence operating successfully. It is also an excellent example of the reasons why traditional hierarchal structures such as the US Military are so incapable of adapting this highly efficient, highly innovative structure: the requirement to cede ultimate control of actions. Al-Qa’ida is limited, in “guiding” the emergence of a global Islamic jihad, to arguing why this jihad should be prosecuted, how this should be done, and on occasion directly interjecting personnel or training into the emergent system. This is also its strength—it can act symbolically, and greatly leverage its available resources by persuading others to directly act on, or roughly on, its behalf. It also forces al-Qa’ida to directly confront a prerequisite to ultimate political victory that is normally only given lip service by Nation-States in their pursuit of political-military victory: winning the hearts and minds. The US military, as others before it, is often lulled into thinking that winning hearts and minds is of secondary concern because direct application of military force can control the situation in the absence of control of hearts and minds. This tends to work well in the short term and disastrously over any much longer time period (witness: the very notion of “blowback” arises from this problem). Al-Qa’ida, by virtue of the fact that it does not and cannot directly control the kind of military force required to be tricked into this short-term perspective is forced to take a long-term approach that requires addressing hearts and minds first, and then looking for a military solution. While this allows temporary military setbacks such as the one it suffered in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, it ultimately leads to victory against an opponent who thinks that hearts and minds are an unnecessary sideshow. Hearts and minds will always, ultimately, be most attracted to an organization that permits unfettered, bottom-up innovation, because that directly allows the actual interests of people (as opposed to the theoretical interests advanced on their behalf by world aid organizations and “benevolent” Nation-States’ international policy programs) to dictate the actions of the emergent entity. It is very hard for a Nation-State to win hearts and minds when those hearts and minds realize that the Nation-State is not organically arising FROM them, but rather is attempting only to leverage them toward its own goals. A bottom-up, emergent organization doesn’t suffer from this weakness. This makes attempts to guide the emergence of such a bottom-up system—ultimately nothing more than an argument for why it is in THEIR best interests to follow the proposed course—so much more successful because it is inherently persuasive rather than coercive.

Guided Emergence and a National Military

So, given the problems of adapting a bottom-up, emergent, decentralized structure to a Nation-State military, is there no application of this kind of theory in the world of modern military affairs? I think that there is a very direct application, but that we must first remove “State” from “Nation-State” before attempting to apply guided emergence. “State” is an inherently centralized, hierarchal edifice erected (in theory, though never precisely in practice) upon the exact boundaries of an ethnic, religious, or cultural “Nation.” I’ve written before about the impossibility of erecting a state with Cartesian boundaries upon the inherently non-Cartesian space occupied by a Nation. However, if we dispense of “State,” it is very possible to apply a decentralized, emergent, bottom-up decision structure on a Nation’s military defense system. As I’ve discussed in “Defending Pala,” it is probably not possible to adapt this to a Nation’s offensive interests, but, that by confining the power of a Nation’s military to actual (as opposed to politically “spun”) operationally defensive engagement, the very problem of “blowback” and the current “need” for the very notion of “offensive defense” may be reduced or eliminated.

Guided Emergence and a Local Community

I find it interesting that John Robb has recently been applying much of his “global guerrillas” theory to local communities. I have long found this to be the foundational element of our post-Nation-State future, and think that developing a theory of guided emergence for local communities will pay great dividends. Communities may be the most appropriate place for guided emergence of minimally self-sufficient but cooperating and interacting individuals, families, and family groups to come together in the absence of some centralized, hierarchal structure organizing them. These communities, just like Nations in the Nation-State context, can function in a “guided emergence” environment with or without exclusive boundaries (where, for example, everyone in a geographic town may or may not participate in the guided emergence “game”). Traditional, hierarchal, and centralized “government-run” communities generally cannot function in this way, and therefore greatly inhibit the amount of innovation available to a community to essentially the “one organizational structure per geographic area” maximum. Guided emergence could, on the other hand, support multiple competing organizational schemes within a single geographic area (what might today be the boundaries of one “town”) without conflict arising—if people are drawn from one scheme to another, then it grows, but there would not necessarily (key word here—exclusive religious notions, as with al-Qa’ida, make motivation for conflict possible) be motivation to out-compete or eliminate other schemes.

It may be clear by now that this notion of guided emergence as applied to local communities nests nicely with my outline for resilient and self-sufficient communities from The Problem of Growth. It may be a bit difficult to understand outside that context. But consider the ability to use guided emergence to persuade, rather than coerce, others to pursue the exact program outlined in Problem of Growth: establish minimal self-sufficiency in extended family nodes (along with regionally-appropriate means of doing that, best practices, etc.), establish mutually beneficial but optional interaction between these nodes, drive innovation in both of these areas, and serve to advocate for collective courses of action that may require temporary leadership or that work best with greater unity of effort.

This may be the key benefit to guided emergence: to the extent that guided emergence is only available to bottom-up, decentralized organizations, and that these kinds of organizations are capable of getting inside the OODA-Loop of their centralized/hierarchal competitors or opponents, there exists a structural trend in favor of just these decentralized and bottom-up entities. I think that decentralized and bottom-up entities are more likely to be compatible with human ontogeny, to be environmentally sustainable, and to allow for resilience and diversity of practice within human society without oppression. Any theory that helps speed along the erosion of centralization and hierarchy and the rise of a decentralized replacement seems welcome in that context.

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