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Art of the Exploit: An Introduction to Critical Engineering [30c3]
Art of the Exploit: An Introduction to Critical Engineering In this lecture Julian will introduce projects and interventions made by himself and others that ...
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Introduction to Bitcoin [SIGINT13]
lecture: Introduction to Bitcoin This presentation will give understandable introduction into the principles that make Bitcoin work, how Bitcoins can be kept...
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Forging the USB armory - Creating an open source secure flash-drive-sized computer [31c3]
Forging the USB armory
Creating an open source secure flash-drive-sized computer
The presentation will cover the journey that we have taken to develop the USB armory board from scratch, explaining the lessons learned and its prospected applications.
Inverse Path recently introduced the USB armory project (http://inversepath.com/usbarmory), an open source hardware design, implementing a flash driv
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Through a PRISM, Darkly - Everything we know about NSA spying [30c3]
Through a PRISM, Darkly Everything we know about NSA spying From Stellar Wind to PRISM, Boundless Informant to EvilOlive, the NSA spying programs are shroude...
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NSA: Tell no-one [31c3] by James Bamford
Tell no-one
A century of secret deals between the NSA and the telecom industry
For nearly one hundred years, the NSA and its predecessors have been engaging in secret, illegal deals with the American telecom industry, with both virtually immune from prosecution.
How did this begin? How does it work? How much have US presidents known? What happens when they get caught? Will it change after the Sno
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Seeing The Secret State: Six Landscapes [30c3]
Seeing The Secret State: Six Landscapes Although people around the world are becoming increasingly aware of the United States' global geography of surveillan...
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A Brief History of Plutocracy [28C3]
A Brief History of Plutocracy This whistlestop re-telling of world economic history squeezes 12000 years of history into 18 slides. Its focus is the changin...
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Hello World! How to make art after Snowden? [30c3]
Hello World! How to make art after Snowden? USB DeadDrops, IRL map marker in public, FUCK 3D glasses or How to vacuum form a guy fawkes mask. I will present ...
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Food-Hacking: Eating in the Anthropocene [28C3]
Eating in the Anthropocene Transgenic Fish, Mutagenic Grapefruits and Space Potatoes Over the last few years hackers have begun to take a larger interest in ...
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Even More Tamagotchis Were Harmed in the Making of this Presentation [30c3]
Even More Tamagotchis Were Harmed in the Making of this Presentation
You might remember Tamagotchi virtual pets from the 1990's. These toys are still around and just as demanding as ever! At 29C3, I talked about my attempts to reverse engineer the latest Tamagotchis, and this presentation covers my progress since then. It includes methods for executing code on and dumping code from a Tamagotchi,
-
Let's Encrypt - A Free Robotic Certificate Authority [31c3]
Let's Encrypt
A Free Robotic Certificate Authority
As we've called for widespread use of HTTPS, the cost and complexity of the certificate system has been an obstacle.
In 2015, a certificate authority, trusted by mainstream web browsers, will issue certificates for web servers automatically at no charge in under a minute. This CA will automatically perform Domain Validation (DV) to verify applic
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Telescope Making [31c3]
Telescope Making
How to make your own telescope
In this talk an introduction to amateur telescope making (ATM) will be provided. Starting from grinding the mirror, testing it and building the telescope around it.
Why to take the effort to make your own telescope? Because it's custom and many times even cheaper.
How-To grind your own mirror, lens, test its optical properties and build the telesc
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The Year in Crypto [30c3[preview]]
The Year in Crypto This was a busy year for crypto. This was a busy year for crypto. TLS was broken. And then broken again. Discrete logs were computed. And ...
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Hacking Cisco Phones [29C3]
HACKING CISCO PHONES
Just because you are paranoid doesn't mean your phone isn't listening to everything you say
We discuss a set of 0-day kernel vulnerabilities in CNU (Cisco Native Unix), the operating system that powers all Cisco TNP IP phones. We demonstrate the reliable exploitation of all Cisco TNP phones via multiple vulnerabilities found in the CNU kernel. We demonstrate practical covert
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GSM: SRSLY? [26C3]
GSM: SRSLY? The worlds most popular radio system has over 3 billion handsets in 212 countries and not even strong encryption. Perhaps due to cold-war era law...
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CCCEN-NNNTR-RRRAL
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KinectFusion - Real-time 3D Reconstruction and Interaction Using a Moving Depth Camera [28C3]
KinectFusion Real-time 3D Reconstruction and Interaction Using a Moving Depth Camera This project investigates techniques to track the 6DOF position of handheld depth sensing cameras, such...
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Qual é a função do CCCEN?
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Reverse Engineering the MOS 6502 CPU [27C3]
Reverse Engineering the MOS 6502 CPU 3510 transistors in 60 minutes The MOS 6502 CPU, which was designed in 1975 and powered systems like the Apple II, the A...
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Livestream from the 30c3 in Hamburg - Tag 1 [30c3][live]
Falls der normale Stream nicht reicht, gibt es hier für noch mehr User die Möglichkeit, von zu Hause am 30c3 teilzunehmen. mehr Infos erhalten... http://www....
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Console Hacking 2008: Wii Fail [25C3]
Console Hacking 2008: Wii Fail Is implementation the enemy of design? The Nintendo Wii game console has been one of the most popular of all time, selling alm...
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Stylometry and Online Underground Markets [29c3[preview]]
This is only a dump of the livestream! the official video will be released in another playlist! === Stylometry and Online Underground Markets Stylometry ...
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SS7map : mapping vulnerability of the international mobile roaming infrastructure [31c3]
SS7map : mapping vulnerability of the international mobile roaming infrastructure
SS7 has been shown repeatedly as an insecure protocol: spoofing, faking, crash through fuzzing, fraud. The main question of our study is to determine how this insecurity is mitigated by network operator’s action to prevent compromise on both network exposure of infrastructure and privacy compromise of subscribers.
Art of the Exploit: An Introduction to Critical Engineering [30c3]
Art of the Exploit: An Introduction to Critical Engineering In this lecture Julian will introduce projects and interventions made by himself and others that ......
Art of the Exploit: An Introduction to Critical Engineering In this lecture Julian will introduce projects and interventions made by himself and others that ...
wn.com/Art Of The Exploit An Introduction To Critical Engineering 30C3
Art of the Exploit: An Introduction to Critical Engineering In this lecture Julian will introduce projects and interventions made by himself and others that ...
- published: 29 Dec 2013
- views: 2733
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author: CCCen
Introduction to Bitcoin [SIGINT13]
lecture: Introduction to Bitcoin This presentation will give understandable introduction into the principles that make Bitcoin work, how Bitcoins can be kept......
lecture: Introduction to Bitcoin This presentation will give understandable introduction into the principles that make Bitcoin work, how Bitcoins can be kept...
wn.com/Introduction To Bitcoin Sigint13
lecture: Introduction to Bitcoin This presentation will give understandable introduction into the principles that make Bitcoin work, how Bitcoins can be kept...
- published: 23 Jul 2013
- views: 4523
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author: CCCen
Forging the USB armory - Creating an open source secure flash-drive-sized computer [31c3]
Forging the USB armory
Creating an open source secure flash-drive-sized computer
The presentation will cover the journey that we have taken to develop the USB ...
Forging the USB armory
Creating an open source secure flash-drive-sized computer
The presentation will cover the journey that we have taken to develop the USB armory board from scratch, explaining the lessons learned and its prospected applications.
Inverse Path recently introduced the USB armory project (http://inversepath.com/usbarmory), an open source hardware design, implementing a flash drive sized computer for security applications. The USB armory is a compact USB powered device that provides a platform for developing and running a variety of applications.
The security features of the USB armory System on a Chip (SoC), combined with the openness of the board design, empower developers and users with a fully customizable USB trusted device for open and innovative personal security applications.
The presentation will cover the journey that we have taken to develop the USB armory board from scratch, explaining the lessons learned and its prospected applications.
──────────
➤Speaker: Andrea Barisani
➤EventID: 6541
➤Event: 31th Chaos Communication Congress [31c3] of the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
➤Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
➤Language: english
➤Begin: Sun, 12/28/2014 17:30:00 +01:00
➤License: CC-by
Help us caption & translate this video!
http://amara.org/v/FszA/
wn.com/Forging The Usb Armory Creating An Open Source Secure Flash Drive Sized Computer 31C3
Forging the USB armory
Creating an open source secure flash-drive-sized computer
The presentation will cover the journey that we have taken to develop the USB armory board from scratch, explaining the lessons learned and its prospected applications.
Inverse Path recently introduced the USB armory project (http://inversepath.com/usbarmory), an open source hardware design, implementing a flash drive sized computer for security applications. The USB armory is a compact USB powered device that provides a platform for developing and running a variety of applications.
The security features of the USB armory System on a Chip (SoC), combined with the openness of the board design, empower developers and users with a fully customizable USB trusted device for open and innovative personal security applications.
The presentation will cover the journey that we have taken to develop the USB armory board from scratch, explaining the lessons learned and its prospected applications.
──────────
➤Speaker: Andrea Barisani
➤EventID: 6541
➤Event: 31th Chaos Communication Congress [31c3] of the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
➤Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
➤Language: english
➤Begin: Sun, 12/28/2014 17:30:00 +01:00
➤License: CC-by
Help us caption & translate this video!
http://amara.org/v/FszA/
- published: 29 Dec 2014
- views: 2942
Through a PRISM, Darkly - Everything we know about NSA spying [30c3]
Through a PRISM, Darkly Everything we know about NSA spying From Stellar Wind to PRISM, Boundless Informant to EvilOlive, the NSA spying programs are shroude......
Through a PRISM, Darkly Everything we know about NSA spying From Stellar Wind to PRISM, Boundless Informant to EvilOlive, the NSA spying programs are shroude...
wn.com/Through A Prism, Darkly Everything We Know About Nsa Spying 30C3
Through a PRISM, Darkly Everything we know about NSA spying From Stellar Wind to PRISM, Boundless Informant to EvilOlive, the NSA spying programs are shroude...
- published: 30 Dec 2013
- views: 36084
-
author: CCCen
NSA: Tell no-one [31c3] by James Bamford
Tell no-one
A century of secret deals between the NSA and the telecom industry
For nearly one hundred years, the NSA and its predecessors have been engaging in...
Tell no-one
A century of secret deals between the NSA and the telecom industry
For nearly one hundred years, the NSA and its predecessors have been engaging in secret, illegal deals with the American telecom industry, with both virtually immune from prosecution.
How did this begin? How does it work? How much have US presidents known? What happens when they get caught? Will it change after the Snowden revelations? A fascinating look at a hundred years of handshakes and backroom deals between the eavesdroppers and the telecom executives.
──────────
➤Speaker: James Bamford
➤EventID: 6600
➤Event: 31th Chaos Communication Congress [31c3] of the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
➤Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
➤Language: english
➤Begin: Sun, 12/28/2014 12:45:00 +01:00
➤License: CC-by
wn.com/Nsa Tell No One 31C3 By James Bamford
Tell no-one
A century of secret deals between the NSA and the telecom industry
For nearly one hundred years, the NSA and its predecessors have been engaging in secret, illegal deals with the American telecom industry, with both virtually immune from prosecution.
How did this begin? How does it work? How much have US presidents known? What happens when they get caught? Will it change after the Snowden revelations? A fascinating look at a hundred years of handshakes and backroom deals between the eavesdroppers and the telecom executives.
──────────
➤Speaker: James Bamford
➤EventID: 6600
➤Event: 31th Chaos Communication Congress [31c3] of the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
➤Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
➤Language: english
➤Begin: Sun, 12/28/2014 12:45:00 +01:00
➤License: CC-by
- published: 28 Dec 2014
- views: 1683
Seeing The Secret State: Six Landscapes [30c3]
Seeing The Secret State: Six Landscapes Although people around the world are becoming increasingly aware of the United States' global geography of surveillan......
Seeing The Secret State: Six Landscapes Although people around the world are becoming increasingly aware of the United States' global geography of surveillan...
wn.com/Seeing The Secret State Six Landscapes 30C3
Seeing The Secret State: Six Landscapes Although people around the world are becoming increasingly aware of the United States' global geography of surveillan...
- published: 02 Jan 2014
- views: 22115
-
author: CCCen
A Brief History of Plutocracy [28C3]
A Brief History of Plutocracy This whistlestop re-telling of world economic history squeezes 12000 years of history into 18 slides. Its focus is the changin......
A Brief History of Plutocracy This whistlestop re-telling of world economic history squeezes 12000 years of history into 18 slides. Its focus is the changin...
wn.com/A Brief History Of Plutocracy 28C3
A Brief History of Plutocracy This whistlestop re-telling of world economic history squeezes 12000 years of history into 18 slides. Its focus is the changin...
- published: 29 Dec 2011
- views: 4729
-
author: CCCen
Hello World! How to make art after Snowden? [30c3]
Hello World! How to make art after Snowden? USB DeadDrops, IRL map marker in public, FUCK 3D glasses or How to vacuum form a guy fawkes mask. I will present ......
Hello World! How to make art after Snowden? USB DeadDrops, IRL map marker in public, FUCK 3D glasses or How to vacuum form a guy fawkes mask. I will present ...
wn.com/Hello World How To Make Art After Snowden 30C3
Hello World! How to make art after Snowden? USB DeadDrops, IRL map marker in public, FUCK 3D glasses or How to vacuum form a guy fawkes mask. I will present ...
- published: 29 Dec 2013
- views: 1767
-
author: CCCen
Food-Hacking: Eating in the Anthropocene [28C3]
Eating in the Anthropocene Transgenic Fish, Mutagenic Grapefruits and Space Potatoes Over the last few years hackers have begun to take a larger interest in ......
Eating in the Anthropocene Transgenic Fish, Mutagenic Grapefruits and Space Potatoes Over the last few years hackers have begun to take a larger interest in ...
wn.com/Food Hacking Eating In The Anthropocene 28C3
Eating in the Anthropocene Transgenic Fish, Mutagenic Grapefruits and Space Potatoes Over the last few years hackers have begun to take a larger interest in ...
- published: 29 Dec 2011
- views: 2578
-
author: CCCen
Even More Tamagotchis Were Harmed in the Making of this Presentation [30c3]
Even More Tamagotchis Were Harmed in the Making of this Presentation
You might remember Tamagotchi virtual pets from the 1990's. These toys are still around an...
Even More Tamagotchis Were Harmed in the Making of this Presentation
You might remember Tamagotchi virtual pets from the 1990's. These toys are still around and just as demanding as ever! At 29C3, I talked about my attempts to reverse engineer the latest Tamagotchis, and this presentation covers my progress since then. It includes methods for executing code on and dumping code from a Tamagotchi, an analysis of the Tamagotchi code dump and a demonstration of Tamagotchi development tools that make use of these capabilities.
Recent Tamagotchis are more than just pets. They can talk to their friends over IR, support games on external ROMs and store generations worth of information about their ancestors. This talk goes through the different ways Tamagotchis can be tampered with through these channels. It describes a method of achieving code execution on a Tamagotchi though a flash accessory, using this to dump the Tamagotchi's internal ROM, and the internal Tamagotchi 'secrets' it revealed. It also covers the development tools I've written for the Tamagotchi and includes some demonstrations of modified Tamagotchis.
Speaker: Natalie Silvanovich
EventID: 5279
Event: 30th Chaos Communication Congress [30c3] by the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
Language: english
Begin: Sun, 12/29/2013 17:15:00 +01:00
Lizenz: CC-by
wn.com/Even More Tamagotchis Were Harmed In The Making Of This Presentation 30C3
Even More Tamagotchis Were Harmed in the Making of this Presentation
You might remember Tamagotchi virtual pets from the 1990's. These toys are still around and just as demanding as ever! At 29C3, I talked about my attempts to reverse engineer the latest Tamagotchis, and this presentation covers my progress since then. It includes methods for executing code on and dumping code from a Tamagotchi, an analysis of the Tamagotchi code dump and a demonstration of Tamagotchi development tools that make use of these capabilities.
Recent Tamagotchis are more than just pets. They can talk to their friends over IR, support games on external ROMs and store generations worth of information about their ancestors. This talk goes through the different ways Tamagotchis can be tampered with through these channels. It describes a method of achieving code execution on a Tamagotchi though a flash accessory, using this to dump the Tamagotchi's internal ROM, and the internal Tamagotchi 'secrets' it revealed. It also covers the development tools I've written for the Tamagotchi and includes some demonstrations of modified Tamagotchis.
Speaker: Natalie Silvanovich
EventID: 5279
Event: 30th Chaos Communication Congress [30c3] by the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
Language: english
Begin: Sun, 12/29/2013 17:15:00 +01:00
Lizenz: CC-by
- published: 02 Jan 2014
- views: 499
Let's Encrypt - A Free Robotic Certificate Authority [31c3]
Let's Encrypt
A Free Robotic Certificate Authority
As we've called for widespread use of HTTPS, the cost and complexity of the certificate system has been an o...
Let's Encrypt
A Free Robotic Certificate Authority
As we've called for widespread use of HTTPS, the cost and complexity of the certificate system has been an obstacle.
In 2015, a certificate authority, trusted by mainstream web browsers, will issue certificates for web servers automatically at no charge in under a minute. This CA will automatically perform Domain Validation (DV) to verify applicants' control over domain names. The associated software can optionally reconfigure their web servers and deploy the new certificates immediately.
We'll take a look at how the Let's Encrypt CA works, our ACME protocol for requesting and issuing certs, and the client software that can automate the process. And we'll demonstrate what the experience of getting a cert from the new CA may look like for webmasters (don't look away, or you might miss it!). We'll also talk about who's behind Let's Encrypt and some of the measures we're considering for preventing misissuance of certs. Of course, you're invited to test and help perfect the process.
──────────
➤Speaker: Seth Schoen
➤EventID: 6397
➤Event: 31th Chaos Communication Congress [31c3] of the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
➤Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
➤Language: english
➤Begin: Tue, 12/30/2014 14:00:00 +01:00
➤License: CC-by
Help us caption & translate this video!
http://amara.org/v/Fu1i/
wn.com/Let's Encrypt A Free Robotic Certificate Authority 31C3
Let's Encrypt
A Free Robotic Certificate Authority
As we've called for widespread use of HTTPS, the cost and complexity of the certificate system has been an obstacle.
In 2015, a certificate authority, trusted by mainstream web browsers, will issue certificates for web servers automatically at no charge in under a minute. This CA will automatically perform Domain Validation (DV) to verify applicants' control over domain names. The associated software can optionally reconfigure their web servers and deploy the new certificates immediately.
We'll take a look at how the Let's Encrypt CA works, our ACME protocol for requesting and issuing certs, and the client software that can automate the process. And we'll demonstrate what the experience of getting a cert from the new CA may look like for webmasters (don't look away, or you might miss it!). We'll also talk about who's behind Let's Encrypt and some of the measures we're considering for preventing misissuance of certs. Of course, you're invited to test and help perfect the process.
──────────
➤Speaker: Seth Schoen
➤EventID: 6397
➤Event: 31th Chaos Communication Congress [31c3] of the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
➤Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
➤Language: english
➤Begin: Tue, 12/30/2014 14:00:00 +01:00
➤License: CC-by
Help us caption & translate this video!
http://amara.org/v/Fu1i/
- published: 01 Jan 2015
- views: 397
Telescope Making [31c3]
Telescope Making
How to make your own telescope
In this talk an introduction to amateur telescope making (ATM) will be provided. Starting from grinding the mir...
Telescope Making
How to make your own telescope
In this talk an introduction to amateur telescope making (ATM) will be provided. Starting from grinding the mirror, testing it and building the telescope around it.
Why to take the effort to make your own telescope? Because it's custom and many times even cheaper.
How-To grind your own mirror, lens, test its optical properties and build the telescope around that optics. The focus will be on newtonian telescopes but other types will be outlined as well.
Grinding the optical components is the trickiest part, here the techniques and methods are explained, especially how to make high precission optics with your own hands.
Testing those is very critical especially in the late manufaturing process, but optical testbenches can be made for as much as 30-50€
The most time consuming part is the building of the telescope itself, here many aspects have to be considered and taken into account.
──────────
➤Speaker: Madonius
➤EventID: 5931
➤Event: 31th Chaos Communication Congress [31c3] of the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
➤Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
➤Language: english
➤Begin: Tue, 12/30/2014 17:15:00 +01:00
➤License: CC-by
wn.com/Telescope Making 31C3
Telescope Making
How to make your own telescope
In this talk an introduction to amateur telescope making (ATM) will be provided. Starting from grinding the mirror, testing it and building the telescope around it.
Why to take the effort to make your own telescope? Because it's custom and many times even cheaper.
How-To grind your own mirror, lens, test its optical properties and build the telescope around that optics. The focus will be on newtonian telescopes but other types will be outlined as well.
Grinding the optical components is the trickiest part, here the techniques and methods are explained, especially how to make high precission optics with your own hands.
Testing those is very critical especially in the late manufaturing process, but optical testbenches can be made for as much as 30-50€
The most time consuming part is the building of the telescope itself, here many aspects have to be considered and taken into account.
──────────
➤Speaker: Madonius
➤EventID: 5931
➤Event: 31th Chaos Communication Congress [31c3] of the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
➤Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
➤Language: english
➤Begin: Tue, 12/30/2014 17:15:00 +01:00
➤License: CC-by
- published: 01 Jan 2015
- views: 445
The Year in Crypto [30c3[preview]]
The Year in Crypto This was a busy year for crypto. This was a busy year for crypto. TLS was broken. And then broken again. Discrete logs were computed. And ......
The Year in Crypto This was a busy year for crypto. This was a busy year for crypto. TLS was broken. And then broken again. Discrete logs were computed. And ...
wn.com/The Year In Crypto 30C3 Preview
The Year in Crypto This was a busy year for crypto. This was a busy year for crypto. TLS was broken. And then broken again. Discrete logs were computed. And ...
- published: 29 Dec 2013
- views: 5446
-
author: CCCen
Hacking Cisco Phones [29C3]
HACKING CISCO PHONES
Just because you are paranoid doesn't mean your phone isn't listening to everything you say
We discuss a set of 0-day kernel vulnerabilit...
HACKING CISCO PHONES
Just because you are paranoid doesn't mean your phone isn't listening to everything you say
We discuss a set of 0-day kernel vulnerabilities in CNU (Cisco Native Unix), the operating system that powers all Cisco TNP IP phones. We demonstrate the reliable exploitation of all Cisco TNP phones via multiple vulnerabilities found in the CNU kernel. We demonstrate practical covert surveillance using constant, stealthy exfiltration of microphone data via a number of covert channels. We also demonstrate the worm-like propagation of our CNU malware, which can quickly compromise all vulnerable Cisco phones on the network. We discuss the feasibility of our attacks given physical access, internal network access and remote access across the internet. Lastly, we built on last year's presentation by discussing the feasibility of exploiting Cisco phones from compromised HP printers and vice versa.
We present the hardware and software reverse-engineering process which led to the discovery of the vulnerabilities described below. We also present methods of exploiting the following vulnerabilities remotely.
Cisco PSIRT has assigned CVE Identifier CVE-2012-5445 to this issue.
The issue is being disclosed via a Release Note Enclosure per the Cisco Vulnerability Policy. The Vulnerability Policy can be found at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/productssecurityvulnerability_policy.html
I have included the contents of the Release Note Enclosure (RNE) that will be available via the Cisco Bug Search tool bellow.
Cisco PSIRT appreciates you reporting this issue in a responsible manner and working with us to remediate the issue. We look forward to your next report.
Symptoms: Cisco Unified IP Phone 7900 series devices also referred to as Cisco TNP Phones contain an input validation vulnerability. A local, authenticated attacker with the ability to place a malicious binary on the phone could leverage this issue to elevate their privileges or take complete control of the device.
The issue is due to a failure to properly validate certain system calls made to the kernel of the device. This failure could allow the attacker to overwrite arbitrary portions of user or kernel space memory.
The following Cisco Unified IP Phone devices are affected: Cisco Unified IP Phone 7975G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7971G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7970G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7965G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7962G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7945G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7942G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7931G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7911G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7906
The following models have reached end-of-life (EOL) status (for hardware only): Cisco Unified IP Phone 7971G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7970G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7906
Refer to the following link to determine what product upgrade and substitution options are available: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/phones/ps379/prodeolnotices_list.html
Conditions: Cisco Unified IP Phones within the 7900 Series running a version of Cisco IP Phone software prior to 9.3.1-ES10 are affected. The fixed software release is expected to be available for customers mid-to-late November 2012.
Workaround: Restrict SSH and CLI access to trusted users only. Administrators may consider leveraging 802.1x device authentication to prevent unauthorized devices or systems from accessing the voice network.
Further Problem Description: This issue was reported to Cisco PSIRT by Ang Cui of Columbia University. Cisco PSIRT would like to thank Ang and his staff for working with Cisco to resolve this issue.
PSIRT Evaluation: The Cisco PSIRT has assigned this bug the following CVSS version 2 score. The Base and Temporal CVSS scores as of the time of evaluation are 6.8/5.6: https://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvssCalculator.do?dispatch=1&version;=2&vector;=AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:F/RL:OF/RC:C
CVE ID CVE-2012-5445 has been assigned to document this issue.
Additional information on Cisco's security vulnerability policy can be found at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/productssecurityvulnerability_policy.html
Speaker: Ang Cui, Michael Costello
EventID: 5400
Event: 29th Chaos Communication Congress (29c3) by the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
Language: english
Start: 27.12.2012 23:00:00 +01:00
License: CC-by-nc-sa
wn.com/Hacking Cisco Phones 29C3
HACKING CISCO PHONES
Just because you are paranoid doesn't mean your phone isn't listening to everything you say
We discuss a set of 0-day kernel vulnerabilities in CNU (Cisco Native Unix), the operating system that powers all Cisco TNP IP phones. We demonstrate the reliable exploitation of all Cisco TNP phones via multiple vulnerabilities found in the CNU kernel. We demonstrate practical covert surveillance using constant, stealthy exfiltration of microphone data via a number of covert channels. We also demonstrate the worm-like propagation of our CNU malware, which can quickly compromise all vulnerable Cisco phones on the network. We discuss the feasibility of our attacks given physical access, internal network access and remote access across the internet. Lastly, we built on last year's presentation by discussing the feasibility of exploiting Cisco phones from compromised HP printers and vice versa.
We present the hardware and software reverse-engineering process which led to the discovery of the vulnerabilities described below. We also present methods of exploiting the following vulnerabilities remotely.
Cisco PSIRT has assigned CVE Identifier CVE-2012-5445 to this issue.
The issue is being disclosed via a Release Note Enclosure per the Cisco Vulnerability Policy. The Vulnerability Policy can be found at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/productssecurityvulnerability_policy.html
I have included the contents of the Release Note Enclosure (RNE) that will be available via the Cisco Bug Search tool bellow.
Cisco PSIRT appreciates you reporting this issue in a responsible manner and working with us to remediate the issue. We look forward to your next report.
Symptoms: Cisco Unified IP Phone 7900 series devices also referred to as Cisco TNP Phones contain an input validation vulnerability. A local, authenticated attacker with the ability to place a malicious binary on the phone could leverage this issue to elevate their privileges or take complete control of the device.
The issue is due to a failure to properly validate certain system calls made to the kernel of the device. This failure could allow the attacker to overwrite arbitrary portions of user or kernel space memory.
The following Cisco Unified IP Phone devices are affected: Cisco Unified IP Phone 7975G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7971G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7970G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7965G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7962G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7945G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7942G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7931G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7911G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7906
The following models have reached end-of-life (EOL) status (for hardware only): Cisco Unified IP Phone 7971G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7970G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G-GE Cisco Unified IP Phone 7906
Refer to the following link to determine what product upgrade and substitution options are available: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/phones/ps379/prodeolnotices_list.html
Conditions: Cisco Unified IP Phones within the 7900 Series running a version of Cisco IP Phone software prior to 9.3.1-ES10 are affected. The fixed software release is expected to be available for customers mid-to-late November 2012.
Workaround: Restrict SSH and CLI access to trusted users only. Administrators may consider leveraging 802.1x device authentication to prevent unauthorized devices or systems from accessing the voice network.
Further Problem Description: This issue was reported to Cisco PSIRT by Ang Cui of Columbia University. Cisco PSIRT would like to thank Ang and his staff for working with Cisco to resolve this issue.
PSIRT Evaluation: The Cisco PSIRT has assigned this bug the following CVSS version 2 score. The Base and Temporal CVSS scores as of the time of evaluation are 6.8/5.6: https://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvssCalculator.do?dispatch=1&version;=2&vector;=AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:F/RL:OF/RC:C
CVE ID CVE-2012-5445 has been assigned to document this issue.
Additional information on Cisco's security vulnerability policy can be found at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/productssecurityvulnerability_policy.html
Speaker: Ang Cui, Michael Costello
EventID: 5400
Event: 29th Chaos Communication Congress (29c3) by the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
Language: english
Start: 27.12.2012 23:00:00 +01:00
License: CC-by-nc-sa
- published: 29 Dec 2012
- views: 68898
GSM: SRSLY? [26C3]
GSM: SRSLY? The worlds most popular radio system has over 3 billion handsets in 212 countries and not even strong encryption. Perhaps due to cold-war era law......
GSM: SRSLY? The worlds most popular radio system has over 3 billion handsets in 212 countries and not even strong encryption. Perhaps due to cold-war era law...
wn.com/Gsm Srsly 26C3
GSM: SRSLY? The worlds most popular radio system has over 3 billion handsets in 212 countries and not even strong encryption. Perhaps due to cold-war era law...
- published: 03 Jan 2012
- views: 1058
-
author: CCCen
KinectFusion - Real-time 3D Reconstruction and Interaction Using a Moving Depth Camera [28C3]
KinectFusion Real-time 3D Reconstruction and Interaction Using a Moving Depth Camera This project investigates techniques to track the 6DOF position of handheld...
KinectFusion Real-time 3D Reconstruction and Interaction Using a Moving Depth Camera This project investigates techniques to track the 6DOF position of handheld depth sensing cameras, such...
wn.com/Kinectfusion Real Time 3D Reconstruction And Interaction Using A Moving Depth Camera 28C3
KinectFusion Real-time 3D Reconstruction and Interaction Using a Moving Depth Camera This project investigates techniques to track the 6DOF position of handheld depth sensing cameras, such...
- published: 30 Dec 2011
- views: 47806
-
author: CCCen
Reverse Engineering the MOS 6502 CPU [27C3]
Reverse Engineering the MOS 6502 CPU 3510 transistors in 60 minutes The MOS 6502 CPU, which was designed in 1975 and powered systems like the Apple II, the A......
Reverse Engineering the MOS 6502 CPU 3510 transistors in 60 minutes The MOS 6502 CPU, which was designed in 1975 and powered systems like the Apple II, the A...
wn.com/Reverse Engineering The Mos 6502 Cpu 27C3
Reverse Engineering the MOS 6502 CPU 3510 transistors in 60 minutes The MOS 6502 CPU, which was designed in 1975 and powered systems like the Apple II, the A...
- published: 28 Nov 2011
- views: 37147
-
author: CCCen
Livestream from the 30c3 in Hamburg - Tag 1 [30c3][live]
Falls der normale Stream nicht reicht, gibt es hier für noch mehr User die Möglichkeit, von zu Hause am 30c3 teilzunehmen. mehr Infos erhalten... http://www.......
Falls der normale Stream nicht reicht, gibt es hier für noch mehr User die Möglichkeit, von zu Hause am 30c3 teilzunehmen. mehr Infos erhalten... http://www....
wn.com/Livestream From The 30C3 In Hamburg Tag 1 30C3 Live
Falls der normale Stream nicht reicht, gibt es hier für noch mehr User die Möglichkeit, von zu Hause am 30c3 teilzunehmen. mehr Infos erhalten... http://www....
- published: 28 Dec 2013
- views: 20953
-
author: CCCen
Console Hacking 2008: Wii Fail [25C3]
Console Hacking 2008: Wii Fail Is implementation the enemy of design? The Nintendo Wii game console has been one of the most popular of all time, selling alm......
Console Hacking 2008: Wii Fail Is implementation the enemy of design? The Nintendo Wii game console has been one of the most popular of all time, selling alm...
wn.com/Console Hacking 2008 Wii Fail 25C3
Console Hacking 2008: Wii Fail Is implementation the enemy of design? The Nintendo Wii game console has been one of the most popular of all time, selling alm...
- published: 02 Feb 2012
- views: 1169
-
author: CCCen
Stylometry and Online Underground Markets [29c3[preview]]
This is only a dump of the livestream! the official video will be released in another playlist! === Stylometry and Online Underground Markets Stylometry ......
This is only a dump of the livestream! the official video will be released in another playlist! === Stylometry and Online Underground Markets Stylometry ...
wn.com/Stylometry And Online Underground Markets 29C3 Preview
This is only a dump of the livestream! the official video will be released in another playlist! === Stylometry and Online Underground Markets Stylometry ...
- published: 29 Dec 2012
- views: 9990
-
author: CCCen
SS7map : mapping vulnerability of the international mobile roaming infrastructure [31c3]
SS7map : mapping vulnerability of the international mobile roaming infrastructure
SS7 has been shown repeatedly as an insecure protocol: spoofing, faking, cra...
SS7map : mapping vulnerability of the international mobile roaming infrastructure
SS7 has been shown repeatedly as an insecure protocol: spoofing, faking, crash through fuzzing, fraud. The main question of our study is to determine how this insecurity is mitigated by network operator’s action to prevent compromise on both network exposure of infrastructure and privacy compromise of subscribers. It's why we wanted to come out with SS7map.
SS7 has been shown repeatedly as an insecure protocol: spoofing, faking, crash through fuzzing, fraud. The main question of our study is to determine how this insecurity is mitigated by network operator’s action to prevent compromise on both network exposure of infrastructure and privacy compromise of subscribers.
The goal of SS7map is to provide a global overview by building the first SS7 signaling network world map revealing how vulnerable and exposed are telecom operators and their subscribers. We explain how it is possible for each mapped network to abuse legitimate signalling messages and call flows to discover and fingerprint equipment, intercept SMS messages, and perform massive location tracking of subscribers. More than pure analysis of vulnerability, this map rates and ranks the vulnerability of countries and operators showing discrepancies in the level and type of protection: SCCP screening, SS7 policing, MAP filtering, rate limiting, Network Element security configurations. We then conclude on the direction of signaling security and its current trend and development in the LTE world that shares many similar design insecurities with SS7.
──────────
➤Speaker: Laurent Ghigonis, Alexandre De Oliveira
➤EventID: 6531
➤Event: 31th Chaos Communication Congress [31c3] of the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
➤Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
➤Language: english
➤Begin: Sat, 12/27/2014 23:00:00 +01:00
➤License: CC-by
wn.com/Ss7Map Mapping Vulnerability Of The International Mobile Roaming Infrastructure 31C3
SS7map : mapping vulnerability of the international mobile roaming infrastructure
SS7 has been shown repeatedly as an insecure protocol: spoofing, faking, crash through fuzzing, fraud. The main question of our study is to determine how this insecurity is mitigated by network operator’s action to prevent compromise on both network exposure of infrastructure and privacy compromise of subscribers. It's why we wanted to come out with SS7map.
SS7 has been shown repeatedly as an insecure protocol: spoofing, faking, crash through fuzzing, fraud. The main question of our study is to determine how this insecurity is mitigated by network operator’s action to prevent compromise on both network exposure of infrastructure and privacy compromise of subscribers.
The goal of SS7map is to provide a global overview by building the first SS7 signaling network world map revealing how vulnerable and exposed are telecom operators and their subscribers. We explain how it is possible for each mapped network to abuse legitimate signalling messages and call flows to discover and fingerprint equipment, intercept SMS messages, and perform massive location tracking of subscribers. More than pure analysis of vulnerability, this map rates and ranks the vulnerability of countries and operators showing discrepancies in the level and type of protection: SCCP screening, SS7 policing, MAP filtering, rate limiting, Network Element security configurations. We then conclude on the direction of signaling security and its current trend and development in the LTE world that shares many similar design insecurities with SS7.
──────────
➤Speaker: Laurent Ghigonis, Alexandre De Oliveira
➤EventID: 6531
➤Event: 31th Chaos Communication Congress [31c3] of the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
➤Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
➤Language: english
➤Begin: Sat, 12/27/2014 23:00:00 +01:00
➤License: CC-by
- published: 28 Dec 2014
- views: 598