

Dealmaking Leads to Broken Promises and Lost Elections: Lessons from Past Trade Votes

Goodies Promised in Exchange for Trade Votes Don't Materialize, Don't Shield Representatives from Voters' Wrath



www.tradewatch.org

June 2015

Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch

Published June 2015 by Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch

Public Citizen is a national, nonprofit consumer advocacy organization that serves as the people's voice in the nation's capital. Since our founding in 1971, we have delved into an array of areas, but our work on each issue shares an overarching goal: To ensure that all citizens are represented in the halls of power. For four decades, we have proudly championed citizen interests before Congress, the executive branch agencies and the courts. We have successfully challenged the abusive practices of the pharmaceutical, nuclear and automobile industries, and many others. We are leading the charge against undemocratic trade agreements that advance the interests of mega-corporations at the expense of citizens worldwide. As the federal government wrestles with critical issues – fallout from the global economic crisis, health care reform, climate change and so much more – Public Citizen is needed now more than ever. We are the countervailing force to corporate power. We fight on behalf of all Americans – to make sure your government works for you. We have five policy groups: our Congress Watch division, the Energy Program, Global Trade Watch, the Health Research Group and our Litigation Group. Public Citizen is a nonprofit organization that does not participate in partisan political activities or endorse any candidates for elected office. We accept no government or corporate money – we rely solely on foundation grants, publication sales and support from our 300,000 members. Visit our web page at www.citizen.org. For more information on Public Citizen's trade and globalization work, visit the homepage of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch: www.tradewatch.org.

Additional copies of this document are available from:

Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch

215 Pennsylvania Ave SE, Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-4996

Other Recent Titles by Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch:

Analysis: Hatch Bill Would Revive Controversial 2002 Fast Track Mechanism that Faces Broad Opposition (April 2015)

Don't Believe the Hype: Agricultural Exports Lag under Trade Deals, Belying Empty TPP Promises (April 2015)

Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims under NAFTA and Other U.S. "Trade" Deals (April 2015)

Only One of 41 Attempts to Use the GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV "General Exception" Has Ever Succeeded:

Replicating the WTO Exception Construct Will Not Provide for an Effective TPP General Exception (April 2015)

Analysis of Leaded Trans-Pacific Partnership Investment Text (March 2015)

Korea FTA Outcomes on the Pact's Third Anniversary (March 2015)

Job-Killing Trade Deficits Soar under FTAs (February 2015)

Raw Deals for Small Businesses: U.S. Small Firms Have Endured Slow and Declining Exports under "Free Trade Deals" (February 2015)

Prosperity Undermined: Fast-Track Trade Agreements' 20-Year Record of Massive U.S. Trade Deficits, American Job Loss and Wage Suppression (January 2015)

New Polls Reveal that U.S. Public Supports Trade in General, Opposes Current "Trade" Policy Agenda (January 2015)

Debunking USTR's Absurd Assertion of a U.S. Trade Surplus with NAFTA Countries (January 2015)

USTR's Omissions and Data Distortions Aimed at Hiding the Dismal Realities of the Korea FTA (December 2014)

Myths and Omissions: Unpacking Obama Administration Defenses of Investor-State Corporate Privileges (October 2014)

TPP: The "Trade" Deal that Could Inflate Your Healthcare Bill (July 2014)

The Rising Use of the Trade Pact Sales Pitch of Last Resort: TPP Foreign Policy Arguments Mimic False Claims Made for Past Deals (April 2014)

NAFTA's 20-Year Legacy and the Fate of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Feb. 2014)

Studies Reveal Consensus: Trade Flows during "Free Trade" Era Have Exacerbated U.S. Income Inequality (Feb. 2014)

Dealmaking Leads to Broken Promises and Lost Elections: Lessons from Past Trade Votes

Goodies Promised in Exchange for Trade Votes Don't Materialize, Don't Shield Representatives from Voters' Wrath

Executive Summary

Facing bipartisan congressional opposition to Fast Track trade authority and polls showing majority U.S. public opposition,¹ the Obama administration and GOP congressional leaders are now resorting to asking members of Congress to swap their votes for promises of special favors and pledges to help representatives survive the political backlash of a “yes” vote on Fast Track. Most members of Congress know better than to trust an exiting president's promises of political cover for voting “yes” on such a controversial, career-defining issue as Fast Track. That was partly why President Clinton's offers of special favors failed to convince Congress to grant him Fast Track authority in 1998 when he, like President Obama, was nearing the end of his second term. In a political alignment similar to today, 71 GOP members of the Republican-controlled U.S. House of Representatives and 171 Democrats voted down Clinton's Fast Track bid.²

Already the first promise of the 2015 Fast Track battle has been broken. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) and colleagues cast deciding Senate votes after obtaining commitments that Congress would vote on reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank before its June 30, 2015 sunset. Now GOP leaders have made clear this will not occur. Whether Ex-Im will ever be authorized is in doubt. **This case spotlights rule number one in trade vote bargaining: make sure the promise is fully implemented before you vote!**

Indeed, political peril for those relying on promises for trade votes is not limited to imminently exiting presidents. Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.) still awaits changes to the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) to protect his district's now-devastated sock manufacturers – changes that President George W. Bush's administration promised in 2005 to obtain Aderholt's “yes” vote for that deal.³ Other casualties of Bush's broken CAFTA deals were GOP Representatives Robin Hayes (R-N.C.) and Phil English (R-Pa.). Their casting the last two deciding votes on CAFTA instigated multi-year efforts to unseat them that succeeded, as did efforts to primary out Democrats, such as Matthew Martinez (D-Calif.) and Albert Wynn (D-Md.), who cast votes for past trade deals.

From Clinton's failure to deliver on a raft of promises used to extract “yes” votes for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – including promises of more labor protections to “mitigate” damage on the middle class, new import safeguards and help passing unrelated legislation – to Bush's broken promises, the offers made in the heat of trade vote battles went unfulfilled.

Indeed, a review of the last two decades of presidential promises made to extract trade votes facing passionate public opposition reveals that members of Congress who have exchanged “yes” votes for such IOUs have more often than not seen the promises broken, leaving them exposed to voters' anger over their vote against the opinion and interests of the majority. In many cases, this exposure has contributed to subsequent electoral losses, costing members of Congress their jobs.

Introduction

This report offers examples of the track record of empty promises made to obtain difficult trade votes and resulting truncated political careers, providing a cautionary tale to members of Congress who are now contemplating the administration's pledges of political cover, and offers of various goodies from the president and congressional leaders, in exchange for an unpopular "yes" vote on Fast Track. It starts with failed deals made by those still in Congress and proceeds to review failed deals that contributed to the electoral demise of those who relied on them to vote "yes." (For a comprehensive list of trade-vote deals from the NAFTA fight through the 2002 Fast Track debate, see the appendix.)

Not a month after the first round of trade-vote dealmaking ensued, already a broken promise can be added to the perilous tally. On May 21, 2015, Senator Maria Cantwell huddled with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and other colleagues on the Senate floor, hatching a deal on the too-close-to-call vote underway to advance the 2015 Fast Track bill. Cantwell had made clear that to cast a decisive vote for the Fast Track bill to proceed, she required commitments from GOP House and Senate leaders for votes to reauthorize the Export-Import Bank before it expired on June 30, 2015.⁴ As the vote clock ticked, President Obama called Cantwell to pledge she would get her votes before the bank expired⁵ and McConnell promised her a June vote. Cantwell and her colleagues then cast the decisive votes that allowed for Senate passage of Fast Track.

Just two weeks later, the promise to Cantwell has already unraveled. The House is unwilling to take up a reauthorization bill before the Senate does. The Senate has no space on its schedule for such a bill before the bank's June 30 expiration date. Senate Minority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), a supporter of the bank, has concluded that expiration of the Ex-Im Bank at the end of June is "inevitable."⁶ Whether it could be reauthorized after that is an open question.

The promise used to secure Cantwell's vote is just the latest example of a long litany of empty commitments used in the heat of the battle to get members of Congress to cast politically damaging trade votes. It serves as a warning of the dubious pledges that members of Congress are likely to see as the Obama administration and GOP House leaders are unable to sell Fast Track on its merits.

Despite months of intense pressure from the Obama administration, most House Democrats and a sizeable bloc of House GOP members stand opposed to the 2015 Fast Track bill that would delegate away Congress' constitutional trade authority to whoever may be president during the next three to six years. The administration has tried cajoling members of Congress in special lobby visits from Cabinet members,⁷ peppering their in-district TV stations with pro-Fast Track platitudes,⁸ and even levying personal criticisms against Fast Track's most vocal opponents.⁹

Appeals on the merits have not worked. Indeed, new members have continued to announce their opposition daily.¹⁰ Meanwhile, new polls reveal that a clear majority (55 percent) of the U.S. public opposes Fast Track, lending further backing to the majority position of their representatives.¹¹

The Obama administration has already resorted to promising favors to try to seduce some members into offering their Fast Track votes. These include perks like rides on Air Force One, promises to somehow suddenly overcome the GOP congressional majority to push infrastructure legislation and lists of in-

district goodies. President Obama has also pledged that he will campaign for members in their next election if they vote for Fast Track, to try to mitigate the expected political fallout.¹²

GOP congressional leaders have sought to convince GOP Steel Caucus members to vote for Fast Track by pledging to include changes to U.S. anti-dumping law in the customs bill that will also be voted on soon. This is an especially odd “promise,” in that House Ways and Means Committee Chair Paul Ryan (D-Wis.) already committed to doing just that in a letter to Senate colleagues just after the Senate Fast Track vote.¹³ And with differences in the House and Senate Customs bills that will require a conference and then additional votes on the measure, apparently this promise requires prospective buyers to vote on Fast Track in the House while trusting that the promised changes will be passed at a later date – a gamble that has proved ruinous on past such deals.

If past trade policy fights provide any indication, the Obama administration and GOP congressional leaders may soon add to this list promises of new programs and policies touted as helping to offset the expected damage of Fast Tracked deals to workers, farmers and consumers, in addition to district-specific goodies. Over the past two decades, administrations have repeatedly made such promises in attempts to buy votes for past iterations of Fast Track and Fast-Tracked trade deals like NAFTA and CAFTA. Common promises have included safeguards against import surges of specific agricultural or manufacturing commodities; selection of districts for small business funding and other projects; labor and/or environmental enforcement or “capacity building”; and increases in the funding or scope of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to help workers who would be displaced by a trade deal.¹⁴

Time and again, the promises have proven empty. Members who trusted the pledges and traded their vote have been voted out of office. The following examples illustrate this trend.

Raw Deals: Hollow Promises Lead to Loss of Jobs/Farms and Constituent Fury

In a 2005 report (“Trade Wars: Deals for Trade Votes Gone Bad”), Public Citizen reviewed 92 deals from 1992 through 2004 in which members of Congress delivered unpopular “yes” votes on Fast Track and Fast-Tracked pacts in exchange for promises of favors to provide political cover.¹⁵ Only 17 percent of the promises were kept. Pledged import safeguards never materialized, promised funds for community development or worker assistance proved illusory, and dreams of new infrastructure projects remained dreams.

In 2005 the House passed CAFTA by a single vote after a bout of ill-fated dealmaking spurred some members to flip-flop from opposing the deal to casting the decisive vote. Many of them were subsequently voted out of office. Among those who remain, many are still waiting, one decade later, for fulfillment of the promises made in exchange for their politically costly vote.

Below we profile some of the dozens of trade vote-swapping deals gone wrong, focusing on the few deal-makers from past trade votes who are still in Congress.

Rep. Robert Aderholt’s Empty Sock (Promise)

Members of Congress from manufacturing-heavy districts, whatever their political party, typically understand that a vote for Fast Track or a controversial NAFTA-style trade deal would spell significant

loss of jobs in their district and loss of respect from their constituents. While most simply vote “no” on such deals, some have curiously bowed to pressure to sell their vote for non-binding assurances that special safeguards could be made available to protect particular industries important to their district. One of the clearest examples is Rep. Robert Aderholt’s (R-Ala.) quixotic quest for sock manufacturing protections in exchange for his CAFTA vote.

Aderholt’s district is known as the “sock capital” of the United States. During the CAFTA debate, the deal was widely considered a bane to the survival of the sock and hosiery industry, which has indeed been among those hardest hit by the pact’s implementation. After informing local industry and constituents that he opposed CAFTA because the administration had refused his demands to safeguard his state’s sock producers,¹⁶ Aderholt dramatically reversed his opposition to CAFTA and under pressure from GOP congressional leaders and President Bush switched positions to vote for CAFTA. Aderholt explained that the Bush administration had provided a written commitment¹⁷ to help the sock industry by trying to obtain a replacement of CAFTA’s immediate duty-free treatment for sock imports with a ten-year phase-out of tariffs on CAFTA-qualifying sock imports from Central America. The commitment was never fulfilled.

In 2003, before CAFTA was signed, Aderholt and other members of Congress sent a letter to President Bush demanding that CAFTA “not include exceptions, such as tariff preference levels (TPLs).”¹⁸ Despite Aderholt’s demand, the final, signed agreement included TPLs for both Nicaragua and Costa Rica, allowing socks and other apparel made there to qualify for tariff-free access to the U.S. market even if made from fabric sourced from outside CAFTA countries.

Just a couple weeks before the vote, he had stated that his “constituents fret that their jobs will get exported to low-cost, low-wage CAFTA countries.”¹⁹ After the sock promise and vote, Aderholt said, “The agreement we demanded of the Trade Ambassador will protect jobs and the economy in north Alabama.”²⁰ He defended his flip-flop by calling the Bush administration commitments “substantial, not mere promises.”²¹

Unfortunately for the workers in Aderholt’s district, the commitment was indeed a “mere promise.” Upon CAFTA’s implementation in each Central American nation, U.S. tariffs on socks were immediately eliminated, not phased out.²² And though the administration had further committed to “be very proactive in initiating a sock safeguard [against CAFTA country imports] if the situation were to warrant it,”²³ such safeguard actions were tepid at best. After imports of socks from Central America surged upon CAFTA’s implementation, the U.S. government imposed a small 5 percent tariff on socks from Honduras that lasted just 6 months in 2008.²⁴

Rep. Aderholt stated that he was “deeply disappointed and very frustrated” by this superficial “safeguard.”²⁵ Indeed, the safeguard failed to forestall the ballooning U.S. imports of socks from CAFTA countries. In the first four years of CAFTA, annual U.S. imports of cotton socks from CAFTA countries rose from zero to more than \$365 million, and have stayed high since.²⁶

Aderholt’s vote for CAFTA, and the failure of his sock protection promise, has been disastrous for workers in his district. Since CAFTA’s passage, more than 3,445 workers *in sock factories alone* in Aderholt’s district have lost their jobs to offshoring or imports, as certified under the Department of Labor’s narrow TAA program. (These numbers significantly undercount trade-related job loss as TAA only covers a subset of jobs lost to trade.) That includes, for example, the decision of V.I. Prewett and

Sons to offshore sock production to CAFTA member Honduras after CAFTA took effect, resulting in a mass layoff of 1,302 workers at its Fort Payne sock factory in 2007.²⁷

Rep. Rick Larsen, Rep. Adam Smith and the Trade Adjustment Assistance Bamboozle

Like CAFTA, the fight over the 2002 Fast Track delegation that enabled CAFTA was closely and bitterly fought. The legislation passed the House by a single vote in December 2001 and the conference report containing Fast Track squeaked by with just a three-vote margin in July 2002. Some representatives agreed to vote “yes,” despite their concerns that Fast-Track deals could displace more workers, in part because the George W. Bush administration promised a significant expansion of the TAA program to help displaced workers. Indeed, promises to increase the funding, change the funding source or expand the scope of TAA are among the most common fig leaves that administrations have extended to members of Congress when pressuring them to undertake politically dubious trade votes.

This TAA expansion carrot for Fast Track reportedly held sway, for example, with Reps. Rick Larsen (D-Wash.) and Adam Smith (D-Wash.).²⁸ While neither voted for Fast Track when it was not packaged with TAA in the December 2001 vote, both voted for Fast Track when bundled with TAA in a final conference report in July 2002.

President Bush’s original TAA promises during the 2001-02 Fast Track fight were grandiose: major increases in TAA funding; health insurance credits and wage insurance supplements for trade-displaced workers; and expanding the program to cover service sector workers, including high tech workers, and workers in downstream secondary services related to manufacturing.²⁹

But the language in the final Fast Track legislation did not extend TAA to high tech or most other service workers. Only “upstream” service workers directly linked to manufacturing were covered, such as plant custodians or sales staff, while downstream service workers, such as truck drivers delivering products, logistics and marketing staff, information technology staff and more, were excluded.³⁰ The final language on health insurance credits burdened unemployed workers with most of the costs of extending their coverage; in addition, the credits were designed in a manner that excluded many workers outright. Regarding wage insurance supplements, the final legislation only included a small pilot program to experiment with the benefit.³¹

In this instance, the promise used to turn a “no” vote into a “yes” vote was already scaled back before the vote even happened. Those who still voted for Fast Track, like Larsen and Smith, may have viewed the gutted TAA proposal as a first step, in hopes that it would soon lead to a more meaningful expansion of assistance for displaced workers. But for the next seven years, there was no new expansion of TAA’s scope or benefits for trade-displaced workers.³² There was, however a dramatic expansion of the NAFTA model contributing to worker displacement, thanks to the Fast Track authority granted by the votes of Larsen and Smith. During those seven years, eight new U.S. trade agreements (including CAFTA) were Fast Tracked through Congress and implemented under the 2002 grant of Fast Track authority. In that same period, more than one million additional workers were certified under TAA as having lost their jobs to offshoring or imports.³³

Rep. Alcee Hastings and the Tomato Trap

Failed agricultural deals swapped for trade votes also have a long history in Congress. During the NAFTA debate, the Clinton administration made several promises in order to obtain the votes of members from agricultural districts, including Florida representatives like Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-Fla.) who relied on such promises in voting for the controversial deal. For example, Clinton promised that the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) would take special actions to vigilantly monitor agricultural imports and take expedited action to guard against import surges by imposing safeguard measures such as new tariffs. At the time of the NAFTA debate, Florida vegetable growers were concerned that imports of Mexican-grown crops would devastate the state's \$4.8 billion winter agricultural sector.³⁴

One of the most infamous NAFTA agriculture deals concerned tomatoes, a major product in Hastings' district.³⁵ In a letter from the Clinton administration to the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association, the U.S. Trade Representative at the time promised that the USITC would monitor imports of Mexican vegetables and "*expedite* any request for relief under the fast track provisional relief procedures," which could provide safeguards to domestic farmers through tariffs.³⁶ Numerous Florida House Members relied on this promise – which was laid out in detail with new, special USITC Fast Track review and safeguard provisions – in deciding to support NAFTA.

The Clinton administration never fulfilled this promise. The USITC monitored the post-NAFTA surge of imported tomatoes and extensively documented the U.S. tomato industry's demise.³⁷ Before NAFTA, Florida had a \$700 million tomato industry with 250 growers; within two years of NAFTA's import surges, revenues had dropped to \$400 million with only 100 growers remaining.³⁸ Many Florida Democrats and Republicans were under political attack for their NAFTA "yes" votes as the Florida industry was decimated. Yet, the Clinton administration refused to take meaningful action based on the data.³⁹ After initially starting a process to impose countervailing tariffs in 1996 under pressure from Florida's tomato growers, the Clinton administration then changed course and signed an agreement with Mexico that allowed Mexico to continue to export tomatoes to the U.S. market so long as they were sold at an established reference price.⁴⁰ Subsequent investigations found that Clinton administration customs officials were not fully enforcing the reference price. Then, in 2002, Mexico briefly withdrew from the agreement altogether.⁴¹

In an example of the perils of taking a deal that can only deliver if its enforcement outlasts changes in presidents, the Bush administration was even less faithful to the Clinton administration's safeguard promise, as it took no action in response to the Florida tomato growers' and Florida state agricultural officials' continued allegations of dumping of tomatoes in the U.S. market by Mexico.⁴² Instead, it renewed the Clinton administration's agreement with Mexico twice.

While the Obama administration once again initiated the process to impose countervailing tariffs on imported tomatoes from Mexico in 2012 under continued protests from Florida's tomato growers, the administration halted the process in 2013 by signing yet another suspension agreement with Mexico. Today, imports of tomatoes from Mexico are up 247 percent since NAFTA's implementation.⁴³ Florida's tomato growers argue that the suspension agreements have failed. They have now filed a lawsuit to reinstate the countervailing tariff process that they, and Florida's members of Congress, were promised 22 years ago as a way to extract support for NAFTA.⁴⁴

Rep. Sam Farr and the Wilting of Cut Flower Promises

As with Florida's tomatoes, the Clinton administration promised to safeguard the California cut flower sector in effort to solicit the votes of California representatives like Rep. Sam Farr (D-Calif.). The administration added language to the NAFTA implementing legislation that directed the Agriculture Department to monitor Mexican flower import volumes, prices and quality.⁴⁵ Rep. Farr voted for NAFTA after receiving such assurances that the administration would monitor cut flower imports and protect against import surges.

The cut flower industry had been struggling for years trying to compete against unfair imports, but according to Lee Murphy of the California Cut Flower Council, instead of establishing prompt safeguards "NAFTA was like rubbing salt in the wound."⁴⁶ After NAFTA, the California Cut Flowers Council and the Floral Trade Council estimated that each year, 10 percent of U.S. producers were driven out of business by low-wage foreign competitors, particularly with the importation of Mexican roses.⁴⁷ Since NAFTA took effect, imports of cut flowers from Mexico and Canada have surged 148 percent.⁴⁸

After the administration's promise to protect against such a surge proved hollow, Rep. Farr voted against giving Clinton Fast Track in 1998. In explaining his decision, Rep. Farr said, "The President has the legal authority to stop the closure of American nurseries that raise fresh cut flowers. But he is not using that authority because he is listening to the State Department, rather than American workers."⁴⁹

When Fig Leaves Fail: Exposure to Voter Ire Unseats Deal-Makers

Members of Congress who, under the duress of intense lobbying, have cast controversial trade votes in exchange for empty promises of political cover have often found themselves with little protection from their constituents' ire. For some, the backlash has led to electoral defeat. Below we profile a few of the members of Congress whose careers have fallen victim to trade vote deals gone wrong.

Robin Hayes: The Man Responsible for CAFTA Loses to a Former Textile Worker

Former Rep. Robin Hayes (R-N.C.) was perhaps the most flagrant trade turncoat in Congress during the Bush administration, in addition to being the member of Congress most directly responsible for CAFTA's passage. Hayes provided the final vote to pass Fast Track in 2002, literally changing his "no" vote *on the floor* to a "yes," after telling his constituents he would oppose it. He reportedly did so in exchange for a pledge for more customs inspection for transshipped goods – a promised that never materialized.⁵⁰ That delegation of Fast Track gave President Bush blank check powers to sign CAFTA and send the done deal to Congress for a no-amendments, limited-debate vote.

Despite his vote for Fast Track, Hayes repeatedly announced his opposition to CAFTA in the lead-up to the CAFTA vote. Hayes' district, like many in North Carolina, had lost thousands of textile jobs under NAFTA.⁵¹ A week before the vote, Hayes stated that he was "flat-out, completely, horizontally opposed to CAFTA."⁵² But once again, Hayes initially voted "no" on CAFTA before switching his vote at the last minute to a "yes" at the behest of the House Republican leadership. Had he kept his vote a "no," the vote would have been a tie and CAFTA would not have passed.

In his press release explaining his last-minute switch, Hayes stated that the Bush administration had provided “assurances” that his concerns regarding textiles would be dealt with in an after-the-fact amendment to CAFTA.⁵³ While an amendment addressing some of Hayes’ narrow concerns was eventually implemented three years later,⁵⁴ it was not sufficient to prevent further textile industry job loss. Since Hayes’ decisive CAFTA vote, more than 8,000 jobs from his district have been certified under TAA as lost to offshoring or imports, many of them textile or apparel jobs. Hanesbrands, for example, decided to offshore textile and apparel production to CAFTA countries and lay off workers in Hayes’ district on five separate occasions in the two years following the CAFTA vote, resulting in job losses for 675 North Carolina workers.⁵⁵

Hayes’ double flip-flop on Fast Track and CAFTA sparked not only condemnation from his constituents, but swift vows to challenge Hayes at the polls. Tim Dunn, an Iraq War veteran and Democrat, filed to challenge Hayes days after the CAFTA vote. “He broke his promise to the people of the 8th Congressional District,” Dunn told reporters. “With NAFTA, fast-track and now with CAFTA, those are things that ... will severely hurt our jobs here.”⁵⁶

Larry Kissel, a former textile worker turned social studies teacher, also signed up to challenge Hayes based on his trade votes and ultimately ran against him as the Democratic candidate, stating “My district has been devastated by these trade agreements. My opponent was the deciding vote on both Fast Track and CAFTA. As someone who has worked in textiles for 27 years, nobody knows better than I do the difference that one vote makes.”⁵⁷ In 2006, despite running an underfunded campaign widely considered to be a long shot, Kissel narrowly lost to Hayes in one of the country’s closest elections (by 329 votes). In 2008, Kissel came back and decisively beat Hayes, ending his congressional tenure.⁵⁸

Matthew Martinez: The Man Who Sold His Vote for a Highway Loses His Job (and the Highway)

Former Rep. Matthew Martinez’ (D-Calif.) decision to sell his controversial vote for Fast Track to the Clinton administration in 1997 resembled a more standard pork-barrel deal. Martinez, who wanted federal approval for a freeway extension off of I-710 in his Los Angeles district, reportedly told a Clinton administration official, “Why should I vote for fast track when it’s like pulling teeth to get anything from (the President)?” Days later, Clinton personally called Martinez to tell him that the highway project was approved. One week later, Martinez voiced support for Fast Track, just in time for a planned vote.⁵⁹ Facing criticism for the apparent horse-trade from constituents who opposed Fast Track, Martinez said, “All I did was my job. What am I supposed to do as a congressman?”⁶⁰

In the end, the plan for a Fast Track vote in 1997 fizzled under broad congressional opposition.⁶¹ When Fast Track finally did come to a vote in 1998, Martinez still had not seen any action on his promised highway. He voted “present.”⁶²

Martinez’ constituents had had enough. They set out to recruit a primary challenger to knock him out of office. In March 2000, Martinez, an 18-year incumbent, faced a primary challenge from then-State Senator Hilda Solis. Solis ran a campaign that included repeated attacks on Martinez’ votes for trade policies harming the district, including his support for Fast Track in 1997. Martinez, who usually won by impressive margins, lost to Solis, 29 to 62 percent.⁶³

Martinez’ promised freeway extension was never built.⁶⁴

“The Misadventure of Tom Sawyer: How the Free Trade Issue Turned a Presumed Congressional Lifer into a Democratic Primary Loser”⁶⁵

The 2002 unseating of Rep. Tom Sawyer (D-Ohio), a seven-term Ohio Democrat, was one of that campaign cycle’s more high-profile examples of festering trade vote anger playing out in an incumbent’s defeat. Sawyer had voted repeatedly for trade agreements deeply opposed by his Akron constituents: NAFTA; the World Trade Organization (WTO); and in 2000, China PNTR (Permanent Normal Trade Relations). He repeatedly relied on deals with the administration to justify his “yes” votes.

For example, during the NAFTA debate, Sawyer, like many members of Congress, was concerned about pitting workers in his district against underpaid workers who endured labor abuses in Mexico. To assuage this concern, the Clinton administration negotiated a NAFTA labor side agreement, promising that it would guarantee that Mexico enforced basic labor standards, thereby raising labor costs in Mexico.⁶⁶ Sawyer touted the commission as a breakthrough that would raise labor standards in Mexico and thus counter the expected flood of imports from low-wage Mexican production. But the NAFTA labor commission received only a third of the \$2 million a year promised by the Clinton administration for its operation.⁶⁷ Even more, the terms of the side agreement were entirely unenforceable. Though labor law in Mexico was frequently flouted, the commission established by the side agreement did not order fines or remedial actions.⁶⁸

As the bankruptcy of Ohio’s manufacturing companies escalated, the deals and funds that Sawyer had claimed as “gains” obtained for his votes on NAFTA, the WTO, China PNTR and other trade deals never materialized. The China vote – and a canned pro-PNTR rally in the district with President Clinton – was the last straw.⁶⁹

A diverse local coalition set out to replace Sawyer with someone who would represent their interests. They recruited then 29-year-old State Senator Tim Ryan, who made opposition to retrograde trade deals a top campaign issue. Ryan flattened Sawyer by 41 to 28 percent.⁷⁰ The primary fulfilled the pledge by local union leaders demanding Sawyer oppose China PNTR after the abysmal record of the pacts he had supported. “People who vote the wrong way in this Congress are going to be punished this time around,” said Warren Davis, a United Auto Workers organizer in the region who attended the rally.⁷¹ Sawyer’s political demise became the subject of a case study, entitled “The Misadventure of Tom Sawyer: How the Free Trade Issue Turned A Presumed Congressional Lifer Into A Democratic Primary Loser,” spotlighting the perils of trade votes.⁷²

No-Deal Incumbents Who Lost Reelection over Unpopular Trade Votes

Of course, members who cast controversial trade votes do not jeopardize their political tenure *only* if they do so in exchange for an empty promise. Casting a “yes” vote on an unpopular pact with *no* promise of political cover can be just as costly as doing so with a promise of cover that is later broken. Indeed, recent election cycles have featured a bipartisan race to align campaign positions with the American public’s majority opposition to current U.S. trade policies and the job offshoring they cause. Many incumbents whose voting record contradicts that majority position have been unseated, including:

- **Howard Berman:** In 2012, Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.), who has a 100 percent fair-trade voting record and is a fair-trade leader in Congress, won an intense primary battle with then-House Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Howard Berman (D-Calif.). Trade was the only significant difference in the two candidates’ records and became the deciding issue for labor and other Democratic base groups siding with Sherman and putting millions in independent expenditures into the race in favor of Sherman. Berman had supported most trade pacts from NAFTA on. With labor and grassroots support, Sherman overcame a withering array of Berman endorsements, from the *Los Angeles Times* to scores of Democratic and GOP policymakers.⁷³
- **Phil English:** In 2008, Rep. Phil English (R-Pa.), who cast a deciding vote for CAFTA, was defeated in a campaign that focused on his trade betrayal. Kathy Dahlkemper (D-Pa.) beat English, a senior House Ways and Means Committee member and frequent practitioner of “bait-and-switch” tactics on trade who voted against CAFTA twice in committee, but supported it on the floor after a last-minute change of position. Dahlkemper’s successful campaign ran numerous paid trade ads highlighting English’s trade voting record and Dahlkemper’s commitment to change, assailed lack of import product safety and called for renegotiation of NAFTA and CAFTA.⁷⁴ That the vote was a repudiation of English’s trade vote record was spotlighted by the fact that Dahlkemper was only the third Democrat to win Pennsylvania’s third district since the late 1800s, and was defeated after one term by GOP candidate Mike Kelly.

A Sample Platter of Rotten Deals

After two decades of promises of political fig leaves, district goodies or policy pledges in exchange for “yes” votes on Fast Track and Fast-Track deals, one can predict the menu of options that the Obama administration and GOP congressional leaders may offer to current members of Congress in attempt to buy votes for the 2015 Fast Track. Below is a selection of promises that Fast Track proponents may be cooking up – promises that have consistently gone unfulfilled.

Presidential Political Damage Control?: President Obama has offered to provide electoral campaign backing for members of Congress who vote for Fast Track and face greater opposition in their district as a result. Implicit in this promise is that Fast Track is unpopular among voters, which begs the question of how an Obama campaign ad or appearance could save a representative once the damage of more Fast Tracked deals becomes apparent. President Clinton made similar promises, and in some instances he even followed through. But this did not save members of Congress whose constituents experienced job loss thanks to their “yes” votes on Fast-Track deals. For example, in 1997 Clinton paid a visit to Rep. Sawyer’s district, which was seen as a way to thank the Ohio Democrat for casting his unpopular vote for NAFTA.⁷⁵ But if the intent was to bolster voters’ support for Sawyer, it backfired. A broad-based

coalition of Ohio faith, environmental, labor and small business groups and activists who had been demanding Sawyer oppose Fast Track organized a protest of the Clinton visit. During meetings to prepare the Clinton protest, organizing efforts shifted toward unseating Sawyer – a goal that was reached in the 2002 Democratic primary when 29-year-old State Senator Tim Ryan beat Sawyer 41 to 28 percent.⁷⁶

Phantom Safeguards: From tomatoes to textiles, members of Congress have repeatedly been assured that the particular products critical to their districts would be protected from the import surges that frequently result from free trade agreements (FTAs). Presidents have personally promised members of Congress that they would strive to negotiate side agreements to phase out tariffs more slowly than actually stipulated in closed trade pacts, or that imports would be closely monitored and countervailing tariffs aggressively pursued. When these non-binding expressions of good will have failed to materialize, not just Reps. Aderholt, Farr and Hastings, but also many others,⁷⁷ have been left to face the resulting surge of imports and erosion of jobs with little recourse. They have learned a harsh truth that today's members of Congress need not relearn: once a vote has been sold, it cannot be repurchased.

Bridges to Nowhere: While not the most common form of quid-pro-quo for “yes” votes on controversial trade deals, some members of Congress have been offered federal approval or financing for in-district infrastructure projects, such as bridges or hospitals. Even if such promises are upheld, there's no assurance that constituents would welcome a new road as a sufficient substitute for thousands of lost jobs. Moreover, as Rep. Martinez and many other members enumerated in our previous trade-vote dealmaking reports⁷⁸ learned the hard way, promised pork may never materialize, even when promised by the president of the United States.

An Airplane Ride: The administration has been relatively unabashed about offering rides on Air Force One to members of Congress who the president is trying to coax into casting a “yes” vote for Fast Track. There can be little doubt that Air Force One offers a memorable ride. But when the wheels touch down again, sensible members of Congress will have to wonder whether a plane ride is really worth jeopardizing their political future, something Rep. Ami Bera (D-Calif.) will have to judge. As his 2014 re-election race tightened, Bera obtained massive on-the-ground support from hundreds of labor volunteers and millions in independent expenditures. He had committed in writing to oppose Fast Track, an issue that became central to whether labor would support him after being among few House Democrats who refused to sign a 2013 letter opposing Fast Track. Copies of his campaign questionnaire pledging opposition to all forms of Fast Track authority have been featured in the ads run against him already.

Labor Rights Lip Service: Since NAFTA, administration officials have created an arsenal of pledges to assuage congressional concerns that a pending controversial trade deal would pit U.S. workers against underpaid workers in countries with widespread labor rights violations. Since NAFTA, those pledges have been largely hollow. During the NAFTA debate, the Clinton administration promised Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) that it would issue an Executive Order extending the coverage of “Section 301” – the section of U.S. trade law that allows for trade benefits to be revoked for countries that fail to meet certain conditions – to include labor rights. The Executive Order would have provided teeth to NAFTA's weak labor side agreement because otherwise NAFTA would guarantee Mexico's trade benefits irrespective of its labor practices. But the Clinton Executive Order was never issued and NAFTA's labor side agreement remained unenforceable.⁷⁹

During the CAFTA debate, the Bush administration promised to provide funds for labor and environmental capacity building in the six CAFTA countries. The amount allotted was \$40 million per

year – a little more than \$6 million per country.⁸⁰ For perspective, a House transportation bill at the same time committed a little more than \$6 million for graffiti removal in the New York City metro area. The sum was clearly insufficient to substantially improve labor and environmental conditions for an entire country. While some CAFTA supporters like Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.) tried to use the tiny pledge as political cover (calling it “a very definite step in the right direction”),⁸¹ few would be fooled into thinking the pittance resolved labor abuses.

During the debate over the Colombia FTA, the Obama administration vaunted a Labor Action Plan, which some members of Congress used as cover to vote for the pact despite the fact that Colombia remained the world’s most dangerous country in which to be a unionist. But the plan was not part of the actual agreement, was not enforceable and has failed to halt labor rights abuses on the ground. In the four years since the “plan” took effect, more than 100 Colombian unionists have been assassinated and more than 1,300 have faced death threats.⁸²

Today for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Obama administration is once again promising that it has a plan to resolve concerns about the widespread labor abuses in TPP countries like Vietnam (where independent unions are banned)⁸³ and Malaysia (where forced labor is used).⁸⁴ Most members of Congress, having learned from experience, are not buying it. In May 2015, members of Congress emerged from a meeting with the administration feeling even less convinced that the TPP or any associated plan would meaningfully alter the systematic labor abuses in TPP countries.⁸⁵

A Mythical TAA Expansion: Members of Congress have been hearing promises of more money or an expanded scope for TAA since President George H. W. Bush was trying to rally votes for NAFTA. In 1992, as controversy over NAFTA grew, Bush proposed a \$4 billion-a-year NAFTA-related worker training program in addition to the existing non-NAFTA TAA program to calm congressional and public anxieties.⁸⁶ Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle touted this new program, as 102 Democrats and 132 Republicans voted for NAFTA⁸⁷ despite polls showing majority public opinion against NAFTA in the months leading up to the vote.⁸⁸ Though the NAFTA implementing legislation created the specific NAFTA-TAA program that Bush had suggested, it received miniscule funding. While President George H. W. Bush had calculated that such a NAFTA program alone would cost \$4 billion *per year* from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2002, the separate NAFTA-TAA *and* TAA programs were appropriated a total of \$3.08 billion dollars to cover a *seven-year* period.⁸⁹ The lion’s share of these funds went to the general TAA program, with NAFTA-TAA receiving only a fraction, leaving members of Congress who had used NAFTA-TAA as political cover thoroughly exposed.

Administrations have delivered similarly overblown promises about the potential expansion of the scope of TAA eligibility or the range of benefits to be covered in attempt to dispel members’ concerns about Fast Tracking job-displacing trade deals. The George W. Bush administration successfully used this tactic, as described above, to push for the 2002 Fast Track, which was paired with TAA legislation.

In the current Fast Track fight, the illusory promise of TAA expansion might be used again, despite the fact that the potential for increased TAA funding has already been all but exhausted. During Senate consideration of the bill, Senator Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) proposed an amendment that would have increased funding from its current level of \$450 million to its 2011 level of \$575 million.⁹⁰ The amendment was defeated, and it is unlikely that a parallel amendment in the House would be approved by the Republican majority (and even if it did, the difference between the two levels would need to be

worked out in conference). While promises of TAA expansion are generally suspect, given the history, such promises in the current context are completely baseless.

Conclusion

As the Obama administration resorts to dealmaking in attempt to overcome broad congressional opposition to Fast Track, members of Congress can take advantage of two decades of hindsight. Too often, members of Congress have had to learn the hard way that promises of political cover for unpopular trade votes will usually prove hollow, leaving one saddled with eroded jobs, angry constituents and a serious electoral liability. Members of Congress who are pressured in the coming days and weeks to sell their vote on Fast Track can instead take their cues from the 243 Democrats and Republicans who withstood such pressure in 1998, refused empty offers of political cover from an exiting president and voted down Fast Track.

Appendix: Terms and Outcomes of Past Trade Deals, 1992-2004*

From: Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, "Trade Wars: Return of the Myth, Votes for Trade Deals Gone Bad," June 2005. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/documents/tradewarsappendixII.pdf>.

Code: F = "policy fix" promise; P = "pork barrel" promise. A promise is considered a "policy fix promise" if its terms relate directly to mitigating or studying possible impacts of a proposed trade agreement.. "Pork barrel promises" relate to promises to fund programs or projects which have little to do with trade.

Summary:

Total Deals: 92

Percentage Unkept, Reversed or Meaningless: 82.6 %

POLICY

Total Policy Fix Deals: 64

Kept = 7

Other = 57

Percentage Unkept, Reversed, or Meaningless: 89 %

PORK

Total Pork Barrel Deals: 28

Kept = 9

Other = 19

Percentage Unkept, Reversed or Meaningless: 68 %

Member Whose Vote Was Sought	Trade Agreement	Terms of Deal	Outcome of Deal
Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and other Members of Congress ⁹¹	Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreements	IMMIGRATION LAW: The Bush administration promised not to make commitments to change U.S. immigration law in future trade talks to allow temporary entry of foreign workers. ⁹² (F)	Still in play. Bush administration officials have made comments at on-going WTO negotiations that suggest that they will entertain new ‘temporary entry’ rights for foreign workers in WTO service sector talks. ⁹³ This has led Judiciary Committee Chair Sensenbrenner and Ranking Member John Conyers (D-MI) to send a letter to the administration seeking a recommitment to the previous pledge.
Reps. Cass Ballenger (R-NC), Robin Hayes (R-SC), Sue Myrick (R-NC) and other Representatives with textile interests in their district	Fast Track 2001-2002	CUSTOMS INSPECTORS: The Bush administration promised to add 72 new customs inspectors to fight textile/apparel transshipment. (F)	Broken. Customs inspectors were never hired. The U.S. textile and apparel sector has lost 264,100 jobs since 2002 Fast Track approval, ⁹⁴ with as many as 46,828 jobs lost per year as a result of illegal textile transshipment. ⁹⁵
Rep. Jim DeMint (R-SC)	Fast Track 2001-2002	TEXTILE DYING AND FINISHING: In order to obtain DeMint’s tie-breaking vote on fast track, DeMint received a signed letter “promising Congressional action to make sure that apparel assembled in Caribbean Basin countries is made from fabric dyed, printed or finished in the United States to qualify for duty-free, quota-free treatment.” (F)	Kept. After some resistance from the House Ways and Means leadership, the final Fast Track legislation included provisions requiring U.S. dying and finishing in order to qualify for duty free treatment. However, many in the textile and apparel industry criticize DeMint for paying too high a price by giving the final vote that passed to Fast Track, which is likely to do more harm to the industry than the closed loophole is likely to help. ⁹⁶
Rep. Melissa Hart (R-PA), Rep. Bob Ney (R-OH) ⁹⁷ and other GOP Representatives from steel districts	Fast Track 2001-2002	STEEL SAFEGUARDS: The Bush administration promised to impose emergency tariffs on imported steel for a 3-year period, and provide funding for outstanding health care costs for steelworker retirees at bankrupt plants. (F)	Reversed. Emergency tariffs were imposed, but removed in 21 months after a successful WTO challenge brought by countries whose imports were affected. The Bush administration did not attempt to follow through on government funding for steel legacy costs. ⁹⁸

Reps. Mark Foley (R-FL), Adam Putnam (R-FL), Cliff Stearns (R-FL), Dave Weldon (R-FL) and other GOP Representatives from Florida	Fast Track 2001-2002	CITRUS II: The Bush administration promised to protect Florida citrus industry from citrus import surges from Latin America. (F)	In jeopardy. While Rep. Foley touted to reporters that this promise would have teeth, the provision was summarily dropped from the final version of the Fast Track bill in the Senate. The U.S. Trade Representatives' Office has confirmed that in future U.S. trade negotiations, including the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (which includes citrus super-exporter Brazil) that "nothing [is] off the table" – including citrus. ⁹⁹
Sens. Max Baucus (D-MT), Larry Craig (R-ID), and Representatives from Arkansas and Western states	Fast Track 2001-2002	SOFTWOOD LUMBER: The Bush administration promised to impose high tariffs on Canadian softwood lumber to protect U.S. softwood lumber against Canadian imports, which had surged since the March 2001 expiration of the Canadian Softwood Lumber Agreement. ¹⁰⁰ (F)	Reversed. NAFTA and WTO tribunals ruled in favor of Canada against U.S. tariffs and protection. ¹⁰¹
Rep. Sonny Callahan (R-AL) and 14 house members ¹⁰²	Fast Track 2001-2002	CATFISH LABELING: The Bush administration promised to support an effort to prohibit whiskered fish from Vietnam's Mekong Delta to be imported under the name "catfish," even though they are very similar to the species raised in farm ponds in the Mississippi Delta. ¹⁰³ (F)	Kept. The U.S. catfish industry was able to persuade Congress to pass legislation forbidding use of the label term "catfish" for similar species from Vietnam. Rep. Mike Ross (D-AR) has since noted that some Vietnamese seafood now is being labeled "Cajun Delight" or "Delta Fresh" in an effort to circumvent the rule. ¹⁰⁴
Reps. Sue Myrick (R-NC), Jim DeMint (R-SC), Cass Ballenger (R-NC), Richard Burr (R-NC), Henry Brown (R-SC), Michael Collins (R-GA) and Rob Portman (R-OH)	Fast Track 2001-02	PAKISTAN TEXTILE AND APPAREL QUOTA: Members of the Congressional Textile Caucus announced a Bush administration commitment to not increase Pakistan's market access in the U.S. textile and apparel market via an increase or reallocation in Pakistan's allocated textile and apparel quotas. ¹⁰⁵ (F)	Broken. In February 2002, the Bush administration raised some of Pakistan's textile quota allotments. The Bush administration claims it never made this promise in the first place. ¹⁰⁶
Reps. Mark Foley (R-FL), Adam Putnam (R-FL), and other GOP	Fast Track 2002	FLORIDA AG TASK FORCE: The Bush administration promised to start a Task Force on	Worthless. Putnam, who had voted against Fast Track in 2001, reversed his position and supported Fast Track in 2002. After the vote he proclaimed to reporters that the access to

Representatives from Florida		Florida Agriculture Trade, chaired by Putnam, to find new markets for Florida's agricultural products and to protect the industry in future trade negotiations. ¹⁰⁷ (F)	administration policymaking that the Citrus Task Force would provide was unparalleled. However, a March 2003 meeting of the Task Force with administration officials yielded no commitment to protect the Florida agriculture industry. In April 2004, Putnam was still asking for a commitment to take cuts in U.S. citrus tariffs off of the negotiating table. However, the USTR has stated that "nothing is off the table" – including citrus – for FTAA negotiations. ¹⁰⁸ As of April 2005, Putnam had not called a second meeting of the Task Force, and had no further commitment. ¹⁰⁹
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)	Fast Track 2001-02	CUBA TRADE: The Bush administration promised that Cuba will not obtain benefits from future U.S. trade policies. ¹¹⁰ (F)	Still in play. Congress is likely to expand some trade benefits to Cuba. It is unclear what the administration will do in response.
Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT), Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD), and 22 other Democratic Senators; ¹¹¹ Reps. Harold Ford, Jr. (D-TN), Jane Harman (D-CA), Rick Larsen (D-WA), Adam Smith (D-WA), and Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), and other Representatives concerned with displaced workers ¹¹²	Fast Track 2001-2002	TAA III: The Bush administration promised to reform TAA in order to offer health insurance credits and wage insurance supplements to trade-displaced workers. The administration also promised to expand the TAA program to cover service sector workers, including high tech workers, and workers in downstream secondary services related to manufacturing. ¹¹³ (F)	Broken. The language in the final Fast Track legislation did not extend TAA to high tech or most other service workers. Only "upstream" service workers directly linked to manufacturing were covered, such as plant custodians or sales staff, while downstream service workers, such as truck drivers delivering products, logistics and marketing staff, information technology staff and more, were excluded. ¹¹⁴ The final language on health insurance credits burdened unemployed workers with most of the costs of extending their coverage; in addition, the credits were designed in a manner that excluded many workers outright. Only 6 percent of the small category of eligible workers has signed up for the benefit because it is too costly for the unemployed worker and administratively hard to qualify for given the final Fast Track language. The final legislation only included a small pilot program to experiment with wage insurance supplements. However, no data is available about the status of this program. ¹¹⁵ Meanwhile, ongoing administrative problems with TAA have resulted in a string of cases in which the U.S. Court of International Trade found that TAA was improperly denied to workers. ¹¹⁶ Funding promises in the program also resulted in states such as Pennsylvania literally running out of TAA funds in the 2001-2003 fiscal years, although now in funding changes unrelated to any trade vote deal

Rep. Solomon Ortiz (D-TX)	Fast Track 2001-01	IMMIGRATION: The Bush administration promised that immigration staffing at U.S.-Mexican border bridges in Ortiz's district would be increased. (P)	change, this problem has been remedied. Unclear. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the government made a \$100 million dollar commitment to upgrade security facilities along the entire length of the Texas-Mexico border. It seems likely that this money would have been dispensed regardless of any promise made to Rep. Ortiz. ¹¹⁷
Rep. Bob Schaffer (R-CO)	Fast Track 2001-02	CDC LAB: The Bush administration promised \$10 million for a Center for Disease Control lab in Fort Collins. ¹¹⁸ (P)	Kept, more or less. While Schaffer's project was appropriated the promised monies, as of June 2005 construction on the project still has not begun. ¹¹⁹ Prior to this, Schaffer lost a GOP Senate primary to Adolf Coors in 2004, and Coors was subsequently defeated by now-Senator Ken Salazar.
Sens. Max Baucus (D-MT), Pat Roberts (R-KS), Trent Lott (R-MS), Tom Daschle (D-SD), Kent Conrad (D-ND), Paul Coverdell (R-GA), Tom Harkin (D-IA), Tim Johnson (D-SD), Bob Kerrey (D-IA), Blanche Lincoln (D-AR), Rick Santorum (R-PA), Charles Grassley (R-IA), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Connie Mack (R-FL), Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), Charles Robb (D-VA), and John Rockefeller (D-WV).	China PNTR	U.S. AGRICULTURE EXPORTS AND CHINA GMO REGULATION: The Bush administration promised to pressure the Chinese government to remove regulations on genetically modified organisms that were blocking U.S. agriculture exports. A majority of U.S. senators, including most members of the Senate Agriculture and Finance committees had written Chinese President Jiang Zemin, calling upon him to implement a bilateral U.S.-China sanitary and phytosanitary agreement signed in 1999, which was supposed to allow U.S. exports of citrus, meat, and Pacific wheat to enter the Chinese market unless a ban for animal or plant health reasons had a "sound science" basis. The Senators wrote that a Chinese commitment on this issue should "ensure the passage of PNTR for China." ¹²⁰ (F)	Kept, more or less, and then watered down in practice. China announced implementation of the bilateral agreement. However, a 2002 U.S. Chamber of Commerce report to Congress complained of China's adoption of measures that regulate the entry of imported genetically modified grains and oilseeds and corn into the Chinese market. According to the report, China's regulations implementing the bilateral agreement require safety certificates, without adequately spelling out how to get certificates or on what basis products would be excluded. ¹²¹ China also blocked U.S. exports of grain in 2001, citing concerns about Pacific Northwest wheat fungus, in violation of the Senate's understanding on this deal. ¹²²

Reps. Solomon Ortiz (D-TX) & Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)	China PNTR	GAS PIPELINE EIS EXPEDITION: The Clinton administration promised expedition of an EPA study of the impact of the proposed Longhorn gas pipeline in Southwest United States. (P)	Kept, but failed. While the promised study was released in Nov. 2000, six months after the China PNTR vote, the pipeline's operational start-up was far from expedited. The expedited release date for the study hinged on an August 2000 letter from the White House to the EPA mandating that the agency conduct <i>no further environmental impact assessments</i> . Environmental groups challenged the EPA findings in court, delaying the opening of the pipeline until 2005. ¹²³
Rep. Ken Bentsen (D-TX)	China PNTR	COMMISSION: The Clinton administration promised that the Department of Labor would establish a commission to study the impact of imports on the U.S. workforce (F)	Broken. President Clinton issued an Executive Order establishing a "Commission on Workers, Communities and Economic Change in the New Economy" shortly before leaving office, ¹²⁴ which was rescinded by President Bush in 2001 when he created the "21st Century Workforce Initiative," ¹²⁵ which hosts a series of Trade Expos on general retraining issues but is virtually unknown. No study of the impact on jobs from imports was ever completed. This was the second time that Rep. Bentsen received a deal that was never delivered regarding establishment of a presidential commission on workers in the new economy.
Reps. Doug Bereuter (R-NE), Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), John LaFalce (D-NY), Sander Levin (D-MI), Nita Lowey (D-NY), Karen Thurman (D-FL), John LaFalce (D-NY), Asa Hutchinson (R-AR), Tom Sawyer (D-OH) ¹²⁶ , and Dianna DeGette (D-CO), Jim DeMint (R-SC), ¹²⁷ and as many as dozens of others	China PNTR	COMMISSION: The Clinton administration promised to establish a high-level commission that would investigate China's compliance with human rights, trade rules and weapons proliferation measures. (F)	Delayed, then ineffective. The Levin-Bereuter language establishing such a commission was included in the China PNTR legislation. However, for two years thereafter, no funding was appropriated for the commission. Although the commission eventually was funded, it has not proved effective and Chinese human and labor rights conditions have deteriorated. ¹²⁸ Sawyer's vote in favor of China PNTR, following his support of NAFTA, WTO, and fast track resulted in an energetic effort by his constituents to replace him. The 16-year veteran was beaten in 2002 41 to 28 percent by then 29-year old State Senator Tim Ryan, now the Democratic Congressman for Ryan's former Akron, Ohio district.
Reps. Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX), Sheila Jackson Lee	China PNTR	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FUNDING II: The	Partially Kept. Rep. Meeks reported that he received some benefits under this proposal. However, according to the GAO, the actual

(D-TX), and Gregory Meeks (D-NY)		Clinton administration promised to create a “New Markets Initiative” which would extend tax credits to targeted poor, communities in order to promote investment and economic development. (P)	program that was established had such a small scope that it was unable to have much effect on promoting development. In addition, the tax credits may not be used by all of those who are eligible, and it is nearly impossible to determine whether the program has met its own vaguely defined objectives. ¹²⁹ Public Citizen efforts to contact the other offices for verification of program outcomes in their district were unsuccessful.
Rep. Martin Frost (D-TX)	China PNTR	ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN UP OF PLANT SITE: The Clinton administration promised that the U.S. Government would pay \$100-200 million to clean up pollution problems at a Northrup Grumman factory so operations would stay in Rep. Frost’s district. ¹³⁰ (P)	Broken. The U.S. Navy fought paying any money for 2 years, and eventually opted to pay only \$53 million in a settlement to the Dallas City Council, less than half of the projected cleanup costs. ¹³¹ While some of Northrup Grumman’s operations stayed in the Texas district, many more positions were moved to California. ¹³²
Rep. Michael Thompson (D-CA)	China PNTR	NEW ZIP CODE, PEST ERRADICATION: The Clinton administration promised to establish a new zip code designation for a wealthy suburb in Thompson’s district and promised to fight infestation of glassy winged sharpshooters, a pest threatening wineries in the Napa Valley. ¹³³ (P)	Kept. The new zip code became effective on July 1, 2000, and Vice President Al Gore declared emergency government action on the pest in June of the same year, providing \$22.3 million in aid to California. ¹³⁴
Rep. Robert Cramer (D-AL)	China PNTR	WEATHER STATION: The Clinton administration promised to keep a tornado warning station in his district. ¹³⁵ (P)	Kept. The Clinton administration supported Cramer’s battle in the appropriations process to obtain millions of dollars to modernize the Huntsville monitoring station. ¹³⁶
Rep. John Porter (R-IL)	China PNTR	VOA FUNDING: The Clinton administration promised extra funding for Voice of America’s Radio Free Asia. ¹³⁷ (P)	Kept. The extra funding was provided. However, given that White House budgets actually proposed more funding than promised in this deal, it seems the basis for the funding may have been an administration strategic decision separate from a direct response to this promise.
Reps. Earl Pomeroy (D-ND), Rick Hill (R-MT), and John Thune (R-SD)	Fast Track 1997**	CANADIAN WHEAT II: The Clinton administration made an array of promises to	Broken. For nearly eight years encompassing Republican and Democratic administrations and deals made over the same issue during several trade fights, no meaningful action has been taken on this or previous related

		investigate and sanction subsidized sales of durum wheat by the Canadian Wheat Board, which was viewed as subsidizing durum wheat imports using a variety of mechanisms that result in unfair competition with Northern Plains wheat. (F)	promises. While assorted investigations and negotiations were initiated with differing levels of seriousness, imposition of U.S. countervailing sanctions against Canadian durum wheat and hard red spring wheat in August 2003 was the first serious action taken. However, two NAFTA panels convened at Canada's request ruled in favor of Canada and against the U.S. policy action. In a parallel process, in 2004, a decade after NAFTA was signed, the United States obtained a split opinion at the WTO on a challenge initiated by the Bush administration on Canadian Wheat Board marketing policies, approving the Board's continued operation. ¹³⁸
Rep. Matthew Martinez (D-CA)	Fast Track 1997	FREEWAY RAMP: The Clinton administration promised to build a freeway extension off of I-710 in Martinez's district. ¹³⁹ (P)	Broken. A decade later, ramp construction is still in the "study" phase. ¹⁴⁰ Martinez was "primaried out" of office in a challenge by now-Rep. Hilda Solis, who in her campaign focused on Martinez' repeated votes in favor of trade agreements that were viewed as contrary to the district's interests. ¹⁴¹
Reps. Ken Bentsen (D-TX), Bob Clement (D-TN), Chet Edwards (D-TX), Harold Ford (D-TN), Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX), Darlene Hooley (D-OR), Steny Hoyer (D-MD), Bernice Johnson (D-TX), and Solomon Ortiz (D-TX) ¹⁴²	Fast Track 1997	TAA II: The Clinton administration promised \$4 billion in funding for Trade Adjustment Assistance, ¹⁴³ including over \$1 billion in <i>new monies</i> for TAA and NAFTA-TAA. (F)	Broken. By 2002, five years after the initial promise, TAA funding had only grown by 30 percent of the promised amount. ¹⁴⁴
Rep. Ken Bentsen (D-TX)	Fast Track 1997	COMMISSION: The Clinton administration promised to create a Presidential Commission on Workers and Economic Change to address the effect of changing technology on worker displacement. ¹⁴⁵ (F)	Broken. While an amendment was offered in a piece of House legislation to create the commission in 1999, ¹⁴⁶ it appears never to have been created and an extensive news search yields no commission activity. Indeed, five years later in the context of the China PNTR vote, Bentsen received another promise for this same unmet deal, which also never came to fruition.
Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-TX)	Fast Track 1997	MEXICAN-DOMICILED TRUCKS: The Clinton administration promised to expedite the opening of the U.S. border and U.S. roadways to Mexican-domiciled trucks. ¹⁴⁷ (F)	Broken. The Clinton administration did not open U.S. roads to Mexican-domiciled trucks, and in contrast took actions to halt border opening. The Bush administration issued regulations to provide access, which were challenged. A 2004 Supreme Court decision authorized the issuance of regulations. However, Mexican-domiciled trucks remain limited to travel within a limited border zone because the Mexican government opposes U.S.

			regulations requiring safety inspections of Mexican trucking companies' vehicles prior to receiving access to U.S. highways. ¹⁴⁸
Reps. Sanford Bishop (D-GA) and Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) and other Georgia lawmakers ¹⁴⁹	Fast Track 1997	PEANUTS II: The Clinton administration promised to protect the domestic peanut industry by taking into account its import sensitivity in future trade agreements. ¹⁵⁰ (F)	Broken. The Clinton administration implemented policy changes that continued the phase-out of restrictions on imports of peanuts. ¹⁵¹ Peanut imports rose to a record high in the late 1990s through 2002, when the number of peanut farmers in Georgia declined from about 6,000 farmers in 1995 to about 4,000 by 2002. Nationally, there was a decline of about 18,000 farmers to 12,000 farmers during the same period. ¹⁵²
Rep. Michael Bilirakis (R-FL)	Fast Track 1997	PERISHABLE AG GOODS: The Clinton administration promised "consultations" with Congress before beginning future trade negotiations on "perishable agricultural products" or cutting tariffs in this sector. ¹⁵³ (F)	Meaningless. Because Fast Track was ultimately defeated, the Clinton administration was constitutionally required to go through the normal, non-Fast Track procedure of seeking Congressional approval and mark-up for trade deals until Fast Track was obtained by President Bush in 2002.
Rep. Porter Goss (R-FL) and other Representatives from Florida	Fast Track 1997	TOMATOES III: The Clinton administration promised to more vigorously enforce a 1996 U.S.-Mexico agreement that would allow Mexico to export tomatoes into the U.S. market, so long as these exports were sold at a U.S.-government established reference price. ¹⁵⁴ (F)	Broken. Investigations found that Clinton administration customs officials were not enforcing the reference price on certain growers from Sinaloa. Then, in 2002, Mexico briefly withdrew from the agreement altogether. ¹⁵⁵ In an example of the perils of taking a deal that can only deliver if its enforcement outlasts changes in Presidential administrations, the Bush administration has refused to take action on the Florida tomato growers' and Florida state agricultural officials' continued allegations of tomato dumping in the U.S. market by Mexico. ¹⁵⁶ Total tomato imports into the U.S. grew by 137 percent from 1994 to 2003, ¹⁵⁷ while the number of tomato farmers in Florida shrank from 250 tomato farmers in 1994 to only 100 today. ¹⁵⁸
Reps. E. Clay Shaw Jr. (R-FL) and Peter Deutsch (D-FL)	Fast Track 1997	CUSTOMS INSPECTORS: The Clinton administration promised to add 50 customs inspectors for Florida's cruise ship piers. ¹⁵⁹ (F)	Broken. An attempt to provide funding for the inspectors was attached to legislation granting Clinton Fast Track trade negotiating authority. When that bill was withdrawn, Rep. Shaw was forced to draft emergency legislation and introduce it as a stand-alone bill in order to cover the cost of the customs inspectors. ¹⁶⁰
Rep. Sonny Bono (R-CA)	Fast Track 1997	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELLING II: The Clinton administration promised to require that perishable imported foods	Broken. The Clinton administration did not take action on this promise. While the 1930 Tariff Act requires country-of-origin labeling in theory, its exemptions are so broad as to render it meaningless. The 2002 Farm Bill was

		be labeled with their country of origin. This measure was designed to calm domestic avocado farmers worried by the threat of pests, which could potentially cripple their business, posed by the importing of Mexican avocados. ¹⁶¹ (F)	supposed to phase in mandatory country-of-origin labeling for fruits, vegetables, meats, peanuts, and other products, but this was delayed by the Bush administration until at least 2006. ¹⁶²
Rep. Sonny Bono (R-CA)	Fast Track 1997	SALTON SEA: The Clinton administration promised to seek an environmental engineering solution to severe problems with California's polluted Salton Sea. President Clinton also promised to visit the site in 1998. ¹⁶³ (P)	Broken. H.R. 3267, a measure to conduct a feasibility study and construct a project to rehabilitate the Salton Sea, was passed in 1998. However, the study was so woefully inadequate that the Sierra Club sued the investigating agency. ¹⁶⁴ Clinton never visited the Salton Sea. ¹⁶⁵
Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC)	Fast Track 1997	TAX BREAK: The Clinton administration promised to reinstate a tax break that allows homeowners to rent their primary residence tax-free for the first fortnight, a measure geared to benefit homeowners in Coble's district who rent out their homes for an annual furniture show. ¹⁶⁶ (P)	Broken. According to Rep. Coble's office, his constituents had to fight against the Clinton administration efforts to close this loophole every year. According to Coble's office, the Bush administration supports the tax break, and his constituents no longer have to fight to keep this short-term rental arrangement tax-free. ¹⁶⁷
Sens. William Roth (R-DE), Thomas Daschle (D-SD), and Chuck Grassley (R-IA); Rep. Earl Pomeroy (R-ND), and other representatives with farm interests ¹⁶⁸	Fast Track 1997	AG EXPORT BARRIER REMOVAL: The Clinton administration promised to put into effect a new policy to identify by name countries with "egregious" barriers to any U.S. agricultural exports through the "Section 301" process, expanding on existing requirements that mandated only the naming of countries with barriers against value-added agricultural products. ¹⁶⁹ (F)	Broken. The Senate Bill, S.219, became S.2400 (105 th Congress), and died in committee.
Sen. Thomas	Fast Track 1997	MEAT LABELING: The Clinton administration promised support for a	Meaningless. Countries could have always labeled their country-of-origin voluntarily – the

Daschle (D-SD)		voluntary country-of-origin labeling regime for imports of meat into the U.S. market. ¹⁷⁰ (F)	issue is whether there is any mandatory program that verifies these claims. As of 2005, Congressional appropriations for country-of-origin labeling for beef have been postponed until at least 2007. ¹⁷¹
Rep. Bob Etheridge (D-NC)	Fast Track 1997	TOBACCO: The Clinton administration promised to take into account the interests of farmers in administration tobacco policy. “Clearly we have indicated that protecting tobacco farmers as part of any tobacco settlement [on tobacco companies' liability for states' medical costs], is very important to us,” then-Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman told reporters. ¹⁷² (P)	Worthless. The most significant tobacco policy change, the Master Settlement, was negotiated between cigarette companies and U.S. states, outside the control of the Clinton administration. This agreement did include a compensation mechanism for growers (\$5.15 billion to growers over 12 years). ¹⁷³ However, the number of farms growing tobacco in the United States fell by 39 percent during the 5-year period 1997-2002, by far the greatest percentage decline in the past 50 years. ¹⁷⁴
Rep. Tom Sawyer (D-OH) ¹⁷⁵ , Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX), and Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) ¹⁷⁶	Fast Track 1997	CLINTON MEET & GREET: President Clinton promised to visit the Ohio and Texas home districts of Reps. Sawyer, Hinojosa, and Jackson Lee, in order to show his thanks for their support on the failed Fast Track attempt. (P)	Kept, with unintended consequences. A broad-based coalition of Ohio faith, environmental, labor and small business groups and activists who had been demanding Sawyer oppose fast track organized a protest of the Clinton visit. This organizing effort shifted towards unseating Sawyer during meetings to prepare the Clinton protest. The 16-year veteran was beaten in 2002 41 to 28 percent by then 29-year old State Senator Tim Ryan, now the Democratic Congressman for Ryan's former Akron, Ohio district.
Rep. George Radanovich (R-CA)	Fast Track 1997	WINE II: The Clinton administration promised to fight to open foreign markets to U.S. wine, particularly in a U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement. ¹⁷⁷ (F)	Kept, but worthless. The Clinton administration did not succeed in completing an FTA with Chile. A Chile FTA was implemented by the Bush administration in 2003 which included tariffs cuts for U.S. wine. However, U.S. export sales of wine to Chile remain far below pre-agreement highs. ¹⁷⁸
Rep. George Radanovich (R-CA)	Fast Track 1997	PEACHES: The Clinton administration promised to take action on European Union subsidies for peaches and canned fruit. ¹⁷⁹ (F)	Broken. Under the Clinton administration, the USTR ignored Radanovich's appeals to deal with the problem as promised. ¹⁸⁰ Thus far, neither the Clinton nor Bush administrations have brought a WTO challenge against the EU on the subsidies despite a 1999 USDA report finding EU support for canned peaches was 10-15 times higher than U.S. levels. ¹⁸¹

Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX)	Fast Track 1997	COMMISSION: The Clinton administration promised to establish a presidential task force to monitor “housing, labor and environmental conditions” along the Mexican border. ¹⁸² (F)	Reversed. An Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border was created in 1999, ¹⁸³ but dissolved when President Bush came into office. Environmental conditions along the U.S.-Mexico border continue to deteriorate at rapid rates. ¹⁸⁴
Rep. Solomon Ortiz (D-TX)	Fast Track 1997	BRIDGE: The Clinton administration promised to fund an international cross-border bridge in Brownsville, Texas. ¹⁸⁵ (P)	Unclear. On April 30, 1999 the Veterans International Bridge at Los Tomates opened, connecting Brownsville, Texas and Matamoros, Mexico. ¹⁸⁶ However, Cameron County was entirely responsible for paying for the bridge itself, a cost of \$16 million. The federal government contributed only \$20 million (for things like customs inspection, border security, etc.) of the \$68 million total cost. ¹⁸⁷
Reps. Ken Bentsen (D-TX), Chet Edwards (D-TX), Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX), Bernice Johnson (D-TX), and Solomon Ortiz (D-TX) ¹⁸⁸	Fast Track 1997	U.S.-MEXICO BORDER OFFICE: The Clinton administration promised to provide \$250 million towards an Office of Community and Economic Adjustment to better coordinate NADBank activities. (F)	Broken. The office was never created. ¹⁸⁹
Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO)	Fast Track 1997	STATEMENT: The Clinton administration promised to issue a statement that trade is important to national security. ¹⁹⁰ (F)	Kept, but meaningless. The Clinton administration regularly linked trade to national security issues well before this promise, so the “deal” itself had no real effect.
Rep. Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX)	Fast Track 1997	WATER TREATMENT FACILITY: The Clinton administration promised to push through a water treatment facility for McAllen, Texas, and Reynosa, Mexico. (P)	Unclear. A McAllen Northwater Plant already existed by 1995 ¹⁹¹ and an expansion of the facility began in 1998. ¹⁹² Hinojosa’s office did not know whether the projects were a result of the Fast Track promise. ¹⁹³
Rep. Brian Bilbray (R-CA)	Fast Track 1997	AUTOMOBILE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: The Clinton administration promised to support legislation (HR 8 in the 105th Congress) that would require cars crossing the Mexican and	Meaningless. The bill passed unanimously and had not been subject to opposition by the Clinton administration, thus no further commitment had been needed to avoid a veto or obtain the President’s signature on this legislation. The legislation that was passed was quite weak only applying to California until other states opt-in. ¹⁹⁵

		Canadian borders to meet tighter environmental standards. ¹⁹⁴ (F)	
Reps. William Baker (R-CA), Brown (D-CA), Anne Eshoo (D-CA), Richard Lehman (D-CA), Norm Mineta (D-CA), Richard Pombo (D-CA), and Ed Royce (R-CA) ¹⁹⁶	NAFTA	WINE I: The Clinton administration promised to accelerate the reduction of Mexican tariffs provided for under NAFTA on U.S. exported wine. (F)	Broken. Cuts on Mexican tariffs on California wine were not accelerated, and Mexico enacted duties on wine during 1998 in a retaliatory measure against U.S. safeguards on broomcorns. ¹⁹⁷
Reps. John Spratt (D-SC), Herbert H. Bateman (R-VA), Howard Coble (R-NC), George Darden (D-GA), Nathan Deal (D-GA), E.G. Hefner (D-NC), Don Johnson (D-GA), Blanche Lambert (D-AR), Marilyn Lloyd (D-TN), J. Roy Rowland (D-GA), and John S. Tanner (D-TN)	NAFTA	EXTENSION OF TEXTILE-APPAREL MFA QUOTA PHASE-OUT: The Clinton administration promised that in on-going GATT Uruguay Round negotiations (which established the WTO), it would seek an extension in the phase-out of the global textile quota system by five years so that the Multi-fiber Arrangement would sunset in 2010 rather than the 2005 date then proposed. (F)	Broken. Clinton administration negotiators agreed to the original 2005 phase-out date weeks after NAFTA passed in 1993, making this the first NAFTA deal-for-votes promise to be broken. The Multi-fiber Arrangement was phased-out on January 1, 2005 as originally scheduled. In the months since the end of quotas, which had allocated set percentages of the U.S. textile and apparel market to the imports of an array of developing countries, Chinese textile and apparel imports have jumped 45 percent for the period Jan- April 2005, compared to the same period a year before. Imports of apparel increased 105 percent, and certain categories have seen increases in the thousands. For example, imports of cotton trousers from China have increased 1,500 percent. ¹⁹⁸ The George W. Bush administration has put into place certain emergency safeguards which are allowed for only three years under the terms of the U.S.-China bilateral agreement setting terms for China's WTO accession. Since NAFTA's implementation, 851,500 U.S. jobs have been lost in the textile and apparel sectors. ¹⁹⁹
Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX)	NAFTA	MILITARY PLANES: The Clinton administration promised to order two C-17 military cargo planes. The factory assembling C-17s was located in Rep. Johnson's district. (P)	Fake. Demand for new C-17's was growing consistently at the time, resulting in Pentagon orders for Rep. Bernice Johnson's district, as well as for factories in other Congressional districts that had capacity. Since the Pentagon purchases from companies were based on a competitive bidding process, Clinton would have been unable to "promise" the Representative that an order would be placed in her district. The administration and Congress had already decided to build the two addition planes regardless of whether or not Rep. Johnson voted for NAFTA. ²⁰⁰
Representatives from Florida. The	NAFTA	TOMATOES, PEPPERS, FLORIDA WINTER	Broken. A significant surge in tomato and pepper imports from Mexico started

following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL), Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL), Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)		VEGETABLES II, Part I: The Clinton administration promised to “take the necessary steps to ensure that the USTR and the ITC take prompt and effective action to protect the U.S. vegetable industry against price-based import surges from Mexico.” This system was to be “enforceable and effective,” and included specific commitments that the ITC would monitor imports of tomatoes and peppers and that the administration would impose safeguards measures against import surges. (F)	immediately after NAFTA went into effect. The ITC conducted annual investigations documenting the import flood and the demise of Florida’s \$4.8 billion winter vegetable industry. However, the Clinton administration took no action to implement safeguards despite compelling ITC data showing that such actions were called for under U.S. trade safeguard law and compatible with NAFTA’s surge protection provisions. In 1996, the Clinton administration inked a meaningless “agreement” on vegetable imports with Mexico. Total tomato imports into the United States from Mexico grew by 137 percent from 1994 to 2003, and Florida shrank from 250 tomato farmers in 1994 to only 100 today, while the winter vegetable industry lost \$1 billion in sales revenues, and 300 Florida winter vegetable operations have gone out of business.²⁰¹ NAFTA’s safeguard provisions are “totally ineffectual” for perishable commodities, according to a growers’ representative interviewed by <i>Inside U.S. Trade</i>. NAFTA’s tariff-rate quotas, which set a volume limit on imports beyond which tariffs are charged at pre-NAFTA rates, cannot be activated until “the damage is done” for commodities such as tomatoes, he said. In addition, the safeguard for perishable commodities written into NAFTA’s implementing legislation, which expedites consideration by the International Trade Commission under Sections 201 and 202 of the 1974 trade act, is “totally ineffective as a safety valve” for industries overrun by surges of imports from Mexico, the tomato representative said. He noted that it did not work because the way that particular U.S. law is structured makes it “virtually impossible” for the ITC to find injury to the domestic industry, as was evidenced in a case brought two years ago by the U.S. tomato and pepper industries.²⁰²
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL),	NAFTA	TOMATOES, PEPPERS, FLORIDA WINTER VEGETABLES II, Part II:	Kept. In 1995, a pilot program was jointly launched by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Department of Defense to allow state departments of agriculture to use the military’s pre-existing commissary distribution system to increase state school

Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL). Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)		The Clinton administration promised that the U.S. Agriculture Dept. would seek to establish a distribution program for the U.S. school lunch program that is favorable to fresh fruit and vegetables. As structured at the time, the distribution system favored canned or juiced vegetables, which Florida largely does not produce.²⁰³ (F)	systems' access to fresh fruit and produce. Industry sources consider the program, called DOD Fresh, to be wildly successful, and Congress recently doubled the programs' budget.²⁰⁴
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL), Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL). Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)	NAFTA	TOMATOES, PEPPERS, FLORIDA WINTER VEGETABLES II, Part III: The Clinton administration committed to supporting passage of a then-pending "Minor-Use Pesticide Act," which would benefit small crop producers.²⁰⁵ (F)	Broken. This bill – H.R. 967 (103rd Congress) - died in committee.
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL), Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL).	NAFTA	TOMATOES, PEPPERS, FLORIDA WINTER VEGETABLES II, Part IV: The Clinton administration committed to supporting full funding for the relocation of a research lab of the Agricultural Research Service from Orlando to	Kept. The laboratory relocated in 1997,²⁰⁷ and expanded its research agenda so that it now studies various factors affecting winter vegetables grown in Florida.²⁰⁸

Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)		Fort Pierce, Florida. Accompanying the move would be a commitment to expand the research agenda to include research on pests and other factors affecting winter vegetables grown in Florida. ²⁰⁶ (F)	
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL), Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL). Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)	NAFTA	TOMATOES, PEPPERS, FLORIDA WINTER VEGETABLES II, Part V: The Clinton administration promised that the United States would not agree in the Uruguay Round global trade talks at the GATT to cut U.S. tariffs for tomatoes, celery, head lettuce, green peppers and sweet corn by more than 15 percent. In addition, the Clinton administration promised not to allow any new countries to export those crops to the U.S. duty-free under the Generalized System of Preferences, according to congressional and industry sources.²⁰⁹ (F)	Meaningless. The agreement applied only to imports allowed under the GATT and General System of Preferences, but did not apply to imports negotiated under regional or bilateral agreements, under which U.S. negotiators repeatedly placed every commodity on the table and made cuts. ²¹⁰
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL), Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston	NAFTA	TOMATOES, Part VI: The Clinton administration promised to phase-out tariffs on tomatoes under NAFTA over a 10-year adjustment period. (F)	Compromised. Actual tomato tariffs were phased-out as scheduled in 2004. However, the Mexican peso devaluation of 40 percent in 1994 effectively resulted in a phase-out of tomato tariffs in 1995. Despite urgent demand to take compensatory action, the Clinton administration refused to do so.

(D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL). Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)			
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL), Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL). Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)	NAFTA	CITRUS I, Part I. The Clinton administration promised to obtain greater market access for Florida citrus products in Mexico. (F)	Broken. While overall U.S. citrus exports to Mexico more than tripled under NAFTA, it was through no additional promised actions of the Clinton administration that this occurred. ²¹¹ In fact, a U.S. Department of Agriculture report from 2002 found that the Mexican sanitary and phytosanitary standards the citrus industry was targeting still amounted to a considerable barrier to trade. ²¹² ²¹³ On balance, citrus industry groups say that, “NAFTA encouraged under-priced imports, which contributed directly to the erosion of U.S. processing orange prices and grower earnings. [...] This damage occurred without any counterbalancing positive effects on U.S. orange juice exports.” ²¹⁴
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL), Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL). Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)	NAFTA	CITRUS I, Part II: The Clinton administration pledged to limit the cuts in U.S. tariffs on citrus imports in the Uruguay Round of global trade talks to 15 percent, and also promised that no new U.S. trading partners would be allowed in the future to sell fresh or processed citrus products into the U.S. duty-free under the Generalized System of Preferences program. ²¹⁵ (F)	Meaningless. This agreement applies only to imports allowed under the GATT and General System of Preferences, and does not apply to imports negotiated under regional or bilateral agreements, under which U.S. negotiators have repeatedly said that every commodity is on the table. ²¹⁶
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL),	NAFTA	CITRUS I, Part III: The Clinton administration promised to incorporate into NAFTA a safeguard mechanism	Broken. According to industry sources, “Despite the natural, currency and competitive difficulties Mexican producers have faced, U.S. imports of frozen orange juice from Mexico have still exceeded the NAFTA tariff

Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL). Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)		for frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ), which would allow U.S. tariffs to be increased if Mexican juice imports surged beyond a certain volume, causing lower prices for U.S. juice producers.²¹⁷ (F)	rate quota in every year, except 2001. Thus, Florida orange growers have still had to contend with significant volumes of orange juice from Mexico. However, U.S. growers are not nearly as concerned about the volume of imports from Mexico as they are about the price effects of those imports. As U.S. tariffs on Mexican juice are being gradually phased down, the unit price of orange juice imports from Mexico has continued to fall. In 2002, the average landed, duty-paid value per liter of bulk FCOJ imports from Mexico was 25 percent less than the average during the 5 years prior to NAFTA implementation (1989-1993), as compared to the above-referenced 31percent reduction in the Brazilian price resulting from the URA tariff reductions.”²¹⁸
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL), Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL). Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)	NAFTA	CITRUS I, Part IV: The Clinton administration promised to amend Section 201 of U.S. trade law to allow imports of all types of citrus juice from non-NAFTA countries to qualify as perishable produce, and thus merit expedited consideration of industry complaints by the International Trade Commission.²¹⁹ (F)	Meaningless. While Section 201 was expanded to cover “perishable products and citrus products” (technically in violation of the promise to classify citrus products as “perishable products”),²²⁰ Florida’s citrus industry representatives have regularly deemed these protections inadequate.²²¹ As mentioned above for winter vegetables, agricultural sectors consider the “perishable” product provisions of U.S. trade law to be inadequate and unenforceable.²²²
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL), Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E.	NAFTA	FOOD IMPORT INSPECTION: The Clinton administration promised to increase inspections of imported food if there was a significant increase in imports from Mexico. (F)	Broken. While the volume of agricultural imports from Mexico grew by nearly 50 percent between 1995 and 2004, the rate of inspection on imported food from Mexico has remained roughly the same as pre-NAFTA levels. It is difficult to obtain detailed information about most forms of inspections of imported food conducted by the government. One form of inspection, however, is the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service’s Foreign Equivalency Audits, where USDA officials go abroad to examine conditions in meat and poultry facilities that are certified to

Clay Shaw (R-FL). Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)			export to the United States. While meat and poultry imports from Mexico have grown 60 percent in the 2000-2004 period, ²²³ equivalency audits have maintained constant at either around 12 or 24 site inspections a year. ²²⁴ Current Bush administration policy is to decrease the number of inspections per level of imports. ²²⁵
Representatives from Florida. The following Reps. voted for NAFTA: Tom Lewis (R-FL), Dan Miller (R-FL), Bill Young (R-FL), Bill McCollum (R-FL), Porter Goss (R-FL), Harry Johnston (D-FL), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), E. Clay Shaw (R-FL). Sam Gibbons (D-FL), and Carrie Meek (D-FL)	NAFTA	METHYL BROMIDE: The Clinton administration promised that there would be no restrictions on the use or manufacture of methyl bromide (a chemical tomato growers used for soil and post-harvest fumigation which was listed for phase-out as an ozone depleting chemical) until 2000 and to provide “full funding” for research to develop “satisfactory alternatives.” (P)	Compromised. By 1999, a year ahead of the promised schedule, the administration agreed to a 25 percent reduction in the use of methyl bromide, in violation of the initial 1993 promise. ²²⁶ While the government has invested in research into methyl bromide alternatives, environmental groups say that industry has undermined efforts to come to definitive conclusions on the phasing-in of alternatives to the chemical. ²²⁷
Rep. Sam Farr (D-CA)	NAFTA	CUT FLOWERS: The Clinton administration promised to safeguard the California cut flower sector. Specific commitments included a promise that the ITC would monitor imports and that the administration would impose safeguards measures against import surges. (F)	Broken. A significant surge in cut flowers from Mexico began shortly after NAFTA went into effect. The ITC conducted investigations documenting the surge in imports and detailing the demise of California’s cut flower industry. However, the Clinton administration took no action to implement safeguards despite compelling ITC data that would support such actions under U.S. law as well as show such actions to be compatible with NAFTA’s safeguard provisions.
Reps. Bill Sarpalius (D-TX), Bill Brewster (D-OK), ²²⁸ and Glenn English (D-OK)	NAFTA	CANADIAN WHEAT I: The Clinton administration promised that it would pressure the Canadian Wheat Board to eliminate wheat subsidies and protect the U.S. durum wheat industry. (F)	Broken. For nearly ten years encompassing Republican and Democratic administrations, no meaningful action was taken on this promise, which has been traded for votes on several trade bills. In 2004, a decade after NAFTA was signed, the United States obtained a split opinion at the WTO on a challenge initiated by the Bush administration on Canadian Wheat Board marketing policies that allows for the continued operation of the Canadian Wheat

			Board.
Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-MI), and Representatives from California, Washington and other states	NAFTA	ASPARAGUS: The Clinton administration promised to ensure that “asparagus farmers remain competitive under NAFTA.” (F)	Broken. Asparagus imports from Mexico grow by 55 percent from 1995 to 2004. The Clinton administration took no actions, despite ITC data that would have supported use of U.S. safeguards measures allowed under NAFTA. Import surges have contributed to a 55 percent reduction in production in Washington State alone since 1991.
Representatives in districts with trucking industry interests	NAFTA	TRUCK LENGTH RULES: The Clinton administration promised that it had obtained Mexico’s commitment to allowing U.S. trucking industry-preferred 53 foot trailers on Mexican roads. (F)	Delayed. The administration did not make this commitment a priority. Seven years passed before the 2000 change in Mexican policy allowing 53-foot trailers.
Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA), Rep. Fred Grandy (R-IA), Neal Smith (D-IA), and other Iowa Representatives	NAFTA	APPLIANCE TARIFF CUT ACCELERATION: The Clinton administration promised to push Mexico to accelerate reductions on tariffs on U.S.-made appliances, due to members’ interest in supporting Maytag, Amana and Frigidaire companies. (F)	Broken. The Clinton administration did not push for or obtain accelerated tariff cuts for such refrigerators and clothes-washers, for which there is significant demand in Mexico. Some accelerated tariff reductions were obtained for dishwashers and clothes-dryers, two goods for which industry sources say there is no Mexican market. ²²⁹
Rep. Dave Hobson (R-OH), and Representatives from Texas and Oklahoma with flat glass industry interests	NAFTA	FLAT GLASS TARIFF CUT ACCELERATION: The Clinton administration promised to push Mexico to accelerate tariff reductions for U.S. flat glass imports. (F)	Broken. When the Clinton administration raised this proposal, the Mexican government was unwilling to discuss it. Accelerated tariff reductions were not obtained. ²³⁰ Indeed, Mexico increased tariffs on U.S. flat glass imports for several years after NAFTA was signed in retaliation for U.S. raising tariffs on broomcorn brooms after a safeguard case. ²³¹
Representatives with Brussels sprouts interests in their districts	NAFTA	BRUSSEL SPROUTS: The Clinton administration promised to expedite a tariff-quota snapback if Mexican Brussels sprouts imports	Broken. The U.S. industry characterizes the promised snapback as “total failure.” Mexican Brussels sprouts were dumped on U.S. market, but the promised interventions were not timely. Total Brussels sprouts imports from Mexico soared several hundred percent between 1995

		negatively affected U.S. producers. (F)	and 2004.
Rep. Sam Farr (D-CA)	NAFTA	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELLING I: The Clinton administration promised to vigorously enforce U.S. country-of-origin labeling requirements for imports of frozen produce, requiring that such labels be prominent and on the front of packages. (F)	Broken. The Clinton administration did not act on this promise. While the 1930 Tariff Act requires country-of-origin labeling in theory, its exemptions are so broad as to make it meaningless. The 2002 Farm Bill was supposed to phase in mandatory country-of-origin labeling for fruits, vegetables, meats, peanuts, and other products, but this has already been delayed until at least 2006. ²³²
Rep. Howard McKeon (R-CA)	NAFTA	HIGHWAY FUNDS; The Clinton administration promised to secure federal highway funds for an interchange on Highway 126 linking the Golden State freeway and Antelope Valley Freeway. (P)	Broken. The Clinton administration did not deliver on this promise. A decade later, this interchange has still not been built.
Representatives with sugar, corn or HFCS processing in their districts	NAFTA	SUGAR: The Clinton administration negotiated a NAFTA side letter that it claimed would alter core NAFTA rules regarding sugar imports. The side letter stated that Mexico could only export sugar into the U.S. market if Mexico's sugar production exceeded its domestic sugar <i>and</i> high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) consumption, thereby giving Mexico an incentive to consume more HFCS, and making it much harder for sugar importing interests to import sugar into the U.S. market. The original NAFTA text had a formula that only counted	In jeopardy. Although the side letter was contained in the U.S. implementing legislation, it was not approved by the Mexican government. The Mexican government disputed the legal relevance and meaning of the side letter, arguing that it had the right to import sugar under NAFTA's original terms. When the United States capped sugar imports according to the U.S. version of the sugar formula, Mexico retaliated by launching an anti-dumping measure against U.S. exports of HFCS into the Mexican market. When a WTO panel ruled that this was inconsistent with Mexico's WTO obligations, Mexico imposed a tax on the sale of drinks containing HFCS, thereby penalizing U.S. exporters of HFCS. ²³³ The United States is currently pursuing a WTO case against Mexico for this tax, so far with no progress. ²³⁴ The U.S. Trade Representative's office has indicated that it may be abandoning the original U.S. interpretation of the side letter, putting further uncertainty on whether this NAFTA promise will stand the test of time. ²³⁵ While U.S. sugar interests were protected

		sugar consumption as an import trigger. (F)	under NAFTA's tariff rate quota for sugar, CAFTA and other trade deals down the line may jeopardize this protection. Meanwhile, changes in the Farm Bill 1996 already caused the prices paid to cane and beet growers of sugar to be lowered by 20 percent, while retail prices paid to wholesalers of products containing sugar rose has risen from 7.1 to 23.3 percent since 1996. ²³⁶
Rep. Bill Sarpalius (D-TX)	NAFTA	RESEARCH FACILITY: The Clinton administration promised to fund construction of a plutonium research laboratory at Pantex nuclear disassembling site at Amarillo, Texas. (P)	Broken. The promised federal funds were never appropriated and the lab was never built.
Rep. Gerry Studds (D-MA)	NAFTA	SHIPYARD FUNDING: The Clinton administration promised \$1.2 billion in federal financing to revive an abandoned shipyard in Quincy, Massachusetts. (P)	Broken. The promised federal funds were never appropriated. Quincy Shipyard remains closed and has been subject to possession and repossession by the government.
Reps. Jay Kim (R-CA), Carlos Moorhead (R-CA), and other Members of Congress	NAFTA	PRISONER TRANSFER TREATY: The Clinton administration promised to increase enforcement of an existing prisoner transfer treaty with Mexico and begin negotiations on a new one. (P)	Broken. The Clinton administration never negotiated a new treaty, while the number of Mexican citizens in the U.S. prison system continued to outnumber all other foreign nationals at significant taxpayer expense, according to the GAO.
Reps. Bill Sarpalius (D-TX) and Glenn English (D-OK)	NAFTA	PEANUTS I: The Clinton administration promised to monitor peanut imports and to use trade safeguard law to protect the U.S. peanut industry. (F)	Broken. Despite a surge of imports and the halving of the number of farms growing peanuts since NAFTA went into effect, no safeguards were imposed. Indeed, the USDA dismantled its peanut program, contributing to the demise of U.S. production levels.
Rep. Dave Hobson (R-OH)	NAFTA	BROOMCORN: The Clinton administration promised to monitor broomcorn imports and use trade law to protect	Reversed. The Clinton administration imposed what was supposed to be a three-year tariff safeguard on Mexican broomcorns in Nov. 1996. But in Dec. 1998, a year before schedule, the administration dropped the safeguard when Mexico was successful in a NAFTA challenge

		the industry. (F)	to the measure. ²³⁷
Reps. David Price (D-NC), Tim Valentine, (D-NC), and Bob Clement (D-TN) ²³⁸	NAFTA	INTERNATIONAL AIR ROUTES: The Clinton administration promised to award American Airlines two additional routes to London through Raleigh and Nashville. ²³⁹ (P)	Kept. The administration authorized new American Airlines flights from RDU and Nashville to London. However, Nashville flight ended two years later because of American Airlines' financial difficulties. ²⁴⁰
Rep. J.J. Pickle (D-TX)	NAFTA	COMMISSION: The Clinton administration promised to provide \$10 million for a "Center for the Study of Trade in the Western Hemisphere" in Pickle's Austin district. ²⁴¹ (P)	Broken. Although the \$10 million was authorized in NAFTA's implementing legislation, it was not provided for in the administration's \$2.5 billion 'NAFTA funding' package, thus adding to the billions of dollars in unfunded NAFTA costs. ²⁴²
Reps. Bob Smith, (R-OR), Joel Hefley (R-CO), and Wayne Allard, (R-CO), ²⁴³ and other Representatives from Western States	NAFTA	GRAZING FEES: The Clinton administration promised that the Interior Department would delay a decision on an increase in grazing fees. ²⁴⁴ (P)	Kept. The Clinton administration delayed the announcement of a package of federal range land reforms which included raising grazing fees, and reopened negotiations with Representatives from western states who opposed the administration's grazing- reform fees. ²⁴⁵ According to the Sierra Club, fees were actually lowered, resulting in the breaking of a promise then-candidate Clinton had made to the environmental community concerned about "subsidizing the cattle industry while overtaxing people and land." ²⁴⁶
Rep. Lewis Payne (D-VA)	NAFTA	NIST SITING: The Clinton administration promised to consider Rep. Payne's district for a National Institute of Standards and Technology facility. ²⁴⁷ (P)	Broken. NIST facilities are located in Gaithersburg, Maryland and Boulder, Colorado. There is no record of a location in Bedford or Danville, Virginia (Rep. Payne's district), according to the Bedford County Department of Planning.
Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA)	NAFTA	ENERGY: The Clinton administration promised not to reopen free-trade negotiations with Canada on energy. ²⁴⁸ Because Massachusetts is heavily reliant on imported Canadian energy, Markey opposed language in a proposed NAFTA side letter that would have	Unclear. While the Clinton administration did not negotiate the side letter Canada sought regarding energy issues, the Chrétien administration in Canada issued a diplomatic <i>demarche</i> shortly after NAFTA was passed by Congress interpreting its NAFTA commitments as "not requiring any Canadian to export a given level or proportion of any energy resource to another NAFTA country." ²⁵⁰ The status of the U.S.-Canada energy trade commitments has not been

		allowed Canada to limit energy exports to the U.S. in the event of a Canadian emergency need for more energy. ²⁴⁹ (F)	tested in a NAFTA tribunal, although NAFTA's actual terms would favor an interpretation in conflict with the Chrétien unilateral declaration.
Reps. Mel Hancock (R-MO) and Bill Emerson (R-MO)	NAFTA	MISSOURI LEVEES: The Clinton administration promised \$150 million to rebuild levees destroyed in 1993 in massive Midwest flooding, projects which had not previously been eligible for federal aid funds. ²⁵¹ (P)	Broken. Weeks after the November vote, the <i>St. Louis Post Dispatch</i> reported that the Clinton administration had backtracked on the levee offer, and was only offering \$18 million for the repair of previously ineligible levees. Emerson, outraged, proposed another bill requesting more money, which passed the House in late November 1993. ²⁵²
Rep. Tom Ewing (R-IL)	NAFTA	TAX PHASE-OUT: The Clinton administration promised to phase out a tax on international airline travel. ²⁵³ (P)	Broken. President Clinton did agree to phase out the small \$1.50 increase in the Customs processing fee by 1997. ²⁵⁴ However, in the same year he arranged for massive tax hikes on international airline travel, including a new \$12 arrival fee, as well as a \$6 increase in the international departure fee. ²⁵⁵
Rep. E. Clay Shaw (R-FL)	NAFTA	EXTRADITION OF RAPIST: The Clinton administration promised to extradite a Mexican man who raped an acquaintance of the Representative. ²⁵⁶ (P)	Broken. The rapist remains in Mexico. ²⁵⁷
Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)	NAFTA	LABOR RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT: The Clinton administration promised to issue an Executive Order extending the coverage of "Section 301" – the section of U.S. trade law that allows for trade benefits to be revoked for countries that fail to meet certain conditions – to include labor rights. The Executive Order would have provided teeth to NAFTA's weak labor side agreement because otherwise NAFTA would guarantee Mexico's trade benefits irrespective of its	Broken. The Clinton Executive Order was never issued, contributing to NAFTA's labor side agreement being unenforceable. Moreover, despite Clinton administration assurances that Section 301 would remain usable and effective despite WTO rules that would seem to eviscerate it, the U.S. government settled a WTO case with Japan concerning Section 301 sanctions over film trade (Kodak vs. Fuji) after it became apparent that a WTO panel would issue a formal ruling that Section 301 was no longer usable under WTO requirements.

		labor practices. (F)	
Rep. Tom Sawyer (D-OH) and other Representatives concerned about labor rights	NAFTA	NAFTA LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT: The Clinton administration negotiated a NAFTA labor side agreement, promising that it would guarantee that each country enforced basic labor standards so as to raise wages and improve working conditions. (F)	Broken. The NAFTA labor commission received only a third of the \$2 million a year promised by the Clinton administration for its operation. While labor law is frequently flouted, the commission established by the side agreement has not ordered remedial actions. Moreover, not a single illegally-fired worker has been reinstated as a result of the NAFTA labor side agreement.
Representatives concerned about environmental and conservation problems.	NAFTA	NAFTA ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE AGREEMENT: The Clinton administration negotiated a NAFTA environmental side agreement that it promised would ensure improved environmental laws and enforcement. (F)	Broken. The NAFTA environmental side agreement received just over half of the promised \$5 million a year promised by the Clinton administration for its operation. Although the commission established by side agreement permits the imposition of \$20 million dollar fines for repeated failures to enforce certain categories of environmental laws, not a single ruling has been issued by the commission imposing fines. Environmental conditions in Mexico have deteriorated during NAFTA's eleven years of operation.
Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA), Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ), ²⁵⁸ and other Democratic House members	NAFTA	NADBANK: The Clinton administration promised to establish a \$3 billion North American Development Bank to fund the environmental clean-up of the heavily polluted U.S.-Mexico border region, and to build basic water and sewage infrastructure. (F)	Broken. While the Clinton administration did obtain the \$1.5 billion in paid-in and callable capital funding for the NADBank's initial capitalization, the Bank's operating rules resulted in the disbursement of less than 1 percent of the promised clean-up monies. Thus NADBank funding has not been available for the many needed cleanup and infrastructure projects.
Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA) and other Democratic House	NAFTA	BECC: The Clinton administration promised to fund a Border	Broken. While it was authorized in NAFTA's implementing legislation to receive \$5 million a year, the BECC was appropriated only about

members		Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) that would coordinate and approve NADBank projects, at rate of \$5 million a year. (F)	half of this amount, while border environmental problems, including the handful of high-profile projects used to sell the BECC and NADBank, remain unresolved.
Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA)	NAFTA	COMMUNITY ADJUSTMENT AND INVESTMENT PROGRAM: The Clinton administration promised to create a “domestic window” of the NADBank called the Community Adjustment and Investment Program (CAIP). Ten percent of the total capital of NADBank (\$300 million, or \$150 million per country) was to fund community development programs anywhere in either host country, provided the community could show that NAFTA was directly responsible for a particular economic downturn. ²⁵⁹ (F)	Broken. For an entire year after the passage of NAFTA, no employees were even hired to operate the “domestic window.” Finally, in December 1995, after growing protests from Members of Congress, an administration official was named Interim Director and an advisory committee was appointed. ²⁶⁰ For several years thereafter, NADBANK’s “domestic window” program did not loan a single cent, nor certify a single community as a possible recipient of development programs. ²⁶¹ Since its inception, the program has dispersed a trifling 2 percent of the promised \$150 million for U.S. community programs. ²⁶²
Rep. Floyd Flake (D-NY)	NAFTA	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FUNDING I: The Clinton administration promised \$580 million in federal Small Business administration funds for community development in Flake’s district. ²⁶³ (F)	Broken. No projects were financed in Flake’s district. ²⁶⁴
Representatives concerned with trade-related job loss in their districts.	NAFTA	TAA I: The George Herbert Walker Bush administration promised a \$4 billion per year trade adjustment assistance program for workers. ²⁶⁵ (F)	Broken. The TAA program received less than \$4 billion total from 1994-2002. ²⁶⁶

Endnotes

- ¹ “Americans’ Views on Income Inequality and Workers’ Rights,” *The New York Times / CBS News* poll, June 3, 2015. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/03/business/income-inequality-workers-rights-international-trade-poll.html>.
- ² Final Vote Results for Roll Call 466, HR 2621, Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act, September 25, 1998. Available at: http://www.citizen.org/trade/article_redirect.cfm?ID=15963.
- ³ Mike Marshall, “The Decline of the Former ‘Sock Capital of the World’ Is a Story of Lost Jobs and Empty Mills,” *The Huntsville Times*, April 17, 2011. Available at: http://blog.al.com/huntsville-times-business/2011/04/the_decline_of_the_hosiery_ind.html.
- ⁴ “Cantwell Says No Deal Yet on Ex-Im Vote, But Wyden Says Efforts On-Going,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, May 21, 2015. Available at: <http://insidetrade.com/daily-news/cantwell-says-no-deal-yet-ex-im-vote-wyden-says-efforts-going>.
- ⁵ Burgess Everett and Manu Raju, “Ex-Im Bank Expiration ‘Inevitable’ amid 2016 GOP Fight,” *POLITICO*, June 4, 2015. Available at: <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/ex-im-bank-expiration-now-inevitable-amid-2016-gop-fight-118663.html>.
- ⁶ Burgess Everett and Manu Raju, “Ex-Im Bank Expiration ‘Inevitable’ amid 2016 GOP Fight,” *POLITICO*, June 4, 2015. Available at: <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/ex-im-bank-expiration-now-inevitable-amid-2016-gop-fight-118663.html>.
- ⁷ Toluse Olorunnipa and Justin Sink, “Obama Starts New Trade Push Targeting Reluctant House Democrats,” *Bloomberg*, June 2, 2015. Available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-02/obama-starts-new-trade-push-targeting-reluctant-house-democrats>.
- ⁸ David Jackson, “Obama’s Day: Selling Free Trade,” *USA Today*, June 3, 2015. Available at: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2015/06/03/obama-free-trade-local-television-asia/28397049/>.
- ⁹ Kevin Bohn, “Obama Says Elizabeth Warren ‘Absolutely Wrong’ on Trade,” *CNN*, May 12, 2015. Available at: <http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/09/politics/barack-obama-elizabeth-warren-trade/>.
- ¹⁰ Jonathan Weisman, “Obama’s Trade Deal Faces Bipartisan Peril in the House,” *The New York Times*, May 31, 2015. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/01/business/obamas-push-for-trade-deal-faces-bipartisan-peril-in-house.html>.
- ¹¹ “Americans’ Views on Income Inequality and Workers’ Rights,” *The New York Times / CBS News* poll, June 3, 2015. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/03/business/income-inequality-workers-rights-international-trade-poll.html>.
- ¹² David Jackson and Susan Davis, “Obama’s New Political Battle: The Trade Deal,” *USA Today*, June 4, 2015. Available at: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2015/06/04/obama-democrats-trans-pacific-partnership-asia/28465831/>.
- ¹³ “Ryan Letter Reveals Pledge To Accept Four Failed TPA Amendments,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, May 28, 2015. Available at: <http://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/ryan-letter-reveals-pledge-accept-four-failed-tpa-amendments>.
- ¹⁴ Public Citizen, “Trade Wars: Deals for Trade Votes Gone Bad,” PC report, June 2005. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/documents/tradewars.pdf>.
- ¹⁵ Public Citizen, “Trade Wars: Deals for Trade Votes Gone Bad,” PC report, June 2005, at 6. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/documents/tradewars.pdf>.
- ¹⁶ Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.), “Congressman Aderholt Meets with President Bush to Discuss CAFTA,” Congressional Press Release, July 19, 2005.
- ¹⁷ Letter from Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez and U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman to Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.), dated July 27, 2005.
- ¹⁸ Letter signed by Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.) and other Members of Congress to President Bush, dated Sept. 17, 2003.
- ¹⁹ Mary Deibel, “Portman lobbying for trade accord,” *Cincinnati Post*, July 9, 2005.
- ²⁰ Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.), “Congressman Aderholt Secures Commitment to Protect Sock Industry,” Congressional Press Release, July 27, 2005.
- ²¹ Brian Lawson, “Aderholt deal keys CAFTA passage,” *Huntsville Times*, July 29, 2005.
- ²² International Trade Administration, “FTA Tariff Tool,” U.S. Department of Commerce, accessed June 5, 2015. Available at: <http://export.gov/fta/ftatarifftool>.
- ²³ Letter from Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez and U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman to Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.), dated July 27, 2005.
- ²⁴ International Trade Administration, “Administration to Apply Temporary Safeguard to Cotton Socks from Honduras,” Department of Commerce, April 25, 2008. Available at: http://www.trade.gov/press/press_releases/2008/socks_042508.asp.
- ²⁵ Martin Crutsinger, “Honduran Socks to Face Tariff, But U.S. Firms Say It’s Too Small,” *The Washington Post*, April 26, 2008. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/25/AR2008042503189.html>.

²⁶ U.S. International Trade Commission, Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, accessed June 5, 2015. Available at: <http://dataweb.usitc.gov/>.

²⁷ Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, Trade Adjustment Assistance Database, U.S. Department of Labor, 2015. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/taadatabase>.

²⁸ Charlie Mitchell, Keith Koffler, Stephen Norton and Stephanie Conner, "Combatants in Full Court Press for Today's Trade Authority Vote," *National Journal's CongressDaily*, Dec. 6, 2001; Public Citizen Congressional Vote Database.

²⁹ "Baucus Calls for TAA Reform, Reserves Opinion on Possible Vehicles," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Oct. 8, 2004.

³⁰ Government Accountability Office, "Trade Adjustment Assistance: Reforms Have Accelerated Training Enrollment, but Implementation Challenges Remain," GAO-04-1012, Report to the Senate Finance Committee, Sept. 2004.

³¹ "Baucus Calls for TAA Reform, Reserves Opinion on Possible Vehicles," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Oct. 8, 2004.

³² J.F. Hornbeck, "Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy," Congressional Research Service, August 5, 2013, at 11. Available at: <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41922.pdf>.

³³ Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, Trade Adjustment Assistance Database, U.S. Department of Labor, 2015. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/taadatabase>.

³⁴ Economic Research Service, "U.S. and State farm income data: Net value added (with net farm income), 1910-2003," U.S. Department of Agriculture, database accessed June 3, 2005.

³⁵ Palm Beach County, "Palm Beach County Agricultural Facts," accessed June 5, 2015. Available at:

<http://www.pbcgov.com/coextension/agriculture/facts.htm>.

³⁶ Letter from the U.S. Trade Representative to Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association, Nov. 10, 1993, reprinted in *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 19, 1993 (emphasis added).

³⁷ It describes a market where U.S. farmers are facing tremendous pressures from Mexican imports and diminished markets for exports. Domestic production declined 13 percent between 1994 and 2003. Exports to Mexico dropped off nearly 50 percent during that period. Over the same period, imported fresh tomatoes from Mexico doubled, up 110 percent to 785 million kilograms in 2003. Even Canadian imports grew – nearly 1600 percent to 130 million kilos.

³⁸ For 1999-2004 numbers, see U.S. International Trade Commission, "Monitoring of U.S. Imports of Tomatoes," USITC Investigation No. 332-350, Publication 3738, Nov. 2004; for 1994-1998 numbers, see U.S. International Trade Commission, "Monitoring of U.S. Imports of Tomatoes," USITC Investigation No. 332-350, Sept. 1999. Interview with the Florida Tomato Commission on June 3, 2005, based on numbers printed in the Federal Register; Andrew Meadows, "Trade Proposal Will Devastate Agriculture, Protesters Say," *Tampa Tribune* (Florida), Aug. 24, 2001. Press Release, University of Florida, Professor John Van Seckle, "U.S. Economist optimistic U.S. Growers Will Get NAFTA Relief," June 1996.

³⁹ Economic Research Service, "Briefing Room: Tomatoes: Trade," USDA ERS Brief, April 29, 2005; and International Trade administration, "New Suspension Agreement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico," DOC ITA, Dec. 4, 2002.

⁴⁰ Guy Gugliotta, "Wheeling and Dealing and Keeping Score on the 'Fast Track'; Legislators Put Promises from Clinton in Writing," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997; "Commerce, Mexican Growers Ink Tomato Pact, Suspend 17percent Ad Duties," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 1, 1996.

⁴¹ Jennifer Sargent, "Florida Tomato Growers Don't Like Foreign Trade Bill," *Press Journal* (Vero Beach, FL), June 9, 2002.

⁴² Economic Research Service, "Briefing Room: Tomatoes: Trade," USDA ERS Brief, April 29, 2005; and International Trade administration, "New Suspension Agreement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico," DOC ITA, Dec. 4, 2002.

⁴³ Foreign Agricultural Service, Global Agricultural Trade System, U.S. Department of Agriculture, accessed June 6, 2015. Available at: <http://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/>.

⁴⁴ M. Angeles Villarreal, "U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications," Congressional Research Service, April 20, 2015, at 28. Available at: <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf>.

⁴⁵ "The Secretary of Agriculture shall collect and compile" information regarding acreage, prices, and quality of cut flower imports into the U.S. from Mexico. North American Free Trade Agreement, implementing legislation, Subtitle B, section 321(e).

⁴⁶ Interview by Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch with Lee Murphy, California Cut Flowers Council, May 11, 2000.

⁴⁷ Interview by Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch with Betty Stone, California Cut Flowers Council, October 16, 1997.

⁴⁸ U.S. International Trade Commission, Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, accessed June 5, 2015. Available at: <http://dataweb.usitc.gov/>.

⁴⁹ Rep. Sam Farr, *Congressional Record*, Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997, H8794, September 25, 1998.

⁵⁰ Public Citizen, "'Flat-Out, Completely, Horizontally Opposed to CAFTA,' Rep. Robin Hayes Flip-flops His Initial 'No' Vote to 'Yes' at Last Minute for Empty Promises on Textiles...Again," PC press release, August 1, 2005. Available at: http://www.citizen.org/documents/Hayes_Post_CAFTA_Deals_090905_FINAL.pdf.

⁵¹ Edmund L. Andrews, "How CAFTA Passed House by 2 Votes," *The New York Times*, July 29, 2005. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/29/politics/how-cafta-passed-house-by-2-votes.html>.

⁵² Jim Morrill and Tim Funk, “Democrats Attack Hayes over CAFTA: Hayes voted no, then cast decisive vote for trade pact,” *Charlotte Observer*, July 28, 2005.

⁵³ Congressman Robin Hayes, “Congressman Robin Hayes Supports 8th District Jobs with a Vote on CAFTA,” press release, July 28, 2005.

⁵⁴ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Schwab Announces Implementation of Two CAFTA-DR Textile Provisions,” USTR press release, July 22, 2008. Available at:

https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2008/July/asset_upload_file551_15039.pdf.

⁵⁵ Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, Trade Adjustment Assistance Database, U.S. Department of Labor, 2015. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/taadatabase>.

⁵⁶ Tim Whitmire, “Veteran files to challenge Hayes in 8th Congressional District,” Associated Press, Aug. 24, 2005.

⁵⁷ Citizens Trade Campaign, “2006 Fair Trade Congressional Candidates,” 2006, accessed June 6, 2015. Available at:

<http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/the-trade-brigade/pac-archives-page/2006-fair-trade-congressional-candidates/>.

⁵⁸ “Kissell Upsets Hayes, Dems Take NC’s 8th District,” *Independent Tribune*, November 4, 2008. Available at:

http://www.independenttribune.com/news/kissell-upsets-hayes-dems-take-nc-s-th-district/article_c17cca63-c25a-5851-b748-d264d1ad74ef.html.

⁵⁹ Margot Hornblower, “Pork and the Fast Track,” *Time*, February 2, 1998. Available at:

<http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,10340,00.html>.

⁶⁰ Richard Winton, “South Pasadena Sues to Stop 710 Extension, Alleges Law Violations,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 11, 1998. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jun/11/local/me-58939>.

⁶¹ William Neikirk, “Clinton’s Wooing Couldn’t Sell ‘Fast-Track,’” *Chicago Tribune*, November 11, 1997. Available at:

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-11-11/news/9711110074_1_fast-track-house-democrats-leadership-source.

⁶² Final Vote Results for Roll Call 466, HR 2621, Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act, September 25, 1998. Available at: http://www.citizen.org/trade/article_redirect.cfm?ID=15963.

⁶³ Danielle Burton, “10 Things You Didn’t Know about Hilda Solis,” *U.S. News and World Report*, February 13, 2009.

Available at: <http://www.usnews.com/news/obama/articles/2009/02/13/10-things-you-didnt-know-about-hilda-solis>.

⁶⁴ Kristin Yinger, “How a Community Fought the 710 Expansion and Won: What Happens Next?” Annenberg Media Center, February 5, 2013. Available at: <http://www.neontommy.com/news/2013/02/community-fought-710-expansion>.

⁶⁵ David Beiler, “The Misadventure of Tom Sawyer; How the Free Trade Issue Turned A Presumed Congressional Lifer Into A Democratic Primary Loser,” *Campaigns & Elections*, Sept. 2002.

⁶⁶ “Media Roundtable Interview on NAFTA” with Bill Clinton, The American Presidency Project, November 12, 1993.

Available at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46105>.

⁶⁷ Brandon, Karen. “NAFTA at Five,” *Chicago Tribune*, November 29, 1998.

⁶⁸ See Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Submissions under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation

(NAALC),” U.S. Department of Labor, 2015, accessed June 8, 2015. Available at:

<http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalc.htm>.

⁶⁹ Joseph Kahn, “Clinton Takes His China Trade Campaign to the Midwest,” *New York Times*, May 13, 2000. Available at:

<http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/051300china-trade.html>.

⁷⁰ Gregory L. Giroux, “Remap, Trade Issues Sink Rep. Sawyer in Ohio Democratic Primary,” *Congressional Quarterly Daily Monitor*, May 8, 2002; David Beiler, “The Misadventure of Tom Sawyer; How the Free Trade Issue Turned A Presumed Congressional Lifer Into A Democratic Primary Loser,” *Campaigns & Elections*, September 2002.

⁷¹ Joseph Kahn, “Clinton Takes His China Trade Campaign to the Midwest,” *New York Times*, May 13, 2000. Available at:

<http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/051300china-trade.html>.

⁷² David Beiler, “The Misadventure of Tom Sawyer; How the Free Trade Issue Turned A Presumed Congressional Lifer Into A Democratic Primary Loser,” *Campaigns & Elections*, Sept. 2002.

⁷³ Public Citizen, “Obama, Romney and Congressional Candidates Nationwide Used TradeThemed Ads to Appeal to U.S. Majority Opposing Trade Status Quo, Reinforcing Public Anger and Building Expectations for Reform,” PC press release, November 7, 2012. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/documents/2012-election-report.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Kathy Dahlkemper for Congress, 2008, on file at Public Citizen.

⁷⁵ Ron Kirksey and Charlene Nevada, “Why Is Bill Clinton Making Trip To Akron? There Are Plenty Of Reasons Besides City’s Achievements In Race Relations,” *Akron Beacon Journal* (Ohio), Nov. 20, 1997.

⁷⁶ Gregory L. Giroux, “Remap, Trade Issues Sink Rep. Sawyer in Ohio Democratic Primary,” *Congressional Quarterly Daily Monitor*, May 8, 2002; David Beiler, “The Misadventure of Tom Sawyer; How the Free Trade Issue Turned A Presumed Congressional Lifer Into A Democratic Primary Loser,” *Campaigns & Elections*, September 2002.

⁷⁷ See Public Citizen, “CAFTA Damage Report: Tracking Results of CAFTA Votes in Key Districts,” PC factsheets, December 2005. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=1265>. Public Citizen, “Trade Wars: Deals for Trade Votes Gone

Bad,” PC report, June 2005. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/documents/tradewars.pdf>. Public Citizen, “The Record on Deals for Trade Votes: Don’t Get Fooled Again,” PC report, December 2001. Available at: https://www.citizen.org/documents/fast_track_deals.PDF. Public Citizen, “Deals for NAFTA Votes: Trick, No Treat,” PC report, October 1997. Available at:

<http://www.citizenarchive.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6824&secID=1038&catID=126>. Public Citizen, “Deals for NAFTA Votes II: Bait and Switch,” PC report, October 1997. Available at:

http://www.citizenarchive.org/publications/print_release.cfm?ID=6825.

⁷⁸ See Public Citizen, “CAFTA Damage Report: Tracking Results of CAFTA Votes in Key Districts,” PC factsheets, December 2005. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=1265>. Public Citizen, “Trade Wars: Deals for Trade Votes Gone Bad,” PC report, June 2005. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/documents/tradewars.pdf>. Public Citizen, “The Record on Deals for Trade Votes: Don’t Get Fooled Again,” PC report, December 2001. Available at: https://www.citizen.org/documents/fast_track_deals.PDF. Public Citizen, “Deals for NAFTA Votes: Trick, No Treat,” PC report, October 1997. Available at:

<http://www.citizenarchive.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6824&secID=1038&catID=126>. Public Citizen, “Deals for NAFTA Votes II: Bait and Switch,” PC report, October 1997. Available at:

http://www.citizenarchive.org/publications/print_release.cfm?ID=6825.

⁷⁹ Public Citizen, “Trade Wars: Deals for Trade Votes Gone Bad: Appendix” PC report, June 2005, at 72. Available at: <http://www.citizen.org/documents/tradewarsappendixII.pdf>.

⁸⁰ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “CAFTA Facts,” USTR brief, July 2005. Available at:

https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file80_7841.pdf.

⁸¹ Public Citizen, “With N.Y. Jobs at Risk, and Dominican-American Constituents Opposing, Did Rep. Gregory Meeks Trade Deciding Vote for CAFTA-NAFTA Expansion in Exchange for Corporate Campaign Cash, Pork Barrel Funds or Other Empty Promises?” PC press release, August 1, 2005. Available at:

http://www.citizen.org/documents/Meeks_Post_CAFTA_Deals_090905_FINAL.pdf.

⁸² Mike Hall, “Despite Labor Action Plan, Colombian Unionists Still Targeted for Death,” AFL-CIO, April 7, 2015. Available at: <http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Global-Action/Despite-Labor-Action-Plan-Colombian-Unionists-Still-Targeted-for-Death>.

⁸³ U.S. Department of State, “Vietnam 2013 Human Rights Report,” 2014, at 23. Available at:

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220456.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Verite, “Forced Labor in the Production of Electronic Goods in Malaysia,” September 2014. Available at:

http://www.verite.org/sites/default/files/images/VeriteForcedLaborMalaysianElectronics_2014_0.pdf.

⁸⁵ Greg Sargent, “Rising Skepticism among Democrats about Obama’s Big Trade Deal,” *The Washington Post*, May 19, 2015. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/05/19/rising-skepticism-among-democrats-about-obamas-big-trade-deal/>.

⁸⁶ John Maggs, “Fast Track Clears Key Hurdle in the Senate,” *Journal of Commerce*, Nov. 5, 1997.

⁸⁷ Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 575, Nov. 17, 1993.

⁸⁸ CNN/USA Today/Gallup polls showed 65 percent opposed to NAFTA in July 1993; 44 percent opposed but 64 percent opposed when jobs were mentioned in August 1993; and 41 percent opposed (versus 35 percent in favor of) in September 1993. See “Poll: NAFTA Foes Outnumber Backers 2-1,” *Greenwire*, July 14, 1993; “Poll: NAFTA Opposition Jumps When ‘Jobs’ Are Mentioned,” *Greenwire*, Aug. 12, 1993; Richard Benedetto, “Clinton has work cut out for him, poll shows,” *USA Today*, Sept. 15, 1993.

⁸⁹ Public Budget Database, Office of Management and Budget, accessed March 18, 2005. TAA and NAFTA-TAA funds are drawn from account 16-0326-0-1-999. The Federal Unemployment Benefits Account Budget Authority Table, U.S. Department of Labor Employment & Training administration, accessed March 18, 2005, reveals a slightly different figure of \$3.14 billion appropriated.

⁹⁰ “Senate Approves TPA-TAA Bill With Two Changes, After Two-Week Fight Fizzles,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, May 29, 2015. Available at: <http://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/senate-approves-tpa-taa-bill-two-changes-after-two-week-fight-fizzles>.

⁹¹ “We were gratified that Ambassador Zoellick agreed with these principles and agreed that any changes to American immigration or antitrust law be only considered through the normal legislative process. *It was only because of Ambassador Zoellick’s commitment that many members of the House and Senate agreed to support passage in the 108th Congress of legislation implementing the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreements*” [italics added]. From: Reps. F. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and John Conyers (D-MI), Letter to U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman on WTO Mode 4, May 27, 2005.

⁹² “House Committee Amends Visa Plan In FTAs, Vows To Never Pass Another,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, July 11, 2003.

⁹³ Bruce Odessey, “They should open markets to telecom, financial, education and logistics suppliers, he says,” Speech by Robert Zoellick before Coalition of Service Industries, *News from the Washington File*, Dec. 3, 2003.

- ⁹⁴ Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics survey (National)," U.S. Department of Labor, website, accessed June 10, 2005.
- ⁹⁵ Kate Bronfenbrenner, "Impact Of U.S.-China Trade Relations On Workers, Wages, And Employment," U.S.-China Security Review Commission/U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission Report, June 30, 2001, at 69 and 124. It is assumed that 11,707 U.S. jobs are lost for every \$1 billion in illegally transshipped goods, which is then multiplied by the \$2 to 4 billion estimates for the value of transshipped goods (estimated by the U.S. Customs Service and the American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition, respectively, and referenced in the Bronfenbrenner report.)
- ⁹⁶ Lauren Markoe, "DeMint says trade bill vote vindicated; others unsure," *The State* (Columbia, SC), July 22, 2002.
- ⁹⁷ Chris Newmarker, "Fast track passes by one-vote margin," Copley News Service, Dec. 6, 2001.
- ⁹⁸ "U.S. Promises Self-Initiation of Trade Cases After Steel Tariff Repeal," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Dec. 5, 2003; "Steel Legacy Bills Lack Support From Mini-Mills, Administration," *Inside U.S. Trade*, May 17, 2002.
- ⁹⁹ Peter Allgeier Speech to Sao Paulo Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 2002.
- ¹⁰⁰ "U.S. Lumber industry wants Canada hit hard," *The Guardian* (Charlottetown, Canada), April 3, 2001; Peter O'Neil, "Montana senator wields lumber-fight big stick," *Vancouver Sun*, Nov. 17, 2001; Emily Pierce, "Polar Opposites United on Trade Remedies," *Congressional Quarterly Daily Monitor*, May 14, 2002; William Neikirk, "Free trade hits snag on farm, tariff fronts," *Chicago Tribune*, May 3, 2002.
- ¹⁰¹ World Trade Organization, "United States – Investigation Of The International Trade Commission In Softwood Lumber From Canada: Report Of The Panel," Wt/Ds277/R, March 22, 2004; World Trade Organization, "United States – Final Dumping Determination On Softwood Lumber From Canada: Report Of The Appellate Body, Ab-2004-2," Wt/Ds264/Ab/R, Aug. 11, 2004; World Trade Organization, "United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect To Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada, Report Of The Appellate Body, Ab-2003-6," Wt/Ds257/Ab/R, Jan. 19, 2004; "Article 1904 Binational Panel Review Pursuant To The North American Free Trade Agreement In The Matter Of Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada: Final Affirmative Antidumping Determination Secretariat File No. Usa-Cda-2002-1904-02, June 9, 2005.
- ¹⁰² Various Members of Congress, Letter on Catfish to USTR Zoellick, Feb. 9, 2001, reprinted in *Inside U.S. Trade*.
- ¹⁰³ George Hager, "Bush plays free trade game," *USA Today*, May 5, 2002; "Senate Action On Vietnam, Jordan Trade Deals Likely Linked," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Sept. 14, 2001.
- ¹⁰⁴ Stephen Clapp, "COOL supporters and critics await USDA's proposed regulations; Labeling; country-of-origin labeling," *Food Chemical News*, Oct. 6, 2003.
- ¹⁰⁵ "House Textile Republicans List Demands In Fast-Track Fight," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 2, 2001; "Interagency Group Formed To Implement Fast Track Textile Promises," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Feb. 1, 2002.
- ¹⁰⁶ "U.S. Does Not Rule Out Lower Tariffs As Textile Group Reports," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Sept. 20, 2002.
- ¹⁰⁷ Jennifer Sargent, "Citrus Growers Await Trade Fallout," *Fort Pierce Tribune* (Florida), Aug. 25, 2002.
- ¹⁰⁸ Peter Allgeier Speech to Sao Paulo Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 2002.
- ¹⁰⁹ Kevin Bouffard, "Agriculture Task Force to Reconvene," *The Ledger* (Lakeland, FL), Nov. 20, 2004; Kevin Bouffard, "Warming to the Task," *The Ledger* (Lakeland, FL), April 23, 2005.
- ¹¹⁰ Tim Johnson and Jane Bussey, "Bush Narrowly Wins Trade Authority," *Miami Herald*, Dec. 7, 2001.
- ¹¹¹ Karen Hosler, "Senate OKs bill expanding president's trade authority," *Baltimore Sun*, May 24, 2002.
- ¹¹² Charlie Mitchell, Keith Koffler, Stephen Norton and Stephanie Conner, "Combatants in Full Court Press for Today's Trade Authority Vote," *National Journal's CongressDaily*, Dec. 6, 2001; Public Citizen Congressional Vote Database.
- ¹¹³ "Baucus Calls for TAA Reform, Reserves Opinion on Possible Vehicles," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Oct. 8, 2004.
- ¹¹⁴ Government Accountability Office, "Trade Adjustment Assistance: Reforms Have Accelerated Training Enrollment, but Implementation Challenges Remain," GAO-04-1012, Report to the Senate Finance Committee, Sept. 2004.
- ¹¹⁵ Government Accountability Office, "Health Coverage Tax Credit: Simplified and More Timely Enrollment Process Could Increase Participation," GAO-04-1029, Report to the Senate Finance Committee, Sept. 2004.
- ¹¹⁶ AFL-CIO, "Breaking Faith with Workers: The Bush Labor Department's Improper Denials of Trade Adjustment Assistance," AFL-CIO Issue Brief, July 2004.
- ¹¹⁷ Office of Rep. Ortiz, "U.S. Transportation Department Dispenses Funding for Border Infrastructure," Press Release September 22, 2004. See also Steve Taylor, "Austin, Texas, Announces \$54 million in Grants for Border Inspection Stations," *The Brownsville Herald*, June 6, 2002.
- ¹¹⁸ "CDC facility to get \$10 million in federal funds," Associated Press, Dec. 9, 2001.
- ¹¹⁹ Lisa Splitlog, "Beyond Atlanta: A Closer Look at CDC in Fort Collins, Colorado," *The Frontier Newsletter*, Fall 2004.
- ¹²⁰ "Senators Call on China to Implement Bilateral SPS Agreement," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Feb. 11, 2000; "Most Of Senate Urges China To Buy U.S. Products Before MFN Vote," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Feb. 18, 2000.

¹²¹ Text: Draft Chamber Report On China Agriculture, Published in *Inside U.S. Trade*, Aug. 23, 2002; “Chamber To Take Soft Line On Fixes To China Agriculture Problems,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Aug. 23, 2002.

¹²² “China Blocking U.S. Grain Shipments Despite 1999 Agreement,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, March 2, 2001.

¹²³ Vic Kolenc, “Gas to Flow in Pipeline,” *El Paso Times*, Dec. 13, 2003; Dana Calvo, “Fuel Pipeline Built, But Relief Isn’t Delivered,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 26, 2005.

¹²⁴ Statement on Signing an Executive Order Creating the Commission on Workers, Communities, and Economic Change in the New Economy, Oct. 27, 2000.

¹²⁵ President Bush Issues Executive Order Regarding 21st Century Workforce Initiative, June 20, 2001.

¹²⁶ Tom Diemer, “Sawyer Announces He Will Support Permanent Trade Status For China,” *Plain Dealer* (Cleveland, Ohio), May 20, 2000.

¹²⁷ “Final Levin-Bereuter Proposal Prompts Four New Announcements Of China PNTR Support,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, May 19, 2000.

¹²⁸ AFL-CIO, “Bush administration Offer Words, Not Action, on China Trade,” AFL-CIO Issue Brief, 2003.

¹²⁹ GAO, “New Markets Tax Credit Program: Progress Made in Implementation, but Further Actions Needed to Monitor Compliance,” GAO Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-04-326, Jan. 2004.

¹³⁰ John Maggs, “Art of the Deal,” *National Journal*, May 20, 2000; Gary Martin, “Texans Wheeled and Dealed to help pass trade legislation,” *San Antonio Express-News*, May 25, 2000.

¹³¹ Dave Michaels, “Navy to clean air station site; Dallas council agrees to \$53 million settlement of environmental suit,” *Dallas Morning News*, June 27, 2002.

¹³² Katie Fairbank, “Northrop to Leave Las Colinas; 100 of 230 employees to lose jobs in move to California to cut costs,” *Dallas Morning News*, May 10, 2002.

¹³³ John Maggs, “Art of the Deal,” *National Journal*, May 20, 2000

¹³⁴ “Winegrape Insect Found in West Sac: U.S. Pledges \$22 million to Fight Pest,” *Sacramento Bee*, June 24, 2000.

¹³⁵ “House Resumes Final Debate Before Vote on China Trade Bill,” *New York Times*, May 24, 2000.

¹³⁶ Kent Faulk, “Congress May Vote on Weather Office,” *Birmingham News*, Nov. 11, 2001; Kent Faulk, “New Weather Office Eyes Lightening Alerts,” *Birmingham News*, March 5, 2005.

¹³⁷ “Horse trading, pork barreling, plain old jawing precede trade vote,” *Chicago Tribune*, May 24, 2000.

¹³⁸ “Appellate Body Rejects U.S. Appeal Of WTO Wheat Board Decision,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Sept. 3, 2004; “WTO Panel Offers Mixed Decision On Canadian Wheat Board,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Feb. 13, 2004; “Canada May Contest Final U.S. Ad Finding On Wheat In NAFTA Panel,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, May 9, 2003; “NAFTA Panel Criticizes U.S. Subsidy Decision On Wheat,” Press Release From Canadian Department Of Foreign Affairs And International Trade, March 10, 2005; “NAFTA Panel Finds Fault With U.S. Injury Decision On Wheat,” Press Release From Canadian Department Of Foreign Affairs And International Trade, June 7, 2005.

¹³⁹ “South Pasadena Concerned Reported Fast Track Vote Swap ‘Taints’ FHWA Preliminary Approval of 710 Freeway Extension,” *Business Wire*, Dec. 5, 1997.

¹⁴⁰ Richard Simon, “Transportation Bill Clears House,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 11, 2005.

¹⁴¹ John Mercurio, “Martinez’s Last Stand?” *Roll Call*, Jan. 20, 2000.

¹⁴² “Approps Issue Settled, Threatening Fast Track Votes,” *National Journal’s Congress Daily*, Nov. 6, 1997.

¹⁴³ This included \$349 million for expanding NAFTA-TAA to include workers who lost their job due to relocation of factories to Mexico and Canada; \$750 million for general TAA benefits; \$250 million for secondary workers (reshuffled from other funds); \$662 million for merely continuing the TAA program; a doubling of the amount of paid-in capital to the NADBank; \$500 million for new community empowerment zones; \$1 billion for the out-of-school youth opportunity act; and \$250 million for the office of community and economic adjustment. See Alexis Herman, et. al., “Holds News Briefing to Discuss the Job Training Package for Workers who Lose their jobs to imports,” FDCH Political Transcripts, Nov. 5, 1997.

¹⁴⁴ Public Citizen analysis of Office of Management and Budget numbers.

¹⁴⁵ “White House Offers Incentives For Fast Track Votes,” *National Journal’s CongressDaily*, Nov. 6, 1997.

¹⁴⁶ Rep. Robert Matsui, “H.R. 1491[106]: Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 1999,” Last Action: Apr 29, 1999: Referred to the Subcommittee on Trade.

¹⁴⁷ David Hess and Maria Recio, “Clinton and GOP Delay Trade Vote To Gather More Support,” *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, Nov. 8, 1997.

¹⁴⁸ “Mexican Trucks Still Halted At Border As Sides Discuss Inspections,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 12, 2004.

¹⁴⁹ Pat Griffith, “House Delays Trade-Power Vote To Tomorrow; 3 Other Bills Offer Rewards As Clinton Lines Up Support,” *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* (Pennsylvania), Nov. 8, 1997.

¹⁵⁰ “Administration Deals on Fast Track Span Industry, Agricultural Sectors,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 11, 1997.

-
- ¹⁵¹ Erik Dohlgan, Edwin Young, Linwood Hoffman, and William McBride, "U.S. Peanut Sector Adapts to Major Policy Changes," *Amber Waves*, U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service Policy Brief, Nov. 2004.
- ¹⁵² Public Citizen interview with Emory Murphy, Georgia Peanut Commission, June 13, 2005.
- ¹⁵³ Guy Gugliotta, "Wheeling and Dealing and Keeping Score on the 'Fast Track'; Legislators Put Promises from Clinton in Writing," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997.
- ¹⁵⁴ Guy Gugliotta, "Wheeling and Dealing and Keeping Score on the 'Fast Track'; Legislators Put Promises from Clinton in Writing," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997; "Commerce, Mexican Growers Ink Tomato Pact, Suspend 17percent Ad Duties," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 1, 1996.
- ¹⁵⁵ Jennifer Sargent, "Florida Tomato Growers Don't Like Foreign Trade Bill," *Press Journal* (Vero Beach, FL), June 9, 2002.
- ¹⁵⁶ Economic Research Service, "Briefing Room: Tomatoes: Trade," USDA ERS Brief, April 29, 2005; and International Trade Administration, "New Suspension Agreement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico," DOC ITA, Dec. 4, 2002.
- ¹⁵⁷ For 1999-2004 numbers, see U.S. International Trade Commission, "Monitoring of U.S. Imports of Tomatoes," USITC Investigation No. 332-350, Publication 3738, Nov. 2004; for 1994-1998 numbers, see U.S. International Trade Commission, "Monitoring of U.S. Imports of Tomatoes," USITC Investigation No. 332-350, Sept. 1999.
- ¹⁵⁸ Interview with the Florida Tomato Commission on June 3, 2005, based on numbers printed in the Federal Register; Andrew Meadows, "Trade Proposal Will Devastate Agriculture, Protesters Say," *Tampa Tribune* (Florida), Aug. 24, 2001.
- ¹⁵⁹ Guy Gugliotta, "Wheeling and Dealing and Keeping Score on the 'Fast Track'; Legislators Put Promises from Clinton in Writing," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997.
- ¹⁶⁰ Herald Staff and Wire Reports, "Congress Oks Customs Measure," *The Miami Herald*, November 15, 1997.
- ¹⁶¹ Guy Gugliotta, "Wheeling and Dealing and Keeping Score on the 'Fast Track'; Legislators Put Promises from Clinton in Writing," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997.
- ¹⁶² Government Accounting Office, "Country-of-Origin Labeling: Opportunities for USDA and Industry to Implement Challenging Aspects of New Law," Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-03-780, Aug. 2003.
- ¹⁶³ Onell Soto, "Salton Sea Woes get White House attention," *The Press-Enterprise*, Dec. 10, 1997.
- ¹⁶⁴ Public Citizen interview with Elden Hughes, co-chair of the Sierra Club California-Nevada Desert Committee, June 11, 2005.
- ¹⁶⁵ http://www.salttonsea.ca.gov/facts/fs_chrono.htm
- ¹⁶⁶ Guy Gugliotta, "Wheeling and Dealing and Keeping Score on the 'Fast Track'; Legislators Put Promises from Clinton in Writing," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997.
- ¹⁶⁷ Denise Becker, "Tax Break On Rentals Seems Secure; Former President Clinton Tried For Years To Tax Short-Term Rental Income, Such; As That Earned During The Furniture Market," *News & Record* (Greensboro, NC), May 12, 2001.
- ¹⁶⁸ "Administration Endorses Broad Section 301 Law for Farm Exports," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 7, 1997.
- ¹⁶⁹ Guy Gugliotta, "Wheeling and Dealing and Keeping Score on the 'Fast Track'; Legislators Put Promises from Clinton in Writing," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997; "Administration Endorses Broad Section 301 Law for Farm Exports," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 7, 1997.
- ¹⁷⁰ "Administration Endorses Broad Section 301 Law for Farm Exports," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 7, 1997.
- ¹⁷¹ Barry Krissoff, Fred Kuchler, Kenneth Nelson, Janet Perry, and Agapi Somwaru, "Country-of-Origin Labeling: Theory and Observation," U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service, WRS-04-02, Jan. 2004.
- ¹⁷² "Administration Deals on Fast Track Span Industry, Agricultural Sectors," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 11, 1997.
- ¹⁷³ Tom Capehart, "Trends in the Cigarette Industry After the Master Settlement Agreement," U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service, No. (TBS250-01), Nov. 2001.
- ¹⁷⁴ Tom Capehart, "Trends in U.S. Tobacco Farming," U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service, Outlook Report No. (TBS25702), Nov. 2004.
- ¹⁷⁵ Ron Kirksey and Charlene Nevada, "Why Is Bill Clinton Making Trip To Akron? There Are Plenty Of Reasons Besides City's Achievements In Race Relations," *Akron Beacon Journal* (Ohio), Nov. 20, 1997.
- ¹⁷⁶ Bennett Roth, "Clinton's Texas trip seen as payback for supporters," *Houston Chronicle*, Dec. 31, 1997.
- ¹⁷⁷ Guy Gugliotta, "Wheeling and Dealing and Keeping Score on the 'Fast Track'; Legislators Put Promises from Clinton in Writing," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997.
- ¹⁷⁸ Foreign Agricultural Service, "U.S. Exports of Wine (HTS 2204) to Chile," U.S. Department of Agriculture database, accessed June 8, 2005.
- ¹⁷⁹ Guy Gugliotta, "Wheeling and Dealing and Keeping Score on the 'Fast Track'; Legislators Put Promises from Clinton in Writing," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997.
- ¹⁸⁰ Rep. George Radanovich, "Radanovich Criticizes Clinton Canned Fruit Policy," Press Release, Feb. 20, 1998.
- ¹⁸¹ John Dunmore, Jason Bernstein, Linda Calvin, Todd Morath, and Thomas Vollrath, "Competition in the Canned Peach Industry," U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service, Jan. 1999, at 46.

- ¹⁸² Guy Gugliotta, "Wheeling and Dealing and Keeping Score on the 'Fast Track'; Legislators Put Promises from Clinton in Writing," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997.
- ¹⁸³ "Text of Executive Order on the Interagency Task Force of the Economic Development of the Southwest Border," U.S. Newswire, May 25, 1999.
- ¹⁸⁴ Mary Jo Pitzl, "Patrols, crossers trash border's pristine desert," *Arizona Republic*, March 25, 2005.
- ¹⁸⁵ Gary Martin, "Arm-twisting for naught over fast-track authority," *San Antonio Express News* (Texas), Nov. 22, 1997.
- ¹⁸⁶ Found at http://www.house.gov/ortiz/accomplishments_106.shtml
- ¹⁸⁷ Conversation with Pete Sepulveda, Director of Cameron County Department of Transportation (Texas), June 13, 2005.
- ¹⁸⁸ "Approps Issue Settled, Threatening Fast Track Votes," *National Journal's Congress Daily*, Nov. 6, 1997.
- ¹⁸⁹ "In its FY1999 budget, the administration requested \$50 million for a new EDA. Office of Community and Economic Adjustment, specifically to assist communities harmed by foreign competition. Although Congress did not approve the new office, it did provide the additional \$50 million for economic assistance." See "White House Report On Increased U.S. Steel Imports," U.S. Embassy of Korea Fact Sheet.
- ¹⁹⁰ John E. Yang and Terry M. Neal, "Fast Track Hits a Brick Wall," *Washington Post*, Nov. 9, 1997.
- ¹⁹¹ Geller, Marc. "McAllen marks opening of new treatment plant" *The Monitor*. April 6, 2005.
- ¹⁹² Interview with David Rios, McAllen Northwater Plant, 6/10/05
- ¹⁹³ Interview with Connie Humpfree, Hinojosa's office, 6/10/05
- ¹⁹⁴ Juliet Eilperin and Jim Vande Hei, "Despite Yanking Fast-Track Vote, GOP Vows to Deliver on Promises to Members," *Roll Call*, Nov. 17, 1997.
- ¹⁹⁵ Matthew T. Brown, "Taking the Hill," *AutoInc. Magazine*, September 1998.
- ¹⁹⁶ Exchange of letters between Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, and Jaime Serra Puche, Mexican Secretary of Commerce, November 3, 1993, and letters from Rep. Eshoo (D-CA), Rep. Baker (R-CA), Rep. Brown (D-CA), Rep. Doolittle (R-CA), Rep. Lehman (D-CA), Rep. Mineta (D-CA), Rep. Pombo (D-CA), and Rep. Royce (R-CA), to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, October 4, 1993, on file with Public Citizen.
- ¹⁹⁷ "Clinton Lifts Broomcorn Safeguard; Mexico Will Drop Retaliation," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Dec. 11, 1998. See also http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/NAFTA_Tariff_Acceleration/Section_Index.html.
- ¹⁹⁸ Office of Textiles and Apparel, "Major Shippers Report," U.S. Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration, website, accessed June 10, 2005.
- ¹⁹⁹ Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics survey (National)," U.S. Department of Labor, website, accessed June 10, 2005.
- ²⁰⁰ John Maggs, "Art of the Deal," *The National Journal*, May 20, 2000; Public Citizen interview with Mick Miqueon, Vought Aircraft Industries in Texas.
- ²⁰¹ Florida Farmers Inc. Fact Sheet, website, accessed June 10, 2005.
- ²⁰² "Administration Urged To Address Farm Issues to Gain Fast-Track Support," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Sept. 12, 1997.
- ²⁰³ "Administration Fattens Vegetables Offer To Save Florida NAFTA Deal," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 12, 1993.
- ²⁰⁴ Public Citizen interview with a representative of the United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association, June 13, 2005; Food and Nutrition Service, "Availability of Fresh Produce in Nutrition Assistance Programs," U.S. Department of Agriculture, Special Nutrition Programs, Report No. CN-02-FV, May 2002.
- ²⁰⁵ "Administration Fattens Vegetables Offer To Save Florida NAFTA Deal," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 12, 1993.
- ²⁰⁶ "Administration Fattens Vegetables Offer To Save Florida NAFTA Deal," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 12, 1993.
- ²⁰⁷ Doris Stanley, "USDA Breaks Ground for New Federal Lab in Ft. Pierce, Fla.," USDA Website, dated June 21, 1997, accessed June 14, 2005.
- ²⁰⁸ Email correspondence with Calvin E. Arnold, Laboratory Director, USDA-ARS-US Horticultural Research Laboratory
- ²⁰⁹ "Administration Fattens Vegetables Offer To Save Florida NAFTA Deal," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 12, 1993.
- ²¹⁰ See, for example, Peter Allgeier Speech to Sao Paulo Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 2002.
- ²¹¹ NAFTA Trade Officials Agree To Small Package Of Tariff Eliminations" *Inside U.S. Trade*, March 21, 1997.
- ²¹² "Mexico, U.S. Seek To Head Off Future Fight On Poultry, Pork Trade," *Inside U.S. Trade*, April 12, 2002.
- ²¹³ "U.S., Mexico To Study Data Discrepancies Related To Safeguard Requests," *Inside U.S. Trade*, May 28, 2004.
- ²¹⁴ Comments by Florida Citrus Mutual Before The United States International Trade Commission, In the Matter of The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the Tokyo Round, U.S.-Israel FTA, U.S.-Canada FTA, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round on the U.S. Economy, USITC Investigation TA-2111-1, March 31, 2003.
- ²¹⁵ "Kantor Curbs Citrus Tariff Cuts Under GATT, GSP To Gain NAFTA Votes," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 5, 1993.
- ²¹⁶ See, for example, Peter Allgeier Speech to Sao Paulo Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 2002.
- ²¹⁷ "Kantor Curbs Citrus Tariff Cuts Under GATT, GSP To Gain NAFTA Votes," *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 5, 1993.

- ²¹⁸ Comments by Florida Citrus Mutual Before The United States International Trade Commission, In the Matter of The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the Tokyo Round, U.S.-Israel FTA, U.S.-Canada FTA, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round on the U.S. Economy, USITC Investigation TA-2111-1, March 31, 2003, at 6.
- ²¹⁹ “Kantor Curbs Citrus Tariff Cuts Under GATT, GSP To Gain NAFTA Votes,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 5, 1993.
- ²²⁰ 19 U.S.C. § (2252), “Investigations, determinations, and recommendations by Commission.”
- ²²¹ “Florida Farm Groups Seek New Perishable-Goods Safeguards Before Fast Track,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, May 30, 1997.
- ²²² “Administration Urged To Address Farm Issues to Gain Fast-Track Support,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Sept. 12, 1997.
- ²²³ Foreign Agriculture Service, “FAS Agricultural Import Commodity Aggregations: Livestock, Meats, and Poultry,”
- ²²⁴ Food Safety and Inspection Service, “Foreign Audit Reports,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, website, accessed June 13, 2005.
- ²²⁵ “The number of inspections are going to go down as a percentage of total imports, but up in the number of actual inspections conducted.” Comment by Dr. Lester Crawford, Food & Drug Administration, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Agriculture, March 11, 2004, at 73.
- ²²⁶ Environmental Protection Agency, “Harmonizing the Clean Air Act & Montreal Protocol Methyl Bromide Phaseouts,” EPA Website, accessed June 14, 2005.
- ²²⁷ Juliet Eilperin, “U.S. Gets Another Reprieve on Use of Pesticide by Farms,” *Washington Post*, Nov. 27, 2004; Public Citizen interview with David Donegar, National Resource Defense Council, June 14, 2005.
- ²²⁸ “Food Growers Top Trade Pact’s Menu,” *Daily Oklahoman* (Oklahoma City, OK), Nov. 17, 1993.
- ²²⁹ See http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/NAFTA_Tariff_Acceleration/Section_Index.html
- ²³⁰ “NAFTA Trade Officials Agree to Small package of Tariff Eliminations,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, March 21, 1997.
- ²³¹ “Clinton Lifts Broomcorn Safeguard; Mexico Will Drop Retaliation,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Dec. 11, 1998.
- ²³² Government Accounting Office, “Country-of-Origin Labeling: Opportunities for USDA and Industry to Implement Challenging Aspects of New Law,” Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-03-780, Aug. 2003.
- ²³³ “Mexico’s New Soft Drink Tax Raises Stakes In Sweetener Fight With U.S.,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Jan. 11, 2002.
- ²³⁴ “Mexico Argues HFCS Dispute Should Be Settled In NAFTA, Not WTO,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 5, 2004.
- ²³⁵ Martin Vaughan, “U.S. Abandons Side Letter As It Forges Ahead With Sugar Talks,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Aug. 16, 2002.
- ²³⁶ R. Dennis Olson, “Sweet or Sour?: The U.S. Sugar Program and the Threats Posed by the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement,” Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy Report, April 2005
- ²³⁷ “Clinton Lifts Broomcorn Safeguard; Mexico Will Drop Retaliation,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Dec. 11, 1998.
- ²³⁸ Ben Lilliston, “Pork Barreling for NAFTA,” *Multinational Monitor*, 1993.
- ²³⁹ Karen Ball, “White House: Wheeling and Dealing to Sell NAFTA,” Associated Press, Nov. 12, 1993.
- ²⁴⁰ “American Airlines Marks 10th Anniversary with a British Reception at RDU on May 26,” American Airlines Press Release, May 21, 2004; “Political Ad Watch,” *The Commercial Appeal*, Aug. 12, 1994; Paula Wade, “American makes more Nashville ‘hublet’ cuts,” *The Commercial Appeal*, Sept. 27, 1995.
- ²⁴¹ Karen Ball, “White House: Wheeling and Dealing to Sell NAFTA,” Associated Press, Nov. 12, 1993.
- ²⁴² Ben Lilliston, “Pork Barreling for NAFTA,” *Multinational Monitor*, 1993.
- ²⁴³ “Food Growers Top Trade Pact’s Menu,” *Daily Oklahoman* (Oklahoma City, OK), Nov. 17, 1993.
- ²⁴⁴ Karen Ball, “White House: Wheeling and Dealing to Sell NAFTA,” Associated Press, Nov. 12, 1993; Ben Lilliston, “Pork Barreling for NAFTA,” *Multinational Monitor*, 1993.
- ²⁴⁵ Ben Lilliston, “Pork Barreling for NAFTA,” *Multinational Monitor*, 1993.
- ²⁴⁶ David Brower, “Why I Won’t Vote for Clinton,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 22, 1996; Adam Clymer, “Congress Calls it Quits,” *New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1994.
- ²⁴⁷ Ben Lilliston, “Pork Barreling for NAFTA,” *Multinational Monitor*, 1993.
- ²⁴⁸ “Food Growers Top Trade Pact’s Menu,” *Daily Oklahoman* (Oklahoma City, OK), Nov. 17, 1993.
- ²⁴⁹ “Clinton Slams Door on Canadian Demands For NAFTA Energy Changes,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Nov. 26, 1993.
- ²⁵⁰ “Canada Ready To Proclaim NAFTA After Joint Statements Are Issued,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, Dec. 3, 1993.
- ²⁵¹ “Clinton cuts farm, business deals to win NAFTA votes,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 16, 1993.
- ²⁵² Robert L. Koenig, “Environmentalists and the Army Oppose Bond’s Levee- Repair Rush,” *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (Missouri), Nov. 28, 1993.
- ²⁵³ Karen Ball, “White House: Wheeling and Dealing to Sell NAFTA,” Associated Press, Nov. 12, 1993.
- ²⁵⁴ See <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/a9717.htm>
- ²⁵⁵ “Mixed Bag of Tax Changes on Air Travel,” *The Daily News of Los Angeles*, August 10, 1997. See also <http://www.airlines.org/econ/d.aspx?nid=5362>.
- ²⁵⁶ “Shaw claims judicial victory and will vote for NAFTA,” press release, Nov. 16, 1993.

²⁵⁷ Sharyn Obsatz and Rocky Salmon, "Proximity of border with Mexico complicates cases," *Press Enterprise* (Riverside, CA), Aug. 18, 2002.

²⁵⁸ Karen Ball, "White House: Wheeling and Dealing to Sell NAFTA," Associated Press, Nov. 12, 1993.

²⁵⁹ "NADBANK'S U.S. Community Adjustment Branch," Tina Faulkner, *BorderLines* 30 (Vol. 4, No. 11, Dec. 1996).

²⁶⁰ Interview with Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA), Dec. 5, 1995.

²⁶¹ Interview with Hugh Loftus, Director, NADBANK Domestic Window Office, April 21, 1997.

²⁶² Ten percent of the Bank's capital, or \$300 million, is designated for community adjustment programs, with half going to the U.S. and half to Mexico. A total of \$7.84 million in loans have been made in the United States and Mexico, while only \$3.35 million have gone to the United States. See North American Development Bank, "Annual Report 2003: Moving Forward," at 28 through 31.

²⁶³ Jill Dutt, "Flake Makes NAFTA Pay," *Newsday*, Nov. 17, 1993.

²⁶⁴ "President Clinton Announces SBA Job Creation Program in the Bronx," U.S. News Wire, Dec. 11, 1997; Interview by Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch staff with Rep. Serrano's staff, May 15, 2000.

²⁶⁵ John Maggs, "Fast Track Clears Key Hurdle in the Senate," *Journal of Commerce*, Nov. 5, 1997.

²⁶⁶ Public Citizen analysis of Office of Management and Budget "Budget Authority" Numbers.