

# AGING AND FAILING INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS: DAMS

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PREPARED BY: OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS DIVISION

## SCOPE

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) produces Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Notes in response to changes in the infrastructure community's risk environment from terrorist activities, natural hazards, and other events. This product summarizes the findings related to dams identified in the National Risk Estimate on Aging and Failing Critical Infrastructure Systems, released by OCIA in December 2014. This note supports DHS leadership; other federal, state, and local agencies; and private sector decision makers.

## **KEY FINDINGS**

- States, localities, and private entities own 82 percent of all high hazard potential dams. The Federal Government owns 4 percent and public utilities own 2 percent of the dams listed on the U.S. National Inventory of Dams.
- States have inspection and regulatory authority over most dams. However, the Dam Safety Act expired in 2011, limiting federal funds available to support state dam safety programs.
- Dam safety incidents can occur at any point during a dam's lifetime, but approximately 31 percent of dam safety incidents occur during construction or within the first 5 years of operation.

## **OVERVIEW**

For the National Risk Estimate on Aging and Failing Critical Infrastructure Systems, OCIA gathered subject matter experts to highlight the current state of critical infrastructure and identify trends and physical characteristics of infrastructure that increase the risk of failure. Dams were one of nine subsectors examined. The study also identifies market, regulatory, and policy factors that affect infrastructure risk.

Dams play a critical role in the Nation's economy and serve a wide range of functions: debris control, fire protection, fish and wildlife conservation, flood control, grade stabilization, hydroelectric power production, irrigation, navigation, recreation, tailings storage, and water supply management.<sup>1</sup> Dams are generally categorized as either embankment or concrete. Embankment dams are either "earthfill" or "rockfill" and are the most common type of dam in use today. Gravity and arch dams are types of concrete dams, and gravity dams are the most common. Approximately 80 percent of dams in the United States were built before 1980.<sup>2</sup> The 2013

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A grade stabilization structure controls the grade of land surrounding a dam and reduces erosion. A tailings storage facility is a structure made up of (one or more dams) built for storing the uneconomical ore (ground up rock, sand, and silt) and water from the milling process.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "National Inventory of Dams," http://geo.usace.army.mil/pgis/f?p=397:5:0::NO, accessed 21 April 2014.

National Inventory of Dams (NID), maintained by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), consists of 87,359 dams.<sup>3</sup>

States, localities, and private entities own more than 89 percent of all dams listed in the NID and 82 percent of high hazard potential dams. The Federal Government owns only 4 percent and public utilities own only 2 percent of the dams on the NID. Local governments own a large percentage of flood control dams, federal agencies and state governments own most navigation dams, and public utilities own a large percentage of hydroelectric dams. Dams serving other purposes are mostly privately owned. States are the primary regulators of dams, although the Federal Government, including Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and USACE, also play an important role in managing dams and supporting state dam safety programs.

#### **RISK OF FAILURE**

Dam safety incidents can occur at any point during a dam's lifetime, but the most common period of dam failure is the first 5 years of operation. The United States Society of Dams conducted a study in 2009 of 1,158 national and international dam failures and safety incidents and found that 31 percent of safety incidents occur during construction or within the first 5 years of operation.<sup>4</sup> The most common causes of failure are overtopping, piping, and foundation defects.<sup>5</sup>

Overtopping caused by flooding and high-water events accounts for 34 percent of dam failures in the United States. Erosion caused by overtopping can compromise embankments and lead to failure. The risk of overtopping increases if the spillway design is inadequate, debris causes spillway blockage, or the dam crest settles.<sup>6</sup>

Piping—internal erosion caused by seepage—accounts for 20 percent of dam failures in the United States. Erosion through piping or seepage can occur through abutments or under the dam. In its initial stage, seepage can be described as a leak in the dam. The term piping applies when the leak carries embankment material, thus creating erosion and the likelihood of sinkholes that could cause structural failure.<sup>7</sup> Piping and seepage are the most common types of failure in the early years of a dam and are important considerations throughout the life of a dam.<sup>8</sup>

Foundation defects such as embankment slope instability and dam settlement, degradation of materials, operational issues, and inadequate maintenance are other common causes of dam failure. Earthquakes can also significantly damage dams.

Droughts affect the ability of dams to function as designed, especially hydroelectric dams. A prolonged drought can prevent dams in the impacted region from operating at full capacity when water levels drop too low.<sup>9</sup> The loss of the largest hydroelectric dams could result in inadequate power generation and lead to rolling blackouts—particularly in Washington and Oregon where more than 50 percent of electricity is hydroelectric.

Another important risk known as "hazard creep" describes urban growth and development occurring downstream of dams, increasing the consequences from failure. Dams designed as low hazard potential dams (those for which failure or improper operation results in no probable loss of human life and low economic or environmental losses; losses are principally limited to the owner's property) may become high hazard because of downstream developments. Although the failure or improper operation of high hazard potential dams could result in the loss of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "National Inventory of Dams," http://geo.usace.army.mil/pgis/f?p=397:5:0::NO, accessed 21 April 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Regan, Patrick J., "An Examination of Dam Failures vs. Age of Dams," 29th Annual United States Society on Dams (USSD) Conference, April 2009, http://ussdams.com/proceedings/2009Proc/35-58.pdf, accessed 6 June 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Association of State Dam Safety Officials, "Dam Failures and Incidents," http://www.damsafety.org/news/?p=412f29c8-3fd8-4529-b5c9-8d47364c1f3e, accessed 20 February 2013.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 7 Ibid

Regan, Patrick J., "An Examination of Dam Failures vs. Age of Dams", 29th Annual United States Society on Dams (USSD) Conference, April 2009, http://ussdams.com/proceedings/2009Proc/35-58.pdf, accessed 6 June 2013.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Projected Climate Change and Its Impacts," Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report,

https://www.ipcc.ch/publications\_and\_data/ar4/syr/en/spms3.html, accessed 5 March 2014.

human life, the hazard potential of a dam is determined solely by consequences, not dam condition.<sup>10</sup> Dam safety regulators generally have no control over local zoning laws or developers' property rights. Therefore, regulators will continue to face challenges from hazard creep.

#### **REGIONS OF INCREASED RISK**

Dams built near previously undetected seismic zones are more likely to fail if they were not designed to withstand earthquakes. In addition, dams built in areas now experiencing higher than normal amounts of precipitation are more likely to fail from overtopping. The intensity of heavy precipitation events has increased in the past 50 years, especially in the Northeast and Midwest, and the designs for dams in these regions may not be adequate for current weather patterns.<sup>11</sup>

#### **DEPENDENCIES AND INTERDEPENDENCIES**

The Water and Wastewater Systems Sector critically depends on dams for all steps of potable water production, including intake, distribution, and treatment. In addition, the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector assets depend on electric power provided by dams.

As of 2013, hydroelectric power accounts for nearly 7 percent of electricity generated in the United States, and a few states in the Northwest, including California, Oregon, and Washington, get more than 50 percent of their electricity from hydroelectric sources.<sup>12</sup>

The Transportation Systems Sector relies on dams and navigation locks for transporting goods and freight on inland waterways. Typically, dams on navigable waterways have navigation locks close by to allow passage around the dam. Dam failures could result in the extended closure of critical locks, requiring that goods be transported via more expensive routes, such as railways and commercial vehicles. An extended closure of some locks would result in insufficient rail and commercial vehicle capacity to transport some goods.

### MARKET, POLICY, AND REGULATORY FACTORS

The National Dam Safety Program, led by FEMA, was established in the Water Resources Development Act of 1996 to help states establish and maintain dam safety programs and to train state dam safety inspectors and staff.<sup>13</sup> The legislation appropriated funding for FEMA to implement the NID and to perform technical and archival research to develop devices for monitoring dam safety. However, the Act did not provide funding for dam rehabilitation and repairs. The Dam Safety Act of 2006 reauthorized funding only through 2011 and has since expired.<sup>14,15</sup> Attempts in 2012 and 2013 to renew the Dam Safety Act and to provide grant assistance to states were unsuccessful.<sup>16,17,18</sup> The Association of State Dam Safety Officials estimates that \$21 billion will be needed to repair aging critical high hazard potential dams.<sup>19</sup> Inadequate funding and underinvestment limit the ability of dam owners and operators to conduct inspections and perform timely maintenance and repairs.

Another challenge is that states vary in their regulatory capabilities. Approximately 77 percent of high hazard potential dams in the NID are regulated by state dam safety offices, and 14 percent are regulated by federal agencies. Approximately 9 percent of high hazard potential dams are not regulated due to exemptions based on

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Electricity Data Browser," http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/, accessed 25 August 2014.
<sup>13</sup> S.640, Water Resources Development Act of 1996, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ303/content-detail.html, accessed 24 April 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Association of State Dam Safety Officials, "Top Issues Facing the Dam Community," http://damsafety.org/news/?p=c0fdade4-ab98-4679-be22-e3d7f14e124f, accessed 17 April 2014.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Implementing Climate Change Adaptation Planning in Accordance with Executive Order 13514, 'Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance,' Federal Agency Climate Change Adaptation Planning Support Document,"

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/adaptation\_support\_document\_3\_3.pdf, accessed 30 December 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> S.2735, Dam Safety Act of 2006, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s2735, accessed 7 January 2014.

<sup>15 33</sup> USC §467, 2012,"US Code-Subchapter VII: Dam Inspection Program," http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/33/9/VII, accessed 24 April 2013.

<sup>16</sup> H.R.6254, Dam Rehabilitation and Repair Act of 2012, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr6254, accessed 7 January 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> S.3362, Dam Safety Act of 2012, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3362, accessed 24 April 2013.

<sup>18</sup> H.R.1489, Dam Safety Act of 2013, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1489/text, accessed 25 August 2014.

<sup>19</sup> American Society of Civil Engineers, "2013 Report Card for America's Infrastructure," http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/, accessed 25 April 2013.

size and purpose. Since 2014, every state but Alabama has had dam safety legislation or dam safety programs.<sup>20</sup> Some states have only limited ability to enforce laws; in others, little recourse is available for dam owners who do not complete repairs ordered by the state.<sup>21</sup>

Differences among states make it difficult to aggregate data; no comprehensive national dataset exists. States receiving grant money under the National Dam Safety Program must have in place or be working toward having state dam safety programs with the authority to inspect dams and collect data. The NID receives information from dam regulators, but it can become outdated because the NID data fields are not comprehensive, and the NID is not updated annually. The most current information on the condition of state regulated dams is available through state dam safety offices.

#### **MITIGATION INITIATIVES**

FEMA collaborates with federal and state partners to continually improve dam safety and is the lead agency for the National Dam Safety Program. The Strategic Plan for the National Dam Safety Program captures a wide range of strategic goals for improving dam safety, including the following:<sup>22</sup>

- Goal I—Reduce the likelihood of dam failures: assess all high and significant hazard potential dams for the risks they pose to life, property, and the environment; reduce the number of deficient dams in the United States; learn from dam failures in the United States and worldwide to improve dam safety programs; and support effective federal and state dam safety programs.
- Goal 2—Reduce the potential consequences of dam failures: promote a program of Emergency Action Plan implementation, compliance, and exercises for all high and significant hazard potential dams in the United States; and improve consequence evaluation for dams nationwide.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Association of State Dam Safety Officials, "Top Issues Facing the Dam Community," http://www.damsafety.org/news/?p=c0fdade4-ab98-4679-be22-e3d7f14e124f, accessed 17 April 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Federal Emergency Management Agency, "FEMA Strategic Plan for the National Dam Safety Program," http://www.fema.gov/media-library-

data/8025e6039b9aebfa22e9f378347149c4/NDSP%20Strategic%20Plan\_FEMA%20P-916.pdf, accessed 14 April 2014.