Robert Wenzel: Libertarian Theory Allows the Death Penalty for Any Violation of the Non-Aggression Principle

No, he didn’t say exactly that.  Except that he did.

This is a very sad post for me to write.  If Wenzel is right, then libertarian theory is a dead theory to me.  If he is wrong, he is clearly demonstrating how little he understands about both expanding the non-aggression principle beyond its simple form as well as the application of the non-aggression principle to various real-life situations. 

I will enjoy neither option.  I lose something either way.

It is difficult to read his post.  He doesn’t understand culture.  He doesn’t understand governance.  He doesn’t understand the beneficial (and I say necessary) qualities in both toward developing and maintaining a libertarian society.  It is full of strawman arguments.  He accuses me of advocating government force when I have not.  It is written as if he has not gone past the first grade in libertarian studies.

Or maybe I have not gone past the first grade.  But if Wenzel is right about this, I will certainly not bother to enroll in the second grade.  If libertarian theory justifies death for any violation of the NAP, I will drop out.  Read the last sentence again; Marx and Engels did not spawn as evil a child.

First a few thoughts.

Libertarian theory is a fairly young philosophy.  One could easily say that it was nothing more than randomly-found ideas scattered in various philosophies before Rothbard began his prolific work.  This would place it at 50 years of age, more or less.  One could go back to some of the eighteenth and nineteenth century liberal and anarchic writers.  I don’t think you can go back much further – at least not for any identifiable, unifying theory.

I point this out because – being such a young theory – there are many things that libertarian thinkers have not yet worked out.  There are many questions on which many of us disagree, or that many of us believe libertarian theory cannot answer.  Someday there will be consensus on more issues; there will always be disagreements on some issues.  Christianity is two-thousand years old, and there are varying interpretations on many topics even here.

One such issue within libertarian theory is the issue of punishment / retaliation / penalty / whatever.  What punishment is consistent with libertarian theory?  Are there objective answers, or only subjective?  What I have read on this topic from libertarian writers offers guidelines, but no definitive, objective standards.  That doesn’t mean there will never be definitive, objective standards (although I strongly doubt that there will, because I doubt there can be).  There certainly aren’t today.

There is another question: What punishment is inconsistent with the non-aggression principle?  Again no way to draw a definitive line; however I know one punishment that is not.  Wenzel believes it is consistent with the non-aggression principle for a farmer to shoot and kill a child for stealing an apple.  I am certain this is inconsistent with the non-aggression principle.

Wenzel offers to me a definition of the non-aggression principle:

Here is the NAP as defined by Walter Block:

"The non-aggression [principle] ...is the lynchpin of the philosophy of libertarianism. It states, simply, that it shall be legal for anyone to do anything he wants, provided only that he not initiate (or threaten) violence against the person or legitimately owned property of another."

I am glad he chose Walter Block; I will be calling on him shortly.

Wenzel Develops Theory That Could Never Survive Practice

It is also a theory that violates the theory he claims to be defending.

Robert has posted a response to several comments regarding his view that a property owner is justified via libertarian theory for shooting a child who stole an apple.  I will only focus on his replies to my comments.

To set the stage, general descriptions regarding my earlier comments, as offered by Robert:

…[bionic] has left the world of anarcho-capitalism and entered the world of limited government.

…you are, at least, a limited government advocate.

These because I suggest culture would have a role in society.

Now, you sound like a total government propagandist….

This because I used the decades-long fighting between Israelis and Palestinians as an example of a blood-feud – ongoing, retaliatory violence. 

Now, on to his comments in some detail.  Regarding my views on culture:

I am not sure Bionic Mosquito realizes it here, but he has left the world of anarcho-capitalism and entered the world of limited government. The moment there is a central party, be it culture or whatever, that sets the rules that overrule the desires of a person on his property, it is a central power, that is, it is government. Regardless of how modest the desires of such a ruling power that is what it is. It is no longer anracho-capitalism.

Please note: culture = government according to Robert.  I guess I have a different definition of “culture” and / or a different definition of “government.”

When “culture” has a monopoly of a police force and military, courts and taxation, when culture allows for those with badges to live by different rules than those without, I will bow down to Wenzel.  To describe “culture” as a “central party” or “central power” akin to a monopoly provider of force completely misses the point, or purposely distorts it.

I have written often about the difference of “government” and “governance.”  There will always be governance – else there is no civil society.  It is to governance that I introduce and discuss culture.

I am talking about a society where people mind their own business and respect private property….

So why write a post entitled “Additional Comments on Penalties for Violators of the Non-Aggression Principle”?  If “people mind their own business and respect private property,” why speak of penalties?  Why speak of violators?

It is easy for a political theory to sound good in a world made up of “people like me.”  Unfortunately, there will always be individuals who do not “mind their own business and respect private property.”  So Wenzel must be speaking of a world made up of non-human beings.

The following questions come to mind:

Is there a point to advocating a political theory that ignores human nature?  Some would call this “mental masterb…” well, you know the term.  Of course, Wenzel will distort this into suggesting that I advocate for monopoly government (see above).

Does a common, unifying culture increase or decrease the likelihood for the demand of the service of a monopoly fixer of all things?  I say decrease.  Is it “central planning” to point this out, or merely a recognition of human nature?

Is it “government” when neighbors voluntarily agree to abide by a certain code of conduct despite not being pleased with every single clause?  No – it is called life.

But there is a more basic question: Is it possible for a property owner to initiate aggression on his own property?  The answer, of course, is yes (I hope this doesn’t need explaining or defense). 

Looked at another way: Is it possible for a penalty to cross the line into the initiation of aggression?  Again, yes. (This isn’t self-evident to Robert, but perhaps one or two others might read it and say “duh, how stupid does bionic think we are?”)

Wenzel suggests shooting a child for stealing an apple is not initiating aggression.  In any civil society – meaning any society that has some reasonable chance of putting libertarian theory into practice – he would be wrong.

Picture the scene: the child, dead in a pool of blood; the parents, neighbors, and other community members show up.  Wenzel says “that dumb kid stole my apple, so I shot him.  You have to respect my property rights.”  Everyone says “you know, that Wenzel guy is right.  Let’s buy him a beer.”  And the child’s father picks up the tab.

On what planet?

I place the half-life of this “private property society” at about six months.  Thereafter it will be gang-style warfare and blood feuds. 

Shooting a child for stealing an apple is initiating aggression.  Robert advocates that a political theory that disallows the initiation of aggression allows for the initiation of aggression.

Wenzel’s theory of punishment could never survive practice; what good is such a theory?  Further, his theory of punishment violates that very theory which he claims to be defending – the non-aggression principle; he has to destroy the village in order to save it.

All of Wenzel’s dancing around the issue cannot change these realities.  His theory on punishment is wrong in theory and will never function in practice in any place populated by human beings.

Did I mention, the title of his post is “The Current State of Anarcho-Capitalist Theory.”

Let’s hope not.

The German Struggle with Hitler’s Struggle

This one will be interesting.  Writing about Hitler, Jews, National Socialism, Germans…there are only two possible positions one is allowed to hold on this general topic, neither allowing for nuance and each diametrically opposed to the other.  Very black and white.

One position: Hitler bad.  That’s it.  If you write one more word, you are labeled a Nazi sympathizer and an anti-Semite.  The other is: Hitler-didn’t-kill-six-million-Jews-and-there-were-no-gas-chambers-but-there-should-have-been-because-Jews-were-communist-and-Jews-are-behind-every-bad-thing-that-ever-happened-in-the-history-of-the-world-and-if-you-don’t-believe-this-you-are-a-dupe-of-the-Jewish-controlled-media.

Wait a minute while I catch my breath…. OK, we can go on now.

There is no room for considered discussion in between these two extremes – any consideration of the gray spaces in-between brings vitriol from both camps. 

But into this gray space we go….

From Spiegel:

For the first time since 1945, Adolf Hitler's 'Mein Kampf' is available for sale in Germany. With a new annotated edition, Historians hope to "defuse" the Nazi-era bestseller. Even after seven decades, it remains a dangerous proposition.

The book has been unavailable for sale in Germany for seventy years.  It is always troubling when a book is banned in some fashion – troubling to me.  Evil cannot stand the light of day, so why hide evil?  Lies cannot withstand scrutiny, so why banish lies?  If truth cannot overcome lies, what is true?  Of course, it is those who have the power to try and hide the truth that have the most to hide.

Some will read the preceding paragraph and wonder – is bionic sympathizing with Hitler’s struggle?  No, not at all.  I ask these questions merely as an intellectual and ethical curiosity – and I would ask the same questions about any banned book.  (You see, this paragraph was necessitated by my venturing into the gray area between the two extremes.)

Why has the book been unavailable in Germany (at least officially)?  A hint is offered here:

For 70 years, the state refused to allow the manifesto to be republished out of respect for victims of the Nazis.

There is another reason, offered by Spiegel:

In 1945, the Allies banned the book.

Do you know – to this day it is illegal in Germany to teach anything contradictory to the conclusions reached at Nuremburg?  That German law must conform to decisions reached in those trials?  Courts that were stylized after Stalin’s show trials?

There are laws in various countries making illegal the denial of the holocaust of Jews, the genocide of Armenians, and various other historical episodes.  Why does history need law to protect it?  So people’s feelings won’t be hurt? 

Hurting people’s feelings is against the law: It seems this disease has permeated every corner – note the “safe zones” now available on many college campuses (this reminds me of a great character from Saturday Night Live…Pat; don’t laugh if you are in a safe zone).

But back to the Spiegel article:

That damned book! The minister [Ludwig Spaenle, the Bavarian Minister of Education and Science] feels a need to drink something spicy.

He initially welcomed the new edition of Adolf Hitler's book, he says, and the Bavarian state parliament even approved a budget of €500,000 ($542,000) for the project, led by the Munich Institute of Contemporary History. But then, says Spaenle, he accompanied the Bavarian governor on a trip to Israel in September 2012. And after that, opinions changed, he explains. Period.

…there were the victims' rights groups, there were Israeli cabinet ministers and there were many meetings. After that, it was clear that it just wouldn't do. A new edition of "Mein Kampf" with the coat of arms of the State of Bavaria on the front cover? No one in Israel would have understood such a thing.

Seventy years later.  The reaction is not “let’s look into the mind of one of history’s most brutal murderers and expose him for the world to see.”  No, the fear is that if the book is too easily available in Germany a new Hitler might be born (but aren’t we told of another new Hitler almost daily?  Never mind, I digress).  Or the old Hitler might be seen as one degree short of the devil incarnate. 

Or feelings might be hurt.  It seems to me, if I was a member of a brutally victimized group of one sort or another and the guilty party could be so easily identified, that I would welcome the opportunity to look into his mind – further benefiting from an analysis of his various claims.  What made him tick?  Why?  How warped was his thinking?  What was the foundation for his thoughts and actions?

Libertarian Punishment

NB: Update below in response to David Gordon

I reference my earlier post, and take from the comments:

Anonymous January 15, 2016 at 8:44 PM

You should check out Stephan Kinsella's writings on libertarian legal theory.

bionic mosquito January 15, 2016 at 9:04 PM

…who is to say the right amount.

Kinsella offers a framework for discussion. Yet the answer is ultimately not found in the non-aggression principle.

If I am missing something specific in his writing, please provide a link and specific quotes.

Anonymous January 17, 2016 at 12:26 PM

http://www.stephankinsella.com/2009/09/the-libertarian-approach-to-negligence-tort-and-strict-liability-wergeld-and-partial-wergeld/

https://mises.org/library/punishment-and-proportionality-estoppel-approach-0

read more write less

OK, I have read more; now I will write more.  From Kinsella’s “The Libertarian Approach to Negligence, Tort, and Strict Liability: Wergeld and Partial Wergeld,” the relevant section is entitled “Restitution and the Right to Punish” (reproduced entirely, and emphasis added):

First, note that the right to punish can serve to help make restitution more objective. As I argued in Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law, a review essay of Randy Barnett’s The Structure of Liberty, “It is … more costly to seek punishment than to seek restitution. For this and other reasons, restitution would probably become the predominant mode of justice in a free society.” However, as I explain there and elaborate in Inalienability and Punishment and Punishment and Proportionality,

Nevertheless, acknowledging (and justifying) the theoretical legitimacy of punishment can be useful. For example, punishment (or a theory of punishment) may be utilized to reach a more objective determination of the proper amount of restitution, because a serious aggression leads to the right to inflict more severe punishment on the aggressor, which would thus tend to be traded for a higher average amount of ransom or restitution than for comparatively minor crimes. Especially offended victims will tend to bargain for a higher ransom; and richer aggressors will tend to be willing to pay more ransom to avoid the punishment the victim has a right to inflict, thereby solving the so-called “millionaire” problem faced under a pure restitution system (where a rich man may commit crimes with impunity, since he can simply pay easily-affordable restitution after committing the crime).

Moreover, even if punishment is banned (de facto or de jure) and is not an actual option–because of the possibility of mistakenly punishing innocents, say–an award of restitution can be based on the model of punishment. To-wit: a jury could be instructed to award the victim an amount of money it believes he could bargain for, given all the circumstances, if he could threaten to proportionately punish the aggressor. This can lead to more just and objective restitution awards than would result if the jury is simply told to award the amount of damages it “feels” is “fair.”

This latter point is significant because, as noted above, restitution based on the idea of restoring the victim is often impossible, and thus meaningless; for this reason, those advocating restitution usually are vague about the proper standard (since there is no proper standard), or just “punt” it to the juries or courts, much like Congress does when it uses vague terms in statutes or Constitutions such as “accommodate” in the Americans with Disabilities Act or “privileges or immunities” in the Fourteenth Amendment.

Read again the words in bold type: can serve to help make restitution more objective, probably, predominant, may be utilized, tend to bargain, tend to be willing, even if punishment is banned, can be based, believes, can lead, since there is no proper standard.

I bolded the last one only to emphasize that Kinsella is saying what I said (“Kinsella offers a framework for discussion.”) – and yet I am admonished to read more and write less.

I could end this now.  There is no proper standard; punishment could be banned…or not; determining restitution could be made more objective – but not completely objective.  Ask Kinsella.

But I march on, now to the second recommended reading, “Punishment and Proportionality: the Estoppel Approach:”

Just because aggressors can legitimately be punished does not necessarily mean that all concerns about proportionality may be dropped.

We now further consider the various types of punishment that can be justly administered.

As has been shown, a victim of aggression may inflict on the aggressor at least the same level or type of aggression, although proportionality imposes some limits on the permissible level of retaliation.

In short, any rights or combinations of rights of an aggressor may be ignored by a victim in punishing the aggressor (implying that the aggressor actually does not have these purported “rights”), as long as general bounds of proportionality are considered.

Who is to decide what is proportional?  Solely the victim?  How will the decision regarding level of punishment be reached?  Proportionality imposes some limits.  What limits, how much?  Bounds of proportionality must be considered.  To what extent?  By whom?

You steal an apple from me; I get one back from you.  Is this proportional?  Is it punishment?  What risk is there to the thief if this is all there is?  Should the punishment be two apples?  Cutting off the hand?  Who will decide?  Solely the victim?  What if the community doesn’t agree?  What happens to any chance of a libertarian society if others in the community find the punishment abusive?

My point is this, and it remains unanswered by Kinsella because it cannot be answered: the concept of punishment and proportionality is subjective; the actual punishment delivered is very objective.  There is no method grounded within the non-aggression principle that leads one to conclude that the punishment for violation X is always and everywhere Y. 

There is no way to use the NAP to derive what will be acceptable in a given community.  There is nothing in the NAP that will ensure that what is acceptable in one community will be acceptable in all communities.  What is deemed proportional will vary from one community to another.  What is proportional?  While libertarian theory is helpful to set some bounds, this question cannot be answered in objective form by libertarian theory – as Kinsella demonstrates.

I remain: Kinsella offers a framework for discussion.  He explains very well the things that should be considered and accounted for.  He frames this well via libertarian theory. 

In the end, unless the punishment is considered proportional within the local culture, escalating violence will ensue – regardless of which direction the disproportionality occurs.

There is no proper standard to be derived from libertarian theory.  This is my point.  Also any punishment dished out must be deemed just by the broader community.  Else you will live in hell.  And no sweet-sounding ideas from libertarian theorists who advocate otherwise will change this.

I don’t need to read more libertarian theory to conclude this.  I know very well the fertile soil upon which blood feuds thrive.

Update: David Gordon noted this post at LRC.  I thank him for doing so, and would like to address a couple of his comments.  Before I address these, I offer: I have not thought significantly about punishment within the framework of libertarian legal theory.  I entered this discussion because I believe Wenzel is wrong about his theory, for the reasons I have written about in this post and especially my earlier post on the topic.

With this in mind, from Gordon:

In [bionic’s] view, “the concept of punishment and proportionality is subjective; the actual punishment delivered is very objective. There is no method grounded within the non-aggression principle that leads one to conclude that the punishment for violation X is always and everywhere Y.” I would note, and I am not sure the Mosquito would agree, that two distinct claims are being made in the quoted passage: no standard of punishment can be derived from the NAP, and there is no objective standard for punishment. The first claim does not imply the second, though both may be true.

I have not thought about it in such distinct terms, but on initial reaction I can accept that it is two claims.  Until I find some convincing reason to conclude otherwise, I hold that both claims are true.

The Mosquito reports that a commenter referred him to the work of Stephan Kinsella to solve his problems about punishment. The Mosquito does not find in Kinsella’s articles reason to change his opinion.

As mentioned, I find Kinsella helpful in framing the discussion – there are some things to consider that can be helpful in arriving at acceptable and unacceptable forms of punishment / restitution / whatever.

One suggestion by Kinsella surprised me, but I do not wish to attribute my objection to the Mosquito.

I did not consider Kinsella’s comments beyond my one purpose: I asked for links to articles that offer a means to arrive at an objective standard for punishment within a libertarian framework.  I was offered two by Kinsella.  I looked for objective standards.  There were none – instead words like can, probably and tend to.  These are guidelines to assist in reaching an acceptable punishment but there is nothing objective in these terms.

Of course, that these articles by Kinsella were not on point is no fault of his; rather it demonstrates the shortcoming of commenters who write (in a rather snarky manner, I might add) about things they don’t understand.

Budding Anarchy

In Syria:

Even as war continues to rage in Syria, normal people in the country are doing their best to survive in places like the village of Korin. It has transformed into a kind of mini-republic and has WiFi on the town square.

Of course, the situation isn’t all roses.  The catastrophe that is life in this war-torn region is well described; I don’t mean to suggest that I am presenting a complete picture – either of the situation in Syria or of a fully-developed life without a state.  However, in this situation one will find governance forming in the absence of a state – along a line that conforms to the idea that both local culture and natural leaders will come to the fore.

In other words, non-state-enforced governance in a world occupied by humans.

Korin and the entire region surrounding it, with hundreds of towns and villages, have been living for almost four years in a state of anarchy.

It is almost as though someone had devised a wicked experiment to see what happens when everything that serves public order is suddenly removed. When police, courts and indeed the entire state simply disappears without a new one replacing it.

Anarchy in the worst sense and anarchy in the best sense.  Here I will offer some green shoots – how might a society form governance structures without the existence of a state?

If the war weren't still going on, one could almost have called it a peaceful summer.

Life in the village of Korin, with a population of about 11,000, is relatively peaceful except for those occasions when the villagers were met by an enemy (the Syrian air force as one example) that overwhelmingly out-gunned the residents.

Natural leaders develop…naturally:

Ajini used to be an English professor in the provincial capital but is now the village's chain-smoking éminence grise.

Without a state, all is not chaos:

Instead of simply crumbling, public order has merely contracted….For years now, the media has portrayed Syria as being entirely consumed by horror and destruction, by explosions and black-clad barbarians who behead their victims on camera. But there are countless places that -- like islands in a storm -- are doing all they can to survive the fighting.

Contrary to open borders, residents want to be careful about who comes and goes – a managed border:

Traveling from one town to the next "is today like crossing an international border," adds the Korin village council member who is responsible for ensuring the town's water supply.

Fear of the others grew automatically, he says, fear of those one doesn't know so well and who don't offer protection.

No police, no courts – yet there is relative calm:

The calm is astounding given the fact that it is simple for people to arm themselves. It is easier than ever to kill someone should one so desire…

Calm, even though it is easy to secure firearms.  Not “astounding,” if one considers the entire circumstance.

…and it has become virtually impossible to hold criminals accountable without risking a blood feud.

But criminals are held accountable; it is done in a tempered manner – a level of justice determined in order to avoid unending escalation.

Punishment in a Libertarian World

NB: check below for updates to this post

My comment posted at Target Liberty:

To start: I will set aside the situation where the property owner has clearly specified rules and penalties for violations regarding his property.  I will also set aside the implication of this to the child taking the apple – libertarian theory is very incomplete when it comes to many questions about children.

From everything I gather, I believe it is correct that libertarian theory does not answer the question: what is the proper punishment / restitution / whatever for violation X?

It is possible that this means that libertarian theory offers that the victim is allowed to determine the punishment.  I imagine it is also possible that this is not a logical conclusion.  If libertarian theory doesn’t answer the question, the logical conclusion might just be that it doesn’t answer the question – and that the answer must be found elsewhere.

Subjective value is a truism for humans – in economics and in all human action.  I don’t know that this suggests subjective value is a libertarian concept.  It is subjective value on which Robert rests.  This might be one way to answer the question: “what is the proper punishment for violation X?”  But it isn’t the only way, and I don’t know that it is inherently the libertarian way.

There are many issues of human action and human interactions that are not addressed by libertarian theory and the NAP – which only address the issue of initiating violence (of course, against property or person).  Punishment (after the cessation of the initial violent act) is not an initiation of violence. 

How does a theory that addresses the initiation of violence address something that isn’t the initiation of violence?

Robert might be right, however I remain in the box that this question can only be answered by what is acceptable in a given culture.  Fortunately or unfortunately this leaves a somewhat wide path for “acceptable” punishment – but, I would argue, not as wide a path as the one offered by Robert’s position.

Whatever might be correct in libertarian theory (and again, I do not believe libertarian theory offers an answer), communities want to avoid blood feuds (I have a post that will be published tomorrow that touches just on this point, an example from today’s world). 

The decision of punishment will not be left solely to the victim to decide.  And I do not see this as contradictory to libertarian theory.

Additional thoughts:

From the Mises Institute:

The non-aggression principle is an ethical stance which asserts that "aggression" is inherently illegitimate. "Aggression" is defined as the "initiation" of physical force against persons or property, the threat of such, or fraud upon persons or their property. In contrast to pacifism, the non-aggression principle does not preclude violent self-defense.

From Kinsella:

Or, as Rothbard put it:

The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the "nonaggression axiom." "Aggression" is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.

In other words, libertarians maintain that the only way to violate rights is by initiating force — that is, by committing aggression.

So, define aggression.  A child stole an apple from the orchard and ate it.  He is now sitting at home peacefully when the farmer barges in the door and shoots him.  At this particular moment, is the child committing aggression, or is the farmer?

Following the definition offered at Mises: certainly what the farmer did was “violent.”  Can it also be described as “self-defense”?  At the moment the farmer shot the child, the child was not threatening the farmer’s life or property.

The answers to these questions are self-evident.  What about punishment, restitution, or retaliation – to Bob’s comments?  Can the farmer’s actions be justified in this light?

False Profits

Matthew 7: 15 “Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves. 16 By their fruit you will recognize them.

Divination is the attempt to gain insight into a question or situation by way of an occultic, standardized process or ritual.

A charlatan (also called swindler or mountebank) is a person practising quackery or some similar confidence trick in order to obtain money, fame or other advantages via some form of pretense or deception.

“We really can’t forecast all that well, and yet we pretend that we can, but we really can’t.”

That last one is courtesy of Alan Greenspan, and it comes from John Mauldin’s recent Thoughts from the Frontline, entitled Economicus Terra Incognita.

Actually, I’m going to spend the first few pages demonstrating that the mathematical models used to forecast GDP and all sorts of interesting economic events are basically nonsense.

That’s very Austrian of you, John.

He begins with a look at the professionals who forecast returns of the stock market, in this case the S&P 500:

Housel calculates that the strategists’ forecasts were off by an average 14.7 percentage points per year.  His Blind Forecaster, who simply assumed 9% gains every year, was off by an average 14.1 percentage points per year.  Thus the Blind Forecaster beat the experts even if you exclude 2008 as an unforeseeable “black swan” year.

So why do people listen to any of these knuckleheads?  An answer is offered via the aforementioned Morgan Housel:

I think there’s a burning desire to think of finance as a science like physics or engineering….Finance is much closer to something like sociology. It's barely a science, and driven by irrational, uninformed, emotional, vengeful, gullible, and hormonal human brains.

What about the Federal Reserve?

A 2015 study by Kevin J. Lansing and Benjamin Pyle of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank found the FOMC was persistently too optimistic about future US economic growth. They concluded:

Over the past seven years, many growth forecasts, including the SEP’s central tendency midpoint, have been too optimistic. In particular, the SEP midpoint forecast

(1) did not anticipate the Great Recession that started in December 2007,

(2) underestimated the severity of the downturn once it began, and

(3) consistently overpredicted the speed of the recovery that started in June 2009.

Of course, forecasting GDP is a waste of time in the first place:

One problem here is that GDP itself is a political construction. Forecasting the future is hard enough when you actually understand what you are forecasting. What happens when the yardstick itself keeps changing shape? You get meaningless forecasts. But this doesn’t stop the Fed from trying.

Of course not.  If they did, what would happen to the value of a Ph.D in Economics?