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The United Nations Security Council "power of veto" refers to the veto power wielded solely by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States), enabling them to prevent the adoption of any "substantive" draft Council resolution, regardless of the level of international support for the draft. The veto does not apply to procedural votes, which is significant in that the Security Council's permanent membership can vote against a "procedural" draft resolution, without necessarily blocking its adoption by the Council.

The veto is exercised when any permanent member—the so-called "P5"—casts a "negative" vote on a "substantive" draft resolution. Abstention or absence from the vote by a permanent member does not prevent a draft resolution from being adopted.

Origins of the veto provision[link]

The idea of states having a veto over the actions of international organizations was not new in 1945. From the foundation of the League of Nations in 1920, each member of the League Council, whether permanent or non-permanent, had a veto on any non-procedural issue.^[1] From 1920 there were 4 permanent and 4 non-permanent members, but by 1936 the number of non-permanent members had increased to 11. Thus there were in effect 15 vetoes. This was one of several defects of the League that made action on many issues impossible.

The UN Charter provision for unanimity among the Permanent Members of the Security Council (the veto) was the result of extensive discussion, including at Dumbarton Oaks (August–October 1944) and Yalta (February 1945).^[2] The evidence is that the UK, US, USSR, and France all favoured the principle of unanimity, and that they were motivated in this not only by a belief in the desirability of the major powers acting together, but also by a hard-headed concern to protect their own sovereign rights and national interest.^[3] Truman, who became President of the US in April 1945, went so far as to write in his memoirs: "All our experts, civil and military, favored it, and without such a veto no arrangement would have passed the Senate."^[4]

The UNSC veto system was established in order to prohibit the UN from taking any future action directly against its principal founding members. One of the lessons of the League of Nations (1919–46) had been that an international organization cannot work if all the major powers are not members. The expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations in December 1939, following its November 1939 attack on Finland soon after the outbreak of World War II, was just one of many events in the League's long history of incomplete membership.

It had already been decided at the UN's founding conference in 1944, that Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the United States and, "in due course" France, should be the permanent members of any newly formed Council. France had been defeated and occupied by Germany (1940–44), but its role as a permanent member of the League of Nations, its status as a colonial power and the activities of the Free French forces on the allied side allowed it a place at the table with the other four.^{[citation needed]}

Article 27[link]

Article 27 of the United Nations Charter states:

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.^[5]

Although the "power of veto" is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, the fact that "substantive" decisions by the UNSC require "the concurring votes of the permanent members", means that any of those permanent members can prevent the adoption, by the Council, of any draft resolutions on "substantive" matters. For this reason, the "power of veto" is also referred to as the principle of "great Power unanimity".^[6]

The experience of the veto power[link]

The actual use of the veto, and the constant possibility of its use, have been central features of the functioning of the Security Council throughout the UN's history. In the period from 1945 to the end of 2009, 215 resolutions on substantive issues were vetoed, sometimes by more than one of the Permanent Five. The average number of vetoes cast each year to 1989 was over five: since then the average annual number has been just above one.

The figures reflect the fact that a Permanent Member of the Security Council can avoid casting a veto if the proposal in question does not in any event obtain the requisite majority. In the first two decades of the UN, the Western states were frequently able to defeat resolutions without actually using the veto; and the Soviet Union was in this position in the 1970s and 1980s. Use of the veto has reflected a degree of diplomatic isolation of the vetoing state(s) on the particular issue. Because of the use or threat of the veto, the Security Council could at best have a limited role in certain wars and interventions in which its Permanent Members were involved – for example in Algeria (1954–62); Suez (1956), Hungary (1956), Vietnam (1946–75), the Sino-Vietnamese war (1979), Afghanistan (1979–88), Panama (1989), Iraq (2003), and Georgia (2008).

Not all cases of UN inaction in crises have been due to actual use of the veto. For example, re the Iran–Iraq war of 1980–88 there was no use of the veto, but the UN role was minimal except in its concluding phase. Likewise the limited involvement of the UN in the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan from 2003 onwards was not due to any actual use of the veto. A general lack of willingness to act was the main problem.

Since 1990 the veto has been used sparingly. The period from 31 May 1990 to 11 May 1993 was the longest without use of the veto in the history of the UN. Up till the end of 1989 the number of resolutions passed by the Security Council had been 646 – an average of about 15 per annum. The figures for the years since then show a peak of Security Council activism in 1993, followed by a modest degree of retrenchment.^[7]

In 1950 the Soviet Union missed one important opportunity to exercise its veto power. The Soviet government had adopted an "empty chair" policy at the Security Council from January 1950, owing to its discontent over the UN's refusal to recognize the People's Republic of China's representatives as the legitimate representatives of China,^[8] and with the hope of preventing any future decisions by the Council on substantive matters. Despite the wording of the Charter (which makes no provisions for passing resolutions with the abstention or absence of a veto-bearing member), this was treated as a non-blocking abstention. This had in fact already become Council practice by that time, the Council having already adopted numerous draft resolutions despite the lack of an affirmative vote by each of its permanent members. The result of the Soviet Union's absence from the Security Council was that it was not in a position to veto the UN Security Council resolutions 83 (27 June 1950) and 84 (7 July 1950) authorising the US-led military coalition in Korea which assisted South Korea in repelling the North Korean attack.^[9]

Most common users[link]

Number of resolutions vetoed by each of the five permanent members of the Security Council between 1946 and 2007.^[10]

Almost half the vetoes in the history of the Security Council were cast by the Soviet Union, with the vast majority of those being before 1965. Since using its first veto in 1946, Russia has been the most frequent user of the veto.^[11]

From 1946 to 2008, vetoes were issued on 261 occasions. For that period, usage breaks down as follows:

• United States has used the veto on 82 occasions between 1946 and 2007; and has used its veto power more than any other permanent member since 1972.^[12]
• Russia/the Soviet Union has used the veto on 124 occasions, more than any two others of the five permanent members of the Security Council combined.^[13]

Most recent vetoes[link]

While China, Russia and the United States have exercised their veto power in the twenty-first century, neither France nor the United Kingdom have. The following list contains the most recent event any of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council exercised their veto power:

• February 4, 2012: China and Russia double vetoed for the second time a draft resolution calling for support for the Arab League plan to end violence and support political transition in Syria.^[14]
• February 18, 2011: The United States vetoed a draft resolution condemning Israeli settlements in the West Bank.^[15]
• December 23, 1989: France, the United Kingdom and the United States vetoed a draft resolution condemning the United States invasion of Panama.^[16]

Analysis by country[link]

Russia/Soviet Union[link]

In the early days of the United Nations, the Soviet Union commissar and later minister for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, said no so many times that he was known as "Mr. Veto". In fact, the Soviet Union was responsible for nearly half of all vetoes ever cast—79 vetoes were used in the first 10 years. Molotov regularly rejected bids for new membership because of the US's refusal to admit the Soviet republics. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has used its veto power sparingly.

United States[link]

Ambassador Charles W. Yost cast the first U.S. veto in 1970, regarding a crisis in Rhodesia, and the U.S. cast a lone veto in 1972, to prevent a resolution relating to Israel. Since that time, it has become by far the most frequent user of the veto, mainly on resolutions criticising Israel; since 2002 the Negroponte doctrine has been applied for the use of a veto on resolutions relating to the ongoing Israel-Palestinian conflict. This has been a constant cause of friction between the General Assembly and the Security Council. On 18 February 2011, the Obama administration vetoed resolutions condemning Israeli settlements.

United Kingdom[link]

The United Kingdom used its Security Council veto power, along with France, to veto a draft resolution aimed at resolving the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. They eventually withdrew after the U.S. instigated an "emergency special session" of the General Assembly, under the terms of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, which led to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), by the adoption of Assembly resolution 1001.^[17] The UK also used the veto unilaterally seven times because of Rhodesia.

France[link]

France uses its veto power sparingly. It vetoed a 1976 Resolution on the question of the Comoros independence, when the island of Mayotte was kept in French territory due to the vote of the local population. The threat of a French veto of resolution on the impending 2003 invasion of Iraq caused friction between France and the United States. France subsequently used the threat of a veto to support Morocco's position in the Western Sahara conflict .^[18]

China (ROC/PRC)[link]

Between 1946 and 1971, the Chinese seat on the Security Council was the government of the Republic of China (from 1949 on Taiwan) during which its representative used the veto only once (to block the Mongolian People's Republic's application for membership in 1955 because the ROC considered Mongolia to be a part of China. This postponed the admission of Mongolia until 1960, when the Soviet Union announced that unless Mongolia was admitted, it would block the admission of all of the newly independent African states. Faced with this pressure, the ROC relented under protest.

After the Republic of China's expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, the first veto cast by the present occupant, the People's Republic of China, was issued in 25 August 1972 over Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations. As of December 2008, the People's Republic of China has used its veto six times; observers have noted a preference for China to abstain rather than veto on resolutions not directly related to Chinese interests.^[10]

Veto power reform[link]

Various discussions have taken place in recent years over the suitability of the Security Council veto power in today's world. Key arguments include that the five permanent members no longer represent the most stable and responsible member states in the United Nations, and that their veto power slows down and even prevents important decisions being made on matters of international peace and security. Due to the global changes that have taken place politically and economically since the formation of the UN in 1945, widespread debate has been apparent over whether the five permanent members of the UN Security Council remain the best member states to hold veto power. While the permanent members are still typically regarded as great powers, there is debate over their suitability to retain exclusive veto power.^[19]

A second argument against retaining the UNSC veto power is that it is detrimental to balanced political decisions, as any draft text needs to be approved of by each permanent member before any draft resolution can possibly be adopted. Indeed, several proposed draft resolutions are never formally presented to the Council for a vote owing to the knowledge that a permanent member would vote against their adoption (the so-called "pocket veto"). Debate also exists over the potential use of the veto power to provide "diplomatic cover" to a permanent member's allies^{[citation needed]}. The United States has used its veto power more than any other permanent member since 1972, particularly on what it sees as unbalanced draft resolutions condemning the actions or policies of the State of Israel.

Advocates of the veto power believe that it is just as necessary in the current geo-political landscape, and that without the veto power, the Security Council would be open to making democratic "majority rules" decisions on matters that have implications at a global level^[20]—decisions that may well go directly against the interests of a permanent member.

Discussions on improving the UN's effectiveness and responsiveness to international security threats often include reform of the UNSC veto. Proposals include: limiting the use of the veto to vital national security issues; requiring agreement from multiple states before exercising the veto; and abolishing the veto entirely. However, any reform of the veto will be very difficult, if not impossible. In fact, Articles 108 and 109 of the United Nations Charter grant the P5 veto over any amendments to the Charter, requiring them to approve of any modifications to the UNSC veto power that they themselves hold: it is highly unlikely that any of the P5 would accept a reform of the UN Charter that would be detrimental to their own national interests.

Nonetheless, it has been argued that with the adoption of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution by the General Assembly, and given the interpretations of the Assembly's powers that became customary international law as a result, that the Security Council "power of veto" was rendered, fundamentally, irrelevant.^[21] By adopting A/RES/377 A, on 3 November 1950, over two-thirds of UN Member states declared that, according to the UN Charter, the permanent members of the UNSC cannot and should not prevent the UNGA from taking any and all action necessary to restore international peace and security, in cases where the UNSC has failed to exercise its "primary responsibility" for maintaining peace. Such an interpretation sees the UNGA as being awarded "final responsibility"—rather than "secondary responsibility"—for matters of international peace and security, by the UN Charter. Various official and semi-official UN reports make explicit reference to the Uniting for Peace resolution as providing a mechanism for the UNGA to overrule any UNSC vetoes;^{[22][23][24][25]} thus rendering them little more than delays in UN action, should two-thirds of the Assembly subsequently agree that action is necessary.

The threat of the use of the veto by the P5 has led the UN Security Council to adopt what some commentators have described as unlawful resolutions that violated the UN Charter. For example, UNSC resolution 1422 of 2002, renewed once through resolution 1487 of 2003, aimed at exempting peace-keepers and other military personnel conducting operations authorized by the Security Council from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for a period of 12 months. Resolution 1422 was adopted as a consequence to the US veto on 30 June 2002 to the renewal of the Peace-keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC.^[26]

There has been discussion of increasing the number of permanent members. The countries who have made the strongest demands for permanent seats are Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. Indeed, Japan and Germany are the UN's second and third largest funders respectively, while Brazil, the largest Latin American nation, and India, the world's largest democracy and second most populous country, are two of the largest contributors of troops to UN-mandated peace-keeping missions. This proposal has found opposition in a group of countries called Uniting for Consensus. On 21 September 2004, the G4 nations issued a joint statement mutually backing each other's claim to permanent status, together with two African countries. Any such proposal would involve amendment of the UN Charter, and as such would need to be accepted by two-thirds of the General Assembly (128 votes), and also by all the permanent members of the Security Council.^[27]

Criticism[link]

Notes[link]

Further reading[link]

• Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum, ed. The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford University Press, 2008. http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199583300.do.  ISBN 978-0-19-953343-5 (hardback); ISBN 978-0-19-958330-0 (paperback). US edition. On Google.
• David Malone (ed), The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 2004. ISBN 1-58826-240-5 (paperback).

External links[link]

• "Can You Bypass a U.N. Security Council Veto?", Slate magazine
• "Security Council veto power usage", Peace.ca
• Global Policy Forum, information on use of the veto power
• Malone, D & Mahbubani, K: "The UN Security Council – from the Cold War to the 21st Century", UN World Chronicle, 30 March 2004.

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It has been suggested that Veto override be merged into this article or section. (Discuss) Proposed since June 2010.

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This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2008)

A veto, Latin for "I forbid", is the power of an officer of the state to unilaterally stop an official action, especially enactment of a piece of legislation.

In practice, the veto can be absolute, as for instance in the United Nations Security Council, whose permanent members (China, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the United States of America) can block any resolution. Or, it can be limited, as in the legislative process of the United States, where a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate may override a Presidential veto of legislation.^[1]

A veto only gives power to stop changes, not to adopt them. The veto therefore conveys to its holder an ability to protect the status quo.

The concept of a veto body originated with the Roman consuls and tribunes. Either of the two consuls holding office in a given year could block a military or civil decision by the other; any tribune had the power to unilaterally block legislation passed by the Roman Senate.^[2]

Roman veto[link]

The institution of the veto, known as the intercessio, was adopted by the Roman Republic in the 6th century BC as a way of enabling the tribunes to protect the interests of the plebs (common citizenry) from the encroachments of the patricians, who dominated the Senate. A tribune's veto did not prevent the senate from passing a bill, but meant that it was denied the force of law. The tribunes could also use the veto to prevent a bill from being brought before the plebeian assembly. The consuls also had the power of veto, as decisionmaking generally required the assent of both consuls. If one disagreed, either could invoke the intercessio to block the action of the other. The veto was an essential component of the Roman conception of power being wielded not only to manage state affairs but to moderate and restrict the power of the state's high officials and institution.^[2]

Westminster systems[link]

In Westminster Systems and most constitutional monarchies, the power to veto legislation by withholding the Royal Assent is a rarely used reserve power of the monarch. In practice, the Crown follows the convention of exercising its prerogative on the advice of its chief advisor, the prime minister. The House of Lords used to have the power of veto. However, reform first by a Liberal government and then by a Labour government has seen their powers limited. The Parliamentary Acts of 1911 and 1949 saw their powers reduced to being able to amend and delay legislation. They are able to delay legislation for up to one year. Under the 1911 Act, money bills may not be delayed, and under the Salisbury Convention, they cannot delay any bills laid out in the party's manifesto.

In Spain, the article 115 of the Constitution provides that the King shall give his assent to laws passed by the General Courts within 15 days after their final passement by them; the absence of the royal assent, although not constitutionally provided, would mean the bill not to become law.

Australia[link]

Since the Statute of Westminster (1931), the United Kingdom Parliament may not repeal any Act of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia on the grounds that is repugnant to the laws and interests of the United Kingdom.^[3] Other countries in the Commonwealth of Nations (not to be confused with the Commonwealth of Australia), such as Canada and New Zealand, are likewise affected. However, according to the Australian Constitution (sec. 59), the Queen may veto a bill that has been given royal assent by the Governor-General within one year of the legislation being assented to.^[3] This power has never been used. The Australian Governor-General himself or herself has, in theory, power to veto, or more technically, withhold assent to, a bill passed by both houses of the Australian Parliament, and contrary to the advice of the prime minister.^[4] This may be done without consulting the sovereign as per Section 58 of the constitution:

When a proposed law passed by both Houses of the Parliament is presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion, but subject to this Constitution, that he assents in the Queen's name, or that he withholds assent, or that he reserves the law for the Queen's pleasure. The Governor-General may return to the house in which it originated any proposed law so presented to him, and may transmit therewith any amendments which he may recommend, and the Houses may deal with the recommendation.^[5]

This reserve power is however, constitutionally arguable, and it is difficult to foresee an occasion when such a power would need to be exercised. It is possible that a Governor-general might so act if a bill passed by the Parliament was criminal, illegal or in violation of the Constitution.^[6] One might argue, however, that a government would be hardly likely to present a bill which is so open to rejection. Many of the vice-regal reserve powers are untested, because of the brief constitutional history of the Commonwealth of Australia, and the observance of the convention that the head of state acts upon the advice of his or her chief minister. The power may also be used in a situation where the parliament, usually a hung parliament, passes a bill without the blessing of the executive. The governor general on the advice of the executive could withhold consent from the bill thereby preventing its passage into law.

With regard to the six governors of the states which are federated under the Australian Commonwealth, a somewhat different situation exists. Until the Australia Act 1986, each state was constitutionally dependent upon the British Crown directly. Since 1986, however, they are fully independent entities, although the Queen still appoints governors on the advice of the state head of government, the premier. So the Crown may not veto (nor the UK Parliament overturn) any act of a state governor or state legislature. Paradoxically, the states are more independent of the Crown than the federal government and legislature.^[7] State constitutions determine what role a governor plays. In general the governor exercises the powers the sovereign would have, including the power to withhold the Royal Assent.

India[link]

In India, the president has several veto powers. The president can refuse to assent, which constitutes an absolute veto. The president can send the bill back to parliament for changes, which constitutes a limited veto that can be overridden by a simple majority. The president can also take no action indefinitely on a bill, sometimes referred to as a pocket veto.^[8][9]

United Kingdom[link]

In the United Kingdom, the royal veto ("withholding Royal Assent") was last exercised in 1707 by Queen Anne with the Scottish Militia Bill 1708.

Canada[link]

According to the British North America Act, 1867, the Governor General of Canada may veto a bill by refusing Royal Assent. If the Governor General withholds the Queen's assent, the sovereign may within two years disallow the bill, thereby vetoing the law in question. However, this power has never been used.

Provincial viceroys, Lieutenant Governors, however are able to reserve Royal Assent to provincial bills for the governor general; this clause was last invoked in 1961 by the Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan.^{[citation needed]}

United States[link]

All legislation passed by both houses of Congress must be presented to the President. This presentation is in the President's capacity as Head of State.

If the President approves of the legislation, he signs it into law. According to Article 1. Section 7 of the Constitution, when the president chooses, if he does not approve, he must return the bill, unsigned, within ten days, excluding Sundays, to the house of the United States Congress in which it originated, while the Congress is in session. The President is constitutionally required to state his objections to the legislation in writing, and the Congress is constitutionally required to consider them, and to reconsider the legislation. This action, in effect, is a veto.

If the Congress overrides the veto by a two-thirds majority in each house, it becomes law without the President's signature. Otherwise, the bill fails to become law unless it is presented to the President again and he chooses to sign it.

A bill can also become law without the President's signature if, after it is presented to him, he simply fails to sign it within the ten days noted. If there are fewer than ten days left in the session before Congress adjourns, and if Congress does so adjourn before the ten days have expired in which the President might sign the bill, then the bill fails to become law. This procedure, when used as a formal device, is called a pocket veto.

Modifications declared unconstitutional[link]

In 1982, the Supreme Court had struck down the one-house legislative veto, on separation of powers grounds and on grounds that the action by one house of Congress violated the Constitutional requirement of bicameralism. The case was INS v. Chadha, concerning a foreign exchange student in Ohio who had been born in Kenya but whose parents were from India. Because he was not born in India, he was not an Indian citizen. Because his parents were not Kenyan citizens, he was not Kenyan. Thus, he had nowhere to go when his student visa expired because neither country would take him, so he overstayed his visa and was ordered to show cause why he should not be deported from the United States.

The Immigration and Nationality Act was one of many acts of Congress passed since the 1930s, which contained a provision allowing either house of that legislature to nullify decisions of agencies in the executive branch simply by passing a resolution. In this case, Chadha's deportation was suspended and the House of Representatives passed a resolution overturning the suspension, so that the deportation proceedings would continue. This, the Court held, amounted to the House of Representatives passing legislation without the concurrence of the Senate, and without presenting the legislation to the President for consideration and approval (or veto). Thus, the Constitutional principle of bicameralism and the separation of powers doctrine were disregarded in this case, and this legislative veto of executive decisions was struck down.

In 1996, the United States Congress passed, and President Bill Clinton signed, the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. This act allowed the President to veto individual items of budgeted expenditures from appropriations bills instead of vetoing the entire bill and sending it back to the Congress. However, this line-item veto was immediately challenged by members of Congress who disagreed with it. In 1998, the Supreme Court declared that the line-item veto was unconstitutional. The Court found the language of the Constitution required each bill presented to the President to be either approved or rejected as a whole. An action by which the President might pick and choose which parts of the bill to approve or not approve amounted to the President acting as a legislator instead of an executive and head of state—and particularly as a single legislator acting in place of the entire Congress—thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine. (See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).)

In 2006, Senator Bill Frist introduced the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006 in the United States Senate. Rather than provide for an actual legislative veto, however, the procedure created by the Act provides that, if the President should recommend rescission of a budgetary line item from a budget bill he previously signed into law—a power he already possesses pursuant to U.S. Const. Art. II—the Congress must vote on his request within ten days. Because the legislation that is the subject of the President's request (or "Special Message", in the language of the bill) was already enacted and signed into law, the vote by the Congress would be ordinary legislative action, not any kind of veto—whether line-item, legislative or any other sort. The House passed this measure, but the Senate never considered it, so the bill expired and never became law.

Early federal history[link]

The Presidents of the Continental Congress (1774–1781) did not have the power of veto. The President could not veto an act of Congress under the Articles of Confederation (1781–1789), but he possessed certain recess and reserve powers that were not necessarily available to the predecessor President of Continental Congress. It was only with the enactment of the United States Constitution (drafted 1787; ratified 1788; fully effective since 4 March 1789) that veto power was conferred upon the person titled "President of the United States".

The presidential veto power was first exercised on April 5, 1792 when President George Washington vetoed a bill outlining a new apportionment formula submitted by then Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. Apportionment described how Congress divides seats in the House of Representatives among the states based on the US census figures. President Washington thought the bill gave an unfair advantage to the northern states.

The Congress first overrode a presidential veto (passed a bill into law notwithstanding the President's objections)on March 3, 1845.^[10]

U.S. states, veto powers, and override authority[link]

All U.S. states also have a provision by which legislative decisions can be vetoed by the governor. In addition to the ability to veto an entire bill as a "package," many states allow the governor to exercise specialty veto authority to strike or revise portions of a bill without striking the whole thing.

Amendatory veto:
Allows a governor to amend bills that has been passed by the legislature. Revisions are subject to confirmation or rejection by the legislature.^[11]

Line item veto:
Allows a governor to remove specific sections of a bill that have been passed by the legislature. Deletions can be overridden by the legislature.^[12]

Pocket veto:
Any bills presented to a governor after a session has ended must be signed to become law. A governor can refuse to sign such a bill and it will expire. Such vetoes cannot be overridden.^[13]

Reduction veto:
Allows a governor to reduce the amounts budgeted for spending items. Reductions can be overridden by the legislature.^[14]

Package veto:
Allows a governor to veto the entire bill. Package vetoes can be overridden by the legislature.^[15]

Veto power and override authority by state^{[16] [17]}

European parliamentary republics[link]

Presidential veto[link]

Many parliamentary republics in Europe, including Italy, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Hungary, allow a form of limited presidential veto on legislation.

The President of Austria technically has no veto power but may order a referendum on a bill passed by the legislature if he refuses to sign it.

The President of Iceland may refuse to sign a bill, which is then put to universal adult suffrage. This right was not exercised until 2004, by President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, who has since refused to sign two other bills. The first bill was withdrawn, but the latter two resulted in referenda.

The President of Hungary has two options to veto a bill: submit it to the Constitutional Court if he suspects that it violates the constitution or send it back to the Parliament and ask for a second debate and vote on the bill. If the Court rules that the bill is constitutional or it is passed by the Parliament again, respectively, the President must sign it.

The President of Ireland may refuse to grant assent to a bill that he or she considers to be unconstitutional, after consulting the Council of State; in this case, the bill is referred to the Irish Supreme Court, which finally determines the matter. This is the most widely used reserve power. The President may also, on request of a majority of the Senate and a third of Dáil Éireann (the lower house of parliament), after consulting the Council of State, decline to sign a bill "of such national importance that the will of the people thereon ought to be ascertained" in an ordinary referendum or a new Dáil reassembling after a general election held within eight months. This latter power has never been used because the government of the day almost always commands a majority of the Senate, preventing the third of Dáil Éireann that usually makes up the opposition from combining with it.

The President of Italy may request a second deliberation of a bill passed by Parliament before it is promulgated. This is very weak form of veto as the Parliament can override the veto by an ordinary majority. The same provision exists in France and Latvia. While such a limited veto cannot thwart the will of a determined parliamentary majority, it may have a delaying effect and may cause the parliamentary majority to reconsider the matter. The President of Republic can also call new Parliament elections.

The President of Estonia may effectively veto a law adopted by Estonian parliament by refusing to proclaim it and demanding a new debate and decision. The parliament, in its turn, may overrride this veto by passing the law unamended for the second time (a simple majority is enough). In this case the President is obliged to proclaim the law or to request the Supreme Court of Estonia to declare the law unconstitutional. If the Supreme Court rules that the law does not violate the Constitution, the President may not object any more and is obliged to finally proclaim the law.

The President of Latvia may suspend a bill for a period of two months, during which it may be referred to the people in a referendum if a certain number of signatures are gathered. This is potentially a much stronger form of veto, as it enables the President to appeal to the people against the wishes of the Parliament and Government.

The President of Poland may submit a bill to the Constitutional Tribunal if he suspects that bill is unconstitutional or send it back to the Sejm for a second voting. If the Tribunal says that the bill is constitutional or if Sejm passes it by at least three-fifths of the votes, the President must sign the bill.

The President of Portugal may refuse to sign a bill or refer it or parts of it to the Portuguese Constitutional Court. If the President refuses to sign bill without it being declared unconstitutional, the Assembly of the Republic (parliament) may pass it again, in which case it becomes law.

The President of Ukraine may refuse to sign a bill and return it to Parliament with his proposals. If the parliament agrees on his proposals, the President must sign the bill. Parliament may overturn a veto by a two-thirds majority. If Parliament overturns his veto, the President must sign the bill within 10 days.

Liberum veto[link]

In the constitution Poland or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 17th and 18th centuries, there was an institution called the liberum veto. All bills had to pass the Sejm or "Seimas" (Parliament) by unanimous consent, and if any legislator voted nay on anything, this not only vetoed that bill but also dissolved that legislative session itself. The concept originated in the idea of "Polish democracy" as any Pole of noble extraction considered was as good as any other, no matter how low or high his material condition might be. It was never exercised, however, under the rule of the strong Polish royal dynasties, which came to an end in the mid-17th century. These were followed by an elective kingship. As might be expected, the more and more frequent use of this veto power paralyzed the power of the legislature and, combined with a string of weak figurehead kings, led ultimately to the partitioning and the dissolution of the Polish state in the late 18th century.

See also[link]

• Constitution of the Roman Republic
• Popular referendum
• Jus exclusivae, a veto exercised by certain Catholic monarchs by means of their crown-cardinals in papal conclaves to prevent papabili objectionable to them from being elected Pope.
• Sign into law

References[link]

External links[link]

• Regular Vetoes and Pocket Vetoes: An Overview (report) by Kevin R. Kosar
• Senate Reference Webpage on Vetoes, which includes lists of vetoes from 1789 to the current day.