


Caribbean Human Development Report 2012

**Human Development
and the Shift to Better Citizen Security**



*Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.*



The cover design of the report is the outcome of a poster competition organized by UNDP in July 2011 entitled “Youth violence is an exception rather than a rule: Releasing youth vitality through investing in them.” The theme for the competition was intended to closely reflect one of the priority focus areas covered by the Caribbean HDR and inspire the branding of the report.

The competition, which was open to all citizens of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Suriname, Barbados, Guyana and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), closed officially on July 17th with a winner selected from a total of seventeen entries from across the region. The selection was the result of a popular poll done on the Caribbean HDR Facebook page and the votes of a judging panel composed of a regional artist and various UNDP representatives.

The winner of the competition was Trinidadian Timothy Bootan who described his work as depicting “two halves of youth, people who invest in their youth and make their lives better by learning to play music and doing things a normal young person would do, while the other half shows some who decide to follow the wrong path and choose violence from either their loneliness or peer pressure.”

The report cover is a fragment of the winning poster which is reproduced as well on the back cover. UNDP thanks all the competition participants.



Caribbean Human Development Report **2012**

Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security



*Empowered lives.
Resilient nations*

Caribbean Human Development Report 2012
Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security

Copyright © 2012
by the United Nations Development Programme
1 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior permission.

ISBN: 9789962688082

Website: <http://www.regionalcentre-lac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean>

Editors: Robert Zimmermann, Carol Lawes and Nanette Svenson
Cover design: Timothy Bootan and Juan Manuel Salazar
Design and Layout: Miguel Nova y Vínculos Gráficos

Printed in Panama by Inversiones Gumo, S.A.

For a list of any errors or omissions found subsequent to printing please visit our website.

No consultation has been carried out in Guyana.

The data on Guyana have been obtained through public sources and the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Caribbean Human Development Report 2012

Helen Clark

Administrator
United Nations Development Programme

Rebeca Grynspan

Associate Administrator
United Nations Development Programme

Heraldo Muñoz

Assistant Administrator and Director of the
Regional Bureau for LAC
United Nations Development Programme

Niky Fabianci

Deputy Director
Regional Bureau for LAC
United Nations Development Programme

Freddy Justiniano

Director a.i.
Regional Centre for LAC
United Nations Development Programme

Leida Mercado

Human Development Advisor
Coordinator Caribbean HDR
Regional Centre for LAC
United Nations Development Programme

Anthony Harriott

Lead Author Caribbean HDR

Executive Board

Marcia De Castro

UNDP Resident Representative
Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname

Luis Felipe Lopez Calva

Former Chief Economist and Practice Leader
Poverty, MDGs and Human Development
Regional Bureau for LAC

Thomas Gittens

UNDP Country Director
Suriname

Alvaro Pinto

Former Practice Leader
Democratic Governance
Regional Bureau for LAC

Michelle Gyles-McDonnough

UNDP Resident Representative
Barbados and OECs

Pablo Ruiz

Practice Leader
Crisis Prevention and Recovery
Regional Centre for LAC

Arun Kashyap

UNDP Resident Representative
Jamaica

Khadja Musa

UNDP Resident Representative
Guyana

Consultants

Richard Bennett

Consultant on Police

Marlyn Jones

Consultant on State Policies and
Policy Orientation of the Populations

Terri-Ann Gilbert-Roberts

Consultant on Youth Violence and Youth
Resilience

Charles Katz

Consultant on Street Gangs and Organized Crime

Edward Maguire

Consultant on Criminal Justice Systems

National Consultants

April Bernard

Barbados

Marlyn Jones

Jamaica

Randy Seepersad

Trinidad and Tobago

Anthony George

Saint Lucia

Janielle Matthews

Antigua and Barbuda

Mellissa Ifill

Guyana

Jack Menke

Suriname

Survey and Statistics

University of West Indies

Mark Kirton
Marlon Anatol
Roy Russell

Quality Control Consultant

Helena Rovner

Peer Reviewers

Edward Greene

Peer Reviewer on Human Development

Patricia Mohammed

Peer Reviewer on Gender

Gabriel Kessler

Peer Reviewer on Youth

Trevor Munroe

Peer Reviewer on Policy

Foreword

The increase in violence and crime in Latin America and the Caribbean is an undeniable fact that erodes the very foundation of the democratic processes in the region and imposes high social, economic and cultural costs. Our region is home to 8.5 percent of the world's population, yet it concentrates some 27 percent of the world's homicides. Violence and crime are therefore perceived by a majority of Latin American and Caribbean citizens as a top pressing challenge. The resulting alarm has often led to short-sighted, *mano dura* (iron fist) policies, which have proven ineffective and, at times, detrimental to the rule of law.

The situation varies much among and within countries. Broadly speaking, there are high- and low-crime countries in the region, and differences exist even within each of the sub-regions (i.e., South America, Central America, and the Caribbean). However *perceived* insecurity and citizens' concern are independent of actual crime rates, so that *mano dura* policies are not exclusive of high-crime countries.

In this context, we are confronted by a paradox: Why is it that, despite the democratization process experienced in the region in the last 20 years, citizen security levels, as well as the justice and security institutions in the region, are in crisis? Why is it that, despite the structural and institutional reforms promoted by countries in the region in order to construct governance mechanisms which are more transparent, horizontal and democratic, the justice and security institutions are overwhelmed and confidence in them is shattered?

To begin to resolve this paradox and deal effectively with crime and violence, we need accurate assessments that provide evidence for action. To this end, the United Nations Development Programme, in association with governments, civil societies and international agencies, is leading numerous initiatives aimed at improving citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean. This report is a one of these efforts. Drafted by a team of outstanding scholars building upon previous research and practical experience, this report also reflects findings from the analysis of extensive new survey data and sustained consultations involving over 450 experts, practitioners and stakeholders in seven Dutch- and English-speaking Caribbean countries.

Of primary concern with citizen security is the issue of public confidence in state capacity to protect citizens and ensure justice. If citizens lack confidence in the police, the judiciary and other public authorities, no amount of repression will restore security. The success of any law enforcement system depends on the willingness of the people to participate and contribute. For the state to enjoy the trust and commitment of the people, it must strive to eradicate exclusion, improve transparency and create opportunities that encourage a sense of belonging for all.

A key message of the report is that Caribbean countries need to focus on a model of security based on the human development approach, whereby citizen security is paramount, rather than on the traditional state security model, whereby the protection of the state is the chief aim. Indeed, the contrast between prevention on the one hand and repression and coercion

on the other is ill conceived. Social inclusion to help prevent crime and violence and efficient and effective law enforcement are by no means incompatible or mutually exclusive. In a truly democratic society, broad based social inclusion and swift criminal justice—or “prevention” and “coercion”—serve to reinforce and complement each other. This is one of the most important lessons to be taken from this report – and not only for the Caribbean but for all of Latin America as well.

An issue of common interest to Latin America and the Caribbean is security. Organized transnational crime, mainly that which involves drug trafficking, looms large in the security crisis currently affecting an increasing number of countries in both sub-regions. Although this report concentrates on implications for the domestic dimensions of the problem in the Caribbean, especially among youth, it is also important to note that the Caribbean is a critical transit route between drug producers and large-scale consumers. As a result of this geographical positioning, it is necessary for the Caribbean to strengthen cooperation with its Latin American neighbours and project a larger voice in the global dialogue on existing policies and possible alternatives.

An improved worldwide policy addressing the problem of addictive drugs could contribute considerably to reducing levels of violence and social disruption in the Caribbean. This belief is substantiated by an encouraging finding presented in the report: despite exceptionally high homicide rates, the overall incidence of crime in the Caribbean as measured by the victimization survey data “compares favourably at the lower end with countries such as Japan,” referring to nations that participated in the 2004-2005 International Crime Victimization Survey. This suggests that the spiral of violence generally associated with drug trafficking exists within the context of an otherwise durable social fabric that makes for lesser ordinary “street” crime.

This is but one of the constructive insights readers of the Caribbean Human Development Report 2012 will find. With its fresh perspective, solid data and rigorous analysis, this publication offers people from the Caribbean, along with those from Latin America and every other region, many valuable lessons to apply in the ongoing effort of confronting crime and fostering human development.



Heraldo Muñoz
Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme
and Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean

Acknowledgements

This groundbreaking report, the first regional Caribbean Human Development Report, represents an incredible collaboration across sectors of UNDP and non-UNDP experts, practitioners, academics and policy-makers whose combined insight and dedication have made this publication possible. Thus, the list of credits and thanks extends far beyond these pages, but first and foremost goes to the UNDP Country Offices in the Caribbean and the UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean for both financial and technical support of this process since its inception.

Likewise, the UNDP Bureau for Development Policy contributed funding and expertise, and the Human Development Report Office provided critical guidance and commentary. A special appreciation is also in order for the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery for its extensive and invaluable expert participation along with its financial backing.

Several teams and individuals were essential to the success of this production as well. Among them are the technical committee that included Trevor Benn, Sandra Baptiste Caruth, Akiko Fuji, Pablo Gago, Sonia Gill, Stein Hansen, Daniel Luz, Chisa Mikami, Paula Mohamed, Edo Stork, and Alana Wheeler; the communications team comprised of Pablo Basz, Maria Blanco Lora, Janine Chase, Francois Coutu, Luke Paddington and Laura Raccio; the internal and external readers Carmen de la Cruz, Alfredo Gonzalez, George Gray Molina, Natasha Leite, Jairo Matallana, Gerardo Noto, Stefano Pettinato, Maria Tallarico, Hernando Gómez, Mitchell Seligson and Oscar Yunowsky; the research and finance component with Danielle Brown, Estefania Grijalva, Norma Peña, Querube Mora, Raj Ramnath and Cheryle Tewarie. A special appreciation is also due to Minh Pham (Former UNDP Resident Representative Jamaica), Paula Hidalgo, and Pedro Moreno who provided valuable inputs at onset of the preparation process.

The statistical team from the University of the West Indies was indispensable for the design and implementation of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Another important institutional contributor was the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) that facilitated access to Caribbean LAPOP survey data and commented instructively on methodology and results.

With the support of UNDP Country Offices and the UNDP Democratic Dialogue Regional Project, a widespread series of consultations was conducted that involved over 450 government officials, policy-makers, opposition members, academic researchers, civil society representatives, and national and international development practitioners. A special effort was also made during these consultations to include representatives of typically underrepresented groups such as youth, women, Maroon communities and other populations facing potential discrimination. All of the participants in these consultations provided vital qualitative data as well as insightful references that were important for consolidating the findings and recommendations of the report. We thank those who acted as chairs and repertoires of the working groups, Mobola Aguda-F, Charles Clayton, Beverly Chase, Gianluca Giuman, Itziar Gonzalez, Lebrechtta Oye Hesse-Bayne, Meriam Hubbard, Gaston Ian, Anna West, Rosemary Lall, Ruben Martoredjo Carol Narcisse, Rachida Norden, Howie Prince, Philip Thomas, Joan Seymour and Stacey Syne.

We specially wish to acknowledge the contributions provided by the following government and non government representatives during the entire preparation process:

Barbados: Carson Browne, Permanent Secretary Economic Affairs and Team on the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs; George Belle, Dean, F.S.S and Corin Bailey, Research Fellow, University of the West Indies; Rodney Grant, CEO, Wildey Great House; Victor Roach, President National Committee for the Prevention of Alcohol; Cheryl Willoughby, Director, National Task Force on Crime Prevention.

Jamaica: Dwight Nelson, Former Minister of National Security; Aubyn Bartlett, Minister of State, Ministry of National Security; Delroy Chuck, Former Minister for Justice; Peter Phillips, Minister of Finance, Planning and Public Services; Senator Oswald Gaskell Harding; Robert Rainford, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Vivian Brown, Chief Technical Director, Ministry of National Security; Richard Lumsden, Planning Institute of Jamaica; Dianne McIntosh, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of National Security; Gladstone Hutchinson, Director General, PIOJ.

Saint Lucia: Issac Anthony, Permanent Secretary, John Calixte, Deputy Permanent Secretary and Team on the Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and National Development; Mary Wilfred, Programme Officer UNDP-Government of Saint Lucia; Agnes Henry, Assistant Commissioner of Police and Dorian O'Brian, Police Inspector, Royal Saint Lucia Police Force; Hilary Herman, Director, Bordelais Correctional Facility.

Suriname: Jennifer Geerlings-Simons, Speaker of the Parliament; Martin Misiedjan, Minister of Justice and Police; Paul Abena, Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs; Robby Ramlakhan, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ewald Refos, National Champion; Krishna Mathoera, Commissioner of Police; Saskia Wip, Secretary and Raynel Fraser, Member, Suriname National Youth Parliament; Abigail Misdjan, CARICOM Ambassador for Suriname, Ratanlal Kalka, Advisor, Suriname Business Development Center; Lilian Ferrier, Chair, National Commission for Child Rights.

Trinidad and Tobago: Timothy Hamel-Smith, President of the Senate; Bhoendradath Tewarie, Minister of Planning and the Economy; John Sandy, Minister of National Security; Jennifer Boucaud-Blake, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of National Security; Nizam Baksh, Minister of Community Development; Arlene Mc Comie, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government; Senator Surujrattan Rambachan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communications; Gary Griffith, Security Adviser to the Prime Minister; Roy Augustus, Adviser to the Minister of National Security; Margaret Farray, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Community Development; Margaret Parillon, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Communications; Claire Exeter-De Bourg, Senior International Relations Officer, Multi Lateral Division, MFAC; Petronella Sylvester, Asst. Director, Legal Affairs Unit, Ministry of Justice; Stephen Williams, Deputy Commissioner of Police; Gillian Gellizeau-Gardner, National Security Council Secretariat; Mc Donald Jacob, Deputy Commissioner Police ASP, Crime and problem Analysis Unit (CAPA); Esther Best, Director, National Drug Council; Dave Clement and Sean O'Brien, Central Statistical Office (CSO); Wayne Chance, Vision on a Mission (VOM); Jessie-May Ventour, CNMG Television and Radio Producer and Journalist; Anselm Richards, Tobago CSP; Dana Seetahal, President of the T&T Law Association; National Champions: Rhoda Reddock, Don La Foucade, Noble Khan, Winston Cooper, Folade Mutota, Richard Ramoutar, Renee Cummings, Robert Torry, and Ira Mathur.

Regional organizations: Beverly Reynolds, Programme Manager Sustainable Development, CARICOM Secretariat; Len Ishmael, Director General and Team on the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Secretariat; Regional Security System representatives: Grantley Watson, Coordinator; Leonard Cabral and Franklyn Daley, Antigua and Barbuda; Yvonne Alexander, Dominica; Franklyn Belgrove and Margaret Astona Browne, Saint Kitts; Jonathan Nicholls, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Brian Parkes, Grenada; Rhea Reid, Central Liaison Office.

A more detailed presentation of the background research, which was commissioned across a broad range of topics and the complete list of participants attending the consultations, are available online in the Caribbean HDR website <http://www.regionalcentre-lac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean>. Finally, we, the regional Caribbean HDR Team, would like to sincerely thank all of those who were involved directly or indirectly in the research and compilation of this report.

We particularly want to express our gratitude to the survey respondents whose number reached more than 11,000 and who generously supplied the responses that serve as the basis for the preparation of this report. The new regional insights provided in this publication are a reflection of the collective investigative effort, while any errors of commission or omission are the sole responsibility of the Report Team. We are all proud to have been instrumental in this pioneering endeavor and hope it will pave the way for many Caribbean Human Development Reports to follow.

Contents

Overview	1
<hr/>	
Chapter 1 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups	13
<hr/>	
Introduction	15
The Caribbean Context	15
Human Development in the Caribbean Community	16
Trends in the Three Basic Dimensions of Human Development	17
The Inequality-Adjusted HDI	17
The Gender Inequality Index	17
Crime Trends since Independence	20
Crime Victimization	27
Determinants of Victimization	27
Domestic Violence and the Victimization of Women	29
Trafficking in Persons	31
Identification of Groups Vulnerable to Victimization	33
Fear of Crime	36
Perceptions of Security and Insecurity	36
Women's Fear of Crime	39
Conclusion	41
<hr/>	
Chapter 2 Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience	43
<hr/>	
Introduction	45
Youth Violence and Caribbean Human Development	45
Youth Involvement in Violent Crime	46
The Impact of Youth Violence on Caribbean Human Development	49
Risk and Vulnerability: Explaining the Patterns of Youth Violence	50
Societal Risks	52
Community and Interpersonal Risks	54
Individual Risks	56
Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience	57
Reducing Risk and Vulnerability	57
Enhancing Youth Resilience	58
Factors Supporting Risk Reduction and Resilience-Building	59
Conclusion	63
<hr/>	
Chapter 3 Reducing the Contribution of Street Gangs and Organized Crime to Violence	65
<hr/>	
Introduction	67
Scope and Nature of the Problem	68
Prevalence of the Problem	68
The Sex and Age Composition of Caribbean Street Gangs	71
The Organizational Characteristics of Street Gangs	72

The Consequences of Street Gangs and Organized Crime	73
The Causes of Street Gangs and Organized Crime	79
Community-Level Explanations	79
Individual-Level Explanations	82
Responding to Street Gangs and Organized Crime	83
Suppression	84
The Consequences and Limitations of Suppression	85
The Need for Intervention and Prevention	87
Conclusion	88

Chapter 4 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security **91**

Introduction	93
Policing under Colonial Rule: State-Oriented Security	93
Modern-Day Policing: The Citizen Security Approach	94
The Police in the Caribbean	95
The Capability Challenges	95
The Integrity Imperative	96
The Rights-Respecting Imperative	96
Accountability	97
Changing the Relationship with Citizens: Community-Based Police	97
Developing Capacity: Advancing Police Training and Education	99
Regional Cooperation	100
Perceptions on the Police in the Caribbean Region	101
Perceived Police Legitimacy	103
Perceived Police Competence and Performance	105
Willingness of Citizens to Participate and Cooperate with the Police	108
Conclusion	114

Chapter 5 Criminal Justice Systems **115**

Introduction	117
Criminal Justice Systems	117
Legal Systems	117
Prosecution and Defence	119
Correctional Systems	119
Statistical Infrastructure	122
Indicators of the Effectiveness of Criminal Justice Systems	122
Case Processing Delays and Backlogs	123
Low Conviction Rates	124
Prison Overcrowding	125
Insufficient Alternatives to Incarceration	126
Opinions on the Effectiveness of Justice Systems	129
Confidence in the Justice Systems	130
Mechanisms to Prevent and Control Crime	131
Accountability	133
Regulating Police Misconduct	133
Regulating Official Corruption	135
Regional Links	136
CARICOM	136
The Caribbean Court of Justice and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court	137
Regional Bodies Focused on Police, Prosecution, and Corrections	137
Additional Regional Efforts	138
Conclusion	138

Chapter 6 State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations	141
<hr/>	
Introduction	143
The Policy Environment	144
Crime and Insecurity in the Caribbean: The Policy Factor	144
The Evolution of Policy, Deterring Social Violence, and the War on Narco-Trafficking	145
The Shift in Policy Reflected in Budgetary Allocations	146
Explaining the Policy Shift	148
The Policy Orientation of the Population	152
The Policy Environment	152
Public Attitudes towards Crime and Punishment	153
The Salience of Crime in Public Opinion	153
Measure of Punitiveness	154
Social Tolerance and Ideals of Justice	155
Public Opinion on Mechanisms for Preventing and Controlling Crime	157
Balancing Crime Prevention and Crime Control	159
The Implications of Policy Responses	160
State Capacity and Citizen Security	163
Institutional Capacity	163
Building the Human Capacity for Development	164
Youth Unemployment and Social Prevention	167
Conclusion	170
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations	171
<hr/>	
Introduction	173
Conclusions	173
Existing Efforts	173
The Demand for Change	174
Directions for Future Efforts	175
Recommendations	175
Reducing Victimization	176
Reducing Risk and Building Youth Resilience	178
Reducing Gang Violence	181
Transforming the Police	182
Reforming the Justice System	184
Building the Capacity for Evidence-Based Policy	185
Notes	187
<hr/>	
References	201
<hr/>	
Technical Notes	225
<hr/>	

List of Boxes, Charts, Figures and Tables

Boxes

Box 2.1	A Promising Family Programme: Parental Education, Suriname	59
Box 2.2	A Promising Peer Programme: Peace Ambassadors, Barbados	60
Box 2.3	A Promising State-Community Programme: The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica	60
Box 3.1	Why Do Caribbean Youth Join Street Gangs?	71
Box 3.2	Do Gangs Have an Impact on the Number of Homicides in Communities?	73
Box 3.3	Deportees, Street Gangs, and Organized Crime in the Caribbean	82
Box 3.4	When Responding to Gangs Makes the Problem Worse	83
Box 3.5	On the Horizon: Caribbean Anti-Gang Legislation	88
Box 4.1	The Example of the Royal Grenada Police Force	95
Box 4.2	Rio de Janeiro: Community Policing in a Context of High Crime Rates	98
Box 4.3	Problem-Solving Partnerships in Suriname	99
Box 4.4	The Co-Production of Security in Nicaragua	99
Box 4.5	Caribbean Regional Police Training Centres	101
Box 6.1	The Citizen Security Programme, Trinidad and Tobago	147
Box 6.2	The Control of Firearms Trafficking in Central America and Neighbouring Countries	151
Box 6.3	Manifesto of the Democratic Labour Party, Barbados, 2008	161
Box 6.4	Inner City Basic Services for the Poor, Jamaica	166
Box 6.5	Special Youth Employment and Training Project, Jamaica	168
Box 6.6	Anti-Corruption: The National Integrity Action Forum, Jamaica	169
Box 7.1	Strengthening the Capacity to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Firearms in the Caribbean	177
Box 7.2	Citizenship Culture in Bogotá	179
Box 7.3	The Juvenile Violence Prevention Unit of the National Police of Nicaragua	182
Box 7.4	The Juvenile Liaison Scheme, Barbados	183

Charts

Chart 1.1	Human Development Index, Caribbean-7, 2011	17
Chart 1.2	Trends in HDI and HDI Components, Caribbean-7, 1980–2011	18
Chart 1.3	Sense of Security in the Caribbean-7, 2010	19
Chart 1.4	Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010	21
Chart 1.5	Firearm-Related Offences Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean Countries, 1990 - 2010	22
Chart 1.6	Robbery Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010	23
Chart 1.7	Burglary and Break-in Rates Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1990 - 2010	24
Chart 1.8	Rates of Rape Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1993–2010	26
Chart 1.9	Self-Reported Criminal Victimization, Caribbean-7, 2010	27
Chart 1.10	Self-Reported Victimization, by Demographic Group, Caribbean-7, 2010	28
Chart 1.11	Gender Differences in Victimization Rates for Specific Types of Crime, 2010	28
Chart 1.12	Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010	29
Chart 1.13	Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, by	

	Type and Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010	30
Chart 1.14	Fear of Burglary and Robbery, Caribbean-7, 2010	37
Chart 1.15	Weapon-Related Self-Protective Behaviour, Caribbean-7, 2010	38
Chart 1.16	Gender Differences in the Fear of Crime Victimization, by Type of Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010	39
Chart 1.17	Fear of Sexual Assault and Partner Assault, Caribbean-7, 2010	40
Chart 2.1	The Main Problem in the Country in the View of All Respondents, Caribbean-7, 2010	52
Chart 3.1	Perceptions of the Street Gang Problem, Caribbean-7, 2010	68
Chart 3.2	The First Appearance of the Gang Problem in Neighbourhoods, Caribbean-7, 2010	69
Chart 3.3	Neighbourhood Experiences of Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010	74
Chart 3.4	Respondents Who Believe Gangs Make Neighbourhoods Safer, Caribbean-7, 2010	76
Chart 3.5	Perceived Confidence in the Ability of the Police to Control Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010	85
Chart 4.1	Incidence of Key Topics in Police Training Curricula	100
Chart 4.2	The Role of Perceptions of the Police in Achieving Citizen Security	102
Chart 4.3	People Who Believe Police Treat Citizens with Courtesy, Equality, Fairness and Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010	103
Chart 4.4	People Who Believe Police Respect Their Rights and the Rights of All Citizens, Caribbean-7, 2010	104
Chart 4.5	Victims of Domestic Violence Who Believe Police Treated Them with Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010	105
Chart 4.6	Perceived Confidence in the Police to Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010	106
Chart 4.7	Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Robbery and Burglary, Caribbean-7, 2010	107
Chart 4.8	Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010	107
Chart 4.9	Reporting Crimes to the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010	108
Chart 4.10	Satisfaction with Police after Violent Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010	109
Chart 4.11	Satisfaction with Police after Property Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010	110
Chart 4.12	Respondents Who Believe the Police Are Competent and Deserve Support, Caribbean-7, 2010	111
Chart 4.13	Respondents Who Believe the Police Need More Personnel and More Resources, Caribbean-7, 2010	112
Chart 4.14	Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Violent Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010	113
Chart 4.15	Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Age, Caribbean-7, 2010	113
Chart 4.16	Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010	114
Chart 4.17	Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Socio-economic Status, Caribbean-7, 2010	114
Chart 5.1	Respondents Who Rate the Capacity of the Criminal Justice System as Sufficient, Caribbean-7, 2010	129
Chart 5.2	Perception of the Hopelessness of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010	130
Chart 6.1	Estimates of Government Expenditure on Security, Caribbean-7	148
Chart 6.2	Problems of Insecurity, by Dimension, First Mention	

	(Top of Mind), Caribbean-7, 2010	154
Chart 6.3	Crime as One of the Three Most Serious Problems, Caribbean-7, 2010	154
Chart 6.4	Respondents Who Agree the Military Should Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010	157
Chart 6.5	Citizen Support for Institution Building in Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010	159
Chart 6.6	Support for Social Interventions as a Means of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010	160

Tables

Table 2.1	Youth Population, by Country, Caribbean-7, 2004	46
Table 2.2	Youth Self-Reported Criminal Accusations and Arrests, Caribbean-7, 2010	47
Table 2.3	Youth Victimization, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010	49
Table 2.4	The Annual Cost of Youth Crime in Four Caribbean Countries	50
Table 2.5	Risk Antecedents and Risk Markers of Youth Violence in the Caribbean Region	51
Table 2.6	The Main Problem in the Country in the View of Youth, Caribbean-7, 2010	53
Table 2.7	How Should One Resist Violence in Communities? The Point of View of Youth	58
Table 2.8	Analysis of the Context of Youth Violence in the Caribbean	63
Table 3.1	Official Police Estimates of the Population of Street Gangs, Caribbean-7	70
Table 3.2	Victimization and Neighbourhood Gang Presence, Caribbean-7, 2010	75
Table 3.3	Perceptions of Corruption, Caribbean-7, 2010	78
Table 3.4	Mean Levels of Informal Social Control and Community Cohesion with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010	80
Table 3.5	Mean Levels of Social Cohesion in Communities with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010	81
Table 3.6	Confidence of Neighbourhood Residents in the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010	86
Table 3.7	Residents Who do Nothing about Crime Because Criminals are too Powerful, Caribbean-7, 2010	87
Table 4.1	Police Strength and Density, Caribbean-7, 2011	95
Table 4.2	Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7, 2007	97
Table 5.1	A Statistical Profile of Prison Systems, Caribbean-7	120
Table 5.2	Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7	134
Table 5.3	Corruption Perceptions Index, Rankings, Caribbean-7, 2009–2011	135
Table 6.1	The Distribution of Government Budgetary Expenditures on Security	149
Table 6.2	Youth Labour Force Participation Rates, by Gender, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000–2015: History, Estimates and Projections	167



Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security

“The advantage of economic growth is not that wealth increases happiness, but that it increases the range of human choice.”¹ These words were written in 1955 by Arthur Lewis, a Caribbean scholar and Nobel laureate in economics who made an important contribution to the development debate and development policy in the Caribbean and elsewhere. It is a profoundly people-centred approach to economic growth that prefigured the later debates on human development. If people are generally regarded as the centre of the development process in that their freedom of choice, standard of living and general welfare are the purpose of development and their participation, creativity and power in society, the economy and polity are the primary drivers of these outcomes, then these truths are important in Caribbean countries, which are generally characterized by small size and limited natural resources.² This meaning of human development, which emphasizes freedoms and human choice, is found in the work of the Indian development economist Amartya Sen. Human development means the enlargement of people’s freedom to lead lives they value. This revolves around expanding choices and capabilities. The history and developmental aspirations of the Caribbean are truly connected with this approach.

Caribbean people now have a vastly wider range of choices than they had in the colonial era when Arthur Lewis wrote the words quoted above. There have been significant advances in human development especially in health care and education. Since the 1960s, there have been marked increases in life expectancy across most of the countries of the Caribbean and a similarly marked decline in infant mortality. There has been a virtual revolution in access to education. Secondary education is nearly universal, and there is much greater access to tertiary education. There have been

tremendous advances in reducing the levels of poverty and improving the standard of living of the majority. These advances are reflected in the Human Development Index (HDI) scores and rankings for these countries.

There have also been advances in political development and democratic governance. Caribbean countries are, with some exceptions, stable democracies with high levels of political participation and low and declining levels of political violence, which is, in the main, associated with electoral cycles. Democratic stability is evidenced by the repeated uneventful changes in the political administrations in the countries of the region since independence (with interruptions in Grenada and Suriname).³ This stability in the electoral system has been accompanied by the progressive consolidation of the rule of law. The reduction of undue and unlawful political influences on law enforcement and the protection of the independence of the courts have been major achievements in political development since the end of the colonial era.

Despite these advances, several countries in the region are beset by high rates of violent crime and troubling levels of non-criminalized forms of social violence that are typically directed at the members of vulnerable groups that historically have been disfavoured and discriminated against.⁴ If the purpose of development is to widen human choice, the elevated rates of violent crime in the Caribbean may be taken as evidence of problematic development paths that leave far too many behind because of rather limited choices and limited life chances. Much of the crime that is evident in the region is, after all, the outcome of a limited range of human choice, that is, the inequalities of opportunity that restrict these choices among large sections of the populations of the region. Within the region, crime may thus rightly be

regarded as a problem that is profoundly developmental.

Consistent with this understanding of the relationship between crime and development, Amartya Sen, in the introduction to the global *Human Development Report of 2010, The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development*, makes the point that, while much has been accomplished on a global scale since the first Human Development Report in 1990, “the human development approach is motivationally committed to concentrating on what remains undone—what demands most attention in the contemporary world—from poverty and deprivation to inequality and insecurity.”⁵ Insecurity is one of the issues that demand greater attention in the human development process. Insecurity restricts the capacity of people to exercise their freedom of choice and their autonomy. It reinforces inequalities because it mainly affects vulnerable people. It has a negative impact on economic growth. If insecurity is related to elevated rates of violent crime, as it is in the case of the Caribbean, it reflects the limited range of choices open to significant sections of society and the inequalities of opportunity that prevail. Given the strong relationship among crime, insecurity and human development in this region of highly vulnerable small and island micro-states and the importance of this issue to the people of the region, it is most appropriate that the problems of crime and insecurity should demand the attention of the first Human Development Report on the Caribbean.

A Time for Action, the report of the West Indian Commission (1993), was an attempt to address the challenges of Caribbean development in a comprehensive way. Written in 1993, the report only briefly discussed the problem of insecurity, through a focus on illegal drugs. The decade of the 1990s was, however, a period in which the issue of insecurity became more problematic in the region. Subsequent regional reports, including the reports of the Task Force on Crime and Security of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM 2002) and of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and

World Bank (2007), have made invaluable contributions to the better understanding of the problem, improving policy-making and potentially enhancing the effectiveness of planning and programming in crime prevention and control at the national and regional levels. This HDR attempts to build on these efforts and to promote an explicitly developmental approach to the security of people.

This HDR does not aim to replicate or to improve on these efforts, but, rather, to extend them. There are unavoidable overlaps between the HDR and these earlier reports, but this HDR reflects a deliberate attempt to minimize these overlaps. Therefore, this HDR does not attempt to explore every aspect of the security situation in the region. Thus, for example, the discussion of drug use and drug-trafficking is somewhat limited, and, related to this, the discussion of the transnational activity of organized crime networks is also limited. Indeed, the discussion of organized crime is largely restricted to national dimensions and activities and, particularly, the violence that is generated. This approach calls greater attention to the internal roots of the problem and does so without minimizing the importance of international cooperation in tackling transnational organized crime networks and drug-trafficking. Similarly, while the UNODC and World Bank report (2007) focuses on organized crime, the HDR places greater emphasis on street gangs and their role in generating violence. Consistent with the intent to avoid retracing the paths followed by earlier reports, the important issues of white-collar and corporate crime, as well as deportee or involuntarily returned migrants, are also excluded.⁶ The focus on violence and the responses or incapacity to respond effectively to violence is a central concern of the report.

The Caribbean

This is the first HDR on the Caribbean region. The Caribbean is diverse. It consists of several subgroupings that may be categorized in different ways. It may be subdivided by geographical features into the mainland

Caribbean and the insula (island) Caribbean and by linguistic groups into the Dutch-speaking, English-speaking, Francophone, and Hispanic Caribbean.

The Caribbean is largely made up of societies that are young in historical terms. Except for Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Cuba, which became independent in 1804, 1821 and 1902, respectively, Caribbean societies have only emerged as independent nations in the last 50 years, and some still remain dependencies of European powers.⁷ In the case of the English-speaking Caribbean countries that attained their independence between 1962 and 1983, the sense of national identity that emerged during the latter part of the colonial era has not yet become consolidated into a source of social cohesion.

These countries are also characterized by considerable variation in their basic demographic features, levels of development and state capacities. Caribbean populations are young, and, in several countries, most persons now live in urban areas. In the seven countries selected as the research sites for this report (the Caribbean-7), the proportion of persons below the age of 25 years ranges from a high of 54 percent in Guyana to a low of 36 percent in Barbados, with the corresponding population proportion for this group of countries is 46 percent.⁸ The populations of the region are diverse. Cultural differences are expressed in the wide range of languages and religions. Christianity is the dominant religion, but there are significant proportions of Hindus and Muslims in Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. In Trinidad and Tobago, 23 percent of the population are Hindus, and 6 percent are Muslims, and, in Guyana, the corresponding proportions are 28 and 7 percent. Racial, colour and ethnic diversity are variously configured within the region. For example, in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, no racial group enjoys majority status. The major racial groups are persons of East Indian origin, at 44 and 40 percent, respectively, and persons of African origin, at 30 and 38 percent, respectively. Other societies such as Jamaica and Antigua are of predominantly African descent. Barbados has a numerically

significant—at 3 percent—and economically powerful white racial minority. There are other minority groups, including Amerindians, who constitute 9 and 2 percent of the population in Guyana and Suriname, respectively.⁹ People of Chinese origin are also present and have made invaluable contributions to the development of the countries of the region.

Differences in levels of development are captured in the distinction between those states that are classified as more developed countries (MDCs) and those that are classified as less developed countries (LDCs).¹⁰ This distinction is being erased by the higher growth rates and HDI scores of the LDCs and former LDCs. The MDCs are typically small states, while the LDCs are typically micro-states. The size of the populations of the micro-states falls within a range of less than 40,000 in Saint Kitts and Nevis to almost 173,000 in Saint Lucia. These states have limited capacities. Among them, regionalism is thus treated as a problem-solving device.

Historically, the countries of the region have been producers of primary products for export. This pattern left legacies of inequality that have since been eroded by changes in economies, greater access to education and high rates of social mobility. But, in some Caribbean cities, particularly those in the larger territories, there are substantial populations of excluded poor. In contexts of rapid social change and socially dislocating modernizing processes, high levels of inequality and the multiple deprivations that are associated with social exclusion tend to be strongly correlated with criminal violence.

The countries of the region have tried to increase their viability and reduce their vulnerabilities via regional integration. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM), and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) are expressions of these efforts. CARICOM has a membership of 15 states. CARIFORUM is simply CARICOM, plus the Dominican Republic. It was expected to be a bridge to the Dutch-, French-, and Spanish-speaking countries of the Caribbean. OECS is a subset of more closely integrated

CARICOM states. Earlier attempts at political integration were not successful, and the West Indies Federation, which was the architecture for political integration, collapsed in 1961 before the first set of Caribbean countries became independent. The movement for Caribbean integration now focuses on functional cooperation, economic integration, the coordination of foreign policy, and, most recently, regional security cooperation and rationalization. These are the four pillars of the integration movement. CARICOM has a fairly elaborate structure. At the apex of this structure is the Conference of Heads of Government. The regional security establishment includes the Council of National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE). At the level of the civil service, there are several committees consisting of heads of law enforcement and military, customs and migration officials and other representatives of security and law enforcement agencies. The operational arm of the security establishment is the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), which, as its name suggests, coordinates the implementation of regional security policies. IMPACS was established after the completion of the work of the CARICOM Task Force on Crime and Security, which identified a number of priorities and made several recommendations to the Conference of Heads of Government, most of which remain relevant.¹¹

The Selection of Countries

The scope of this report is limited to the Dutch-speaking and English-speaking countries. The selection of these two subregions is based on the understanding that insecurity has become a serious problem in these two groupings, but particularly in the English-speaking Caribbean. In addition, systematic work aimed at a better understanding of the issues on a truly regional scale has been somewhat limited. Moreover, there has not been a regional HDR for these groups of countries previously, and there have been only a few HDRs on the individual countries within these two subgroupings.¹²

Seven countries within these two groups

have been selected as the research sites for this report (the Caribbean-7). These countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The report clearly focuses on the English-speaking group. These seven countries have been selected in a manner that accounts for geographical spread, population size, and the variations in the degree and character of the problem of insecurity. They have been selected with variation in mind. They represent the geographical dispersion of the group in that they include countries in the northern Caribbean (Jamaica), the south Caribbean (Trinidad and Tobago) and the east Caribbean (Saint Lucia). There are island territories (Barbados) and mainland territories (Guyana). There is variation in the size, including micro-states (Saint Lucia and Antigua and Barbuda) and small states (Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago). And there is variation in the levels of development through the representation of LDCs and MDCs. The selected countries also represent the differences and range of variation in the level, structure and intensity of the crime and insecurity problems in the region. Barbados, for example, shows a high level of property crimes, but a relatively low level of violent crimes. Jamaica is the opposite. Among the English-speaking countries, the countries selected approximate a maximum variation sample. Suriname represents the Dutch-speaking territories. It is the only unambiguously independent Dutch-speaking territory. In this sense, it is self-selecting. We emphasize variation to capture the range of problems and experiences and thereby enrich the analysis and the proposed solutions to the problems. This approach, we hope, will make the report relevant and useful for all.

As a regional HDR, the report and the process associated with it present an opportunity for the people of the region to learn more about each other and to learn from each other. Learning more about each other is imperative given the CARICOM and CARIFORUM integration frameworks and the impact of the forces of globalization. There is increasingly intensive contact among the peoples of the region. Because of increased

integration, there is more interdependence, shared vulnerabilities and greater risks and opportunities. Learning about each other smashes stereotypes and reduces fear and the treatment of neighbouring citizens as threats. Learning from each other involves making accessible the positive and negative experiences of the different countries of the region, thereby enhancing collective learning from this larger pool of experience. Given the dynamism and complexity of the crime and security problems and the importance of finding solutions to these problems for the people of the region, this ought to be a focal point for shared learning. Thus, in this report, promising practices are drawn from several countries. This approach is extended beyond the region to draw on some of the experiences of Central America and other parts of the hemisphere.

Crime and Development in the Caribbean

The negative impact of crime on development in its various aspects is well documented. Crime, particularly violent crime, tends to have a negative impact on vulnerable economies such as those of the Caribbean. It erodes confidence in the future development of countries, reduces the competitiveness of existing industries and services by, for example, imposing burdensome security costs, and may negatively alter the investment climate. Capital may take flight.¹³ Crime may generate insecurities among the general population that lead to loss of human capital via migration, that is, the loss of skilled and educated citizens. People may take flight. The quality of education and health care suffer because of the diversion of scarce resources to the control of crime. Crime destroys social capital and thereby retards the development process.¹⁴ This negative effect of crime on development represents an argument for more effective crime prevention and control and improved citizen security as a condition for development.¹⁵ In the context of the Caribbean, effective crime prevention and control may be a condition for development, but de-

velopment is also a condition for lower rates of violent crime and more secure societies.

It is well known that growth is not equated with development. But the relationship between crime and growth may serve to illuminate the relationship of growth to development.

The joint report of UNODC and the World Bank, *Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean*, presents evidence in support of the claim that, on average, increased economic growth is associated with reduced crime rates.¹⁶

Economic growth increases opportunities. It may, however, also intensify inequalities and exclusionary trends, and, in the rapidly changing societies of the Caribbean region, it may also trigger unrealistic expectations and have strong mobilizing effects even among the excluded. Exclusionary and jobless growth and, especially, high rates of youth unemployment, coupled with unrealistic expectations and high levels of inequality, tend to result in high rates of crime, including violent crime. Particular countries may thus deviate from the general pattern or average effect of the impact of growth rates on crime rates or crime patterns. The relationship is policy and context sensitive. High rates of violent crime and gender violence may be regarded as the outcome of a wrong approach to development that marginalizes large sections of the population.

Where crime, particularly violent crime, has become a major social problem, it has had feedback effects that retard the development process in the economic, social and even political dimensions.

The effects of crime on some of the economies of the region have been documented. As suggested above, the effects extend beyond the economy. In the more socially fragmented societies of the region, the victimization of members of one group by members of another group may have the effect of deepening race, class and gender divisions. For example, if crime becomes racially motivated or otherwise associated with race, this may trigger race mobilization, which intensifies political conflicts, thereby generating even greater inse-

curity. In such situations, it becomes exceedingly difficult to achieve consensus policies for crime prevention and control that would permit greater community-level cooperation and avoid cross-pressures on law enforcement and other state agencies that tend to make these agencies ineffective in policy implementation. Crime control and prevention policies thus become the policies of particular political administrations rather than truly national policies.

High levels of violent crime may have other negative political effects. These effects may include the amplification of already existing authoritarian tendencies among citizens that take the form of demands for greater punitiveness, support for laws that reduce the rights of citizens and give greater power to the police, and, more recently, significant support for military regimes as a means of managing more effectively the problems of insecurity.¹⁷ These tendencies influence national policies, and it is the poor and the most vulnerable whose freedoms are most affected by crime and whose rights are most restricted by crime control measures. At the national level, if crime is responded to or fought in ways that reduce fundamental rights, then political development may be arrested and notions of citizenship may become problematic. Security policies that unnecessarily restrict the rights and freedoms of people tend to restrict political development.

At the regional level, there is a reproduction of this problem if citizens of the countries of the region who seek opportunities elsewhere or who, in various ways, conduct business or simply wish to travel within the region are subjected to indignities and disrespectful treatment by border control agents. These activities find their justification in narratives that seek to tie links among freedom of movement, the migration of poverty and a crime contagion. If crime and violent behaviour are externalized in this way, then unwarranted restriction on movement within the region is the likely outcome. Yet, given the small size of the countries and the corresponding limited pools of human capital in any one country, free movement is vital to the integration pro-

cess and to development in the region.

The approach to crime control that regards it as a trade-off with freedom and rights is but an expression of a broader attitude towards the place of the ordinary citizen in the larger development process. Freedoms and rights may be seen as threatening to the development process, which, it is felt, requires a disciplined focus on economic growth and capital accumulation. As in matters of crime control and security, where freedom may be seen as an obstacle rather than as foundational to the security of citizens, so too in matters of economic development: freedom may be seen as an obstacle to development (at least in its early stages) rather than as constitutive of development.¹⁸

Given the effects described above, the concern regarding the development strategies of some countries of the region, particularly in the 1960s to 1980s, was that these strategies were exclusionary and thus underestimated the importance, in the development process, of social integration and human creativity. The pattern of concentration of violent crimes in the communities of the urban poor that is described in this report is evidence of the association of crime with exclusionary processes that have long histories and that have found much contemporary reinforcement. In troubled countries, a vicious cycle has been set in motion, thereby making crime control and prevention more difficult.

This vicious cycle of unbalanced development that generates high levels of crime and insecurity that, in turn, impede development may be avoided. Where this vicious cycle exists, it may be transformed into a virtuous circle. Balanced development reduces and prevents the emergence of crime as a major social problem. Sound crime reduction and prevention facilitate the achievement of development goals. In the words of Helen Clark, the Administrator of the UNDP, "If we fail to reduce [the] levels of armed violence in affected countries, our collective commitment to MDG targets is not only under threat; but indeed progress is likely to be reversed."¹⁹

There is considerable variation in the pop-

ulation size, land area and natural resources of the countries of the Caribbean, but they are, in the main, small island developing states (SIDSs). They rely on state institutions to respond to the security challenges they face. These countries, however, cannot afford to spend large proportions of their budgets to strengthen law enforcement machinery. They must invest in the prevention of crime, in the capabilities of their people and in the creation of opportunities.

The degree, intensity and character of the problems of crime and insecurity vary from country to country. The capacities of the state institutions that are charged with the responsibility to protect the populations they serve and to ensure justice are also quite different within the region. Regardless of these differences, however, crime and insecurity have become more generalized Caribbean problems. Crime, violence and insecurity demand our attention.

The problem is acute and in need of urgent action. A sense of urgency usually inspires policies that are intended to yield short-term results and therefore are usually restricted to more punitive measures, more robust law enforcement action, and assigning more power to the police, typically without the commensurate systems of accountability. The challenge behind this report is to discover ways to address crime as a fundamental development issue without ignoring the pressing short-term aspects of crime. The challenge is to meet the requirements of urgency, effectiveness and justice without neglecting the root socio-economic causes of the problem.

It may reasonably be claimed that HDRs have helped shift the debate on development and that this shift has had some impact on public policy and, consequently, on the conditions of the lives of people in the region. *A similar shift in thinking is needed in security and crime control policy-making.* Shifts in ways of thinking and acting on this scale are usually the outcome of slow processes that may take place in many different sites of innovation in crime reduction and prevention both within the state and non-state sectors and at the national and regional levels. Such shifts

in thinking are most likely to first occur and take effect as policy if there is an inclusive and deliberative approach to policy-making based on an active citizenry and open and accountable government and if the welfare and rights of the citizen are at the centre of security considerations and the citizen is regarded as a critical actor in the co-production of security. This report hopes to make a contribution to this process of change and innovation, not least by documenting and highlighting some of the good practices that may be observed in the region.

Citizen Security: a Shift in Ideas

We believe that the required shift in thinking is reflected in the idea of citizen security. Citizen security may be regarded as a dimension of human security. The more overarching construct, human security, “is based on a fundamental understanding that Governments retain the primary role for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens.”²⁰ Human security articulates a core set of concerns, including safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats and safety from both state and non-state actors. It refers to “one of the means or conditions for human development, which in turn is defined as the process that opens up an individual’s options . . . [which] range from enjoying a long and healthy life, access to the knowledge and resources needed to achieve a decent standard of living, to enjoyment of political, economic and social freedoms.”²¹ In this construct, citizen security is strictly a dimension of human security because it is conceived as the social situation in which all persons are free to enjoy their fundamental rights and in which public institutions have sufficient capacity, against a backdrop of the rule of law, to guarantee the exercise of those rights and respond efficiently when those rights are violated.²²

Thus, the citizenry is the principal focus of the state’s protection. It is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of *human* development. Therefore, institutional interventions to prevent and control violence and crime (citizen security policies) can be regarded as an indi-

rect, but, nonetheless, significant opportunity, first, to buttress sustainable economic development and, second, to strengthen democratic governance and the observance of human rights.²³

The concept of ‘citizen security’ is associated with security against the threat of crime or violence and is used to refer to the paramount security of individuals and social groups. It does not stand in opposition to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state. Citizen security includes institutional and social actions to protect and guarantee effective liberties and the rights of people through the control and prevention of crime and disorder.

In addition, the “concept of citizen security involves those rights to which all members of a society are entitled, so that they are able to live their daily lives with as little threat as possible to their personal security, their civic rights and their right to the use and enjoyment of their property.”²⁴ This conceptualization entails the idea that the state has an obligation to protect the citizen and to do so in ways that respect rights. These ideas have universal appeal and are particularly relevant in the Caribbean.

Elements essential to increasing citizen security in the Caribbean context therefore include the reform of state institutions to make them more effective and ensure they respect rights, the creation of avenues for citizen participation and the development of programmes geared towards decreasing poverty and inequality, including gender and race or ethnic inequality, thereby increasing social integration.

The idea of citizen security also places responsibilities on the citizens. They are expected to participate actively in the co-production of their security in partnership with state agencies. This means citizens must actively engage in problem-solving in their communities and in demanding greater accountability among state agencies, including the police and courts. It means taking greater responsibility for their own security and their own behaviour, respecting the rights and integrity of others and acknowledging their responsi-

bility towards their fellow citizens. Security and human progress entail a commitment to good citizenship. The capacity of responsible state institutions, however, remains central to the effective protection of the citizen.

Institutions

Strong and legitimate institutions and inclusive systems of governance are crucial to providing citizen security and justice so as to break cycles of violence.²⁵ In the Caribbean, the law enforcement and justice systems tend to be weak and have a limited capacity to provide the effective protection of citizens. Thus, while building the capacity of state institutions, it is necessary to transform the relationship between these institutions and the people so that, in the case of the provision of security services and the administration of justice, this is done with the people, not only for the people. This is the option of transitioning to citizen security, that is, a profoundly democratic approach to security. This approach is even more important for the enduring stability of weak and vulnerable states such as those in the region. In this context, the term citizen security is not used to carry the idea of pushing back or pushing out the state. Rather, it involves democratizing the state so that it better serves and protects the people. In its most developed expression, it entails the co-production of security by state and citizen. As a co-producer of security, the citizen has a duty to respect the rights, physical integrity and dignity of others. Traditional approaches to security in situations where the capacity of the state to protect and ensure adequate access to justice is doubtful may lead to external dependency and a renunciation of democratic processes and practices. Just as there can be jobless, voiceless and rootless growth, there can be voiceless security, that is, a paternalistic state security system whereby the state is not accountable to its citizens and, worse, whereby authoritarian tendencies are strengthened in the state security establishment, the political administration and among sections of the population. There can also be a rights-less security whereby populations are told that they must constantly give up their rights as a trade-off for the more effective provision of security by the state. Through

The time to act is now. The trajectory of violence can be interrupted, and insecurity can be diminished. This has been achieved elsewhere and can be achieved in the countries of the region.

these old patterns, security is set in opposition to any notion of political development that is grounded in democratic principles of voice, participation and accountability.

Social Prevention

A transition to citizen security means not only institutional reform, but also a focus on the reduction of social risks, that is, social crime prevention. This assures a stable and sustained security that does not rest primarily on police action and the imposition of discipline by the state and therefore does not constantly seek to trade away the rights and freedoms of security among citizens. Social crime prevention means ending marginalization and more effectively integrating excluded sections of the population. The improved social integration of society increases the potential for greater resilience and better state-society relations, which may result in greater voluntary compliance with the law. This focus on social crime prevention means paying attention to the social conditions that are most associated with crime and creating greater opportunities and choices for people, which does not necessarily mean one must design expensive intervention programmes in skills training and job creation. The root causes of violent crimes, especially youth crimes and delinquency, include less tangible factors that account for the alienation and sense of exclusion among these population groups. Paying attention to the root causes therefore also means treating people with respect, positively protecting their rights, and promoting common integrative identities that bridge race, colour, ethnicity, class, gender and other social divides, thereby promoting a common sense of belonging and a common national and regional purpose. The survey which was conducted as a part of this project—the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010—found majority support for this approach in every country. The adoption of programmes of social crime prevention is, therefore, not a politically risky policy.

In summary, citizen security ought to have social prevention, citizen rights, and state institutional reform dimensions. Citizen security is most effective if states are responsive

and accountable and are willing to integrate crime prevention into larger development planning and if citizens are aware of their civic duties and rights and are engaged in the co-production of their own security.

The Messages of the Report

The central message of this report is simple enough: the Caribbean countries need to complete the shift from an approach to security that is centrally concerned with regime protection to the full adoption of a citizen security approach that is consistently pursued in the context of human development. Caribbean countries have a long history of inequality and discrimination. The inequality includes inequalities of social power that find expression in the unbalanced distribution of state protection and the inequitable treatment of rights and freedoms. This historical pattern still affects the distribution of the protective resources of the state and the way in which the rights of different groups, including the most vulnerable, are treated. Citizen security is centred on profoundly changing this relationship between the state and the citizenry by making institutions more responsive and accountable to the people they serve. Such a fundamental change entails greater social integration, which may be brought about by seeking to resolve the problems of social exclusion and marginalization among large sections of the populations—including state security practices that do not respect rights and unnecessarily stigmatize and criminalize—and by a greater emphasis on human development. These ideas may be simple, but they are hugely significant in the everyday lives of the people of the region.

The main messages of this report are as follows:

- *First, with the right mix of policies, high levels of violence can be successfully turned around.* There are many useful and instructive cases of countries that have been able to make considerable improvements in their security situations, while reducing the levels of violence and insecurity. Some of these experiences are included in the various chapters of this report. There are also

valuable and instructive Caribbean experiences at the country and community levels. Barbados, for example, has avoided high levels of criminal and political violence. Targeted prevention programmes, especially those that are directed at youth, the greater responsiveness and accountability of state agencies, national unity, and high levels of citizen participation all contribute to effective outcomes. The practices and lessons of some of these experiences may be helpful for other countries and are discussed in the report.

- *Second, gender-based violence (GBV) can be controlled and prevented by interventions that interrupt the cycle of violence.* Some forms of GBV, particularly domestic violence, tend to show histories and patterns of abusive behaviour that may be disrupted in their early stages before they degenerate into life-threatening and life-taking physical violence. This requires investments aimed at developing the capabilities of the responsible institutions of the state.
- *Third, social cohesion is generally greater in communities that have no street gangs and less in communities that have street gangs.* Street gangs are major contributors to the high rates of violence. This message should instruct policy. Social cohesion is promoted by socially integrative policies that give people, particularly young people, a sense of being valued and belonging to the community and the country regardless of ethnicity, gender, class, or other differences.
- *Fourth, security efforts are more effective if the rights of the people are respected and the people are involved as active agents and co-producers of their own security.* If they are to be effective, the policy-making and policy-implementation processes and the state institutions that are responsible for public safety and the security of citizens must have the confidence of the people. Confidence rests on respect for rights and adherence to the principles of good governance, including accountability, transparency and participation. Processes that are open and participatory and institutions that are fair and responsive are likely to be more effective.
- *Fifth, there is considerable popular support for social crime prevention.* Caribbean populations, including in the most crime-affected countries, tend to have a strong sense of social justice that informs their thinking about crime prevention and crime reduction policies. Public policies that are oriented towards social justice are therefore likely to be consensus policies. Considerable evidence in support of this conclusion is presented in this report.
- *Sixth, empowering young people by investing in their development should be a priority.* Most Caribbean countries have young populations. There are large populations of youth at risk, some of whom may drift into self-destructive anti-social behaviour. It follows that investments in youth and, more specifically, investments in youth at risk or detached youth are likely to yield significant returns in terms of reductions in violence and crime and greater citizen security. Because violent crime is a drag on development, investments in the prevention of youth violence may, in turn, yield good results in human development.
- *Seventh, opportunities matter.* This is why the importance of social crime prevention is underscored, but a sense of belonging, participating in political and community life, being respected by others, and having one's rights respected matter equally; in the case of young people, they may matter even more. Improving security therefore does not involve only the design and implementation of costly programmes. It requires adequate regard for the intangibles associated with how people are treated and with greater social integration and cohesion.
- *Eighth, crime and insecurity are costly to long-term development.* Successfully meeting the security challenges of the moment requires the consistent adoption of a citizen security approach. The time to act is now. The trajectory of violence can be interrupted, and insecurity can be diminished. This has been achieved elsewhere and can be achieved in the countries of the region.

The Process of Producing the Report

The HDR Process

The process of producing the report may be divided into two basic stages. During the first stage, monographs on the situation in the Caribbean-7 countries selected for participation in the HDR process were prepared, albeit with considerable limitations in the availability of comparable data. During the second stage, an analysis of the regional situation was conducted, and the regional HDR was produced. The national processes and the seven national monographs fed into the second stage of the process.

Methodological Issues

Evidence-based policy and programme design requires rigorous analysis of the problems to be addressed. This HDR relies heavily on primary data gathered through the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.²⁶ Extensive use is also made of secondary sources, including official statistics on reported crimes, although this was limited by the absence of comparable data on all countries. For example, data on the caseloads of courts, the caseloads of police investigators and other indicators of the capacities and capabilities of institutions of the criminal justice systems of the countries of the region are not uniformly available across all countries.

The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 was administered in the Caribbean-7, which are named in the section on Selection of Countries. Some 11,155 resident citizens of the Caribbean-7 were randomly selected and interviewed. The target population of the survey was households with at least one person older than 18 years of age and residing permanently in the household.

The sample for the survey was designed to reflect the key demographic characteristics of the adult population of the participating countries based on the results of the most recent population censuses. For each country, the sample was self-weighted by regional and gender distribution and configured to be representative of the target population. A multi-stage, stratified area probability sample

was developed. The objective of this sample design was to attain the highest level of representativeness and distribution among the selected sampling units and, in turn, the respondents of the survey.²⁷

The report also relies on secondary data taken from official sources in the Caribbean-7. It is well known that reported crime rates do not usually approximate true crime rates. The proximity of the reported crime rate to the true crime rate usually varies with the seriousness of the type of crime. Thus, for example, in most jurisdictions, the reported homicide rate may be assumed to approximate closely the true homicide rate. For those types of crimes on which the reported rates are high across jurisdictions, valid comparisons within and across countries may be made. At the other end of the spectrum, the proportions of property crimes that are reported will tend to be much lower and will tend to vary considerably across jurisdictions. This makes cross-national comparisons somewhat problematic. However, if within any given country, the proportion of each crime that is reported is stable over time, then trend analyses may be meaningful.

Some of the factors that may affect changes in the proportion of crimes that are reported to police services include the level of confidence in the police and other institutions of the justice system and patterns of insurance coverage. Under normal conditions, these factors tend to change rather slowly. Trends may thus be compared and contrasted across countries even though the official statistics may not represent true crime rates and the proportion of reported crimes may differ across countries.

Another obstacle to comparative analyses of official crime statistics is the differences in legal definitions of various crimes. These definitional differences may be found in the Caribbean. This problem has been minimized by selecting for comparative analysis only those crimes that are legally defined in similar fashion across the Caribbean-7 jurisdictions, such as murder and homicide, and those crimes that are amenable to reconstituted operational definitions, such as burglary. Where

particular categories of crimes have been re-constituted to make them comparable, these changes are noted in the text.

Consultations: Participation Matters

The process of producing the report has involved extensive and intensive consultations with experts, practitioners and a variety of institutional actors and interested parties across the region. There were three iterations of national consultations in Barbados, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago and fewer, but similarly targeted consultations during bilateral meetings in Antigua and Barbuda and in Saint Lucia. Some 194 persons, including government officials and representatives of civil society, experts and practitioners, actively participated in this process. Five regional consultations were also held in Paramaribo, Suriname; Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago; Bridgetown, Barbados; Castries, Saint Lucia; and Kingstown, Jamaica between 1 and 20 September, 2011 and involving 256 persons, including members of regional organizations such as the Regional Security System and CARICOM. The consultations were developed using the democratic dialogue methodology, and they provided the opportunity to

cross-check and flesh out the findings derived from the data generated during the survey according to the experiences of the participants in the consultative process.

Participation is an important principle. It ensures good recommendations that are grounded in the evidence generated by the research process, as well as the experience of practitioners. Good recommendations are not simply bright new ideas. They are ideas that are effective in the particular national environment and that sufficiently animate people and motivate them to invest their time and energy in implementation. The best results are achieved if rigorous research is combined with efforts to tap into the experiences of practitioners and stakeholders.

This requires the active participation of practitioners and stakeholders. The commitment to participation is grounded in confidence in the knowledge that people may contribute and the belief that people's actions make a difference in determining outcomes. For this HDR, the participatory process is expected to be ongoing and may be even more fruitful after the report has been published. The process initiated by the report will, hopefully, be more important than the report itself.



CHAPTER

1

Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

**Proactive, pre-emptive
policies need to target at-risk
groups, eradicating violence
before it starts**

**It's not culture; it's crime:
no form of gender-based
violence should be tolerated**

**Rejection by the mainstream
breeds mischief on the
margins**

Introduction

This chapter examines crime trends since independence and locates these trends in the context of the development challenges faced by Caribbean countries during this period. It identifies aspects of citizen insecurity in the region and shows how feelings of insecurity have shaped public attitudes about the effectiveness of Caribbean governments in fighting crime.

The chapter first reviews and describes important developments in crime in the region since independence. It then discusses the victimization reported by the participants in the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 for this Caribbean Human Development Report (HDR), followed by an examination of the fears about crime or the anxieties related to the perceived risk of victimization that these people experience and the protective steps they have taken. At several points, the discussion focuses on the experiences and concerns of vulnerable groups.

The Caribbean Context

Although the achievement of national independence is supposed to signal a promising moment in the path towards development, the optimism with which countries in the region engaged in their independence was soon challenged by economic, political and social factors that had foundations in the colonial past. The legacy of deep social problems, such as high levels of income inequality and inequality of opportunity, including gender inequality, high rates of unemployment, high rates of rural and urban poverty, and communities with histories of social exclusion, has continued to exert an influence until today. Post-independence governments

must bear some of the responsibility for these disappointing results. Better management of the transition from independence might have produced more positive outcomes among populations.

For instance, governmental policy for economic development was based on direct foreign investment in key sectors of the region's economies. When strains emerged soon after independence, evident in the resentment felt about foreign ownership, enclave economic growth, limited economic diversification, high unemployment and rising social discontent, these were not adequately addressed in creative and positive ways. Indeed, the current economic and social predicament facing the region demands innovative leadership and sound long-term development strategies.

Thus, the region's development and, by extension, the peoples' quality of life have been affected by a range of negative factors. Economically, except for Guyana's agricultural sector and Trinidad and Tobago's extractive sector, the light industries and services that once sustained the region have struggled. The region now relies heavily on travel and tourism for economic wealth and job creation. The World Travel and Tourism Council ranks the Caribbean region first (among 12 regions) in the relative contribution of tourism to the regional economy and the most tourist-dependent area in the world. Tourism accounts for 25 percent of the foreign exchange earnings, 20 percent of all jobs, and between 25 and 35 percent of the total economy of the Caribbean.¹ The region's heavy dependence on tourism creates vulnerabilities, such as the emergence of sex tourism, which exploits young women and children. Tourism is highly vulnerable to developments in source countries such as tax regimes and changes in the business cycle in these countries, as well

as the effects of climate change, including the loss of shore-line and more extreme weather conditions. It is also vulnerable to the effects of high rates of violence. Persistently high rates of violence in a single country or group of countries have the potential to damage the reputations of all the countries of a region. This is truly a regional issue and a regional vulnerability.

Politically, the region underwent dramatic changes in response to powerful shifts in global and local values that began in the 1960s with the Black Power Movement and continued into the 1970s with other social movements that were inspired by grass-roots advocacy for social justice and social change. The outcome was a shift to the left by some states, such as Guyana, which adopted cooperative socialism under Forbes Burnham, and Jamaica, which turned to democratic socialism under Michael Manley. During the 1970s, the ideas associated with these social movements became, for a time, part of the political mainstream and profoundly influenced the development policies of governments in the region.

In one of the outcomes, social sensibilities and public attitudes towards restraining moral values underwent dramatic changes beginning in the early 1970s. As the growing population of young people became more assertive, claims for individual empowerment and more open opportunity structures, especially wider access to education, created greater pressure for social reform. This is reflected in the comparatively better performance of the countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) on international indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and their ranking as middle-income countries.²

Human Development in the Caribbean Community

Human development measures rely on the HDI, which is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The HDI has been


estimated since 1990 for most countries in the world. However, a complete 1990–2011 HDI series has been calculated for only three countries among the Dutch-speaking and English-speaking countries in the Caribbean, while, for many others, especially small island developing states (SIDSs), the HDI was estimated for the first time only in 2010–2011.³ This represents a challenge in looking at HDI trends in the region.

The HDIs for the seven Caribbean countries selected as the research sites for this report (the Caribbean-7) are presented in chart 1.1. The HDI for Barbados for 2011 is 0.793, positioning the country in the very high human development category and a rank of 47 among 187 countries and territories. For the rest of the countries, with the exception of Suriname and Guyana, the HDI ranges between 0.764 and 0.723, positioning these in the high human development category. Suriname and Guyana, with HDIs of 0.680 and 0.633, respectively, are in the medium human development category. Among the Caribbean-7, only Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, and Trinidad and Tobago have HDIs higher than the HDI for the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region (0.731).

To reflect more closely the specific characteristics of the Dutch-speaking and English-speaking countries, we have estimated a 2011 aggregated HDI that covers all CARICOM countries for which data are available.⁴ This represents the first attempt to estimate such an HDI. The 2011 CARICOM estimated HDI is 0.564, which is considerably lower than the 2011 LAC HDI. Since the HDI is a population-weighted index, the low value of the CARICOM HDI may be explained by the impact of Haiti, given the proportion of the CARICOM population accounted for by Haiti (nearly 60 percent) in 2011. If the CARICOM HDI is estimated without including Haiti, the value shifts upwards (0.724), which better approximates the reality of the Dutch-speaking and English-speaking countries and is closer to the LAC HDI (0.731).

Chart 1.1

Human Development Index, Caribbean-7, 2011



Source: Calculations of the UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean based on International Human Development Indicators (database), UNDP, New York, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/>.

Trends in the Three Basic Dimensions of Human Development

Trends in the HDI and in the three basic dimensions of the HDI for the Caribbean-7 are presented in chart 1.2. All the countries show positive average growth rates in the three HDI components. Between 1980 and 2011, the increase in life expectancy ranged from 10.4 years in Guyana to 2.6 years in Jamaica. Barbados has the longest life expectancy, at 76.8 years, and Guyana has the shortest, at 69.9 years, followed by Suriname, at 70.6 years. In education, the mean years of schooling in 2011 varied from 7.2 years in Suriname to 9.3 and 9.6 years in Barbados and Jamaica, respectively. The increase in gross national income since 1980 shows positive trends in all seven countries.

The Inequality-Adjusted HDI

The HDI is an average measure of basic human development achievements. As an average, it masks inequality in the distribution of human development across a population at the country level. The 2010 global HDR


introduced the inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI), which takes inequality into account across all three dimensions of the HDI by discounting the average value in each dimension according to the relevant level of inequality in a country.⁵ The human development potential forgone because of inequality is indicated by the difference between the HDI and the IHDI, which can be expressed as a percentage. Due to a lack of relevant data, the IHDI has only been calculated for Trinidad and Tobago (0.644 and an overall loss of 15.3 percent), Jamaica (0.610 and an overall loss of 16.2 percent), Suriname (0.518 and an overall loss of 23.8 percent), and Guyana (0.492 and an overall loss of 22.3 percent). In general, the overall loss among these countries is lower than the overall loss among LAC countries (26 percent).

The Gender Inequality Index

The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects women's disadvantage in three dimensions—reproductive health, empowerment and economic activity—for as many countries as data

Chart 1.2

Trends in HDI and HDI Components, Caribbean-7, 1980–2011



Source: Calculations of the UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean based on International Human Development Indicators (database), UNDP, New York, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/>.

of reasonable quality allow.⁶ The GII shows the loss in human development caused by inequality between the respective achievements of men and women in the three GII dimensions. The 2011 score on the GII has been estimated for Trinidad and Tobago (0.331), Barbados (0.364), Jamaica (0.450), and Guyana (0.551). The scores reflect a percentage loss in achievement across the three dimensions that arises because of gender inequality of 33.1, 36.4, 45.0 and 55.1 percent, respectively. Trinidad and Tobago, as well as Barbados, experienced the least loss, while Guyana experienced the greatest loss. In the case of Jamaica and Guyana, the loss is higher than the LAC average (44.5 percent).

Advances in social policy that are represented in the HDI measurements noted above may be compromised by poor economic performance and high debt burden. With

some exceptions, countries in the region currently have high debt ratios, high unemployment rates and significant poverty rates. Girvan (2011, citing CARICOM 2010a) reports that national poverty rates are 14.5 percent in Jamaica, 15.9 percent in Nevis, 16.7 percent in Trinidad and Tobago, 18.4 percent in Antigua and Barbuda, 27.0 percent in Saint Kitts, 28.8 percent in Saint Lucia and 37.7 percent in Grenada.⁷ The majority of the region's poor live in rural areas.⁸ UNDP (2004) finds that there is considerable variation and unevenness in the poverty profile of countries in the region, as well as significant disparities in wealth distribution.

Women have made important advances in education, labour force participation, political participation and equality before the law, but gender inequalities persist.⁹ The economic sectors that have traditionally provided employ-

ment and contributed to the livelihoods of poor women and their families, such as agriculture and light industries, have experienced significant decline. In addition, the global financial crisis has deepened the economic crisis in the Caribbean and undercut the well-being of women in the region. These economic factors, together with other outcomes of gender inequality, such as the gender employment gap, the gender pay gap, occupational segregation, and the burden of unpaid work, are contributing to the marginality of Caribbean women. Indeed, the significant rate of poverty among women, coupled with their dependent status within countries and in the region, has had long-term negative effects, not the least of which is the intergenerational transmission of poverty and inequality.¹⁰

The current high level of violent crime in the Caribbean region is a result of some of these convergences. Increasing rates of violent crime and the public's deepened sense of insecurity have led governments in the region to undertake remedial measures. The crisis has also encouraged collaboration with international and regional agencies and institutions. Indeed, the involvement of these agencies has contributed to a noticeable increase in scholarship on the region's crime problems. The scholarship has introduced a needed comparative framework that goes beyond the earlier concern about high crime rates in specific countries to focus on the whole region and argue that anti-crime efforts require a response that is regionwide.


CARICOM agreed in 2001 to establish the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) to identify the major causes of crime in the Caribbean and to recommend approaches to deal with the interrelated problems of crime. The task force report identified the main security threats in the region and highlighted the threats from illegal drugs, from the increasing involvement of youth in crime and from the increased access to and use of illegal firearms as major sources of insecurity in the region.¹¹ The threats and challenges identified in the RTFCS report overlap with those identified by Harriott (2002), Deosaran (2007a) and UNODC and the World Bank (2007).

As the discussion above illustrates, the growth of violent crime in the Caribbean region is one manifestation of declines on many national and regional fronts. Here, as elsewhere in the world, crime is contextualized in an environment of high debt, high rates of poverty and high unemployment, especially youth unemployment. These occur in an environment of changes in crime patterns, changes in public attitudes, and weakening institutions.

It is important to understand the outcome of all these factors and changes on the personal sense of security from crime among the respondents to the Crime Security Survey 2010 (chart 1.3). Regionwide, 46 percent of the respondents said that, overall, they felt secure or very secure living in their countries; looked at the other way, more than half felt insecure because of crime or uncertain about crime and security. The sense of security was strongest in Barbados (79 percent) and weakest in Trinidad and Tobago (25 percent).

Chart 1.3

Sense of Security in the Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "How secure or insecure do you consider (living in) your country to be?" The chart shows the share of respondents who answered "Secure" or "Very secure".

Crime Trends Since Independence

The region consists of small, open societies that have been subjected to globalization and fairly rapid modernization. These forces have also fostered social instability and rising rates of violent crime. As the literature on modernization and development confirms, modernization has contradictory effects. On the one hand, it enhances economic growth and living standards. On the other, it fosters social mobility that may widen the gulf between rich and poor, thereby heightening the sense of relative deprivation among marginalized groups. Indeed, a deep sense of relative deprivation may well have an impact on the crime rate precisely because it fosters, among marginalized groups, outrage and the search for remedies to injustice by any means.¹² The increase in criminal violence across the region threatens the post-independence development trajectory of most nations and will have consequences in the attainment of or the poor performance in global indicators such as the Millennium Development Goals, as well as in national development plans.

The changes in post-independence environments have coincided to impact the region's security landscape. This includes the economic consequences of structural adjustment programmes in several countries. In addition, the region has been affected by the violence associated with and emerging from political competition, growth in the drug trade and, more recently, gang-related violence. High levels of violence represent a break from the colonial pattern of criminal offending, which was characterized by high rates of property crime and low rates of violent crime. Jamaica was the first country to break with this pattern and consistently exhibit high rates of violent crime.

In a discussion of crime trends in Jamaica, Harriott (1996), identifies three discernable stages in the development of criminality in independent Jamaica. The first was a continuity with the colonial era in terms of the structure of crime, that is, a continuation of a pattern that was dominated by property crime rather than violent crime. The second stage was associated with a clear turn towards violence (largely due to the growth in drug-traf-

ficking and high-intensity political violence). The third and current stage is associated with the activities of transnational organized crime and gang conflicts. The third stage also evidences an increase in violent crimes such as homicide, more firearm-related offences and violence against women. This is not the inevitable trajectory of other Caribbean countries. Indeed, several other Caribbean countries have not followed this path, but they have been variously affected by the drug trade and gang violence, and, in several countries, there was a clearly discernable turn towards higher rates of homicide and other categories of violent crime during the first decade of the 2000s. During the consultations that were part of the process of producing this report, participants repeatedly expressed concern regarding the elevated levels of violence in their countries and in the region.


In some Caribbean countries, aggregate crime rates are falling. Prior to 1990, with some exceptions, the Caribbean was characterized by low rates of violent crime, and the ratio of property crimes to violent crimes approximated the rates in developed countries. For more than a decade, violent crimes have been on a downward trend in most parts of the world. Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby (2010) report that, in countries where trend data are available, the majority show decreasing or stable homicide rates. In the Caribbean, however, the trend in violent crime has been moving in the opposite direction; it has been increasing.

Despite the rising rates of violent crime, there are variations in the structure of crime and the complexity of crime problems across the Caribbean countries. In some countries, property crime rates continue to outstrip violent crime rates. A review of the current structure of crime throughout the region shows countries such as Barbados, Saint Lucia, and Antigua and Barbuda with low violent crime rates, but high rates of property crime.¹³ Property crimes such as burglaries are often associated with inequalities, especially relative poverty.

Homicides: Homicide is one of the most reliably and consistently recorded crimes.¹⁴

Chart 1.4

Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010



Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Guyana Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

The patterns exhibited in the associated crime rates may therefore be discussed with considerable confidence. During the pre-independence period, Caribbean homicide rates were comparable with and, in some instances, lower than the rates in other developing countries. After independence and prior to the 1990s, homicide rates within the region were below the global average.¹⁵ By 1990, however, Latin America and the Caribbean had an average homicide rate of 22.9 per 100,000 citizens, and the region was ranked first in the homicide rate among regions of the world.¹⁶

As depicted in chart 1.4, there has been considerable variation in the homicide rates across time in the countries of the Caribbean-7 on which trend data are available. Jamaica has had particularly high per capita homicide rates and is ranked among the most violent countries worldwide. The homicide

rates were relatively low and stable in the other five across the 1990–2000 period. Since then, the homicide rate has risen substantially in Trinidad and Tobago and fluctuated, but trended mostly upward in Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, and Saint Lucia. Barbados has experienced some fluctuation, but tended to have a low and stable rate across the 20-year period of 1990–2010.

Some of the conditions that influence homicide rates across the Caribbean region include, but are not limited to crime clearance rates, levels of development, low rates of economic growth, and the proportion of young men in the population.¹⁷ Drug-trafficking (in some concrete contexts) and weapons availability are also associated with high homicide rates.

The RTFCS report identifies increased access to firearms and the greater involvement of

youth in crimes as conditions influencing the commission of crimes in the region. Increased insecurity can be related to gun ownership. On the one hand, it can lead to a rise in the number of legal registration applications for firearms. On the other hand, insecurity also arises from the spread of legal and illegal firearms, a condition that is now manifest in the rise in firearm-related offences.


Firearm-related offences: Across the Caribbean, deaths and injuries because of gun violence have been exacerbated by the ready availability and misuse of firearms. The impact is being witnessed predominantly in nations such as Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, but, regionwide, firearms are being used more often in the commission of crimes.

Chart 1.5 shows the rate of firearm-related offences in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, the only nations on which data are available. The rates have consistently been highest in Jamaica. However, even in jurisdictions with low rates of violence, such

as Barbados, there has been a rise in firearm-related offences. Between 1975 and 2010, the use of firearms increased in Barbados, and, despite a decline in firearm-related offence rates between 2000 and 2009, the rates have remained above the levels of the 1990s. Since 1997, Trinidad and Tobago has seen a steady increase, which peaked in 2005 at 66 offences per 100,000 population. All three jurisdictions showed a reduction in rates in the last three years of the data period, but the rates in all remain significantly above the 1990 rates.

The LAC region is disproportionately affected by small arms violence. This type of violence accounted for 42 percent of all firearm-related deaths worldwide. The Caribbean is, however, not a major producer, exporter, or consumer of legal firearms. Indeed, between 2004 and 2006, only 3 percent of global arms trade transfers involved the Caribbean.¹⁸ Gun violence is related to the ease of access to US markets for firearms and to narcotics trafficking, as well as governmental inability to secure the borders, which are issues intricately

Chart 1.5 Firearm-Related Offences Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean Countries, 1990–2010



Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

related to organized crime activities and the incapacity of states.¹⁹

The ready availability of small arms and light weapons in the Caribbean region impedes security, democratic processes and economic development. Several initiatives under way regionwide aimed at reducing gun use and availability may offer significant opportunities for stemming the tide of gun-related crime.²⁰

Robberies: Data of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 indicate that robberies, burglaries and break-ins are the crimes that induce the most fear among Caribbean residents. Robbery, defined as the theft of property by relying on force or the fear of force, is traditionally classified as a violent crime. Robbery rates in the Caribbean-7 for the period 1990–2010 are shown in chart 1.6. They evidence an upward trend. While rates have been relatively stable in Barbados and have declined in Jamaica and Guyana, the overall rates have increased.²¹ Trinidad and Tobago currently shows the highest rates of robber-


ies, and, while Saint Lucia shows a gradual increase, Antigua and Barbuda has shown the most dramatic increase. The rates in Suriname, which has lower rates of violent crime than other Caribbean countries, posted an increase from 107 to 386 per 100,000 people between 2004 and 2006 and have declined since then, though they have remained above 300.

Similar to homicide rates, robbery rates in the Caribbean are higher in countries showing low economic growth.²² The exception is Jamaica, which has had low economic growth, but also records low robbery rates. Francis et al. (2009) indicate that businesses in Jamaica have experienced high rates of violent crimes, including robberies, but police records do not distinguish between commercial and individual victims.

Burglaries and break-ins are the unlawful entering of a home or other building.²³ Both are discussed herein in the context of acquisitive crimes.²⁴ Within the Caribbean region, citizens are most likely to be victimized by

Chart 1.6


Robbery Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010



Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Guyana Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

Chart 1.7

Burglary and Break-in Rates Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1990–2010



Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

burglaries and robberies, crimes that involve high social, economic and personal costs among victims. As chart 1.7 shows, there has been a long downward trend in burglaries. While Trinidad and Tobago saw low and stable burglary rates, Barbados and Saint Lucia saw somewhat higher, but stable rates over 1990–2010. The burglary rate in Jamaica fell significantly from a higher level, and the rate in Antigua and Barbuda mirrored this behaviour, but from an even higher initial rate. The low recent rates for Jamaica may be attributed to underreporting.

Economists and criminologists have long discussed the impact of economic conditions on crime. Development affects crime, but crimes of violence and theft are affected differentially. Specifically, as development increases, violent crimes decrease, while crimes of theft increase across all socio-economic

groups. This is a general trend that does not apply to every country. Prenzler and Townsley (1996) have reviewed the literature and suggest that affluent homes often attract skilled professional burglars, while homes and businesses in poorer areas are vulnerable to burglaries committed by individuals who live nearby. Demographically, households in lower socio-economic areas are the most vulnerable, but burglary rates are also high in communities that lack social cohesion. The number of people in a household, marital status, housing type, and time of day also impact the likelihood of a burglary.²⁵

Another set of insecurity-generating crimes worth examining is gender-based violence. Across the Caribbean, three specific practices have become a significant concern primarily regarding women and the girl-child, although data generated by the Citizen Secu-

rity Survey 2010 suggest that smaller shares of men also fear becoming the victims of these practices. These are sexual violence, domestic violence and trafficking in persons. An increase in the incidence and brutality of some of these crimes across the region has raised

Gender-based violence also serves—by intention or effect—to perpetuate men’s power and control. It is sustained by a culture of silence and denial of the seriousness of the consequences of abuse. In addition to the harm they exact on the individual level, these consequences also exact a social toll and place a heavy and unnecessary burden on health services.

— ‘Gender Equality: Ending Widespread Violence against Women’, United Nations Population Fund, New York, <http://unfpa.org/gender/violence.htm>

public awareness and spurred demands for redress.

Combating gender-based violence is of considerable importance if the Millennium Development Goals are to be achieved. Violence against women, as defined by the United Nations in Article 1 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women and reiterated in subsequent documents, refers to “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.”²⁶ The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women expanded the enunciation of the rights of women to include protection against discrimination in the family, community, employment, and political life.²⁷


Not every violent act that a woman may experience encompasses gender-based violence.²⁸ Instead, the term ‘gender-based’ acknowledges that this sort of violence against women is directly related to and shaped by gender roles in society. Specifically, this is a “manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of women’s full advancement.”²⁹ Gender-based violence has been reinforced by and in social, cultural, economic and historical values, beliefs, norms and institutions.

Different forms of gender-based violence may be experienced at different phases of the life cycle. Thus, the protection of women’s rights within the region is predicated on the existence of legal, cultural and social frameworks to empower and protect women. Across the region, there have been significant improvements in access to justice for women who are victims of gender-based violence. However, challenges remain. Thus, this report supports the continuation of regional programmes such as police training, the strengthening of service delivery through family courts, increased access to legal aid, and capacity-building to support legislation.³⁰

The effects of rape are particularly devastating and life-changing. Rape is non-consensual sexual intercourse with a female.³¹ In some jurisdictions, police statistics on rape are often aggregated with statistics on other sexual offences, making it difficult to discern national trends in the crime.³² Nonetheless, in the five countries of the Caribbean-7 in which police statistics can be disaggregated, the rates were low and stable in four in 1993–2010: Barbados, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago (chart 1.8). The rates in Antigua and Barbuda were the highest among the five and doubled between 2006 and 2009, before declining to a low level. De Albuquerque and McElroy (1999) also note this puzzling difference in rape rates between larger and smaller jurisdictions; they attribute it to the fact that, in small countries, minor increases in occurrence produce dramatic increases in per capita rates. In Antigua and Barbuda, the rate of

Chart 1.8

Rates of Rape Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1993–2010



Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

rapes and indecent assaults accounted for as much as 20 percent of the country's violent crime rate.³³

Rape is one of the most underreported crimes worldwide. The underreporting transcends age, race, class and geography. According to worldwide estimates, 60 percent of all sexual crimes go unreported, and one in three women will be raped, beaten, forced into sex, or otherwise assaulted in her lifetime.³⁴ In countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, the risk of sexual victimization increases in specific geographical areas and among specific subpopulations.³⁵

Across the Caribbean, rape rates are relatively high, and clearance rates on cases are low; so, by extension, conviction rates are also low.³⁶ For example, during the period 1970 to 2009, the average clearance rate for cases of rape and carnal abuse in Jamaica was 48 percent. It declined from 62 percent in 1970, was lowest, at 35 percent, in 1995, and then rose to 50 percent in 2009.

UNODC and World Bank (2007), drawing on United Nations crime trend data for various years, state that 3 of the top 10 recorded rape rates occur in the Caribbean. Among Caribbean countries on which there are available and comparable data, each showed a rape rate that was higher than the unweighted average of the full set of 102 countries in the study. A comparison shows significant differences in incidence rates across rape statistics as measured by reports to police, hospital records and surveys. In general, the number of self-reported rapes in victimization surveys is approximately 25 percent greater than the number known by or reported to the police.³⁷ It is even more difficult to estimate rates for some of the other sexual offences.

Regionwide, violence against women is disproportionately borne by youth and significantly impacts the girl-child. Amnesty International (2008) finds that, in 2004, seventy percent of all reported sexual assaults in Jamaica were committed against girls rather than women. LAC is the region with the highest

proportion of adolescent females who claim to have had their sexual debut before age 15, at 22 percent; there are no equivalent figures for young men in the region.³⁸ The Caribbean region has the earliest onset of sexual initiation in the world.³⁹ The World Bank (2003) cites a study on nine countries conducted by the Pan American Health Organization that found the mean age of first intercourse was 10 years or younger, and almost two-thirds of respondents reported sexual initiation before the age of 13. Early sexual debut and sexual violence impact adolescent pregnancy and expose the girl-child to HIV/AIDS through forced sexual intercourse with infected partners, increased sexual risk-taking such as multiple partners or engaging in transactional sex, and a lack of control or negotiation skills to use condoms and seek preventive health care services.⁴⁰

Crime Victimization

Crime and violence have created a disequilibrium that now threatens human development, national prosperity and regional stability. Insecurities emerge from many sources, such as crime and natural disasters, and it is evident that the consequences of such events are not borne equally by all members of society. The Citizen Security Survey 2010 included questions about crime victimization to assess the characteristics of individuals more likely and less likely to have been victimized in 2009, the one-year recall period used in most of the survey questions.

Determinants of Victimization


The risk factors associated with victimization are multifaceted and vary based on the offence, the offender type, the victim and the context within which the victimization occurs. Responses to the Citizen Security Survey 2010 show that national context is important. The share of respondents who reported that they had been victims of a crime in 2009, as recalled in the 2010 survey, ranged from a high of 11 percent in Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Lucia, and Barbados to a low of 6 percent in Jamaica; the average for the Caribbean-7 was 9 percent (chart 1.9).

The demographic characteristics of the re-

spondents are important for understanding the risk of victimization. As chart 1.10 shows, three groups were significantly more likely to report that they had been victimized in 2009: men, people 18 to 34 years of age, and people unemployed or seasonally employed. A similar pattern emerges if the distinction is drawn between victims of violent crimes and victims of property crimes. The predictors of violent crime victimization include gender (see chart 1.11), age (18–30 years), class self-placement (lower), education (low) and employment status (unemployed or seasonally employed). Income and race are not significant predictors.⁴¹ For property crimes, respondents whose income self-placement was high reported higher levels of property crime victimization (12.8 percent) compared with respondents who placed themselves lower (10.8 percent). Age was also a significant predictor, as was educational attainment (lower levels).

Chart 1.9

Self-Reported Criminal Victimization, Caribbean-7, 2010




Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "In the last year, were you the victim of a crime?" The chart shows the share of respondents who answered "yes".

Chart 1.10

Self-Reported Victimization, by Demographic Group, Caribbean-7, 2010




Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "In the last year, were you the victim of a crime?" The chart shows the share of respondents who answered "Yes".

Chart 1.11

Gender Differences in Victimization Rates for Specific Types of Crime, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "Within the last 10 years, have you been a victim of any of the following crimes/behaviour?" The chart shows the share of respondents who answered that they had been victims, for each type of crime.

Differences are statistically significant at $p < .01$.

The overall self-reported victimization rate of 9 percent among respondents can be compared with the corresponding rates among 30 nations that participated in the 2004–2005 round of the International Crime Victimization Survey, which found that 16 percent of respondents reported that they had been victims of crime during the previous year.⁴² The Caribbean rate compares most closely with the rates in countries such as Japan that registered at the lower end of the survey rate list.

Domestic Violence and the Victimization of Women


Domestic violence, a major human rights violation, takes many forms, including sexual, emotional, physical, psychological and economic abuse. It is often accompanied by child

maltreatment and can be directed towards a person regardless of age, sex, sexual orientation, social class and marital or other status.⁴³ Across the region, approximately 11 percent of the survey respondents of both sexes reported experience with domestic violence (chart 1.12). The rates ranged from a low of 6 percent of respondents in Jamaica to a high of 17 percent in Guyana. Gender-based violence has been a persistent problem in the region. It is, however, now more well understood and can be controlled and prevented more effectively by interventions that interrupt the cycle of violence and the patterns of conflict that are associated with it.

The violence was most likely to be psychological, that is, insults (reported by 21 percent of the respondents), and least likely to be

Chart 1.12

Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010




Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "To what extent has any member of your household (age 16 or over) deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort, or kicked you or used violence on you in any way?" The chart shows the share of persons declaring that they had been victims of domestic violence.

Chart 1.13

Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, by Type and Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "To what extent have you been sworn at or insulted by a partner (ex-partner) or a boyfriend/girlfriend (or ex-boyfriend/girlfriend)?" "To what extent has your spouse (or ex-spouse) ever said things to you that frightened you, such as threatening to harm you or someone close to you?" "To what extent has any member of your household (age 16 or over) deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort, or kicked you or used violence on you in any way?" "To what extent have you been injured, even slightly, on any occasion when your spouse (or ex-spouse), or a partner (or ex-partner), or a boyfriend/girlfriend (or ex boyfriend/ girlfriend), used violence against you? By injuries we mean bruises, scratches and cuts of any kind". The chart shows the percentage of persons who declared that they had been a victim at least once, by type of violence.

physical injury (reported by 9 percent). Domestic violence is experienced by both males and females, but, as chart 1.13 shows, females experience all forms of violence at higher rates than males.

Psychological abuse is often downplayed by victims, policy makers and the media. However, evidence exists that psychological abuse is often a precursor to physical abuse and, in its myriad manifestations, can be as devastating as physical abuse.⁴⁴ Le Franc et al. (2008), in a three-country Caribbean study, find high levels of interpersonal violence, which they suggest may be indicative of an entrenched culture of violence and adversarial intimate relationships. They also report significant between-country differences in the overall level of phys-

ical violence and psychological aggression. The Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys for Guyana (2006-2007) and Suriname (2006), as well as McDonald (2008), who presents findings of the 2008 Reproductive Health Survey in Jamaica, indicate that there are entrenched attitudes held by men and women according to which it is justified to use violence in response to violations of expectations about gender roles.⁴⁵ Thus, the progression from aggressive abuses such as pushing and insults to more serious physical violence is cause for concern, and efforts need to be undertaken to disrupt this progression.

In response to this problem, CARICOM has developed model legislation on issues affecting women; three of these initiatives spe-

cifically address gender-based violence.⁴⁶ The Model Legislation on Domestic Violence, also known as the Family (Protection against Domestic Violence) Act, seeks to address domestic violence and provide remedies to mitigate the effects of such violence.⁴⁷ CARICOM has prepared the model legislation to assist member states in drafting national legislation and to assist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in research and advocacy.

Since the introduction of the model legislation, domestic violence legislation has been enacted widely across the region, with some exceptions. However, concerns have been raised about the replication of weaknesses in the model. Nonetheless, Trinidad and Tobago's Domestic Violence Act that mandate police to respond and keep careful records of all reports, has emerged as a model that has influenced nations such as Dominica, Grenada and Suriname.⁴⁸ Beyond legislation, some police services have introduced domestic violence units, and others have rightly broadened this to gender-based violence units. Other police forces and services should adopt similar measures and ensure that the capabilities of these units are extended.

Sexual violence creates high levels of insecurity among women. Regionwide, 11 percent of respondents to the Citizen Security Survey 2010 reported that they had experienced violent sexual victimization, including rape and sexual assault (see above). The results of the survey indicate that the reported occurrence of sexual assault in 2009 was 2.1 percent. When the respondents who had experienced a sexual assault were asked about their relationship to the offender, they were least likely to respond that this was a stranger. This is consistent with other research that has found that women are more likely to be victimized by persons they know.⁴⁹ Women's vulnerability to sexual assault and domestic violence is dramatically greater than men's, and sexual offences are a category of crime that reflects this differential risk.

There is no regionwide survey using a common methodology to document levels of violence against women. Similarly, lack of standardized data and data collection meth-

ods and the inability to disaggregate statistics by sex and age deter accurate assessments. Nonetheless, regionwide research reports and surveys by governmental organizations and NGOs providing services to women report increasing rates of violence against women.⁵⁰ Statistics of these agencies indicate that sexual assault and domestic violence are prevalent regionwide and create high levels of insecurity among women. The UN Women Regional Office in Barbados, drawing on data from crisis centres, contends that there is significant underreporting of all forms of sexual violence. Among the reasons for low reporting are the lack of responsiveness among law enforcement authorities and within the administration of justice. Although legal, social and political reforms appear to have improved the chances that a rape or attempted rape will be reported to the police, most victims still do not report. Consequently, police data are an inadequate tool with which to assess the prevalence of this sort of violence; victim surveys are much more accurate.

Despite the levels of violence and the difficulties described above, gender-based violence can be more effectively controlled and prevented through interventions that interrupt the cycle of violence. Some forms of gender-based violence, particularly domestic violence, tend to have histories and show patterns of abusive behaviour that may be disrupted in the early stages before they degenerate into life-threatening and life-taking physical violence. This requires investments aimed at developing the capabilities of the responsible institutions of the state.

Trafficking in Persons

Trafficking in persons is a practice of growing concern that creates insecurity among Caribbean women and children, though it does not exclusively affect these groups.⁵¹ Men are also victims, but the patterns of victimization vary according to the gender of the victims. Globally, at any given time, as a result of trafficking, 2.5 million people are estimated to be trapped in forced labour, including sexual exploitation, of which 10 percent are in Latin America and the Caribbean.⁵² Some countries

in the Caribbean region serve as sources or suppliers of this traffic, as transit points for victims of trafficking moving towards North America and Europe, and as destination areas for both internal and intraregional flows.⁵³ The scale of the problem in the Caribbean region has not been properly estimated, but trafficking in persons appears to have become a particular problem in some countries in the region. While trafficking occurs in a variety of exploitative forms, forced labour, domestic servitude and sex exploitation are believed to be the most common manifestations in the Caribbean. Sex exploitation seems to be the most predominant form.

Most victims trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation are women and girls, who are usually found eventually to be involved in prostitution, exotic dancing, massages, pornography and other related activities. Evidence suggests that, while boys and young men are more at risk of becoming victims of trafficking for labour exploitation, especially in the agricultural, construction and mining sectors, some are also trafficked for sexual exploitation and domestic servitude.⁵⁴ Across the region, the number of children that are sexually exploited may be increasing, and the average age may be decreasing. Women are typically trafficked internationally, while children are most often trafficked within their own countries. The trafficking of children and children vulnerable to commercial sexual exploitation are most common in popular tourist destinations and centres of sex tourism.⁵⁵ Indeed, the growing demand for sex tourism is largely considered the primary factor contributing to sex trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly in relation to minors.⁵⁶ With regard to the Caribbean countries, for most of which tourism constitutes a major industry, research suggests that trafficking cases exist within the sex tourism industry.⁵⁷

In 2005, the International Organization for Migration identified unsecured borders, lax enforcement of rules on entertainment visas and work permits, legalized prostitution and the tourism industry as contributors to the problem.⁵⁸ While most of the push-pull risk factors for trafficking in persons primar-

ily affecting the most vulnerable members of society, particularly women and children, are similar to those found in other regions of the world, including poverty, lack of economic opportunities, marginalization, violence, illiteracy, gender discrimination, homelessness, some distinctive vulnerability factors have been identified in Latin America and the Caribbean. These include gang affiliation, persistent substance abuse and births among girls under the age of 18 years.⁵⁹ With regard to children, who are often sexually exploited for the financial benefit of their families, lack of awareness of the risks, a history of sexual abuse of children and parental migration resulting in child abandonment have been found to be additional push-pull factors in some Caribbean countries.⁶⁰

In the Caribbean, the organization of the trafficking of persons and the main actors involved are not well understood, but, in the larger Latin American and Caribbean region, organized crime groups have become significant actors. They use trafficking in persons to fund other illicit activities. Increasingly, trafficked victims are at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS and other diseases. Migrant communities are especially vulnerable to trafficking.⁶¹ It has also been found that minority and indigenous populations face specific vulnerabilities to trafficking.

UNODC and UN.GIFT (2008) have identified lack of knowledge, an inadequate national legal framework, ineffective policy and capacity to respond, limited protection of and assistance for victims, and poor international cooperation as the primary challenges to efforts to eradicate trafficking in persons. A number of Dutch-speaking and English-speaking Caribbean countries have ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000), which is attached to the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, including Jamaica (2003), Guyana (2004), Suriname (2007), and Trinidad and Tobago (2007).⁶² All countries are also signatories of various anti-trafficking and forced labour-related conventions, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women

and the CARICOM Declaration on the Rights of the Child 2008. However, the Legal Review on Trafficking in Persons in the Caribbean conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2010a) shows that the translation of the obligations under these instruments into national legislation and the associated implementation have been rather limited.⁶³ Until Caribbean countries are able to pass and effectively implement domestic counter-trafficking legislation, they may resort to existing legislation for the protection of victims and the prevention and prosecution of trafficking activities, including the application of criminal legislation that addresses some of the aspects of the trafficking process, such as procurement, forced detention, prostitution, sexual offences, kidnapping, and abduction.⁶⁴ Furthermore, given the international nature of trafficking in persons and the limited human, economic and technical resources of most Dutch-speaking and English-speaking Caribbean countries for tackling the issue, regional cooperation needs to be enhanced to strengthen national and regional capacities to protect and assist trafficking victims, prevent trafficking activities and prosecute traffickers.

Identification of Groups Vulnerable to Victimization

Vulnerability and power are intertwined. While vulnerability is a relative concept that includes natural or physical factors, it is often a function of inequitable resource allocation in a society, that is, of social disadvantage. Consequently, vulnerable groups are those groups that suffer from an inequitable distribution of social, economic and political power. Vulnerabilities place people at risk and limit the resources that are available to them to manage and navigate these risks. Vulnerable populations are often victimized in familial settings, as well as non-familial settings, are victims of human rights violations, or are powerless to defend their own rights. Their concerns are not given priority by political elites and may be undermined by systemic and institutional discrimination. Mostly, they are denied the personal protection of the state or are victims of benign neglect.

Vulnerable groups face threats arising from discrimination, exploitation, or displacement. They are stigmatized relative to others mainly on account of their status, characteristics and powerlessness. The stigma, in turn, limits their access to needed benefits and services. Factors such as poverty, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, as well as demographic characteristics such as race, gender, language, and a myriad of other characteristics such as physical, mental, or health status (including HIV/AIDS) may create vulnerabilities to victimization.

Two concepts help to make sense of the cultural endorsement of violence against vulnerable groups. The first, from the victimology literature, is embedded in what Nils Christie (1986) labels the ideal victim. Christie notes that some victims are constructed as being more deserving of victimization; this construction of 'legitimate' victimization will determine an individual's experience and treatment in the criminal justice system. The second is the notion of the hierarchy of victimization, most readily identifiable in the media construction and treatment of events. Singly or in tandem, these concepts operate to legitimize the demeaning treatment of the victim and to justify the politics associated with the victimization. The cultural endorsement of violence against specific groups leads to net-widening and the condoning of 'legitimate' violence against specific groups.

Women: Gender is the strongest predictor of criminal behaviour and criminal victimization.⁶⁵ In the Caribbean, as well as elsewhere, women commit fewer crimes than men and are disproportionately the victims of some types of crimes. They are more at risk and more vulnerable to some types of crime, particularly gender-based violence. Criminological debate about the relationship between crime and fear is in its fourth decade.⁶⁶ This literature indicates that men are more likely to be victims of violent crimes, but women are consistently found to worry about the threat of violence more than men. Among the reasons attributed to vulnerability is that women feel less physically able to defend themselves and consider the risk of some types of victimization greater for themselves

and their social groups. Indeed, women and men's vulnerability to victimization differ in two fundamental ways: relationship with the perpetrator and the type of victimization. The United Nations Population Fund lists 16 forms of gender-based violence. Worldwide, patterns of violence indicate that women's vulnerability to these forms of gender-based violence, especially intimate partner violence and sexual violence by other perpetrators, is greater. Women and men are thus also affected differentially by crime. Women are more likely to be killed or sexually assaulted by someone they know. In addition, because fear of victimization can be disempowering, it has the potential to constrain the ability to participate fully in society. This is partly why gendered vulnerabilities must be taken seriously by the state and why gender-based violence must be reduced.

Approximately half of all households in the Caribbean are headed by women, who must therefore shoulder the responsibility for both productive and reproductive work. Women also have longer life expectancies than men. Together, these factors contribute to the feminization of poverty.⁶⁷ Women who live in poverty experience additional vulnerabilities, such as higher infant mortality rates, higher likelihood of early pregnancy, lower school enrolment, lower employment rates, and increased likelihood of experiencing violence. Poverty is the typical condition of single mothers, elderly women and disabled women.⁶⁸

Children: Within the Caribbean, children are disproportionately affected by crime and violence.⁶⁹ Published by UNICEF (2006), the United Nations Secretary-General's Study on Violence against Children highlights a range of physical, emotional and social abuse children experience in homes and families, communities, schools, institutions, and work situations. They are witnesses to and victims of violence across all the major social institutions and in the media: domestic violence, child abuse and neglect, and corporal punishment at home and in school. In some jurisdictions, there has been an increase in the number of children killed and a rise in the number of children who are victims and

perpetrators of violence. In turn, this raises the vulnerability of children to recruitment and participation in gangs.

Regionwide, children face increased vulnerability to sexual crimes, domestic violence, trafficking, child labour, commercial sexual exploitation, sexually transmitted infections and early sexual initiation. Groups of children identified as especially vulnerable are abused children, children of absent parents, children in minority groups such as Guyana's Amerindians and Suriname's Maroon communities, children in poor households, children living in inner-city communities, disabled children, and children of parents who are disabled, have mental health problems, or suffer from drug or alcohol abuse.

Across the region, there is concern for the safety of children in institutional care, in children's homes and other custodial settings and in correctional institutions. In many of these institutions, children are often placed alongside adult residents, which is a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child because this exposes the child to physical and sexual violence.⁷⁰

Youth: Across the Caribbean, youth are the primary victims and perpetrators of crime. According to CARICOM (2010b), crime and violence associated with poverty, unemployment, and other political and social inequities remain the number one concerns among adolescents and youth in the Caribbean Community. Levels of youth unemployment in the region are among the highest in the world, and the education system does not prepare youth adequately for the regional and global labour market. Youth violence affects victims, families, friends and communities. In addition to death or injury, there are negative psychological outcomes such as a poorer quality of life, reduced productivity and generally disrupted lives.

Youth-related vulnerabilities and insecurities have also emerged because of an upward trend in drug-trafficking, the spread of HIV/AIDS, adolescent pregnancies, gang involvement, and access to and use of firearms. While crime is typically male-on-male and youth-on-youth, young girls face the added burden

of forced or early sexual initiation. This has consequences for early pregnancy, health status such as HIV/AIDS infection, exposure to intimate partner violence, intergenerational transmission of violence and poverty in later life.

Minorities and indigenous populations: Crime trend data show geographical patterns in victimization across the Caribbean based on minority or indigenous status. Examples include the interior areas of Guyana and Suriname that are populated largely by indigenous people (Amerindians) and descendants of Maroon populations.⁷¹ These groups face vulnerabilities that are inconsistent with their status as officially protected minorities. Their communities are especially insecure because of their remoteness, the people's lack of knowledge and inadequate access to criminal justice institutions, and the expansion of extractive economic enterprises in and around their communities that generate few benefits for them. Within these communities, young girls are particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and human trafficking, while indigenous women are at risk of violence in both the public and private spheres, as well as within and outside the indigenous communities.

Caribbean indigenous groups face discrimination, systemic racism, inequity, and marginalization that are related to colonialization, dispossession, and forced assimilation. Consequently, in many communities, indigenous people continue to suffer from infringements on cultural rights, loss of protection of property and inadequate access to justice. A major aspect of the marginalization is their exclusion from the dominant culture; they are often denied citizenship. They frequently occupy areas that are poorly explored and that are underdeveloped, and they are often exposed to land appropriation and industries in their communities that erode their cultural and social habits.⁷² They face social exclusion if they reside in urban communities. Historic inequities have also left many indigenous children, youth and families without support and services. Their exclusion is often in response to their resistance to acculturation and external control and is exercised through the mechanisms of education, language training,

culturally insensitive health care delivery and encroachment on communal land.

Sexual minorities: While constitutions around the region bar discrimination on the basis of race and gender, no such protection exists for sexual orientation or sexual minorities. Legally, homosexuality remains a crime in much of the region. Eleven CARICOM countries use laws against buggery to criminalize relationships between men who have sex with men.⁷³ The insecurities faced by and exacerbating the vulnerabilities of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities encompass problems in accessing health care, verbal and physical harassment, isolation and violence. This community also faces secondary victimization, including job loss, eviction from housing, denial of accommodation, and HIV/AIDS-related stigmatization. Despite the general stigmatization of the entire community, there is a relative tolerance for lesbians compared to a more vociferous hatred of gay men, which can be explained by what Herek (1984) labels defensive coping attitudes.⁷⁴ Many of these issues are facilitated by the illegal status of homosexuality in the English-speaking Caribbean.

Sexual minorities are targeted for brutal violence and even death; consequently, gay men are an increasingly vulnerable group in the region. Homosexuals are stigmatized and stereotyped and generally seen as the negation of masculinity. Their vulnerability arises from the social construction of masculinity and the hatred for persons who challenge heterosexual notions of manliness. Thus, people who are or who are perceived to be members of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer communities live in an environment of stigma, stereotype, and constant vulnerability to violence (Norman, et. Al. 2006; White & Carr 2005). Violence towards sexual minorities is tolerated and is, at times, even openly advocated in the media, religious practice and music in the Caribbean.

Regionally, there are numerous agencies, initiatives and programmes that have citizen security and the conditions of vulnerable populations as their mandate or area of focus. These include the CARICOM Implementa-

tion Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), the Inter-American Observatory on Security, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Citizen Security and Justice Programme of the Inter-American Development Bank. Their work can strengthen the knowledge base on citizen security and aid creative policy-making.

Fear of Crime

Citizen security refers to the freedom from physical violence and to the freedom from fear of violence.⁷⁵ It encompasses security at home, in the workplace and in political, social, and economic interactions with the state and other members of society.

Perceptions of Security and Insecurity

Public opinion polls and surveys have generally provided means to assess the public's perception of crime and insecurity. However, while there are some national and regional surveys, there is no consistent regional assessment in the Caribbean, nor is there systematic participation throughout the Caribbean in international standardized surveys such as the International Crime Victims Survey. Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby (2010) rank the Caribbean as the second most violent region of the world. Central America is the first. Violent crimes increase insecurity and create challenges for regional development. How secure do Caribbean citizens feel in the face of the crime profile documented in police records and the victimization data presented in this chapter?

The Citizen Security Survey 2010 conducted for this report asked respondents about their perception of security. As shown in chart 1.3 nearly 46 percent of all respondents reported that they felt secure or very secure. The sense of security ranged from a low of 25 percent in Trinidad and Tobago to a high of 79 percent in Barbados. The feelings of security were negatively correlated with the level of violent crime, especially homicide rates, in a country. For example, Barbados and Suriname record low levels of officially reported violent crime, and high percentages

of the respondents there indicated they felt secure from crime; in contrast, the violent crime rates in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago are high, and respondents in these countries expressed more negative feelings about security.

Caribbean citizens are sensitive to issues of safety and security. The insecurity can be measured by the fear of crime, that is, the feelings and subsequent behaviours of citizens in response to perceived criminal threats. Chadee, Austen, and Ditton (2007) characterize this as differential sensitivity to risk. Insecurity is manifest in a feeling of safety only in specific places, a willingness to engage in only specific activities and the taking of protective actions based upon the fears generated.


The affective aspects of fear are assessed by asking people about the level of worry or fear they feel about the possibility they will become victims of crime. Across all countries, 48 percent of respondents to the Citizen Security Survey 2010 had worried at some time about becoming victims of crime. House-breaking (41.3 percent) and robbery (33.7 percent) were the most frequent among eight crimes possibly facing communities; so, it is not surprising that these two crimes created the greatest level of insecurity. Chart 1.14 shows the percentages of respondents in each country who said they worried about each crime all or most of the time. The data indicate that the fear of victimization associated with the two crimes was highest in Guyana (47 percent) and lowest in Barbados (14 percent).

Primary insecurities emerge from the perception that burglary is highly likely to occur and, more importantly, that the crime constitutes a violation of the home, a space considered private. In addition, there are psychological consequences of burglary that relate to the fear that one will be victimized again. Robbery at gunpoint is more terrifying to the victim because of the arbitrariness and unpredictability of the situation.

Across the surveyed countries, 73 percent of respondents felt safe walking in their neighbourhoods during the day; 65 percent

Chart 1.14

Fear of Burglary and Robbery, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about having your house broken into at night." "Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about being robbed by someone with a gun." The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "All the time" or "Most times".


felt safe at home after dark; 61 percent felt safe at work; and 50 percent felt safe walking in their neighbourhoods at night.

Behavioural aspects of fear relate to the extent to which people modify their behaviour in response to their level of fear. This includes protective strategies such as changes in routine to avoid activities and locations that are perceived to increase the risk of being victimized or such as 'target hardening' (for example, carrying pepper spray or installing security devices in the home). The Citizen Security Survey 2010 reveals that the major behavioural changes included keeping a weapon at home (23 percent of all respondents) and carrying a weapon at night (9 percent) (chart 1.15).

Carrying a weapon is an extreme response that could escalate the potential of victimization, that is, concern for safety may encourage weapon-carrying behaviour; however, weapon-carrying may also reduce the concern for safety and thus increase both vulnerability and the likelihood of victimization. Weapons, especially gun ownership, may also be part of a self-help tradition that has developed because of a lack of access to the legal system.⁷⁶ Thus, building institutional capacity to enhance the public's sense of security may significantly reduce the fear of crime and, by extension, the reliance of citizens on weapon-carrying for protection.

Jackson and Gray (2010) point out that insecurity need not be debilitating. Instead,

Chart 1.15

Weapon-Related Self-Protective Behaviour,
Caribbean-7, 2010

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "Do you keep a weapon at home (when you are there)?" "Do you travel with a weapon at nights?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who responded "Yes".

it can motivate vigilance and routine precaution or problem-solving to increase personal and collective safety. For example, the results of the Citizen Security Survey 2010 show that, across the region, 5 percent of respondents moved to a more secure location in 2009; 11 percent put in a security device; and 72 percent indicated that their communities had taken steps to address the crime problem. However, the extent to which they mobilize to solve problems within their communities is affected by their perception of social stability, moral consensus and informal control processes.

Citizens are concerned about trouble in the neighbourhood and the physical environment. Perception of crime within the

community decreases trust among peers and neighbours. Distrust hinders social capital and possible civic participation. Citizen perceptions of the government's ability to ensure freedom from crime are also an integral part of feeling secure. Across the Caribbean-7, there was general optimism on this point: 41 percent of the respondents to the Citizen Security Survey 2010 expressed the belief that their country had sufficient capacity to solve or manage the problem of insecurity.

The levels and patterns of fear of crime documented through the survey indicate that only a small percentage of the respondents were fearful of being killed, and fewer than one-fifth were seriously worried about having their homes broken into or being robbed

at gunpoint. Overwhelmingly, the survey participants expressed feelings of safety at home, at work and in their neighbourhoods and were unlikely to move or install security devices to reduce the perceived risk. More importantly, respondents were optimistic that their countries had the capacity to manage the crime problems, and, regionwide, a majority of respondents said their neighbourhoods were engaging in activities to address crime problems.

Women's Fear of Crime


Perceptions of the risk of victimization are not necessarily based on official crime statistics. A major influence on fear of crime is gender, as noted by Ditton and Farrall (2000, xv), who conclude that the "single demographic factor positively related to fear" is gender. Overall, women demonstrate higher levels of fear. Chadee (2003) and Brathwaite and Yeboah (2004) also report gender differences in fear

of crime in the Caribbean. These findings should, however, not be understood to indicate an essential or naturally occurring fearfulness among women. Thus, while both men and women were equally likely to say they felt very secure living in their countries, some gender differences were apparent. Women indicated higher levels of fear of sexual assault (30.4 percent compared with 11.1 percent among men), of being killed (35.4 to 32.8 percent), and of being beaten by a spouse or partner (11.5 to 8.6 percent). Women were also more likely to report travelling in groups at night for security reasons (28 to 17.3 percent).

Chart 1.13 above documents that women self-report that they had experienced each of four types of domestic violence at higher rates than men. While women are less likely than men to be victims of crimes generally, they are more likely to be victims of rape and sexual assault (chart 1.16). Nearly 10 percent of both sexes across the Caribbean-7 fear

Chart 1.16

Gender Differences in the Fear of Crime Victimization, by Type of Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010




Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about them." The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "All times", plus "Most times" and "Sometimes".

Chart 1.17

Fear of Sexual Assault and Partner Assault, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about being beaten up by your spouse or partner". "Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about being sexually assaulted". The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "All the time", plus "Most times".

being sexually assaulted in some fashion; one-third of this subgroup also fear being beaten by a spouse or partner (chart 1.17).

The Citizen Security Survey 2010 asked about the likelihood that members of one's community would intervene in a suspected case of domestic violence. Of the respondents, 45 percent said an intervention would be made. Implied in the question was that an intervention would stop or prevent violence against women. This finding highlights a contradictory aspect of Caribbean popular culture on matters pertaining to the status of women. Despite the general indifference to the plight of women in the region and broad complicity in what might be deemed a rape culture, the prevailing attitudes on the status of women, recognition of their victimization, and concern regarding their fears are far more complicated. Hence, indifference to women

is matched by outrage about the victimization of women and girls. This paradox may partially be explained by the highly individualistic and deeply religious cultures in the region. Concern for individual rights, a political culture of democracy, and widespread piety often lead to protection for victims and vulnerable populations. This concern for rights is most notable among sections of the Caribbean population, both working class and the wealthier class, that are law-abiding, church-going and justice-seeking. In such cases, as the data show, sizeable minorities can be counted on not only to condemn, but also to intervene against the victimization and demeaning treatment of women, girls and other vulnerable groups.

Community activism is important in a context where the general perception of performance and the confidence in the police's

ability to control domestic violence and rape are not high. Among women who were physically or sexually abused in 2009 and reported the incidents to the police, the majority were dissatisfied with the action taken by the police in response. Although the vast majority of respondents did not have this traumatic experience, their perception of police performance was not much more favourable.

Violence against women and women's fear of victimization are both manifestations of gender inequality, which leads to the maintenance of an unequal balance of power. Sheffield (1989) uses the term 'sexual terrorism' to describe the reality of such violence in women's lives. Sexual terrorism refers to systems that operate to frighten, control, subordinate, intimidate and punish women. This takes the form of actual or threatened violence, both of which tend to create a heightened level of fear among potential victims. Underlying the control is a good woman–bad woman dichotomy that justifies women being 'punished' for 'bad' behaviour, usually a violation of sexual norms. These norms are contained in the images and messages that society perpetuates and that women and men receive during socialization. The norms provide legitimacy and social support for the victimizers. Indeed, the fact that nearly half the respondents said members of their community would disregard the norms and intervene in a domestic violence situation is an important finding of the study.

Conclusion

The security situation in the Caribbean has changed. In several countries, the rate of violent crime has escalated and has become high relative to rates in other regions of the world. The region has become more violent. This is the main challenge facing Caribbean countries. The rate, level of intensity, and primary form of violence, however, vary from country to country. In those countries with the highest rates of violence, organized crime and gang violence present the greatest challenge. In others, gender-based violence is the main concern. Regardless of the primary forms, all countries should be encouraged to improve

the capacity of their institutions to respond effectively to these problems.

The increase in violent crimes has been accompanied by a decrease in crime clearance and conviction rates. In some countries, the rapid rise in rates of violent crime has been accompanied by a similarly precipitous decline in arrest and conviction rates to low levels. Inequality and social exclusion are big contributors to the high rates of violence, but the near immunity to arrest also partly accounts for the high rates of violent crime in some countries. These issues will be examined in more detail in chapters 3 and 6.

Changes in the post-independence crime environment have coincided to complicate an understanding of the Caribbean crime situation and its impact on the sense of security among residents.

Caribbean citizens are keenly aware of the region's crime problems. Despite the high rates of violent crime and, in particular, homicide, general victimization rates remain fairly low by international standards, and majorities in all countries in which the Citizen Security Survey 2010 was conducted felt secure. This is true of both men and women. This sense of security is greatest where the level of confidence in the institutions of law enforcement and justice is highest.

New types of crimes have emerged that may not now be prevalent, but that profoundly affect the most vulnerable groups in Caribbean societies. Trafficking in persons is an example of this, especially if children are victimized. These crimes should receive greater attention, and greater capacities should be developed to prevent them and to support the victims.

Citizen security, human development and human rights are interdependent. The transition to a more secure environment will necessitate change to ensure more well integrated societies, the social, economic and political empowerment of excluded and vulnerable groups to counter the decades of deprivation caused by poverty, social, cultural, political and institutional practices, respect for human rights, and more effective and responsive institutions.



CHAPTER

2

Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience

**Don't just react – pre-empt,
prevent and protect**

**Sow the seeds of security –
invest in youth development**

**Today's empowered youth are
tomorrow's responsible citizens**

Introduction

Youth violence has become an important development challenge worldwide. Declining social and economic development conditions have increased the risk that youth will become violent offenders and victims of violence.¹ Increased youth involvement in violence has contributed to popular perceptions of growing insecurity in the Caribbean. At the same time, the experiences of and involvement in crime and violence among Caribbean youth have become linked to other developmental issues, including high levels of youth unemployment, poor educational opportunities, and feelings of voicelessness and exclusion from national and regional governance processes. In this context, youth violence is more than a security concern. It is a major human development problem. The feelings of insecurity among Caribbean citizens on account of youth violence have stemmed from inadequate attention to youth development and youth empowerment, which has increased the risk of youth offences and victimization. In recognition of the public significance of the issue, this chapter analyses the relationship between youth violence and human development in the Caribbean. In keeping with the overall view of the *Caribbean Human Development Report* that youth development and youth empowerment are important parts of the citizen security response, the chapter argues that investments in reducing the risk factors associated with violent offending and victimization, coupled with strategies for boosting youth resilience, can optimally reduce or even reverse the negative impact of youth violence on Caribbean human development. In other words, reducing risk factors and enhancing the resilience of Caribbean youth are imperative for the prevention of youth violence and the pro-

motion of human development in the region. In support of this argument, the chapter uses primary and secondary data sources, including the results of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 conducted specifically for the report, to discuss the phenomenon of youth violence. Although the chapter focuses primarily on violence among 15–24-year-olds, the survey did not capture the views and behaviour of Caribbean citizens under 18 years of age. In this regard, all references to youth responses in the survey provide the perspectives and experiences of a smaller sample of youth between the ages of 18 and 24 years. Against this background, the next section undertakes an overview of the current state of affairs with regard to youth violence and its impact on Caribbean human development. The following section analyses the risk and vulnerability factors that predispose and expose youth to violence. The subsequent section explores the available approaches to risk reduction and resilience-building that are aimed at preventing youth violence. The final section concludes the discussion by proposing policy recommendations to prevent youth violence by reducing risk and enhancing youth resilience.

Youth Violence and Caribbean Human Development

The prominence of youth violence as a Caribbean developmental concern is not surprising given the fact that 64 percent of the population of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) consists of young people under 30 years of age, while 30 percent of the population is between 18 and 30 years of age.² Even the specific youth category of 15–24-year-olds represents significant proportions (around one fifth) of national populations of

Table 2.1. Youth Population, by Country, Caribbean-7, 2004
percent

Country	Youth population
Antigua & Barbuda	14.9
Barbados	18.0
Guyana	21.3
Jamaica	18.7
Saint Lucia	20.3
Suriname	18.6
Trinidad & Tobago	20.7

Source: World Bank (2011a).
Note: Youth are individuals 15–24 years of age.

the countries selected as research sites for this report (the Caribbean-7) (see table 2.1). Thus, there is a logical expectation that gains in Caribbean human development will depend heavily on the well-being and contribution of the youth population. At the same time, any increase in violence among youth, however marginal, will have a significant impact on society, including increased fear and insecurity among youth and other citizens. The prevention of youth violence is therefore an imperative for human development.

Caribbean governments have pledged their commitment to preventing youth violence through the World Plan of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond.³ However, the increase in reported youth violence suggests that policy, planning and programme responses to the problem have failed to address adequately the fundamental social and economic development issues that have predisposed youth to violence. Against this background, the following subsections outline, first, the current status of youth violence and victimization in the Caribbean and, second, the impact of youth violence and victimization on regional development.

Youth Involvement in Violent Crime

Youth crime and violence in the Caribbean have been characterized as a phenomenon pitting youth against youth and male against male and have been closely linked to the emergence of criminal gangs, a feature discussed more fully in chapter 3. Notwithstanding the youth-on-youth profile of youth crime, youth who use violence are a minority of the youth population.

The country studies and the findings of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 highlight that, while young people are involved in serious crimes, most of the activities they undertake that violate the law or social norms are not serious or violent. Nonetheless, it is also likely that episodes of youth violence may be underreported for a variety of reasons. These include community tolerance and acceptance of some non-criminal violent behaviour, a desire to keep youth out of criminal justice systems, and a lack of confidence that authorities will respond if crimes are reported. It is also true that crime data hide other forms of delinquent behaviour. However, there is sufficient evidence in the country studies and the survey to suggest that violent behaviour is not prevalent or endemic among the youth populations of the region. In the context of overall youth behaviour in the Caribbean, reliance on violence is uncommon.

In fact, most youth who come into contact with the police and the justice system are not involved in violent crimes, but have run away from home or are associated with behaviour indicating a desperate need for care and protection following abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Such ‘status offences’, which are not considered criminal if they are committed by adults, often bring children and youth into conflict with the law. In Jamaica, 52 percent of the female juveniles who appeared in court in 2007 were found to be in need of care and protection. Only 23 percent of the male juveniles who appeared in court fell into the same category. Although comparable data are not immediately available for the other six countries of the Caribbean-7, national-level research suggests there is a similar gender pattern in court appearances by juveniles for

Table 2.2. Youth Self-Reported Criminal Accusations and Arrests, Caribbean-7, 2010
percent

Country	Violent crime with weapon	Violent crime without weapon	Property crime	Ganja use	Other drug use	Other	No answer	Not applicable
Antigua & Barbuda	0.9	0.5	2.3	2.3	0.0	4.6	6.5	82.9
Barbados	4.0	1.3	0.0	7.3	0.7	1.3	0.0	85.3
Guyana	1.4	4.2	1.1	2.0	0.0	2.8	0.6	87.9
Jamaica	0.0	1.9	0.6	3.8	0.0	1.3	1.6	90.9
Saint Lucia	2.7	4.3	1.1	3.7	0.0	2.1	2.7	83.4
Suriname	0.5	1.5	1.0	1.5	0.5	4.6	3.6	86.6
Trinidad & Tobago	3.0	2.6	1.3	1.3	0.0	2.6	0.4	88.9

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: Respondents aged 18 to 24 years (N = 1,653). Question: "Have you ever been arrested by the police? If yes, for which of the following: 1. A violent crime involving the use of a weapon (blunt instruments excluded), 2. A violent crime not involving the use of a weapon, 3. A property crime, 4. Ganja use, 5. Use of other drugs, 6. Other." The table shows the percentage of the respondents answering positively in each case.

non-violent offences. Meanwhile, young men are more likely than young women to be in conflict with the law for violent offences.

In the context of the survey, only 1.6 percent of youth between 18 and 24 years of age had been accused or arrested for violent crimes involving the use of weapons, and only 2.5 percent for violent crimes without weapons. The variations across countries are highlighted in table 2.2. The variations across countries are highlighted in table 2.2. The highest proportions of reported youth violence occurred in Saint Lucia (2.7 percent with weapons and 4.3 without), followed by Guyana (1.4 percent with weapons and 4.2 percent without), Trinidad and Tobago (3 percent with weapons, and 2.6 percent without) and Barbados (4 percent with weapons, and 1.3 percent without), despite the country's reputation for low levels of violent crime. Notwithstanding Jamaica's regional and international reputation for relatively high levels of violence, the proportion of Jamaican youth survey respondents who reported they had

been accused or arrested for violent crimes was low (0 percent with weapons, and 1.9 percent without). It should be noted, though, that, in absolute terms, the actual number of cases in all countries was small.

Six key patterns associated with the incidence of youth violence were observed through the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. We now list these.

First, *youth violence has a gender dimension*. Across the region, the majority of aggressors and victims are young men who use violence for protection against threats—real or perceived—or who have been socialized into a male-dominated tradition of conflict resolution through violence. At the same time, young women are victims of verbal and physical violence, particularly in the interpersonal and domestic spheres. Relative to men, almost twice the proportion of women reported being threatened by spouses, partners, or ex-partners (14 percent of young women compared with 7.5 percent of young men). This reinforces the

“We feel more secure when we form gangs in the schools; each member looks out for each other.”
 —Focus group, CARICOM Commission on Youth Development

“I hope to be alive given all that is happening. The crime and violence situation makes death in five years an imminent reality.”
 —Focus group, CARICOM Commission on Youth Development

point that young men are predominantly the violent aggressors among Caribbean youth. In addition, the majority of youth reporting fear of sexual assault are young women. Young female respondents were over three times more likely to be fearful of sexual assault (37.7 percent of all young women surveyed compared with 11 percent of all young men surveyed).

Second, *violence among pre-adolescents is a growing concern among citizens*. Although rare, primary school children as young as 11 years of age have begun using violence at home or at school. These early manifestations are continued into adolescence and youth. (The potential for family and school environments to contribute to early violent behaviour is discussed in the section on risk and vulnerability.) The gender dimension is apparent among the youngest offenders: mostly boys use violence, although the incidence of female aggression also appears to be increasing. Younger boys tend to commit less serious offences than older boys, but at greater frequency.⁴

Third, *school violence has escalated*. Consequent on the emergence of younger offenders, violence in schools appears to have increased.⁵ The reported cases of apparent escalation in youth violence have largely emerged from media debates given the fact that adequate data on the phenomenon are not readily available in the region. However, where school violence has been observed, there have been suggestions that the acts of violence have become more brutal. There have been a few reported cases of the use of guns in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Student sexual violence against other students has also been reported across the region and was highlighted as a special concern in Suriname.⁶ The resort to violence at school has been expressed as a function of the need for self-defence, self-protection, or peer protection and, in rarer instances, also for image profiling and to intimidate others. It is believed that youth who have experienced verbal and physical abuse at home often transfer this behaviour to school through physical and psychological bullying of classmates and teachers.⁷

Fourth, *youth violence is often a response to the threat and fear of victimization*. The fear

of victimization has contributed to the formation of delinquent groups and gangs in schools, as students seek to defend themselves from community violence that permeates the educational environment.⁸ Gang formation is most likely to occur at the secondary school level. Young people usually represent gang formation as a security response to the context of the community, a way to protect themselves from students and others in the surrounding community who prey on them because of ongoing gang conflict. School gangs are generally represented as defensive even if they share some characteristics with street gangs. They are not simply peer groups. Boys are more likely to be involved in school gangs.

Fifth, *youth violence is closely associated with community violence*. The use of violence has often emerged from exposure to various forms of neighbourhood or community violence directly as a victim or indirectly as a witness.⁹ Over 7 percent of youth frequently experience community violence. These experiences and the subsequent use of violence are also linked to feelings of fear among youth. In their communities, Caribbean youth worry about child abuse, rape, robbery, guns and shoot-outs, police abuse, unemployment, drugs, and lack of road safety. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 found that almost half of youth (46.8 percent) express fearfulness about the possibility of becoming a victim of a crime. Among these, many are worried all the time, most of the time, or sometimes about becoming victims of violent crimes, including through murder (48.7 percent), the murder of a relative (24.4 percent), assault by a spouse or other person (44.8 percent), robbery at gunpoint (28.2 percent), or sexual assault (24.4 percent). They often experience psychological trauma and grief, including fear, anxiety, aggression, depression and physical trauma such as aches and pains and racing heartbeat as a result of exposure to community violence.¹⁰ This suggests that youth may conceptualize their concerns about violence in a different way other than ‘insecurity’, but that their concerns with personal safety are not unlike those of other members of society.

Sixth, *youth victimization by peers and adults creates an environment for more violence*. Among youth respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010, 19.4 percent had been victims of a crime within the last 10 years (table 2.3). The survey validates the assumptions in the literature that much crime is peer-on-peer in that 28.6 percent of the youth who said they had been assaulted reported that the assaults were committed by acquaintances or friends, which can reasonably be assumed to be peers. Meanwhile, adult abusers included police, teachers, and parents and guardians.¹¹ Relative to the level of the fear of violence, the actual incidence of violent victimization is limited. While 9 percent of respondents had been victims of crimes in 2009, only 3 percent had been victims of violent crimes. Sexual assault affected 2.9 percent of all the respondents; over half of these were female victims. The fear of victimization, however, resulted in changes in behaviour, which included self-imposed curfews and decreased participation in community activities.¹² This fear also led to increased use of weapons in and out of school. The survey indicates that as many as 359 youth (21.7 percent of the youth surveyed) carried weapons at night, 269 (16.2 percent) carried weapons during the day, and 538 (32.5 percent) kept weapons at home. Youth violence has therefore constrained youth choices, freedom and opportunity, while creating an environment conducive to more violence. The fear of victimization has left some youth feeling hopeless about their prospects for long and happy lives.¹³

The Impact of Youth Violence on Caribbean Human Development

Notwithstanding its exceptional nature, youth violence poses a challenge for human development. Indeed, displays of violence among youth create a risk that patterns of persistent violent behaviour will emerge and, once entrenched, affect the future of society. The sheer number of youth in the region has meant that youth crime and violence have already had several negative influences on all sectors of society.¹⁴ The direct monetary costs to governments and citizens of corrective measures include budgetary expenditure on security, policing, judicial processing, and incarceration, in addition to private security expenditure by businesses and individuals. The indirect monetary and economic costs include loss of earnings of incarcerated youth, loss of life among young productive citizens, lower economic growth and reduced tourism revenues. In a situation analysis for the CARICOM Commission on Youth Development, Chaaban (2009, 15) highlights some of the economic costs, as follows (see also table 2.4):

“Overall, youth crime is costing CARICOM countries... between 2.8% and 4% of GDP annually, in terms of direct expenditure on fighting crimes and in lost revenues due to youth incarceration and declines in tourism revenues. . . . With the highest numbers of youth convicted, Jamaica incurs more than 529 million USD every year as direct public and private costs linked to fighting youth crime. Youth who are incarcerated in Saint Lucia every year could have contributed to increasing the country’s income by 1.9 million USD each year. In

Table 2.3. Youth Victimization, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010
percent

Gender	Once	Twice	Three times or more	Not applicable
Males	9.1	5.9	5.8	79.2
Females	9.7	3.8	4.3	82.0

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: respondents aged 18 to 24 years (N = 1,653). Question: “Within the last 10 years, how many times have you been a victim of a crime?” The table shows the percentage of respondents.

Table 2.4. The Annual Cost of Youth Crime in Four Caribbean Countries

Country	Year	Youth 15–24 convicted, total	Direct costs, US\$	Forgone earnings, US\$	Forgone tourism revenue, US\$	Opportunity costs, US\$	Total cost, US\$	Total cost, % GDP
Guyana	2002	425	68,717,820	289,678	1,665,000	1,954,678	70,672,498	2.79
Jamaica	2005	1,959	529,098,000	4,262,815	91,125,000	95,387,815	624,485,815	3.21
Saint Lucia	2005	663	43,485,580	1,935,977	17,100,000	19,035,977	62,521,557	4.01
Trinidad & Tobago	2005	786	616,983,450	2,792,403	35,415,000	38,207,403	655,190,853	2.88

Source: Based on data in Chaaban (2009).
 Note: US\$ figures are in purchasing power parity dollars.

Trinidad and Tobago, decreasing youth crimes by 1% could increase tourism revenues by nearly 35 million USD yearly.”

Linked with estimates of the costs of low educational achievement and poor health status among youth, these figures represent a good contribution to our understanding of the youth crime and violence–human development nexus. However, the estimates do not account for the non-monetary costs of youth violence. Thus, there are certainly social costs of youth violence, including physical and psychological pain, suffering and trauma, the erosion of social capital, the intergenerational transmission of violence, and lower quality of life.¹⁵ There are also political costs associated with the labelling, marginalization and exclusion of at-risk or problem youth from participation in governance, the economy and society. The general labelling of youth holds potential for encouraging negative stereotyping, which can be internalized by youth, causing frustration and fuelling aggressive behaviour.

There is still a lack of appropriate data in the Caribbean to permit rigorous analysis of the relationships among youth development, human development, and youth violence and delinquency. The need for these data has been

recognized internationally by the United Nations in the context of monitoring the implementation of the World Programme of Action for Youth.¹⁶ In other areas of the world, progress has been made towards analysing these relationships through the correlation of a youth development index and the Human Development Index.¹⁷ However, to date, no Caribbean country has formulated a youth development index. Such an instrument would certainly enhance the regional capacity to measure the contribution of advances in youth development to national and regional development, including reductions in youth crime and violence. The lack of national and regional data management frameworks to support evidence-based planning and programmes for youth is addressed elsewhere below in our discussion on approaches to building resilience. We turn attention at this point to an examination of the contextual factors that have contributed to the patterns of youth violence and victimization outlined above.

**Risk and Vulnerability:
 Explaining the Patterns of Youth Violence**

An explanation of the patterns of youth violence and its impact on human development

“Youth are assets in the development process but remain vulnerable to risk.”

requires a discussion of the factors that give rise to the violence in light of the consideration that youth are inherently vulnerable assets in the development process.

Although Caribbean youth aspire to lead honourable and productive lives and to experience a good standard of living, they are vulnerable to several factors that erode their capacity to achieve their personal, professional and social goals and predispose them to significant risk of becoming perpetrators or victims of acts of violence.¹⁸ This section discusses the principal factors that emerge from the Caribbean

development context to predispose youth to violent behaviour and expose youth to victimization.

Youth at risk are described as those young people who “face environmental, social and family conditions that may hinder their personal development and successful integration into society as productive citizens.”¹⁹ Youth become vulnerable if they are exposed to these hindrances, which are multidimensional and emerge from various levels of the social experience of the youth population. In the Caribbean, some of the most vulnerable youth are living on the streets, in group homes or correctional facilities, or they are living on their own because they have been orphaned, neglected, or left unsupervised by parents who have migrated or been incarcerated. These young people are among those individuals likely to become involved in criminal or violent offending.

In general, the risks that may increase the likelihood of youth involvement in violence may be grouped in three main categories: societal; community, including interpersonal; and individual. The factors are often inter-related in a complex web of risk and vulnerability. They may include unemployment, societal or community tolerance of violence, illegal drug use and trafficking, gang activity, disconnection from or poor attitudes towards school and low educational attainment, and lack of effective and caring parenting.²⁰ It is useful to have a framework for identifying risk and vulnerability by, for example, looking out for risk antecedents and risk markers that, if addressed early in a young person’s life cycle, could prevent later manifestations of high-risk behaviours and negative outcomes. Risk antecedents include environmental conditions such as poverty, neighbourhood environment and family dysfunction. Risk markers include behaviours such as poor school performance. Some researchers use these antecedents and markers to predict youth violence. However, we use the terms here without claim to making predictions. Rather, we argue that various combinations of risk antecedents and markers may contribute to youth violence. Table 2.5 summarizes the principal risk antecedents and risk markers in the Caribbean context

Table 2.5. Risk Antecedents and Risk Markers of Youth Violence in the Caribbean Region

Category	Risk antecedents and risk markers
Societal	Limited socio-economic opportunities Increased criminal activity and access to drugs and firearms Tolerance of violence
Community, interpersonal	Community and gang volatility Exploitation and abuse by adults in the home and at school Loss of social cohesion because of distrust and lack of support among neighbours
Individual	Poor health status, early sexual initiation, drug abuse and mental health problems Inherent youthful desire to take risks with personal security and safety

Source: Adapted from Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999).

that have potential to contribute to high-risk youth behaviour involving violence. They are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

Societal Risks

Caribbean society presents significant risk to young people. The socio-economic development context is challenging and marked by


high levels of unemployment, particularly among youth. Taking a telescopic view, one may see that criminal activity has increased, including narco-trafficking and the drug trade, while firearms have become more accessible to young people. In addition, society has sent subtle signals of tolerance and even respect for violence through the political and community systems of governance.

The three risk antecedents are as follows:

First, *limited socio-economic opportunities are a push factor for violence*. Unemployment and the high cost of living are not in themselves predictors of ordinary criminal violence.²¹ Yet, they are constituents of a socio-economic context that increases vulnerability and the risk of violence. The youth respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 were concerned about four main socio-economic issues: unemployment (27.7 percent), violent crime (20.0 percent), the cost of food (13.2 percent), and the cost of living (10.5 percent) (chart 2.1; table 2.6).

Unemployment is the number one problem according to youth in five of the Caribbean-7; in Saint Lucia and in Trinidad and Tobago, violent crime was the top concern of the majority of youth respondents to the survey. In the Caribbean countries in 2004, the youth unemployment rate (among 15–24-year-olds) was higher than the overall unemployment rate: 34.0 percent in Jamaica; 25.4 percent in Trinidad and Tobago; 44.0 percent in Saint Lucia; and 21.8 percent in Barbados.²² Among the youth surveyed, 8.6 percent were unskilled labourers, while 18.8 percent had never been employed. Over 20 percent of the youth surveyed indicated that they did not have enough income to live comfortably or to cover basic needs. The emotional frustration arising from the social exclusion associated with unemployment or low income has been linked to aggression among youth and may motivate violent crimes such as homicide.²³

Low levels of educational achievement have also been identified as a socio-economic risk factor for the involvement in violence.²⁴ Access to education at the primary level is close to universal in the Caribbean, and young people have good access to education at high-



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.
 Note: Base: respondents aged 18 to 24 years (N = 1,653) and total survey sample (N = 11,155). Question: "From the list of problems mentioned above [listed hereafter], which three are the most serious in your country?" The list of problems: a. Level of unemployment, b. Inadequate housing, c. Inadequate schooling for children, d. Cost of food, e. Level of property crime, f. Level of violent crime, g. Level of insecurity, h. Cost of living, i. Level of poverty, j. Level of corruption, k. Level of migration, l. Inadequate sanitation, m. Inadequate access to health care, n. Inadequate voice in governmental affairs. The chart shows the percentage of respondents who chose the problem either as their first, second, or third option as the most serious problem.

Table 2.6. The Main Problem in the Country in the View of Youth, Caribbean-7, 2010

Country	Main problem (N = 1653)		Second problem (N = 1543)		Third problem (N = 1523)	
	Problem	%	Problem	%	Problem	%
Antigua & Barbuda	Unemployment	30	Cost of living	26	Corruption	16
Barbados	Unemployment	28	Cost of food	25	Cost of living	21
Guyana	Unemployment	27	Cost of living	19	Poverty	10
Jamaica	Unemployment	41	Cost of living	22	Corruption	17
Saint Lucia	Violent crime	38	Unemployment	20	Cost of living	18
Suriname	Unemployment	22	Corruption	13	Cost of living	11
Trinidad & Tobago	Violent crime	39	Cost of living	19	Cost of food	14

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: respondents 18 to 24 years old (N = 1,653). Question: "From the list of problems mentioned above [listed hereafter], which three are the most serious in your country?" The list of problems: a. Level of unemployment, b. Inadequate housing, c. Inadequate schooling for children, d. Cost of food, e. Level of property crime, f. Level of violent crime, g. Level of insecurity, h. Cost of living, i. Level of poverty, j. Level of corruption, k. Level of migration, l. Inadequate sanitation, m. Inadequate access to health care, n. Inadequate voice in governmental affairs. The chart shows the percentage of respondents who chose the problem either as their first, second, or third option as the most serious problem.

er levels. However, concerns remain about the increasing rates of school drop-outs and declining levels of educational attainment, particularly among boys. Data of the Caribbean Examinations Council show that overall pass rates in the basic subjects of mathematics and English at the secondary school level have declined and declined more significantly among boys.²⁵ On average between 1997 and 2009, the pass rate in mathematics fell by over 8.0 percent among boys and by about 2.5 percent among girls, even though boys had higher pass rates.²⁶ Over the same period, in English, the pass rates declined by over 13.0 percent among boys and by 12.5 percent among girls (girls had the higher pass rates). Overall, the average pass rates among boys and girls in 2009 were low in both subjects (around 35 percent for mathematics and around 55 per-

cent for English). These outcomes are worrisome given the acknowledged correlation between declining educational achievement and increasing levels of violence in society.²⁷ Departure from school without the requisite skills and abilities increases the likelihood of youth exposure to and experience of other risk factors, including higher levels of unemployment, teen pregnancy, risky sexual activity and substance abuse, which contribute to other problem behaviours among youth. The early departure of boys from school certainly contributes to the male-on-male character of violence in the Caribbean. On the one hand, school drop-out rates suggest that educational institutions do not meet student expectations. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge other factors that may impinge on the capacity of students to con-

tinue schooling. The lack of financial support for studies, school closures due to violence, and inability to concentrate because of environmental conditions, including community violence, may all contribute to students dropping out, making them even more vulnerable to recruitment into violent activity.

Second, *access to drugs and firearms makes crime an alternative for youth*. Because of the lack of legitimate socio-economic opportunities, young people are vulnerable to recruitment into a vibrant illegitimate economy fuelled by gangs, including those involved in the drug trade. Through these channels, youth gain access to firearms, which creep into the school environment.

Third, *the tolerance and acceptance of violent crime influence the perspectives of youth*. The acceptance of violence, particularly non-criminalized social forms of violence, has been a worrying trend, particularly in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago. In these contexts, youth model the behaviours of influential others in their homes, at school, in their communities and in different spheres of national life. National figures in music and politics, among other fields of activity, have signalled to young people that some forms of violence may be acceptable and, in some instances, may be worthy of respect. The highly visible role of violent criminals in the politics of some countries provides the evidential support for this claim. This reinforces illegitimate structures (such as gangs) and reduces youth confidence in legitimate structures of political representation. Young people may lose faith in formal governance processes and seek to create subcultural systems of participation through gangs, which become viable alternatives to legitimate employment. The value of legitimate structures and agents of socialization and their influence on youth behaviour are diminished. Although this context of tolerance for violence is not general to the region, it is plausible that intraregional cultural transfers through media and music may influence youth in other countries.

Community and Interpersonal Risks

Risk antecedents that are manifest in the com-

munity environment include exposure to community and gang volatility, exploitation and abuse by adults, and loss of social cohesion.

Exposure to community volatility has a negative impact on youth development. The majority of youth respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 live in neighbourhoods that are free of gang violence (67.7 percent); therefore, fewer youth thought that criminal gangs were a big problem in their communities. However, a significant proportion had experienced some gang violence through the presence of a criminal gang based in their communities. Over 20 percent of youth respondents were living in neighbourhoods in which murders had been committed in 2010; 29.1 percent where shootings had occurred; 16.4 percent, rapes; 44.2 percent, fights in the streets; and 16.1 percent, gang violence; while 29.7 percent had witnessed community members threaten other community members. The highest proportion of youth who indicated they had experienced significant levels of gang violence was in Saint Lucia, though, in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago, there is a wider perception of gang problems. The lowest proportion was found in Barbados. The theme of disturbance by gun violence and gang warfare was prevalent among the focus groups conducted by the CARICOM Commission on Youth Development. Recurring community shootouts disturbed school work, homework and sleep, raised fears of personal injury and death, or family injury and death, and increased the concern about freedom to move around the community, especially after dark.²⁸ We note above in our discussion of the status of youth violence that gang and community conflicts often spill over into the school environment, as youth take up arms out of a sense of a need for protection. In the focus groups, youth lamented that “a lot of good, decent innocent youth get killed; violence is no good to our communities.”

Exploitation and abuse by adults have been linked to youth violence. There is no consensus among researchers that abuse by adults is a firm predictor of youth violence.²⁹ However, there have been suggestions that youth may model the behaviours of their aggressors and

mimic the acts of violence they witness or experience, and the pain and frustration they feel that arises from the victimization may evolve into aggression and rage.³⁰ Furthermore, victims of abuse in the home, particularly victims of sexual abuse, often run away from home and end up living on the streets. Street youth are at increased risk of resorting to criminal activities, which may involve violence.³¹ Abuse by adults may be most negatively influential if it is meted out by a parent. Several studies have highlighted the significant impact of parental relationships on youth behaviour, particularly in school and other institutional settings. Positive parental relationships characterized by care, discipline and encouragement are likely to promote positive youth behaviours. Negative parental relationships characterized by neglect, abuse and violence are likely to lead to negative behaviours.³²

However, our survey data show that, of the youth respondents who had been victims of domestic violence (n = 238), only 4.1 percent had been charged with crimes. Furthermore, among the 73 youth who had ever been charged with crimes, only 10 reported having ever been victims of violence in the household. These findings cast additional doubt on the relationship between offending and victimization through abuse. Domestic violence may not directly predispose youth to violence in other settings; however, if combined with other factors, violence may ensue in a variety of contexts. In the meantime, we note that domestic violence, particularly sexual abuse (which was not specifically probed in the survey), may be underreported, particularly among males. In addition, the survey's focus on criminal forms of violence may have hidden other forms of social violence that may become manifest as a result of abuse. Against this background, youth are under threat of abuse from several quarters: in the community (abduction and rape), at school (verbal and physical abuse) and in their homes (child abuse and domestic violence). Over 14 percent of the respondents had been victims of domestic violence many times, a few times, or on one occasion. Of these, 8.6 percent had

been injured by partners; 10.8 percent had been threatened by partners; and 21.4 percent had been sworn at or insulted by partners. By country, only in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago did fewer than 10 percent of the sample report themselves as victims (6.8 percent and 9.8 percent, respectively), while Saint Lucia had the highest proportion, at 51.2 percent; Guyana, at 43.3 percent; Suriname, at 19.1 percent; Antigua and Barbuda, at 18.7 percent; and Barbados at 15.7 percent. The highest shares of respondents who reported experiencing domestic violence many times—4.1 percent—were in Suriname and in Antigua and Barbuda.

Despite the potential significance of violence in the household, others argue that it is from their interactions outside the home, particularly among peers, that youth learn and adopt particular behaviours.³³ Additional sources of abuse may emerge in school settings. For example, the use of corporal punishment in schools, which remains legal in Caribbean countries, has also been linked to youth violence. It has been suggested that “because students were beaten but rarely praised or received kind words from their teachers, corporal punishment served mainly to alienate and cause resentment among students.”³⁴ Although guidelines have been established for corporal punishment in many countries to mitigate the potential for severe abuse, youth may still experience other forms of abuse by teachers, usually of a verbal and psychological nature, which is more difficult to regulate.

Loss of social cohesion in communities significantly affects the ability of youth to live productive lives. Certainly, many of the aforementioned risk factors contribute to breakdowns in social cohesion. In the context of periods of socio-economic decline, people lose jobs and have limited access to educational and health services, and the capacity of community members to support one another declines. This decline may lead to conflict and violence. At the same time, youth violence in itself may erode social capital by creating conditions that are even more unsuitable for job creation and the provision of services. Youth violence may also reduce the level of trust and cooperation

“Living is a big risk in our society.” “It is easy to die but hard to live.”

—CARICOM (2009)

among community members.³⁵ This loss of social cohesion because of inadequate socialization by parents and schools leads to social exclusion among youth. Madden (2011) has argued that, if young males have no meaningful social status or ties (whether at home or in the community), they are more prone to gang recruitment. One may therefore assume a strong correlation among the strengthening of social capital, increased youth participation, inclusion in community activities, and the prevention of youth violence. Indeed, advocates have called for a focus on youth populations as a whole rather than on problem youth.³⁶ Encouraging youth from a variety of backgrounds to work together helps build social capital.

Individual Risks

At the individual level, the choice to pursue the use of violence is often affected by peer influence, low self-esteem and employment status. The CARICOM Commission on Youth Development engaged youth between 15 and 29 years of age in discussions on the meaning of risk and vulnerability in their own reality. Youth conceptualized risk as potentially both positive and negative. Some responses of youth are highlighted here that reflect this duality in the concept.³⁷

On the one hand, risk was viewed in the context of relative life-or-death situations. On the other hand, risk-taking was viewed as a necessary part of a young person’s life that could lead to the achievement of personal goals. The negativity of risk seemed to overwhelm the potential for positive outcomes. Risk-taking appeared to be more about survival and fitting in than about achievement. The reasons for negative risk-taking included the following:³⁸

- Desire to belong to a group and to be cool, popular, a trendsetter or an admired rebel
- Yielding to peer pressure
- As a means to obtain money from older people who influence them
- For mere survival or to better themselves
- To create a new space for self-expression and to distinguish themselves from others
- To add excitement to their lives

In addition to battling the risks that arise in

their environment, the young people admitted taking personal risks to their health, safety and security.

Risks to sexual, mental and physical health include promiscuity, unprotected sex, skin bleaching (mostly in Jamaica) and substance abuse (including alcohol abuse). Youth health insecurity and health risk-taking have been associated with exposure to new and potentially more deadly risks, including violence. Violence against self in the form of attempts at suicide has been a subject of growing concern in the region and has been linked to community and interpersonal risk factors associated with violence. For example, youth who have admitted that they have attempted suicide have often been victims of physical or sexual abuse, have had relatives who attempted suicide, and have expressed feelings of rage connected to these experiences. Such histories of violence may fuel aggression against others and violence against oneself.

In the Caribbean, the two principal concerns in relation to the risk that youth will use violence against others have been related to early sexual initiation and substance abuse. Early sexual initiation has been a worrying feature of Caribbean youth development. The age of first sex is among the lowest in the world: as early as 12.5 years of age among males.³⁹ In 2007, two thirds of youth who had reported they had had sex claimed to have done so before the age of 13 years.⁴⁰ Early sex has put young people at greater risk and made them more vulnerable to exposure to HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, as well as teenage and unexpected pregnancy, which constrain socio-economic potential. These outcomes often lead to interpersonal conflict between partners and to depression, frustration and aggression. The early sexual initiation of girls in some communities in Jamaica is also associated with the use of coercion and appears to be related to the socialization of girls into dependent relationships with men.⁴¹ Evidence shows that early sexual initiation is linked with child abuse in many Caribbean countries.⁴²

Substance abuse is the second most widely recognized risk in terms of youth violence and has also been linked to early sexual ini-

tiation. Blum et al. (2003) find that 60 percent of sexually active boys indicated they were using marijuana. Alcohol use is most closely associated with increased aggression and violence.⁴³

The context of youth risk and vulnerability is complex, but an understanding of these factors provides the foundation upon which effective approaches to preventing violence may be built as a priority in human development.

Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience

Given the significance of youth in the Caribbean region, there is a need to develop effective approaches to preventing youth violence. An understanding of the challenge of youth violence in the Caribbean should lead to acceptance of the fact that strategies for reducing youth violence must tackle the context in which violence arises, while carving out a space for youth to be equipped to take responsibility for resisting the recourse to violence. The prevention of youth violence therefore requires a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, there is a need to address the fundamental structural issues that predispose youth to act violently and make them susceptible to victimization. This will require a reduction in the societal and community or interpersonal risk factors highlighted above. On the other hand, there is a need to equip youth with enhanced agency so as to prevent and reverse trends towards crime and violence in communities by building youth resilience. Certainly, the reduction of risk factors is also likely to contribute to the enhancement of youth resilience. For example, a reduction in the exposure to violence eliminates the stress, frustration and trauma that would otherwise prevent youth from coping with periodic socio-economic stressors in their environments. The reduction of risk and the enhancement of youth resilience are therefore inextricably linked. The attention to one to the detriment of the other is likely to reduce the effectiveness of policies and programmes on violence prevention.

Reducing Risk and Vulnerability

The concern about increasing levels of youth violence has led to the mobilization of support and resources for many youth development programmes at various levels across the region. These programmes are mounted by a variety of actors, including governments, civil society organizations, the private sector, community associations and faith-based organizations. It is perhaps too early in many cases to assess fully the success of various programmes implemented in the Caribbean, especially given the lack of data.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, the following six themes are presented as the foundations of good practice. However, stakeholder preparedness to engage with these principles is likely to be hampered by the limited regional capacity for systematic data collection on youth to support evidence-based planning and programme design.

First, the *contextualization of programmes* for violence prevention among youth as aspects of a broader project of societal development is imperative. Programmes must address community risk factors, as well as the national and regional contexts for development, including unemployment, political corruption, gang violence and organized crime, government inefficiency, and the low penetration of public services.

Second, *the principle of inclusivity* should be applied in age- and gender-targeted interventions. Initiatives need to be tailored to different stages of the life cycle by integrating all levels and involving all categories of youth, including youth who are at risk, good youth, offenders, and school drop-outs. Everyone deserves a second chance, and good youth should not be neglected. In addition, because the age of offenders is decreasing, the adoption of the life cycle approach, which targets children and adults, as well as youth, provides a pre-emptory avenue to address violence. It does this through preventive interventions prior to the display of any forms of violent behaviour among younger cohorts, in partnership with parents and teachers who are responsible for youth socialization.

Inclusive programmes acknowledge the gendered dimension of the patterns of youth violence and develop preventive steps that take into

“Youth have to run risks to achieve things, youth risk their lives to eat food, they have to leave from one point to another and during this process youth end up getting killed.”

“Youth hardly consider risk: it’s something they don’t want to hear about because they view it as being scolded for doing something wrong.”

—CARICOM (2009)

Over 80 percent of the youth surveyed indicated their willingness to work towards the reduction of violence. Building their resilience will enable them to act as agents of change and of greater human development in their homes, schools, communities, countries and the region.

account gender differences. However, male-focused initiatives are not considered as effective as more holistic gender-based approaches that seek to address the causes of the differences between boys and girls in relation to violence and reinforce the factors that have contributed to lower rates of female offending.⁴⁵

Third, *integrated planning and programmes* are most effective. For example, linking drug abuse counselling to anger management, entrepreneurship and skills training at the community level on a voluntary and demand-driven basis helps address all levels of risk in a holistic, coordinated manner.

Fourth, *coordination and partnership* among intergovernmental, governmental and civil society stakeholders is imperative and must support youth-adult partnerships. There is a general perception that civil society programmes are more effective even though the majority of programmes are run by the state. The effectiveness could be due to the fact that civil society organizations are more likely to involve young people in the planning and implementation process so as to understand more fully the context in which youth function. In addition, civil society organizations are more likely to employ social rather than punitive judicial approaches to risk reduction.

Fifth, *strengthened police-youth relations*, including police outreach in schools, are likely to provide a good foundation for social violence prevention. These kinds of voluntary partner-

ships among social institutions may contribute to encouraging law-abiding behaviour.

Sixth, *the provision of specific alternatives* for offenders and second-chance programmes for school drop-outs help lower youth risk and reduce the funnelling of youth unnecessarily into the criminal justice system.

Enhancing Youth Resilience

While the context for development must change through the reduction of exogenous risks, any violence prevention programme must also acknowledge the role that youth themselves must play in the process. In the Caribbean, youth are willing to participate in enhancing citizen security. The youth respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 displayed strong feelings about participation in community violence prevention programmes. Stakeholders need to enable youth to play a role in violence reduction and prevention.

Resilience involves positive adaptation under stress and the development of good outcomes despite serious threats to well-being.⁴⁶ It refers to the capacity of youth to cope with challenges and resist risk factors. It is about supporting youth agency—the capacity of youth to resist the overwhelming influence of risk and to take responsibility for their own development—through processes that promote youth well-being and empowerment. The situation analysis of the CARI-

Table 2.7. How Should One Resist Violence in Communities? The Point of View of Youth

Passive	Active-destructive	Active constructive
Isolate oneself and stay indoors	Form gangs to protect each other	Report violence to the police (notwithstanding some distrust of police in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago)
Try to stay neutral and do not take sides in any conflict	Face risk directly and defend oneself using violence	Go to church and pray
Be polite to everyone		Focus on productive work, a job, or other activity
		Go to parties to relieve stress

COM Commission on Youth Development has revealed that young people have their own understandings of resilience and the actions that contribute to the enhancement of resilience.⁴⁷ The responses that youth have exhibited in an attempt to resist violence in their communities can be placed into three categories: passive, active destructive, and active-constructive (table 2.7).

Factors Supporting Risk Reduction and Resilience-Building

In addition to observance of the six planning and programme principles outlined above, a contributory factor in achieving the two-pronged approach to violence prevention is the mobilization of protective institutions to achieve the interconnected objectives of risk reduction and resilience-building. The protective institutions that influence young people's decision-making with respect to risk-taking have been widely discussed in the literature. They may be distilled into four main spheres of influence: the family, peers, the community (including schools), and state institutions. These spheres correspond and relate to several societal and community risk factors. Therefore, the mobilization of each of these spheres of influence into positive action is likely to contribute to both risk reduction and resilience-building. The process of strengthening protective factors has been achieved to a varying extent through a variety of programmes and interventions for youth violence prevention.

The family: Families, particularly parents, play an important role in shielding youth from some of the societal and community risk factors they encounter.⁴⁸ The socialization of the child away from violent conflict is an important tool in promoting more socially positive behaviours at school and in the community. Close, stable and positive family connections and positive, supportive and non-violent relationships with parents who provide supervision and discipline are the linchpins of youth resilience, particularly among children under 16 years of age, although the provision of basic needs in care and protection, including food and shelter, is essential. Most programmes in the Caribbean seek to strengthen the protective capacity of the family by offering training in parenting and family counselling, with a focus on young and teenage parents (see box 2.1, for example). Practitioners have suggested that these kinds of interventions have only limited success unless they are linked to other activities that build the resilience of the wider family with respect to the promotion of poverty reduction, increased income generation and worthwhile employment. These approaches should also provide spaces for youth participation in family decision-making to begin the process of building youth self-esteem and the capacity of youth to make good decisions.

Peer support groups: Participation in clubs, associations and other peer groups may help prevent youth violence. Positive influences have been as effective in persuading youth away

Box 2.1. A Promising Family Programme: Parental Education, Suriname

The Parental Education Programme has been offered for more than seven years by the Bureau for the Development of Children, an NGO in Suriname. The programme offers combined socialization and educational services to a low-income community in Sophia's Lust, a slum in the urban periphery of Paramaribo, where the majority of the population is of Maroon descent. The risk factors that have been identified in the family setting include low parental

education, scarce family resources, abuse and violence, impaired parental mental health and the presence of non-biological parents. Parents and professional educators have collaborated on strategies to address risk factors, while also acknowledging the context of discrimination against Maroons. Healthy social networks, positive role models, the existence of friends who are at low risk, and fair treatment have been indicated as positive protective factors.

Source: Parental Education, Suriname. Bureau for the Development of Children, Suriname.

Box 2.2. A Promising Peer Programme: Peace Ambassadors, Barbados

The Peace Ambassadors Programme was established in 2006 to confront the rise of violence and conflict in secondary schools in Barbados and to influence positive choices and decision-making among boys and girls. The programme targets young people interested in living in peace by promoting respect for themselves and others. It brings girls and boys together to speak out and take action against violence by encouraging them to become involved with others to solve problems in their schools and commu-

nities. The programme currently involves over 150 Peace Ambassadors at seven secondary schools in Barbados. It encourages the establishment of zones of peace at each school, supported by events and activities that promote an atmosphere of harmony within the school environment. The Peace Ambassadors are easily identified by other students through the pins that the ambassadors wear that are inscribed with the word 'Peace'.

Source: Peace Ambassadors, Barbados. Personal communication, Adisa (AJA) Andwele, Program Director.

from violence as negative influences have been effective in pushing youth towards violence. Several programmes have been developed across the region that seek to link youth perpetrators to their victims and to other youth who have been rehabilitated and reintegrated into society (box 2.2). These types of interventions are considered most effective in resilience-building. The decline of youth movements and capacity issues among youth organizations have affected the ability of youth to reach out

to their peers. A revival of structures for youth participation is critical to building resilience.

The community: Schools, community groups and faith-based organizations also play a role in the protection of youth and in building their resilience. Several successful violence prevention programmes have been located across the region within such social institutions and are implemented by civil society groups, including NGOs, faith-based organizations, universities and coalitions of

Box 2.3. A Promising State-Community Programme: The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica

A programme of early intervention, the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) seeks to stop conflict from escalating into violence and strengthens civic organizations that offer stability, sustainable development, security and self-respect in inner-city communities. These objectives are achieved through a number of short- and long-term strategies such as deploying mediators, providing support to community organizations and developing economic livelihoods. PMI has worked to control gang violence, negotiate peace agreements, provide counselling and treatment to individuals affected by violence, and cultivate relations with community leaders.

Led by the Ministry of National Security, PMI involves several interest groups, such as churches, academia, political parties, government agencies, and NGOs at the local and national levels. Established in January 2002, PMI has

contributed significantly in lowering the homicide rate; during the first two years of its operations, the homicide rate dropped by 15 percent. Although Jamaica's crime rate escalated again thereafter, PMI is still seen as a worthwhile initiative. There is a prevailing perception that, in the absence of the programme, the homicide rate would have been even higher.

Among the lessons learned through PMI, programme members have highlighted the following: capacity building reduces the incidence of violence; there is a need to distinguish between community and criminal violence in planning and programmes; understanding the role played by civil society is fundamental in supporting governmental initiatives; and employable skills and training are crucial to preventing and reducing crime.

Source: The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica. Personal communication, Rohan Perry.

organizations. The Peace Management Initiative, in Jamaica, is one such coalition (box 2.3). The initiative holds potential for building collective effectiveness whereby community members participate for the common good of violence reduction.⁴⁹ It helps young people build good relationships with adults other than their parents and model positive values and attitudes.

Data of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 show that, even among those youth who had been charged with crimes, most indicated that they appreciated the presence of associates and the feeling of belonging to and being proud of their neighbourhoods. However, 30 percent did not participate in community activities, and 20.5 percent did not trust people in the community. Nonetheless, the level of social inclusion among young people who had been charged with crimes was comparatively high, even if isolation from the community seems to affect more than 20 percent of the youth among them. Overall, most of the youth felt that the people in their communities would intervene on their behalf if they fell victim to crimes. Even among victims of domestic violence, 34.7 percent felt that community members were likely to intervene in incidents of domestic violence, though 36.2 percent did not feel this way. This kind of social cohesion is an important strategy in violence prevention and has been employed successfully in the Caribbean through neighbourhood watch groups and other collaborative efforts among citizens.

State institutions: A significant share of the initiatives aimed at reducing violence have been launched by state institutions, which also play a role in protection and resilience-building. Typically, the police, criminal justice systems and social departments and ministries have had the greatest access to young people. There is a plethora of programmes and approaches being implemented by the state, which suggests that there is a need for greater coordination across agencies and for integrated programmes and planning that contextualize youth violence prevention initiatives within other, broader initiatives so as to address community and societal risk factors. There is certainly support in

the literature for integrated programmes and planning that treat youth violence holistically by focusing on the development of youth communities rather than targeting only problem youth.⁵⁰ However, experience has shown that there are weaknesses associated with many state violence prevention programmes that are not unrelated to the failure to embrace the six principles for effective approaches outlined above.

We highlight four main weaknesses. The first relates to the extent to which *responses that revolve exclusively around legislation and law enforcement* have been able to contend properly with the phenomenon of youth violence. In 2008, CARICOM mandated the establishment of a Caribbean Community Social and Development Crime Prevention Action Plan, which is now in draft stage. The action plan aims to reduce violence, foster social inclusion, promote reintegration, empower victims, and protect the environment and economic resources.⁵¹ It highlights young people as priority stakeholders. At the same time, even though some of the Caribbean-7 have adopted national youth policies (Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago), the majority of policies and frameworks that deal with youth relate to children and the criminal justice system. Much of the available framework is couched within the context of defining unacceptable youth actions as delinquency, that is, actions in conflict with the law. This approach limits the responses of the state to youth issues to national security strategies that address delinquency rather than human development strategies to promote the development of young people (including by reducing risk factors) and youth empowerment (including by enhancing resilience).

The second issue within the state policy framework relates to the promotion of the *institutionalization of problem youth*, which has led, in many cases, to the incarceration of young people who are in need of care and protection from neglect and abuse and who have come into contact with the justice system for offences variously defined as wandering, being out of control, or running away from home.⁵² The youth are often housed in penal facilities

together with serious offenders, where they are often victimized again.

These policy preferences for the institutionalization of youth in need of care and protection also harbour a gender bias. Data on Barbados reveal that the majority of youth institutionalized for wandering are girls. It is likely that the pattern is similar in other countries.

Meanwhile, the majority of youth living on the streets are boys or young men. For example, Cooke (2002, 6) notes that, among street children in Jamaica, “boys outnumber girls by a proportion of 70:30.” These boys, averaging about 13 years of age, become involved in various forms of child labour and other forms of exploitation. That boys outnumber girls on the streets is likely to be a regional trend. These findings suggest that young men who leave their homes for various reasons, including child abuse, are allowed to live on the streets, while young women who leave their homes for similar reasons are more likely to be institutionalized. This distinction is in itself a sign of inequality; however, we argue that neither approach is appropriate. Both reflect neglect: a neglect of the responsibility to provide care and protection to youth. Neither young males living on the street, nor young females in institutions receive the kind of support, counselling, or encouragement required to address the issues that lead them to abandon their homes and families.

There should be a shift away from institutionalization as a first response for youth in conflict with the law. The focus of state approaches should be on working with civil society to provide a protective environment to prevent youth from coming into conflict with the law. However, where conflict with the law has not been avoided, governments should encourage the use of alternative approaches to incarceration, including diversion and restorative justice. An example of a good practice originates in Barbados. The Juvenile Liaison Scheme, which was launched by the Royal Barbados Police Force in 1983, has helped over 3,000 young people and their families by diverting offenders away from the criminal justice system. Police officers pro-

vide voluntary supervision for the youth, who are placed in remedial programmes. A success of the scheme has been the extent of police collaboration with other government departments and civil society organizations in forming an inter-agency management committee for the programme.

While in contact with the criminal justice system, youth have become victims of abuse or fail to receive adequate rehabilitative or reintegration services. Over 50 percent of the youth respondents to our survey believe that the justice systems in their countries are corrupt, and 47 percent believe that the police are incompetent. Of the youth who reported that they had been victims of violent crimes, 64.1 percent had reported the crimes to the police, while 34.5 percent had not. The reasons for non-reporting have not been determined, but, of those youth who reported, 18.6 percent were ‘dissatisfied’ with the police investigative processes, and 18.8 percent were ‘very dissatisfied’. Nonetheless, the majority of the youth respondents felt that the police deserved their support, and they indicated a willingness to work towards violence prevention. The strengthening of police-youth relations can become the foundation of strategies to reduce youth violence by adopting social measures in policing and by preventing the immediate institutionalization of youth. This issue is discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

The third weakness apparent in state responses is the failure to create *effective links to build communities and strengthen social capital and social cohesion* while in pursuit of violence reduction.

The fourth weakness of the state framework is the lack of the pursuit of *youth-adult partnerships* by which youth and civil society become acknowledged as joint stakeholders in the process of violence prevention. Youth have a role to play in violence reduction and prevention. The majority of youth surveyed indicated that they currently contribute or are willing to contribute to violence reduction programmes and human development programmes. They express hope that they will be able to contribute. “We have the skills to make a contribution but have no

tools,” Joseph, Holder, and Alexis (2009) quote a youth from Belize saying during the consultations conducted by the CARICOM Commission on Youth Development. If they are provided with the opportunity to participate, youth become empowered and can contribute to the enhancement of their own resilience.

Conclusion

The risk of violent offending and violent victimization among young people has increased. This has occurred in a context of high levels of youth unemployment, inadequate educational opportunities, and exposure to violence at home, in schools, in communities and in the wider society. At the same time, youth continue to express feelings of exclusion from national and regional governance processes, which helps predispose them to participate in alternative structures, including gangs.

While the problem of youth violence warrants urgent attention, exaggeration of the

problem, particularly through anecdotes reported in the media, may serve to stereotype youth, particularly young males. Stereotyping contributes to the adoption of heavy-handed and rights-violating security responses that foster youth exclusion and unnecessary institutionalization through the criminal justice system.

Nonetheless, all instances of youth violence, however small in proportion to the incidence of violence generally, should be taken seriously. Responses must address the structural, societal, community, and individual risk factors that account for youth violence and victimization. These responses should take into consideration country-specific contexts and gender differences in the patterns of offending and victimization.

Interventions aimed at reducing violence must acknowledge youth agency and the rights of youth to participate in the design, implementation and monitoring of violence prevention processes. Significant opportunities exist for youth participation

Table 2.8. Analysis of the Context of Youth Violence in the Caribbean

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The majority of youth are not violent b. Some youth are already contributing to violence reduction and human development c. Several promising programmes have been implemented to reduce risk and build youth resilience; these now require evaluation, assessment and replication as appropriate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Youth are stigmatized as violent b. Youth offenders do not receive adequate rehabilitation and reintegration support c. Lack of appropriate data to support planning and programmes
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Youth are open to new experiences and pursuits, and, so, change is not as threatening to them b. Youth generally feel respected in their communities, which provides a foundation for building youth-adult partnerships c. Youth have strong feelings about participation and are willing to contribute to violence prevention d. Most youth believe that the police deserve their support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. High levels of youth unemployment and inadequate educational opportunities b. Parents neglect and abuse their children c. Societal tolerance of violence threatens to erode progress in non-violent socialization among youth at home and school and in communities

in a context in which the majority of Caribbean youth surveyed have positive attitudes to participation in community activities and supporting law enforcement officers. These young people have expressed the willingness to contribute to violence reduction in their countries.

The context in which policy makers, programme implementers and youth respond to the phenomenon of youth violence offers distinct strengths and opportunities for violence reduction and the development of more socially just societies. These issues are summarized in table 2.8.



CHAPTER

3

Reducing the Contribution of Street Gangs and Organized Crime to Violence

**More social cohesion, less
crime**

Stronger bonds, safer societies

**Caribbean governments must
make security a policy priority**

Introduction

Over the last several years, street gangs and organized criminal groups have become increasingly perceived in many regions of the world as a major problem contributing to violence and crime and undermining local economies, the rule of law, and human development. The Caribbean is no exception. Nations across the Caribbean region are struggling to determine the scope, nature and causes of the problem of crime and the appropriate mix of programmes and resources to be dedicated to suppression and prevention to respond to street gangs and organized crime. This chapter focuses on street gangs and organized crime in seven Caribbean nations (the Caribbean-7). Its primary concern is the connection among street gangs, organized crime and violence. It does not focus on the links to drug-trafficking and related issues such as money laundering, which have been covered in prior reports.¹ Following the definitions of street gangs and organized crime, the chapter presents a cross-national approach to examining the scope and nature of the problems, the causes of street gangs and organized crime, and the current responses throughout the region.

There is often substantial confusion and debate over the terms street gang and organized crime. The difference between the two is important, however, not only for diagnosing the related issues accurately, but also for the implementation of effective and efficient responses. Street gangs and organized crime are different and require different responses. While organized crime can have greater consequences for nations, attention to street gangs is needed because of the high risks associated with policies that are directed towards delinquent youth in general and gangs in particular, but that are poorly conceived and implemented. Other reports have focused primarily on organized

crime and neglected to differentiate organized crime and street gangs.

In general terms, there is agreement that street gangs are characterized as “any durable, street oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity.”² Durability generally means that the group has been around longer than a few months. Street oriented refers to the group spending substantial time on the streets and in parks, malls and other public places. Youth refers to those who are, on average, between 13 and 25 years of age. Illegal activity refers to criminal activity, not merely disorderly conduct or presenting a public nuisance. Identity refers to the sense of the group, not merely to an individual’s self-image.³ Organized crime, in contrast, “is characterized by enterprise activity, the use of violence (actual and/or threatened) and corruption as typical means and exploitable relationships with the upper-world.”⁴ In this regard, enterprise activity involves the provision of illegal goods or services to individuals. Traditional examples have revolved around trafficking in drugs, guns and people, as well as extortion. Organized crime groups are also characterized by their organizational sophistication. In general, their organizational structure can be observed in two forms: corporate and relational. Those groups that operate within the corporate model possess formal hierarchy and clear lines of authority. Those groups that operate with a relational model are organized based on personal and social networks that often already exist in a community or area.⁵ Street gangs are different from organized crime groups in several ways. For example, street gangs typically lack organization and have limited centralized leadership, whereas organized crime groups have clear lines of authority. Street gangs are also more likely to be

motivated by issues of status, while organized crime groups are often economically motivated. Whereas street gangs may be involved in neighbourhood-level drug sales, organized crime groups are involved in the wider distribution and trafficking of drugs.

Scope and Nature of the Problem

Research on street gangs and organized crime has a long and extensive history in the United States; in Europe, the topic has also received increasing attention, but these phenomena have not been as systematically examined in the Caribbean. According to the *Central American Human Development Report 2009–*

2010, the key finding is to realize that youth gangs are a complex, changing and differentiated phenomenon.⁶ A comprehensive review of studies on this topic reveals the dangers of oversimplifications, especially the ones that picture gangs as out-and-out criminal groups or as innocent youth clubs. The lack of research in the Caribbean should not come as a surprise given that, as Caribbean scholars report, little attention has been given to citizen insecurity until recently and even less attention has been dedicated to gangs and problems related to organized crime. Most of what is known comes from the two largest Caribbean nations: Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

Prevalence of the Problem


Multiple data sources show that street gangs are active in much of the Caribbean region, albeit the magnitude of the problem in each nation varies substantially. Popular tools in the research on the issues are resident perception data, official police data and self-reporting data.⁷

Of the respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 across the Caribbean-7, 12.5 percent believe that gangs are in their neighbourhoods (chart 3.1). However, perceptions vary by nation. Almost 18 percent of residents surveyed in Saint Lucia report the presence of gangs in their neighbourhoods, followed by Trinidad and Tobago (13.9 percent), Guyana (13.2 percent) and Antigua and Barbuda (12.4 percent). About 9 to 18 percent of the residents claim there are gangs in their neighbourhoods. Chart 3.1 also shows that, among those who report a gang presence in their neighbourhoods, about 32.4 percent state that the problem is a big one. These perceptions of the magnitude of the gang problem also vary by nation. Around 41 percent of residents in Jamaica, 40 percent in Saint Lucia, and 38 percent in Trinidad and Tobago state the problem is a big one because of gangs in their neighbourhoods. Between 26 and 30 percent of residents in Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, and Suriname report the same. Meanwhile, only about 13 percent of residents in Barbados so report.

Chart 3.2 examines when respondents in each of the Caribbean-7 first observed the

Chart 3.1


Perceptions of the Street Gang Problem, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: respondents who answered that gangs were in their neighbourhoods (N = 1700). Questions: "Is there a criminal gang (or gangs) in your neighbourhood?" "To what extent is there a criminal gang problem in your neighbourhood?" The chart shows, for the first question, the percentage of respondents who answered "Yes" and, for the second question, the percentage of respondents who answered "A big problem". *p<.05

Chart 3.2 The First Appearance of the Gang Problem in Neighbourhoods, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.
 Note: Base: respondents who answered that gangs were in their neighbourhoods (N = 1,700). Question: "If yes (if there is a criminal gang or gangs in your neighbourhood), since when has this become a problem?"

gang problem. While a small proportion of Caribbean residents observed the gang problem emerged over the previous year (16.3 percent), most said it had emerged over the previous three to five years (20.6 percent) or five or more years ago (37.0 percent). While this pattern was similar across most Caribbean countries, Guyana was a notable exception. The data clearly show that respondents in Guyana observed the emergence of gangs in that country much later than respondents in most other Caribbean countries, with about two thirds of the observers in Guyana reporting that gangs had emerged in their neighbourhoods in the previous three years. These findings suggest that, with the exception of Guyana, many Caribbean nations have had a gang problem for five years or longer.

Another method of measuring a nation's gang problem is through official police data. Official police data capture information from people who come into contact with the police, and this information therefore tends to refer to older individuals who are more heavily involved in criminal activity.⁸ As shown in Table 3.1, the police in Jamaica have identified 268 gangs and approximately 3,900 gang members. In Trinidad and Tobago, the police have identified 95 gangs and approximately 1,269 gang members. Law enforcement officials in Antigua and Barbuda have reported 15 gangs and estimated there are between 264 and 570 gang members. Barbados has reported 150 gangs and 4,000 gang members, but these figures may be inflated. Police estimates of the street gang problem in Guyana, Saint Lucia and Suriname are unavailable, which

Table 3.1. Official Police Estimates of the Population of Street Gangs, Caribbean-7

Country	Gangs, number	Gang members, number	Estimate year	Source
Antigua & Barbuda	15	264-570	2008	OAS (2008a)
Barbados	150	4,000	2008	OAS (2008b)
Guyana	—	—		
Jamaica	268	3,900	2010	Data of Ministry of National Security
Saint Lucia	—	—		
Suriname	—	—		
Trinidad & Tobago	95	1,269	2006	Katz and Choate (2006)

Note: The notation “—” indicates unavailability of data.

represents a challenge to policy makers in these nations to have an accurate understanding of the problem. Some Caribbean police agencies do not have the capacity to diagnose the scope of local gang activities.

Possibly the most common strategy adopted in examining the prevalence of gang-related phenomenon is the use of self-reporting. Self-reported data have proven to be a robust, valid and reliable method for collecting information from gang members.⁹ Ohene, Ireland, and Blum (2005) have conducted one of the few studies that examine the prevalence of gang membership across the Caribbean. They have collected self-reported data from 15,695 school-aged youth in Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica and Saint Lucia. They find that 17–24 percent of males and 11–16 percent of females (varying by age) report they have been involved in gangs. Their research suggests that, compared with more developed nations, the Caribbean

might have a relatively significant gang problem. Similarly, Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010) have examined a sample of 2,292 youth attending schools in urban areas in Trinidad and Tobago. Their analysis indicates that 12.5 percent of school-aged youth self-report they have been in gangs. In contrast, self-reported data obtained from school-aged youth in Jamaica indicate substantially lower rates of gang membership. Wilks et al. (2007), utilizing a community-based sample of 1,185 youth, find that only 6.4 percent self-report ever being in gangs; using a school-based methodology, Fox and Gordon-Strachan (2007) find a like proportion (6 percent). Data collected through focus groups and survey-based convenience samples of school-aged youth in Antigua and Barbuda have confirmed the presence of gangs in neighbourhoods and schools, although quantitative estimates are unavailable.¹⁰ Self-reported data collected from adults on their participation in street gangs in the Caribbean are rarer. As part of the 2009 Jamaican National Crime Vic-

timization Survey, over 3,100 residents were surveyed, of which fewer than 0.51 percent of those aged 16 years or older self-reported ever being in a gang.¹¹ Katz, Maguire, and Choate (2011) interviewed over 400 arrestees who had been booked in Port of Spain, Trinidad. They find that 5.1 percent of recently booked arrestees self-reported current street gang membership.

Measuring the prevalence of organized crime is substantially more difficult. Organized crime groups, in their many forms, have been found in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. However, the number of groups and the number of individuals who identify with such groups are relatively unknown. The most comprehensive examination of organized crime in the Caribbean has been conducted in Jamaica by Anthony Harriott, Glaister Leslie, and Donna Moncrieffe. Moncrieffe (1998) estimates that there were seven organized crime groups in Jamaica in 1998. A decade later, Leslie (2010) counted 12, and Harriott (2009) found 20. Harriott (2011) notes that organized crime in Jamaica is now more active, powerful and entrenched and perhaps more well tolerated by the people and some of their political representatives than ever before. While there is anecdotal evidence of organized crime in the other six Caribbean-7 nations, there has been almost no systematic research examining prevalence. As a consequence, the data and information required to understand the problem are lacking in the Caribbean basin.

The Sex and Age Composition of Caribbean Street Gangs


We know little about the socio-demographic characteristics of street gang members in the Caribbean. Preliminary evidence on Jamaica and on Trinidad and Tobago indicate that, among school-aged youth, the majority of street gang members are male; however, female gang membership is also prevalent. For example, Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010) find that, among a national sample of Trinidadian youth in urban schools, 40.1 percent of self-reported gang members were females. Similarly, Meeks (2009) notes a strong presence of

females in Jamaican street gangs. Police data suggest, however, that gang membership is predominately male. A survey of experts with the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service found that there were no female-dominated gangs in the country.¹² Similar findings were reported in a study comprised of police experts in Antigua and Barbuda.¹³ Together, these findings might suggest that, while females are involved in street gangs in the Caribbean, their involvement might not be sufficient to come frequently to the attention of police. Regardless,

Box 3.1. Why Do Caribbean Youth Join Street Gangs?

There is almost no Caribbean-based empirical research examining why youth join street gangs. One of the few studies to examine the issue collected self-reported data from almost 2,300 school-aged youth in Trinidad and Tobago. The study found that most youth joined for reasons of friendship (42 percent) and protection or safety (29.4 percent) (chart a). The remaining joined because a family member was in a gang (5.9 percent), to make money (8 percent), or for other reasons (14.7 percent).

Chart a. The Reasons Given by Trinidadian Youth for Joining Gangs



Source: Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010).

these findings hint that increased focus needs to be placed on understanding how females impact gang structure, culture, and criminality and the role females fulfil in gangs.

This same body of research suggests that individuals join street gangs at a young age (see box 3.1). In Trinidad and Tobago, school-aged youth who self-reported gang membership stated that, on average, they had first become involved with their gangs when they were 12 years old.¹⁴ Surveys of school officials in Antigua and Barbuda have indicated that most gang members are between the ages of 12 and 15 years.¹⁵ These preliminary findings together imply that the street gang problem is largely confined to young marginalized males. School-based gang prevention efforts should therefore begin early in life to inoculate youth from gang membership.

The Organizational Characteristics of Street Gangs

Available research finds that the organizational characteristics of Caribbean street gangs vary by nation. Studies based on data collected from law enforcement experts in Antigua and Barbuda and in Trinidad and Tobago indicate that street gangs typically have an accepted name and that gang members refer to themselves as a gang or crew, spend a lot of time in public places and claim turf. While, in Trinidad and Tobago, according to police experts, most street gangs do not have symbols such as recognizable styles of clothing, ways of speaking, or signs, police experts in Antigua and Barbuda say that most street gangs do make use of such symbols.¹⁶ Relying on self-reported data from self-identified school-aged gang members in Trinidad and Tobago, Pyrooz et al. (2012) indicate that, while most gang members state that their gangs hold regular meetings (56 percent) and have rules (52 percent), fewer than half state that their gangs have a leader (45 percent) or insignia (45 percent). While these gangs exhibit relatively low levels of organization, Pyrooz et al. (2012) find that gang organizational structure is positively related to delinquency. In other words, the more structurally organized a gang, the more the gang

members self-report delinquency. A report by an officer of the Royal Barbados Police Force suggests that street gangs in that country use symbols and initiation rituals.¹⁷ Street gangs in Jamaica, however, appear to be more well organized. According to Leslie (2010), gangs there are characterized by an organizational hierarchy and a division of labour, typically including an all-powerful leader, an upper echelon, a middle echelon and bottom-level 'workers.' Gangs in Jamaica exhibit several typologies that range from small, loosely organized gangs to large highly organized gangs. Leslie (2010) also notes that these gangs lack defined territories and do not use identifying signs such as tattoos or gang colours.

Much less is known about organized crime groups in the region. In Jamaica, organized crime groups are hierarchical and are led by 'dons.' Dons typically have several 'soldiers' who perform many functions. While some may be involved in a gang or criminal lifestyle; others may be more involved in local politics. Soldiers have access to the resources that are derived from their activities.¹⁸ Dons play a leadership role in politics, community affairs and the underground economy. For example, they have veto power over political party decisions and regularly provide essential public services that the government cannot provide such as food, jobs and community safety.¹⁹ These organized crime groups have identifiable territories, referred to as 'garrisons', that are considered safe havens from law enforcement. Harriott (2008b, 24) notes that "entry into these areas by the police may precipitate armed battles that are costly in lives lost and may be politically costly for the police and the political administration."

In Trinidad and Tobago, there have been several drug-trafficking networks, some of which have evolved into organized crime groups. There are, however, alternate trajectories to organized crime. Members and ex-members of the Jamaat al Muslimeen constitute a network that is involved in organized crime activities. The network is reportedly highly organized and prolific.²⁰ International attention turned to the group in 1990 when members attempted to overthrow the government of Trinidad and Tobago.²¹ The structure

of organized crime groups in Guyana and Suriname is less well known, but is believed to be comprised of loosely organized networks that support the drug and gun trade.

The Consequences of Street Gangs and Organized Crime

Street gangs and organized crime groups are major obstacles to meeting regional development goals. They affect the quality of life, erode the development of human and social capital and divert substantial resources away from more productive uses. Below, we illustrate how street gangs and organized crime have contributed to violence and crime and undermine local economies, the rule of law and human development.

Crime and violence are perhaps the most publicly visible consequences of street gangs and organized crime (box 3.2). Available data indicate there is substantial variability in the degree

to which countries are affected by gang-related crime and violence. For example, in Antigua and Barbuda, homicide data for 2006–2007 show that only 1 of the 29 homicides reported in that country were gang related.²² In Barbados and Guyana, while the problem does not appear prevalent, there are periodic news reports of gang homicides.²³ However, the situation in these countries has not been systematically examined. The number of gang homicides in Saint Lucia appears to be growing and contributing to a greater share of the nation's homicides, but there is no systematic research. The number of gang homicides in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago, however, are substantial and increasing. In Jamaica, in 2006, there were 1,303 homicides, of which 32.5 percent ($n = 423$) were classified as gang homicides, and, in 2009, the country experienced 1,680 homicides, of which 48.1 percent ($n = 808$) were classified as gang related. Similarly, in Trinidad and Tobago, in

Box 3.2. Do Gangs Have an Impact on the Number of Homicides in Communities?

After controlling for social-structural factors, the authors of a recent study have found that there is a strong relationship between the presence of gangs and gang members and the incidence of homicide in communities. Thus, for every additional gang member in a community, the number of homicides increased by 0.4 percent, and, for every additional gang in a community, the number of homicides increased by about 10 percent (table a).

Table a. The Relationship between Gangs and Homicides

Increase in gangs, number	Increase in homicides, %	Increase in gang members, number	Increase in homicides, %
1	9.1	1	0.4
2	19.0	5	2.0
3	29.9	10	4.1
4	41.7	50	22.1
5	54.6	100	49.1
10	138.9	150	82.0
20	470.8	200	122.2
		400	393.7

Source: Katz and Fox (2010).

2006, there were 371 homicides, of which 26.4 percent ($n = 98$) were classified by the police as gang related; in 2009, the country reported 506 homicides, of which 34.8 percent ($n = 176$) were gang related. Accordingly, not only did the proportion of gang-related homicides increase in both countries, but the number of gang-related homicides almost doubled in both countries over the same period.


Research suggests that these figures may underreport the extent of the problem. Over the last several decades, a number of researchers have described the limitations of gang homicide data and the under classification of homicides as gang related.²⁴ One such study was conducted in Trinidad and Tobago. Katz and Maguire (2006) examined the nature of the homicides in the Besson Street Station District, a station district with one of the worst homicide rates in the nation. They determined that, while the police classified about 25 percent of the district's homicides as gang related, interviews and document reviews revealed that at least 62.5 percent of the homicides were actually gang related. This suggests that, through-

out the Caribbean, gang homicides may be more pronounced than official police statistics and news reports indicate.

Perhaps our greatest understanding of the threat posed by Caribbean street gangs was provided by research conducted in Trinidad and Tobago. A national study diagnosing the issue of street gangs was funded by the Ministry of National Security. It examined several data sources, including official data, self-reported data of school-aged youth, and self-reported data of arrestees. All three data sources yielded similar outcomes. The official data showed that gang members, relative to non-gang members, were two times more likely to have been arrested for property crimes, three times more likely to have been arrested for violent, gun, or drug offenses, and five times more likely to have been arrested for drug sales.²⁵ Self-reported data of school-aged youth showed that, compared with non-gang members, gang members were about 11 times more likely to be involved in drug sales, 7 times more likely to be involved in violence, 5 times more likely to be involved in property crimes, and three times more likely

Chart 3.3

Neighbourhood Experiences of Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents ($N = 11,155$). Question: "In the last year, did any of the following crimes/behaviours occur in your neighbourhood?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Gang violence".

to have been arrested.²⁶ While similar findings were reported by adult arrestees, analysis indicated that many gang members in the nation possessed firearms (52.6 percent), which were carried for self-defence.²⁷

Surveys of residents are another common strategy for understanding the consequences of street gangs and organized crime. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 reveals varying levels of gang violence in the Caribbean-7. Slightly more than 12.1 percent of the residents in these nations stated that gang violence takes place in their neighbourhoods (chart 3.3). Saint Lucian residents were the most likely to report such gang violence (20.2 percent), followed by Trinidadians (14.5 percent), Antiguans (12.7 percent), Jamaicans (12.6 percent), Guyanese (10.0 percent), Surinamese (8.7 percent), and Barbadians (5.7 percent).

We also explored the impact of street gangs by examining the personal experiences of residents as victims during the year previous to the survey. We compared the victimization rates among residents who lived in neighbourhoods with gang problems and the rates among residents in gang-free neighbourhoods. Table 3.2 shows that, regardless of country, people who live in areas with gangs were about twice as likely to have been crime victims during the year previous to the survey. While extortion has been strongly related to the presence of gangs in neighbourhoods in Central America, this does not appear to be the case in the Caribbean. Property crime, however, is associated with the presence of gangs in the Caribbean. In Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana and Suriname, people who live in neighbourhoods with gangs were more than twice as likely to have been the

Table 3.2. Victimization and Neighbourhood Gang Presence, Caribbean-7, 2010

percent

Country	Any victimization		Violent victimization		Property victimization		Extortion victimization	
	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs
Antigua & Barbuda	9.3	23.3	3.1	12.7	4.8	12.7	0.1	0.0
Barbados	10.1	26.1	4.3	14.1	4.0	11.5	0.1	0.0
Guyana	6.2	17.7	1.7	6.9	2.9	6.9	0.2	0.0
Jamaica	5.3	8.3	1.8	4.3	2.4	4.3	0.0	0.0
Saint Lucia	9.1	19.7	3.2	11.4	4.9	9.3	0.1	0.4
Suriname	8.7	18.1	2.0	7.1	6.7	13.8	0.0	0.0
Trinidad & Tobago	9.6	16.0	3.7	10.1	4.2	5.3	0.2	0.0
Caribbean-7	8.4	18.5	2.8	9.6	4.4	9.0	0.1	0.1

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "In the last year, were you victim of a crime, a violent crime, property crime, financial crime?" and "Is there a criminal gang in your neighbourhood?" The table shows, according to the presence or absence of gangs, the percentage of respondents who answered "Yes" to the first question by type of crime. *p<.05

victims of property crimes. In Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago, there was not a significant relationship between gang presence and property crime victimization. With respect to victimization through violence, the relationship was particularly strong in the Caribbean-7: almost 10 percent of the residents of neighbourhoods with gangs had been victims of violent crimes, compared with about 3 percent of the residents of neighbourhoods with no gang problems. The highest rates of victimization by violence in neighbourhoods with gangs were found in Barbados, a country in which the gang problem appears to be fairly modest relative to the other countries; the lowest rates were in Jamaica, a country in which the gang problem is fairly substantial relative to the other countries. These findings may arise from the fact that neighbourhoods with emerging gang problems experience greater conflict than neighbourhoods with long-standing and chronic gang problems.


We sought to understand these same issues by examining the perceptions of residents in

terms of the impact of gangs on neighbourhood safety. Specifically, we were interested in determining if residents believed that the presence of street gangs made their neighbourhoods safer or less safe. While most respondents stated that gangs made their communities less safe, a surprisingly large share of the respondents in Barbados (14.3 percent) and Jamaica (14.9 percent) stated that gangs made their neighbourhoods safer (chart 3.4). This might reflect the concern of Barbadians about the high risk of victimization and their perception that gangs might provide citizen safety. In Jamaica, these findings may reflect the view of resident that the state has failed in its responsibilities to ensure citizen security, and gangs have filled the void.

Organized crime groups are engaged in activity that is often less visible to the public, but that can nonetheless have an equally or more damaging effect than the activity of street gangs. Data are sparse; for most nations, we must rely on learning about the consequences of organized crime through anecdotal evidence. For example, such evidence indicates that, in Guyana and Suriname, both South American nations geographically, but Caribbean in culture, the consequences of organized crime are varied, but are often related to drug-trafficking. Local officials note that “the people who are involved in moving drugs are often the same people who will use the same operation for many other illegal activities” such as money laundering and terrorism.²⁸ Drug-trafficking perpetuated by organized crime groups also often leads to local drug use problems because traffickers are frequently not paid in cash, but in product and are therefore required to sell in domestic markets, which then has consequential effects on local criminality, including youth gangs, prostitution, and violent and property crime related to drug markets.²⁹ Drug-trafficking likewise leads to the proliferation of firearms, which are frequently traded for drugs, and the presence of armed men to protect turf and other illegal property. Indeed, drug-trafficking has been linked to the rise in execution-type killings, which account for around a third of homicides in Guyana each year.³⁰ Additionally, it fosters the corruption of public sector employees and

Chart 3.4

Respondents Who Believe Gangs Make Neighbourhoods Safer, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: respondents who said gangs were in their neighbourhoods (N = 1,700). Question: “Have the gangs made the neighbourhood safer or less safe?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Safer”.

law enforcement personnel by drug traffickers, who use their wealth to buy influence and protection from prosecution. Finally, in Guyana, drug-trafficking distorts the local economy and undermines legitimate economic activity because the monies derived from drug sales are laundered by pricing commodities and services much lower than the prevailing market rate.³¹

While all the Caribbean island nations experience problems associated with drug-trafficking, Jamaica continues to be the largest Caribbean supplier of marijuana and serves as a major transit point for cocaine trafficked from Central and South America to North America. Drug production and trafficking in Jamaica are both enabled and accompanied by organized crime and domestic and international gang activity. Cases such as *United States vs. Knowles* and the indictment of Jamaican drug lord Christopher Coke illustrate the transnational nature of the drug-trafficking component of organized crime.³² In Jamaica, similar to Guyana, there is also a strong relationship between the illicit drug trade and the illicit arms trade. The trade in guns in exchange for illicit drugs exacerbates the crime problem because unregistered handguns flow freely into the country, contributing to the high rates of firearm-related crimes.³³ In like fashion, but to a lesser extent, officials of the Royal Barbados Police Force report that organized crime has been linked to drug-trafficking and fighting over turf, primarily at sea, where disputes over drug shipments have led to deadly violence.

While drug-trafficking has often dominated public dialogue, trafficking in persons has been identified as a new problem in the region (see chapter 1). Criminal networks in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and Jamaica are increasingly becoming involved in human trafficking. For example, investigative work in Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados recently discovered that the majority of prostitutes in the country were immigrant women forced into the sex trade. The investigation uncovered at least 80 women who were told they would be earning decent salaries as bartenders, masseuses, hotel workers, or dancers. Instead, the women, who were mainly from Guyana, Jamai-

ca, and Saint Lucia were forced to serve as sex workers in nightclubs. The investigation determined that organized crime groups obtained the cooperation of immigration officers and senior officials, who were frequently bribed to allow the women into the country.³⁴ Similarly, Jamaica is a source of internally and externally trafficked children and adults. A US State Department (2010a) report indicates that Jamaica serves as a transit country for illegal migrants going to Canada and the United States and that Jamaicans are trafficked into forced labour in the United States. Foreign victims of this trafficking have also been identified in Jamaica. These findings raise questions about the effectiveness of policies that constrain free movement throughout the Caribbean for the purpose of suppressing human trafficking or of policies that address organized crime issues related to guns and drugs.

In Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago, business scams are becoming more sophisticated and more difficult to detect. For example, Jamaican Lotto scams, which are concentrated primarily in Montego Bay, disproportionately target elderly people in the United States. Lotto scammers email or phone individuals claiming that the individuals have won large sums of money and only need to wire small administrative fees to Jamaica to receive their winnings. The scams reportedly generate US\$30 million a year for organized crime groups, and more than 100 killings have been linked to the scams. The scammers have been found to illicit the help of local police officers. In one Jamaican police station, 10 officers were asked to retire because of their role in the scams.³⁵

In Trinidad and Tobago, criminal groups commit high-level fraud through the Unemployment Relief Programme (URP), which is designed to provide short-term employment to the jobless. The criminal groups obtain contracts to manage URP projects and fraudulently magnify the number of persons required to complete particular jobs. For instance, a job requiring only one person is presented as if it requires seven people. The ghost operations are staffed, on paper, by the seven individuals, who eventually receive cheques from the government for their supposed work and

turn over part of the proceeds to the criminal group. URP contracts offer the crime groups opportunities to provide resources not only to those who support them (their soldiers), but also to community residents in need, such as the elderly, children, or pregnant women, and this garners good will for the benefit of the criminal groups. Because URP contracts are administered through local community leaders, organized crime groups seek to increase their territory by pressuring community leaders to cooperate so that the groups may obtain more URP contracts. Disputes over territory frequently arise. There are no official statistics, but one report indicates that, since 2002, over 100 URP supervisors, foremen, contractors, and workers have been killed because of the schemes.³⁶

Organized crime can also have a substantial impact on the rule of law through the corrup-

tion of the judicial process.³⁷ Even if an individual or group of individuals are arrested, the rule of law can be subverted through multiple avenues. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 suggested that judicial corruption is pervasive. For example, 53 percent of residents in the Caribbean-7 believe that politically connected criminals go free; about 50 percent believe that the justice system is corrupt; 47.3 percent believe powerful criminals go free; and 37.2 percent believe judges are corrupt (table 3.3). While organized crime appears to have undermined the faith of the public in the rule of law across the Caribbean, the problem appears particularly acute in Trinidad and Tobago. Almost 70 percent of the residents there believe the judicial system is corrupt and politically connected criminals go free, and about 62 percent of respondents believe powerful criminals go free and 59 percent believe judges

Table 3.3. Perceptions of Corruption, Caribbean-7, 2010

percent

Country	Judges are corrupt	Justice system is corrupt	Powerful criminals go free	Politically connected criminals go free
Antigua & Barbuda	32.3	44.3	37.8	44.8
Barbados	24.5	33.8	40.1	41.9
Guyana	39.0	47.7	46.9	51.8
Jamaica	36.3	57.3	52.7	57.8
Saint Lucia	33.7	48.1	47.7	51.3
Suriname	35.6	45.8	38.9	47.0
Trinidad & Tobago	58.7	69.8	61.6	70.2
Caribbean-7	37.2	49.6	47.0	52.5

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "Using a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Don't know, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree), indicate your assessment of the performance of the criminal justice system on the following (fairness, integrity, effectiveness): 'The judges are not corrupt', 'The justice system is free of corruption', 'The justice system is unable to convict powerful criminals', 'Powerful criminals are likely to go free', 'Politically connected criminals are likely to go free'." The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Strongly disagree" or "Disagree". *p<.05

are corrupt. While the nation has invested considerable resources in improving the police services, it appears that the judicial system is also in dire need of improvement and reform.

Combined, these crime and social problems impact Caribbean nations in a number of other, less visible ways. For example, gang homicides are much less likely to be solved or result in a conviction compared with other types of homicides. This undermines the rule of law in two main ways, as follows: (1) Residents lose faith in the government's capacity to exact justice. General and specific deterrence is weakened. The community at large perceives fewer formal consequences for criminal actions. Individuals who have committed crimes and who have not been punished view the benefits outweighing the consequences, increasing the probability they will commit such crimes again. (2) The citizenry begins to seek justice through informal mechanisms. Victims and others may seek retributive justice on their own or solicit others, such as a don or a gang leader, to execute justice on their behalf.

The crimes and corruptive influence of gangs and organized crime also lead to decreased economic performance.³⁸ Crime diverts a country's limited resources towards crime prevention and control initiatives and away from sectors that can fuel economic growth and human development such as education and the maintenance of physical infrastructure. Corruption helps discourage positive corporate investment decisions, foreign investment and private and public loans from abroad. In the Caribbean region, in particular, crime and corruption dampen tourism. Potential tourists are alienated by violence and criminal activities and search for other locations where there is no threat to personal safety. Finally, crime and corruption cause Caribbean citizens to divert substantial resources away from more productive and entrepreneurial uses. Finances are squandered on bribes, compensating for bureaucratic delays, and engagement with organized crime rather than on personal savings and investment and human and social capital development.

The Causes of Street Gangs and Organized Crime

This section focuses on the causes and correlates of street gangs and organized crime in the Caribbean. The first part of the section focuses on the social structural conditions that give rise to and sustain street gangs and organized crime. Specifically, it addresses such issues as community cohesion, social cohesion, and informal social control and the relationship these may have with the rise and spread of street gangs and organized crime in the Caribbean. The second part of the section focuses on the risk factors and the protective factors associated with street gang membership. Our purpose is to understand why people in the Caribbean are becoming involved in street gangs.

Community-Level Explanations

Community cohesion and social cohesion are important because they allow for the development of shared goals and provide the means for collective action. The willingness and ability to develop and achieve shared goals—labelled collective efficacy by Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997)—promote cooperative efforts to define, monitor and condemn undesirable behaviours occurring within a community. Absent these social ties and relationships, communities cannot exercise informal social control over their neighbourhoods. As a result of this diminished capacity for control, these neighbourhoods begin experiencing elevated levels of crime and delinquency relative to the neighbourhoods of other communities.³⁹

Analysis of the data obtained through the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 suggests that informal social control, community cohesion and social cohesion are generally lower in communities with street gangs. In the Caribbean-7, neighbourhoods with gangs exhibited less community cohesion than neighbourhoods that did not have gangs (table 3.4).⁴⁰ In five of the Caribbean-7, informal social control was significantly less in neighbourhoods with gangs than in communities that did not have gangs.⁴¹ These findings sug-

Table 3.4. Mean Levels of Informal Social Control and Community Cohesion with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010

Country	Informal social control		Community cohesion	
	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs
Antigua & Barbuda	-0.06	-0.42	-0.13	-0.71
Barbados	-0.10	-0.12	-0.15	-0.63
Guyana	0.15	-0.17	0.15	-0.44
Jamaica	0.31	0.13	0.41	-0.14
Saint Lucia	0.20	-0.31	0.03	-0.57
Suriname	-0.20	-0.28	0.01	-0.17
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.02	-0.32	0.13	-0.39
Caribbean-7	0.03	-0.23	0.07	-0.44

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). 'Gangs' and 'No gangs' refer to the presence or absence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. *p<.05

gest that community cohesion and informal social control might be important factors in understanding the causes of street gang formation in the Caribbean.

We also examined various dimensions of social cohesion and their relationship to the presence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. Our results indicate that some dimensions of social cohesion are specific to nations and that policy makers cannot necessarily generalize across the Caribbean (table 3.5). Across the Caribbean-7, respondents residing in neighbourhoods with gangs were significantly less likely to feel a sense of belonging than respondents residing in neighbourhoods without gangs. Belongingness is the sense of pride and loyalty that respondents feel towards their countries.⁴² In Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago, respondents who lived in an area with gangs were significantly less likely to feel

a sense of belonging to their nation. Feelings of societal inclusion were also significantly associated with the presence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. Inclusion is the extent to which respondents believe they are similar to others in the country.⁴³ In Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, respondents who lived in neighbourhoods with gangs were significantly less likely to feel a sense of inclusion. Participation was also significantly related to the presence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. Participation was measured by the willingness of respondents to work with others to reduce violence and improve the country.⁴⁴ In Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, residents of neighbourhoods with gangs were less likely to state that they were willing to participate with others to reduce violence or improve the country. We also examined the relationship between neighbourhood gang presence and

Table 3.5. Mean Levels of Social Cohesion in Communities with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010

Country	Belonging		Inclusion		Participation		Legitimacy		Respect	
	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs
Antigua & Barbuda	-0.25	-0.82	-0.11	-0.56	-0.06	-0.56	-0.04	-0.53	-0.18	-0.50
Barbados	0.17	-0.14	-0.06	-0.32	-0.39	-0.60	0.23	-0.02	-0.04	-0.31
Guyana	-0.25	-0.56	-0.04	-0.49	-0.06	-0.28	-0.23	-0.64	-0.15	-0.47
Jamaica	0.22	0.17	0.19	0.06	0.32	0.20	0.21	0.04	0.21	0.01
Saint Lucia	0.00	-0.19	0.01	-0.05	0.23	-0.05	0.20	-0.02	0.28	0.04
Suriname	0.07	0.05	0.03	-0.07	-0.04	0.05	-0.09	-0.14	-0.08	-0.11
Trinidad & Tobago	0.20	-0.08	0.20	-0.22	0.11	-0.17	0.02	-0.47	0.18	-0.22
Caribbean-7	0.03	-0.23	0.03	-0.23	0.01	-0.11	0.04	-0.26	0.03	-0.21

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "Is there a criminal gang (or gangs) in your neighbourhood?" "To what extent is there a criminal gang problem in your neighbourhood?"

the perceptions of respondents about the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and the perceptions of respondents about the respect granted to them within society. Legitimacy was measured by the willingness of respondents to support institutions such as the police and the courts and the views of respondents on judicial fairness.⁴⁵ Respect was measured by the perceptions of respondents about whether they were respected by their fellow citizens, people earning more than them, and people of different ethnic origins.⁴⁶ With the exception of Suriname, the respondents in all the Caribbean-7 who were living in neighbourhoods with gangs scored lower on the legitimacy and respect scales than the respondents who were living in neighbourhoods without gangs. Together, these findings suggest that people living in neighbourhoods with gangs feel isolated, disenfranchised and apathetic and are less supportive of formal mechanisms of social control.

As a consequence of the lack of social cohesion, community cohesion and informal social control, as well as the lack of effective formal social control to respond to gangs and organized crime, criminal groups have filled the void, empowering them and helping them become engrained into the fabric of local communities (see below and chapters 5 and 6). In Jamaica, formal and informal social control and social and community cohesion have deteriorated to such an extent that some communities have turned to dons and street gangs for help. Mogensen (2005) reports that, in Jamaica, citizens do not believe that the police can effectively address crime, and they seek justice from local dons through kangaroo courts. "When crimes are carried out within the community, dons enforce discipline, including beatings or executions, to an extent considered commensurate with the level of the crime."⁴⁷ Dons also provide housing, food,

medical assistance, policing services, early childhood education and other assistance to citizens who are loyal, as well as greater opportunities for political advancement to people with political aspirations.⁴⁸ Research in Trinidad and Tobago yielded similar findings. One community leader, when asked about this issue, stated, “Gangs bring down crime. They instituted a community court that meets weekly where young males are punished and given strokes. . . . One to two local councillors have gone to the courts to observe their practice.” Another stated, “Gangs are the first ones to respond to crime; the police are incompetent, they take too long and never finish the work. If you go to the gang leader you know they will take care of you.” Still another explained, “If you live in a community where there is gang cohesion you are more safe because they [protect you]. . . . Gangs provide safety, create jobs . . . , give people food, give mother’s milk for their babies.”⁴⁹ Harriott (2008b) notes that, as a consequence, leaders of street gangs and organized crime groups have served as role models and mentors in some communities, which necessarily perpetuates a culture that places additional value on these criminal organizations and their positive role in communities.

Individual-Level Explanations

Another approach to explaining and understanding delinquent and criminal groups is

through the risk factor prevention paradigm. Risk factors are those characteristics or symptoms that, if present, increase the odds that an individual will be involved in problem behaviour. Conversely, protective factors are those characteristics or symptoms that, if present, decrease the odds that an individual will be involved in problem behaviour.⁵⁰ The risk and protective model has been used extensively in public health since researchers first learned that heart disease was associated with risk factors such as tobacco use, lack of exercise, and family history of heart disease and that individuals were less likely to experience heart disease if protective factors such as exercise and low-fat diets were present in the individuals’ lives.⁵¹ Since then, the risk and protective factor approach has been used extensively to understand and develop public health policy surrounding cancer, mental health, and disease. Most recently, it has been applied to achieve greater understanding of the reasons people join gangs.

There is almost no research on the risk and protective factors associated with street gang membership. Anecdotal evidence hints that membership is related to risk factors such as neighbourhood social disorganization, neighbourhood levels of crime and drug use, lack of attachment to school, poor school performance, unemployment, poor family management, attachment to antisocial peers, and an

Box 3.3. Deportees, Street Gangs and Organized Crime in the Caribbean

In the Caribbean, public policy makers and residents have made claims that deportees from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have contributed to the problems of gangs and organized crime in the region. The claims have largely focused on the belief that individuals learn about criminal behaviour in developed nations and, after they have been deported home, are responsible for much of the crime. While there has been little research on this issue, preliminary evidence indicates that deportees are not a major contributor to crime and violence in the Caribbean.

A joint report by UNODC and the World Bank (2010), for example, shows that 13 percent of deportees to Barbados

and 15 percent of deportees to Trinidad and Tobago were later charged with a crime. There have been similar findings in Jamaica. However, the UNODC and World Bank report noted that, while most deportees are not involved in crime, a small number might be responsible for much violence. For instance, the report states that, between 2001 and 2004, 224 individuals were deported to Jamaica who had previously been convicted of murder. The report concludes that, given the relatively small population of Jamaica, such a large number of deportees can have a significant impact on local crime rates.

Source: Katz and Fox (2010).

individual's prior involvement in delinquency and drug use. The only empirical study to date is the one conducted by Katz and Fox (2010) in their examination of school-aged youth in Trinidad and Tobago. The authors report that gang involvement is associated with youth who (1) have parents with attitudes that favour antisocial behaviour, (2) live in neighbourhoods that are characterized by high mobility, (3) live in neighbourhoods in which handguns are widely available, (4) have been involved in antisocial behaviour from an early age, (5) have the intention to use drugs, (6) have antisocial peers, and (7) have peers who use drugs. Also of interest was their finding that school-related risk factors were not, for the most part, significantly associated with gang involvement.⁵² The case of deportees is also revealing (box 3.3).

Responding to Street Gangs and Organized Crime

Responses to street gangs and organized crime groups can be varied and multidimensional (box 3.4). Domestic responses fall into five broad strategies, as follows: (1) suppression; (2) the provision of academic, economic and social opportunities; (3) social intervention; (4) community mobilization; and (5) organizational change and development. International responses tend to focus on treaties, inter-agency cooperation, and capacity-building. In the sections below, we discuss the responses that have been implemented in the Caribbean to address street gangs and organized crime, and we discuss the public's perceptions of these responses.

Box 3.4. When Responding to Gangs Makes the Problem Worse

Malcolm Klein (1995), an eminent gang scholar, notes that, in Los Angeles, gang sweeps by the police are not an effective means of generating gang arrests and do not appear to justify the US\$150,000 a day that they cost the local police department. Klein claims that such tactics may actually have a negative impact on the community's gang problem. He argues that, because the majority of the people arrested were immediately released without having been charged, gang cohesiveness may have been strengthened, and the deterrent impact on gang members may have been reduced.

Suppression efforts in Central America have yielded similar results. *Mano Dura*, the gang-reform programme in El Salvador, criminalized gang membership, and, as a consequence, youth, even if they were only remotely associated with gangs, were arrested, incarcerated and then discriminated against upon their return to their communities from prison. The policy had the unintended impact of increasing gang cohesion and the proliferation of gangs.^a

A number of researchers have evaluated the impact of other prevention and social intervention approaches on gang membership and gang crime. While a few studies report some positive impacts, most of the research examining these

strategies finds that they are ineffective in reducing gang membership or gang crime.^b Indeed, some of the research indicates that these programmes lead to an increase in gang membership and gang delinquency. Klein (1971) reports that the assignment of caseworkers increases the local reputation of particular gangs, which helps attract new members and leads to more gang activity in the areas employing detached caseworkers. Spergel (1995) reports similar findings in his examination of a programme that was designed to provide job training and job opportunities for gang members in Chicago. Project staff were primarily comprised of gang leaders from two of the largest gangs in Chicago. The analyses indicate that the project was a failure by almost all accounts. Job training and placement efforts were unsuccessful; gang structures became more sophisticated; and the number of gang-motivated homicides rose. As a consequence, many policy makers no longer believe that prevention and social intervention approaches represent a successful method to deal with gangs. This has led to a general decrease in intervention efforts conducted by youth-oriented agencies, which have since undertaken more general prevention initiatives aimed at younger at-risk youth.^c

a. USAID (2006).

b. Short (1963); Spergel (1995).

c. Spergel (1986).

Suppression

Suppression is the main approach that is used by Caribbean nations to respond to street gangs and organized crime. The suppression strategies are typically reactive in nature and make use of criminal law to control behaviour. The objective of the strategies is not only to address immediate issues (to arrest individuals for criminal activity, for example), but also to deter youth and adults from joining gangs and organized crime groups and discourage gang members from engaging in future crime. Typical tactics involve arrest, prosecution, intermediate sanctions, and imprisonment by criminal justice officials.

While general law enforcement strategies have been used to respond reactively to crimes perpetrated by gangs, no nation, with the exception of Jamaica and of Trinidad and Tobago, have focused efforts on the gang members or gangs that are disproportionately involved in gang crime. Most of these nations lack sufficient intelligence services to identify accurately the members of gangs or the main groups involved in violence. The police response has generally lacked the adequate focus on persons and places that can lead to good results.

Operation Kingfish was launched in Jamaica in 2004 to restore community confidence and reduce the fear of crime by targeting dons and leaders of gangs and by breaking up organized crime groups. The operation task force reportedly made a major dent in organized crime, effected the arrest of some of Jamaica's most wanted men, smashed at least two gangs, and disrupted six others.⁵³ Jamaican police stepped up their efforts in 2011, targeting 47 groups, particularly those with more sophisticated ties to local political parties. The new strategy appears to be focused on local police commanders, who identify the three worst criminal groups in their jurisdictions and undertake suppression efforts.⁵⁴ Additionally, the Jamaica Constabulary Force, through an enhanced anti-gang strategy, has recently identified the dismantling of gang activities as a priority. It requires officers to (1) focus on streets and public spaces; (2) identify, profile and act to disrupt or completely

demolish the gangs identified; and (3) open a Proceeds of Crime Act file on each person arrested or charged with a serious gang or drug-related crime.⁵⁵ Security officials report that this crime-fighting strategy has resulted in a 44 percent reduction in killings in the first quarter of 2011 compared with the same period in 2010.⁵⁶ Trinidad and Tobago was one of the first nations in the Caribbean to establish a specialized unit with trained personnel to respond to gangs. Trinidad and Tobago's Gang/Repeat Offender Task Force—since disbanded (see below)—was established in May 2006 and staffed with approximately 40 sworn officers.⁵⁷ The unit was trained by gang specialists (sworn officers) from the United States, and the staff included a coach (a former sworn officer from the United States) who was responsible for mentoring the unit's leadership. The unit was responsible for apprehending wanted persons, collecting gang intelligence, disseminating information to units across the police service, and conducting random patrols in areas with gang problems.

Much of the response to organized crime in the Caribbean has come through the enactment of legislation and drug-related international treaties. These treaties support the operational work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and help secure membership in regional and international organizations that foster collaboration and cooperation to suppress drug-trafficking. However, in many ways, the legislation and treaties have served more as symbolic responses to the problem rather than as effective means to combat organized crime. Caribbean nations have not had the law enforcement capacity to implement many of the laws they have passed, and the result has been suppression strategies targeting end-users and street-level drug traffickers, rather than apprehending those who profit most from drug-trafficking. Some effort has been made to address other types of activity associated with organized crime such as money laundering, bribery and fraud; however, these efforts have been hampered by lack of financial resources and personnel with the relevant investigative skills.

Recently, the Global Commission on Drug Policy, a group comprised of current and past influential statesmen from Brazil, Columbia, Greece, Mexico, Switzerland, the United States, and other nations, as well as influential leaders from the United Nations, proclaimed that, after 50 years of financing and repressive measures, the global war on drugs has failed. They argued that suppressive strategies aimed at traffickers and consumers have not taken into consideration that other traffickers too rapidly replace those who have been apprehended. The Global Commission on Drug Policy (2011, 2) also pointed out that these same suppressive efforts obstructed “public health measures to reduce HIV/AIDS, overdose fatalities and other harmful consequences of drug use” and that suppressive efforts aimed at violence related to drug markets (that is, gangs and organized crime groups fighting over turf) resulted in higher homicide rates and decreased overall public safety.


The Consequences and Limitations of Suppression

In the Caribbean, similar to early efforts in developed nations, the police response to gangs has been limited and has experienced substantial setbacks.⁵⁸ First, while police policies that define the gang phenomenon have begun to emerge, the policies are not well known among the police services and are rarely followed. This has led to unreliable gang intelligence. Officers do not necessarily document individuals because of the behaviour of these individuals. Instead, they document individuals according to the ideas, beliefs and biases of the police. Second, specialized police units dedicated to responding to gangs are themselves frequently the target of suspicions about serious misconduct and human rights violations. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago, the Gang/Repeat Offender Task Force had to be disbanded after it was accused of involvement in kidnappings, passing information to criminals about imminent police raids, providing illegal extra security at nightclubs, running ghost gangs to acquire public money fraudulently, and participation in numerous extrajudicial killings.⁵⁹ Similarly, over

the past few years, the Jamaican Constabulary Force has been accused of killing civilians in pursuit of gang members. One report indicated that, as part of its crackdown on gangs, 253 civilians were killed by police in 2009, and another 400 were killed in 2010. The increase in 2010 was, in large part, a consequence of police saturating Tivoli Gardens, a garrison neighbourhood controlled by gangs, to capture Christopher Coke, a drug lord.⁶⁰ Third, evaluations of the police response to gangs in the Caribbean have shown that suppressive efforts are generally ineffective. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago, the Gang/Repeat Offender Task Force made 495 arrests from May 2006 through August 2007. Of those arrested, only 110 (22.2 percent) were charged; the rest were released or transferred. Moreover, the police capacity to collect, maintain and disseminate intelligence—a core function of the task force—was poor, unorganized and unreliable.⁶¹

Chart 3.5

Perceived Confidence in the Ability of the Police to Control Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how much confidence you have in the police to effectively control gang violence. Use ‘1’ for a low level of confidence and ‘5’ for a high level of confidence.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents answering “High” and “Very high”.

Table 3.6. Confidence of Neighbourhood Residents in the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010*percent*

Country	Murder		Gang violence		Drug-trafficking		Powerful criminals		Crime in general	
	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs	No gangs	Gangs
Antigua & Barbuda	29.2	19.4	28.2	20.4	23.1	20.4	9.0	2.7	10.7	3.2
Barbados	45.3	37.7	45.6	43.3	41.4	43.7	11.7	3.8	17.6	14.0
Guyana	23.9	17.8	17.9	9.6	17.8	10.1	5.8	3.4	6.9	3.4
Jamaica	22.7	21.4	22.8	22.0	20.5	17.9	9.1	5.8	11.7	6.9
Saint Lucia	20.2	21.1	19.8	23.3	18.5	19.9	6.2	9.1	7.2	6.6
Suriname	34.6	36.0	30.4	28.5	27.7	24.8	9.5	12.2	12.4	15.3
Trinidad & Tobago	9.5	4.1	11.4	4.5	10.6	4.5	3.5	1.8	3.7	0.9
Caribbean-7	26.7	21.3	25.4	20.5	23.0	19.2	7.9	5.7	10.2	6.8

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "How much confidence do you have in the police to effectively control the crime problem in your country?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "A great deal of confidence". 'Gangs' and 'No gangs' refer to the presence or absence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. *p<.05

According to analysis of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010, only 24 percent of respondents in the Caribbean-7 had confidence in the police to control gang violence (chart 3.5). In Trinidad and Tobago, fewer than 10 percent of respondents were confident that the police could perform this task. Respondents in Barbados showed the highest level of confidence, at only 39 percent.

In the Caribbean-7, survey respondents in neighbourhoods with gangs have even less confidence in the ability of the police to control gang crime (table 3.6). Relative to crimes in general, respondents expressed more confidence in the ability of the police to solve crimes involving homicide, gang violence and drug-trafficking. A few other findings are also of particular interest. First, in Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Suriname, confidence in the crime-fighting ability of the police did not significantly vary even in neighbourhoods

with gangs. Second, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago were outliers in our measures. Specifically, resident confidence in the police to control crime was relatively high in Barbados, but, in Trinidad and Tobago, few residents stated they had high confidence in the police. Third, residents in all Caribbean-7 nations had little confidence in the ability of the police to control crime in general or the criminal activity of powerful criminals. The public appears to believe that the police and, potentially, the judicial system are heavily influenced by organized crime and that the response of the police to crimes of a less serious nature, but experienced more frequently by residents is rarely effective.

The problem, however, is more complicated than residents simply having little confidence in the police and believing that judges and the justice system are corrupt. Because they believe criminals are too powerful, sur-

Table 3.7. Residents Who Do Nothing about Crime Because Criminals Are Too Powerful, Caribbean-7, 2010

percent

Country	No gangs	Gangs	Overall
Antigua & Barbuda	4.2	2.8	4.0
Barbados	0.8	4.5	1.3
Guyana	9.4	8.4	8.9
Jamaica	8.3	21.8	10.4
Saint Lucia	4.2	12.1	6.5
Suriname	3.2	7.8	3.6
Trinidad & Tobago	5.4	11.9	6.6
Caribbean-7	4.8	10.4	5.7

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: respondents who answered that there was no neighbourhood response to crime (N = 4391). Questions: "What has been done about crimes in your neighbourhood?" "If nothing, why?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "The people who are involved in the violence/crimes are too powerful". 'Gangs' and 'No gangs' refer to the presence or absence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. *p<.05

vey respondents also do nothing about crime (table 3.7). This finding was particularly pronounced in neighbourhoods with gangs. About 4.5 percent of respondents in Barbados, 12.0 percent in Saint Lucia and in Trinidad and Tobago, and 22.0 percent in Jamaica reported that they did not respond to crime because criminals were too powerful.

While it is difficult to assess what respondents mean by 'too powerful', prior research in Trinidad and Tobago suggests that this answer may be related to the perceived inability of the police to do something about the problem and the perceived belief that gang members will seek retribution. For example, through a community survey in the neighbourhood of Gonzales in Trinidad and Tobago, Johnson (2006a, 2006b) found that more than 85 percent of residents had heard gun-shots in the previous 30 days, but only 7 percent had reported the gun-shots to police. At the same time, 86 percent of the respondents stated they believed gangs would retaliate against people who reported gang-related crimes to police.

The Need for Intervention and Prevention

If implemented properly, suppression can be an important strategy in addressing street gangs and organized crime, but it is only part of the solution. Suppression strategies typically address problems that already exist; they do little to prevent individuals from joining gangs or organized crime groups, and they do not address the social conditions that give rise to these gangs and groups. Caribbean governments have been slow to adopt such intervention and prevention strategies (box 3.5).

It is necessary for Caribbean nations to implement mobilization tactics that focus on the development of community coalitions involving schools, churches and public health and criminal justice agencies for the purpose of coordinating services and developing collaborative responses to gangs and organized crime. Collaborative efforts that have been undertaken are often not focused solely on gang issues. Likewise, Caribbean nations should implement opportunity provision strategies aimed at addressing the root causes of gangs and organized crime. This approach assumes that

Box 3.5. On the Horizon: Caribbean Anti-Gang Legislation

As of late 2011, no Caribbean nation had enacted legislation that defines gangs, gang membership, or gang crime. Gang legislation can supply an opportunity for public discourse on the scope and nature of the problem and can offer policy makers an opportunity to define concepts. Well-developed legislation provides guidelines and supports the police in documenting gangs and gang membership. It can also represent an opportunity for citizens to review gang-related police records, the success or failure of anti-gang initiatives, and decisions related to the identification of gang status.

Two nations have begun the process of enacting gang legislation: Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Both nations are seeking to criminalize gang membership and individuals who assist gang members. The legislation provides the police in both nations with greater authority to search and seize individuals involved in gangs. Thus, the proposed legislation in Trinidad and Tobago—Act No. 10 of 2011—would allow the police, without a warrant, to enter and search any location where they believe gang members may be found. Furthermore, gang members would be sentenced to 10 years in prison for a first conviction and 20 years for

a second conviction. Likewise, individuals who aid gang members may be imprisoned for up to 25 years.

There are a number of troublesome aspects to these legislative initiatives. First, they do not define a gang or gang membership, nor do they place a check—a quality-control review, for example—on the discretion of the police or the courts in labelling a group as a gang or a person as a gang member. Second, the proposed legislation would have only limited impact in suppressing gang membership, gangs, or gang activity. Both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have low clearance and detection rates in gang-related crime. For example, Katz and Maguire (2006) report that, in 53 homicide investigations associated with gang activity in one Trinidadian community, there were only three arrests and no convictions. While the legislation may have a modest effect on arrest rates, it would likely have no impact on the conversion of arrests to convictions. Instead, the legislation may have the undesirable effect of increasing the probability that gang members will threaten witnesses because of the severity of the potential sentences if they are convicted

many individuals become involved in criminal groups to obtain goals and resources because they do not have access to legitimate opportunities. These strategies focus on improving the academic, economic and social opportunities of disadvantaged youth. They often rely on job training and job placement, educational initiatives and the development of problem-solving skills. The use of social intervention strategies is also lacking. Social intervention strategies often rely on outreach workers to supply immediate services to gang members in moments of need. For example, following a violent incident, an outreach worker may provide counselling, crisis intervention, or temporary shelter. Outreach workers also undertake inter-gang mediation, group counselling and conflict resolution among gangs.⁶²

Primary prevention programmes are also needed for youth in the Caribbean. The goal of such programmes is to change life trajectories among youth by offering encouragements for them to avoid gang membership

and involvement with criminal groups. The programmes focus on the supply of services to an entire population or to populations in high-risk communities. Primary prevention services can be provided to youth, families, or communities by schools, NGOs, government agencies and faith-based groups. Examples of such programmes include school-based instruction, individual- and family-based life skills training and public service opportunities.⁶³ There are few formal prevention efforts aimed at dissuading youth in the Caribbean from becoming involved in street gangs or organized crime groups.

Conclusion

This chapter argues that street gangs and organized crime contribute significantly to the levels of criminal violence and other forms of crime and undermine the rule of law in the region. Street gangs and organized crime should therefore be among the most impor-

tant concerns for Caribbean policy makers in their goal of improving human development in the region. A key first step is to understand the scope and nature of the problem, the causes of the problem, and contemporary responses to the problem if we are to address street gangs and organized crime in the Caribbean effectively. This chapter highlights several major findings with respect to these issues. These major findings are summarized below.

The scope and character of the problem vary across nations in the Caribbean. Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Saint Lucia and Suriname appear to have street gang problems, but the extent and nature of these problems are unclear because of the lack of available information. Data do suggest, however, that Guyana is experiencing problems with organized crime. The problems are sufficiently substantial to influence the national economy and have been associated with significant corruption. The research findings indicate that street gangs and organized crime are a serious major issue in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago.

Despite the variations in scope, our findings suggest that there is some consistency in the characteristics of street gangs and organized crime groups across the Caribbean. For example, these gangs and groups are largely comprised of poor young men (or young men from poor backgrounds). While young women are also involved in these groups, their involvement in violence and other crimes is substantially less than that of the young men. Street gangs often lack formal leadership and structure and are frequently bound together by symbols and turf; organized crime groups are more sophisticated with respect to structure and leadership.

The incidence of homicide and other forms of violence has risen sharply as a consequence of street gangs and organized crime. The association between street gangs and higher rates of neighbourhood homicide is significant, and, in neighbourhoods in which street gangs are located, residents report much higher rates of victimization through violence and property crimes. Organized crime groups are associated with violence, high-level drug-

trafficking and fraud. While less visible than street gangs, but perhaps more consequential, organized crime has infiltrated state institutions in many Caribbean nations to the extent that the public believes the rule of law has been substantially compromised.

An examination of the causes and correlates of criminal groups in the Caribbean reveals that informal social control, community cohesion and social cohesion are generally lower in communities with street gangs. Additionally, there is evidence that youth who have parents with antisocial attitudes, who live in communities in which guns are available, who have engaged in antisocial behaviour at an early age, and who have peers who have engaged in delinquency and drug use are more likely to be involved with street gangs. Finally, Caribbean nations lack the infrastructure and capacity to respond effectively to street gangs and organized crime. This is illustrated by the fact that crimes associated with street gangs and organized crime groups rarely lead to arrests and even more rarely lead to convictions. This is also illustrated by the fact that, in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago, where street gangs and organized crime groups appear to be more well developed, the formal social control mechanisms in some neighbourhoods have broken down to the point that criminal groups are now providing many vital social services—such as policing, welfare services and even education—that state institutions can no longer adequately provide.



CHAPTER

4

The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security

**An open ear is more powerful
than an iron fist – involve the
community**

**Earn the confidence of the
community by being open, fair
and accountable in safeguarding
security**

**Respect citizens' rights while
ensuring security**

Introduction

Historically, in nations under colonial rule, formal social control of the population was undertaken by a security force that had the mission of maintaining the status and prerogatives of the colonizers and their political and social elites. Therefore, post-colonial nations striving for full democracy, economic development, social stability and citizen security must find ways to evolve the role of security personnel into one whereby the rights of all people are protected and defended. This means that the security agency must transition from a state security-oriented force to a citizen-oriented force. This type of force should include professional managers, a personnel system that makes the force representative of the population it has sworn to serve and a standardized method so that citizens can share their grievances with police, and it must include officers who see their first duty as loyalty to their countrymen and the rule of law, not the state or its political leaders.¹

The other necessary change in the transition to an effective, democratic police force must take place in the minds of citizens. Citizens must begin to perceive changes in the police function and, more importantly, must experience for themselves treatment by police officers that is respectful of their rights, courteous and fair.² Citizens have to believe that laws are enforced equally among all citizens, regardless of social status, and that the police are responsive to their needs and will use only appropriate force to ensure a safe society.³ However, the citizenry must not view the state as the sole provider of security from crime and disorder.⁴ Citizens must resist the urge to allow or encourage the state to implement draconian laws that limit human and civil rights in a misguided attempt to control a spiraling crime rate. Rather, citizens must

accept the responsibility of helping to produce their own security by becoming co-producers of safety and crime control alongside their police.⁵

This chapter analyses the evolution of the security sector in the Caribbean, describes aspects of the historical background and context of the efforts to reform the police forces of the region and explores the perceptions of the performance of police forces by Caribbean citizens. The main focus is the seven Caribbean countries (the Caribbean-7) in which we have conducted the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. The chapter argues for a more thoroughgoing transformation of Caribbean police forces that is consistent with the notion of citizen security.

Policing Under Colonial Rule: State-Oriented Security

The police forces imposed by colonial powers in many countries during the last century or earlier had a number of common characteristics, as follows:⁶

- Their primary role was to maintain the status and prerogatives of the colonial political and social elites that ruled the country.
- Police functioned as a paramilitary organization.
- Police stayed in station houses, only leaving to enforce governmental crackdowns on demonstrations, riots and crimes against the colonizers and, to a lesser extent, major crimes against other people.
- Authority and responsibility were held by top police officials only; officers lower down the hierarchy had little discretion in the performance of their duties.
- Interaction with local people was limited to treating them as suspects or accomplices, never as resources for solving crimes or as potential crime victims.

The policing model deployed in the English-speaking colonial Caribbean was based on the Irish Constabulary, which was formally established in 1822.⁷ This constabulary was designed to quell governmental disruption in Ireland and control political and social dissent. It was a well-armed paramilitary force that was primarily concerned with the protection of the state and not with the quality of life or human rights among the citizenry. The model was implemented in the English-speaking Caribbean and other British colonies; the role of the police as protector of the state was most poignantly exhibited during the labour unrest in the Caribbean in the late 1930s.⁸

The independence gained by the British colonies in the Caribbean in the second half of the 20th century did little to change the role of the police. Rather than protecting the old colonial government, the police protected the newly independent governments.⁹ The same was true in the nations of the Netherland Caribbean in which the police served to protect Netherland colonial interests to the detriment of citizens.

Modern-Day Policing: The Citizen Security Approach

One of the first steps in the modernization and democratization of a police force was taken in London in 1829. The Peelian reforms, instituted by Sir Robert Peel, were based on the simple principle that police should be citizens protecting citizens from crime and social disorder. As a symbol of their citizen status, the police were dressed like the gentlemen of the time and were not allowed to carry military-type weapons. According to the premise underlying the reform experiment, effective policing required the confidence and the cooperation of the citizens of London. As Peel wrote in a letter to the Duke of Wellington on 5 November 1829: "I want to teach people that liberty does not consist in having your house robbed by organised gangs of thieves, and in leaving the principal streets of London in nightly possession of drunken women and vagabonds."¹⁰

The Peelian reforms required constables of the London Metropolitan Police and their

administrative staffs to address crime and disorder in London proactively. They did this by establishing street patrols and engaging with citizens. The constables prided themselves on responding to citizen reports of victimization, investigating reported crimes and capturing and charging perpetrators. To accomplish this, they were assigned to geographical districts with the mandate to get to know local families and community organizations for the purpose of intervening early with individuals or groups that might commit criminal acts and building trust and respect so that community members would alert them whenever interventions were needed.¹¹

This focus on police-citizen relations and citizen cooperation with the police relies on three principles, as follows: (1) citizens co-produce security in cooperation with the police, (2) police function as problem solvers, and (3) the police and the populace jointly seek organizational changes in the police and in neighbourhoods that will improve crime prevention and control. Community policing is a philosophy rather than a rigid set of requirements, and police agencies are expected and encouraged to apply the philosophy in ways that meet the specific, self-defined needs of the public.¹² The underlying philosophy also implies a commitment on the part of the police to serve as a catalyst for local change through outreach, organizational initiatives and educational efforts that reflect citizen input and concerns.¹³ Community policing entails a commitment on the part of the police to greater responsiveness and accessibility to citizens (see box 4.1).

With the move towards community policing, police officials began to realize that positive citizen perceptions of the legitimacy and competence of the police were critical.¹⁴ Legitimacy and competency are directly related to a police force's ability to control and prevent crime, as well as ensure citizen security from disorder, victimization and insecurity.¹⁵ The role of the populace is essential for excellent and effective policing because if citizens do not report crimes to the police, cooperate in police investigations and alert the police to potential crimes and criminals, crimes are not solved and criminals are not removed from the streets. Thus, citizen

Box 4.1. The Example of the Royal Grenada Police Force

The Royal Grenada Police Force provides a good example of innovation in community policing. It has expanded the functions of patrol cars in some neighbourhoods to serve as substations where residents can file victimization reports and obtain information. The force conducted a competition among agency divisions that had to develop and carry out projects with members of neighbourhoods; the launch of the programme included a health fair, cultural displays and an open house to attract citizens.

Source: Personal communication, James Clarkson, Commissioner, Royal Grenada Police Force, April 2010.

participation and cooperation promote partnerships with the police and the co-production of crime prevention and control. Neighbourhoods engaged in effective community policing yield nations in which citizens feel unthreatened by crime and sufficiently secure to lead productive and creative lives.

The Police in the Caribbean

This section provides a brief description of the main challenges facing the police services of the region. These include, first, the challenge of improving effectiveness and responsiveness to the security demands of citizens. We call this the problem of performance legitimacy. The second is the challenge and imperative of

integrity because corruption invariably compromises performance and weakens public confidence. This issue bridges both performance and what may be called the problem of values, authority and legitimacy. The third challenge is to reduce abuses of power and to become more rights-regarding.

The Capability Challenges

The responsiveness and effectiveness of police services are related to capacities and capabilities. Consistent with the size of the populations in the region, Caribbean police forces are small (see table 4.1). Still, police density is greater in the Caribbean than in Latin America. There is a recurrent debate among practitioners on the proper density

Table 4.1. Police Strength and Density, Caribbean-7, 2011

number

Country	Strength	Density
Antigua & Barbuda	560	1:114
Barbados	1,415	1:190
Guyana	2,900	1:259
Jamaica	9,903	1:273
Saint Lucia	1,060	1:148
Trinidad & Tobago	6,302	1:201

Sources: UNDP estimation based on data from Regional Security System, Christ Church, Barbados, <http://www.rss.org.bb/>; Jamaica Constabulary Force, <http://www.jcf.gov.jm/>.

Note: The population estimates are taken from the most recent census and are therefore dated. Police reserves are excluded for all countries except Jamaica, where the auxiliary, the Island Special Constabulary Force, is included because it consists of full-time, fully salaried officers. All part-time actual reserves are excluded. The data for Guyana are for 2007.

of police officers per inhabitant. Despite the importance of this indicator, it depends on multiple factors, including the distribution of a population between rural and urban settings and the geography of the territory.

The fairly high police densities across the region suggest that, with the possible exception of Guyana and Jamaica, coverage is not a particularly acute problem. Perhaps the more challenging issue is the effective use of these human resources. Adequate police strength and density are conditions for effective service delivery and the protection of the population, but they are not sufficient conditions. The effectiveness and efficiency of even the largest police services enjoying the best resources may be compromised by corruption.

The Integrity Imperative

The performance and values dimensions of legitimacy can be insidiously undermined by corruption. One of the major barriers to the adoption of more effective and efficient crime control methods and the meaningful inclusion of citizens in police operations is corruption. Corruption is particularly devastating to crime prevention and control efforts because of the detrimental effect that it has on citizen perceptions and subsequent actions.¹⁶ Tankebe (2009) notes that, in developing nations, the relationships between the public and the police are fraught with distrust and alienation. In Suriname and in Trinidad and Tobago, 89 percent of the respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 believed that governments should invest more in reducing corruption so as to lower the incidence of crime. The respondents in Barbados were not as concerned about corruption as those in the other six nations: only 71 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the government should invest more in reducing corruption. The Jamaican respondents were the most concerned about this issue: 94 percent believed that corruption and crime are linked and that government should invest more in reducing corruption. Accordingly, it is difficult to speak of the success of modern police reforms without simultaneously acknowledging the destabilizing role of corruption.

The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) has a long and varied history in fighting corruption. Corruption within the JCF was a major reason behind the selection of individuals from outside the force as members of top management. For example, Trevor MacMillan, a former military officer, was selected as commissioner of police in 1993. In the following two years, 572 allegations of misconduct were investigated. This represented approximately 10 percent of the JCF at the time.¹⁷ After MacMillan's tenure ended, the force sank back into a pattern of corruption. Currently, the JCF is again making serious strides in combating internal corruption, and it is achieving fairly good results. Commissioner Ellington and the Ethics Committee have aggressively identified corrupt police officers and have terminated the employment of these officers: 20 since the beginning of 2011, with 137 officers denied reenlistment in 2010 because of allegations of corruption.¹⁸ The JCF is attempting to reform the police culture from the acceptance of corruption to zero tolerance. The Jamaican example demonstrates that the police can do something to control corruption and thereby increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.

The Rights-Respecting Imperative

If corruption has the effect of weakening the values-based moral authority of the police, abuses of power that take the form of a disregard for the rights of citizens tend to have an equal or even greater negative effect on this dimension of the legitimacy of the police. In this area, there is considerable variation in the performance of Caribbean police forces. In the countries with high rates of violent crime, the abuses of citizen rights and, particularly, extrajudicial killings tend to be more frequent than in countries with lower homicide rates. This is supported by data of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Situational factors seem to play an important role in determining these outcomes. The governments and police services of the region have tried to respond to the challenges by improving accountability and capability and by introducing new methods of policing that aim at greater responsiveness to needs and better relationships with citizens.

Accountability

One of the challenges facing police forces in the Caribbean, as elsewhere, is the necessity to improve accountability mechanisms. Accountability has the potential to enhance performance, integrity and regard for the rights of citizens.

To a greater or lesser extent, all the police forces in the Caribbean suffer from the problems of unreformed police structures. The constitutions of the Caribbean countries that are members of the Commonwealth entrench considerable power in the hands of the prime minister, including the power to appoint members of the police services commission after the consent has been obtained from the governor general or the president, as head of state.

The police services commissions make top-tier appointments to the police services, as well as senior promotions, and provide, in the main, retrospective oversight of the police services. Table 4.2 describes the systems of accountability across the Caribbean. At first look, most police services appear to have adequate external systems of accountability.

Based on the performance of these police services, these systems have not, however, proved effective in ensuring a desirable level of crime control or rights-respecting results. The experiences in the region indicate that the systems of accountability ought to be evaluated and, perhaps, re-engineered so they may support the transformation of policing that is required.

With the exception of Antigua and Barbuda, the systems of internal accountability include internal police investigative units that investigate corruption and ensure professional standards. These units have varying capabilities and, in some instances, are not robust. Some capacity development may therefore be required.

Changing the Relationship with Citizens: Community-Based Police

While these efforts to combat corruption are necessary, national leaders across the region have also sought to implement other initiatives and programmes intended to increase the perceived legitimacy and competency of

Table 4.2. Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7, 2007

Country	Police service commission	Internal police investigative division	Ombudsman	Civilian oversight body
Antigua & Barbuda	Yes	No	No	No
Barbados	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Guyana	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Jamaica	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Saint Lucia	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Suriname	–	–	–	–
Trinidad & Tobago	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

Source: Gomes (2007).

Note: Jamaica relies on a police public complaints authority (a civilian body) and a police civilian oversight authority. The notation “–” indicates unavailability of data.

Box 4.2. Rio de Janeiro: Community Policing in a Context of High Crime Rates

Throughout the 1990s, the police of Rio de Janeiro faced serious credibility issues because of severe human rights abuses and the poor relations of the police with urban poor communities. In response to these problems, the police established a unit, *Grupamento de Aplicação Prático Escolar* (literally, the group for Applied Practice), that was responsible for ensuring public security within communities. At the end of the 1990s, another initiative, *Mutirão pela Paz* (or Collective Effort for Peace), was undertaken by the police to deliver social services to communities in an effort coordinated with labour, welfare and other governmental departments.

In the 2000s, *Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais* (Police Unit for Special Areas) was created to patrol high-risk areas. Participating police officers had to be volunteers. The areas in which the units were active all had high homicide rates. Small police stations were opened in these areas. The results were revealing; the units had an impressive effect in bringing together police and communities. However, there

were problems. The small units had to confront powerful drug-trafficking networks, and many of the police volunteers were not accustomed to these sorts of operations. Moreover, the resources were insufficient to realize an integrated, effective approach.

Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Units), the initiative currently being tried, represents quite a different approach. First, the units begin patrolling into the favelas, the poor shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro, where they confront and attempt to neutralize drug networks and suppress other criminal activities. Next, fresh graduates of the police academy who have received special training in community policing are stationed in the favelas. However, they are not deployed in isolation. They are assisted through social services and other support programmes. This permits effective engagement with community members and promotes a less repressive image of the police. These new units are larger and have more resources than the *Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais*.

police forces. Many of these efforts have centred on the adoption of community-oriented policing. For example, Barbados made the shift to a community-oriented approach beginning in the 1970s. The establishment of the Office of Public Relations in the early 1980s was a crucial part of this transformation. The Community Policing Unit has been credited with reaching out to neighbourhoods through education and programmes to help citizens protect themselves and their neighbours. The results of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 indicate that support for police is greater in Barbados than in the other Caribbean-7 nations; Barbadians believe the police to be a legitimate force. Given these findings, it is not surprising that Barbados has been the most successful nation in the region in instituting reforms that transition the police force beyond older models of policing. Jamaica made great strides towards reform beginning in the 1990s with the intent of increasing the transparency, effectiveness and legitimacy of the police. Community policing was implemented along with these changes. However, the reform movement and community policing came to an untimely de-

mise with a change in administration and a rapidly rising rate of violent crime. (See box 4.2 for an example of a similar context.) Today, Jamaica is trying again to reform the police. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service has also adopted a community-oriented approach, but, because of the high levels of violent victimization among citizens that strain police and the shortage of public resources, these reforms have not been achieving progress as quickly as desired.

The other Caribbean-7 nations have not achieved the same level of reform as Barbados, but are not struggling as much as Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago. For example, Suriname has also adopted a community policing approach. Citizen involvement in crime prevention grew organically during the 1990s, when an increase in crime was coupled with an economic downturn. Citizens formed their own neighbourhood watch groups because they were displeased with the effectiveness of the police. Such groups usually do not build a sense of general security because they do not involve two-way communication and coordination with the police. The formation of these groups represented, however, an ef-

Box 4.3. Problem-Solving Partnerships in Suriname

The community police manager plays a fundamental role in solving conflicts and preventing violence at the community level. The manager is supervised by the police and, in 2006, involved the participation of commercial institutions, small businesses and individual citizens in the activities of 12 police subregions in the district of Paramaribo and in 3 rural districts. The managers deal with problems such as the presence of informal street vendors or the need for parking spaces for private buses.

fort by the citizenry to begin to take responsibility for public safety. The police found ways of positively responding to this problem by establishing community police managers who engaged with residents in problem-solving (box 4.3).

In 2009, Antigua and Barbuda implemented community policing based on the principle of the co-production of security. Police salaries were also increased. A formal complaint procedure for citizens was established, and other reforms were undertaken. Despite the major changes, community-oriented policing has not been fully realized, and the police continue to behave in a largely reactive manner by focusing on response times. A recent initiative is intended to equip law enforcement with the latest in computer and telecommunications technology, an effort that modernizes rather than reforms the police and their relationship to the public. Although the modernization of equipment is important in the Caribbean, it will not enhance feelings of security among citizens. There must be reform aimed at improving the relationship between the police and the public so that effective co-production of security can occur. The Nicaraguan experience is a good example of citizen-police partnership for the co-production of security (box 4.4).

Developing Capacity:

Advancing Police Training and Education

Another aspect that is important for the future of policing in the Caribbean is the model of police training. All the Caribbean-7 countries have police training academies. These institutions or units were all established be-

tween the 1950s and the 1980s.¹⁹ Chart 4.1 summarizes the training programmes offered. It is based on information provided by the security agencies of the respective countries. Investigative competence, use of force, human rights, women's rights, appropriate responses to gender-based violence and community policing are curriculum topics in most of the training programmes.


Box 4.4. The Co-Production of Security in Nicaragua

In 2001, the national government established the Comprehensive Policy on the Police and the Community, which defined the concepts and strategies of a community policing model. Since 2004, the Proactive Community Policing Model has brought together the government, NGOs and communities to address the issues of violence and crime by sharing information and to build trust, interaction and partnerships. The programme helps identify the security needs of citizens and address them through comprehensive initiatives and planning.

The Proactive Community Policing Model has four main components. The first is the operation of a police 'total school' that was established by the police academy and is used to train and develop officers throughout their careers. Police training and related programmes were also inaugurated in each local police station. The second component involves fostering police-citizen partnerships to address local crime issues. The third is the commissioner for women and children, a position created to address the prevention of domestic and sexual violence. The fourth component is the Adolescents and Youth Affairs Department, which was created to address youth violence and reintegrate youth into their communities. The programme is being supported by the Youth Affairs Division of the National Police.

Sources: UNDP (2009).

Chart 4.1

Incidence of Key Topics in Police Training Curricula
percent

Source: Data of CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, <http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs>.

Note: Special thanks is owed to IMPACS for granting UNDP access to the report led by IMPACS and funded by the European Commission.

Training in topics related to the treatment of people by the police are present across most or all of the programmes. These topics may be viewed as supportive of the transformation process in the police forces of the Caribbean. Likewise, skills training in topics such as drug control, fraud investigation and intelligence gathering and analysis are no less important. The culture and structure of the institutions also have to be considered to ensure the effective application of positive principles and the improved performance of the police. Moreover, in the small countries of the region, the rationalization of police training from a regional perspective would be of considerable benefit to all.

Regional Cooperation

The Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM, the Caribbean Community, at its 22nd Meeting, held in Nassau, the Bahamas in July 2001, expressed concern over the crime and violence that continue to pose a threat to regional security. This gave impetus to efforts to develop and intensify regional cooperation on security matters. These efforts have been facilitated by the establishment of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security.

At the regional level, significant training has been undertaken among senior-level police officials on specific issues such as drug-trafficking, intelligence and management (box 4.5). The purpose is to foster a regional

Box 4.5. Caribbean Regional Police Training Centres

There are four regional training centres on security issues in the Caribbean.

The Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Centre, located in Jamaica, trains officials in drug-related topics such as criminal law, management, intelligence, investigation, drug control and suspect interrogation techniques. The courses address a wide range of law enforcement officials, including military personnel, police, prison officials, immigration officers and customs officials. The institution was established in 1996. It offers courses for 50 trainees at a time. Trainees are full-standing staff, not recruits.

The Caribbean Centre for Development Administration, located in Barbados, trains immigration and customs officials and others. The overall aim is to enhance public governance. The centre has only six instructors, all university graduates, and 10 support staff. It was created in 1980 and offers courses for 30 trainees at a time. Trainees are recruits and regular officers of all ranks.

The Regional Security System, located in Barbados, was

created in the 1980s to promote a collective response to security threats among eastern Caribbean states. The current member nations are Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Trainees include police, military personnel and customs, prison and immigration officials. Up to 30 trainees are accepted at a time, though none can be new recruits. Courses cover patrolling, investigation, crime forensics and diving.

The Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre was created in 2007 to provide intelligence support to regional and international stakeholders and to serve as a mechanism of intelligence integration in the region. Training is offered for police and military officials, as well as civilians involved in intelligence gathering. All course contents pertain to intelligence gathering and analysis. Up to 25 trainees are accepted. It does not train new recruits.

Source: Data of CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, <http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs>. Note: Special thanks is owed to IMPACS for granting UNDP access to the report led by IMPACS and funded by the European Commission.

approach to common regional challenges and to establish a regional network of security operatives and officials.

These various initiatives and programmes have advanced the process of change within the police services of the region. This process should be intensified. The perceptions of the populations of the region who are served by the police reveal the extent of concern about these issues and the extent of the demand for change.

Perceptions on the Police in the Caribbean Region

This section presents analysis primarily of responses to questions on the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 regarding experiences, opinions and perceptions about the police. Four main topics are explored, as follows:

- The effects of crime on the general sense of insecurity among citizens
- Indicators of the values dimension of the legitimacy of the police, that is, the per-


ceptions of respondents about the police in terms of the protection of the rights of individuals and equitable treatment of all people

- The performance and competence dimension of the legitimacy of the police, that is, the perceptions of respondents about the effectiveness of police in controlling specific types of crimes in the community and at the national level
- The willingness of citizens to cooperate with the police in crime prevention and to work with others in the community to reduce violence.

The public's perceptions of the police are crucial in the transition to citizen security. The police must be viewed as possessing the legitimate authority to uphold and enforce the laws and the rights of citizens, as well as the competence to fulfil these duties in a way that is fair, appropriate and respectful. If citizens view police in this light, they will be more likely to cooperate with the police and participate in crime prevention and control

Chart 4.2

The Role of Perceptions of the Police in Achieving Citizen Security



efforts. As the role of citizens in crime prevention and control grows, citizens will begin to co-produce the positive outcomes along with the police, ultimately increasing the public's sense of security from crime (chart 4.2). As fear of crime lessens and the sense of security increases, citizens will become more able psychologically to pursue human development activities that enhance the quality of their lives.

Crime is salient to citizens in the Caribbean region. Less than half of the survey respondents felt secure from crime (see chapters 1 and 6). Given the high rates of homicide, robbery, burglary, rape and domestic violence documented in chapter 1, it is not surprising that insecurity is widespread. The region is also facing economic challenges that are sometimes more immediate and threatening than the fear of becoming the victim of a crime. It is therefore revealing that the survey found that nearly one fifth of the respondents said crime is the number one problem in their nations; a smaller percentage said crime was the first or second greatest problem in their neighbourhoods.

Violent crime was considered a more serious problem than property crime by the respondents in almost all the Caribbean-7 countries. The fact that violent crime is perceived as more threatening is typical of most developed nations in the world, even though the incidence of property crime is generally many times greater than the incidence of violent crime.²⁰ At the neighbourhood level, robbery and day-time break-ins were rated as the first or second greatest crime problems in all the Caribbean-7 countries except Guyana and Jamaica. In Guyana, citizens worried the most about robbery and night-time break-ins in their neighbourhoods; in Jamaica, murder was feared the most.

In the rest of this section, we discuss the two factors—shown in chart 4.2—that are predictive of a sense among citizens that they are secure from crime: perceived police legitimacy and perceived police competence. If citizens see the police as credible agents of social control operating under the rule of law and as competent in that role and worthy of assistance and cooperation, then citizens are likely to feel secure from crime. Perceived legiti-

macy and perceived competence may both be eroded by the use by police of excessive force or by police corruption; so, it is important for police organizations to develop mechanisms and incentives that increase positive police conduct and reduce misconduct.


Perceived Police Legitimacy

If one perceives the police as a legitimate agency for social control, then one believes that the policies and procedures of the police promote humane, equitable and consistently applied treatment among all citizens and that officers respect the rights of everyone.²¹ The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 included eight questions concerning the performance of the police with regard to their handling of civil rights, a key aspect of perceived legitimacy. To simplify the presentation of the results, we conducted a factor analysis to determine the items that could be grouped together in an empirical fashion.²² The analysis revealed that the way police deal with the civil rights of citizens can be described according to three concept clusters: respect and fairness in dealing with citizens; the treatment of citizens with courtesy; and on the basis of equality and respect for political rights.

The survey responses on the respect, fairness, equality and courtesy displayed by the police in their dealings with citizens are outlined in chart 4.3. The chart is based on respondent ratings on a five-point scale ranging from very poor to very good. The data displayed in the chart refer to the combined percentages of respondents who answered 'good' or 'very good'. Across the three questions, an average of only 15 percent of the respondents gave ratings that indicated substantial perceived legitimacy. The highest average percentage was associated with respect for the rights of citizens (20.7 percent), followed by fairness in dealing with people (18 percent), courtesy towards citizens (17 percent), and equitable treatment of all people (14 percent). The variation across the Caribbean-7 is noteworthy. Among all respondents, the police were perceived to be the most legitimate by respondents in Barbados, while the police were perceived to be the least legitimate by respondents in Trinidad and Tobago. These findings are

Chart 4.3

People Who Believe Police Treat Citizens with Courtesy, Equality, Fairness and Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010
percent




Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "How do you rate the performance of the police on the following items? Courtesy to ordinary citizens; respect for citizens rights; fairness in dealing with people; treating people equally." The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Good" or "Very good".

Chart 4.4

People Who Believe Police Respect Their Rights and the Rights of All Citizens, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "Using a scale from 1 to 5, please rank the extent to which the police have generally been respectful of your rights as a citizen. Use '1' for very respectful and '5' for very disrespectful." A similar question associated with a different rating scale was asked about respect for the rights of others. The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "respectful" or "very respectful".


supported by a study that examined calls for police service assistance by citizens in three of the Caribbean-7.²³ Using the proportion of calls related to non-criminal matters as an indicator of legitimacy, the study found that Barbadian citizens regard their police as more legitimate than the citizens in either Trinidad and Tobago or Jamaica. The police in Barbados have also achieved the greatest amount of reform, while the police in Trinidad and Tobago are struggling to keep pace with the high levels of criminal activity there. The other four countries fall somewhere in between.

Respondent perceptions of the respect shown by the police for citizen rights generally and for civil rights in particular are outlined in chart 4.4. The two relevant survey questions probed police legitimacy through the perceptions of respondents on the respect displayed by police for the rights of the respondents, but also the rights of other citizens. The questions were asked at different points in the survey interviews and re-

lied on different five-point rating scales; the answers are thus not strictly comparable. The results suggest, however, that the respondents tended to feel their own rights are respected more than those of their fellow citizens. Thus, almost 49 percent of the respondents in Saint Lucia felt that the police respected their rights, but fewer than half of this 49 percent believed that their fellow citizens were treated in a respectful manner. Agreement that the police showed respect for the rights of other citizens averaged only 21 percent across the Caribbean-7, while respect for the respondents' own rights averaged 39 percent. Except in Barbados, neither set of answers seemed to indicate that the police in the region are regarded as legitimate. This finding is likely related to the perception that the police are corrupt. In any case, it appears these countries face a significant challenge in seeking citizen cooperation with the police or citizen co-production in crime prevention and control.

Chart 4.5

Victims of Domestic Violence Who Believe Police Treated Them with Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: respondents who declared they had reported an incident of domestic violence to the police (N = 1,192). Question: "Please rank the extent to which the police have generally been respectful of your rights as a citizen." The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "respectful" or "very respectful".

The pattern is different among victims of domestic violence (chart 4.5). The level of satisfaction of these people, both men and women, regarding their treatment by police is low.

Perceived Police Competence and Performance


The perception that police officers and police agencies are competent rests on the belief that the police can control crime through prevention activities and by solving criminal cases, as well as the perception that the police are effective in carrying out their myriad other responsibilities.²⁴ The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 included three questions that measured perceived competence. The first question asked respondents to gauge how much confidence they had in the ability of the police to control crime effectively: no confidence, some amount of confidence, or a great deal of confidence. Chart 4.6 displays

the percentage of respondents in the Caribbean-7 who chose the last two answers. Respondents in Barbados showed the greatest amount of confidence in the competence of the police in this area: 16.7 percent responded "a great deal", and 65.4 percent responded "some confidence". As above, this is not surprising given the transformation of the police in Barbados. For example, the Royal Barbados Police Force has recently improved its already well-regarded services by expanding outreach to rural areas. If we sum the two response options within each country, the data show that more than 55 percent of the respondents in each country felt some confidence or a great deal of confidence in the ability of the police to control crime.

The survey findings show that the confidence of respondents in the police also mirrors the assessment by respondents of the performance of the police in controlling two major crimes: robbery and burglary (com-

Chart 4.6

Perceived Confidence in the Police to Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "How much confidence do you have in the police to effectively control the crime problem in your country?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "A great deal of confidence" or "Some amount of confidence".


pare charts 4.6 and 4.7). The respondents in Barbados had the greatest confidence in the police: around 82 percent had a great deal of confidence or some confidence in the police (chart 4.6). Their rating of police performance in controlling robbery and burglary was also the highest relative to respondents in the rest of the Caribbean-7: 40 percent of the respondents in Barbados rated the police good or very good in controlling both robbery and burglary (chart 4.7). Respondents in Trinidad and Tobago showed the least confidence in the police: 58 percent had a great deal of confidence or some confidence in the police (chart 4.6). They also rated police performance the poorest in controlling robbery and burglary: only 10 percent rated the police good or very good in these areas (chart 4.7). As seen in charts 4.3, 4.4 and 4.6, the respondents in Barbados rated the police as the most legitimate and most competent on

the measures so far discussed, and this trend continued with regard to performance. In contrast, the respondents in Trinidad and Tobago had little confidence in the police and also rated the performance of the police the lowest in controlling robbery and burglary. Suriname was second to Barbados: 77.6 percent of the respondents there indicated they had confidence in the police to address the crime problem, while 29.1 and 27.7 percent, respectively, rated the police as good or very good in controlling robbery and burglary.

It is also evident in chart 4.7 that the perceptions of the police control of robbery (that is, theft from a person) tracks closely with perceptions of the police control of burglary (theft from a building, car, home, and so on), even though the latter is a much more frequent crime in the Caribbean. Another conclusion is that, although the respondents have more or less confidence in the police to control the

Chart 4.7

Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Robbery and Burglary, Caribbean-7, 2010




Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how much confidence you have in the police to effectively control the following crimes: robbery and burglary. Use '1' for a low level of confidence and '5' for a high level of confidence." The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "High" or "Very high".

Chart 4.8

Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how much confidence you have in the police to effectively control domestic violence. Use '1' for a low level of confidence and '5' for a high level of confidence." The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Good" or "Very Good".

crime problem, they do not feel that the police are performing at an appropriate level.

Chart 4.8 focuses on the perceived performance of the police in controlling domestic violence in the communities and the countries of the respondents. The findings show that the rating by respondents of the ability of the police to control domestic violence mirrors the assessment by respondents of the performance of the police in controlling robbery and burglary. Thus, Barbados ranks the highest, and Trinidad and Tobago ranks the lowest. However, even in Barbados, only 29 percent of the respondents thought the performance of the police in the community was either good or very good; the majority perceived the performance of the police as less effective. This indicates that police departments in the Caribbean need to focus


more on training officers in domestic violence prevention and intervention and implement best practice in this area. Noteworthy also is the fact that the respondents rate the performance of police in their communities more favourably than the performance of police in their countries. This parallels research showing there is greater support for the police in one's own community than for police elsewhere, suggesting that familiarity has a somewhat positive effect on assessment.

Willingness of Citizens to Participate and Cooperate with the Police

If citizens perceive the police to be both legitimate in the use of social control mechanisms and competent in doing so, citizens are more likely to participate in crime control activities with the police and to be generally supportive of police efforts.²⁵ The crime control activities include reporting crimes to the police, cooperating in investigations, coming forward with information about future or past criminal incidents, and donating time and money to police programmes. The only relevant question on participation in the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 came at the end of a question sequence: "In the last year, were you the victim of any of the following 18 violent crimes, and, if yes, did you report the violent incident to the police?" A similar sequence of questions dealt with property crime. Research in developing nations and in the United States suggests that the seriousness of an offense is the best predictor of whether the crime will be reported to the police: as the seriousness increases, so does the reporting. However, factors other than seriousness play a role in decisions to report. Research has shown that, especially in the developing world, past victimization and socio-economic status affect a victim's willingness to report a crime to the police.²⁶ Thus, the rate of reporting crime victimization has frequently been treated as an indicator of the public's trust that the police will respond appropriately to such reports and neither ignore nor punish the citizens filing the reports.

Chart 4.9 displays the percentage of respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security

Chart 4.9 Reporting Crimes to the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: respondents who were victims of violent crime (N=1060) and respondents who were victims of property crime (N=882). Questions: "Did you report the (violent) incident to the police?" "If you were the victim of a property (non-violent) crime, including fraud, did you report this crime to the police?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who said they had been victimized by crimes and who reported the crimes to the police.

Survey 2010 who had been victimized and said they reported the violence or the property crimes to the police. There is a fairly similar reporting rate of around 60–70 percent for violent crimes across the Caribbean-7. The likelihood of reporting property crimes is consistently lower, around 40–50 percent except in Antigua and Barbuda (34 percent) and Suriname (65 percent). Comparable data on reporting in the United States and many European nations have been available from the International Crime Victims Survey since 1989. The 2004–2005 surveys conducted in 30 countries found that the reporting rate associated with five property crimes was 53 percent.²⁷ This comparison suggests that the level of trust in the police found in five of the Caribbean-7 is consistent with the corresponding level in other developed and developing countries.


A frequent follow-up question among respondents who had been crime victims and who said they had reported the crimes gauged

their satisfaction with the police reaction on a five-point scale ranging from very dissatisfied to very satisfied. On average, across the Caribbean-7, the level of satisfaction with the police response to reports of violent crimes (28.7 percent satisfied) was surpassed by satisfaction with the response to reports of property crimes (54.9 percent satisfied). For comparison, the average satisfaction level found by the 2004–2005 International Crime Victimization Survey for property crimes was incrementally lower at 53 percent.²⁸

The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 did not ask respondents about the reasons for their assessment of their encounter with police after they had reported crimes, but practices that have been adopted in some countries may help explain some of the variation. For example, Suriname has established informal neighbourhood councils composed of community members. The councils serve as an alternate means to encourage community involvement in evidence-based crime prevention and con-

Chart 4.10

Satisfaction with Police after Violent Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 percent




Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: respondents who were victims of violent crimes and reported the crimes to police (N = 643). Question: "How satisfied were you with the action taken by the police?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who declared they were "Very satisfied" or "Satisfied".

Chart 4.11

Satisfaction with Police after Property Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010

percent



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: respondents who were victims of property crimes and reported the crimes to police (N = 1,074). Question: "How satisfied were you with the action taken by the police?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who declared they were "Very satisfied" or "Satisfied".

trol. This informal mechanism may explain the low satisfaction of some citizens with the police response to crime reports. In Guyana, citizens say they do not believe the police will follow up on reports regarding non-violent crimes and, so, often do not file such reports. Nonetheless, relative to respondents elsewhere, when citizens in Guyana do report property crimes, they are the most satisfied with the police reaction.


Charts 4.10 and 4.11 show that, across the Caribbean-7, there was no particular general gender pattern in the satisfaction of respondents with the police reaction to reports of violent crimes or property crimes. There were, however, marked differences across the seven nations. For example, significantly higher percentages of women in Barbados, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago were satisfied with the police response to their reports of violent or property crimes. In contrast, significantly higher percentages of men were satisfied with the police response to violent crime reports in Guyana and to property crime reports in An-

tigua and Jamaica. As measured by the survey, the lack of gender differences across the region indicates that the police do not systematically respond differently to crime reports filed by women or men. This suggests that inputs by women into discussions on the best way for police forces to transition to a citizen security focus or inputs by women serving on police oversight bodies are not being discounted by police services.

Attitudes that support the police can be as important as participation with the police in crime prevention and control activities. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 included five items measuring supportive attitudes. Two items focused on the personal attitudes of respondents about the competence of the police and whether the police deserve support (chart 4.12). The first question allowed a simple yes or no. On average, 57 percent of the survey respondents said "yes" in answer to this question about police competence. The share varied widely across the Caribbean-7, from a low of 42 percent in Guyana to a high of 72 percent

Chart 4.12

Respondents Who Believe the Police Are Competent and Deserve Support, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "Do you believe that the police are competent?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Yes". Question: "Using a scale from 1 to 5 (1 weakest, 5 strongest), indicate how you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following: 'The police force deserves my support.'" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who gave the two most positive answers.

in Barbados. Agreement with the statement "The police force deserves my support" was measured on a five-point scale ranging from "the weakest feeling" to "the strongest feeling". For this question, the two most positive responses were combined. The overall rate of agreement with the statement was 54 percent, and the positive responses ranged from a low of 40 percent in Guyana to highs of 65 percent in Jamaica and 67 percent in Saint Lucia. Both measures showed considerable attitudinal support for the police.


It may not be inconsistent for citizens to be dissatisfied with the police and unsure about the effectiveness of the police in responding to major crimes and, yet, also believe that the police deserve their support. First, the respondents were only asked about effectiveness regarding specific major crimes and not a fuller range of crimes for which they might

have rated the effectiveness at a higher level. Second, the respondents might not think the police are currently effective, but, because there is only one police force, they feel the police deserve citizen support to help them become more effective. Third, support is a fuzzy term, and some citizens may base their support on confidence in the ability of the police to prevent and solve crimes, while others base their support on the friendliness and fairness of the officers with whom they come into contact.²⁹ Thus, these questions may be measuring quite different aspects of the willingness to participate and cooperate with the police. Fourth, the belief that police deserve support may reflect the optimism and hope of respondents that the police will continue to reform and meet the demands of modern policing.

Three other attitudinal measures in the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 gauged

Chart 4.13

Respondents Who Believe the Police Need More Personnel and More Resources, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "Do you think that increasing the size of the police force would be an effective means of reducing crime?" "In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in the police force/service." "Would putting more police on the streets make you feel more secure?" For the first two questions, the chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Strongly agree" or "Agree". For the last question the chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Yes".


the support of respondents for governmental action that would enhance police services by putting more police on the streets, investing more in the police force and increasing the size of the force. Together, all three actions garnered more than 55 percent agreement (chart 4.13). Across the Caribbean-7, an average of 75 percent of the respondents supported investing more in the police; 69 percent favoured putting more police on the streets; and 58 percent favoured increasing the size of the police force. Together, the findings outlined in charts 4.12 and 4.13 demonstrate considerable attitudinal support for the police in terms of competence, reputation and the need for more resources from the government. These results indicate that citizens are interested in supporting the police. This support can be leveraged to aid the police in realizing the transition to an organization that is more well oriented to

the rule of law and service of the citizenry. The government and the police should not take advantage of this support only to modernize the force (for example, by obtaining better weapons, communications systems and transportation), but also genuinely to reform the force by enhancing the organizational structure of the police, the incentive and reward structure within the service and the relationship between the police and the public.

The final measure of the likelihood of citizen participation was the response to a survey question on working together with others to reduce violence. At least 45 percent of respondents across the Caribbean-7 expressed their willingness to do this (chart 4.14). Jamaica showed the highest positive response rate (65 percent), and Barbados the lowest (46 percent). The latter finding is not surprising because the respondents in Barbados do

Chart 4.14

Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Violent Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010




Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "Using a scale from 1 to 5 (1 weakest, 5 strongest), indicate how you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following: 'To what extent would you be willing to work together with others to reduce violence in this country.'" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "A great extent", "A good extent" or "A fair extent".

Chart 4.15

Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Age, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "How do you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following: 'To what extent would you be willing to work together with others to reduce violence in this country?' 'The police force deserves my support.?' The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Strongly agree" and "Agree".

not believe that the country has a major crime problem warranting more widespread collaborative action. The Jamaican respondents realized, in contrast, that they have a serious crime problem.

These data indicate that a crucial element in citizen participation and cooperation in solving the crime problem exists across the Caribbean: the willingness of citizens to work collectively to reduce crime. However, the willingness to work collectively is not identical with engaging in partnerships with the police.³⁰ Although citizens may express a desire to engage in the co-production of safety, they

may not have the means, knowledge, or leadership to do so effectively. For example, even though neighbourhood watch programmes are common in Suriname, they do not necessarily make citizens feel safer. Nonetheless, the data indicate there is an untapped pool of respect for the police and a sense of social connectedness that, if properly mobilized by an innovative police agency, could lead to the co-production of citizen security.

To assess the distribution of this willingness across populations, the answers of respondents were broken down by demographic characteristics. Charts 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 show that the


willingness is exhibited in all age categories, both genders and all but the lowest socio-economic category. Thus, the distribution is broad throughout the populations of the Caribbean-7. Even among respondents who described themselves as poor, almost 60 percent stated that they are willing to work together to in-

crease security. These findings differ from findings in the United States, where older citizens and women are more likely to participate and cooperate with the police.³¹

While the survey data show that the citizens of the Caribbean-7 do not view the police as legitimate in all dimensions, the respondents evaluate the police as competent, are willing to work together with others to reduce violence, and support increased public resources for the police. The combination of these three factors can significantly help the transition of the police to a citizen-oriented organization and begin the co-production of national security from crime.

Chart 4.16

Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010




Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "How do you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following: 'To what extent would you be willing to work together with others to reduce violence in this country?' 'The police force deserves my support.?' The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Strongly agree" and "Agree".

Chart 4.17

Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Socio-economic Status, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "How do you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following: 'To what extent would you be willing to work together with others to reduce violence in this country?' 'The police force deserves my support.?' The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Strongly agree" and "Agree".

Conclusion

Caribbean countries suffer from unreformed police structures. Despite progress in some nations, the predominant policing model is still focused on state security, not citizen security. The transition to citizen security requires institutional reforms within police forces and changes in police work and attitudes so that community-based policing becomes the norm. Improving mechanisms to promote accountability in police performance that are independent of police agencies will contribute to the transformation process and enhance citizen security. The attitudes of citizens will then change, and people will become more willing to cooperate with the police in new and meaningful ways to prevent crime and control criminality.

The results of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 offer grounds for optimism. Even though the necessary organizational changes within police forces are far from complete, citizens across the Caribbean region already perceive the police as moderately legitimate and competent. They are willing to become co-producers of their own security, and, in each nation, they are supportive of government investment in more resources for the police to transform the police services and enhance their effectiveness. If citizens perceive the police as both legitimate and competent, they are more likely to participate in crime control activities and be generally supportive of the other efforts of the police.



CHAPTER
5

**Criminal
Justice
Systems**

**Security and justice are
equal priorities for Caribbean
people**

**Opportunities for all, justice
for all, respect for all,
security for all**

Introduction

This chapter examines the role of criminal justice systems in addressing crime, violence and insecurity in the Caribbean. Chapter 4 analyses the important part the police play in promoting citizen security. The primary focus of this chapter is legal systems, including prosecution, the courts and sentencing, correctional systems and the criminal justice system as a whole. The major issues of interest are as follows:

- Institutional structures and operations
- The effectiveness of institutions, including systems of accountability and the capacity to deliver the required services fairly and efficiently
- The extent to which institutions are held accountable
- The relationship of national institutions to regional institutions and NGOs

Throughout the chapter, special attention is paid to the treatment of juveniles and other vulnerable groups by the criminal justice system, including their access to justice.¹ Research has demonstrated that the behaviour of criminal justice institutions can have a vital impact on citizen security, especially with regard to vulnerable groups. This chapter also provides a critical evaluation of existing reform projects and outlines a vision for criminal justice reform in the Caribbean region.

The chapter is organized according to the issues listed above. The discussion therefore begins with a description of criminal justice systems in the region. Next, the chapter examines objective indicators of system effectiveness, including problems such as case processing delays, low conviction rates and insufficient alternatives to incarceration. The chapter then explores the subjective assessments of citizens of the effectiveness of crimi-

nal justice systems such as public confidence and the relationship of national institutions to regional structures and governance.

Criminal Justice Systems

The long shadow of colonialism has exerted an indelible influence on the cultures and institutions of the Caribbean for centuries. Forms and structures of government, including the legal codes and criminal justice systems of interest in this chapter, continue to exhibit characteristics of each nation's colonial legacy. Despite post-independence efforts to bring about change and to make national institutions more responsive to the needs of the people, understanding the criminal justice systems in the Caribbean involves understanding the history of colonialism and the ways colonialism still influences the nations in the region.

Legal Systems

The legal systems of six of the seven nations examined in this report (the Caribbean-7) are based on British common law and national statutory laws. (The seventh is Suriname, where the legal system is based on the system of the Netherlands.) Although the legal systems of the former British colonies share many similarities, they also differ in some respects. The legal systems of Guyana and Saint Lucia, for instance, are often described as hybrid or mixed. The legal code in Saint Lucia is a hybrid of British common law and French civil law owing to Saint Lucia's history as both a British and a French colony. Similarly, Guyana's legal code is a hybrid of British common law and Netherland civil law. In all six nations, British common law was the primary foundation of the legal systems at the time of independence, though there were hybrid ele-

ments. Suriname once relied on the British common law system, but this was replaced by Netherland civil law in the 1600s when the United Provinces (the Netherlands) defeated England in battle during the Second Anglo-Dutch War.²

In addition to the similarities in the foundations of their legal systems, the criminal justice systems in the Caribbean-7 also share structural similarities. Each nation has a similar hierarchy of courts that handle both civil and criminal matters, as well as appeals. With the exception of courts in Suriname, the courts in each country have a three-tier structure that includes magistrates courts, a high court and a court of appeal.³ The terminology used for these three entities is fairly consistent, though there are variations.⁴ The magistrates courts serve as the lowest level of the court system, hearing lesser judicial matters, including small claims civil actions and less severe criminal matters.⁵ Typically non-jury cases are handled in the magistrates courts, while more serious civil and criminal matters are handled through the high courts. Consistent caseload statistics are not available for each country, though it has been estimated that approximately 90 percent of the legal proceedings in the judicial system in Guyana emanate from the magistrates courts.⁶ The court structure in Suriname, the only nation in the Caribbean-7 with a legal system based on laws of the Netherlands, is somewhat different. Suriname's legal system is grounded on three cantonal or district courts, each of which is presided over by a single judge, whose decisions can be appealed to the Court of Justice. The First District Court tries civil cases in specific regions of the country. The Second District Court tries criminal cases in specific regions of the country. The Third District Court hears civil and criminal cases in those regions not covered by the two other courts. There is also a lower court, the Martial Court, which has jurisdiction over cases involving military personnel.⁷

The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC) has jurisdiction in the member countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, including Antigua and Barbuda,

as well as Saint Lucia.⁸ The ECSC serves as a unified supreme court for these countries. It consists of two divisions: the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal.⁹ Both are based in Saint Lucia. It acts as an itinerant court, travelling to member states at fixed periods throughout the year to "hear appeals from the decisions of the High Court and Magistrates Courts in Member States in both civil and criminal matters".¹⁰ Whereas other countries may operate their own independent high court and court of appeals, the ECSC offers these functions regionally for member states. However, the ECSC does not serve as a final appellate court. For Antigua and Barbuda and for Saint Lucia, final appellate jurisdiction rests with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, an entity located in London and formally tied to the United Kingdom and to judicial systems in many Commonwealth countries.

The majority of the countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) use the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as a last venue for appeals.¹¹ As the only country of the Caribbean-7 that does not have a predominantly British legal foundation, Suriname uses its own High Court of Justice as a final court of appeals.¹² Only Barbados and Guyana rely on the regional Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as final appellate court.¹³

The CCJ was established by a treaty that was ratified in 2003. However, "although the Agreement was signed by nearly all of the Member States of the Community, only three of those States (Barbados, Belize and Guyana) have enacted the required domestic legislation to accord access to the Court by their nationals."¹⁴ The CCJ is modelled after the British appellate system and replaces the Privy Council for those countries that choose to enact the appellate jurisdiction of the agreement. The CCJ was established to "provide for the Caribbean Community an accessible, fair, efficient, innovative and impartial justice system built on a jurisprudence reflective of Caribbean history, values and traditions, while maintaining an inspirational, independent institution worthy of emulation by the courts of the region and the trust and confidence of its

people.”¹⁵ The court, located in Port of Spain, capital of Trinidad and Tobago, is intended to have both original and appellate jurisdiction among all CARICOM member states. The original jurisdiction of the court is applicable to all CARICOM countries, including the Caribbean-7, while the appellate jurisdiction must be ratified by each country. The original jurisdiction allows the CCJ to “adjudicate disputes among Member States pertaining to [their] economic integration.”¹⁶

Prosecution and Defence

The prosecutorial system within the Caribbean varies across countries. In each country, defendants are entitled to a fair trial, are presumed innocent until proven guilty and have the right to appeal. With the exception of Suriname, which has no jury system, all countries allow jury trials. Juries are typically relied on in cases involving serious criminal offences. Trial by jury for civil cases is permissible in some areas, though rare. Guyana and Saint Lucia do not allow jury trials for civil cases.¹⁷

In each of the Caribbean-7, detained suspects are provided access to defence counsel upon request, though some countries provide this access more promptly after arrest than others. In Suriname, for example, prosecutors may choose to deny access to counsel if they feel such access would harm an ongoing investigation. The extent to which the state provides defence counsel for indigent suspects varies. In Antigua and Barbuda, legal defence is only provided to indigent persons facing capital charges. Similarly, in Saint Lucia, defence counsel is provided only to people charged with serious criminal offences. Trinidad and Tobago provides counsel to indigent persons charged with murder and other serious offences. In Barbados, the government supports “free legal aid to the indigent in family matters, child support, serious criminal cases such as rape or murder, and all cases involving minors.”¹⁸ In Guyana, the right to counsel is only provided in capital murder cases that reach the High Court. For other offences, the Georgetown Legal Aid Clinic supplies legal advice. Legal aid attorneys in Jamaica are available in cases that can result in incarceration, while Suriname

provides for court-assigned attorneys in both civil and criminal matters.¹⁹

Each of the Caribbean-7, with the exception of Suriname, has a functioning bail system. Most deny bail in cases involving more serious crimes or if the offender has been previously convicted of a violent crime. There is some speculation that judges in some countries may use high bail and distant remand dates as leverage in trying to secure guilty pleas, though the extent of this practice is unknown.²⁰ In the wake of a serious outbreak of violent crime, including a 488 percent increase in the homicide rate from 1999 to 2008, Trinidad and Tobago enacted a bail reform that is intended to keep violent offenders behind bars.²¹

Correctional Systems

With the exception of Suriname, Caribbean correctional systems are housed within government ministries that are separate from the offices responsible for public prosecutions. One indicator of transparency in correctional practices is the extent to which nations permit access to prisons and jails by outside observers, particularly NGOs that focus on human rights. Each of the Caribbean-7 allows for the possibility of access to prison facilities by independent human rights observers.²²

The number of prisons in the Caribbean-7 ranges from 1 (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and Saint Lucia) to 12 (Jamaica). Table 5.1 provides basic descriptive statistics about prisons in each country. The existence of separate facilities for women, men, juveniles and those awaiting trial varies across the region. In Antigua and Barbuda, there are separate youth facilities for juvenile delinquents. However, in 2010, a small number of juveniles were housed in the country’s prison alongside adult inmates. In Barbados, women are housed in a separate wing in the adult prison facility, while a separate juvenile facility houses boys and girls. In Guyana, there is a single women’s prison, and juveniles under the age of 16 years are housed in a separate detention facility, while those over the age of 16 are incarcerated in adult facilities. Jamaica’s prison facilities include four locations for juveniles, while adult men and women of-

Table 5.1. A Statistical Profile of Prison Systems, Caribbean-7

Country	Prisons, number	Prison population ^a				Official capa- city	Popula- tion density ^b
		Total	Rate	Pre-trial, remand	Juveniles		
Antigua & Barbuda	1 (2010)	295 (2010) ^c	330 (2010) ^d	34.2 (2007)	4.1 (2007)	150 (2007)	130.7 (2007)
Barbados	1 (2010)	910 (2010) ^e	354 (2010) ^f	37.2 (2009)	1.8 (2009)	1,250 (2010)	72.8 (2010)
Guyana	5 (2010)	2,122 (2010) ^e	284 (2010) ^g	41.0 (2010)	0.0 (2010)	1,580 (2010)	134.3 (2010)
Jamaica	12 (2009) ^h	4,709 (2007) ^e	174 (2007) ⁱ	15.0 (2007)	9.2 (2007)	4,247 (2007)	110.9 (2007)
Saint Lucia	1 (2011)	568 (2011) ^e	323 (2010) ^j	23.2 (2011)	0.9 (2011)	450 (2011)	126.2 (2011)
Suriname	6 (2009) ^k	915 (2009) ^l	175 (2009) ^m	55.0 (2005)	5.7 (2005)	1,233 (2002)	162.7 (1999)
Trinidad & Tobago	8 (2010)	3,591 (2010) ^e	276 (2010) ⁿ	41.9 (2008)	3.0 (2006)	4,386 (2006)	87.8 (2006)

Source: World Prison Brief (database), International Centre for Prison Studies, London, <http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/>.

Note: The data year is in parentheses.

a. The total includes pre-trial detainees and remand prisoners. The rate is per 100,000 national population. The population of pre-trial detainees and remand prisoners and the population of juveniles are shown in percentages of the total prison population. Juveniles = under-18-year-olds.

b. Prison population as a percentage of official prison capacity.

c. US State Department (2010c).

d. Based on an estimated national population of 89,500 in December 2010 (United Nations data).

e. Data of the national prison administration.

f. Based on an estimated national population of 257,200 in October 2010 (United Nations data).

g. Based on an estimated national population of 761,000 in October 2010 (United Nations data).

h. Eight prisons are for adults; four are for juveniles.

i. Based on an estimated national population of 2.7 million in October 2007 (United Nations data).

j. Based on an estimated national population of 176,000 in December 2010 (United Nations Data).

k. Three adult prisons, one pre-trial detention centre, one juvenile detention centre, and 19 temporary detention centres in police stations.

l. US State Department (2010e).

m. Based on an estimated national population of 522,000 at the end of 2009 (United Nations data).

n. Based on an estimated national population of 1.3 million in January 2010 (United Nations data).

fenders are housed in separate facilities. Suriname has a pre-trial detention centre for adults and juveniles, as well as a juvenile detention facility. Within the three adult prison facilities in Suriname, women and men are housed separately. Of the eight correctional facilities in Trinidad, one is specifically for women, and another is for juveniles. Even in the countries with separate facilities, juveniles may often be detained in adult prisons because of security concerns at youth facilities. Female juveniles are especially vulnerable to placement in adult prisons because of a lack of female youth facilities. The extent to which juveniles are isolated from adult populations within adult facilities varies as well.

In each country, arbitrary arrest and detention are prohibited by the constitution. However, there are varying practices regarding the length of time a person may be detained on suspicion of involvement in criminal activity. In Antigua and Barbuda, detainees must be brought before a court within 48 hours of arrest or detention. In Barbados, the constitution allows for the detention of individuals for up to five days without arrest. Once an arrest is made, the individual must appear before the court as promptly as possible. Guyana law states that, once an arrest has been made, the individual can be held no longer than 72 hours before appearing in court to be charged. Saint Lucia also allows for a 72-hour holding period for persons detained with a warrant before a court appearance is required. In Jamaica, detainees are to be charged within 24–48 hours or be released. Justices of the peace or resident magistrates may grant special waivers to this law in extenuating circumstances. In Suriname, if the sentence for a crime is longer than four years, officials are authorized to detain a suspect for up to 14 days, during which time the suspect must be brought to court to face charges. However, if additional time is needed, judges may extend this holding period for another 150 days.²³ Finally, in Trinidad and Tobago, detained suspects must appear before the court within 48 hours. For more serious offences, magistrates have the discretion of placing detainees on remand or allow them to post bail while a preliminary inquiry is conducted.

The practice of pre-trial detention is widespread within the region and often contributes to significant problems with case backlogs and prison overcrowding. Table 5.1 provides data on the share of the prison population that is incarcerated during pre-trial detention for each country. Elsewhere below, we review complications criminal justice systems face as a result of pre-trial detention practices, case processing delays and backlogs.

Probation and parole are common in criminal justice systems in the Caribbean, but the nature and extent of these practices vary widely across the region. Probation services are generally more widespread than parole services. Because probation services are more common, we discuss them briefly, paying particular attention to the services available for juvenile offenders.

Probation services are often considered part of community corrections strategies in the region. Jamaica began experimenting with probation in the 1940s as a way to alleviate “the harshness of punishment and [prevent] the contamination of the criminal novice in the unsavoury atmosphere of the prison”.²⁴ In Barbados, the Penal System Act of 1998 encourages community sentencing options such as probation and community service. As a result, since 2000, the Barbados Probation Department has supported offenders that have been given the option of community service. However, community-based correctional services in the region are limited. Other nations, including Guyana and Jamaica, have also experimented with a variety of community corrections strategies, including community service orders, community-based rehabilitation programmes and the appointment of community members to parole boards. Many such programmes have come and gone because of budget crises and shifts in the national and international political environment.

While there is no systematic data available to compare the number of persons on probation across nations, anecdotal evidence provides insights. For example, Probation Department data from Barbados indicates that, in 2000–2007, an average 75.5 adult men and 10.8 adult women were placed on proba-

tion annually (most frequently for drug- and theft-related offences). Compared with the number of persons incarcerated in Barbados (see table 5.1), this appears to be a small share of individuals being diverted away from detention facilities. Data obtained from the Guyana Police Force indicate that, in 2008 and 2009, 183 juveniles were charged with offences. Of these, 74 (approximately 40 percent) were placed on probation. Probation may be a more frequent alternative to incarceration for juvenile offenders.

Probation is also increasingly viewed as a viable alternative to incarceration because it can help alleviate the overcrowding in prisons and jails and the lengthy court backlogs (assuming that defendants mount a more vigorous defence if they are facing prison instead of probation). Probation may serve the interests of justice by giving those people who have not yet become committed to crime an opportunity to turn their lives around. Probation is likewise a framework within which the state can attempt to rehabilitate young or inexperienced inmates.

Most often, probation officers are assigned court supervision over juveniles requiring additional oversight and support. For example, in Barbados, magistrates courts can require juveniles and probation officers to return to court every three months for assessment. During this time, the judge reviews the juvenile's progress and provides recommendations for continuing or suspending support services. Juveniles on probation in Barbados may also be ordered by the court to attend non-residential drug counselling services.

Probation departments in the Caribbean often struggle with access to adequate resources, including referral sources. In many instances, probation officers are unable to refer their clients to appropriate rehabilitation or support services, limiting their effectiveness. Some countries have attempted to respond to this limitation by linking community-based services with local probation departments. The unfortunate reality is that, if resource or political constraints inhibit effective probation services, juvenile offenders are often the most affected. Without adequate probation services to steer

first-time offenders away from lives of crime, today's minor offenders will often become tomorrow's serious offenders.

Statistical Infrastructure

Only the most rudimentary official data useful for measuring and describing the operations of criminal justice systems are available for the Caribbean-7. Statistical infrastructures in the Caribbean-7 are sorely lacking, and even basic descriptive data on the flow of cases through criminal justice systems are not consistently available. If elementary descriptive data on the activities of criminal justice systems are either of generally poor quality or are simply unavailable, then the more rigorous kinds of data and research necessary to judge the effectiveness of criminal justice operations across the Caribbean are even more difficult to obtain.²⁵

Building a regional statistical infrastructure for measuring threats to human security and studying the capacity of governments to prevent and alleviate these threats are critical. The solution to these statistical and research capacity issues needs to be multifaceted, involving governments, NGOs, development banks and universities. Putting in place effective criminal justice solutions depends heavily on proper analysis of the crime problems in each nation and across the region. Accurately diagnosing the nature of crime problems and the capacity of criminal justice systems will require a serious investment in the development of statistical infrastructure for measuring crime and justice at the regional level. It will also require workforce development, including training and the education of technical experts to manage the data and make the data widely available and of policy analysts and scholars with the diverse skills necessary to interpret the data properly. Only with such an investment can Caribbean nations improve their capacity to diagnose crime and evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice institutions.²⁶

Indicators of the Effectiveness of Criminal Justice Systems

The most common performance measure of criminal justice systems is the extent to which

cases are processed fairly and efficiently. This section reviews evidence on four issues that exert a profound influence on the fairness and effectiveness of criminal justice systems: case processing delays and backlogs, low conviction rates, prison overcrowding and insufficient alternatives to prison. Like many issues in criminal justice, none of these issues stands in isolation; they are strongly interconnected. Addressing them remains an enduring challenge for the Caribbean-7.

Case Processing Delays and Backlogs

The ability of criminal justice systems to process cases effectively and efficiently is a basic ingredient of proper system functioning in any nation. Significant delays in one part of the system often reverberate through other parts of the system, reinforcing the cliché that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Case processing delays and backlogs have had a debilitating effect on criminal justice systems in the Caribbean.

Many of the Caribbean-7 are struggling with caseloads that far exceed the processing capacity of the criminal justice systems. Various explanations exist for the case processing delays, including increases in crime and, thus, court caseloads and a subsequent harshening of sanctions against offenders; inadequate staffing levels; incompetent criminal justice prosecutors, courts, and correctional systems; and deliberate delays by lawyers and other criminal justice practitioners.²⁷ Furthermore, institutional weaknesses, corruption, poor management, and inadequate finances and resources are often blamed.

While there is convincing evidence that these delays and backlogs exist, there is only anecdotal evidence to explain why. Data on case processing delays and backlogs are not available in a systematic way throughout the Caribbean, but the available evidence paints a disturbing picture of challenges to the effectiveness of criminal justice. For instance, Trinidad and Tobago experienced a sharp increase in homicides from 1999 to 2008. During the last four years of this period, police detection rates in homicide cases (the proportion of cases in which an arrest was made) never reached

20 percent.²⁸ These low homicide detection rates were compounded by long case processing delays and low conviction rates among those who were arrested.

“Although more than three quarters of the 160 defendants charged with murder in the Port of Spain Magistrate’s Court from 2003 through 2006 were committed to the High Court to stand trial for murder, very few of these cases had been concluded as of July 2008. . . . Only seven of the defendants had been convicted by trial or plea and 20 had been acquitted at trial. Although most defendants suspected of murder were charged within 60 days of the homicide, the median time to disposition in Magistrates Court was 107 days and the median time to case filing in the High Court was 271 days.”²⁹

Mark (2007, 20–21) provides insight on why case processing delays are such a problem in Trinidad and Tobago, noting as follows:

“If after the initial appearance, the accused person is remanded in custody then that person’s case must be listed every ten days before the court to which the matter is adjourned. In the vast majority of these cases the parties are not ready to proceed and the case is adjourned on several occasions thereafter. In most cases, the court takes no significant steps to ensure that parties are ready for trial or ready to proceed with any aspect of the case on the date to which the matter is adjourned. The prosecutor is the functionary traditionally charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the case is ready to proceed. Almost every adjournment request from the defence or the prosecution is granted.”

Thus, in Trinidad and Tobago, inefficient court scheduling practices appear to contribute to case processing delays. However, case processing delays in Trinidad and Tobago were not limited to the courts. Delays in evidence processing in the nation’s crime laboratory were responsible for holding up thousands of cases. For instance, in 2005, researchers estimated that a backlog of unprocessed ballistics evidence in firearms cases had held up more than 2,000 cases, some for more than five years.³⁰ The problem became

so bad that some police officers stopped gathering ballistics evidence at crime scenes and stopped turning over seized firearms for processing by the crime laboratory.³¹ The researchers concluded that the backlogs at the laboratory were partially responsible for the nation's massive increase in homicides and shootings because violent repeat offenders who might have been incarcerated based on the evidence were free to continue offending. Trinidad and Tobago's solution to the problem was to hire foreign firearms examiners from the United Kingdom and the United States. Such short-term measures may be useful, but they suggest a failure to recognize the systemic nature of this problem and associated problems. No long-term solutions were put in place to prevent the backlog from returning.

The issue of evidence processing backlogs will become even more resonant as Caribbean nations grow increasingly reliant on forensic evidence to close cases. For instance, the United States is currently dealing with massive backlogs in DNA evidence.³² While DNA is a wonderful tool for identifying and convicting offenders, processing DNA evidence is expensive and resource-intensive and is likely to worsen case processing delays and backlogs. Backlogs are, however, not merely a matter of efficiency; they go directly to the question of whether defendants are being treated justly. Consider Guyana, which reports that, in 2010, nearly 41 percent of its prisoners had not yet been tried or convicted on the current charges for which they were being detained.³³ For defendants who are not guilty, backlogs might mean spending a lot of time in jail for offences they did not commit. Consider Suriname, where many prisoners awaiting appeal end up serving their full original sentence before their appeal is heard because there are not enough judges to adjudicate these cases.³⁴ The general consensus within the region is that backlogs are exacerbated by inadequate staffing. However, even attempts to address these concerns highlight the crippling extent of the problem. For example, Guyana reduced to some extent its backlog in the civil court under a special project whereby part-time

judges were appointed to adjudicate cases and help eliminate the backlog. To eliminate the backlog in criminal cases, a similar strategy was proposed in the Guyana Justice Sector Reform Strategy of 2006–2010.³⁵ However, even with this programme in place, the shortages of judges make it virtually impossible to reduce the civil litigation backlog. Estimates suggest that, even if two judges were assigned and even if each one concluded one civil matter every working day of the year (249 days), this would only lead to the completion of 498 cases out of an average of 5,600 cases filed, thus leaving a backlog of 5,102 cases.³⁶

No silver-bullet solutions have emerged in the Caribbean for case processing delays and backlogs. As more of these nations begin using sophisticated forensic evidence processing techniques (such as ballistics imaging and DNA profiling), it is likely that the delays will actually worsen. Finding a way to address this problem is crucial.

Low Conviction Rates

Although systematic data are not available, scattered evidence suggests that conviction rates in the Caribbean are alarmingly low. For instance, Guyana's Justice Sector Reform Strategy 2006–2010 reports that an estimated "90% of criminal prosecutions in the Magistrates Courts are unsuccessful."³⁷ Brathwaite (1996) reports that, in Barbados, the number of convictions fell from 1,729 in 1960 to only 775 in 1990.

Part of the challenge in studying the problem is that case processing delays make it difficult to measure conviction rates: the two issues are hopelessly intertwined. For instance, a study conducted in Trinidad and Tobago found that, of the 123 cases involving defendants committed to stand trial in the High Court in 2003–2006, only 30.1 percent had been concluded as of July 2008. Only seven (5.7 percent) of the 123 cases had produced a conviction either by trial or by plea.³⁸ Similarly, a report on human rights practices in Guyana notes that "Prisoner Justin John was taken into custody in 2003 and charged with murder; his trial was scheduled to begin in 2008, but, in May 2010, he was among 23

prisoners who requested an early trial; he was freed on June 16 after the state was unable to produce witnesses in support of its case.”³⁹ This may be an extreme case, but it highlights the general problem. In nations that process cases expeditiously, computing conviction rates is simple, but, in nations with excessive case processing delays, estimating conviction rates is challenging.

One explanation for the low conviction rates has been the increase in case dismissals. Case dismissals are common because of witness intimidation, lack of victim participation in prosecution and attorney absenteeism. While data on the reasons for case dismissals are not available across countries, anecdotal evidence illustrates the extent of this problem. In Trinidad and Tobago, the majority of homicide case dismissals in the magistrates court between 2006 and 2008 occurred as a result of complications with witness testimony.⁴⁰ Witnesses frequently failed to appear in court or, once on the stand, recanted statements they had made to the police earlier. In one example, a murder witness went into hiding, and charges against the defendant were dropped “despite the fact that the defendant was charged with shooting the victim during a proceeding in the Magistrates Court”.⁴¹ Witness intimidation is especially challenging in a region of small countries with weak witness protection programmes.

In Barbados, the National Task Force on Crime Prevention found that 48.8 percent of the adjournments in the magistrates court in 2003 were accounted for by absenteeism by attorneys, the accused, or witnesses (at 17.2, 15.0 and 16.6 percent, respectively). Absenteeism in the High Court also contributed to more than one third of the adjournments. In 2003, 22.7 percent of the adjournments occurred because the accused were not properly represented by counsel, and 15.2 percent because the attorneys were absent.⁴² In Barbados, trial scheduling is often not synchronized across cases, and attorneys are often double-booked in the magistrates courts or the High Court. Similarly, of an estimated 6,000 to 7,000 criminal records that arrive annually in Suriname’s prosecution offices,

only approximately 20 to 25 percent are prosecuted. The remaining cases are dismissed or left in limbo. The prosecution office simply lacks the human resource capacity to handle all the criminal cases that are submitted.

Many commentators blame the police for these issues. For instance, Guyana’s 2005–2007 Supreme Court Annual Reports argue that deficiencies in police investigation and evidence management practices make successful prosecutions difficult. Gaps in prosecution give defence attorneys plenty of room to secure acquittals. Police point to case backlogs in crime laboratories and case processing delays in courts. There is lots of finger-pointing in the region about which institutions are to blame for low conviction rates. The reality is that the problem is systemic. The solution lies in the comprehensive reform of entire criminal justice systems to ensure that police gain the confidence of the population and are given sufficient resources to prevent crime, arrest offenders and gather evidence; that crime laboratories are properly trained, staffed and equipped to process criminal evidence quickly and accurately; that the prosecutors offices and courts are given sufficient resources and adopt more appropriate structures and procedures to move cases along rapidly and justly; and that nations begin to institute mechanisms for criminal justice planning across these various sectors to ensure that they work in harmony.

Prison Overcrowding

Many people awaiting trial in the region are held in pre-trial detention, sometimes for years. The practice of pre-trial detention is controversial. Setting pre-trial detainees free may endanger the public and reduce citizen security in the region, but holding them for lengthy periods is an affront to justice and overwhelms the capacity of prisons. As shown in table 5.1, five of the Caribbean-7 countries report prison occupancy levels well above 100 percent of capacity, thus signalling a serious problem with prison overcrowding. Table 5.1 also shows the percentage of prison populations held on pre-trial detention. Five of the seven countries report that at least a third

of their prison populations are being held for pre-trial detention or remand.⁴³ Guyana reported that this figure was higher than 40 percent in 2010, while, in 2005, Suriname reported that more than 50 percent of the prison population was being held for pre-trial or remand.

While overcrowding is problematic on its face, it has also generated residual issues associated with the conditions of confinement. Some reports document widespread deterioration in prison conditions in the Caribbean because of overcrowding, poor sanitation and resource constraints. According to the US State Department (2010b, 2010e), among the Caribbean-7, only the prison facilities in Barbados and Saint Lucia meet international standards.

The large number of people held in pre-trial detention is a major contributor to backlogs and overcrowding, but other factors also contribute. For instance, many nations faced with increases in crime, particularly violent crime, have passed laws containing provisions for harsher sanctions and longer prison terms for certain types of offenders, particularly those convicted of gang-related crimes. Harsher prison sentences for certain types of offenders are likely to produce public safety benefits, but such sentences for other types of offenders—particularly non-violent drug offenders and older offenders who have aged out of crime—contribute to prison overcrowding. Brathwaite (1996) finds that, in Barbados, the share of offenders sentenced to prison for three or more years rose from 6.9 to 38.5 percent between 1960 and 1990. Brathwaite also notes that patterns in crime changed across this time period so that there was an increase in drug-related offences, robbery and theft. Caribbean nations can learn from the experiences of California. Decades of tough-on-crime rhetoric by politicians led to runaway spending on prisons and contributed to a financial meltdown that resulted in major cuts to public services, especially education. Moreover, the financial crisis caused California to release tens of thousands of prisoners under less than ideal circumstances.

Correctional policy must balance the requirement to protect the public and the need for ef-

iciency and fiscal prudence. The result of this balancing act in some nations is to incapacitate only violent offenders and those with a high likelihood of recidivism and to develop alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders and those whose likelihood of repeat offending is minimal. This idea of a correctional triage strategy applies most directly to three types of offenders: juvenile offenders, older offenders and people convicted of drug possession. Juvenile offenders, particularly those new to crime and those who commit nonviolent offenses, will often either be victimized or will go on to commit more crime as a result of spending time in a criminogenic environment such as a prison. Imprisoning older offenders, who are often long past the peak of the age-crime curve, is not always the most efficient use of prison space. Finally, imprisoning offenders convicted of drug possession is also often not wise because many such offenders need treatment for addiction. In all three cases, offenders and society may be best served through alternative punitive sanctions, coupled with rehabilitation.

Insufficient Alternatives to Incarceration

Policy makers facing increases in crime and high levels of violence often focus so intently on being tough on crime that they forget about the importance of rehabilitation and alternative sanctions. The Caribbean region's nascent criminological infrastructure is not yet supported by a well-developed knowledge base on effective sanctions and rehabilitation strategies. This is so despite the experiences of other nations, which provide evidence on the effectiveness and promise of a range of strategies, as well as approaches that may actually increase crime. For instance, *Scared Straight!*, a popular programme that has evolved from a ground-breaking film, involves exposing juvenile offenders to the reality of life in prison. Critics assert that such programmes not only fail to deter crime, but increase offending among young participants.⁴⁴ Lacking a comprehensive local knowledge base on effective strategies, Caribbean policy makers run the risk of excessive reliance on the knowledge base of more developed countries. A regional

investment in an institute to study the effectiveness of strategies in reducing crime and recidivism would be a positive step towards building the knowledge base that is so desperately needed.⁴⁵

Rehabilitation services can be established within the prison system, or they can involve the use of alternative sanctions that allow offenders to avoid incarceration, but still pay their debt to society for the crimes they have committed. Alternative sanctions may include fines, community service, curfews, or house arrest for non-dangerous offenders. Other sentencing alternatives to prison are mediation, restitution to victims and probation. These options offer a number of potential benefits: they often cost less than a conventional prison sentence; they help avoid the labelling and stigmatization of imprisonment, thereby reducing the tremendous challenges associated with reintegrating offenders into society following their release; they eliminate the negative socialization processes that occur in prison (and that often increase recidivism); and they often bring greater satisfaction to victims. Moreover, if well-calibrated, they can encourage and reinforce the bonds with conventional society that help to prevent crime over the long term. Alternatives to imprisonment have been explored within the region, including curfews, electronic monitoring, drug courts and drug treatment, transitional housing, and community sentencing for non-violent prisoners, but we are not aware of any studies of the effectiveness of these efforts.

While many nations in the region have acknowledged the need to implement alternatives to imprisonment, the use of relevant programmes has been sporadic. The most commonly cited explanation for this is a lack of adequate resources. For instance, in Barbados and elsewhere, resource shortages are often blamed for the lack of important services aimed at offenders, such as dedicated mental health resources, a functional after-care programme, entrepreneurship training and transitional housing necessary to meet the needs of prisoners as they prepare for release.⁴⁶ Moreover, in a tough-on-crime climate, rehabilitation is often not a political priority for

policy makers.

Of course, any wise correctional strategy will account for the fact that offenders present different levels of risk. Offenders presenting the greatest risk of recidivism or causing harm to others need to be identified and incarcerated. For this reason, correctional systems should employ selective incapacitation strategies that assign prison terms only for serious offences and to persons who are most likely to recidivate (as evidenced by a culture-appropriate dangerousness assessment). Persons who are unlikely to reoffend or who have not committed serious offences should be sentenced to alternative dispositions. Selective incapacitation will reduce the strain on correctional systems, improve cost-efficiency and protect the public. Imprisonment should only be used as a last resort.

Some nations have taken initial steps towards establishing programmes to reduce case processing delays and incarceration rates. In 2003, for instance, the Guyana Bar Association and the Guyana Association of Women Lawyers launched a pilot project on alternative dispute resolution that focused on civil cases. This project involved creating a mediation centre and providing training for Guyanese lawyers, while the law programme at the University of Guyana introduced a new course option for law students on alternative dispute resolution. During this time, 98 cases were transferred from the court to the alternative dispute resolution system within one year.⁴⁷ Furthermore, in Guyana, out of the 21,366 civil matters pending for 2008, a mere 72 civil cases went to the mediation centre for 2007, and 140 mediation cases were pending from 2006, resulting in 212 cases pending for mediation in 2007. At the end of 2007, 63 cases had been successfully mediated, leaving 149 pending.⁴⁸

In Barbados, the Penal System Act of 1998 has encouraged a philosophical change in ways to deal with offenders by creating community sentencing options such as probation and community service. Since 2000, the Barbados Probation Department has supported offenders who have been given the option of community service. Some of the challenges

associated with this effort include substance abuse treatment, job placement and community support. The Prison Service of Trinidad and Tobago is experimenting with restorative justice strategies. In 2002, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago appointed a task force to review the penal reform system. One of the key recommendations advanced by the task force was the implementation of a restorative justice philosophy throughout the criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago. The Prison Service is facing a familiar set of challenges in its efforts to shift from retributive justice to restorative justice.

The issue of alternatives to incarceration is particularly salient for juvenile offenders. Each of the Caribbean-7 has indicated that juveniles detained for non-criminal matters such as truancy, lack of appropriate guardianship and victimization through abuse are often housed together with juveniles who have committed criminal, often violent offences.⁴⁹ Because it is a long-standing truism of criminology that one of the most potent causes of delinquency is exposure to delinquent peers, any strategy that houses minor offenders together with serious offenders is likely to increase crime. Furthermore, these approaches are also likely to expose the less serious offenders to further victimization.

Researchers find that “for the entire population of three juvenile institutions in Trinidad and Tobago, 58.5 percent of youth in an institution for young boys and 92.8 percent of youth in an institution for young girls were institutionalized for non-illegal acts.”⁵⁰ Suriname, on the other hand, has a pre-detention juvenile facility specifically for youth awaiting trial. The facility, which is called Opa Doeli, was founded in 2007 and houses young persons aged 10 to 18 years. It can accommodate 54 boys and 14 girls, and these are able to attend school normally within the centre. The purpose of the facility is to provide the youth with the skills to defend themselves against criminal influences.

The Beijing Rules, adopted by the United Nations in 1985 to define a set of principles for the proper administration of juvenile justice, speak directly to these concerns. These

rules specifically outline that “no minors should be held in a facility where they are vulnerable to the negative influences of adult detainees” and that “the danger to juveniles of ‘criminal contamination’ while in detention pending trial must not be underestimated. It is therefore important to stress the need for alternative measures. . . . to avoid such detention in the interest of the well-being of the juvenile.”⁵¹

The degree to which countries in the region observe the set of principles outlined in the Beijing Rules varies. In Guyana, provisions for juveniles are deficient in that there are no alternatives to detention prior to trial, nor have adequate facilities been established to support juveniles while they are kept in detention. A detention centre has been constructed, but it has not been functional, and juveniles, both males and females, have been housed with adults in detention facilities. This increases the risk of sexual abuse. Indeed, it has led to news reports of the sexual and physical abuse of juveniles by law enforcement operatives and adult inmates.⁵²

Concerns about proper supervision and staffing at some juvenile facilities or, in some instances, a complete lack of a juvenile correctional facility may result in the detention of juvenile offenders in adult facilities, as in Antigua and Barbuda and in Guyana. In Antigua and Barbuda, the Boys Training School is criticized for inadvertently preparing abandoned and abused boys for lives of crime by housing offenders and non-offenders together in the same facility. Many magistrates try to avoid remanding juvenile offenders to the facility. One magistrate revealed that she is extremely upset with the system’s failure to address adequately the problem of young boys who constantly get into trouble. This particular magistrate has joined the chorus of complaints with respect to poor management, untrained staff, ineffective rehabilitation and little oversight of the boys. Because of these inadequacies, boys who commit serious offences are committed to Her Majesty’s Prison, the country’s adult prison. Furthermore, in Antigua and Barbuda, aside from probation, there are no alternatives to sentencing and no restorative

justice options, and juveniles are tried in the same courts as adults.

There are a number of reasons to support the use of alternatives to incarceration within the region, especially in the case of juveniles. Systems should be put in place to house non-criminal juveniles in facilities that do not expose them to peers who have been charged with or convicted of criminal offenses. Additionally, the benefits of alternatives to incarceration are particularly important to juvenile offenders, who represent a more vulnerable population.

The issues of case processing delays, backlogs, low conviction rates, overcrowded prisons and a lack of alternatives to incarceration are all interconnected. As Deosaran (2009, x–xi) indicates, “there are some factors which push criminal behaviour such as family neglect and bad schooling, but there are also other factors which pull crime such as weak and ineffective prosecution, low conviction rates, lawyer absenteeism, poor police response, corrupt police and having the prisons as a criminogenic ghetto.” These issues reinforce the dire need for system-wide criminal


justice planning agencies in Caribbean nations. Putting in place agencies capable of this kind of systems thinking to monitor the criminal justice system will help these nations address inefficiencies, locate case processing blockages and delays, identify slack resources and put in place strategies to optimize the functioning of the entire system. Each part of the criminal justice system has a specific role to ensure the stability of the whole system. Although there is evidence of scattered reform efforts in the region to address the issues identified in this chapter, a significantly more integrative approach is necessary to reduce backlogs, improve case processing, increase conviction rates, reduce prison overcrowding and provide more alternatives to incarceration.

Opinions on the Effectiveness of Justice Systems

Even if criminal justice systems are judged effective by objective standards, public perceptions of the criminal justice system are vitally important. Thus, another way to assess the

Chart 5.1

Respondents Who Rate the Capacity of the Criminal Justice System as Sufficient, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “What is the capacity of your country to solve and better manage the problem of insecurity?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Sufficient” or “Very sufficient”.


effectiveness of criminal justice systems in promoting human security is to gauge the opinions of citizens. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 asked respondents in the Caribbean-7 to assess the capacity of their countries “to solve and better manage the problem of insecurity.” The share of respondents rating the capacity of their nations as ‘sufficient’ or ‘very sufficient’ varied widely by nation, from a low of 27 percent in Trinidad and Tobago to a high of 70 percent in Barbados (with an average of 41 percent) (chart 5.1). Three patterns are striking in the findings. First, the wide variation across nations suggests that some governments have done a substantially better job in the eyes of citizens in building capacity to address security issues. Second, although perceived capacity varies by nation, it is quite low overall. Less than half of the respondents across the Caribbean-7 perceive their nations to have sufficient capacity

to manage human security threats effectively. Third, perceptions of this capacity do not appear to be linked to national poverty levels. Trinidad and Tobago is the wealthiest of these nations, yet is perceived by its citizens to have the lowest capacity to address citizen security concerns. Similarly, Suriname and Guyana are among the poorest nations in this group, yet they rank second and third, respectively, in perceived level of capacity to address citizen security.⁵³ National wealth alone is insufficient to guarantee citizen security and safety.

Confidence in the Justice System

One of the principal goals of government generally and criminal justice systems specifically is to provide for the security of the population. This security has an objective component that is reflected in official statistics on crime, violence and other threats to human security. It has a subjective component as well. For in-

Chart 5.2 Perception of the Hopelessness of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “The problem of crime has no remedy.” “Nothing can be done to control crime in this country.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree” or “Agree”.

stance, one way of viewing the perceived effectiveness of criminal justice systems is to gauge the extent to which citizens have grown hopeless about crime. Effective criminal justice systems inspire public confidence. Hopelessness is a sign of a system that is failing to meet one of its most important goals. Two questions in the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 addressed the extent of hopelessness by asking respondents in the Caribbean-7 to indicate their level of agreement with the following statements, both of which served as proxies for hopelessness: “The problem of crime has no remedy” and “Nothing can be done to control crime in this country”.

Chart 5.2 presents the results by country. The good news is that the share of respondents agreeing with the statement that crime has no remedy is low, never exceeding 19 percent in any of the nations. On the other hand, people tend to be more sceptical regarding what can be done to control crime. The most sceptical are in Suriname, and the least in Jamaica.

The survey data reveal stark disparities across the Caribbean-7, and some of the results are curious. Respondents in Saint Lucia, which does not have the highest rates of insecurity and violence among these nations, appear to have the greatest levels of hopelessness. Among them, 18.4 percent believe “the problem of crime has no remedy”, and 26.8 percent believe “nothing can be done to control crime in this country”. At the same time, Jamaican respondents appear to have lower levels of hopelessness than their peers in several nations that have lower rates of crime and violence. These findings point to a disjuncture between the levels of crime and violence and feelings of hopelessness among citizens.

Two factors may explain this disjuncture. First, it may be that the *levels* of crime are not as important as *changes* in crime. The homicide rate in Jamaica is about twice the homicide rate in Saint Lucia (53 versus 26 per 100,000 population, respectively), but homicides are decreasing in Jamaica and increasing in Saint Lucia. Citizens may have difficulty comparing homicide rates between their own nation and others, but they may be cognizant

of trends and trend changes in violence, particularly if such phenomena are documented regularly by local media. Second, these findings are reminiscent of a body of research that suggests there is a disjuncture among people’s *actual* risk of victimization, their *perceived* risk of victimization and their fear of crime.⁵⁴ Hopelessness about crime does not appear to be a simple function of crime rates. In the same way as police departments worldwide have been implored by reformers to put in place solutions to manage people’s *fear* of crime, this finding suggests that governments may be able to take steps to address the *hopelessness* or *despair* felt by some residents over the issue of crime.

Mechanisms to Prevent and Control Crime

What is the extent of support for severe crime control policies such as the death penalty and the construction of more prisons? To what extent do these preferences vary by nation?

The results of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 indicate that public support for crime prevention policies such as increased investment in education, youth development, job creation and poverty reduction is fairly universal across the Caribbean. Analysis of these results indicates a fairly complicated picture (see chapter 6 for a fuller analysis). Citizens also expressed mixed feelings about harsher policies, and opinions varied much more strongly by nation. For this reason, it is important to examine each policy in detail.

The severity of punishments: Across the Caribbean-7, about 83.1 percent of the survey respondents agreed that criminals should be punished more harshly. Indeed, the respondents across the countries displayed only a limited degree of variability; the shares ranged from 75.2 to 89.6 percent. The two nations with the highest share of respondents agreeing that harsher punishments are necessary were Trinidad and Tobago (89.8 percent) and Jamaica (89.6 percent). Both nations face high levels of gang violence, and citizens understandably want to see offenders held accountable for their behaviour.

Capital punishment: About 62.6 percent of respondents support the death penalty.

The respondents in the six British Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean-7 (that is, less Suriname) exhibited only a narrow range of variation in their support, from 61.5 to 75.5 percent. Similarly, a 2001 study of the opinions of college students on capital punishment found that 86.7 percent of males and 78.4 percent of females in Saint Augustine, Trinidad favoured capital punishment in cases of first degree murder.⁵⁵ The study noted that “not one of the respondents in Saint Augustine checked the ‘No Opinion’ category, suggesting that capital punishment is a particularly salient topic there.”⁵⁶ Meanwhile, in Suriname, the only recent former colony of the Netherlands examined here, only 35.7 percent of respondents supported the death penalty.⁵⁷ What accounts for this puzzling disparity? It is often said that colonies, even after independence, continue to take on the characteristics of their colonizers. The Netherlands abolished capital punishment more than a century ago (in civil law, not in military law) and remains steadfast in its rejection of capital punishment. To this day, the Netherlands will not honour extradition requests in which the death penalty is a possible sanction.⁵⁸ In contrast, the United Kingdom abolished capital punishment only a little more than a decade ago. A 2009 poll on attitudes towards the death penalty in the United Kingdom found that “70 percent think the U.K. should still have the death penalty as the maximum possible penalty for at least one of the twelve different types of crime surveyed.”⁵⁹ Thus, the variations in the support for capital punishment in the Caribbean seems to be directly linked with the culture of support for the death penalty among the former colonizers.

The overwhelming level of support for capital punishment in six of the Caribbean-7 appears to be out of proportion with the likely deterrent value of the punishment. A long-standing axiom of criminology holds that deterrence has three components: certainty, severity and celerity (or swiftness).⁶⁰ This means that the sanctions with the greatest deterrent value are sufficiently severe and are administered swiftly and with a strong

level of certainty. Capital punishment is clearly severe. However, low detection rates and case processing delays in the Caribbean make it unlikely that capital punishment will be administered with sufficient swiftness or likelihood to produce a deterrent benefit. The research evidence on capital punishment is mixed, but generally tends to indicate that capital punishment is a weak deterrent.⁶¹ Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that it may even backfire by legitimating the use of deadly force.⁶² Moreover, regardless of its actual or potential instrumental benefit, the death penalty is incompatible with the values that are associated with the human development approach.

Human rights: The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 asked respondents about their agreement that human rights are obstacles to more effective crime control. Across the Caribbean-7, only about 43.2 percent of the respondents agreed, ranging from a low of 34.2 percent in Guyana to a high of 62.8 percent in Saint Lucia. The nation with the second highest share of respondents who agreed was Suriname, at 48.2 percent. Thus, with the exception of Saint Lucia, the extent of variation in the responses was fairly narrow. What accounts for the relatively high proportion of respondents in Saint Lucia who view human rights as an impediment to crime control? The most likely explanation is a recent outbreak of violent crime in Saint Lucia. Another potential explanation is a Privy Council ruling prohibiting Saint Lucia from enforcing a mandatory death penalty for all capital offenses and the Privy Council’s general unwillingness to uphold death sentences during appeal phases.⁶³

Building more prisons: The survey asked respondents to rate their level of agreement that government should build more prisons to reduce crime. Across the Caribbean-7, only about 26.0 percent agreed, ranging from a low of 11.7 percent in Barbados to a high of 41.3 percent in Guyana. Excluding these two outliers, one sees that the extent of variation in support for building more prisons is minimal (from 21.7 percent in Jamaica to 33.8 percent in Trinidad and Tobago). Moreover, these findings point to a curious pattern. Across the Caribbean-7,

83.1 percent of respondents believe criminals should be punished more harshly, and 62.6 percent support the death penalty; yet, only 26 percent agree that more prisons should be built. The level of crime alone does not seem to account for any preference for an expansion in the number of prisons, given that, in Jamaica, which has the highest rate of violent crime among these nations, the support for prison expansion is at one of the lowest levels.

What accounts for the two outliers: Barbados at the lower end of the distribution and Guyana at the upper end? Reports on human rights practices in both countries help shed light on this question. Barbados has a relatively healthy prison system. A 2010 report concludes as follows:

“Prison and detention center conditions generally met international standards. Dodds Prison, built in 2007 in St. Philip, was designed to meet modern international standards with a capacity of approximately 1,250 prisoners. According to prison officials, in October it held 910 prisoners, including pre-trial detainees.”⁶⁴

Guyana, in contrast, faces a serious overcrowding problem. A 2010 report concludes as follows:

“Prison and jail conditions were poor and deteriorating, particularly in police holding cells. Capacity and resource constraints were a problem. The Prison Authority reported that at the end of October, there were 2,122 prisoners in five facilities, which had a combined design capacity of 1,580. Approximately half of the prisoners were in Georgetown’s Camp Street Prison, which was designed to hold 600 inmates but held 1,060. Overcrowding was in large part due to backlogs of pre-trial detainees, who constituted approximately 41 percent of the total prison population.”⁶⁵

Public support for prison expansion appears to be a function of both crime rates and current prison conditions.

The data of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 show that public opinion about crime and justice is complex. In nations experiencing serious outbreaks of violence, prison expansion and capital punishment are two of

the policy options that come to mind most quickly. The data here suggest that the public is looking at other options as well.

Accountability

Worldwide, the public relies on the police and on criminal justice systems to control crime and maintain a sense of security. At the same time, the public also demands that public officials, including the police and criminal justice officials, be held accountable for behaving lawfully.

Likewise, in the Caribbean, two types of accountability are particularly noticeable in the area of security. First, to what extent are the front-line agents of justice—the police—held accountable for misconduct? Second, to what extent are other government officials, both within and outside the criminal justice system, held accountable for corrupt behaviour in office? Chapter 4 examines the police in detail, but the larger criminal justice system also serves a crucial role in reducing and preventing misconduct, including within the police and elsewhere. So, the topic is relevant here as well.

Regulating Police Misconduct

In general, data on police misconduct in the Caribbean-7 tend to be incomplete. It is thus useful to rely also on data from external sources, although these sources may not always be reliable. Various national human rights groups such as Jamaicans for Justice play an important role in advocating for police accountability to the law. However, the NGO that has the biggest part in examining police misconduct on a regional scale is Amnesty International. This organization regularly tracks human rights violations throughout the Caribbean. It has raised concerns about various issues with regard to police misconduct. Its sights have focused most firmly on Jamaica and on Trinidad and Tobago.⁶⁶ National human rights groups, as well as Amnesty International, have called on the governments of both nations to put in place solutions that will hold police accountable for various forms of misconduct, especially the excessive use of force.

Amnesty International has long bemoaned the police use of deadly force in Jamaica. Between 1983 and 2009, almost 5,000 persons died as a result of the use of force by police. Of these, 1,748 died between 2000 and 2009. Many of these killings have been justified by statements that they occurred during shoot-outs with gunmen. However, the high number of killings, eye-witness testimony, and other evidence such as the virtual absence of injuries or fatalities among police have raised concerns about the possibility of summary executions by police.

In Trinidad and Tobago, excessive use of force by police is reportedly widespread, and “mechanisms to hold members of the police service accountable for alleged abuses are weak”.⁶⁷ Trinidad and Tobago’s Police Complaints Authority, which reviews allegations of police misconduct, reported that the system to investigate killings by police “continues to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable”.⁶⁸ These patterns are suggestive of a more widespread trend in developing nations with a potent combination of weak judiciaries and high crime rates. Police in these nations may hold the view that their job is to sanitize because the court systems fail to hold offenders accountable for their crimes.⁶⁹ Thus, when

police kill people suspected of being violent offenders, they may be attempting to make up for weaknesses in other parts of the criminal justice system. For instance, the Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA 2002, 37) concluded that the relative regularity of execution type killings by the police implies that there are elements in the Guyana Police Force who attempt “to ensure that persons they believe to be guilty of crimes do not escape the consequences”. The courts are therefore implicated in the police use of excessive force in at least two ways. First, by failing to hold police officers accountable for the excessive use of force, courts may be implicitly supporting it. Second, by failing to hold offenders accountable for their crimes, they may be implicitly (and unintentionally) promoting the excessive use of force by police. Research in other countries shows that courts can play a crucial role in controlling the police use of deadly force, but only if this is matched by internal controls within police departments.⁷⁰

The Caribbean-7 countries all face concerns about police misconduct to varying degrees. However, each has undertaken efforts to curb misconduct and create a system of checks and balances to strengthen oversight. Gomes (2007) highlights some of the police

Table 5.2. Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7

Country	Police service commission	Internal police investigation division	Ombudsman	Civil oversight body
Antigua & Barbuda	Yes	No	No	No
Barbados	Yes	Yes	No	No
Jamaica ^a	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Saint Lucia	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Trinidad & Tobago	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

Source: Gomes (2007).

a. In Jamaica, there is a Police Public Complaints Authority (a civilian body) and a Police (Civilian Oversight) Authority.

accountability systems that exist within several countries in the Caribbean, including five of the Caribbean-7. (Guyana and Suriname are absent from her analysis.) Table 5.2, adapted from Gomes, illustrates that the majority of countries already have systems in place to provide oversight. However, questions remain about the extent to which these systems function properly, have sufficient authority and resources to carry out independent investigations, or are merely symbolic gestures. In the case of extrajudicial killings by police, symbols mean little. Effective systems are those that result in fewer shootings of civilians without endangering officers or other civilians.

Excessive force is not the only form of police misconduct in the Caribbean. Police corruption is thought to be problematic as well. For instance, Guyana's Ministry of Home Affairs recently established a five-year strategic plan for the Guyana Police Force; the plan describes corruption as a strategic risk that will "adversely affect public trust and confidence in the police."⁷¹ As a result, the plan includes a component that will "enhance the capability of the force to deal with internal corruption."⁷² Although some nations are thought to experience more police corruption than others, all of the Caribbean-7 have wrestled with corruption issues. Police corruption undermines the legitimacy of the law and legal authorities in the eyes of the public. Legitimacy problems undermine the ability of police to secure witnesses and build viable criminal cases. These same problems may lead judges and juries to second guess the police, thus influencing conviction rates.

Excessive use of force and corruption among police are widespread in several countries of the region; some police services are thought to carry out summary executions of known serious offenders. These illegal patterns of behaviour by police undermine not only the authority of the police specifically, but of law, legal authorities and the state more generally. Putting in place meaningful solutions to these issues is an important challenge for Caribbean criminal justice systems.

Table 5.3. Corruption Perceptions Index, Rankings, Caribbean-7, 2011

Country	Ranking
Antigua & Barbuda	—
Barbados	16 (2011)
Jamaica	86 (2011)
Guyana	134 (2011)
Saint Lucia	25 (2011)
Suriname	100 (2011)
Trinidad & Tobago	91 (2011)

Source: Transparency International (2011).

Note: The notation "—" indicates unavailability of data. The year of the ranking is in parentheses.

Regulating Official Corruption

Criminal justice systems need to control not only the official misconduct of police, but also of all other types of government officials, including its own officials.

Perceived corruption levels vary widely throughout the Caribbean. One of the most well known measures of corruption is Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, which "ranks countries according to perception of corruption in the public sector. The CPI is an aggregate indicator that combines different sources of information about corruption, making it possible to compare countries."⁷³ Table 5.3 shows the ranking of each of the Caribbean-7.

According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Guyana ranks 134 in 183 countries. (Larger numbers indicate greater corruption.) Citizens appear to be well aware of this problem. The Guyana country report for the 2011 Index of Economic Freedom concludes that "there is extensive corruption at every level of law enforcement and government."⁷⁴

Given some of the perceived high levels of corruption within the region, what steps are nations taking to respond to corruption, strengthen regulations and provide oversight? Some nations have chosen to increase transparency by requiring public officials to disclose financial assets. Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and Suriname are the Caribbean-7 countries that do not have such disclosure laws. While Guyana and Jamaica have relevant laws, questions remain about the extent to which the laws are carefully and regularly enforced. In Guyana, the newly established Transparency Institute (Guyana) “hopes to raise awareness of the many faces of corruption, its causes and consequences resulting in a society diminished of resources, unable to provide its citizens with functioning institutions and a decent standard of living.”⁷⁵ The Transparency Institute hopes to use educational tools to inform the public about the negative effects of corruption and also to establish a Freedom of Information Act, creating greater governmental transparency. In 2004, Antigua and Barbuda passed an act to establish an Integrity Commission charged with “receiving declarations of the affairs of persons holding specific positions in public life, for the purpose of establishing probity, integrity and accountability in public life and for related matters.”⁷⁶ The region appears to be taking some steps to address public corruption.

Regional bodies have also played a role in attempting to regulate corruption in the Caribbean. All Caribbean-7 countries are members of the Organization of American States and the United Nations, both of which have established international anti-corruption conventions. To date, Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago have ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Barbados has signed, but not ratified the convention, while Suriname have neither signed nor ratified. Three of the countries with the most serious corruption problems—Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—have ratified the convention. Meanwhile, the two nations with the lowest perceived corruption prob-

lems (according to the Corruption Perceptions Index) have not ratified the convention.

Regional Links

Regional initiatives to address public corruption constitute a tiny share of the many regionalization efforts in Caribbean criminal justice. Given the unique characteristics of the region, including a profusion of small islands, a shared sense of culture in many of the nations and a long history of colonial influence (and interference), it makes sense that there is a strong push for regionalization. A number of regional bodies have emerged to provide a structure for establishing multilateral support in many sectors, including criminal justice. Here, we review just a handful of these organizations.

CARICOM

The largest and most influential regional body in the Caribbean is CARICOM, which was established in 1973 by treaty between four Caribbean-7 nations: Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.⁷⁷ Since then, 11 other nations have joined, for a total of 15 member states, including all the Caribbean-7. Additionally, five British overseas territories are associate members. CARICOM serves as one of the primary conduits for regional links in multiple sectors, including criminal justice. Within CARICOM, the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) houses several entities designed to facilitate regional coordination and cooperation around crime and security issues, including the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre and the Joint Regional Communications Centre. These entities “are specifically geared towards strategic research, programme and project implementation, evaluation, analysis and mobilization of resources to support the collective fight against serious crime and to counter other security threats in the Region.”⁷⁸ IMPACS has recently implemented the Regional Integrated Ballistics Information Network. This system will allow users quickly to access ballistics information to identify weapons used in the commission of crimes and will

facilitate tracing the movement of weapons throughout the Caribbean. This important advance may help address some of the issues involved with backlogs and case processing and should have a significant impact on the ability of prosecutors to secure convictions.

The Council of National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE), within CARICOM, facilitates regular meetings of the region's national security ministers. CONSLE recently commissioned an audit to review IMPACS operations and financial expenditures during 2006–2010. Justification for the audit included a desire for full disclosure and transparency in IMPACS operations to ensure “the Region’s security agenda [is] not compromised”.⁷⁹ The CONSLE audit may provide an opportunity to create additional accountability mechanisms in the region.

The Caribbean Court of Justice and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court

Another important regional criminal justice entity is the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). The CCJ facilitates uniform judicial practices within the region. The CCJ hopes to replace the Privy Council as the final court of appeals in the region, establishing an entirely self-sufficient Caribbean-based justice system. However, only Barbados and Guyana have officially recognized the CCJ as their designated final court of appeals. There are a number of reasons why countries have been averse to ratifying the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction. Most notably, the Privy Council is viewed within the region as an impartial judicial body, immune to political influences.⁸⁰ There appears to be a general lack of confidence within influential subpopulations of the region that a Caribbean-based court of appeals could perform at the same level of proficiency and integrity as the Privy Council. This lack of confidence, which is fuelled by pessimism associated with the region’s struggles to process cases efficiently, serves as a roadblock to regional acceptance of the CCJ.

There is reason to believe that a regional court could act independently and effectively, as exhibited by the ECSC. Developed by another regional body (the Organization of

Eastern Caribbean States), the ECSC functions as a high court of justice and court of appeals for nine Caribbean nations (two of which are among the Caribbean-7). Described by Favaro and Peretz (2008, 15) as “a pioneering example of outsourcing by individual sovereign countries of the provision of justice to a regional court”, the ECSC has functioned within the region since 1967. While final appeals for ECSC member states still rest with the Privy Council, the ECSC, on its own accord, has “fostered responsible governments, supported its objective of guaranteeing an independent judiciary, and secured individual human rights”.⁸¹ The successes of the ECSC highlight the importance of regional links in the Caribbean. Favaro and Peretz (2008, 16) note that “as a regional court, the CCJ has the benefit of drawing on 40 years of experience from the ECSC.”

Regional Bodies Focused on Police, Prosecution and Corrections

The Caribbean is home to several professional associations that aim to link officials and raise the level of professionalism within the region. For instance, the Association of Caribbean Heads of Corrections and Prison Services has 16 member states, including the Caribbean-7. During the opening ceremony of the 2010 association’s annual conference, Elliston Rahming, superintendent of Her Majesty’s Prison in the Bahamas, echoed some of the themes raised throughout this chapter: “Corrections is not just about control and containment. We are equally engaged in the business of crime prevention via ongoing staff development, proper sentence planning, rehabilitation programmes and successful reintegration of offenders”.⁸²

Similarly, the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police includes police commissioners from all the Caribbean-7, as well as many other countries. During a meeting in Kingston, Jamaica among nine commissioners of police in 1986, a resolution was passed calling for the creation of the association. The association was formally established the following year during the meeting of commissioners in Saint Lucia. The association con-

venes annual conferences to discuss issues of regional importance to the law enforcement community. During the 2011 conference in Antigua and Barbuda, the issue of anti-corruption was identified as an important area of concern, as were issues of youth violence and the enhancement of forensic and ballistics examinations.

The Caribbean Association of Judicial Officers is a relatively new regional organization: it held its inaugural conference in 2009. Membership consists mostly of current or retired judicial officers from throughout the Caribbean. The association aims to enhance the administration of justice, promote judicial independence and standards of integrity and accountability, foster professional development among judicial officers, support research on the administration of justice and improve the public image of the judiciary, among other goals. The topics featured at its annual conferences echo many of the themes raised in this report, including trial management; expanding access to justice, especially among vulnerable populations; and protecting victims from reprisal. However, other important themes have not been taken up, especially case processing backlogs and overcrowding in prisons.

Additional Regional Efforts

The organizations outlined above represent some of the more well known and well established forums for regional cooperation and collaboration, but other ongoing efforts not described here might also play a role in improving the practice of criminal justice in the region.

Regional initiatives are a good way to enhance the level of professionalism, coordination and cooperation in dealing with issues of vital importance to Caribbean nations. Such initiatives enable nations to work together to solve common problems, providing economies of scale often not possible in some of the Caribbean microstates that lack sufficient resources to address some problems on their own. Regional professional bodies also provide an opportunity for nations to share ideas, borrow effective programmes and prac-

tices from one another and provide continuing education. The various regional bodies can serve as an effective locus for change, taking on some of the issues raised in this report.

Regional professional bodies can serve as an outstanding venue for professional development by offering an arena for contact with peers from other parts of the world who can share their ideas and help ensure a more vibrant dialogue about regional criminal justice practices. To support this goal, regional professional bodies (such as the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police) might seek affiliation with larger bodies (such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police).

Regional cooperation and communication are vital in any plan to improve the practice of criminal justice in the Caribbean. However, there are at least two main caveats. First, the benefits of regional cooperation are often overstated. Professional meetings can serve as a forum for spreading effective practices, but they can as easily serve as a forum for reinforcing shared assumptions and spreading bad ideas. Second, while globalization has had a fundamental impact on criminal justice systems throughout the world, including the Caribbean, not all the crime and criminal justice problems faced within Caribbean nations are regional or global. Some are local phenomena, and local solutions are needed to address these problems. While regional problems deserve regional solutions, local problems deserve local solutions. Making the distinction is vital.

Conclusion

This chapter outlines important issues facing Caribbean criminal justice systems. Research has demonstrated that the structure and behaviour of criminal justice institutions can have a critical impact on citizen security. At the same time, they can undermine public faith in the criminal justice system and government authority more generally. A long tradition of research in criminology has shown that criminal justice systems can generate unintended increases in crime and decreases in

human security if they do not adopt fair, effective, transparent and accountable practices. Although the region's criminal justice systems have made major strides in some ways, much remains to be done.

Data presented in this chapter indicate that, in the region, confidence in the courts is fairly low. This is a somewhat unexpected finding of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Caribbean officials, judiciary and court managers, and populations should act on this red flag.

There is also a strong demand for change. The findings described in this chapter represent an argument for a comprehensive programme of change in criminal justice systems in the region. Some aspects of this change will be more challenging than others. It is possible to achieve useful short-term gains by adopting immediate administrative measures to solve problems such as case overload and processing delays in the courts. These are problems of efficiency that, however, influence system effectiveness and overall confidence in the

system. Medium-term gains can be realized by establishing a credible, secure and well-designed witness protection programme at the regional level. Other medium-term gains can be realized by establishing greater capacity for analysing crime and criminal justice issues within the region and testing the fairness and effectiveness of crime control interventions.

The deeper and more challenging changes involve how people are treated by criminal justice systems. Police abuses, sentencing disparities and substandard confinement conditions all contribute to a massive crisis of legitimacy in the region's criminal justice systems. As long as some people have greater access to justice than others, the region's inhabitants will continue to exhibit deficits in trust and confidence in the system. These issues constitute a long-term reform agenda that will take many years to put in place. At the same time, these comprehensive reforms require urgent and well-coordinated action if the region is to achieve its aims in citizen security.



CHAPTER

6

State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations

**Sustainable security needs
community collaboration**

**Don't trample our rights en
route to protect our safety**

**Embrace, empower, respect,
protect – we're all in this
together**

**An investment in sustainable
development is an investment
in sustainable security**

Introduction

Across the Caribbean region, citizens want safer societies. The region is at a critical juncture: effective policy-making could make societies safer for citizens, including the most vulnerable. While governments have made considerable efforts to improve security, the challenge is to respond more effectively and in ways that are grounded in respect for citizens.

The right mix of policies is important. A carefully crafted and effectively executed crime control policy, while only one of several tools to make society safer, could become a critical reference point for the effective functioning of other vital influences that also affect public safety in the region. This chapter makes the case for a rebalancing of policy so that there is a stronger focus on social crime prevention, which could thereby contribute to an improvement in the larger human development strategies of the countries of the region. The chapter demonstrates that there is strong support for such a shift in policy and, specifically, for a shift to social crime prevention. It also discusses the influence of various policy-making actors, including the media, civil society and the state bureaucracy. It argues for greater capacity in policy analysis and policy-making in the state and civil society and better evidence-based inputs to accomplish the transition to citizen security efficiently and effectively.

The reform of institutions to enhance their ability to serve the people is an important aspect of policies that are oriented towards citizen security, but this issue has been discussed in previous chapters and is therefore subordinated here. This chapter considers the development of appropriate national and regional responses to ensure a safe and secure environment for Caribbean citizens.

It examines the official crime control plans of various governments, the evolution associated with the current policy framework, and the support for state policies among the population as expressed in the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 conducted for this report. The policy outcomes are then reviewed, and the capacity of states to effectively implement their expressed policies and to effect change is assessed.

The assessment of public attitudes towards crime and violence indicates that, despite expressions of support for punitive responses, citizens overwhelmingly favour social crime prevention strategies. Ordinary citizens and the media play a central role in crime policy-making. Each citizen influences the criminal justice policy arena through the decisions, judgments and actions taken on specific issues. Citizen perceptions of security, the level of fear felt by citizens and the level of risk of crime and victimization impact decision-making processes and determine what each citizen considers serious societal problems. If citizens feel empowered and know the state is concerned to protect their rights, their confidence in government is enhanced. In such circumstances, their decisions can positively influence crime policy and efforts to reduce crime. If citizens join the quest for a safe society in this way, they can also contribute to positive changes in the philosophy, policy and governance of society.

The mass media are a primary means of informing the Caribbean public about the issue of crime and an important actor in influencing public policy. Recent surveys indicate that crime and violence dominate media coverage in the Caribbean. Crime accounts for 27 percent of media reports regionwide. The share is 30 percent in Jamaica, and the average worldwide is 20 percent.¹ The media also play an important role in the policy-making process

by bringing pressing issues to the public's attention and providing forums for debate.

The Caribbean has seen the expansion of the media in several countries, and this development has deepened citizens' awareness of public issues and enhanced an already well-developed democratic culture. By the same token, the media amplify the population's concerns, influence the perceptions of citizens regarding the acuteness and character of problems, help to set the agenda of concerns, and, in so doing, help to frame policy discussions.

Across the region, the media in their various expressions exist as a form of open participation for the public. This ranges from radio talk shows and television programmes that allow call-in participation to lively print publications that invite letters to the editor. Despite the prevalence of television, radio remains a primary source of information for Caribbean residents. Across the region, especially in Jamaica, weekday radio programmes are dominated by call-in sessions. These help hold the government and governmental agents accountable. The ability to rebroadcast via YouTube and the use of other social media aid the process of accountability. For example, during the May 2010 operation to arrest and extradite Christopher Coke, a Jamaican drug lord, social media were used to follow and report on the activities and, particularly, the alleged human rights abuses of Jamaica's security forces. Likewise, news reports of police-civilian confrontations in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago have been rebroadcast via YouTube.²

The first stage in a policy process might involve the framing of an issue by the media. Across the region, this is evidenced in editorials and commentaries on the role of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) in its jurisdiction as a court of last resort. Regionwide, the media are a strong institution operating to strengthen governance. They facilitate participation and transparency by giving citizens a voice and permitting the free flow of information, while helping hold governments accountable through reporting, investigative journalism and a whistle-blowing role. The media and the public work symbiotically: the

media report on public opinion, and public opinion shapes what the media report. Thus, the media reflect and inform public opinion on a variety of issues, including crime. In this way, the media shape agendas, act as a watchdog for the public interest and play a role in the governance process. They facilitate accountability, help reduce the policy implementation gap and bring the people into the process of governance.

The Policy Environment

Crime and Insecurity in the Caribbean: The Policy Factor

Crime control involves social, economic and political dimensions that require the implementation of strategies to reduce and prevent criminality. Crime policies should actually prevent rather than seek to manage the related problems. They must prevent and control crime by targeting its most violent and destructive expressions, while also being acutely sensitive to the protection of citizen rights and contributing to meeting social and economic needs. An optimal response includes crime prevention strategies that address the root and proximate causes of crime, as well as crime reduction initiatives such as the removal of criminals from society. Achieving this balance is integral to citizen security. Therefore, how crime policy is developed and executed and the level of effectiveness of crime policy are at the core of the achievement of a safe society.

Establishing a safe society, however, does not mean the absence of crime and violence. Rather, it means the calibration of policy so that policy can help lead to desired outcomes such as lower crime rates, increasingly effective public institutions, growing conformity with laws and citizen support for crime policy and the agencies and actors responsible for enforcement of the policy. The ultimate aim is a more well integrated society.

However, while effective crime control policies can never be a panacea for all the ills of unsafe societies in the region, the policy response to the challenge of crime in these democracies and the effect of the response on

citizen perceptions of government efforts in crime reduction and in the respect for rights uniquely determine whether these societies will experience statistically normal crime rates and the greater security that citizens want.

The respect of states for civil and political rights creates a favourable environment for open debate and the transparent development of crime policy, as well as the public support for the policy. An appropriate policy-making process requires political accountability and meaningful citizen participation. This is occurring in the region: civil society organizations, an attentive public and the media are participating in the debate about the best ways to address crime. The active and engaged public, the involvement of interest groups and the general disposition to resist state encroachment on liberties and rights are features that, in the main, offer protection against government excesses. Combined, they are compelling governments to be accountable and to consult with civil society actors in policy-making.³

Such efforts by governments indicate that a transition towards enhanced citizen security is possible. The democratic, constitutional forms of government in the region and the region's ideological moderation and centrist political orientation would support a crime policy framework that avoids gross and unchecked violations of citizen rights in the quest to control crime. In addition, the long-standing membership of Caribbean countries in international organizations and the participation of these countries in protocols on national development and citizen security are also exerting a favourable influence on crime policy. This affiliation is a source of funding and expertise for crime-relevant policies, but also exposes governments to the policy frameworks represented by the international conventions and protocols to which Caribbean states are signatories.

These advantages need to be matched through nuanced local crime reduction policies that combine the effective policing of crime, respect for citizen rights and positive social interventions. This multifaceted approach to the problem of crime would target

a reduction in the incidence of crime and address the social roots of crime, while securing citizen support for state policy. It also invites capacity development and a focus on the protection of citizen rights.

The outcome would represent an index of the state's ability to control crime. By producing effective crime control, crime policy would invariably enhance other outcomes, such as increased citizen security. The sense of safety and security among citizens is a valuable asset in crime policy because an increase in public confidence in government strengthens the state's connection with citizens, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the state.

Policies should also be sensitive to the opportunities and constraints in the policy environment for dealing with crime. The Christopher Coke case in Jamaica appears to confirm a truth about the policy environment in terms of achieving success in deterring criminals. It was possible to capture and extradite Coke because the environment was rich in variables that compelled concerted action to end the state's protection of a wanted criminal. These included an inflamed public opinion and the pressure of influential civil society groups, such as the Jamaica Civil Society Coalition and Jamaicans for Justice, that were willing to stand up for democratic rights and the rule of law even under extreme circumstances. Combined with Jamaica's private sector, which had become integrally involved in issues of crime over the years, citizens succeeded in forcing the Jamaican state to undertake the steps they desired.⁴ In sum, key factors in the Jamaican policy environment overcame other powerful constraints and proved decisive in securing Coke's extradition.

The Evolution of Policy, Deterring Social Violence, and the War on Narco-Trafficking

Caribbean countries have, at different times, adopted various approaches to address crime. These approaches include crime control, due process and social justice models. All seven countries that have been sites of the research for this report (the Caribbean-7) subscribe to the due process perspective, which emphasizes fairness and equal treatment under the law.

There have also been elements of a new approach emphasizing social interventionist policies designed to reduce poverty, empower traditionally disadvantaged groups and meet the demands of these groups for social justice. Components of this approach have been present in the policies and programmes of various countries, but were most evident in Guyana and Jamaica in the 1970s.⁵ Yet, this emphasis on social policy and on remedial measures to assist the poor had uneven effects. While crime rates in Guyana remained low, Jamaica experienced violent political conflict, high levels of crime and near economic collapse.

Unlike the due process model, the social justice model is a powerful critique of existing social arrangements as they affect crime and punishment. The social justice approach assumes that crime is caused, in large part, by unjust social arrangements and unequal power relations.⁶ It demands more than the equality and fairness required under a due process framework. It is a rights-seeking model that favours socially excluded and disadvantaged groups through state intervention. It encapsulates civil and criminal justice, deals with the overall fairness of a society and society's relationships and seeks to advance human well-being, including by addressing the needs of the most disadvantaged through the redistribution of resources.⁷

Central to this approach is the notion that government has a responsibility to ensure a basic quality of life for all citizens. The focus of the approach is crime prevention and the reduction of criminality. The crime prevention methods seek to improve life chances through greater social integration, cohesion and respect for human rights and by confronting the power relations in society. It is valuable for dealing with problems of social marginalization and the lack of legitimate opportunities.

Across the region, most states exhibit a preference for the crime control model and, specifically, an excessive reliance on law enforcement. As described by Packer (2004), the "Crime Control Model is based on the proposition that repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by the criminal process."

Nonetheless, other initiatives have also focused on citizen security needs beyond public safety and enriched and nuanced the crime control model. However, such initiatives have not become priorities in policy-making nor do they reflect a "comprehensive integrative vision of crime control and citizen security." Rather, the initiatives have taken the form of ad hoc measures, pilot programmes and experiments in bridging the gap between citizens and the state.

The crime control approach and the social crime prevention–social justice approach are often viewed as polar opposites: one is tough on crime, and the other is soft on crime. Yet, both are more nuanced than the either-or description suggests. The integrated model that combines the best of both approaches bridges the dichotomy between the two. Despite gestures in this direction, nowhere in the Caribbean has any country moved fully towards an integrative model linking crime control and social justice. The model has yet to find a champion among the ranks of the incumbent Caribbean political elite.

Nevertheless, at the turn of the millennium, governments in the region were spurred to adopt tighter preventive measures. This shift saw initiatives ranging from constitutional reforms, implementation of citizen security and justice projects, to gun buy-back schemes in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago. In a similar vein, several countries adopted complementary initiatives aimed at restraining delinquency among the young, encouraging community development and facilitating citizen empowerment. This was buttressed with the installation of independent commissions in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago that were created to achieve equal opportunity for ethnic groups, secure respect for human rights and protect women and children from abuse. Box 6.1 offers an example of an integrated programme.⁸

The Shift in Policy Reflected in Budgetary Allocations

There has been a shift at the level of ideas about crime prevention and control. In some countries, this shift has been accompanied by

Box 6.1. The Citizen Security Programme, Trinidad and Tobago

The Citizen Security Programme seeks to reduce crime and violence by addressing risk factors—such as firearms use, unsafe neighbourhoods and violent behaviour—in 22 high-need communities of Trinidad and Tobago. Led by the Ministry of National Security, the programme involves the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service and members of the targeted communities. The programme's strategy involves three approaches, as follows: (a) institutional strengthening of the

Ministry of National Security by improving its ability to plan, coordinate and manage violence and crime prevention projects; (b) institutional strengthening of the police service to increase public confidence by improving performance, training, management and supervision; and (c) coordination and implementation of community-based preventive strategies.

Source: 'Citizen Security Programme: Promoting a Culture of Peace and Lawfulness', Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, <http://csp.gov.tt/>.

social crime prevention programmes, such as citizen security programmes in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago targeting youth at risk and communities of urban poor. It is worthwhile to probe the extent of this shift in actual policy through an analysis of public security budgets.

Budgets reflect the actual policy priorities of governments. They may reveal a gap between declared and actual priorities. An examination of public expenditures on security in six of the Caribbean-7 reveals that between 5.9 percent (in the case of Guyana) and 13.9 percent (Trinidad and Tobago) of the 2010 budgets were spent on security (see chart 6.1).⁹ These are fairly large proportions of the budgets of these countries. As a proportion of GDP, the figures are also significant. The average public expenditure on security in other regions such as Central America is around 2.5 percent of regional GDP, which is lower in comparison with the expenditure in the Caribbean countries.¹⁰ These levels of expenditure reflect the increasing security problem and increasing risk in the Caribbean, but also highlight the risk of diverting resources from other areas that are similarly vital to achieving the developmental goals of these countries.

The budgetary allocations that are shown in chart 6.1 do not fully represent the level, intensity and complexity of the problem. Thus, while Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, which have the highest rates of serious crime among the Caribbean-7, respectively allocate 6.2 and 13.9 percent of their national

budgets to security, Barbados and Antigua and Barbuda, where the problem is not as severe, both allocate 7.1 percent to security. It may be that budgetary allocations are also a function of economic and fiscal constraints and political pressures on governments to appear to be responsive to the security needs of the populations. Debt burdens are certainly countervailing constraints.


Likewise, the outcomes in terms of crime reduction have no apparent association with expenditure. The expenditure of Trinidad and Tobago on security is relatively high, but the country's serious crime rate remains high. Financial investment is not a sufficient condition for crime reduction. Much depends on the mix of policies, the public support for the policies and the capacity to implement the policies effectively.

The right mix of policies means rebalancing policy to give appropriate emphasis to social crime prevention. The distributions of the security budgets in six of the Caribbean-7 (less Suriname) suggest that, despite new programmes that have been introduced in some countries, crime prevention is relatively neglected (table 6.1).

The crime prevention figures in table 6.1 are rough estimates based on aggregating expenditure on youth development, community development and other such blunt programmes and thus may tend to overestimate the actual expenditure. However, some social crime prevention projects and programmes are funded through loans and grants that may

Chart 6.1

Estimates of Government Expenditure on Security, Caribbean-7



Source: Calculations based on government data (see the text).

not all be included in the estimates. These difficulties aside, the data in the table reveal the reality that, while a shift towards greater social crime prevention may be occurring, this is still in the early stages and is insufficiently reflected in the budgetary allocations of Caribbean governments. Further consolidation of this shift will mean rebalancing security budgets in favour of crime prevention.

Meanwhile law enforcement, the courts and corrections rely on elaborate structures that require large payments for salaries and the maintenance of buildings and equipment, which are not necessarily a measure of responsiveness to the security demands of citizens. Social crime prevention has no such structures. Higher proportions of the prevention dollar are therefore more likely to go directly to programmes.

As in the case of law enforcement and the other areas of the criminal justice system, there is no guarantee that the expenditure on prevention will have a commensurate return in terms of crime reduction. Effective pro-

grammes are required. Accountability, evaluation and innovation are also required.

If the shift towards social crime prevention is to be realized more fully, greater advocacy will be needed. Old and new advocates will have to exert greater influence on policy.

Explaining the Policy Shift

Crime control has consistently been on government agendas in the Caribbean for more than three decades. Deep concerns about political violence and regime protection against subversion influenced policy from the 1960s through the mid-1980s. From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, Caribbean leaders expended the effort in managing rising street crime and the mounting criticism of racial and class bias in policing and in the dispensing of criminal justice. For example, both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago declared states of emergency: Jamaica in 1966 and 1976, and Trinidad and Tobago in 1970.

By the mid-1990s, as governments came to see narco-trafficking as the main threat to

Table 6.1. The Distribution of Government Budgetary Expenditures on Security*percent*

Category	Antigua & Barbuda	Barbados	Guyana	Jamaica	Saint Lucia	Trinidad & Tobago ^a
Law enforcement	5.08	3.36	4.78	5.24	6.99	10.70
Prevention^b	0.04	0.18	0.26	0.22	0.81	2.1
Justice	0.68	0.93	0.69	0.85	1.33	1.1
Corrections	0.32	0.82	0.88	0.71	1.86	0
Total	7.12	7.10	5.90	6.17	11.00	13.9

Sources: Calculations based on government data.

Note: The table shows the share of national budgets going to each security category.

a. For Trinidad and Tobago, correction facility expenditures are included among law enforcement and prevention expenditures.

b. Prevention includes budgetary items covering prevention of armed violence, community-based solutions, initiatives to limit drug and alcohol consumption, witness and victim protection programmes focused on women and youth, local security management programmes, and the prevention of human trafficking, among other topics.

national and hemispheric security, crime control came to be directed primarily at deterring violent criminal behaviour and stemming the increasing trade in guns and drugs. Trafficking in drugs and the associated ills created such a sense of exposure and heightened vulnerability among the region's leaders, that they imagined the danger as an existential threat to the entire region.¹¹

The perception of an existential threat was not unfounded.¹² However, political leaders and law enforcement agencies in the region had to be sensitive to the already inadequate capacity of Caribbean states to secure their borders, conduct sophisticated surveillance of traffickers and devise new legislative and other enforcement measures to bring traffickers to justice.

Between the mid-1990s and the present, Caribbean leaders, local law enforcement agencies and allied international organizations have responded to the crime threat. Recognizing that they could not work alone, heads of government in the region readily adopted a regional approach to the problem.

In policy terms, the regional response to the crime threat in recent years seems to confirm the growth in policy-learning and the de-

velopment of strategic intelligence on crime.¹³ Strategic intelligence refers to the capacity to discern optimal approaches to the solution of crimes and to calibrate policy in ways that produce effective results. Thus, targeting and a tight focus on drug-running were matched by meaningful cooperation and coordination among the members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

This regional focus on crime control with its emphasis on law enforcement, deterrence and interdiction constituted a major policy departure: the initiatives displayed a grasp of the fact that narco-trafficking was susceptible to a regional and coordinated strategy. This shift to a more nuanced policy orientation was encouraged by several developments. They included the recognition that addressing the crime problem required crime reduction, but also crime prevention. In addition, the loss of citizen confidence in the ability of Caribbean states to provide public safety encouraged the states to seek alternative solutions.

In general, factors influencing policy shifts include ideas, institutions and actors.¹⁴ Across the Caribbean, the most influential of the three may be official and unofficial policy actors. The Caribbean crime policy arena con-

sists of several main policy actors, often known to each other, who, singly or in tandem, seek to effect change in the crime landscape. These actors include CARICOM, police and other law enforcement organizations, international development partners, and the United States. Civil society groups, particularly the private sector, the media, regional organs such as the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police and the Regional Security System, and, to a lesser extent, engaged citizens have also influenced crime policy in the direction of social crime prevention.

The shift across the region has involved a change in ideas, as well as policies. For example, there are currently more social prevention programmes within the region than there were five years ago. This includes the citizen security programmes sponsored in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago by the Inter-American Development Bank.

Success in swaying policy depends on the ability to influence policy makers. However, across the Caribbean, this sort of influence has not occurred through lobbying or the formation of coalitions of civic groups. Instead, the ability to influence changes in policy is related to but not restricted to party membership, funding status, knowledge of the system and group interest and power.

Through organs such as the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), the Council for Human and Social Development and the Council of National Security and Law Enforcement, CARICOM has had the most influence on crime policy from within the region. One avenue has been the formalization of IMPACS, an outgrowth of the CARICOM task force report on crime and security. IMPACS provides, among other assistance, “mobilization of resources to support the collective fight against serious crime and to counter security threats in the region”.¹⁵ These CARICOM entities have been able to influence a shift towards advocacy for and the adoption of prevention programmes such as the Social and Development Crime Prevention Plan.

For more than two decades, CARICOM has had regional drug control plans.¹⁶ Mem-

ber states are parties to several regional and international conventions that are complemented by bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives such as the Barbados Plan of Action of May 1996, the Action Plan of October 1996 for the implementation of an anti-drug strategy in the hemisphere, the Bridgetown Plan of Action, and the European Union–Latin America Action Plan.¹⁷ The Barbados Plan of Action sets out specific activities to be undertaken by states in the area of drug control and coordination. The Caribbean has also partnered with international initiatives such as the Drug Prevention Network of the Americas.

CARICOM leaders moved to deepen their knowledge of crime in the region and sought expertise by appointing a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security in 2001. They received the report and recommendations of the task force the following year.¹⁸ In 2007, as a demonstration of its commitment to regional security and in response to the scope of the regionwide crime problem, CARICOM adopted security as the fourth pillar of the community. In 2008, the CARICOM Secretariat, in tandem with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, produced the draft Caribbean Community Action Plan for Social Development and Crime Prevention. The action plan seeks to prevent and reduce levels of violence and crime in member states. It has five specific goals: reduce violence, foster social inclusion, promote integration, empower victims and protect the environment and economic resources.¹⁹

CARICOM crime control initiatives also include regional gun-marking and gun-tracing programmes, as well as regional initiatives to promote firearms marking in Latin America and the Caribbean.²⁰ (See box 6.2 for a sample regional firearms trafficking control initiative.) In collaboration with international and regional NGOs and civil society groups and the Institute of International Relations at the University of the West Indies campus in Saint Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago, CARICOM IMPACS launched a regional initiative aimed at reducing the use of guns in the commission of violent crimes.²¹

Box 6.2. The Control of Firearms Trafficking in Central America and Neighbouring Countries

A new project seeks to control the illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and thereby reduce the impact of these weapons in armed violence in Central America. The project has been developed by the General Secretariat of the Central American Integration System, the Central American Small Arms Control Programme, which works mainly with the governments comprising the Central American Integration System, and a

gamut of national and international partners. It is being executed in Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama with the close collaboration of the Caribbean countries, Colombia and Mexico. The project receives support and advice from the UNDP Regional Centre in Panama, which manages the financial resources of the project. The project has already registered some successes, as follows:

- *Ratification and implementation of instruments for the regional and international control of SALW.* All countries in the region have signed the Inter-American Convention against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms and other international instruments that complement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. They have adopted a regional code of conduct and many of them have made progress in the analysis of the model law (*ley marco*) approved by the Latin American Parliament for eventual incorporation in national legislation.
- *Creation and strengthening of the capacities of national and regional institutions and agencies responsible for SALW control and development of a system for information exchange and improvement of border and customs control.* Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua have established national commissions.
- *Strengthening capacities among civil society organizations to promote SALW control.* NGOs in the countries of Central America have participated in training events organized through the project, as well as in dialogues generated by the project.
- *Strengthening and implementation of regional processes for control of SALW.* The Central American Small Arms Control Programme, in coordination with Central American countries, has elaborated the Central American Common Agenda on SALW Control 2010–2015 to enhance the control of illicit trafficking in arms. The current draft agenda contains five major recommendations that have resulted from national and regional dialogue and comparative analysis, as follows: (a) update the Central American regional diagnostic process by developing comprehensive data, (b) ensure coherence across national law enforcement bodies and with the international instruments ratified by the countries, (c) observe the progress towards the reduction of SALW, (d) promote the development of additional controls on SALW transfers, and (e) promote a comprehensive understanding of the issues so as to foster sustainable responses among actors.

Source: OAS (2010c).

The Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police helps build cooperation and coordinate drug strategy. The Regional Security System, hitherto established to deter political subversion, was upgraded in 1996 to address the problems emerging from the trade in illicit drugs. Both also help influence the policy landscape.

The active participation of civil society is critical in increasing citizen security. Across the region, civil society actors such as NGOs, the private sector and human rights groups have sought to influence the crime control landscape. For example, the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica has developed a National Crime Prevention Fund that is used to

support Crime Stop, a partnership among the community, the police and the media designed to involve the public in the fight against crime.

However, many less influential civil society organizations in the region are struggling for resources. One of the principal roadblocks to the development of relevant transnational support from private funds, corporate foundations and wealthy individuals is the lack of an enabling legal environment for civil society organizations and other actors.²²

Opportunities for civil society organizations from across the region to increase their influence through better coordination of their efforts, knowledge sharing and a com-

mon understanding are unlikely unless there is support from governments or international institutions. Regional institutions, such as the Organization of American States, possess mechanisms to allow civil society participation in their activities. CARICOM, for example, has adopted the Charter of Civil Society for the Caribbean Community. At the national level, however, acceptance of civil society's role in influencing national policy-making and debate is still feeble. In most countries, the architecture for regular engagement between governments and civil society is still being developed. Strengthening civil society participation was among the recommendations of the Caribbean Sub Regional Civil Society Forum held in Preparation for the Fifth Summit of the Americas, in 2009.²³ Government–civil society collaboration requires a climate of cooperation, the institutionalization of civil society participation and a framework of supportive legal and regulatory structures. Many civil society organizations are struggling for legitimacy. Mutual respect and trust are still being developed between governments and civil society organizations.

The United States is also a major actor in crime control policy, influencing policy through initiatives such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, through capacity development programmes and through annual reporting protocols such as the annual Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the Trafficking in Persons Report and the State Department Country Reports on Human Rights.²⁴ The United Kingdom has also sought to influence the region with respect to human rights practices.²⁵

Among the more powerful policy actors in the region are bilateral and multilateral agencies and international development partners, such as the Canadian International Development Agency, the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Organization of American States, the UK Department for International Development and the United States Agency for International Development. These actors do not remain isolated, but seek allies, support and leverage

for their ideas. Policy shifts are also evident in the justice sector reform funded by the Canadian International Development Agency, community policing initiatives and support for the rule of law through the United States Agency for International Development, and the support offered by the UK Department for International Development for police forces.²⁶

This emergent orientation, with its emphasis on crime prevention, poses a challenge to competing ideas about law enforcement in the region. For example, debates about enforcing the law generated advocacy within the law enforcement community for increased resources to heighten police visibility and deter crime. Consequently, across the region, the implementation of this approach has seen an increase in the number of police officers on the streets. Law enforcement influence on the policy landscape occurs through interest and membership. Law enforcement community influence on the implementation of policy is exemplified by the role of the Jamaica Constabulary Force in the realization of Jamaica's 'six anti-crime bills' in 2010 (see the section on implications below).²⁷

The portfolio of CARICOM initiatives on drug-trafficking and criminal activities is an example of how to address the crime challenge effectively. Moreover, it evidences an established framework for pursuing social and development crime prevention initiatives to facilitate the transition to citizen security.

The Policy Orientation of the Population

The Policy Environment

Public opinion has become an integral part of the public policy process. This means that attention to the orientation of the public and to the level of support of the public for policies is an essential element in the shift towards greater citizen security. Across the region, data on public attitudes are increasingly being assessed. Simultaneously, research on public attitudes towards the insecurity arising because of crime and related issues has grown

substantially. Much of this research has taken the form of opinion surveys assessing the public's attitudes about a range of crime-related issues.²⁸

Across the region, inadequate state capacity and diminished authority to address citizen insecurity led to a preoccupation with new areas of danger. Citizen demand for stronger and clearer responses from the state that were not forthcoming created public distrust and caused citizens to assume greater responsibility for their own protection. An increase in burglar bars on doors and windows and guarded and gated communities and the growth in private security firms are evidence of the feelings of insecurity.

The salience of crime, especially in terms of the fear and concern about crime, and anxieties caused by social and economic change impact the attitudes of citizens towards criminals and their support for the punishment of criminals. Other influences include symbolic politics, social and political values and perceptions of procedural fairness. However, punitive attitudes have their strongest roots in fear. Where the media constantly draw attention to crimes, insecurities increase, and, hence, persistent representation and sensationalism of crime in political discourse and the media generate popular support for punitive policies.²⁹

Social tolerance is a term used to describe the extent to which people support certain rights and privileges for others. It thus offers insight into the value orientation of citizens. Social tolerance is integrally associated with social value orientations of altruism and cooperation, but it may also support individualism, competitiveness, or aggression. The concept helps in assessing the extent to which individual rights and liberties are viewed as social goods to be defended or promoted.

Public Attitudes towards Crime and Punishment

This section assesses the policy orientation of populations in the Caribbean-7. The available data outline some general directions in public opinion on crime that cannot be characterized in any simple way. As is evident from the

results of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010, the value orientation of the population reflects inconsistencies and ambiguities. There are what appear to be numerous contradictions: respondents simultaneously favour punitive and liberal approaches that are reflected in an apparent conflict between favouring punishment and supporting rehabilitation.


The Salience of Crime in Public Opinion

Violent crime commands more attention from the media and is a primary source of insecurity. As a result, citizens are acutely aware of criminal activities in their communities and the activities being undertaken to control crime. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 indicates that crime is among the top three issues citizens blame for their sense of insecurity. Yet, overall, respondents did not view crime as the most serious social problem (chart 6.2). Instead, regionwide, social problems related to the economy were considered the most serious problem: 52.9 percent compared with 27.4 percent for crime.

However, crime was mentioned as one of the three most serious problems by a low of 8.9 percent of the respondents in Barbados to a high of 47.6 percent of the respondents in Saint Lucia (chart 6.3). Barbados is at the lower end of the violent crime rates in the Caribbean-7; thus, this lower concern about crime may be expected. Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago has high and increasing rates of violent crime; consequently, increased worry about crime is also to be expected. While the homicide rate in Saint Lucia is at the lower end among the Caribbean-7, it has been increasing, rising from 13 per 100,000 population in 2000 to 26 in 2010. Simultaneously, the robbery rate has also been steadily increasing. The steady rise in the crime rate has heightened the sense of urgency in the Saint Lucian political directorate. Crime is characterized as the number one issue for an island that is "under siege by criminals".³⁰ It is increasingly being used to mobilize the population, and the issue has entered the nation's psyche because of its salience, but also because of the recurring emphasis by policy makers.

Chart 6.2

Problems of Insecurity, by Dimension, First Mention (Top of Mind), Caribbean-7, 2010
percent




Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.
Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "From the list of problems mentioned above, which three are the most serious in your country?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who chose one problem within the dimension as their first option for "Most serious problem".

Across the Caribbean-7, 27.4 percent of the respondents, more than one in four, considered crime the most serious problem, and 47.9 percent were fearful of becoming victims of crime. Nonetheless, 45.5 percent of the respondents thought their countries were safe. Although only 40.8 percent of the respondents expressed general optimism that the state has the capacity to solve and manage the problem of insecurity more effectively, 68.8 percent reported that they would feel more secure if more police were on the streets. The salience of crime and, specifically, the growing concern about crime are leading to increased support for punishment. Across the Caribbean, punitiveness associated with the loss of the capacity of the state to contain crime is most evident in the discourse around and support for the death penalty.

Chart 6.3

Crime as One of the Three Most Serious Problems, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.
Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: "From the list of problems mentioned above, which three are the most serious in your country?" The chart shows the percentage of respondents who believe crime is among the top three "Most serious problems".

Measure of Punitiveness

Across the region, public opinion polls and newspaper headlines continue to reflect the sentiments of a populace that is being forced to adjust to the problem of crime and violence. One of the attitudes most consistently reported, found through research and mentioned by policy makers is support for the

death penalty. As reflected in media reports and in discussions, there is mounting advocacy for the readoption of the death penalty as a panacea across the region. This preference for severe penalty can be explained by rising crime rates and the politicization of crime.

As the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 shows, 63.2 percent of respondents across the region support the death penalty. The support is strongest in the six British Commonwealth countries. In the outlier, Suriname, only 35.7 percent of the respondents support the death penalty. This former colony of the Netherlands more closely reflects the position of the European Union in its rejection of the death penalty.

Caribbean citizens overwhelmingly support the death penalty. Politicians therefore tend to view support for the death penalty as a vote winner and continue to advocate for its return. The absence of the death penalty is seen by a majority among the populace, the police and politicians as an element in a permissive environment in which lawlessness and criminality are allowed to thrive.³¹ The majority Caribbean opinion matches that in other Commonwealth countries. A 2010 Angus Reid Global Monitor found that 62 percent of Canadians and 67 percent of British favour the death penalty for homicide convictions.³² The Angus Reid poll found that 84 percent of respondents in the United States favoured the death penalty for homicide. However, a review of information of the US Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that, between 1953 and 2010, the highest level of support for the death penalty in the United States was 80 percent in 1994. Since 2003, the support has been around 64 percent.³³

The extent to which the death sentence is possible varies across the Caribbean. Some countries have a *de facto* ban; others require constitutional reform to carry out executions; and some have not carried out an execution in more than 10 years. Many countries continue to pass sentences of death in anticipation of being eventually able to carry out the penalty. Trinidad and Tobago, however, successfully carried out executions in 1999 and is among countries pursuing constitutional reform to

facilitate sentences of death. A review of annual reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights shows that appeals have been lodged against sentences of death across the region.³⁴

The death penalty debate has resulted in a backlash against human rights in the region.³⁵ The perceptions of citizens on human rights have consequences for their respect for the rule of law. Across the region, citizens are aware of their human rights and responsibilities. Nonetheless, there is a perception that human rights activists protect criminals by constraining governments in their ability to use the death penalty to address the high homicide rates. As a result, civil society and NGOs concerned with human rights are sometimes unfairly accused of supporting criminals and neglecting victims.

Citizen support for punishment is also manifest in social tolerance for violations of the rights of others, as well as public opinion about the treatment of criminals by governments. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 asked respondents if they agreed that human rights are obstacles to more effective crime control. Across the Caribbean-7, about 43.2 percent of respondents agreed. This ranged from a low of 34.2 percent in Guyana to a high of 62.8 percent in Saint Lucia. With the exception of Saint Lucia, the extent of variation in the responses was fairly narrow. What accounts for the relatively high proportion of respondents from Saint Lucia who viewed human rights as an impediment to crime control? The most likely explanation is a recent outbreak of violent crime in Saint Lucia against which the government has indicated its intent to “get tough”.³⁶

Social Tolerance and Ideals of Justice

Overwhelmingly, survey respondents agreed with the statement, “criminals are a threat to our way of life” (83.3 percent); it is not surprising, then, that 82.9 percent agreed that criminals should be more harshly punished. However, respondents were less supportive of the police being given a free hand to kill criminal gunmen. Among respondents, 30 percent agreed, and 20 percent strongly agreed that it

is acceptable for police to break the law to control violent crime more effectively.

These responses should be viewed as opportunities for intervention. They indicate a high level of punitiveness, as well as a lack of support for the rule of law, but they also indicate that sections of the population are contemptuous of criminals and criminal behaviour. This opposition to criminality should be channelled into more law-regarding and socially constructive directions.

There is a disconnection in the support for human rights practice and the principle of the rule of law. Thus, there is advocacy for the harsher treatment of criminals, but citizens are less inclined to allow the police to break the law to control crime or kill gunmen. This finding mirrors the findings of Powell and Lewis (2011) in Jamaica, where there is strong support for the rule of law, but failings in the observance of civil and human rights in areas such as law enforcement and prison systems, in the increasing incidence of vigilante attacks, and in the excessive and sometimes deadly use of force by the police in their treatment of offenders.

In general, Caribbean societies have been judged to possess a strong belief in basic rules and values of democracy, especially the right to due process, respect for the rule of law, the defence of civil liberties and the political freedom of citizens. Nonetheless, as the dissatisfaction of citizens with escalating crime rates grows, more people are registering support for undemocratic alternatives such as a willingness to support the police in the violation of rights.

Support for the rule of law is a crucial component of democracy. Where the security situation has deteriorated, support for the rule of law has also declined. Crime victimization and the perception of insecurity both negatively impact the level of support for the rule of law.³⁷ Indeed, as more citizens experience crime and the level of insecurity and fear increases, citizen attitudes towards the rule of law has become cavalier, thus increasing the willingness to accommodate violations. Consequently, high crime rates have the potential of jeopardizing democracy directly and indirectly, and support for the rule of law can be

eroded by fear of crime and victimization, as well as by contempt for individual rights.

Across the Caribbean-7, 14.3 percent of the respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 supported the use of dons as agents of crime control.³⁸ That more than 1 person in 10 support a phenomenon that is confined to socially excluded communities indicates the extent to which some citizens have lost confidence in the government. Endorsement of informal social control mechanisms, including vigilante justice, is also an indicator of the erosion of the rule of law and the perception of the state's weak capacity to provide protection.

The survey contained one question about the level of agreement of respondents with a policy that would allow citizens easier access to firearms to reduce crime. Across the Caribbean-7, only about 17.9 percent of the respondents agreed. (The range was from 6.6 percent in Barbados to 25.9 percent in Suriname.) Allowing people to arm themselves in the name of crime prevention does not appear to be a favoured policy option in the Caribbean.

The extent to which a society is viewed as just is integral to perceptions of security. Justice encompasses economic practices, cultural attitudes, and social and personal relationships, privileges and networks.³⁹ Across the Caribbean-7, 40.0 percent of the respondents felt their societies are fundamentally unjust.⁴⁰ Also, 52.5 percent of the respondents indicated that politically connected criminals are likely to go free; 47 percent felt that powerful criminals are likely to go free; and 41.8 percent reported that suspects who are poor are not likely to be treated fairly. This captures the sense of unfairness people are perceiving. Regionwide, only 34.2 percent of the respondents rated the courts fair, although one person in four believes the courts are more fair today than they were five years ago.

Meanwhile, 43 percent of the respondents perceived society as fundamentally law-abiding. A law-abiding society is one in which citizens voluntarily defer to legal authority and adherence to laws regardless of a police presence or absence or a threat or lack of sanctions by the courts. It reflects a general belief in the

legitimacy of the law; rule breakers are in the minority. The view that a society is just is an expression of an attitude towards and confidence in the justice system; the view that a society is law-abiding is an expression of an attitude towards and confidence in the citizens.

Differential police treatment, perceptions of partiality in the application of the law, or politicians who act without regard for their responsibilities can create an impression of a society that is fundamentally unjust. Consequently, an effective police force and confidence in the criminal justice system are essential for creating the perception of a society as fundamentally just and for safeguarding the rule of law. As insecurity increases, citizens more willingly endorse greater levels of rights violations, including support for authoritarian measures. Thus, confidence in criminal


justice institutions, particularly in the police, is an important precursor of citizen security.

Public Opinion on Mechanisms for Preventing and Controlling Crime

Two survey questions measured the views of respondents towards military involvement in crime control regionwide (chart 6.4). First, the survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the idea that “only a military government can effectively combat crime”. Across the Caribbean-7, only about 15.3 percent of the respondents agreed. The range was from 9.7 percent in Barbados to 23.5 percent in Jamaica. These rather low levels of agreement, with only minor variations across countries, show that Caribbean citizens are not in favour of establishing military governments to facilitate crime control.

Chart 6.4

Respondents Who Agree the Military Should Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “In order to reduce crime, the government should rely more on the military.” “Only a military government can effectively control crime.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree” or “Agree”.

The second question in this area assessed the support of respondents for reliance on the military to help control crime. Across the Caribbean-7, about 43.5 percent of the respondents agreed that government should rely more on the military to reduce crime. The range was from a low of 25.5 percent in Barbados to a high of 65.1 percent in Jamaica. Overall, only about two citizens in five in the Caribbean-7 appear to view the military as an option for crime control.

Here, the pattern of outliers at the upper end of the distribution is a little clearer. The two nations with the highest homicide rates, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, also show the highest level of citizen support for military involvement in reducing crime. We envision several explanations for this finding.

First, in both nations, there appears to be a common sentiment that the police and other criminal justice agencies are unable to keep up with the challenges of fighting crime, particularly violent crime carried out by street gangs and organized crime groups. Second, since none of these nations are currently at war, the military is likely perceived as a slack resource that is on the payroll, armed and ready to deploy at a moment's notice. Third, in nations in which the armed forces are viewed with significantly more confidence than the police, the military may be viewed as a more viable option for containing crime and violence.

The last explanation above is supported by scattered evidence from public opinion polls conducted in four nations: Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Thus, a 2005 opinion survey in Trinidad and Tobago found that 26 percent of respondents had "a lot of faith" in the armed forces, a figure second only to the church among the 14 institutions listed. By comparison, only 13 percent of the respondents had a lot of faith in police or judges.⁴¹ A 2010 opinion survey carried out in Jamaica examined public trust in 11 institutions. On a scale with a potential range of 0 to 100, the army came in first, with a score of 65.9. The Supreme Court ranked fourth, with a score of 51.3; and the police ranked last, with a score of 32.6.⁴² A 2010 opinion survey in Guyana asked respondents to indi-

cate the extent to which they trusted 15 institutions.⁴³ Among the 15, the defence forces ranked second; the Supreme Court, third; the attorney general, fifth; the justice system, ninth; and the police force, fourteenth. Finally, a 2010 opinion survey in Suriname asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they trusted 16 institutions.⁴⁴ Among these, the armed forces ranked fifth; the Court of Justice, sixth; the attorney general, seventh; and the police, ninth. In every case in which we were able to find opinion data ranking the degree of trust in institutions, the military ranked higher than the components of the justice system (excluding the police), which outranked the police.

A loss of confidence in criminal justice institutions may lead to greater support for military involvement in crime control. However, the militarization of policing raises concerns about the suspension of personal rights in support of crime control, fears about due process guarantees and questions about the erosion of democratic values. Citizen support for military involvement in crime control signals a weakness in criminal justice institutions that ought therefore to be remedied by consistent reform efforts.

Despite a general lack of confidence in and criticism of the criminal justice system across the Caribbean-7, respondents were in support of building capacity in the police: 74.8 percent agreed that the government should invest more in the police force (chart 6.5). However, there was a 25 percentage point difference between the regional average and the share in Suriname, where there is a perception that the police have been more effective at the community and country levels in the last few years.


Except for Barbados and Saint Lucia, which have new correctional facilities, overcrowding and the condition of prisons remain a regional problem. Nonetheless, in the Caribbean-7, investment in prisons is among the crime control options that is less well supported: only 26.7 percent of the survey respondents agreed that this option was a priority (chart 6.5). The outliers are Barbados, at 11.7 percent, and Guyana, at 40.9 percent. Built in 2007, Dodds prison in Barbados has a capacity of 1,250 and was

Chart 6.5

Citizen Support for Institution Building in Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010

6

State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "In order to reduce crime, the government should build more prisons." "In order to reduce the crime rate, the government should invest more in the police force/service." "In order to reduce the crime rate, the government should invest more in reducing corruption." The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Strongly agree" or "Agree".

designed to meet modern international standards. The 2010 Human Rights Report on Guyana identifies deteriorating prison conditions and overcrowding as major issues.⁴⁵

According to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, public sector corruption is at a high level across the region. Although the ranking of each country surveyed in the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2009 and 2010 improved, Barbados is the only CARICOM country ranking above 5 on a scale from 1 ('highly corrupt') to 10 ('very clean').⁴⁶

Among the crime control responses advocated by survey respondents, there was overwhelming support for reduction in corruption: 86.1 percent across the Caribbean-7. Jamaica, which registered the highest support for corruption reduction, was also the only country in which respondents said that corruption was among the top three national problems.⁴⁷

Despite increasing levels of insecurity, the response was unambiguous nationwide that

the problem of crime can be contained. Less than 30 percent of the respondents felt that nothing could be done about crime.


Balancing Crime Prevention and Crime Control

Commensurate with the optimism about the possibility of turning around the crime environment was general support for social intervention through education initiatives, youth programmes, job creation, poverty reduction, and programmes for the urban poor (chart 6.6; see also chart 5.2).

The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 demonstrates that, despite the ambiguities in public opinion, support for crime prevention policies such as increased investment in education, youth development, job creation and poverty reduction is fairly universal across the Caribbean-7. Although there are minor fluctuations among respondents across nations, the level of support for these initiatives is strong in every country: an average of 89.9

Chart 6.6

Support for Investment in Social Interventions as a Means of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010



Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: "In order to reduce the crime rate, the government should invest more in education." "In order to reduce the crime rate, the government should invest more in programmes for young people." "In order to reduce the crime rate, the government should invest more in job creation." "In order to reduce crime, the government should invest more in the communities of the urban poor." "In order to reduce crime, the government should invest more in reducing poverty." The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered "Strongly agree" or "Agree".

percent of the survey respondents favour such approaches.

According to a popular view, people are either tough on crime or soft on crime. The evidence presented above suggests that this view is overly simplistic and does not capture the reality of people's opinions on crime prevention and crime control in the Caribbean. For instance, on average, 89.9 percent of the survey respondents endorsed soft crime prevention approaches such as increased funding for education, youth programmes, job creation and poverty reduction. Yet, at the same time, 82.9 percent believe criminals should be

punished more harshly. Thus, citizens do not appear to view crime prevention and crime control as an either-or proposition. They want governments to do both.

The Implications of Policy Responses

The findings of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 show that, despite a desire to see perpetrators punished, citizens also expressed strong support for methods that emphasize social intervention. Meanwhile, the public outcry over the problem of rising crime has elicited rhetoric and legislation from the political directorate that too often ignores the social conditions that facilitate crime. Furthermore, even as the region has embraced crime control policies, these policies have generally had little long-term impact in reducing crime rates.⁴⁸ Some gaps in legislation, such as laws to control organized crime more effectively, need to be filled and have been filled by some countries. However, rather than addressing the crime problem in more profound ways, the policies serve mainly to calm public anxieties, to reassure the public that steps are being taken and to win public support for the policies.⁴⁹

For example, in several instances, political campaigns have rallied populations in the region with promises to facilitate the death penalty largely to appease public concern, with scarce regard for the many constraints that would limit the implementation of such a policy. The incidence of crime and the public's fear of crime have been so overwhelming that governments have been pressed to declare policies on crime and punishment without much concern for policy coherence or long-term effectiveness. Political exigencies of the day and the need to show quick results have often dictated policy initiatives. A review of party manifestos and electoral campaign information shows that, across the region, crime features prominently (box 6.3).

Beyond making campaign declarations, however, Caribbean states have also addressed the crime issue by legislative means. As above, the legislation is often more symbolic than substantive in its effects. Jamaica's passage of six anti-crime bills in 2010 (see the section *Explaining the Policy Shift* above), for

Box 6.3. Manifesto of the Democratic Labour Party, Barbados, 2008

Royal Barbados Police Force

- Provide better remuneration for police officers
- Improve or build new police stations in designated areas
- Permit the police force to function free of political interference
- Increase the ranks in the police force and create more promotion opportunities
- Upgrade the government forensic sciences centre to help solve outstanding crimes and restore confidence in law enforcement agencies

Barbados Defence Force

- Expand the career prospects, training opportunities, and counselling and welfare services available to all ranks
- Develop a scheme of resettlement training for persons leaving the force

- Review and simplify the procedures dealing with pensions
- Provide new options within the pension plan for soldiers that would allow better provision to be made for the surviving spouse of a soldier who dies after retirement
- Improve the intelligence and security information-gathering capabilities of the Barbados Defence Force and forge closer ties with the Royal Barbados Police Force

Social Services

- Convert Glendairy Prison into a modern, publicly funded drug treatment and rehabilitation centre

Address the following issues

- The trade in illegal drugs
- Escalating crime and violence
- The threat of terrorism
- Preparation for and appropriate response to natural disasters

Source: Extracted from 'Law and Order', DLP (2008, 49).

example, conforms to this practice. Thus, notwithstanding concerns about their constitutionality, the bills were passed on the premise that there was a need to “get on top of this crime problem” and that desperate times call for desperate measures.⁵⁰ However, less than a year later, the constitutional court entirely struck down one bill and revised most of the provisions of a second, while a third, the Constabulary Force (Interim Provisions for Arrest and Detention) Act of 2010, expired, thus requiring an extension.⁵¹

While not every policy initiative met this fate, the emphasis on crime control indirectly reinforced the primary causes of crime in certain instances. Indeed, research on the effectiveness of crime control measures across the region discloses worrisome aspects of the policy process that has led to a number of unhelpful policy outcomes.

First, the policy process often caters to the public attentiveness and understanding of punishment. Within the Caribbean context, crime is increasingly used to mobilize the populace to support state programmes. However, the public is not always fully informed about the issues. In a region where policy re-

form is on the agenda and where complimentary initiatives, including social interventions, are increasingly regarded as part of the policy mix, appealing to the emotions of the public may prove counter-productive.

Second, because of continuing pressures to respond to public anxieties about crime, the policy process tends to produce ‘feel good’ anti-crime initiatives. Such measures offer little substantive hope of addressing the root causes of crime and thus permanently reducing crime.

An unfortunate outcome of excessive reliance on symbolic reassurances is a growing disconnect between the expressed policies and actual programme implementation. This implementation gap can cause the public to lose faith in the effectiveness of crime policy.

Bold declarations such as ones on the death penalty imply that perpetrators will be apprehended swiftly and promptly adjudicated and sentenced. However, because of constraints and shortcomings in judicial systems, the clearance rate for serious crimes is generally low and alarmingly low for homicide. Because these constraints are hardly ever mentioned in the cut and thrust of public debate

on crime, militant advocacy for delivering harsh punishment to perpetrators invariably founders on the state's organizational inability to deliver the promised results.

Third, within the democratic countries of the Caribbean, police personnel have been identified as major violators of human rights. Despite such vulnerabilities regarding the lack of respect for rights, legislation and anti-crime policies still depend on a heavy police presence in the streets matched by tough anti-crime rhetoric. This has increased concerns about the violation of rights and poses a significant challenge to the struggle for social justice.

Fourth, the police disregard of the rights of suspects highlights a related problem: the insufficiently robust protection of human rights by governments. Despite an admirable record of political democracy, the region has been faulted by international human rights agencies for neglecting these rights. Indeed, for the Caribbean as a whole, the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices have called attention to the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life, as well as police killings, as the primary violation of human rights within the region.⁵² In the Jamaican case, the United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, arbitrary and summary executions noted an apparent "section of influential public opinion that sanctified every action by the police, regardless of its violent dimensions, on the grounds that the first priority is to wipe out crime."⁵³ In this regard, Belur (2010) points out that police officers are more likely to use force if they perceive a social consensus supporting police use of deadly force to eliminate 'criminals'.

The high incidence of extrajudicial killings in the region emphasize the risks associated with simultaneously trying to control crime, while assuring social justice. Crime fighting in the Caribbean has involved securing the former at the expense of the latter. Achieving justice for the population at large is difficult in such circumstances, but social justice remains even more elusive for vulnerable persons who experience discrimination and socio-economic inequities. This lack of respect for rights has raised concerns across the region and in

the international community. The concerns are evident, for example, in the submission on Jamaica of the United Nations special rapporteur, who recommends that police be more well trained so as to reduce extrajudicial killings.⁵⁴

Fifth, because of activism on behalf of human rights in the region, there is a perception among the public that the criminal justice system is skewed in favour of protecting suspects and defendants rather than the victims of crime. This weak public support for the rights of defendants also creates an environment in which the police may feel that they have public support for violating the rights of criminal suspects.

Sixth, because of the region's overemphasis on law enforcement, social interventions have been given minimal attention in the fight against crime. However, this imbalance in policy-making in favour of the law enforcement approach has not reduced violent crime to a level that might be considered a normal range or closer to the world average. This shortcoming suggests the need not only for more social interventions, but also for a careful assessment that looks at the policy mix in terms of effectiveness in reducing crime.

Seventh, crime control initiatives are usually tailored to suppressing violent crime, and this bias has sometimes compromised the physical safety of citizens and the region's democratic ideals. Coupled with the tough stance on crime and the zero tolerance approaches, this bias poses significant challenges to the struggle for social justice, as well as human rights. Thus, not addressing the tension between the norms of social justice and the dictates of law enforcement efficiency appropriately generates problems in protecting physical safety and democratic ideals.

Eighth, crime and criminal victimization are social ills that also threaten the basic human rights of citizens. This is particularly so among socially excluded communities across the region where citizens are criminally victimized by groups that act with impunity because of weak criminal justice institutions.

These citizens are doubly victimized: first, by the neglect of the state, which results in

social exclusion and marginalization, and, then, by confinement in environments that are significantly underdeveloped. The social conditions in many of these environments create vulnerabilities to victimization by both the state and criminally inclined members of society. This illustrates how the lack of appropriate interventions by the state can facilitate disparate outcomes. Transitioning to citizen security therefore requires critical, but constructive assessments of public policy and systematic evaluations of programmes to produce more effective policy outcomes.

Crime policy should reflect an awareness of the complex determinants that influence the commission of crime and the sense of insecurity felt by citizens. Citizen insecurity is one consequence of the state's inability to cope with the challenges facing society in general. Therefore, central to the transition to greater citizen security is the need to make institutions more responsible and accountable. The need for advocacy for institutional reform is adequately covered elsewhere in this report. The emphasis here is on the state's capacity to effect the transformation to more well integrated societies and to adopt social crime prevention measures that are linked to sound development policy.

State Capacity and Citizen Security

Capacity is established in an enabling environment that sets the scope for development. Criminal violence disrupts development. Consequently, the quality of life that Caribbean citizens enjoy and the sense of security they possess depend on the effectiveness of state institutions in dealing with crime and violence. This effectiveness is dependent, in turn, on the adequacy of the state's resources, the competence of its personnel and the possession of an institutional culture oriented to ongoing improvements in delivering quality public goods to citizens.

The more resources, competence and positive institutional culture a state enjoys, the more capacity it possesses. A lack of these advantages weakens the state's ability to function effectively. The capacity of the state is,

meanwhile, integral to citizen security. Citizens are likely to feel not only secure, but also to have confidence in a state that includes the safety of the public and respect for the rights of citizens among its central goals and establishes relevant laws, personnel, procedures and infrastructure to achieve these goals.

To reduce the risk of victimization and restore a sense of security among citizens will require building material infrastructure and normative and technical capacities in weak institutions. Weak institutions include the primary socialization institutions, such as the home and school, and the criminal justice system: the police, the courts and correction facilities.

Enhancing the capacity of Caribbean states to foster an environment free of fear and want among citizens requires policies that shore up human development resources, material infrastructure and normative and technical capabilities in criminal justice systems. Improvements in state capacity can enable the region to achieve progress towards the goal of citizen security.

Several Caribbean states are making strides in these areas. Guyana, for example, has created commissions charged with protecting human rights and the rights of ethnic communities. Equally important for capacity development has been the introduction of citizen bills of rights and the adoption of civil service reform measures throughout the region.

However, more needs to be done. The human, political, social and economic costs of crime and violence are high, and the institutional capacity to achieve citizen security is weak. Insecurity, especially violence, continues to erode the economic landscape. The economic impact of crime has been estimated at 5 to 25 percent of GDP, while every three years that a country is affected by major violence represent a 2.7 percentage point potential loss in poverty reduction.⁵⁵

Institutional Capacity

With some exceptions, the public security problems identified in the region have been attributed at least in part to inadequate train-

ing among police personnel. A well-trained, efficient and effective police force is necessary to address crime. The efficiency and effectiveness of crime policy are impacted by the scope of police responsibilities. In some jurisdictions, the scope is wide-ranging; in others, policy and operational mandates have been separated. In some jurisdictions, there is no independent police oversight authority, and, in others where it exists, the effectiveness of oversight has been minimal.

Moreover, across the region, the continuation of colonial era practices associated with disrespectful treatment of citizens has contributed to a general distrust of the police among citizens. Consequently, regionwide, there is advocacy for police reform to confront the organizational weaknesses that are hindering the ability of the police to meet their responsibilities.

Caribbean states have responded to calls for changes in law enforcement by undertaking reform in police forces. States across the region have been modernizing their police forces, attempting to establish a culture of professionalism and enhancing the institutional capabilities of the police. However, regionwide, there is also a need to equip the police to address issues such as extrajudicial killings, which are contributing to citizen insecurity and vulnerability. The efficiency and effectiveness of the police have a positive impact on the performance of other agencies in the criminal justice system, the confidence of citizens and the willingness of citizens to contribute to and participate in the judicial process.

Caribbean courts must also be reformed. Within the courts, capacity development involves establishing procedures to achieve speedy trials without compromising the rights of citizens, while the correctional arm ought to have the capacity to implement a range of options in addressing violations of the law. However, the region suffers from a shortage of personnel, out-of-date systems, and inadequacies in case management technologies. Not all jurisdictions have alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, separate specialty courts, a choice across sentencing

provisions, or a culture of mediation. Police and justice sector reform processes have been designed to rectify these problems or fill these gaps.

Except in Barbados and Saint Lucia, which have new facilities, correctional facilities are overcrowded and in various stages of disrepair. They require new programmes to ensure the successful reintegration of released prisoners into society. Capacity development in the correctional system should improve the ability of personnel to promote rehabilitation among former inmates and, hence, reduce recidivism and other negative outcomes. Progress is being made in this area in countries in which restorative justice and rehabilitation policies have been introduced.

The shift towards policies more favourable to rehabilitation began with changes in 1975, when components of the correctional system in Jamaica were reorganized into the Department of Correctional Services. This reform altered the emphasis on punishment and adopted rehabilitation as a mandate. Several laws were amended or newly implemented, including the Criminal Justice Reform Act (1978) and the Criminal Records (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act (1988). The former also made provision for alternatives to incarceration.⁵⁶

In short, several states across the region have moved successfully in recent years to implement policies that add to their capacity in ways that enhance citizen security. More needs to be done, however, in strengthening capacity. This requires a combination of approaches, including building the capacity for development by adopting social crime prevention measures, as identified by respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Building the Human Capacity for Development

Policies that generate more inequality result in marginalized groups and less cohesive populations and societies. Lack of respect for human rights, institutional discrimination and neglect of citizen security undermine the capacity for the development of populations and nations. Governments must be alerted to

these problems and issues so that they can establish sound, sustainable and holistically imagined development plans to promote more well integrated societies.

Sustainable human development may be achieved more readily if the structure, policies and procedures that help determine effectiveness are deliberately pursued and if individuals are provided with the skills, experience and knowledge that allow them to exercise their capabilities. This approach to human development presupposes a population that is empowered, secure, treated fairly, and provided with opportunities to participate and cooperate in the quest for the full exercise of human capability. As UNDP makes clear, eliminating poverty, expanding access to education and creating meaningful employment are critical to sustainable human development.

Since independence, the Caribbean has realized improvements in health, education, infrastructure and other areas. However, these advances are being challenged by inequality and social deprivation. Recent global trends have also stalled development. Assessments show that the region's progress towards the Millennium Development Goals has been uneven.⁵⁷

Two factors impeding the spread and potential for economic growth and development across the region are inequality in the distribution of income and wealth and the high rates of income and non-income poverty. First, income poverty, which is related to economic deprivation, is based on the inability of a household to access the resources required to maintain a basic standard of living. Inability to meet this standard is typically measured based on income by assigning an indigence poverty line of US\$1 per day and an absolute poverty line of US\$2 per day. Second, non-income or non-economic poverty refers to individual or group loss of self-esteem, lack of confidence and lack of access to political power and other public goods. This deficit in social and public power is an important indicator of material deprivation.⁵⁸

Policy awareness and appropriate policy design in this domain can make a difference in outcomes. The most highly effective poli-

cies and programmes should address individual risks and environmental conditions. To be successful, violence prevention strategies must be targeted to specific developmental stages and ecological contexts and must be based on evidence.⁵⁹ Tightly focused programmes to address the marginalization of the urban poor and the problem of youth unemployment are crucial.

However, because the Caribbean response to crime and violence has been centred predominantly on law enforcement, the rehabilitative policies and social interventionist measures that could be used to address the problems of unemployed youth have been minimized. As emphasized by numerous research findings and the experiences of many countries in all regions, states cannot arrest their way out of the problem of crime, violence and citizen insecurity. Policies to address the complex causes of insecurity should recognize the immediate manifestations of crime and violence, while reducing the likelihood of future recurrence. It is also important to achieve this end without diminishing individual rights and freedoms.

Much can be done to reduce violence among youth. A broad range of viable strategies for preventing and reducing youth violence already exist and have been tested. For example, social and developmental crime prevention efforts are most effective if the intervention occurs early and if multiple interventions can be sustained. Social factors that work to reduce crime include the attachment, commitment and involvement of males in supportive networks and in local community institutions especially when these young people are in their crime-prone years. Interventions that may reduce the incidence of crime include providing youth with education and employment and recognizing their need for justice and equity, including by addressing the perception that 'they don't care about us', a sentiment poignantly captured in Horace Levy's (1996) book, *They Cry Respect!*

Across the region, crime and violence occur mainly in urban areas and are mainly expressed as male-on-male violence. However, the confinement of the violence to poor ur-

Box 6.4. Inner City Basic Services for the Poor, Jamaica

Background

The Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project was financed through a World Bank loan and was implemented by the Jamaica Social Investment Fund. It was a five-year programme (May 2006–June 2011) and had a budget of US\$32.8 million.

Programme Design

The programme's objective was to improve the quality of life in 12 Jamaican inner-city areas and poor urban informal settlements through the following:

- Increase access to and improve the quality of water, sanitation, solid waste collection systems, electricity, roads, drainage and related community infrastructure for over 60,000 residents of poor urban informal settlements through capital investments and innovative arrangements for operations and maintenance; infrastructure work was intended to reflect principles of crime prevention through an environmental design approach (US\$21.9 million)
- Facilitate access to microfinance for enterprise development and incremental home improvements among entrepreneurs and residents in the project areas (US\$1.3 million)
- Increase security of tenure for eligible households in the project areas (US\$0.6 million)
- Enhance public safety through mediation services, com-

munity capacity development, skills training and related social services (US\$3.9 million)

The final objective on public safety was divided into five core social prevention areas, as follows:

- Mediation and conflict resolution
- Alternative livelihoods and skills development
- Family support programmes
- Youth education and recreation
- Capacity development among community-based organizations

The project relied on community liaison officers in each target community; these were generally of high quality and established good relationships with the communities in which they worked.

Impact on Security and Crime Reduction

The removal of zinc fences in one community was a visible infrastructure intervention with a potential impact on crime and violence. The zinc fences were targeted for removal to reduce barriers between community members and increase security. According to one child, "gunmen used to hide behind the fences, but now they can't." A community leader commented that removing the fences "has given the community a moral lift". The contrast in the look and feel of the streets where the zinc fences have been removed and streets in which the fences have not been removed was surprising and stark to survey team members.

Source: Extracted from 'Law and Order', DLP (2008, 49).

ban neighbourhoods and to males has done little to reduce the sense of insecurity that pervades the entire society. The regional problem of crime and violence requires a range of responses, including socio-economic measures.

Such measures include enabling the sustained economic participation of youth. They must be able to obtain meaningful work at liveable wages. If this economic participation is to be sustained over the long run, a stable formal economy that facilitates job creation and increased employment opportunities will have to be established. However, recent developments in the global economy have weakened Caribbean economies and, thus, the prospects for jobless youth.

Over the past two decades, socio-economic constraints, including mounting domestic debt, have contributed to the growth of inequality across the region. Wage controls, price increases, layoffs, cutbacks in government spending, and unemployment and underemployment have all contributed to social inequality in the region. The brunt of this economic hardship has been borne by vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, especially jobless youth who often experience higher relative rates of poverty.

Relative deprivation and the inequality it represents may increase the risk of criminality among jobless youth, particularly in contexts in which the dignity of the youth is impugned. However, the relationship between inequal-

ity and crime is often indirect. The propensity to commit crimes may be enhanced if it is accompanied by poverty, social isolation and marginalization. Robotham (2003), discussing the Jamaican environment, has characterized the issue in the following manner: the persistence and increase in inequality, accompanied by severe impoverishment among the majority, along with their sense that elite wealth represents ill-gotten gain, are risk factors for crime and need to be addressed.

Caribbean states are aware of these issues, and governments in the region have taken steps to address them. Various approaches to crime prevention from which these governments can draw include social crime prevention that is focused on socio-economic factors, community crime prevention that targets the local community and situational crime prevention strategies that try to alter the environment to reduce the physical opportunities for offending and increase the chance of an offender being caught. Each approach embodies different assumptions about the causes of crime. Situational approaches assume that reduction can be effected through changes in the immediate situation in which offenses occur. Another, the social development approach, assumes that crime is reduced by changing the offender's disposition, motive, knowledge and skills. The assumption is that personal development reduces the propensity to commit crime.

Development and social crime prevention work in tandem. Thus, relevant social programmes address the social causes of delinquency and criminality. Models of social de-

velopment might have components addressing sub-standard housing and low levels of family income and education. They might involve improved urban amenities, projects to foster social inclusion and reduce risk factors, and programmes to improve access to the justice system. An example is the five-year Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project (box 6.4).

Youth Unemployment and Social Prevention

The crime prevention strategy must deal with the problem of youth unemployment. Regionwide, youth typically exhibit low labour force participation rates; young women show lower labour force participation rates than young men (table 6.2).

The problem of unemployment in the Caribbean is complex because of the large numbers of long-term unemployed and because most unemployed youth are clustered at the bottom of the labour market in low- or semi-skilled work. Unemployed youth in the Caribbean also tend to be poorly educated and have only rudimentary levels of literacy and numeracy. These disadvantages lead to chronic unemployment and underemployment and increase the propensity for crime among the young. Thus, programmes to address youth unemployment must include education as a core dimension. This is required to give youth the basic literacy they need and upgrade the group from their low- or semi-skilled profile to a higher skill set that will enable them to move into well-paying jobs.

Across the region, governments have acknowledged the need to make distinctions

Table 6.2. Youth Labour Force Participation Rates, by Gender, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000–2015: History, Estimates and Projections

Indicator	2000	2010 (estimate)	2015 (projection)
Total	54.2	52.1	51.4
Male	66.5	61.3	59.3
Female	41.7	42.7	43.5

Source: ILO (2010).

Box 6.5. Special Youth Employment and Training Project, Jamaica

Aim: To train and employ 10,000 unskilled youth over the course of four years

Target: Young people 18 to 25 years old

Implementing partners: The HEART Trust/National Training Agency screens and assesses candidates. The Jamaica Foundation for Lifelong Learning provides training in basic numeracy and literacy skills. Around 25 private sector companies have committed to the programme so far.

Source: Extracted from 'Law and Order', DLP (2008, 49).

The Barbados Youth Business Trust has continued to grow, and the network was able to support over 8,500 new entrepreneurs during 2009 through our proven model of access to credit, volunteer mentors and business start-up services.

—Andrew Devenport, Chief Executive Officer, Youth Business International (BYBT 2011)

among youth who are underemployed or employed in low-skilled jobs and youth who have never worked. They have also recognized the challenge of restructuring the education system to take into account people who have left school, but are in need of numeracy and literacy skills. The Special Youth Employment and Training Project in Jamaica is an example of a programme that seeks to address crime and education together (box 6.5). Employment programmes also exist that are geared to youth who are neither in school nor working.

The Youth Business Trust operates in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. As a youth development agency, it focuses on helping unemployed youth start new businesses. It has been in existence in Barbados since 1996. In Barbados, it is an extension of the focus of the government and other stakeholders on entrepreneurship as a growth strategy for the country.

There are also regional programmes, such as the Commonwealth Youth Programme,

that address youth development issues. The Commonwealth Youth Programme assists governments in developing and implementing programmes, supports youth and acts as a repository for information on youth.

The strategic importance of youth to the development of the Caribbean is also evident in a number of recent reports, including 'Eye on the Future: Investing in Youth Now for Tomorrow's Community', a 2010 report by the CARICOM Commission on Youth Development; the UNICEF 2006 regional assessment, 'Violence against Children in the Caribbean'; and the 2003 World Bank report, 'Caribbean Youth Development: Issues and Policy Directions'.⁶⁰

As the foregoing account of state interventions in the area of youth programming attest, Caribbean states share a growing concern about the importance of youth to the region's future. In addition to being signatories to international conventions on youth, all countries have established ministries or departments with responsibility for youth. Similarly, a range of governmental, non-governmental and civil society organizations also provide programmes for youth. Still, because many youth-related programmes have not been evaluated, the extent of their effectiveness cannot be verified. Nonetheless, programmes exist in various thematic areas such as education, training and skill development, community sports and leisure, national youth services, national youth councils, and micro-enterprise development. Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, has recently announced a special commission to examine youth issues. In Jamaica, the problem has been more acute and prolonged and, hence, has benefited from more plans and programmes.

As the *World Development Report 2011* highlights, significant social stresses and weak institutions increase the risk of violence.⁶¹ States with weak institutions run the greatest risk of extreme levels of criminal violence.

Governmental capacity to implement social and development policies is affected by a range of issues. Capacity is limited in some instances, and, in others, there are blockages.

Across the Caribbean, obstacles to capacity development and, thus, to a transition towards citizen security are governance related. Among the practices identified by respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 that impede governmental capacity are corruption, lack of respect for the rule of law, and the absence of a just and rights-observing society. Among the requirements for capacity development are competent and well-resourced institutions, leadership, access to knowledge, and public accountability.

In general, Caribbean states have enacted measures that both empower citizens and make governments more accountable. However, there is still a high level of corruption. Mechanisms for addressing corruption include systems of accountability and people participation. Among other responses, this has involved the appointment of ombudsmen to address public complaints, the introduction of anti-

corruption legislation and, in Jamaica, the appointment of a contractor general to look into the awarding of contracts (box. 6.6).

Despite the handicaps, there are hopeful signs, including the public support for social and developmental crime prevention measures. The region's leaders have shown a willingness to pursue alternative policies. Among these alternatives are integrative policy responses that are multisectoral, regional and international in scope. Nonetheless, the key to effective crime prevention is implementation at the local government level.

Moreover, developing the capacity for good governance requires participatory and transparent systems that are consensus oriented and respect the rule of law.⁶² This means that the decision-making environment must include the voices of all categories of citizens and that there must be a free flow of information, aided by a free media.

Box 6.6. Anti-Corruption: The National Integrity Action Forum, Jamaica

Character, Objective, Achievements

The National Integrity Action Forum was launched in January 2009 to promote more effective outcomes in combating corruption in Jamaica. Towards this end, it seeks to provide a mutually reinforcing network of public sector anti-corruption champions and to associate these champions with leaders of the private sector and civil society through forums on anti-corruption issues. The forums have achieved an initial purpose by clarifying the impediments to a more effective engagement with corruption and, on this basis, developing an agenda of urgently needed legislative and administrative measures. Several outreach forums have been held to open a dialogue between the anti-corruption champions and opinion shapers in the media, religious leaders, researchers in various anti-corruption agencies, and international experts at the World Bank Institute and Transparency International. The advocacy and communication activity that has emerged from this effort has significantly influenced the governance reform agenda of the government, helped sustain the attention of the media on corruption issues and contributed to reductions in victimization through corruption in Jamaica.

The National Integrity Action Forum has also commissioned and produced training manuals, including 'Best Practices in Prosecuting Anti-Corruption Cases' and 'Strengthening Jamaica's Conflict of Interest Regime'.

The organization's lobbying and advocacy have contributed to legislative initiatives such as the passage of the Whistle Blower Protection Act.

The Future

To sustain its network within the highly competitive political environment in Jamaica, the forum has established and maintained its non-partisanship in all areas of its activity. For this reason, because of its ties to the public sector, the forum decided to create a companion non-profit NGO, National Integrity Action Limited. The purpose of this NGO is to build public awareness of the need to combat corruption in Jamaica. National Integrity Action Limited does this by enhancing the advocacy for effective anti-corruption legislation, by facilitating capacity-building through training aimed primarily at key anti-corruption officials, and by building relationships with civil society.

Together, the National Integrity Action Forum and National Integrity Action Limited are challenging political corruption and its impunity in Jamaica's governance arrangements.

Source: Information from the National Integrity Action Forum, University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.

There is also the need to strengthen policy-making capacity in national security institutions and youth and education ministries and other ministries that have portfolios involving youth and, by extension, crime and crime control.

Capacity development is the engine of human development and necessary for sustainable (long-term) change. UNDP (2009b, 5) defines capacity development as “the process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time.”

The goal of governance initiatives should be to encourage the capacities that are needed to realize development.⁶³ Hence, it is important to promote state and societal capacities to implement strategies that minimize the impact of impediments to development, including crime and violence.

While crime prevention as a distinct policy focus has been part of the region’s policy landscape for more than a decade, there has been an evident implementation deficit. Thus, advocacy for prevention as a core component of a policy framework for transitioning to citizen security should call for funding for the design, implementation and evaluation of relevant policies and initiatives.

Central to successful transformation are consensus-building, financial support, public support and coordination mechanisms. Because of the impact of violence on development, the reestablishment of security can lead to significant development progress. The time to start is now.

Conclusion

Transitioning to citizen security requires a change in thinking about the security issues in the region. Innovation and change typically occur in times of crisis or after a long period of difficulties. In the absence of such conditions, innovative proposals often do not gain serious consideration or may be vigorously opposed. Thus, the transition to citizen security, though necessary, will need policy entrepreneurs who are interested in seeking to achieve long-term outcomes rather than short-term gains.

A shift to social prevention has occurred at the level of ideas, but this is not sufficiently reflected in planning, programmes and budget support. There must be more meaningful engagement and prioritization. The network of policy actors must be strengthened to reflect more meaningfully the support for social and developmental crime prevention.

As the evidence in this report indicates, citizens are optimistic and hold positive views about the transition to greater citizen security. They have identified social interventions that can significantly propel the shift to citizen security, and they are willing to be engaged. There is considerable optimism that social intervention can make significant inroads into the incidence of crime and violence. There is a sense that change is possible and that there is a capacity for change. In policy parlance, a policy window has been opened. It is time to undertake the transition to a safer, more just Caribbean society.



CHAPTER

7

Conclusions and Recommendations

**Security thrives when
communities bond – engage,
empower and embrace all citizens**

**Communities are their own first
line of defense; government must
engage, not impose**

**Everyone can be an agent of
security: government, police, social
institutions and citizens –
everyone has a part to play**

Introduction

This chapter presents the general conclusions and recommendations of the report. The recommendations are organized according to the themes that are the subjects of the chapters. They are grounded on the evidence generated by the research process described in the respective chapters. They are not the ideas only of the authors of the report. Many of the recommendations reflect the thinking and shared experiences of the hundreds of practitioners, advocates and experts in law enforcement, the judiciary, corrections institutions, crime prevention and state administration who, in one way or another, have participated in the research process. They also reflect the demands for change by Caribbean citizens that were expressed during the many consultations that served as an essential part of the research.

Conclusions

The evidence presented in this report suggests that crime has become an important social problem in the region. Not only is the effect of crime of considerable social, economic and political significance, but majorities of the populations of the region regard crime as an important problem worthy of policy, planning and programme focus. For the people of the region, crime, violence and insecurity are profoundly linked in various ways to key development issues such as freedom of choice, equality of opportunity, increased life chances, especially for the most vulnerable, and the greater responsiveness of state institutions to the needs of people. The solution to the problem of insecurity is tied to a process of change and enhanced social justice.

The central message of this report is that change aimed at greater effectiveness is essential if Caribbean societies are to become safer and more just. There must be a shift in thinking and practice towards citizen security. The report finds that, despite the severity and complexity of the problem of insecurity in the countries of the region and the even greater complexities that are involved in effecting a transformation, there is considerable evidence that an optimistic outlook exists on the problem and the prospects for change in this direction in the region.

People have the power to change their conditions, including their security situation. Ordinary citizens are central to solving the problem of insecurity. Their participation through stable and open channels can help bring about positive change in the philosophy, policy and governance of security. This report provides ample evidence that this commitment to participation is not unrealistic, unproductive, or unlikely to have an impact on the pressing problems associated with intentional violence and the developmental drag of high levels of crime. Ample evidence has been presented to show that change favouring the treatment of people as co-producers of security, as valuable sources of problem-solving knowledge, and as sovereign partners of the state agencies that are accountable to them is also more likely to yield effective crime control and prevention.

Existing Efforts

During the process of preparing this report, we observed a clear acknowledgment of the seriousness of the problem of insecurity among members of governments in the region. We also noted signs of the sorts of changes in policy that will be required to address the problem effectively. These are not

reliable predictors of changes in practice, but they are a source of a measure of optimism about the prospects for change in the region.

The evidence presented in this report demonstrates the imperative that the police and other institutions of criminal justice systems must serve the public and promote non-violence and justice. This is a condition for their success in dealing with crime. The need for a comprehensive reform of police services is recognized in several countries. There is a similar recognition concerning justice sector reform, although the recognition in this case is driven by administrative problems rather than by an understanding that the relationship of these institutions with the people must be reviewed, that is, there must be a change in the way people are treated by justice systems, especially people who have been victimized by criminals or otherwise brought into contact with these institutions without having committed crimes. Re-engineering this relationship means making the system more open. It also means that these institutions must offer a wider range of services and decriminalize some behaviours, particularly the problematic behaviour of young people. It means improving the access to justice. Some countries are attempting to undertake these steps. Their attempts should be encouraged and reinforced.

There is also a recognition that security cannot reliably rest only on the capabilities and the performance of law enforcement agencies. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has, for example, elaborated a social crime prevention plan that represents a shift in the way security problems are addressed. Indeed, some countries are seeking to ensure that national security policies conform with and are informed by long-term development policies.

Governments have led in establishing crime and violence prevention plans and programmes, but NGOs and community groups have also contributed. The region is not barren of innovation. There are promising practices. However, they have not been carefully tested and evaluated; many are not even documented. This shortcoming should

be corrected as a means of encouraging more innovation and more effective action. Some of these experiences underline the creative problem-solving capacity of the people and the potential of citizen security. Additional channels of participation need to be opened so that citizens may become more actively involved as co-producers of security.

The shift in ideas must find representation in sound policies, and, even more important, it must become associated with more effective programme designs and changes in resource allocations that reflect the new priorities. With few exceptions, the countries of the region have only limited resources. Nonetheless, through innovation, it is possible to achieve progress even with limited resources. This is being demonstrated by poor countries elsewhere in the greater region and in other parts of the world. The successes of the Nicaraguan police in establishing a close partnership with communities to lower crime rates have been documented, for example. Countries can solve critical problems and make good progress by encouraging human creativity. This applies to people working in institutions such as the police, the courts and corrections facilities, as well as people in communities who may be suffering relatively more from crime and the abuse of rights.

The Demand for Change

Despite the efforts of governments to bring the crime problem under control, the insecurity levels remain high. The insecurity has roots partly in a lack of confidence that the institutions of the state, especially the police, can protect citizens and treat them fairly. The lack of trust is contributing to the demand for change being expressed by the populations of the region. The demand is for a reform that is not narrowly administrative or technical. It is causing these institutions to become more responsive and fair in their treatment of people. It is a demand for greater attention to crime as a social problem and for programmes that promote greater social justice by targeting the roots of crime in social inequalities and the inequitable distribution of opportunities in society.

This demand for change is supported by a willingness to participate with the state in activities that are designed to bring about the change. If the proposals in this report are to be implemented effectively, the impediments to change must be understood and overcome. These impediments include problems associated with the institutional capacity of the state to undertake the desired programmes successfully, the limited human and material resources and the substantial claims on these resources, which often lead to a focus on immediate challenges rather than viable long-term solutions. In such a setting, if accountability is weak, then little can be accomplished. Better systems of accountability must therefore be crafted, and, more generally, systems of governance must be improved. These outcomes will require more advocacy and more active and engaged populations.

Directions for Future Efforts

It is expected that some of the main ideas and proposals that are presented elsewhere in this report and collated below will find expression in national policies and programmes, as well as in the projects and activities of various groups that will take from this report what is most relevant for their countries. In some instances, this may occur because of the appeal of the ideas. In any case, more advocacy will be required.

Even during the consultative processes associated with the research for this report, voices called attention to the following:

- The need for focused work on juvenile justice reform and the creation of a wider range of options for dealing with youth and children in conflict with the law.
- The need for more effective responses to the problem of domestic violence, particularly early or primary intervention programmes.
- The design of new mechanisms for the participation of citizens in governance and for systems of direct accountability to citizens.
- The need for an aggressive and transparent response to corruption in state agencies.
- The need to strengthen advocacy for innovative policies aimed at citizen security.

This report is intended to reinvigorate the discussion on citizen security among policy makers and citizens across the region. The discussion has been moving in the right direction. It is hoped that the report will help focus the discussion and, beyond this, lead to action that is consistent with the new ideas. The time to act is now: the trajectory of violence can be interrupted; insecurity can be diminished. Success has been achieved elsewhere and can be achieved in the countries of the region. It may be achieved now by a more vigorous pursuit of citizen security.

Recommendations

The true value of this report will lie in its eventual impact on people's lives, that is, in its contribution to making citizens more secure. It is likely that the recommendations of the report will exercise the greatest impact, particularly if they lead to a renewed energy and fresh initiatives in the effort to enhance citizen security. The recommendations are grounded in the analysis of the data that were collected during the research process, the accumulated experience of the experts and practitioners from across the region who participated, and the inputs of the consultations held among hundreds of high-level institutional actors from the state sector, NGOs, universities and elsewhere.

Some of the recommendations are new. Others are old, but worthy recommendations that have not yet been realized. Still others are embodied in ongoing projects and programmes, and we note them in the report and here to draw attention to their value so that they may gain wider support. All are included because we consider them important and have examined their feasibility and appeal. We hope that they will attract sufficient interest to be tested through practical applications.

The recommendations are grouped according to the themes of each chapter. These themes are as follows: reducing criminal victimization, especially the victimization of the groups that are most at risk; enhancing social crime prevention; improving the effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy of the

state institutions that are responsible for protecting the public and ensuring justice; and strengthening citizen participation and improving the capabilities of the actors involved in the co-production of security. The recommendations are also divided into subgroups according to whether they are short term or long term. Short-term recommendations may be implemented fairly quickly and are likely to show results in the short to medium term. Long-term recommendations may require more time to implement, and their effects may not be observed for years. The justifications and supporting evidence for each of the recommendations and the relationship of the recommendations to the main messages of this report may be examined within the respective chapters.

Reducing Victimization

The following are general recommendations aimed at reducing crime victimization, especially among the groups that are most at risk, least adequately protected by the state and least likely to be able to protect themselves through the justice system.

1. Citizen security, human rights and human development are interdependent. The creation of a more secure environment necessitates the social, economic and political empowerment of women and other vulnerable groups to counter the decades of deprivation among these groups caused by poverty and social, cultural, political and institutional practices. There is also a more general need to undertake initiatives to promote awareness of and respect for human rights especially within law enforcement.
2. Short-term efforts are rightly focused on mitigating and more effectively managing those problems that are the most proximate facilitators of violence of all types. Managing the access to legal firearms and reducing the access to illegal firearms should be important elements in such efforts.
 - Regarding legal weapons, firearms acquisition processes should be made more transparent, robust and free of corruption. Firearms acquisition regulations should be reviewed to ensure that access restrictions appropriately protect families and the public.
 - Regarding illegal firearms, in addition to the usual border control and tracing measures, attention should be paid to measures that are simple, but of considerable symbolic value in mobilizing the populations of the region against gun violence (see box 7.1). An example might be the periodic public destruction of illegal weapons.
3. Government protection should be enhanced for those most at risk and least able to protect themselves, especially from violence by fellow citizens and representatives of the state. Accomplishing this would involve the following:
 - Establishing better monitoring systems to prevent child sexual abuse generally, but also among children in the care of the state.
 - Providing better legal protection for indigenous persons and sexual minorities. This would include the following:
 - Appropriate national legislation to protect human rights.
 - Support to strengthen advocacy groups.
 - Reviews of current legislation to eliminate legal provisions that tend to discriminate against indigenous persons and sexual minorities or facilitate intolerance and violence against these groups.
 - Establishing or developing capacity of gender-based anti-violence units in the police services of the region.

These ideas were repeated frequently by participants in the multicountry consultations that were held as a part of the research for this report.
4. Long-term efforts to promote awareness of and respect for human rights should be undertaken. Appropriate measures could be carried out in partnership with ministries of justice, the media and advocacy groups. They should include the following:

Box 7.1. Developing Capacity to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Firearms in the Caribbean

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) is currently implementing an assistance package in nine Caribbean countries (Antigua and Barbuda,

the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago) with the support of the governments of Canada and the United States.

Objectives

- Promote the effective implementation of national, regional and international firearms instruments by strengthening national firearms control measures
- Reduce the availability and number of firearms in circulation by facilitating the destruction of surplus, obsolete and confiscated weapons and ammunition
- Enhance the security and management of national stockpile facilities, thus reducing the risk of diversion to criminal networks
- Develop the capacity of law enforcement officials to combat the illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition and explosives

Activities in 2010–2011

- The assistance project was officially launched in Kingston, Jamaica in March 2010 through an awareness-raising workshop. At the workshop, participating member states were informed of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines developed by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the International Small Arms Control Standards being developed by the same office and UNDP.
- In December 2010, UNLIREC convened a meeting of participating Caribbean states to review national action plans and outline the implementation process for 2011–2012. During this meeting, Caribbean member states agreed that dumping confiscated, surplus and obsolete firearms into the Caribbean was no longer an acceptable practice. The United Nations offers alternative means of disposal.
- During 2010 and 2011, the UNLIREC legal unit undertook detailed studies of national firearms legislation in Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago and examined key recommendations for reform to reinforce the ability of countries to combat illicit trafficking and comply with international obligations.
- In October 2011, UNLIREC provided training to officials in the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, Coast Guard, Police Service and Prisons Service in the destruction of nearly 1,200 confiscated firearms that had been tagged for elimination by the courts and 5 metric tons of confiscated and obsolete ammunition using a small arms ammunition burning tank designed by UNLIREC for small-scale ammunition disposal operations based on International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.

Next Steps

UNLIREC will continue working with the governments in the region in the following areas:

- In Jamaica, 30,000 firearms and several tons of ammunition will be destroyed in February 2012.
- A UNLIREC flagship inter-institutional training course on combating illicit firearms trafficking will be conducted in Jamaica in February 2012 and in the Bahamas in April 2012.
- Technical teams will be deployed throughout the Caribbean to provide training in firearms and ammunition destruction and stockpile management according to established international standards.
- Legal advice will be offered to assist governments in producing appropriate national firearms legislation, to promote the harmonization of laws across the region and to foster international legal cooperation in combating illicit firearms.

Source: UNLIREC (2011).

- Documenting promising practices among police forces in the Caribbean and elsewhere and providing assistance to police services in implementing these practices.
 - Strengthening support for victims, including through the training of staff in dealing with various victim situations; increasing the relevant budget allocations.
5. The knowledge base on social crime prevention should be expanded. Appropriate initiatives should also be launched. These steps would include the following:
- The assessment and evaluation of job training and employment creation programmes in the Caribbean should be systematic.
 - More support should be supplied to families, especially families living in areas characterized by high levels of violence. This might include the development of nationally and culturally appropriate parenting manuals and support for children who are at risk so that they may remain in school and in stable and supportive home environments. Such programmes, if they are effective, are likely to reduce the number of children admitted to state institutions because of neglect or sexual abuse at home. The support should also focus on reducing delinquency.
 - Social workers should be trained in the delivery of specialized services for families. The training should involve instruction in the recognition of the warning signs of child sexual abuse and in support services for the families of child victims of sexual abuse and other forms of violence.
 - The budgetary allocation for social crime prevention programmes should be increased, and the capacity of states to design and implement these programmes should be improved. Capacity can be improved by monitoring and learning from crime prevention experiences elsewhere in the Caribbean and abroad (box 7.2).

Reducing Risk and Building Youth Resilience

Youth are assets in the development process, but many are also considered detached and at risk. The risks can be mitigated by supportive programmes that strengthen the resilience of young people. The report of CARICOM (2010f) contained within the Declaration of Paramaribo on the Future of Youth in the Caribbean Community is supportive of programmes that are aimed at mitigating the risks among youth and empowering youth to play a role in national and regional development processes. The declaration represents a useful guide for prevention programmes and policy development at the national level. The following recommendations are intended to reduce risk and build youth resilience.

1. Develop programmes to promote 'pro-social' behaviour. The main target groups are in-school youth and out-of-school, out-of-work youth, particularly new school leavers. The targeting of these groups and the design of these programmes should be carried out in a gender-differentiated manner. For the in-school group, comprehensive after-school programmes should be developed. Some NGOs in some countries already offer such programmes. For the out-of-school, out-of-work group, some countries offer national youth service. These national youth service programmes should be reviewed to make them more comprehensive and more effective.
 - Structured voluntary community service is a good way to promote pro-social behaviour among young people. Volunteerism among youth should be recognized and encouraged. This might take the form of accreditation, which would facilitate the access of youth to other educational and training opportunities.
 - Designing and implementing programmes that support family stability and prevent 'child-shifting' are also useful investments in promoting pro-social behaviour and reducing delinquency. Such programmes should assist needy parents so that they are able to keep their children in the parental household

Box 7.2. Citizenship Culture in Bogota

A key innovation of the local government of Bogota was to realize that, instead of relying only on law enforcement, it could enhance respect for the law among citizens by exerting influence on culture and consciousness to alter undesirable behaviour or encourage desirable behaviour.

Three value systems may help determine and regulate people's behaviour as social beings: morality (internalized principles that provoke guilt), culture (social norms—beliefs, values and ideals—that, if ignored or flaunted, may open an individual to social sanctions) and the law. Tension among these systems may seriously affect coexistence and productivity in society. Tension may arise if an

individual finds an action morally or culturally acceptable even if it is against the law or if the individual finds an obligation under the law morally or culturally indifferent or unacceptable. There is harmony among law, morality and culture if the individual finds that a legal obligation also conforms with cultural and moral codes or if the individual finds that an illegal activity contravenes these codes.

Citizenship education programmes focus on promoting security, coexistence, obedience to rules, a sense of belonging, shared responsibility and so on by emphasizing the positive links of these determinants of the well-being of society with the three value systems (table a).

Table a. Social Value Systems and Citizenship Education Programmes

Programmes to protect life and ensure compliance with norms	Valuing norms	Disseminate norms and facilitate voluntary compliance; demonstrate the democratic basis and the benefits of the fulfilment of norms Through public awareness campaigns, emphasize standards of security and coexistence and their significance in public transportation, taxation, urban life, and the environment
	Sanctity of life	Discourage gun ownership and promote actions aimed at reducing violent deaths Build trust and security so that rights and freedoms may be exercised
	Contributing out of good will	Raise awareness of the collective benefits of taxation Promote the rejection of unmerited subsidies
Programmes to promote a democratic culture	Decision-making procedures	Promote the use of democratic procedures to change laws Broaden public discussion by emphasizing the usefulness of discussion in clarifying differences, resolving conflicts and reaching agreements
	Organize to influence and learn	Recognize organizations and enhance their ability to build links of solidarity and represent citizens in the decisions of the city, town and district
Programmes to encourage communication and solidarity through the use of public spaces	Communicate life and fair play	Promote art, culture and recreation in public spaces to enhance the creative and communicative capacities of cultural actors and citizens and increase the collective enjoyment of the city Expand the social appropriation of the city through research projects and means of mass dissemination

Examples of programmes in Bogota

Over 350,000 cards were distributed among the population. One side was red and showed a thumb pointing down; the other side was white and showed a thumb pointing up. Citizens were invited to use the cards to indicate their approval (thumb up) or disapproval (thumb down) of the actions of other citizens. The cards became popular as a good-natured

means of communication especially about the conduct of drivers in traffic. Citizens were thus drawn in to mutual regulation. Those who did not participate were considered co-responsible for problems.

Mimes in the streets reminded drivers (silently) about proper traffic etiquette. This illustrates that a local government can carry out a teaching function.

Citizens were encouraged to ration their use of water. These voluntary water savings avoided months of water shortages, and citizens learned to economize on water. Between 1996 and 2003, household water consumption dropped from 28 to 18 cubic meters per month.

Through the 110 percent with Bogota tax programme, 63,000 households or entities agreed to pay an additional 10 percent in property taxes. In exchange, they were given the opportunity to assign the extra 10 percent tax contribution to 1 of 15 public projects.

Several studies documented the progress of this citizenship culture in Bogota. Particularly useful were surveys on citizenship culture and Bogotá Cómo Vamos (*Bogota How are We Doing*), a programme that monitors more than 200 indicators quarterly and conducts an extensive annual survey.

Among the most dramatic results of these initiatives in Bogota were a reduction in the homicide rate from 80 to 23 per 100,000 inhabitants per year and a reduction in traffic fatalities from almost 1,400 at the beginning of the 1990s to fewer than 600 in 2003. The restriction of alcohol consumption during certain hours at night (the 'Carrot Law') was also a key step.

Learning from the experience of Bogota

Bogota has documented its experience so that other cities may benefit and adapt suitable features to their own context. The documentation includes descriptions of research methodologies, measurement data, the planning and design of initiatives, the results of monitoring and evaluation, dissemination and communication procedures, and coordination across institutions.

Source: Mockus et al. (2004).

rather than shifting them to relatives and family friends.

- Another means of promoting pro-social conduct is the development of youth-friendly spaces to facilitate the access of youth to services, strengthen their ties to their communities, build their relationships with and access to critical state institutions, including law enforcement, and empower them to make contributions to violence prevention in their communities. Youth are willing to participate in enhancing citizen security. They require spaces that build their resilience to act as agents of change and play a role in violence prevention and human development.
2. The institutionalization of youth in conflict with the law should be a last resort.
 - Greater attention should be paid to the development of youth diversion programmes and non-custodial sentences

for wrongdoing, restorative justice, and alternative means for providing care and protection. Existing programmes that offer offenders viable alternatives to violent and criminal behaviour should be strengthened and provided with more resources. For, example, youth might be placed in community corrections and community service programmes while in the custody of their parents. Youth who display violent behaviour deserve a second chance.

- Review legislative provisions and repeal those that treat running away as an offence. Youth require support in addressing the issues that lead them prematurely to leave their homes; this support may best be provided by the state.
- Systems should be established for the systematic evaluation of the mental health status of children and youth who are in jails and prisons and who are

generally in the care of the state. They should be provided with any necessary medical treatments and counselling.

3. Develop a regional system for monitoring youth development, for evidence-based planning, and for the design and implementation of programmes. This should include the following:
 - The creation of a youth development index, which would be computed annually and used as part of the process of monitoring the implementation of the CARICOM Youth Development Action Plan, which is now being examined and discussed.
 - Initiate a longitudinal study on youth development, including youth violence in the Caribbean.

Reducing Gang Violence

Caribbean governments and populations regard violence as a major social problem. Street gangs and organized crime account for much of this violence, especially the lethal violence. Violence reduction is thus closely tied to gang reduction. Towards these ends, the following steps are recommended:

1. Establish a surveillance system to monitor street gangs and organized crime in Caribbean nations. The system should focus on understanding the phenomena of street gangs and organized crime. It should seek to provide information on the prevalence of problems associated with gangs and organized crime so as to accomplish the following:
 - Gauge accurately the scope and nature of problems related to gangs and organized crime (locally or regionally).
 - Prioritize security concerns related to gangs and organized crime.
 - Assess local and regional trends in gang and organized crime activity for the purpose of planning and resource allocation. The gang surveillance system should be integrated with existing systems used by law enforcement and gang and violence prevention practitioners.
2. Improve the training of Caribbean police services. To maintain specific and general de-

terrence, it is important to arrest and convict individuals who engage in serious illegal activities related to street gangs and organized crime. If formal social control mechanisms break down, street gangs and organized crime can fill the vacuum. Training should be provided to ensure that suppression and intelligence activities are carried out effectively, fairly and with respect for human rights. This should include the development of police service policies that limit officer discretion and provide the means for transparency and accountability in the actions of police personnel with respect to the control of street gangs and organized crime. Greater police accountability in these matters will enhance the rule of law and increase the effectiveness of the police in their response to gangs and organized crime.

3. Monitor the impact of existing gang legislation. Propose new legislation where appropriate. Well-trained and well-equipped police services should be able to make good use of some elements of the gang legislation. The effectiveness of the new legislation, once adopted, should be evaluated to determine if it is worthy of replication in other Caribbean nations. Evaluation of the legislation should consider any negative consequences associated with misuse or inequities. This evaluation could assist CARICOM in developing model legislation on gangs and organized crime.
4. Adopt a balanced response to street gangs and organized crime. All youth should be exposed to primary prevention programmes that have been proven to be effective at inoculating a significant number of youth from joining criminal organizations. Secondary prevention programmes should be provided for those individuals who are most at risk of joining a street gang or organized crime group. Intervention programmes should be widely available and administered to those who are actively involved in street gangs and organized crime. Suppression strategies should be aimed at those who are the most entrenched in street gangs and organized crime and who are frequently involved in violence, intimi-

Box 7.3. The Juvenile Violence Prevention Unit of the National Police of Nicaragua

Through its Prevention of Juvenile Violence Programme, the National Police of Nicaragua is working with state institutions, local crime prevention committees, the media, the private sector, and gang members to rehabilitate those who leave gangs. The programme provides psycho-social counselling, educational opportuni-

ties, vocational training and job placement. The police unit receives specific training on human rights and community mediation and is involved in the social reinsertion of ex-gang members. For Independence Day, the police trained and used 800 youths formerly belonging to gangs to maintain order during the festivities.

dation, or corruption. Box 7.3 offers an innovative example within the police.

5. Develop plans and programmes to assist gang members to exit from gangs successfully and to assist the victims of gang activity. Research has shown that many of the victims of gang violence are gang members and that the act of leaving a gang is often preceded by an incident involving violent victimization. However, currently, there are few programmes to assist gang members who are interested in leaving gangs or the victims of gang-related activity. Programmes that focus on these individuals might help reduce the amount of time individuals are associated with gangs.
6. Establish a rigorous research agenda on the causes of street gangs and organized crime in the Caribbean. Such a research agenda is essential for the development of efficient and effective public policy in the region. Investment in basic research examining the impact of social structural factors, the community, the family, the school, peers and individuals are necessary, along with basic research that examines the unique role of gender, age and citizenship in criminal organizations. The research agenda would include assessments and documentation on good practices and strategies and policies in various aspects of gang control, reduction and prevention.

Perhaps most needed, however, is a longitudinal study on youth. The longitudinal study should be conducted in nations throughout the Caribbean and track indi-

viduals from a relatively early point in their lives through their 20s, regardless of where they might be. It should collect information on a variety of topics related to human development, including, but not limited to education, delinquency and crime, health, work, social development, and involvement with criminal organizations. Official data sources are somewhat limiting, and a longitudinal study of youth would help Caribbean nations plan and implement effective prevention, intervention and suppression strategies.

Transforming the Police

The Caribbean police, in general, must do more to facilitate the transition from the state security model to the citizen-oriented model of policing. This will require a shift in focus at the highest levels of police administration. First, there must be dramatic changes in the leadership styles of top administrators. The traditional leadership styles of ‘steward’ and ‘commander’ must be replaced by the ‘executive’ style.¹ The executive style incorporates a deep commitment to strategic planning and creative thinking to enhance the organization’s value to the community it serves. For example, both strategic planning and creative thinking are needed to determine how best to mould the willingness of citizens to help reduce violence into a viable and sustainable police-community partnership. In addition, the executive style views changes in organizational structure, cultural changes and programmatic changes as part of an evolutionary process that is to be embraced rather than avoided, as is traditionally

done in the Caribbean. Finally, the executive style highly values input not only from subordinates, but also from external groups and individuals who have a stake in the security of communities and the nation as a whole. The community is viewed as a major resource in terms of input and support, as well as a valuable and necessary partner in reducing violence and increasing citizen security.

1. Change in leadership style at the top of the organization is only part of the reform that must take place if an effective community and police co-productive alliance is to be established. The rank-and-file of the police organization must also be convinced that it is in their best interest to support reform and to work with the community to increase security. The job satisfaction of constables is key to their embracing organizational changes such as community policing. Research indicates that job satisfaction is heightened if the rank-and-file have a role in management decisions that affect their conditions of work.² Participatory management is also a hallmark of the executive leadership style.
2. Caribbean nations and, especially, their police forces need to take advantage of the public's willingness to cooperate by devising and implementing co-production activities jointly with citizens so everyone in each nation can experience a higher level of security free from crime, thereby realizing more fully their human potential. At the same time, the police should continue to strengthen the quality of their service delivery to enhance the trust and confidence among the citizenry for the police.
3. All police services in the region should establish properly resourced gender-based violence units. Promising approaches to this issue have been adopted in, for example, Barbados, Dominica and Jamaica. They involve building partnerships between the police and other agencies and NGOs that are working on these problems. In Jamaica, Woman Inc. provides assistance and guidance to victims of rape, incest, domestic violence, and sexual harassment at the workplace since its inception in 1984. The organization conducts sensitization training among members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force. Woman Inc. also has a legal reform committee that constantly lobbies for legislative changes. These units should meet the following requirements:
 - Be trained to process and support victims of sexual violence
 - Be supported by appropriate legislation
 - Be subject to oversight bodies or consultative committees that include child and women's rights advocates.
4. Responsive police services tend to pay considerable attention to crime prevention programmes. The development of such programmes that target youth populations is especially urgent (see chapter 2). The Royal Barbados Police Force provides a good example of one such promising programme, the Juvenile Liaison Scheme (box 7.4).

Box 7.4. The Juvenile Liaison Scheme, Barbados

The Juvenile Liaison Scheme was established in 1983 by the Royal Barbados Police Force with the goal of diverting juveniles aged 7 to 16 years from the criminal justice system. The programme is located at the Central Police Station in Bridgetown. Youth enter the programme through referrals that originate with parents, police officers, school officials, social service prac-

titioners, entrepreneurs, or victims who have been affected by the youth. The programme is staffed by police officers especially trained in social work, mental health and issues related to adolescent and family functioning, as well as community development. Since its creation, the programme has supported over 3,000 youth and their parents or guardians.

Source: Royal Barbados Police Force.

If the transformation of the police services is to be successful, more robust systems of police accountability are required. These systems must include elements that are internal to the police forces and elements that are external, as well as formal and informal elements. The internal systems should include the following:

- Capable and credible departments of professional responsibility that possess the authority and the capability to investigate corruption effectively and to prevent it in all its forms.
 - External units charged with investigating use-of-force violations by the police, especially those violations that have resulted in death. An example in Jamaica is the recently created Independent Commission of Investigations, which should serve as a model for police services in other Caribbean nations.
 - External informal systems of police accountability include an alert press and active, credible and organized human rights groups that are focused on the issue of police misconduct. Efforts should be made to improve the capacity of the media to play its role as a vital element in the system of accountability.
 - The public is also an important element in the process of informal accountability. The small police forces of the region tend to be responsive to public pressures. Measures should therefore be adopted to change the strongly held belief in some nations that extrajudicial killings of offenders are useful in reducing crime. This could be done by enhancing the capabilities of human rights and police-affiliated citizens' groups to conduct appropriate awareness campaigns.
5. Reform may also be encouraged through incentives. An innovative programme in Brazil offers a rare example of an external motivating force for good police behaviour.³ The Citizen Police prize was created by an NGO dedicated to public security, disarmament and human rights. The prize, consisting of cash or a university scholarship, is awarded to police officers who have solved public security problems in a creative, effi-

cient way that is respectful of human rights and engages the local community.

Reforming the Justice System

The recommendations in support of the reform of the justice system include management and capacity development, issues of access, measures indicating how people are treated by the system and methods to make the system more fair and equitable.

1. Develop rational court scheduling strategies that minimize delays and backlogs and do not place undue strain on criminal justice personnel. The strategy would include minimizing delays that originate outside the criminal justice system. Delays imposed by witnesses could be corrected by better witness management systems that are able to provide needed supports to witnesses such as cost of travel. The strategy would also aim at reducing delays caused by incompetence, such as poor case preparation by criminal justice practitioners. Finally, the strategy would reduce delays caused by the corrupt practices of court administrative personal, lawyers who double-book cases and other institutional actors.
2. Introduce criminal justice planning councils that would coordinate the work of the various institutions within the system and ensure proper staffing to accommodate changes in workloads. These councils should accept inputs from representatives of the people.
3. Establish a well-run, well-protected regional witness protection programme to improve the level of witness cooperation with police and prosecutors. The small size of most Caribbean countries presents many difficulties for such programmes. A renewed effort should be undertaken to explore the possibilities for such a project at the regional level. There are two groups that should be considered: the protection of witnesses who are criminal informants and the protection of witnesses who are victims of serious crimes. The second group should be treated not merely as witnesses, but also as victims. They should therefore also have access to victim support services.

4. Review sentencing policies to remove inconsistencies in punishments. Alternative punishments should be devised especially for persons imprisoned because they are unable to pay fines. This area should be a focus of sentencing reform.
5. Ensure that juveniles and adults are housed separately in prisons and jails. Ensure that juveniles detained for non-criminal reasons are housed separately from juveniles charged with or convicted of criminal acts.
6. Adopt selective incarceration strategies that minimize the use of incarceration for all but the most serious offenders. Opt for alternative sanctions unless the offender is violent or is deemed to have a high-risk of recidivism. Alternatives include drug courts and drug treatment centres that would be introduced in countries in which there are high prevalence rates in drug use. These measures would require the strengthening of probation departments.
7. Establish rehabilitation strategies and alternative sanctions that encourage juvenile, first-time, older and non-violent offenders to live non-criminal lives.
8. Reduce prison overcrowding and improve conditions of confinement. Reducing overcrowding can be accomplished in three ways: minimize the proportion of pre-trial detainees, adopt selective incapacitation strategies based on risk assessments of offenders, or build new prisons. Only build new prisons as a last resort after the first two steps have been taken.
9. Put in place measures to enhance public confidence in the criminal justice system. This should include better systems of accountability and the elimination of abuses of power by state agencies. A new system of oversight for prosecutors and the courts should be considered. As with new police oversight bodies, civil society representatives should be included. More open information systems account for another approach to enhancing public confidence. Police services could, for example, appoint professionally trained public information officers to work closely with the media, minimize misinformation and celebrate victories. Every justice agency should establish a sound public relations and communications strategy that seeks to instil public confidence.
10. Improve access to the justice system by reducing the costs to court users, promoting lower cost alternatives such as mediated settlements, and expanding restorative justice programmes. Access to the police may be improved by controlling corruption more effectively and by enhancing the systems for reporting crimes to the police.

Developing Capacity for Evidence-Based Policy

This report and the recommendations listed in the sections above emphasize the importance of shifting policy so that there is a greater emphasis on social crime prevention, institutional transformation, human rights, the rule of law, youth empowerment and gender equality. During the research stage of this report, there was also significant advocacy aimed at prioritizing gender-differentiated or gender-sensitive responses.

An entry point for increased social intervention and greater emphasis on social crime prevention is the Caribbean Community Action Plan for Social Development and Crime Prevention (2009–2013). The action plan acknowledges the importance of national, regional and international networks cooperating to ensure a coherent and consistent crime prevention response to the region's crime problem. It provides a framework to help countries in the region achieve balance between the justice system's approach to crime and a preventative approach. The action plan reiterates the need for a sustainable crime prevention framework that is empirically based.

The design and implementation of effective policies rest, however, on the capacity to conduct policy-relevant research and to evaluate existing policies, programmes and projects rigorously. In most Caribbean countries, this capacity is inadequate and ought to be strengthened.

In the short to medium term, there should be greater support for developing the capacity for evidence-based policy. Towards this end,

efforts should be made to accomplish the following:

- Work with researchers to test the effectiveness of strategies in reducing crime, disorder and fear and to establish a culture of experimentation and constant improvement. A starting point could be the assessment and documentation of promising crime prevention and control practices in the Caribbean. These practices should include, for example, mentorship programmes, after-school programmes, entrepreneurship and job creation programmes for youth at risk, the use of music culture among youth at risk, reentry programmes for prisoners and deportees, exit strategies for gangs, community violence reduction programmes and proper case management to avoid court delays.
 - Strengthen the capability of regional institutions to measure crime and other threats to human security and to study the capacity of governments to prevent and alleviate these threats.
 - Establish a regional crime observatory that would provide crime mapping and other evidential, monitoring and evaluation support for promising practices and policies. The observatory would seek to fill existing data gaps in areas such as gender-based violence. It would design and implement frameworks for analysis that would be comparable across territories. It would monitor vulnerable populations and provide data that can be used to directly inform policy.
- The definitions of rape, domestic violence and other gender-based violence need to be regularized across the legal systems of the Caribbean so that data collection systems parallel each other more closely. This would require coordinated action by several governments over the long term.
- Connect regional professional bodies with their international counterparts to ensure a continuous flow of fresh ideas from inside and outside the region.
 - Strengthen policy-design and policy-evaluation units within government. Strength-

en and support policy research and evaluation outside the state sector. It is important to identify expertise inside and outside government. Policy design, research and evaluation within the region calls for research capacity that does not presently exist within the region.

The above recommendations can be realized only if there is increased budgetary support for these measures. Many Caribbean governments are restricted by budgetary constraints. Nonetheless, new priorities mean shifts in allocations.

These recommendations will have a better chance of being implemented properly if there is more sustained advocacy on the part of civil society groups and a greater commitment to citizen involvement by the governments of the region. Participation is a principle of citizen security. It is also of great instrumental value. It facilitates successful outcomes.

People are resources, and they are the creators of change. Effective implementation of the many recommendations in this report will require the participation of youth organizations, women's rights groups, victims' rights groups, and human rights groups. It will require action and commitment by officials in the state systems of the region, as well as those in the regional civil service or CARICOM structures, and it will require the support of regional organizations such as the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police and CARICOM Youth Ambassadors. Educational institutions that are involved in the training of social workers and other service professionals must ensure that the competencies and skills that will be needed are instilled through the schools and through the education and training of professionals.

Urgent, but well-considered, well-planned and sustainable action is required. It is not beyond the inventiveness and innovation characteristic of the Caribbean people to deal with the problem of insecurity more effectively and to meet the requirements of citizen security so that the region will become a safer and more just place to live and work.

Notes

Overview

1. See Lewis (1955), page 420.
2. Guyana and Suriname may be regarded as exceptions because of their larger territories and relative abundance of natural resources.
3. Grenada (1978) and Suriname (1980) have experienced regime changes by force of arms.
4. Here, there is a distinction between violent behaviour that is criminalized and punishable by the state, such as murder and rape, and violent behaviour that is not so criminalized and that may even enjoy the approval of large sections of the population. Examples of the latter include child-beating in some settings, intimate partner violence, and fighting. Although, in some jurisdictions, these forms of violence are not explicitly criminalized, there are usually laws that allow the police to charge offenders who engage in them. However, such laws may not be applied because these types of violence are not socially defined or regarded as crimes and the laws do not draw direct attention to them as specific problems of great seriousness.
5. UNDP (2010a, vi).
6. For a comprehensive discussion of deportees in the region, see Barnes and Seepersad (2008).
7. 1821 is the year of the independence of the Dominican Republic from Spain. The country also uses 1844 to mark its independence from Haiti.
8. These statistics have been computed using data from the most recent national censuses.
9. See the most recent national censuses for the respective countries.
10. This has its origins in the 1968 Caribbean Free Trade Association negotiations. The use of the term LDC in this context should not be confused with its use in the United Nations system, where it means least (not less) developed countries.
11. Some of these recommendations are revisited in chapter 7.
12. In 2002 the OECS sub-regional HDR on 'Building Competitiveness in the face of Vulnerability' was produced
13. See UNODC and World Bank (2007).
14. See Ayres (1998); Francis et al. (2009).
15. Crime control refers to the use of political, legislative and (reactive) law enforcement methods to reduce crime in a society. According to Schmallerger (2011), crime prevention is the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of action to eliminate or reduce this risk.
16. See UNODC and World Bank (2007).
17. See Powell and Lewis (2011).
18. Powell and Lewis (2011).
19. Speech before the Second Ministerial Conference on the Geneva Declaration, Geneva, 31 October 2011.
20. United Nations (2010a), page 1.
21. See UNDP (2006).
22. IACHR (2009).
23. IACHR (2009).
24. IACHR (2009).
25. World Bank (2011a).
26. For details on the report methodology, the results of the consultations, and the participants, see the report website, <http://www.regionalcentre-lac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean>.
27. For a full description of the sample design and discussion of other technical issues, see the methodological note on the report website, <http://www.regionalcentre-lac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean>.

Chapter 1

1. WTTC (2011). <http://www.wttc.org/research/economic-impact-research/regional-reports/caribbean/>
2. CARICOM is composed of 15 member states: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Montserrat, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname.
3. See appendix 1 on the website of this report, <http://www.regionalcentre-lac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean>.
4. See appendix 1 on the report website, <http://www.regionalcentre-lac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean>.
5. UNDP (2010a).
6. Reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality and adolescent fertility rates. Empowerment is measured by the share of parliamentary seats held by each gender and attainment in secondary and higher education by each gender. Economic activity is measured by the labour force participation rate for each gender.
7. Antigua and Barbuda (2007) and Saint Lucia (June 2005) have recently been the subject of

- Country Poverty Assessments; however, CARICOM (2010a) is more recent.
8. See IFAD (2002).
 9. In 2010, the share of women aged 25 or older who had attained at least secondary education reached 89.5 percent in Barbados, 42.6 percent in Guyana, 74.0 percent in Jamaica, and 67.6 percent in Trinidad and Tobago. With the exception of Guyana, these values are above the LAC average of 50.5 percent. (No data are available on the other Caribbean-7 countries.) In 2009, female labour force participation rates in Barbados (65.8 percent), Jamaica (56.1 percent) and Trinidad and Tobago (55.1 percent) were higher than the LAC average (51.7 percent), while they were lower than the average in Saint Lucia (51.7 percent), Guyana (44.7 percent), and Suriname (38.5 percent). (No data are available on Antigua and Barbuda.) In 2011, women's political participation as measured by the share of seats in national parliaments held by women was higher than in the LAC region (18.7 percent) in all the Caribbean-7, with the exception of Suriname (9.8 percent). See Human Development Reports (database), UNDP, New York, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/>; also see ECLAC (2010); Robinson (2005); World Bank (2011b).
 10. The relationship between poverty rates (absolute and relative) and crime rates is a complex one. It is not suggested that poverty universally and always directly accounts for all types of crime. The effects of poverty are often indirect and vary with the different categories of crime.
 11. See CARICOM (2002).
 12. See Deosaran (2000).
 13. Both Barbados and Saint Lucia categorize robberies as property crimes.
 14. Homicide is used to describe all cases of suspected murder. Suspected murders are classified as killings prior to the discovery of proof or disproof of murder. Murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a person with intent. This definition applies in all the English-speaking countries in our study. Among all crimes rates, the homicide rate most closely approximates the true rate. Police reports may be compared with data from ministries of health on the discovery of bodies associated with suspected murder. In Caribbean countries, the discrepancies are typically insignificant.
 15. De Albuquerque and McElroy (1999); Harriott (2002).
 16. See Buvinic, Morrison, and Shifter (1999); UNODC and World Bank (2007).
 17. See Francis et al. (2009); Bennett, Shields, and Daniels (2007); UNODC and World Bank (2007).
 18. See 'The Balance in Balance: Exports and Imports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Parts and Ammunition in Latin America and the Caribbean 2000–2006', *En La Mira: The Latin American Small Arms Watch*, 3 (23) (August), 2008, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/LASAW_BalanceOfBalance_SmallArms.pdf.
 19. UNODC and World Bank (2007).
 20. These include the regional Citizen Security Programme of the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank-funded Programme for Violence Prevention, CARICOM initiatives, and collaboration and partnerships to build capacity and greater compliance with the reporting requirements under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There is also the gun-marking and gun tracing programme under the auspices of the Committee of the Organization of American States on the Inter-American Convention against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Related Materials.
 21. Guyana aggregates robberies and extortion. However, the incidence of extortion is not statistically significant.
 22. UNODC and World Bank (2007).
 23. Burglary usually has a time requirement that includes night hours. Jamaica specifies that night begins at 7 pm; in Trinidad and Tobago, night begins at 8 pm. In both countries, it ends at 5 am. The exception to the night requirement is Barbados, where burglary may occur at any time of day or night. This means that the burglary rates for Barbados are less comparable with rates in the other jurisdictions. Consequently, for comparability, break-ins and burglaries are combined in the chart and in the discussion.
 24. Acquisitive crime covers crimes involving items that are stolen or acquired fraudulently. This includes theft, burglary, vehicle crime, and fraud; see 'Tackling Acquisitive Crime', Local Government Improvement and Development, London, <http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/page.do?pageId=8790065>.
 25. With the exception of Jamaica, there have been no studies on the relationship between economic conditions and crime in individual countries in the Caribbean since 1996.
 26. See United Nations (1993). Subsequent reiterations are contained in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

- and the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action (see below).
27. 'Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women', Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm>.
 28. See Russo and Pirlott (2006).
 29. Paragraph 118, Beijing Plan of Action, 'Beijing Declaration and Plan of Action', Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf>.
 30. See Robinson (2005).
 31. This definition is common in most jurisdictions. There are, however, differences in age requirements. In Guyana, the victim must be 13 years of age or older; in Barbados and in Trinidad and Tobago, 14 or older; in Jamaica, 16 or older. In Saint Lucia, there is no age stipulation. All intercourse (consensual and non-consensual) with a female under the ages stated above is defined as rape or carnal abuse. These differences are within the limits of comparability.
 32. For example, in Guyana, the category 'sex crimes' includes attempted rape, carnal knowledge of girls between 12 and 13 years of age, rape, indecent assault, buggery, abduction, incest, attempted incest, acts of gross indecency, and bigamy.
 33. Prior to 1991, the enumerated female population was not available; as a result, rape rates prior to that time were calculated on the entire population rather than on the population of females.
 34. The Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN), using 2005 data from the US National Crime Victimization Survey (see <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/NCVS/>), data from the Rape and Sexual Assault: Reporting to Police and Medical Attention 1992–2000 database (see <http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1133>), and data of the National Center for Policy Analysis (see Reynolds 1999), estimate that 15 of 16 rapists walk free. Based on these sources, RAINN estimates that, if a rape is reported, there is a 50.8 percent chance of an arrest. If an arrest is made, there is a 80 percent chance of prosecution. If there is prosecution, there is a 58 percent chance of conviction. If there is a felony conviction, there is a 69 percent chance the convict will spend time in jail. So, of 39 percent of attacks reported to the police, there is only a 16.3 percent chance that the rapist will go to prison. Factoring in unreported rapes, RAINN concludes that only about 6 percent of rapists will ever spend a day in jail. See 'Statistics', RAINN, Washington, DC, <http://rainn.org/statistics>. See also 'Violence against Women', UN Women, Bangkok, http://unifem-eseasia.org/Violence_Against_Women/index.html.
 35. Of reported rapes and sexual assaults in Trinidad and Tobago, 18.4 percent occurred in the northern police district. Amnesty International (2008), Ustanny (2006), and Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (see <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/>) identify vulnerabilities to sexual violence among women residents of Jamaica's inner-city communities.
 36. Concerns have been raised in the United Kingdom by the Stern Review that the conviction rate has taken over the debate and that a primary outcome is the impact on reporting rates. See Stern (2010).
 37. Discussions of the measurement problems as evident in the differences between official rates and the results of surveys are long standing and widely accepted. For example, see Skogan (1975).
 38. UNICEF (2011).
 39. CARICOM (2010b); World Bank (2003).
 40. Baumgartner et al. (2009).
 41. This applies to differences in the victimization rates for people of East-Indian and African descent in Guyana and in Trinidad and Tobago. Based on data of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010, t-tests suggested there were no significant differences in the rates of victimization among these groups.
 42. van Dijk, van Kesteren, and Smit (2007).
 43. Lee, Kotch, and Cox (2004).
 44. O'Leary (1999); Sims (2008).
 45. See Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys–MICS3, Childinfo (database), United Nations Children's Fund, New York, http://www.childinfo.org/mics3_surveys.html.
 46. 'Model Legislation on Issues Affecting Women', CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/model_legislation_women_issues.jsp.
 47. 'CARICOM Model Legislation on Domestic Violence', CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/model_legislation_domestic_violence.jsp.
 48. Trinidad and Tobago Domestic Violence Act, 1999, <http://www.ttparliament.org/publications.php?mid=28&id=461>.
 49. Le Franc et al. (2008); Pottie Bunge and Locke (2000).
 50. See Le Franc et al. (2008); Inter-Agency Campaign on Violence

against Women and Girls (1999). Among the organizations and initiatives are the following: Antigua and Barbuda Directorate of Gender Affairs; Saint Lucia Department of Gender Relations; Centre for Investigation of Sexual Offences, the division of the Jamaica Constabulary Force responsible for sexual offences against women and children; Trinidad Rape Crisis Society; Help and Shelter Guyana; Women Crisis Centre, Jamaica; Crisis Centre of Barbados; and Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action, Suriname.

51. Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000) defines trafficking in persons as “(a) ... the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; (b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used; (c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ even if this does not involve any of the means

set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article; (d) ‘Child’ shall mean any person under eighteen years of age” (UNODC 2004, 42–43).

52. SAP-FL and ITUC (2007).

53. IOM (2010a).

54. IOM (2010b).

55. Ribando (2005).

56. Ribando (2005).

57. IOM (2010b).

58. IOM (2005).

59. Coffey (2004).

60. IOM (2005).

61. Thomas-Hope (2002).

62. Ratification status as of October 2011; see United Nations Treaty Collection (database), United Nations, New York, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSOnline&tabid=2&mtidsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&lang=en#Participants.

63. As of October 2010, only the Bahamas (2008), Guyana (2005), Jamaica (2007), Saint Lucia (2010) and Suriname (2006), among the eight countries reviewed, had passed an anti-trafficking law (IOM 2010a).

64. IOM (2008).

65. It is often assumed that gender refers specifically to women. However, gender, as defined in *The World's Women: Trends and Statistics* (United Nations 2010b), refers to the socially constructed differences and attributes and opportunities in being female or male and to the social interactions and relationships between women and men. As Ellis (2003) puts it, gender is more than understanding masculinity and femininity: it is about recognizing the importance of human relationships; it is about examining how history has shaped and defined both women and men; and it is about how men, as well as women, have assisted in defining male and female behaviour.

66. Jackson and Gray (2010).

67. CARICOM (2007a) data show that women comprise half the region's population; however, poverty is high within this group. The feminization of poverty refers to the fact that women, who represent half the global population, receive only a 10th of the world's income, own less than a 10th of the world's property, and, increasingly, are living below the poverty line. Despite a rise in women's labour force participation, the poverty rate among women continues to increase. Woman-headed families and women living alone comprise a disproportionate share of the individuals living in poverty. Women who must support themselves and their families are becoming the majority of the poor. Women are often unable to escape poverty after the loss of a husband. Moreover, women who have been largely confined to the domestic sphere would be poor if they had to support themselves.

68. ECLAC (2010).

69. This section relies extensively on UNICEF (2006). See also World Bank (2003); CARICOM (2010b). Additional resources on violence against children include *Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children* (2005); O'Donnell (2004); UNICEF (2000, 2002, 2004).

70. See 'Georgetown Declaration on Building a Region Fit for Children for the Survival, Development, Protection, Dignity, and Participation of Children within the Caribbean Community', CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana, 19 March 2008, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/meetings_statements/georgetown_declaration_children.jsp. See also UNICEF (2011).

71. Maroon are descendants of runaway slaves who formed communities.

An official definition of indigenous has not been adopted by any United Nations agency. Indigenous typically involves self-identification by individuals that is accepted by the community. It also refers to people's historical continuity with pre-colonial or pre-settler societies and is associated with strong links to territories and surrounding natural resources. Indigenous groups often rely on distinct social, economic, or political systems and have language, culture and belief systems that are distinct from dominant social groups. Often, they resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities. See Copabianco, Shaw, and Sagant (2009).

72. A hydroelectric power plant was built in Suriname in the 1960s to generate cheap electricity for the foreign-controlled bauxite industry (the pillar of the Surinamese economy), but it did not generate sustainable development for the benefit of the local Maroon population. Despite increased economic activity since the 1980s among foreign companies and small local entrepreneurs in gold mining, the lumber industry and tourism, the Brokopondo district is characterized by inequalities and widespread poverty, particularly among the local Maroon population.
73. See 'Video: An Interview with Julia Greenberg on HIV in the Caribbean,' AIDS-Free World, Brooklyn, 30 September 2009, <http://www.aidsfreeworld.org/Our-Issues/Homophobia/Video-An-Interview-with-Julia-Greenberg-on-HIV-in-the-Caribbean.aspx>. Greenberg is associate director of AIDS-Free World, a global advocacy group tackling HIV/AIDS.
74. Herek proposes a model that distinguishes three types of attitudes

according to the socio-psychological function they serve, as follows: (a) experiential: categorizes the reality of past interactions; (b) defensive: relates to coping with one's inner conflicts and anxieties by projecting them onto the homosexual persona; and (c) symbolic: expresses a more abstract concept of self and one's social network and reference group.

75. World Bank (2011a).
76. Felson and Pare (2010).

Chapter 2

1. See UNODC and World Bank (2007); ICPC (2010). The term youth is reserved for boys, girls, young men, or young women between the ages of 15 and 24 years. In the Caribbean, definitions differ according to political, legal and sociocultural traditions and according to data collection and research needs. Some research on youth development and youth violence may address young people up to 30 years of age (Moser and van Bronkhorst 1999; CARICOM 2010b). However, the United Nations standard is employed here in an attempt to apply a common definition across countries.
2. CARICOM (2010b).
3. United Nations (1995).
4. Deosaran (2007a); De Lisle et al. (2007).
5. For Antigua and Barbuda, information was provided by the Royal Police Force and the National Youth Intervention Unit. For Jamaica, see 'Gangs in Schools,' Go-Jamaica, 22 July 2008, http://go-jamaica.com/news/read_article.php?id=2832. For Trinidad and Tobago, see Lall (2007). See also Deosaran (2007b).
6. Focus group session conducted in Suriname with youth representatives

as part of the national research for this report.

7. Deosaran (2007a); De Lisle et al. (2007).
8. Chevannes (2004); De Lisle et al. (2007); Deosaran (2007b); Deosaran and Crawford (1996); Queeley-Roberts (2007).
9. Samms-Vaughan, Jackson, and Ashley (2004); Meeks Gardner et al. (2003).
10. For example, see Madden (2011).
11. Deosaran (2007a); Queeley-Roberts (2007).
12. CARICOM (2010b).
13. Carter, R. (2008); Carter, S. (2008).
14. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999); Cunningham et al. (2008).
15. Madden (2011); Levy (2009); Chaaban (2009); UNODC and World Bank (2007).
16. United Nations (2005a).
17. See Jacobo (2007); United Nations (2005a). Youth development indices have been constructed in countries such as Cyprus, Brazil, India, Malaysia, and Nigeria.
18. See CARICOM (2010b); Carter, R. (2008); Carter, S. (2008).
19. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999, 2).
20. Constantine, Benard, and Diaz (1999); Cunningham et al. (2008); Ungar et al. (2008); UNODC and World Bank (2007).
21. In conditions of rapid negative change, they may condition or even trigger rioting and political violence, however. Unemployment should not be confused with youth unemployment. The latter is more directly associated with violent crime.
22. UNODC and World Bank (2007).
23. Harriott (2008a); UNODC and World Bank (2007).
24. CARICOM (2010b); ICPC (2010); Cunningham et al. (2008).
25. The reports are cited in CARICOM (2010b, 37–39).

26. The average of the Caribbean Examinations Council pass rates across six countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago.
27. ICPC (2010).
28. CARICOM 2010b; Carter, R. 2008; Carter, S. 2008; Joseph, Holder, and Alexis (2009).
29. For example, note the difference between Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999) and HHS (2001).
30. Blum et al. (2003).
31. Hernandez-Ramdwars (2008).
32. De Lisle et al. (2007); Deosaran (2007b); Deosaran and Chadee (2007); Queeley-Roberts (2007).
33. Levy (2009).
34. Evans, quoted in Chevannes (2004, 9).
35. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999).
36. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999); Cunningham et al. (2008).
37. Brathwaite (2008).
38. CARICOM (2010b).
39. Blum et al. (2003).
40. UNODC and World Bank (2007).
41. Madden (2011); Crawford-Brown (2010).
42. "In many Caribbean countries the onset of sexual activity is occurring at young ages and early sexual initiation has been positively correlated with child abuse" (Ruland and Finger 2004, cited in Jones and Trotman Jemmot 2009, 18).
43. Queeley-Roberts (2007).
44. UNODC and World Bank (2007).
45. Deosaran (2007b).
46. Ungar et al. (2008, 168).
47. See Joseph, Holder, and Alexis (2009).
48. Blum et al. (2003).
49. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999).
50. Cunningham et al. (2008); Constantine, Benard, and Diaz (1999); Ungar et al. (2008); Madden (2011); Levy (2009).
51. CARICOM (2010c).
52. Wandering is a legal category in Barbados that applies to minors only. It involves being absent from home without the consent of parents or guardians. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, the category is simply running away from home.

Chapter 3

1. UNODC and World Bank (2007); Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby (2010).
2. van Gemert (2005, 148).
3. van Gemert (2005).
4. Harriott (2011, 6).
5. Harriott (2008b).
6. UNDP (2009).
7. All three data source have their respective problems and sources of error. Citizen perception data may not be reliable because various self-definitions of gangs may be operative and may inflate the problem. Self-report surveys may understate the problem because of poor sample frames and the reluctance to reveal gang membership. Police statistics are often rough estimates because various definitions of gangs and gang-related violence may be operative, at times even within the same police force. However, researchers have to make the best of the sources that exist and try to minimize errors through triangulation of the available data.
8. Katz, Webb, and Schaefer (2001); Katz (2003).
9. Webb, Katz, and Decker (2006).
10. Meeks Gardner, Katz, and Rosenblatt (2008).
11. Wortley (2009).
12. Katz and Choate (2006).
13. OAS (2008a).
14. Katz and Choate (2006).
15. Katz (2008).
16. Katz and Choate (2006); OAS (2008a).
17. Allan Goodridge, 'Gangs in Barbados', presentation at a Parent-Teacher Association Meeting, Bridgetown, Barbados, 24 March 2010, cited in 'Parents in Barbados Placed on Gang Alert', Daily Herald (Bridgetown), 26 April 2010.
18. Mogensen (2005).
19. Harriott (2008b).
20. Townsend (2009).
21. Walker, R. 'Profile: Jamaat al Muslimeen', BBC News, 3 June 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6716765.stm>.
22. Katz (2008).
23. OAS (2008a); Wilkinson, B. '11 Slain in Guyana Coastal Village: Gang Leader Blamed', Associated Press (27 January, 2008).
24. Maxson and Klein (1990); Katz (2003).
25. Katz and Choate (2006).
26. Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010).
27. Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010); Wells, Katz, and Kim (2010).
28. 'Guyana Ups Drugs Trafficking Fight', Weekend Mirror (Georgetown, Guyana), 3 December 2010.
29. Granger (2010).
30. Granger (2010).
31. Granger (2010).
32. United States of America vs. Samuel Knowles (2010) D. C. Docket 00-00425-CR-JIC; also see Paulin (2010).
33. US State Department (2011a).
34. Data of the Immigration Enforcement Department, Antigua and Barbuda.
35. 'Woman Falls Victim to Jamaican Sweepstakes Scam', Jamaica Observer (Kingston, Jamaica), 8 May 2010.
36. Townsend (2009).
37. UNODC and World Bank (2007); Solis and Aravena (2009).
38. UNODC and World Bank (2007).
39. Katz and Schnebly (2011).

40. The community cohesion scale was constructed by applying principal components analysis using 14 variables. The component used had an eigenvalue of 5.7 and accounted for 40.7 percent of the variance in the original 14 variables. A standardized variable was used to represent this component. The variables included in the component were as follows: (a) 'living here gives me a sense of community' (reverse coded); (b) 'the associations/relationships that I have with the people in this neighbourhood/community mean a lot to me' (reverse coded); (c) 'I like to think of myself as being in many ways similar to the people who live in this neighbourhood/community' (reverse coded); (d) 'I like to think of myself as being in many ways similar to people of other ethnic groups who live in this country' (reverse coded); (e) 'to what extent do you feel like you belong in this neighbourhood/community?'; (f) 'to what extent do you feel loyal to the people of this neighbourhood/community?'; (g) 'to what extent would you prefer to live somewhere else rather than continue to live in this neighbourhood/community?' (reverse coded); (h) 'to what extent are you proud of being in your neighbourhood/community?'; (i) 'to what extent do you work together with others to reduce violence in your community?'; (j) 'to what extent do you work together with others to improve your community?'; (k) 'to what extent do you participate in community activities?'; (l) 'how involved are you in community organizations and activities such as the church, sports, community centres, cultural activities?'; (m) 'I feel respected by the people who live in this community'; (n) 'are people in this community generally very trustworthy?'
41. The informal social control scale was constructed by applying principal components analysis using three variables. The component used had an eigenvalue of 2.2 and accounted for 74.3 percent of the variance in the original three variables. A standardized variable was used to represent this component. The variables included in the component were as follows: 'What is the likelihood that people from your community would intervene in a (a) suspected case of domestic violence, (b) fight breaking out in front of your house with someone being beaten, (c) stranger is suspected of stealing from someone?'
42. The societal cohesion–belonging scale was constructed by applying principal components analysis using four variables. The component used had an eigenvalue of 2.5 and accounted for 62.6 percent of the variance in the original four variables. A standardized variable was used to represent this component. The variables included in the component were as follows: (a) 'I feel like I belong in this country', (b) 'I feel loyal to the people of this country', (c) 'to what extent are you proud of your nationality?', (d) 'I would prefer to live in another country' (reverse coded).
43. The societal cohesion–inclusion scale was constructed by applying principal components analysis using three variables. The component used had an eigenvalue of 2.2 and accounted for 71.9 percent of the variance in the original three variables. A standardized variable was used to represent this component. The variables included in the component were as follows: (a) 'the associations that I have with the people in this country mean a lot to me', (b) 'I like to think of myself as similar to the people who live in this country', (c) 'to what extent do people in your country have similar values as yourself?'
44. The societal cohesion–participation scale was constructed by applying principal components analysis using two variables. The component used had an eigenvalue of 1.8 and accounted for 89.8 percent of the variance in the original two variables. A standardized variable was used to represent this component. The variables included in the component were as follows: 'to what extent would you be willing to work together with others (a) to reduce violence in the country?, (b) on something to improve this country?'
45. The societal cohesion–legitimacy scale was constructed by applying principal components analysis using four variables. The component used had an eigenvalue of 2.6 and accounted for 65.5 percent of the variance in the original four variables. A standardized variable was used to represent this component. The variables included in the component were as follows: (a) 'the police force deserves my support', (b) 'the court system deserves my support', (c) 'to what extent do you think that the courts of this country guarantee a fair trial?', (d) 'to what extent are your rights protected regardless of which party is in power?'
46. The societal cohesion–respect scale was constructed by applying principal components analysis using three variables. The component used had an eigenvalue of 2.2 and accounted for 72.6 percent of the variance in the original three variables. A standardized variable was used to represent this component. The variables included in the component

were as follows: (a) 'I feel respected by (most of) my fellow citizens', (b) 'I am respected by most citizens of another race/ethnicity', (c) 'I am respected by persons who earn a higher income than me'.

47. Leslie (2010, 22).
48. Harriott (2008b, 2009); Leslie (2010).
49. Katz (2007).
50. Blum et al. (2003).
51. Hawkins et al. (1999).
52. Human beings constantly interact with each other. They must therefore master rules of interaction if they are to live peacefully together and accomplish worthwhile aspirations. Observance of these rules of interaction may be broadly regarded as pro-social behaviour. Antisocial behaviour stands in contrast to pro-social behaviour. Broadly, antisocial behavior is behavior that is harmful to others. Such behaviour patterns are usually carried out in violation of social norms or the law. Individuals are socialized, consciously or subconsciously, about societal values as reflected in customs, norms and mores. Individuals learn or are socialized through official or formal control exercised through the state or informal control mechanisms exercised by non-state agents such as families or other persons on whom power has been conferred or who are able to exercise control or impose sanctions. The internalization of social norms serves to ensure conformity and can become oppressive to minorities that engage in norm-violating behaviour that may not be harmful to others. When such tensions rise, they typically lead to conflict and change.
53. Sinclair (2004a, 2004b).
54. For example, see Barrett (2011).
55. For instance, see Sinclair (2011). The Proceeds of Crime Act makes it a crime to profit from criminal activity.

56. For example, see Matthews (2011); see also 'More on the Decline in Jamaica's Crime', Go-Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica), 7 April 2011, http://go-jamaica.com/news/read_article.php?id=27841.
57. Spohn and Katz (2008).
58. Katz and Webb (2006).
59. Simon (2010a, 2010b).
60. Fahim (2010); see also 'Examining the Tivoli Gardens Gang Bust in Jamaica', PRI's The World (Boston), 21 December 2011, <http://www.theworld.org/2011/12/gang-tivoli-gardens-jamaica/>.
61. Spohn and Katz (2008).
62. Burch and Chemers (1997).
63. Wyrick (2006).

Chapter 4

1. Bayley (2006) identifies four essential characteristics of a democratic, citizen-oriented law enforcement agency, as follows: (a) police must be accountable to the rule of law and not the government; (b) police must protect human rights; (c) police must be accountable to people outside their organization; and (d) top priority must be given to servicing the needs of individual citizens and private groups.
2. Tyler (2004); Skogan and Frydl (2004).
3. Sunshine and Tyler (2003); Tyler (2011); Engel (2005).
4. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990).
5. Corder (2001).
6. Collier (2005); Harriott (2000); Palmer (1988).
7. Palmer (1988).
8. Harriott (2000); Dookhan (1975).
9. Collier (2005); Harriott (2000).
10. Quoted by Critchley (1967, 54).
11. Miller (1973); Critchley (1972).
12. Fridell and Wycoff (2004); Skogan (2004).
13. Greene (2000); Skogan (1990).

14. Skogan and Hartnett (1997); Strobl (2011).
15. Tyler (2004, 2011); Skogan and Frydl (2004).
16. Herrmann, MacDonald, and Tauscher (2011).
17. Harriott (2000).
18. Hall (2011).
19. See CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, <http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs>.
20. Bennett (1991a, 1991b).
21. Tyler (2004, 2011); Sunshine and Tyler (2003); Bayley (2006); Skogan and Frydl (2004).
22. Factor analysis is a statistical technique that identifies common features or similar underlying concepts in a group of items or variables by analysing the extent to which items cluster around a central concept and can be treated as a conceptual unit.
23. Bennett (2004).
24. Skogan (2006).
25. Peak, Bradshaw, and Glensor (1992).
26. Bennett and Wiegand (1994).
27. Van Dijk, van Kesteren, and Smit (2007).
28. Van Dijk, van Kesteren, and Smit (2007).
29. Worrall (1999).
30. Terpstra (2008).
31. Ren et al. (2006).

Chapter 5

1. Rowat, Malik, and Dakolias (1995).
2. Antoine (2008).
3. Antoine (2008).
4. Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago use the term supreme court to describe the entity that comprises both the high court and the court of appeal. The Supreme Court of Jamaica is the official term

used to describe the high court in that nation, while the court of appeals acts as the highest local appeals court.

5. Antoine (2008).
6. See Guyana, Supreme Court of Judicature (2009).
7. United Nations (2004a).
8. In addition to Antigua and Barbuda and to Saint Lucia, the ECSC member states are Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
9. Antoine (2008).
10. See the ECSC website, <http://www.oecs.org/>.
11. Of the Caribbean-7, Antigua and Barbuda, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago continue to use the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as a final appellate court (JCPC 2009).
12. United Nations (2003a).
13. Saunders (2010).
14. Bernard (2009, 223).
15. 'Our Mission, Our Vision,' Caribbean Court of Justice, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, <http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/>.
16. Bernard (2009, 220).
17. Antoine (2008).
18. US State Department (2010b, 4).
19. For more information on the issues outlined in this paragraph, see 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (database), Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, Washington, DC, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/>.
20. DFC (2004).
21. The homicide rates are based on data presented in chart 1.4, chapter 1. For background on the bail reform, see Trinidad and Tobago, Office of the Parliament (2008), 'The Bail (Amendment) Bill, 2008: An Act to Amend the Bail Act, Chap. 4:60', 1st Session of the 9th Parliament, Parliament of the Republic, Port of Spain, <http://www.ttparliament.org/publications.php?mid=28&id=355>.
22. For more information on the issues outlined in this section, see 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (database), Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, Washington, DC, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/>.
23. The absence of bail in Suriname, as well as the possibility of lengthy pre-trial detention, can be traced to the Netherlands. The Netherlanders have been criticized for their pre-trial detention practices in the Netherlands and in the Netherland territories in the West Indies.
24. Jamaica, Ministry of Youth and Community Development (1969, 1).
25. Lum and Yang (2005); Sherman (2003); Weisburd, Lum, and Yang (2003).
26. See Maguire and Bennett (2008); Maguire et al. (2008).
27. See Holdip (2010).
28. Maguire and King (2011).
29. Spohn and Denholm (2008, 9).
30. King and Maguire (2006).
31. See Maguire et al. (2010).
32. Nelson (2011).
33. World Prison Brief (database), International Centre for Prison Studies, London, <http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/>.
34. US State Department (2010e).
35. GINA (2006).
36. Guyana, Supreme Court of Judicature (2009).
37. GINA (2006, 7).
38. Spohn and Denholm (2008).
39. US State Department (2010f, 6).
40. Spohn and Denholm (2008).
41. Spohn and Denholm (2008, 4).
42. National Task Force on Crime Prevention (2005).
43. Webster's New World Law Dictionary (Wild 2006) defines pre-trial detention as "the detaining of an accused person in a criminal case before the trial has taken place, either because of a failure to post bail or due to denial of release under a pre-trial detention statute." Black's Law Dictionary (Black 1910) defines remand as follows: "to remand a prisoner, after a preliminary or partial hearing before a court or magistrate, is to send him back to custody, to be kept until the hearing is resumed or the trial comes on."
44. Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, and Finckenauer (2000).
45. Maguire and Bennett (2008).
46. The Prisons After Care Programme was introduced in Barbados in 1977, but has since undergone scrutiny because of its limited effectiveness.
47. 'Case Study: Resolving Disputes through Alternative Means; Court Mediation Process in Guyana Helps in Reducing Case Backlogs,' United States Agency for International Development, Washington, DC, http://www.usaid.gov/stories/guyana/cs_guyana_law.html.
48. '21,366 Civil Matters Pending at the End of 2007', Kaieteur News (Georgetown, Guyana), 14 March 2009, <http://www.kaieteurnews.com/2009/03/14/21366-civil-matters-pending-at-the-end-of-2007/>.
49. Guyana provides the following example: "Section 17 of the Juvenile Offenders Act identifies 7 instances whereby a juvenile can be brought before the Courts: begging or receiving alms; wandering; destitute; under the care of a parent or guardian who by reason of criminal or drunken habits, is unfit to care for the child; is the daughter of a father who had been convicted

of incest; or frequents the company of any reputed thief, or common or reputed prostitute. These instances are not seen as criminal conduct by a juvenile but rather as the State acting in the best interest of the child by removing that child from a vulnerable situation and placing him/her in the care of a relative or institution.” (Guyana, Office of the President 2008, 1–2)

50. Deosaran and Chadee (1997).
51. United Nations (1985, 8).
52. For example, see Jordan (2009). Also see ‘Police Probing Allegations of Ranks Having Sex with Female Prisoners’, *Kaieteur News* (Georgetown, Guyana), 18 November 2011, <http://www.kaieteurnews.com/2011/11/18/police-probing-allegations-of-ranks-having-sex-with-female-prisoners>.
53. Guyana is the poorest of the seven nations, with a 2010 annual GDP per capita of about US\$6,800. Suriname ranks fifth out of the seven nations, with a 2010 GDP per capita of about US\$9,900.
54. See Rountree and Land (1995); Warr (1987).
55. Norris and Chadee (2001),
56. Norris and Chadee (2001, 69).
57. Guyana was once a colony of the Netherlands, but it then became a British colony for 151 years before achieving independence in 1966.
58. For example, see article 7, ‘Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands’, signed at The Hague on 24 June 1980 and entered into force 15 September 1983, <https://www.unodc.org/tldb/showDocument.do?documentUid=6086&country=NET&language=ENG>.
59. ‘Survey for Channel 4 on Attitudes towards the Death Penalty’ (database), Ipsos Mori, London (28 October 2009), <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2504>.
60. See Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin (1978).
61. See Cohen-Cole et al. (2009).
62. See Cochrane, Chamlin, and Seth (1994).
63. Gifford (2009).
64. US State Department (2010b, 2).
65. US State Department (2010f, 3).
66. Amnesty International (2009).
67. See Amnesty International (2011).
68. Amnesty International (2011).
69. Maguire (2010).
70. Fyfe (1988).
71. Guyana, Ministry of Home Affairs (2011, 22).
72. Guyana, Ministry of Home Affairs (2011, 28)
73. Transparency International (2010, 4).
74. Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal (2011).
75. Chabrol (2010).
76. Integrity in Public Life Act, Government of Antigua and Barbuda, No. 23 of 2004, *Official Gazette* 44 (95), 30 December, <http://www.laws.gov.ag/acts/2004/a2004-23.pdf>.
77. ‘History of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)’, CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana, <http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/history.jsp>. Current member states are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Associate members are Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos.
78. CARICOM (2007b).
79. Coward (2011).
80. Antoine (2008).
81. Byron and Dakolias (2008, 93).

82. ‘Caribbean Prisons Urged to Be Part of Crime Solution’, *Bahama Islands Info* (Freeport, Grand Bahama), 22 June 2010.

Chapter 6

1. Brown (2010).
2. For example, see ‘Clash between Police and Residents, Laventille, Trinidad and Tobago’, *CNC3News* video, 4:10, 16 May 2009, uploaded to YouTube, 18 March 2011, <http://vodpod.com/watch/5788670-trinidad-war-in-laventille>; ‘Jamaican Police Kills Man’, *TVJ News* video, 2:24, 31 July 2010, uploaded to YouTube, 10 August 2010, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eWHSOdVN97Q>.
3. An example is the Governance and Accountability Framework established as part of Jamaica’s Public Sector Modernization Programme. The framework allows for public involvement in the government decision-making process. A Consultation Code of Practice for the Public Service is among the initiatives introduced through the framework. The code establishes guidelines that require public consultation on all policies that affect the population. This requirement of accountability and citizen participation facilitates debates on new laws, for example. Thus, through open debates or legislative submissions, civil society has participated in the drafting of anti-gang legislation, the Terrorism Prevention Act (2005) and the Sexual Offences Act (2009).
4. Private sector initiatives included the creation of a 12-point declaration and establishment of an anti-crime fund. For example, see ‘PSOJ Turns Up “Dudus” Heat’, *Jamaica Observer* (Kingston, Jamaica),

11 March 2010, <http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/PSOJ-turns-up--Dudus--heat-3-11-2010#>.

5. Harriott (2009).
6. Harriott (2009).
7. Schmaller (2011).
8. For Trinidad, see Equal Opportunity Commission, <http://www.equalopportunity.gov.tt/>. For Guyana, see 'Guyana: The Main Human Rights Institutions', United Nations Population Fund, New York, http://www.unfpa.org/derechos/guyana_eng.htm.
9. The estimates were calculated based on public information in expenditure reports delivered by the treasury departments or ministries of finance of each country. However, these figures are approximations. Despite a rigorous effort to select the budget lines that reflected the real expenditure on security, the real total is not fully captured for several reasons. Without deeper involvement in the budgetary process, one faces great difficulty in attempting to capture the values that match some lines, especially in areas such as violence prevention and institutional strengthening. Thus, although most of the budgetary weight in crime prevention, for example, falls on the ministries of security, government, or interior, there are also relevant initiatives in ministries of foreign affairs, education, welfare, health, and so on. Our analysis has consisted in the identification, down to the budget line, of programmes and initiatives directly related to matters of security. There is a consensus that well-groomed public spaces, universal education and anti-corruption initiatives influence, in a clear manner, success in preventing violence, building citizenship and promoting coexistence, besides improving

public services. Nonetheless, we maintained our focus on analysis of direct public expenditure in matters regarding security. This has included prevention of armed violence, community-based solutions, initiatives to limit drug and alcohol consumption, witness and victim protection programmes focused on women and youth, local security management programmes, and the prevention of human trafficking. Thus, we did not analyse fully even the budgets of ministries of security, government, interior and justice. Much of the work of these ministries also involves other matters, including issuance of passports, registries on individuals and documentation services. For defense expenditures, for example, only budgetary activities directly related to citizen security such as arms collection and destruction, border control, and maritime surveillance were examined.

10. UNDP (2011b).
11. See Christie (2002); Patterson (2004); 'US Pledges Help to Fight Caribbean Drug Trafficking', BBC News, 17 April 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8626674.stm>.
12. US State Department (2000).
13. Sabatier (1988).
14. Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009).
15. See the CARICOM IMPACS website, at <http://www.caricomimpacs.org>. See also CARICOM (2002).
16. Gordon (1997); Seelke et al. (2011).
17. See CARICOM (2000, 2010d); OAS (2010a); United Nations (1994); Iglesias (2002).
18. CARICOM (2002).
19. CARICOM (2010c, 2010e).
20. Gun marking and tracing programmes are in line with the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a

Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 2005 (United Nations 2005b). The instrument commits states to mark existing stocks of weapons held by governments, armed individuals and security forces. This surveillance seeks to reduce the chances of the flow of these weapons to the illicit market. By 26 September 2011, 14 governments in the greater region had signed agreements to execute a related Project to Promote Firearms Marking in Latin America and the Caribbean: Barbados, the Bahamas, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Paraguay, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vicente and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay (OAS 2011a). Firearms marking is also a mandate within the framework of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Related Materials (US State Department 1997).

21. See OAS (2010b, 2011b); 'CARICOM Tracking Illegal Guns in Region', Jamaica Observer (Kingston, Jamaica), 11 February 2011, <http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Caricom-tracking-illegal-guns-in-region#ixzz1ZEeHRKje>.
22. ICNL (2001).
23. OAS (2008c).
24. See US State Department (2011b); Narcotics Control Reports (database), US State Department, Washington, DC, <http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>; Trafficking in Persons Report (database), US State Department, Washington, DC, <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/index>.

- htm; Human Rights Reports (database), US State Department, Washington, DC, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/>.
25. 'Caribbean Could See Reduced UK Aid over Anti-gay Laws', *Stabroek News* (Georgetown, Guyana), 30 October 2011, <http://www.stabroeknews.com/2011/news/breaking-news/10/30/caribbean-could-see-reduced-uk-aid-over-anti-gay-laws/>.
 26. See DFAIT (2011); GINA (2006); USAID (2004); Rodgers (2011); Virtue (2011).
 27. See 'Police Present Seven Reasons for 60 Days', *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 1 October 2008, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20081001/lead/lead2.html>; 'Know Your Crime Bills', *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 12 July 2010, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20100712/news/news3.html>.
 28. This includes the Latin American Public Opinion Project's AmericasBarometer, Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys in Guyana and Suriname and National Crime Victimization Surveys in Barbados and Jamaica.
 29. Garland (1990); Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz (2009); Baker and Roberts (2005).
 30. 'St. Lucia's Crime Plan', *nationnews.com* (Fontabelle, Barbados), 1 February 2011, <http://www.nationnews.com/articles/view/st-lucias-crime-plan/>; 'Govt. to Get Tough on Crime', *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 16 February 2011, <http://Jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110216/carib/carib1.html>.
 31. 'Trinidad and Tobago Bringing Back Death Penalty', *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 17 January 2011, <http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110117/lead/lead5.html>.
 32. Angus Reid Public Opinion (2010).
 33. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (database), Section 2 'Public Opinion', US Bureau of Justice Statistics, Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center, University at Albany, Albany, NY, <http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/>.
 34. The commission reported on death penalty-related cases in the Bahamas, Belize, Grenada and Jamaica, where the Commission found government violations and recommended remedies for violations of inmate rights with respect to issues of and treatment with respect to the imposition of the death penalty (IACHR 2011).
 35. Some consequences of this backlash include withdrawal of ratification of the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights, the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and creation of the Caribbean Court of Justice as a court of final jurisdiction. More recently, 12 Caribbean countries voted against United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/168 calling for a moratorium on executions. See Helfer (2002).
 36. 'Govt. to Get Tough on Crime', *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 16 February 2011, <http://Jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110216/carib/carib1.html>.
 37. The following definition of the rule of law has been proffered within the United Nations (2004b, 4): "It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency."
 38. This use of 'don' is derived from a term of respect in Italian that has been adopted outside Italy to refer to a high-ranking or powerful member of the Mafia. In the Caribbean context, the term has come to prominence as a euphemistic label for a 'community leader' in a socially excluded or marginalized community.
 39. Robotham (2003).
 40. Alves and Correia (2010); Lench (2007); Hellman, Muilenburg-Trevino, and Worley (2008).
 41. Worcester and Gill (2005).
 42. Powell and Lewis (2011).
 43. Latin American Public Opinion Project, 'Guyana', Vanderbilt University, Nashville, <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/guyana.php>.
 44. Latin American Public Opinion Project, 'Suriname', Vanderbilt University, Nashville, <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/suriname.php>.
 45. US State Department (2010f).
 46. Transparency International (2009, 2010).
 47. Transparency International has also warned about state capture in Jamaica (Salas and Reiter 2009).
 48. Edelman (1967, 1971, 1988) categorizes policies as instrumental (tangible) or expressive (symbolic). While instrumental policies actually address a problem, symbolic policies are adopted by governments to

appease public concerns; they typically do not create long-term changes or may be enacted, but not enforced.

49. See Marion and Oliver (2006, 2010), including the references.
50. 'Support Us to Fight Crime: PM Golding', Office of the Prime Minister, Government of Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica, 18 June 2010, http://www.opm.gov.jm/news_and_public_affairs/support_us_to_fight_crime_pm_golding.
51. Golding (2011); JIS (2011).
52. For example, see the report on Barbados, which identifies the occasional use of excessive force as a human rights problem (US State Department 2010b).
53. United Nations (2003b), paragraph 81.

54. United Nations (2003b).
55. World Bank (2011a).
56. Jones (2007).
57. United Nations (2005c); UNDP (2010b).
58. Thomas and Wint (2002).
59. UNODC and World Bank (2007); WHO (2010).
60. See CARICOM (2010b); UNICEF 2006; World Bank (2003).
61. World Bank (2011a).
62. UNDP (1997).
63. UNDP (1994).

Chapter 7

1. Moore and Stephens (1991).
2. Wycoff and Skogan (1994).
3. Cano (2008).

References

- Alves, H., and I. Correia. (2010).* 'Personal and General Belief in a Just World as Judgement Norms'. *International Journal of Psychology* 45 (3): 221–231.
- Amnesty International. (2008).* 'Jamaica, "Let Them Kill Each Other": Public Security in Jamaica's Inner Cities'. Report (1 April), Amnesty International, London. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR38/001/2008/en>.
- Amnesty International. (2009).* Amnesty International Report 2009: The State of the World's Human Rights. London: Amnesty International. <http://report2009.amnesty.org/sites/report2009.amnesty.org/files/documents/air09-en.pdf>.
- Amnesty International. (2011).* 'Trinidad and Tobago: Amnesty International Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, 12th session of the UPR Working Group, October 2011'. Document AMR 49/005/2011 (March). Amnesty International, London. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR49/005/2011/en>.
- Angus Reid Public Opinion. (2010).* 'U.S., Britain and Canada Endorse Death Penalty'. Angus Reid Global Monitor (25 January), Angus Reid Public Opinion, Vancouver. http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/38156/us_britain_and_canada_endorse_death_penalty/.
- Antoine, R. M. B. (2008).* *Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge-Cavendish.
- Ayres, R. L. (1998).* 'Crime and Violence as Development Issues in Latin America and the Caribbean'. Report 17408, World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies: Viewpoints, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Baker, E., and J. V. Roberts. (2005).* 'Globalization and the New Punitiveness'. In *The New Punitiveness: Trends, Theories, Perspectives*, ed. J. Pratt, D. Brown, M. Brown, S. Hallsworth, and W. Morrison, 121–138. Portland, OR: Willan Publishing.
- Barnes, A., and R. Seepersad. (2008).* *Beyond Boundaries: A Comparative Study on Deportation in Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago*. Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago: CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security.
- Barrett, L. (2011).* 'Cops Winning the Fight against Gangs'. *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 31 March. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110331/lead/lead5.html>.
- Baumgartner, J. N., C. Waszak Geary, H. Tucker, and M. Wedderburn. (2009)* 'The Influence of Early Sexual Debut and Sexual Violence on Adolescent Pregnancy: A Matched Case-Control Study in Jamaica'. *International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health* 35 (1): 21–28.
- Bayley, D. H. (2006).* *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Belur, J. (2010).* 'Why Do the Police Use Deadly Force? Explaining Police Encounters in Mumbai'. *British Journal of Criminology* 50 (2): 320–341.
- Bennett, R. R. (1991a).* 'Development and Crime: A Cross-National Time Series Analysis of Competing Models'. *Sociological Quarterly* 32 (3): 343–363.

- Bennett, R. R. (1991b).* 'Routine Activities: A Cross-National Assessment of a Criminological Perspective.' *Social Forces* 70 (1): 147–163.
- Bennett, R. R. (2004).* 'Calling for Service: Mobilization of the Police across Sociocultural Environments.' *Police Practice and Research* 5 (1): 25–41.
- Bennett, R. R., W. P. Shields, and B. Daniels. (2007).* 'Crime and Development in the Caribbean: An Investigation of Traditional Explanatory Models.' In *Crime, Delinquency and Justice: A Caribbean Reader*, ed. R. Deosaran, part 6. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
- Bennett, R. R., and B. Wiegand. (1994).* 'Observations on Crime Reporting in a Developing Nation.' *Criminology* 32 (1): 135–148.
- Bernard, D. P. (2009).* 'The Caribbean Court of Justice: A New Judicial Experience.' *The International Journal of Legal Information* 37 (2): 219–238.
- Black, H. C. (1910).* *A Law Dictionary*. 2nd ed. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company.
- Blum, R. W., L. Halcón, T. Beubring, E. Pate, S. Campbell-Forrester, and A. Venema. (2003).* 'Adolescent Health in the Caribbean: Risk and Protective Factors.' *American Journal of Public Health* 93 (3): 456–460.
- Blumstein, A., J. Cohen, and D. S. Nagin, eds. (1978).* *Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates*. Report, Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, National Research Council. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
- Brathwaite, B. (2008).* 'Adolescent and Youth Risk and Vulnerability: Report of Approximately 250 Youth Ages 15–29 from Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago.' Report, Commission on Youth Development, CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana.
- Brathwaite, F. (1996).* 'Some Aspects of Sentencing in the Criminal Justice System of Barbados.' *Caribbean Quarterly* 42 (2–3): 101–118.
- Brathwaite, F., and D. A. Yeboah. (2004).* 'Victims of Crime in the Criminal Justice System in Barbados.' *Journal of Criminal Justice* 32 (5): 431–442.
- Brown, I. (2010).* 'Crime and Violence Dominate Media Coverage in Region.' *Jamaica Observer Online* (27 November). http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Crime-and-violence-dominate-media-coverage-in-region_818940627 November.
- Burch, J. H., and B. M. Chemers. (1997).* 'A Comprehensive Response to America's Youth Gang Problem.' Fact Sheet 40 (March), Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
- Buvinic, M., A. Morrison, and M. Shifter. (1999).* 'Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Framework for Action.' Technical Study (March), Sustainable Development Department, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC.
- BYBT (Barbados Youth Business Trust). (2011).* 'BYBT Annual Report 2010'. 15 April, BYBT, Bridgetown, Barbados. http://www.youthbusiness.bb/files/stories/annual_reports/Annual_Report_2010.pdf.
- Byron, S. D., and M. Dakolias. (2008).* 'The Regional Court Systems in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and the Caribbean.' In *Small States, Smart Solutions: Improving Connectivity and Increasing the Effectiveness of Public Services*, ed. E. M. Favaro, 91–126. Washington, DC: World Bank.

- Cano, I. (2008).* 'Police Oversight in Brazil'. Laboratório de Análise da Violência, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro.
- CARICOM (Caribbean Community). (2000).* 'Regional Drug Control Activities'. Paper prepared for Rotary International's 'Model CARICOM Youth Summit', Georgetown, Guyana, 30 November–3 December. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community_organ/regional_drug.jsp?menu=cob.
- . (2002). 'Report: Crime and Security'. Regional Task Force on Crime and Security, CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/regional_issues/crime_and_security_task_force_report_2002.pdf.
- . (2007a). 'Women and Men in the Caribbean Community: Facts and Figures, 1998–2005'. February, CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.criti.info/sharing_the_vision/CARICOM%20Documents/CHAP1-POPFAM.pdf.
- . (2007b). 'One Team, One Space, One Caribbean'. Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, CARICOM, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. <http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs/pdf/07.pdf>.
- . (2009). 'Youth Risk Composite by Country'. Commission on Youth Development, CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana.
- . (2010a). *Caribbean Trade and Investment Report 2010: Strategies for Recovery, Renewal and Reform*. Georgetown, Guyana: CARICOM; Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publications.
- . (2010b). 'Eye on the Future: Investing in Youth Now for Tomorrow's Community'. Draft report (January), Commission on Youth Development, CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community_organ/cohsod_youth/eye_on_the_future_ccyd_report.pdf.
- . (2010c). 'Crime Prevention Plan: Addressing The Development Challenge of Crime and Violence'. Press Release 365/2010 (17 September), CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/press_releases_2010/pres365_10.jsp.
- . (2010d). 'Caribbean–United States Summit: Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean'. 29 December, CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana. <http://www.caricomlaw.org/Details.aspx?EntryId=173>.
- . (2010e). 'Welcome Remarks by His Excellency Edwin W. Carrington, Secretary General, Caribbean Community (CARICOM), on the Occasion of the First Meeting of the Reconstituted Inter-Governmental Task Force (IGTF), 29 September 2010, Georgetown, Guyana'. Press Release 380/2010 (29 September), CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/press_releases_2010/pres380_10.jsp.
- . (2010f). 'Declaration of Paramaribo on the Future of Youth in the Caribbean Community'. Press Release 47/2010 (30 January), CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres47_10.jsp.
- Carter, R. (2008).* 'Caribbean Youth: An Integrated Literature Review'. Commission on Youth Development, CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana.
- Carter, S. (2008).* 'Youth Visions, Aspirations, Concerns and CSME Perspectives'. Commission on Youth Development, CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana.

- Chaaban, J. (2009).* 'The Cost of Negative Youth Behaviours in the CARICOM Member States'. Report, Commission on Youth Development, CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana.
- Chabrol, D. S. (2010).* 'Local Chapter of Transparency International in the Making: Expects Hurdles'. Demerara Waves 1497 (11 November), Demerara Waves Media, Georgetown, Guyana.
- Chadee, D. (2003).* 'Fear of Crime and Risk Victimization'. Social and Economic Studies 52 (1): 70–97.
- Chadee, D., L. Austen, and J. Ditton. (2007).* 'The Relationship between Likelihood and Fear of Criminal Victimization: Evaluating Risk Sensitivity as a Mediating Concept'. British Journal of Criminology 47 (1): 133–153.
- Chevannes, P. (2004).* 'Preliminary Study on Violence in Caribbean Schools'. Paper prepared for the Change from Within Project, Cluster Office, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Kingston, Jamaica.
- Christie, N. (1986).* 'The Ideal Victim'. In From Crime Policy to Victim Policy: Reorienting the Justice System, ed. E. A. Fattah, 17–30. Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Christie, P. (2002).* 'Speech by Hon. Perry Christie, Prime Minister of the Bahamas'. Speech presented at the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Georgetown, Guyana, 3 July. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/23hgc_christie.jsp.
- Cochrane, J. K., M. B. Chamlin, and M. Seth. (1994).* 'Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma's Return to Capital Punishment'. Criminology 32 (1): 107–134.
- Coffey, P. S. (2004).* 'Literature Review of Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean'. August, United States Agency for International Development, Washington, DC. <http://www.oas.org/atip/regional%20reports/usaid%20lac%20tip%20literature%20review.pdf>.
- Cohen-Cole, E., S. Durlauf, J. Fagan, and D. S. Nagin. (2009).* 'Model Uncertainty and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment'. American Law and Economics Review 11 (2): 335–369.
- Collier, M. W. (2005).* Political Corruption in the Caribbean Basin. New York: Routledge.
- Constantine, N. A., B. Benard, and M. Diaz. (1999).* 'Measuring Protective Factors and Resilience Traits in Youth: The Healthy Kids Resilience Assessment'. Paper presented at the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Society for Prevention Research, 'Toward a Synthesis of Prevention Science Paradigms over the Life Course', New Orleans, 24–26 June.
- Cooke, R. (2002).* 'Report of the National Survey of Street and Working Children'. Child Support Unit, Ministry of Health, Kingston, Jamaica.
- Copabianco, L., M. Shaw, and V. Sagant. (2009).* 'Community Safety and Indigenous Peoples: Sharing Knowledge, Insights and Action'. Background paper for the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime's Workshops, Aboriginal Policy Research Conference, Ottawa, 9–12 March.
- Cordner, G. (2001).* 'Community-Based Policing'. In Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary Readings, ed. R. G. Dunham and G. P. Alpert, 493–510. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc.
- Costelloe, M., T. Chiricos, and M. Gertz. (2009).* 'Punitive Attitudes toward Criminals'. Punishment and Society 11 (1): 25–49.

- Coward, S. L. (2011).* 'CONSLE to Audit IMPACS'. Press release (2 June), Caribbean Press Releases. <http://www.caribbeanpressreleases.com/articles/8376/1/CONSOLE-to-Audit-IMPACS/Page1.html>.
- Crawford-Brown, C. (2010).* Children in the Line of Fire: The Impact of Violence and Trauma on Families in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Kingston, Jamaica: Arawak Publications.
- Critchley, T. A. (1967).* A History of Police in England and Wales, 900–1966. London: Constable.
- . (1972). A History of Police in England and Wales. Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith.
- Cunningham, W., L. McGinnis, R. García Verdú, C. Tesliuc, and D. Verner. (2008).* Youth at Risk in Latin America and the Caribbean: Understanding the Causes, Realizing the Potential. Directions in Development: Human Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- De Albuquerque, K., and J. L. McElroy. (1999).* 'A Longitudinal Study of Serious Crime in the Caribbean'. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology 4 (1–2): 32–70.
- De Lisle, J., N. Ramkhelawan, C. Joseph, S. Annisette, I. Maraj, A. Singh, K. Ali, T. Thomas, L. Murray, and J.-A. Walcott. (2007).* 'Thinking Violent Thoughts: Students' Attitudes to Violence within Secondary Schools in Trinidad and Tobago'. In Crime, Delinquency and Justice: A Caribbean Reader, ed. R. Deosaran, 133–148. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
- Deosaran, R. 2000.* Psychonomics and Poverty: Toward Governance and a Civil Society. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.
- . (2007a). 'A Caribbean Portrait of Crime, Justice and Community Policing'. In Crime, Delinquency and Justice: A Caribbean Reader, ed. R. Deosaran, part 4. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
- . (2007b). 'School Violence and Delinquency: The Dynamics of Race, Gender, Class, Age and Parenting in the Caribbean'. In Crime, Delinquency and Justice: A Caribbean Reader, ed. R. Deosaran, 89–132. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
- . (2009). 'Keynote Address; Criminology: Challenges and Public Policy'. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Public Safety 14 (1–2), iv–xvi.
- Deosaran, R., and D. Chadee. (1997).* 'Juvenile Delinquency in Trinidad and Tobago: Challenges for Social Policy and Caribbean Criminology'. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology 2 (2): 36–83.
- . (2007). 'Juvenile Delinquency in Trinidad and Tobago: Challenges for Social Policy and Caribbean Criminology'. In Crime, Delinquency and Justice: A Caribbean Reader, ed. R. Deosaran, 159–195. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
- Deosaran, R., and C. Crawford. (1996).* 'Crime (and Delinquency) and Violence in Schools: Analysis, Intervention and Prevention; Project Proposal'. University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago.
- DFAIT (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada). (2011).* 'Canada-CARICOM Relations'. 26 July, DFAIT, Ottawa. http://www.international.gc.ca/americas-ameriques/canada_caricom/canada_caricom.aspx?lang=eng&view=d.
- DFC (Disciplined Forces Commission). (2004).* 'Report of the Disciplined Forces Commission'. May, DFC, Georgetown, Guyana. <http://www>.

- scribd.com/doc/56146823/Report-of-the-Disciplined-Forces-Commission-Unofficial-Copy.
- Ditton, J., and S. Farrall. (2000).* *Fear of Crime.* Aldershot, United Kingdom: Ashgate.
- DLP (Democratic Labour Party). 2008.* 'Pathways to Progress: Manifesto of the Democratic Labour Party, 2008'. 31 August, DLP, Bridgetown, Barbados. http://www.dlpbarbados.org/cms/images/stories/policy/2008_dlp_manifesto.pdf.
- Dookhan, I. (1975).* *A Post-Emancipation History of the West Indies.* London: Collins.
- Douglas, L. (2008).* 'Jobs for Gangs: 10,000 Unskilled Youths to Be Trained over Next Four Years'. 23 October, Jamaica Labour Party, Kingston, Jamaica. <http://www.jamaicalabourparty.com/base/content/jobs-gangs>.
- ECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). (2010a).* 'Caribbean Synthesis Review and Appraisal Report in the Context of the 15th Anniversary of the Adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action'. Document LC/CAR/L.259 (14 May), ECLAC, Santiago, Chile.
- . (2010b). 'What Kind of State? What Kind of Equality: 11th Regional Conference on Women in Latin America and the Caribbean'. (December), ECLAC, Santiago, Chile.
- Edelman, M. J. (1967).* *The Symbolic Uses of Politics.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- . (1971). *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence.* New York: Academic Press.
- . (1988). *Constructing the Political Spectacle.* Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- Engel, R. S. (2005).* 'Citizens' Perceptions of Distributive and Procedural Injustice during Traffic Stops with Police'. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 42 (4): 445–481.
- Fabim, K. (2010).* 'Jamaican Forces Accused of Killing Unarmed Men'. *New York Times*, 2 June. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/world/americas/03jamaica.html>.
- Favaro, E. M. and D. Peretz. (2008).* 'Introduction'. In *Small States, Smart Solutions: Improving Connectivity and Increasing the Effectiveness of Public Services*, ed. E. M. Favaro, 1–24. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Felson, R. B., and P.-P. Pare. (2010).* 'Gun Cultures or Honor Cultures? Explaining Regional and Race Differences in Weapon Carrying'. *Social Forces* 88 (3): 1357–1378.
- Fox, K., and G. Gordon-Strachan. (2007).* 'Jamaican Youth Risk and Resiliency Behaviour Survey 2005: School-Based Survey on Risk and Resiliency Behaviours of 10–15 Year Olds'. Report TR-07–58 (March), University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.
- Francis, A., G. Gibbison, A. D. Harriott, and C. Kirton. (2009).* *Crime and Development: the Jamaican Experience.* Kingston, Jamaica: Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies.
- Fridell, L., and M. A. Wycoff, eds. (2004).* *Community Policing: The Past, Present, and Future.* Washington, DC: Annie E. Casey Foundation, Police Executive Research Forum.
- Fyfe, J. J. (1988).* 'Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform'. *Justice Quarterly* 5 (2): 165–201.
- Garland, D. (1990).* *Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- GHRA (Guyana Human Rights Association). (2002). 'Ambivalent about Violence: A Report on Fatal Shootings by the Police in Guyana, 1980–2001'. Report, GHRA, Georgetown, Guyana. <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/GHRA-reporton-FatalShootings.pdf>.*
- Gifford, A. (2009). 'The Death Penalty: Developments in Caribbean Jurisprudence'. International Journal of Legal Information 37 (2): 196–203.*
- GINA (Government Information Agency). (2006). 'Guyana Justice Sector Reform Strategy 2006–2010: Safety, Security and Access to Justice for All'. June, GINA, Georgetown, Guyana. <http://www.gina.gov.gy/justicereform/Guyana%20JSRS%20revised%20June%202006c.pdf>.*
- Girvan, N. (2011). 'Existential Threats in the Caribbean: Democratising Politics, Regionalising Governance'. C. L. R. James Memorial Lecture, Cipriani College of Labour and Cooperative Studies, Valsayn, Trinidad and Tobago, 12 May, revised 17 May. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/clr_james_lecture_girvan.pdf.*
- Global Commission on Drug Policy. (2011). War on Drugs: Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy. June, <http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/Report>.*
- Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children. (2005). 'Ending Legalised Violence against Children: Report for the Caribbean Regional Consultation; the UN Secretary-General's Study on Violence against Children, Trinidad, March 10–11', Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, Geneva. <http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/pdfs/reports/Report-Caribbean.pdf>.*
- Golding, M. (2011). 'The Judicial Dismantling of the Crime Bills'. Jamaica Gleaner (Kingston, Jamaica), 17 July. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110717/cleisure/cleisure2.html>.*
- Gomes, C. (2007). 'Police Accountability in the Caribbean: Where are the People?' Paper presented at the Civicus World Assembly's Workshop on Police Accountability, Glasgow, 23–27 May.*
- Gordon, C. (1997). 'Statement by Ms. Cheryl Gordon, First Secretary in the Permanent Mission of Jamaica'. Statement presented to the Third Committee, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural, United Nations General Assembly, New York, 27 October. <http://www.un.int/jamaica/103104.htm>.*
- Granger, D. A. (2010). 'The Failure of Guyana's National Drug Strategy Master Plan: Guyana's National Drug Strategy Master Plan 2005–2009 Has Expired; Was It a Success or Failure?' Guyana Review (31 May), Stabroek News, Georgetown, Guyana.*
- Greene, J. R. (2000). 'Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure, and Function of the Police'. In Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice System, ed. J. Horney, 299–370. NCJ 182410 (July). Vol. 3 of Criminal Justice 2000. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice.*
- Greer, C. (2007). 'News Media, Victims and Crime'. In Victims, Crime and Society, ed. P. Davies, P. Francis, and C. Greer. London: Sage.*
- Guyana, Ministry of Home Affairs. (2011). 'Guyana Police Force Strategic Plan, 2011–2015'. Ministry of Home Affairs, Georgetown, Guyana. <http://www.moha.gov.gy/GPF.pdf>.*

- Guyana, Office of the President.* (2008). 'Guyana's Response: OAS Questionnaire on Juvenile Criminal Justice in the Americas.' 28 November, Governance Unit, Office of the President, Georgetown, Guyana. http://www.minfor.gov.gy/tsite/images/minfor_docs/questionnaires/juvenile_criminal_justice.pdf.
- Guyana, Supreme Court of Judicature.* (2009). 'Annual Report, 2007'. February, Supreme Court of the Judicature, Georgetown, Guyana.
- Hall, A.* (2011). 'Police Clean House: Several Cops in Hot Water over Corruption Allegations'. *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 16 March. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110316/news/news1.html>.
- Harrendorf, S., M. Heiskanen, and S. Malby, eds.* (2010). *International Statistics on Crime and Justice*. HEUNI Publication Series 64. Helsinki: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control; Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
- Harriott, A. D.* (1996). 'The Changing Social Organization of Crime and Criminals in Jamaica'. *Caribbean Quarterly* 42 (2-3): 54-71.
- . (2000). *Police and Crime Control in Jamaica: Problems of Reforming Ex-colonial Constabularies*. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.
- . (2002). 'Crime Trends in the Caribbean and Responses'. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/barbados/caribbean_report_crime-trends.pdf.
- . (2003). 'The Jamaica Crime Problem: New Developments and New Challenges for Public Policy'. In *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy*, ed. A. D. Harriott, 1-12. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.
- . (2004). 'The Jamaican Crime Problem: Some Policy Considerations'. In *Crime and Criminal Justice in the Caribbean*, ed. A. D. Harriott, F. Brathwaite, and S. Wortley, 251-253. Kingston, Jamaica: Arawak Publishing.
- . (2008a). 'Bending the Trend Line: The Challenge of Controlling Violence in Jamaica and the High Violence Societies of the Caribbean'. Professorial Inaugural Lecture (July), University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.
- . (2008b). *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica: Breaking the Nexus*. Kingston, Jamaica: Canoe Press.
- . (2009). 'Controlling Violent Crime: Models and Policy Options'. GraceKennedy Foundation Lecture (March), GraceKennedy Foundation, Kingston, Jamaica.
- . (2011). 'The Emergence and Evolution of Organized Crime in Jamaica'. Unpublished report, University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.
- Hawkins, J. D., R. F. Catalano, R. Kosterman, R. Abbott, and K. G. Hill.* (1999). 'Preventing Adolescent Health-Risk Behaviors by Strengthening Protection during Childhood'. *Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine* 153 (3): 226-234.
- Helper, L. R.* (2002). 'Over-Legalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes'. *Colombia Law Review* 102 (7): 1832-1911.
- Hellman, C. M., E. M. Muilenburg-Trevino, and J. A. Worley.* (2008). 'Belief in a Just World: An Examination of Reli-

- ability Estimates across Three Measures'. *Journal of Personality Assessment* 90 (4): 399–401.
- Herek, G. M. (1984)*. 'Beyond 'homophobia': A Social Psychological Perspective on Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men'. *Journal of Homosexuality* 10 (1–2): 1–21.
- Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal. (2011)*. 'Guyana.' 2011 Index of Economic Freedom (database), Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC. <http://www.heritage.org/index/country/Guyana>.
- Hernandez-Ramdwar, C. (2008)*. "Neither Lend Out Your Hole to Achieve Piece of Gold": Child Abuse, Bling Addiction and Soca Music in Trinidad and Tobago'. *Caribbean Review of Gender Studies* 2, Centre for Gender and Development Studies, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados.
- Herrmann, S., D. MacDonald, and R. Tauscher. (2011)*. 'Confidence in the Criminal Justice System in the Americas'. With M. L. Layton. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 62, Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University, Nashville.
- HHS (United States Department of Health and Human Services). (2001)*. *Youth Violence: A Report of the Surgeon General*. Washington, DC: HHS.
- Holdip, M. 2010*. 'Recommendations for the Systematic Transformation of the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago'. *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Public Safety* 15 (1–2): 258–260.
- Howlett, M., M. Ramesh, and A. Perl. (2009)*. *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems*. 3rd ed. Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press.
- IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). (2009)*. 'Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights'. Report OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 57 (31 December), IACHR, Organization of American States, Washington, DC. <http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Seguridad.eng/CitizenSecurity.Toc.htm>.
- . (2011). 'Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2010'. Report OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 5, rev. 1 (7 March), IACHR, Organization of American States, Washington, DC. <http://www.cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/IACHR-ANNUAL-REPORT-2010.pdf>.
- ICNL (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law). (2001)*. 'Country Reports: Latin America and the Caribbean; Transnational Philanthropy to Benefit the Caribbean Nations'. *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* 4 (1) (September). http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol4iss1/cr_3.htm#regional.
- ICPC (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime). (2010)*. *International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives, 2010*. Montreal: ICPC.
- IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development). (2002)*. 'Regional Strategy Paper: IFAD Strategy for Rural Poverty Reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean'. IFAD, Rome. <http://www.ifad.org/operations/regional/2002/pl/PLeng.pdf>.
- Iglesias, E. (2002)*. 'Global Positioning of the European Union and MERCOSUR: Towards a New Model of Inter-regional Cooperation'. Annual Lecture of the Mercosur Chair, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, 4 April. <http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/south/chmerc.pdf>.
- ILO (International Labour Organization). (2010)*. *Global Employment Trends for Youth*. 12 August. Geneva: ILO.

- http://www.ilo.org/empelm/pubs/WCMS_143349/lang--en/index.htm.
- Inter-Agency Campaign on Violence against Women and Girls. (1999).* 'National Report Jamaica'. National Reports on the Situation of Gender Violence against Women, Regional Project RLA/97/014, Regional Programme, United Nations Development Programme, New York. <http://freeofviolence.org/jamaicabigfile.pdf>.
- IOM (International Organization for Migration). (2005).* Exploratory Assessment of Trafficking in Persons in the Caribbean Region: The Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles, Saint Lucia, Suriname. 1st ed. Geneva: IOM. <http://www.oas.org/atip/Caribbean%20Research%202005.pdf>.
- . (2008). 'Caribbean Counter-Trafficking Model Legislation and Explanatory Guidelines: A Booklet'. December, IOM, Geneva. <http://www.iom.int/unitedstates/CAR%20PMV/PDF/Booklet%20Caribbean%20Model%20Legislation%20and%20Explanatory%20Guidelines.pdf>.
- . (2010a). Legal Review on Trafficking in Persons in the Caribbean: The Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. 2nd ed. Geneva: IOM. http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/legal_review2.pdf.
- . (2010b). Exploratory Assessment of Trafficking in Persons in the Caribbean Region: The Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. 2nd ed. Geneva: IOM. http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/exploratory_assessment2.pdf.
- Jackson, J. (2009).* 'A Psychological Perspective on Vulnerability in the Fear of Crime'. *Psychology, Crime and Law* 15 (4): 365–390.
- Jackson, J., and E. Gray. (2010).* 'Functional Fear and Public Insecurities about Crime'. *British Journal of Criminology* 50 (1): 1–22.
- Jacobo, J. (2007).* 'The UNESCO Youth Development Index'. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Recife, Brazil.
- Jamaica, Ministry of Youth and Community Development. (1969).* 'Ministry Paper #50: The Probation Service'. Report, Ministry of Youth and Community Development, Kingston. <http://www.nlj.gov.jm/MinistryPapers/1969/50.pdf>.
- Jamaica, Planning Institute. (2009).* 'Assessment of Community Security and Transformation Programmes in Jamaica'. (2009) Planning Institute, Kingston, Jamaica. <http://www.jm.undp.org/files/Governance/CommunitySecurityAssessmentReport.pdf>.
- JCPC (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council). (2009).* 'The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Practice Direction 1'. JCPC, London. http://www.jcpc.gov.uk/docs/pd_01_JCPC.pdf.
- JIS (Jamaica Information Service). (2011).* 'Senate Approves Legislation to Extend Powers of Arrest and Detention'. 22 July, JIS, Kingston, Jamaica. http://www.japarliament.gov.jm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=664:senate-approves-legislation-to-extend-powers-of-arrest-and-detention&catid=1:news&Itemid=8.
- Johnson, D. (2006a).* 'Preliminary Survey Results from the Gonzales IMPACT Study'. Research report (September), Ministry of National Security and Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.

- . (2006b). 'Perceived Legitimacy and Willingness to Assist the Police in Trinidad and Tobago'. Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology's Annual Meeting, 'Democracy, Crime and Justice', Los Angeles, November 1–4.
- Jones, A. D., and E. Trotman Jemmot. (2009).* Child Sexual Abuse in the Eastern Caribbean. New York: United Nations Children's Fund; Huddersfield, United Kingdom: Centre for Applied Childhood Studies; London: Action for Children.
- Jones, M. J. (2003).* 'From the Footnotes and into the Text: Victimization of Jamaican Women'. In *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy*, ed. A. D. Harriott, 113–132. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.
- . (2007). 'Client Rehabilitation or Sanitisation of the Penal Language? Analysis of Correctional Reform in Jamaica'. In *Crime, Delinquency and Justice: A Caribbean Reader*, ed. R. Deosaran, part 5. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers.
- Jordan, M. (2009).* 'Tortured Teen Taken to Hospital: After Four Days in Hell'. *Kaieteur News* (Georgetown, Guyana), 1 November, <http://www.kaieteurnews.com/2009/11/01/tortured-teen-taken-to-hospital-after-four-days-in-hell>.
- Joseph, T., M. Holder, and A. Alexis. (2009).* 'Situation Analysis of Youth and Adolescents in the Caribbean'. Report, Commission on Youth Development, CARICOM, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados.
- Katz, C. M. (2003).* 'Issues in the Production and Dissemination of Gang Statistics: An Ethnographic Study of a Large Midwestern Police Gang Unit'. *Crime and Delinquency* 49 (3): 485–516.
- . (2007). 'Institutional Capacity, Informal Social Control, and Their Influence on Illicit Opportunities in the Caribbean'. Paper presented at the Central Intelligence Agency and Privy Council's 'Global Future Forum', Ottawa.
- . (2008). 'The Scope and Nature of the Gang Problem in Antigua & Barbuda'. Report, Arizona State University, Phoenix.
- Katz, C. M., and D. Choate. (2006).* 'Diagnosing Trinidad & Tobago's Gang Problem'. Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology's Annual Meeting, 'Democracy, Crime and Justice', Los Angeles, November 1–4.
- Katz, C. M., D. Choate, and A. M. Fox. (2010).* 'Understanding and Preventing Gang Membership in Trinidad and Tobago'. Report, Arizona State University, Phoenix.
- Katz, C. M., and A. M. Fox. (2010).* 'Risk and Protective Factors Associated with Gang Involved Youth in a Caribbean Nation: Analysis of the Trinidad and Tobago Youth Survey'. *Pan-American Journal of Public Health* 27 (3): 187–202.
- Katz, C. M., and E. R. Maguire. (2006).* 'Reducing Gang Homicides in the Besson Street Station District'. Report, Arizona State University, Phoenix.
- Katz, C. M., E. R. Maguire, and D. Choate. (2011).* 'A Cross-National Comparison of Gangs in the United States and Trinidad and Tobago'. *International Criminal Justice Review* 21 (3): 243–262.
- Katz, C. M., and S. Schnebly. (2011).* 'Neighborhood Variation in Gang Member Concentrations'. *Crime & Delinquency* 57 (3): 377–407.
- Katz, C. M., and V. J. Webb. (2006).* *Policing Gangs in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Katz, C. M., V. J. Webb, and D. R. Schaefer. (2001).* 'An Assessment of the Impact of Quality-of-Life Policing on Crime and Disorder'. *Justice Quarterly* 18 (4): 825–876.
- King, W. R., and E. R. Maguire. (2006).* 'Improving How Physical Evidence Is Processed in Trinidad and Tobago'. Report (23 January), Ministry of National Security, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.
- Klein, M. W. (1971).* *Street Gangs and Street Workers*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- . (1995). *The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control*. Studies in Crime and Public Policy. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lall, V. (2007).* 'Bullying, Victimization and Delinquency in Primary Schools in Trinidad and Tobago: Some Preliminary Results'. *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology* 12 (1–2): 155–176.
- Lee, L.-C., J. B. Kotch, and C. E. Cox. (2004).* 'Child Maltreatment in Families Experiencing Domestic Violence'. *Violence and Victims* 19 (5): 573–591.
- Le Franc, E., M. Samms-Vaughan, I. Hambleton, K. Fox, and D. Brown. (2008).* 'Interpersonal Violence in Three Caribbean Countries: Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago'. *Pan American Journal of Public Health* 24 (6): 409–421.
- Lench, H. C. (2007).* 'Belief in an Unjust World: When Beliefs in a Just World Fail'. *Journal of Personality Assessment* 89 (2): 126–135.
- Leslie, G. (2010).* 'Confronting the Don: The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica'. Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 26 (September), Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.
- Levy, H. (1996).* *They Cry Respect! Urban Violence and Poverty in Jamaica*. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies.
- . (2009). *Killing Streets and Community Revival*. Kingston, Jamaica: Arawak.
- Lewis, A. (1955).* *The Theory of Economic Growth*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Lum, C. M., and S.-M. Yang. (2005).* 'Why Do Evaluation Researchers in Crime and Justice Choose Non-Experimental Methods?' *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 1 (2): 191–213.
- Madden, F. (2011).* "It's Not about Me"; Working with Communities: Processes and Challenges; The Grace and Staff Community Development Foundation Experience'. GraceKennedy Foundation Lecture (March), GraceKennedy Foundation, Kingston, Jamaica.
- Maguire, E. R. (2010).* 'A Journey through the World of Police Use of Force'. In *Police Use of Force: A Global Perspective*, ed. J. Kuhns and J. Knutsson, 199–211. Westport, CN: Praeger Security International.
- Maguire, E. R., and R. R. Bennett. (2008).* 'Introduction: Special Issue on Criminal Justice Research in Trinidad and Tobago'. *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Public Safety* 13 (1–2): xii–xxxiv.
- Maguire, E. R., and W. R. King. (2011).* 'Transferring Criminal Investigation Methods from Developed to Developing Nations'. Paper presented at the 'Homicide and Major Crime Symposium', Cardiff, United Kingdom, 6 June.
- Maguire, E. R., W. R. King, D. Johnson, and C. M. Katz. (2010).* 'Why Homicide Clearance Rates Decrease: Evidence from the Caribbean'. *Policing and Society* 20 (4): 373–400.

- Maguire, E. R., J. A. Willis, J. Snipes, and M. Gantley. (2008).* 'Spatial Concentrations of Violence in Trinidad and Tobago'. *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Public Safety* 13 (1–2): 44–83.
- Marion, N. E., and W. M. Oliver. (2006).* *The Public Policy of Crime and Criminal Justice*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- . (2010). 'Symbolic Politics, Criminal Justice Policy and Third Political Party Platforms'. *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 21 (4): 476–499.
- Mark, J. R. (2007).* 'Examining a Culture of Delay and Adjournments: Criminal Case Processing in the Trinidad and Tobago Magistrates' Court'. Report (May), Institute for Court Management, National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, VA.
- Matthews, K. (2011).* 'Murders Drop 44%'. *Jamaica Observer* (Kingston, Jamaica), 8 April. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Murders-drop-44-in-first-quarter_8641765.
- Maxson, C., and M. Klein. (1990).* 'Street Gang Violence: Twice as Great, or Half as Great'. In *Gangs in America*, ed. C. R. Huff, 71–100. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- McDonald, O. P. (2008).* 'Gender Attitudes and Violence vs. Women: Findings from the Reproductive Health Survey, 2008'. PowerPoint presentation. National Family Planning Board, Kingston, Jamaica.
- Meeks, J. (2009).* 'Caribbean Children's Involvement in Gangs'. Paper presented at the Consortium for Social Development and Research 'Teleconference on Research Activities', University of West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica, 30 June.
- Meeks Gardner, J., C. M. Katz, and J. Rosenblatt. (2008).* 'Reports of Gangs in Antigua Schools'. Paper presented at the Caribbean Child Research Conference, 'Building a Region Fit for Children: Promoting Child Rights through Research', Kingston, Jamaica, 21–22 October.
- Meeks Gardner, J., C. A. Powell, J. A. Thomas, and D. Millard. (2003).* 'Perceptions and Experiences of Violence among Secondary School Students in Urban Jamaica'. *Pan American Journal of Public Health* 14 (2): 97–103.
- Miller, W. R. (1973).* *Cops and Bobbies: Police Authority in New York and London, 1830–1870*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mockus, A., R. Londoño, E. Sánchez, C. Peñaranda, and C. Casto. (2004).* 'Guía práctica de cultura y convivencia ciudadana'. Document of the Regional Project on Local Governance for Latin America, United Nations Development Programme and National University of Colombia, Bogotá.
- Mogensen, M. (2005).* 'Corner and Area Gangs of Inner-city Jamaica'. In *Neither War nor Peace: International Comparisons of Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence*, ed. L. Dowdney, 229–245. Rio de Janeiro: Viva Rio.
- Moncrieffe, D. (1998).* 'Gang Study: The Jamaican Crime Scene'. Report, Criminal Justice Research Unit, Ministry of National Security and Justice, Kingston, Jamaica.
- Moore, M. H., and D. W. Stephens. (1991).* *Beyond Command and Control: The Strategic Management of Police Departments*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Moser, C., and B. van Bronkhorst. (1999).* 'Youth Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Costs, Causes and Interventions'. LCR Sustainable

- Development Working Paper 3 (August), Urban Peace Program Series, Latin America and Caribbean Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- National Task Force on Crime Prevention.* (2005). 'Study on Court Delays in Relation to Criminal Cases in Barbados'. Crime & Justice 5, Office of the Attorney General, Bridgetown, Barbados.
- Nelson, M.* (2011). 'Making Sense of DNA Backlogs, 2010: Myth vs. Reality'. NIJ Special Report NCJ 232197 (February), National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC. <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232197.pdf>.
- Norman, Lisa R., Robert Carr, and Julio Jimenez.* (2006). "Sexual Stigma and Sympathy: Attitudes toward Persons Living with HIV in Jamaica." *Culture, Health & Sexuality* 8(5):423-33.
- Norris, M., and D. Chadee.* (2001). 'Capital Ideas: A Cross-Cultural Study on Death Penalty Attitudes in and around the Caribbean'. *Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology* 6 (1-2): 62-81.
- OAS (Organization of American States).* (2008a). 'Gangs in Antigua and Barbuda: OAS Assessment on Gang Violence in Antigua & Barbuda'. June, Department of Public Security, OAS, Washington, DC.
- . (2008b). 'Comments by Member States on Their Vision and Experience Regarding the Phenomenon of Gangs (Presented by the Delegation of Barbados)'. Document OEA/Ser.G, CP/CSH-957/08 add. 2 (April 24), Committee on Hemispheric Security, Permanent Council, OAS, Washington, DC.
- . (2008c). 'Presentation by Hazel Brown, on Behalf of the Civil Society Caribbean Forum, of the Recommendations on the Draft Declaration of Commitment of Port of Spain: Fifth Summit of the Americas (Forum Held in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on October 30-31, 2008)'. Document OEA/Ser.E GRIC/O.6/doc.10/08 (11 December), Summit Implementation Review Group, OAS, Washington, DC.
- . (2010a). 'Hemispheric Drug Strategy and Preparation of Its Plan of Action'. Resolution of the General Assembly (8 June), Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, OAS, Washington, DC. http://www.cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/main/aboutcicad/basicdocuments/resolution_strategy_plan_eng.asp.
- . (2010b). 'Report on Measures and Actions Related to the Implementation of the Declaration on Security in the Americas (Submitted by the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security: IMPACS)'. Document OEA/Ser.G CP/CSH-1169/10 (21 January), Committee on Hemispheric Security, Permanent Council, OAS, Washington, DC.
- . (2010c). 'Report of the Secretariat Pro Tempore of the CIFTA Consultative Committee on the Activities Carried Out in 2009-2010'. Document OEA/Ser.L/XXII.2.11 CIFTA/CC-XI/doc.11/10 (19 April), OAS, Washington, DC.
- . (2011a). 'The OAS and the Governments of Guyana and Ecuador Sign Firearms Marking Agreement'. Press Release E-855/11 (26 September), OAS, Washington, DC. http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-855/11.
- . (2011b). 'Bahamas, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay Join OAS Project to Promote the Marking of Firearms'.

- Press Release E-513/11 (24 January), OAS, Washington, DC. http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-513/11.
- O'Donnell, D. (2004).* 'The Convention on the Rights of the Child and Law Reform in the Caribbean: Fifteen Years Later'. Americas and Caribbean Regional Office, United Nations Children's Fund, Panama City.
- Ohene, S. A., M. Ireland, and R. W. Blum. (2005).* 'The Clustering of Risk Behaviors among Caribbean Youth'. *Maternal and Child Health Journal* 9 (1): 91–100.
- O'Leary, K. D. (1999).* 'Psychological Abuse: A Variable Deserving Critical Attention in Domestic Violence'. *Violence and Victims* 14 (1): 3–23.
- Packer, H. L. (2004).* 'Two Models of the Criminal Process'. In *Criminal Justice in America: Theory, Practice and Policy*, ed. B. W. Hancock and P. M. Sharp, 169–180. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Palmer, S. H. (1988).* *Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780–1850*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Patterson, P. J. (2004).* 'Address by the Most Hon. P. J. Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica'. Speech to the Joint Session of the Saint Lucian Parliament, Castries, Saint Lucia, 1 July. http://www.stlucia.gov.lc/addresses_and_speeches/2004/pj_patterson/address_by_the_most_hon_p_j_patterson_to_the_joint_session_of_the_st_lucian_parliament.htm.
- Paulin, D. (2010).* 'Obama's Fruitless Quest to Extradite Drug Thug'. *American Thinker* (7 March). El Cerrito, CA. http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/03/obamas_fruitless_quest_to_extr.html.
- Peak, K., R. V. Bradshaw, and R. Glensor. (1992).* 'Improving Citizen Perceptions of the Police: "Back to Basics" with a Community Policing Strategy'. *Journal of Criminal Justice* 20 (1): 25–40.
- Petrosino, A., C. Turpin-Petrosino, and J. O. Finckenaue. (2000).* 'Well-Meaning Programs Can Have Harmful Effects! Lessons from Experiments of Programs Such as Scared Straight'. *Crime & Delinquency* 46 (3): 354–379.
- Pottie Bunge, V., and D. Locke, eds. (2000).* 'Family Violence in Canada. A Statistical Profile 2000'. Report 85-224-XIE, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada, Ottawa.
- Powell, L. A., and B. A. Lewis. (2011).* *The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times*. Kingston, Jamaica: Centre for Leadership & Governance, University of the West Indies. <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/jamaica/2010-culturapolitica-corrected.pdf>.
- Prenzler, T., and M. Townsley. (1996).* 'Preventing Burglary'. Paper presented at Australian Institute of Criminology's 'Second National Outlook Symposium', Canberra, 3–4 March. [http://www.aic.gov.au/en/events/aic%20upcoming20events/1997/~media/conferences/outlook97/prenzler.ashx](http://www.aic.gov.au/en/events/aic%20upcoming20events/1997/~/media/conferences/outlook97/prenzler.ashx).
- Pyrooz, D. C., A. M. Fox, C. M. Katz, and S. H. Decker. (2012).* 'Gang Organization, Offending and Victimization: A Cross National Analysis'. In *Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research*, ed. F.-A. Esbensen and C. L. Maxson, 85–106. New York: Springer Science+Business Media.
- Queeley-Roberts, M. (2007).* 'An Investigation into Selected Psychosocial Variables and School Violence in Three Second-

- ary Schools in Barbados'. Master's thesis, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados.
- Ren, L., J. Zhao, N. P. Lovrich, and M. J. Gaffney (2006)*. 'Participation in Community Crime Prevention: Who Volunteers for Police Work?' *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management* 29 (3): 464–481.
- Reynolds, M. O. (1999)*. 'Crime and Punishment in America: 1999'. NCPA Policy Report 229 (October), National Center for Policy Analysis, Dallas. <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st229.pdf>.
- Ribando, C. (2005)*. 'Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean'. CRS Report for Congress RL33200 (15 December), Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
- Robinson, T. (2005)*. 'Access to Justice for Women Who Are Victims of Violence in the Caribbean'. Paper presented at the Organization of American States and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights work meeting, 'The Protection of Women's Rights in the Inter-American System of Justice: An Analysis of Access to Justice', Washington, DC, 19–20 April. <http://www.sdn.org.gy/16days/files/Access%20to%20Justice%20for%20Women%20who%20are%20Victims%20of%20Violence%20in%20the%20Caribbean.pdf>.
- Robotham, D. (2003)*. 'Crime and Public Policy in Jamaica'. In *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy*, ed. A. D. Harriott, 197–238. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.
- Rodgers, P. (2011)*. 'Britain Commits to US\$40-Million Compete Caribbean'. *Jamaica Observer* (Kingston, Jamaica), 12 October. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/business/Britain-commits-to-US-40-million-Compete-Caribbean_9887924.
- Rountree, P. W., and K. C. Land. (1995)*. 'Perceived Risk Versus Fear of Crime: Empirical Evidence of Conceptually Distinct Reactions in Survey Data'. *Social Forces* 74 (4): 1353–1376.
- Rowat, M., W.H. Malik, and M. Dakolias, eds. (1995)*. *Judicial Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: Proceedings of a World Bank Conference*. World Bank Technical Paper 280. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Russo, N. F., and A. Pirlott. (2006)*. 'Gender-Based Violence: Concepts, Methods, and Findings'. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1087 (November): 178–205.
- Sabatier, P. A. (1988)*. 'An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein'. *Policy Sciences* 21 (2–3): 129–168.
- Salas, A., and Z. Reiter. (2009)*. 'Report on Visit to Jamaica, September 15 to September 20, 2009'. Report (18 November), Department of the Americas, Transparency International, Berlin. http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/ti_report_to_usaid_on_visit_to_jamaica_final11.pdf.
- Samms-Vaughan, M. E., M. A. Jackson, and D. E. Ashley. (2005)*. 'Urban Jamaican Children's Exposure to Community Violence'. *West Indian Medical Journal* 54 (1): 14–21.
- Sampson, R. J., S. W. Raudenbush, and F. Earls. (1997)*. 'Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy'. *Science* 277 (5328): 918–924.
- SAP-FL (Special Action Programme against Forced Labour) and ITUC (Internation-*

- al Trade Union Confederation*). (2007). 'A Workers' Alliance against Forced Labour and Trafficking'. Brochure (20 August), International Labour Organization, Geneva. http://www.ilo.org/sapfl/Informationresources/Factsheet-sandbrochures/WCMS_083841/lang-en/index.htm.
- Saunders, A. D.* (2010). 'A Commentary on the Early Decisions of the Caribbean Court of Justice in Its Original Jurisdiction.' *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59 (3): 761–778.
- Schmallager, F.* (2011). *Criminal Justice Today: An Introductory Text for the 21st Century*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Seelke, C. R., L. S. Wylers, J. S. Beittel, and M. P. Sullivan.* (2011). 'Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs.' CRS Report for Congress 7–5700 R41215 (12 May), Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf>.
- Sheffield, C. J.* (1989). 'Sexual Terrorism.' In *Women: A Feminist Perspective*, 4th ed., ed. J. Freeman, 3–19. Mountain View: CA: Mayfield Publishing Company.
- Sherman, L. W.* (2003). 'Experimental Evidence and Governmental Administration.' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 589 (1): 226–233.
- Short, J. F., Jr.* (1963). 'Introduction.' In *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago*, Frederic M. Thrasher. Abridged ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Simon, A.* (2010a). 'Police, Criminals "Working Arm-in-Arm".' *Trinidad Express Newspaper* (Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago), 12 September. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Police__criminals__working_arm-in-arm_-102713764.html.
- . (2010b). 'The "Killing Squad".' *Trinidad Express Newspaper* (Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago), 12 September. http://www.trinidad-express.com/news/The__killing_squad_-102713759.html.
- Sims, C.-D. L.* (2008). 'Invisible Wounds, Invisible Abuse: The Exclusion of Emotional Abuse in Newspaper Articles.' *Journal of Emotional Abuse* 8 (4): 375–402.
- Sinclair, G.* (2004a). 'All Out Assault: "Operation Kingfish" to Target Dons, Gangs.' *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 20 October. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20041020/lead/lead1.html>.
- . (2004b). '"Kingfish" Targets a Dozen Major Gangs.' *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 26 October. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20041026/lead/lead1.html>.
- . (2011). 'Ealan Vows to Destroy Gangs.' *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 25 January. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110125/lead/lead2.html>.
- Skogan, W. G.* (1975). 'Measurement Problems in Official and Survey Crime Rates.' *Journal of Criminal Justice* 3 (1): 17–31.
- . (1990). *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- . (2004). 'Community Policing: Common Impediments to Success.' In *Community Policing: The Past, Present, and Future*, L. Fridell and M. A. Wycoff, 159–167. Washington, DC: Annie E. Casey Foundation, Police Executive Research Forum.

- . (2006). 'Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with the Police.' *Policing and Society* 16 (2): 99–126.
- Skogan, W. G., and K. Frydl, eds. (2004). Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.*
- Skogan, W. G., and S. M. Hartnett. (1997). Community Policing, Chicago Style. New York: Oxford University Press.*
- Solis, L. G., and F. R. Aravena, eds. (2009). Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean: Summary of Articles. San José, Costa Rica: Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences.*
- Spergel, I. A. (1986). 'The Violent Gang Problem in Chicago: A Local Community Approach.' Social Service Review 60 (1): 94–131.*
- . (1995). *The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach. New York: Oxford University Press.*
- Spohn, C., and K. Denholm. (2008). 'Case Processing Outcomes in Homicide Cases' Report (11 September), Ministry of National Security, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.*
- Spohn, C., and C. M. Katz. (2008). 'Update on GANG/ROP Task Force Arrest Activity.' Report, Arizona State University, Phoenix.*
- Stern, Baroness V. (2010). The Stern Review: A Report by Baroness Vivien Stern CBE of an Independent Review into How Rape Complaints Are Handled by Public Authorities in England and Wales. London: Government Equalities Office, Home Office.*
- Strobl, S. (2011). 'From Colonial Policing to Community Policing in Bahrain: The Historical Persistence of Sectarianism.' International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 35 (1): 19–37.*
- Sunshine, J., and Tyler, T. R. (2003). 'The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing.' Law & Society Review 37 (3): 513–548.*
- Tankebe, J. (2009). 'Public Cooperation with the Police in Ghana: Does Procedural Fairness Matter?' Criminology 47 (4): 1265–1293.*
- Terpstra, J. (2008). 'Police, Local Government, and Citizens as Participants in Local Security Networks.' Police Practice and Research 9 (3): 213–225.*
- Thomas, M., and E. Wint. (2002). 'Inequality and Poverty in the Eastern Caribbean.' Paper presented at Eastern Caribbean Central Bank's 'Seventh Annual Development Conference', Basseterre, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 21–22 November.*
- Thomas-Hope, E. (2002). 'Human Trafficking in the Caribbean and the Human Rights of Migrants.' Paper presented at Conferencia Hemisférica sobre Migración Internacional: Derechos Humanos y Trata de Personas en las Américas, Santiago, Chile, 20–22 November. <http://www.eclac.org/celade/noticias/paginas/2/11302/Thomas-Hope.pdf>.*
- Townsend, D. (2009). 'No Other Life: Gangs, Guns, and Governance in Trinidad and Tobago.' Small Arms Survey Working Paper 8, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.*
- Transparency International. (2009). 'Corruption Perceptions Index 2009.' Transparency International, Berlin. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.*
- . (2010). 'Corruption Perceptions Index 2010.' Transparency International, Berlin. <http://www.transparency.org/content/download/55725/890310>.

- Trojanowicz, R. C., and B. Bucqueroux. (1990). *Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective*. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company.
- Tyler, T. R. (2004). 'Enhancing Police Legitimacy'. In *To Better Serve and Protect: Improving Police Practices*, ed. W. G. Skogan, 84–99. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- . (2011). 'Trust and Legitimacy: Policing in the USA and Europe'. *European Journal of Criminology* 8 (4): 254–266.
- UNDP (*United Nations Development Programme*). (1994). 'Initiatives for Change'. UNDP, New York.
- . (1997). 'Governance for Sustainable Human Development'. A UNDP Policy Document (January), UNDP, New York. <http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy/>.
- . (2004). 'Regional Report on the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in the Caribbean Community'. September, UNDP, New York. <http://www.undp.org/latinamerica/docs/RegionalMDGCaribbean.pdf>.
- . (2006). 'Guía de Evaluación de la Seguridad Ciudadana en América Latina y El Caribe'. UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean, Panama City.
- . (2009a). *Abrir espacios para la seguridad ciudadana y el desarrollo humano: Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano para América Central, 2009–2010*. Panama City: UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean; Bogotá: D'Vinni S.A.
- . (2009b). 'Capacity Development: A UNDP Primer'. UNDP, New York. <http://www.beta.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/capacity-building/capacity-development-a-undp-primer.html>.
- . (2010a). *Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Development*. New York: UNDP; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/>.
- . (2010b). *Beyond the Midpoint: Achieving the Millennium Development Goals*. January. New York: UNDP. http://www.sl.undp.org/1_doc/MDG_mid_point.pdf.
- . (2011a). *Human Development Report 2011 – Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All*. New York: UNDP; New York; Palgrave Macmillan. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/>.
- . (2011b). 'Información sobre el gasto público de seguridad y justicia en Centroamérica, 2006–2010'. UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean, Panama City.
- Ungar, M., L. Liebenberg, R. Boothroyd, W. M. Kwong, T. Y. Lee, J. Leblanc, and A. Makhnach. (2008). 'The Study of Youth Resilience across Cultures: Lessons from a Pilot Study of Measurement Development'. *Research in Human Development* 5 (3): 166–180.
- UNICEF (*United Nations Children's Fund*). (2000). *An Assessment of the Status of Children and Adolescents with Disabilities in the Caribbean*. Bridgetown, Barbados: UNICEF Office for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean.
- . (2002) 'The OECS Family Law and Domestic Violence Legal and Judicial Reform Project'. *Children in Focus* 15 (2), UNICEF Office for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, Bridgetown, Barbados.

- . (2004). *The State of the World's Children 2005: Childhood under Threat*. New York: UNICEF.
- . (2006). 'Violence against Children in the Caribbean Region: Regional Assessment; UN Secretary-General's Study on Violence against Children'. Child Protection Section, UNICEF Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, Panama City.
- . (2011). *The State of the World's Children 2011; Adolescence: An Age of Opportunity*. New York: UNICEF.
- United Nations*. (1985). 'United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ("The Beijing Rules")'. Document A/RES/40/33 (29 November), United Nations, New York. <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r033.htm>.
- . (1993). 'Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women', Document A/RES/48/104 (20 December), United Nations General Assembly, New York. <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm>.
- . (1994). 'Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, Bridgetown, Barbados, 25 April–6 May 1994'. Document A/CONF.167/9 (October), United Nations, New York. http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_sids/sids_pdfs/BPOA.pdf.
- . (1995). 'World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond'. Document A/RES/50/81 (14 December), United Nations, New York. <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/a50r081.htm>.
- . (2003a). 'Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant; Second Periodic Report: Suriname'. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, document CCPR/C/SUR/2003/2 (4 July), Human Rights Committee, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations, Geneva. [http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/ed050cc5c91e7b91c1256dbf002d2b25/\\$FILE/G0342817.pdf](http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/ed050cc5c91e7b91c1256dbf002d2b25/$FILE/G0342817.pdf).
- . (2003b). 'Report of the Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/53, Addendum: Mission to Jamaica'. Document E/CN.4/2004/7/Add.2 (26 September), United Nations, New York. [http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/a7af3c2c5ba84be7c1256ddb0039c202/\\$FILE/G0316217.pdf](http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/a7af3c2c5ba84be7c1256ddb0039c202/$FILE/G0316217.pdf).
- . (2004a). 'Republic of Suriname: Public Administration Country Profile'. Country Profile (December), Division for Public Administration and Development Management, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York. <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023204.pdf>.
- . (2004b). 'The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General'. Document S/2004/616 (23 August), United Nations, New York. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement>.
- . (2005a). 'Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Youth Development Indicators'. United Nations, New York. <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/youthindicatorsreport.pdf>.
- . (2005b). 'Report of the Open-Ended Working Group to Negotiate an Inter-

- national Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons'. Document A/60/88 (27 June), United Nations, New York. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BF99B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/Arms%20A%2060%2088.pdf>.
- . (2005c). *The Millennium Development Goals: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective*. Document LC/G.2331-P (August). Santiago, Chile: United Nations. <http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/21540/lcg2331.pdf>.
- . (2010a). 'Human Security: Report of the Secretary-General'. General Assembly document A/64/701 (8 March), United Nations, New York.
- . (2010b). *The World's Women: Trends and Statistics*. Report ST/ESA/STAT/SER.K/19. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_full%20report_color.pdf.
- UNLIREC (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean)*. (2011). 'UNLIREC Receives Support from Canada and the United States to Continue Projects Being Implemented in the Andean and Caribbean Region'. Newsletter 4 (May), UNLIREC, Lima. http://www.unlirec.org/newsletter/May2011/EN_Main.htm.
- UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)*. (2004). 'United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto'. United Nations, New York. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>.
- UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and UN.GIFT (Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking)*. (2008). 'Human Trafficking: An Overview'. United Nations, New York. <http://www.ungift.org/docs/ungift/pdf/knowledge/ebook.pdf>.
- UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and World Bank*. (2007). *Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs and Policy Options in the Caribbean*. Report 37820. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- USAID (United States Agency for International Development)*. (2004). 'USAID Promotes the Rule of Law in Latin America and Caribbean Democracies'. Press Release (13 October). USAID, Washington, DC.
- . (2006). *Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment*. Washington, DC: Office of Regional Sustainable Development, Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, USAID.
- US State Department*. (1997). 'Inter-American Convention against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms (CIFTA)'. 1 January, State Department, Washington, DC. <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/49907.htm>.
- . (2000). 'Policy and Program Development'. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999 (March), Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, State Department, Washington, DC. http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1999_narc_report/policy99.html.
- . (2010a). 'Country Report: Jamaica'. *Trafficking in Persons Report 2010*, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, State Department, Washington, DC. <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/142760.htm>.

- . (2010b). '2010 Human Rights Report: Barbados'. 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, Washington, DC. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160153.pdf>.
- . (2010c). '2010 Human Rights Report: Antigua and Barbuda'. 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, Washington, DC. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160150.pdf>.
- . (2010d). '2010 Human Rights Report: Saint Lucia'. 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, Washington, DC. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160172.pdf>.
- . (2010e). '2010 Human Rights Report: Suriname'. 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, Washington, DC. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160174.pdf>.
- . (2010f). '2010 Human Rights Report: Guyana'. 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, Washington, DC. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160167.pdf>.
- . (2011a). 'Country Report: Jamaica'. 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (3 March), Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, State Department, Washington, DC. <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/vol1/156361.htm#jamaica>.
- . (2011b). 'The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative'. Fact Sheet (2 November), Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, State Department, Washington, DC. <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2011/177423.htm>.
- Ustanny, A.* (2006). 'Against Her Will: A Situational Analysis of Rape in Jamaica'. Panos Caribbean Media Brief 11 (March), Panos Caribbean, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. <http://panoscaribbean.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/againsttherwill.pdf>.
- van Dijk, J. J. M., J. N. van Kesteren, and P. Smit.* (2007). *Criminal Victimization in International Perspective: Key Findings of the 2004–2005 ICVS and EU ICS*. Onderzoek en beleid 257. The Hague, the Netherlands: Boom Juridische uitgever.
- van Gemert, F.* (2005). 'Youth Groups and Gangs in Amsterdam: A Pretest of the Eurogang Expert Survey'. In *European Street Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups*, ed. S. H. Decker and F. M. Weerman, 147–168. Violence Prevention and Policy Series. New York: Altamira Press.
- Virtue, E.* (2011). 'British Agency Pumps Funds into Jamaica's Crime Fight'. *Jamaica Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), 12 October. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20111012/lead/lead91.html>.
- Warr, M.* (1987). 'Fear of Victimization and Sensitivity to Risk'. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 3 (1): 29–46.
- Webb, V. J., C. M. Katz, and S. H. Decker.* (2006). 'Assessing the Validity of Self-Reports by Gang Members: Results from the Arrestee Drug-Abuse Monitoring Program'. *Crime & Delinquency* 52 (2): 232–252.
- Weisburd, D., C. M. Lum, and S.-M. Yang.* (2003). 'When Can We Conclude That Treatments or Programs "Don't

- Work?” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 587 (1): 31–48.
- Wells, W., C. M. Katz, and J. Kim. (2010).* ‘Firearm Possession among Arrestees in Trinidad and Tobago.’ *Injury Prevention* 16 (5): 337–342.
- West Indian Commission. 1993.* Report of the West Indian Commission: A Time for Action. 2nd ed. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press.
- White, Ruth C. and Robert Carr. (2005).* “Homosexuality and HIV/AIDS Stigma in Jamaica.” *Culture, Health & Sexuality* 7(4):347-59.
- WHO (World Health Organization). (2010).* ‘Violence Prevention: The Evidence.’ WHO, Geneva. http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/4th_milestones_meeting/publications/en/index.html.
- Wild, S. E., ed. (2006).* *Webster’s New World Law Dictionary*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Wilks, R., N. Younger, S. McFarlane, D. Francis, and J. van den Broeck. (2007).* ‘Community-Based Survey on Risk and Resiliency Behaviours of 15–19 Year Olds.’ Report TR-07–64 (November), University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.
- Worcester, R., and M. Gill. (2005).* ‘Opinion Leaders: Panel Wave 5.’ PowerPoint presentation at the Ministry of Public Administration and Information, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 11 May.
- World Bank. (2003).* ‘Caribbean Youth Development: Issues and Policy Directions.’ World Bank Country Study, May, World Bank, Washington, DC. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/06/06/000094946_03052404023182/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
- . (2011a). *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/>.
- . (2011b). *World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://go.worldbank.org/CQCTMSFI40>.
- Worrall, J. L. (1999).* ‘Public Perceptions of Police Efficacy: The “Fuzziness” of Support for the Police.’ *American Journal of Criminal Justice* 24 (1): 47–66.
- Wortley, S. (2009).* ‘The Jamaican National Crime Victimization Survey.’ Report, Ministry of National Security, Kingston, Jamaica.
- WTTC (World Travel & Tourism Council). (2011).* ‘Travel and Tourism Economic Impact 2011: Caribbean.’ WTTC, London. http://www.wttc.org/site_media/uploads/downloads/caribbean2.pdf.
- Wycoff, M. A., and W. G. Skogan. (1994).* ‘The Effect of Community Policing Management Style on Officers’ Attitudes.’ *Crime and Delinquency* 40 (3): 371–383.
- Wyrick, P. (2006).* ‘Gang Prevention: How to Make the “Front End” of Your Anti-gang Effort Work.’ *United States Attorneys’ Bulletin* 54 (3): 52–60.

Technical Notes

Technical Note 1. National and Regional Consultations

In preparing the first Caribbean Human Development Report (Caribbean HDR) for the English- and Dutch-speaking Caribbean countries, a critical data collection methodology employed—and one which embodies the HDR Corporate Principles of national ownership and participatory and inclusive preparation—was that of a series of national and regional consultations, the details of which are described in this technical note. The purpose of these consultations was twofold: to obtain qualitative data on the views, experiences and priorities of stakeholders across the region regarding the issue of citizen security, and to promote Caribbean ownership of and buy-in for the report as a means to strengthening its advocacy potential.

The consultation processes involved extensive and intensive one-on-one interviews and focus group dialogues with experts, practitioners and institutional actors from across the region. In six of the seven countries selected as research

sites for this report¹, a purposive sample for both national and regional consultations was developed with input from the UNDP Country Office focal points. Sample selection for both national and regional consultations was carried out in line with the principles of the Framework for Actor Mapping/Stakeholder Analysis presented in *Democratic Dialogue: A Handbook for Practitioners*, which facilitates the analysis of potential actors, their interrelationships and distinct perspectives on the issue at hand.²

The key actors for a potential dialogue include a variety of individuals, institutions and interest groups. A thorough analysis for determining a valid sample takes into consideration not only the identification of major relevant groups and institutions but also the diversity existing within each of these organizations. The figure below presents the matrix framework through which such an analysis was configured.

Figure 1. Framework for Actor Mapping and Consultation Sample Selection

Democratic Dialogue Framework for Actor Mapping					
Actor	Interests/needs/goals/concerns	Perception of/ position on key issues	Connections to others/ quality of relationships	Openness to/support for a dialogue process	Power/means of influence

A total of 194 actors participated in the national consultations; 62 percent represented governmental agencies and 38 percent represented non-governmental bodies. A total of 256 actors participated in the regional consultations; 49 percent represented governmental agencies and 51 percent represented non-governmental bodies. Table 1 below shows the breakdown by number and representative percentage of participants by country.

National Consultations

For the national consultations, three or more rounds of focus group dialogue sessions were held in Barbados, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. Additionally, national researchers held a series of bilateral meetings with key local actors who were unable to participate in the group consultations. In Antigua and Barbuda, the consultations were limited

to bilateral meetings and no national consultations were conducted in Saint Lucia. In total, 92 national consultations were held, 69 (75 percent) of which were bilateral meetings and 23 (25 percent) of which were group meetings.

Regional Consultations

Five group dialogue regional consultations also took place in September 2010 in Paramaribo, Suriname; Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago; Bridgetown, Barbados; Castries, Saint Lucia; and Kingstown, Jamaica. These meetings involved a

NOTES:

¹ No consultation has been carried out in Guyana. The data on Guyana have been obtained through public sources and the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

² IDEA, CIDA, OAS, and UNDP. 2007. *Democratic Dialogue – A Handbook for Practitioners*.

Table 1. Number and percentage of participants in national and regional consultations, by country

Country	Number of participants in national consultations	Percentage	Number of participants in regional consultations	Percentage
Antigua & Barbuda	16	8	--	--
Barbados	44	23	47	19
Jamaica	37	19	42	16
Saint Lucia	--	--	46	18
Suriname	61	31	41	16
Trinidad & Tobago	36	19	80	31
Total	194	100	256	100

total of 256 participants from regional organizations such as the Regional Security System (RSS), the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the CARICOM Secretariat, among others. The regional consultations provided an opportunity to triangulate the quantitative data findings from the survey with the experiences of the participants involved in the consultative process and to solicit feedback on the report presentation.

Recommendations offered in the course of these consultations ranged from suggestions for supplementing missing data, revising chapter titles and changing terminology definitions to the identification of successful crime prevention programmes. Questions were also posed by the participants, specifically on methodology employed as well as the accuracy of

the official crime statistics reported and the representativeness of the findings of the surveyed data, particularly with regard to urban and rural populations and different demographic groups. A call for reformation of the criminal justice system was endorsed in all consultations and proposals were offered for alternative penal solutions, different policing models and methods, means for reducing youth violence, and strategies to promote wider involvement of the local community.

It is important to note that the recommendations presented during the consultations were either accepted as offered or further researched and developed; a concerted effort was made in the report preparation to incorporate all substantiated feedback from consultation participants.

Technical Note 2. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010

The most important methodological tool utilized in the preparation of the first Caribbean Human Development Report was the Citizen Security Survey, which involved over 11,000 respondents from across the region and contributed the primary data for much of the subsequent analysis presented in the report. The objective of the survey was to provide empirical evidence for the analysis of how, in the context of the English- and Dutch-speaking Caribbean countries and within the development context of Caribbean Small Island Developing States (SIDS), insecurity and violence have negatively impacted human development. Guided by this central objective, the survey collected data on the following:

- Satisfaction with standard of living/level of human development
- Actual victimization/Crime at the community level
- Domestic Violence
- Fear of crime

- Policy orientations of the population
- Evaluation of and confidence in police and justice systems
- Community and societal cohesion
- Informal control of crime and violence
- Self-reported interaction with the criminal justice system
- Demographics

The survey was conducted in the seven selected territories that served as sites for the report research--Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname, Antigua & Barbuda, Saint Lucia, Barbados and Jamaica. The target population of the survey was households with at least one permanent resident 18 years of age or older. In total, 11,155 persons were interviewed.¹

The sample for the survey was designed to reflect key demographic characteristics of the adult populations in the participating countries based on the most recent census data. The sample was self-weighted by region and gender distributions. Even though probabilistic procedures were followed to select

households, it was expected that at least some of the sample would present moderate biases in variables not controlled by quota.

Post-fieldwork processing of the data implied control of all relevant demographic variables for each country against the last available census data to evaluate possible biases and to elaborate and apply weighting factors where needed. The variable distributions controlled for were age, gender, ethnicity, education level and population by county/area.

The report also utilizes a series of surveys conducted by the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). These datasets were used primarily for their data on the justice systems in the countries surveyed.

Analysis of policy attitudes

The issues that guided the analysis on attitudes of the population towards policy were based on the following:

- The extent to which crime and insecurity is defined by the various populations as a serious social problem in need of policy attention. Section 1 of the Citizen Security Survey questionnaire measures this as the relative seriousness of the problem.
- The specification of policy orientation dimensions and determination of the extent and intensity of support for each.
- The patterns of support towards different policy orientations by country, victimization experience, confidence in the criminal justice system, age, gender, income, education and area.
- Intensity and coherence of the different tendencies or orientations.
- Correlates with perceptions of societal features (for example, how just a society is seen to be); law-abiding inclination among the populations; perceptions of good governance (control of corruption, confidence in the criminal

justice system, etc.); and regime commitment (or attitude to regime change or military government).

In order to detect and analyze underlying attitudinal orientations in the population, a cluster analysis was performed based on a series of 22 items included in the questionnaire. These measured degrees of support or rejection for different statements related to social prevention policies, punitive policies, and attitudes of optimism (or pessimism) about whether the crime problem can effectively be solved by the state and the society.² Cluster analysis is a segmentation method that identifies groups of entities or statistical samples (in this case, the citizens), intended to identify homogeneous subgroups of cases in a population. This technique is used to first, establish groups not previously defined but relevant to the study in question, and second, analyze the group's membership and characteristics. The specific technique used in chapter 6 of this report was hierarchical clustering. This statistical method allows the researcher to select a definition of distance, a linking methodology for forming clusters, and the number of clusters best suited to the data.

Lastly, the analysis of confidence in police and justice systems is based on the construction of simple additive scales. Cronbach Alpha coefficients were analyzed in order to test the scales' reliability.

Use of official crime statistics

The report also relied on secondary data taken from official state sources in the seven countries included in the HDR. Official crime statistics were used for the trend analyses reported. An important condition for comparing crime indicators is that the compatibility of definitions across the range being examined. For this reason, the categories of crime used in these analyses were restricted to homicide, rape, and the aggregate categories of violent crimes and property crimes.

NOTES:

1 For more details on all technical aspects of the survey described in this note, please refer to the following website: <http://www.regionalcentre-lac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean>.

2 The complete English version of the questionnaire is available at <http://www.regionalcentre-lac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean>. Questions used for cluster analysis are Q55 a to Q55v.

CARICOM Human Development Index

To reflect more closely the specific characteristics of the Dutch-speaking and English-speaking countries, we have estimated a 2011 aggregated HDI that covers all CARICOM countries for which data are available (details on the estimations can be found on the report's website at <http://www.regionalcentre.lac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean>). This represents the first attempt to estimate such a HDI. The 2011 CARICOM estimated HDI is 0.564, which is considerably lower than the 2011 LAC HDI. Since the HDI is a population-weighted index, the low value of the CARICOM HDI may be explained by the impact of Haiti, given the proportion of the CARICOM population accounted for by Haiti (nearly 60 percent) in 2011. If the CARICOM HDI is estimated without including Haiti, the value shifts upwards (0.724), which better approximates the reality of the Dutch-speaking and English-speaking countries and is closer to the LAC HDI (0.731).

CARICOM Human Development Indexes

	Human Development Index (HDI)		Inequality-adjusted HDI			Gender Inequality Index	
	Value 2011	Rank 2011	Change ^b 2010-2011	Value 2011	Change in rank ^c 2011	Value 2011	Rank 2011
Very high human development							
Barbados	0.793	47	0	0.364	65
High human development							
Bahamas	0.771	53	0	0.658	-3	0.332	54
Antigua and Barbuda	0.764	60	1 ↑
Trinidad and Tobago	0.760	62	1 ↑	0.644	-2	0.331	53
Grenada	0.748	67	0
Medium human development							
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.735	72	0
Jamaica	0.727	79	-1 ↓	0.610	4	0.450	81
Dominica	0.724	81	-1 ↓
Saint Lucia	0.723	82	0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.717	85	-1 ↓
Belize	0.699	93	-1 ↓	0.493	97
Suriname	0.680	104	0	0.518	-3
Guyana	0.633	117	2 ↑	0.492	-1	0.511	106
Haiti	0.454	158	1 ↑	0.271	-9	0.599	123

Source: Human Development Report 2011 Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All.

NOTES

a. Rank is based on 187 countries for which the 2011 HDI is calculated.

b. Arrows indicate upward or downward movement in the country's ranking over 2010-2011 using consistent data and methodology; a blank indicates no change.

c. Change in rank is based on countries for which the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index is calculated.



Caribbean Human Development Report 2012

Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security

Violent crime is a major challenge to human development in the Caribbean. Produced after a thorough consultation and based on a telltale survey of 12,000 citizens from seven countries, this Report reviews the current state of crime in the English- and Dutch-speaking Caribbean, as well as the policies and programmes developed at both national and regional levels to address crime. The report offers a set of recommendations to reduce and prevent violent crime while advancing human development. It advocates for a balanced mix of policies that includes social programmes to induce youth away from crime, preventive measures to abort the cycle of violence and stop gender violence, and a shift from a state security approach to one focusing on citizen security and participation. Achieving this will require reforms to make law enforcement fair, accountable and more respectful of human rights. A key message of the report is that everyone can be an agent of citizen security: government, police, social institutions and citizens – everyone has a part to play.



*Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.*

ISBN 978-9962-688-08-2

