

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Potomac TRACON  
Type of event: Interview with John Hendershot, Operations Supervisor, Dulles ATCT on  
September 11, 2001  
Date: December 22, 2003  
Special Access Issues: None  
Prepared by: Miles Kara and Kevin Shaeffer  
Team Number: 8  
Location: Potomac TRACON, Warrenton, VA  
Participants - Non-Commission: David Weigand, FAA Counsel  
Participants - Commission: Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer

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NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of  
the interviewee. Please refer to the tape recording of the interview for a complete  
account.  
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**Background**

Hendershot has been with FAA for 20 years starting with a traffic management assignment at Norfolk  
ACTC in 1983. His experience is primarily supervisory and his Washington DC area experience began in  
1990 when he was the area supervisor at Dulles Tower.

**Command and Control in FAA**

Hendershot had no specific knowledge of FAA command and control for emergency situations. His  
references were to standing daily telecoms. He believed that during emergencies all calls to facilities  
would be handled by the Command Center at Herndon.

Hendershot reported to Jaime Llana, the Operations Manager, who reported to Sherelle Caper, the Asst Air  
Traffic Manager, who reported to Stan McLain, the Air Traffic Manager (ATM). Caper may have been the  
acting ATM. Henderson was in the TRACON portion of the Dulles Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT)  
and was not in the Tower. He recalled that Terry Brown was the Tower Supervisor. The two supervisory  
positions were interchangeable and on any given day Hendershot could be the Tower Supervisor or the  
TRACON Supervisor.

**Crisis Management**

Henderson thought that most such communications would have gone through the Traffic Management  
Coordinator, Mark Masaitas. Masaitas reported to the OM, Jaime Llana, not to Hendershot. Masaitas was  
responsible for implementing and coordinating traffic management initiatives [Note: Masaitas currently  
works at Potomac TRACON, but had departed for the day.] Hendershot's duties focused on air traffic  
management and he would sometimes talk to other facility supervisors in that capacity. When asked about  
the Washington Operations Center (WOC) net Hendershot said he was on a telecom on 9-11 but was not  
sure if it was the WOC net, or not.

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He was asked about his FAA statement concerning the events of 9-11. In that statement he specifically mentioned the Critical Event Eastern Regions Hotline. He did not recall the particulars of that hotline and said that he wasn't on it that long, maybe 10 minutes, max. The Operations Manager (OM) Jaime Llana would typically be on the net, but Hendershot had time critical information to pass and the OM was off the floor.

Hendershot had no specific information about either the WOC primary or tactical nets and does not recall talking on or to the WOC.

He was aware of other hijackings in the system (UA93) from the Command Center, he thought, through Mark Masaitas. He recalled directing everyone to be aware of any suspicious aircraft. Both he and Mark were on scopes, but he doesn't recall giving any specific guidance to look for primary-only targets. At the end of the interview he volunteered that upon hearing that ZID lost secondary and primary on a commercial airliner he advised his air traffic controllers to be more alert.

Danielle O'Brien notified him of a suspicious primary. He immediately picked up the White House hot line. Hendershot was questioned extensively about this line, but did not know any particulars at the receiving end. He said, "I guess the operator picked it up," and assumed the information he passed on to them would be relayed to the right people in the White House. He recalled that there might have been periodic phone/line checks prior to 9-11, but showed no familiarity with the line. He didn't recall other times the hotline (a dedicated line) would be used other than phone checks and coordination of Marine One going to/from Camp David.

Hendershot was shown the FAA-provided transcript, most of which didn't ring a bell. He did state that no one from Dulles Tower was talking to the White House during the minute-minute countdown concerning the unknown primary approaching from the west.

As far as he could recall there were only two hotlines at Dulles, one to the White House and one to airport operations at Dulles. The OM and the TMC would be the primary users of the ICSS phone. Supervisors could also use the system.

He has no specific knowledge of the taping of any hotlines or the ICSS other than to assume they were.