The attack on Charlie Hebdo was an abominable tragedy. It struck the heart of one of our capitals and symbols of our democracies as terrorists attacked our freedom of the press. It is now essential to pay our respects to those who lost their lives yesterday and hope that those responsible for the attacks are arrested as soon as possible.

In terrible circumstances, where shock and confusion prevail, it is also crucial to remain level-headed in our response to these horrendous events. While we must stand on the side of the victims and in defence of our inalienable rights, this should not lead us to simplistic, uncritical conclusions and further divisions.

Much of the reporting so far has had the tendency to pit a “Muslim community” against a French or European one in the most essentialist manner. While most commentators, be they journalists, politicians or academics, have warned against laying indiscriminate blame against Islam, their initial disclaimers have too often been lost in simplistic and stigmatising analysis. Many have inadvertently blamed Islam in their subsequent arguments. In the prevalent discourse, the “Muslim community” is commonly described as foreign to our land, values and beliefs.

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Interview with Antonis Galanopoulos

AG: Let’s start with the most important question. In recent years, there have been too many debates in the media and in academia about populism. And we ourselves will now have a discussion focusing on populism. But, what is populism? Which is, in your opinion, the best way to define the term?

AM: That is a crucial point indeed, and too often commentators talk about populism without clearly defining it. Because the concept of ‘the people’ is central to the word populism and because of its highly polemical political content, a definition is necessary before anything else can be discussed. Populism is usually understood either as an ideology (be it a thin one) or as a style or discourse.

My own research, based loosely on the so-called Essex School, sits firmly within the latter understanding, wherein populism is a political style or discourse whereby the populist creates her/his ‘people’ according to her/his ideological goals. ‘The people’ therefore can take many shapes and forms and be used in both inclusive and exclusive ways (e.g. against global injustice, against minorities, for democracy, for discriminatory purposes etc.). Essentially, populism is not intrinsically positive or negative, it is a tool to create a political commonality. Continue reading →

While right-wing populism is certainly one expression of democratic discontent, disproportionate media focus risks reinforcing these parties as serious contenders and adversaries of the status quo, and alienating those who do not believe that the Le Pens and Farages are a viable solution to their political and democratic demands. A more ambitious democratic discussion is needed

One of the most obvious and potentially serious political shifts in the past twenty years in Europe has been the surge in right-wing populism, and yet, as this piece argues, this phenomenon is widely misunderstood and misinterpreted with potentially dramatic consequences. Year on year, the media warns of new waves of (right-wing) populism crashing against the defences of the liberal democratic status quo. The most recent example was the 2014 European elections which, according to much of the media, witnessed an ‘irresistible’ rise of populist parties from the right side of politics. From UKIP, French Front National and Danish People’s Party victories, to the shocking results of the more extreme Jobbik and Golden Dawn in Hungary and Greece, it would seem that right-wing populism has become inescapable.

Early on, Hans-Georg Betz in his formative work on radical right-wing populism argued that this surge was part of the corrective function of democracy (what Margaret Canovan called its ‘redemptive function’). In this understanding (simplified for this short piece), right-wing populism acts as a counterpoint to the pragmatic side of democracy, that is the technocratic forms of government which have become increasingly central to what Colin Crouch has called ‘post-democracy.’ By voting for these parties, the ‘people’ (be they workers, the losers of globalisation etc.) can express their discontent and frustration towards policies and politics from which they feel alienated. This vote acts as a reminder to politicians that the mob may not want the advance of (neo)liberalism and that a step back or a reframing is at times necessary. Continue reading →

Pour Marine Le Pen, “le peuple a parlé”. La chef de file du Front national, forte de ses 25% aux élections Européennes, clame dans tous les médias que son parti est le premier parti de France : “les Français ne veulent plus être dirigés du dehors. Ils n’ont pas seulement lourdement sanctionnés les partis du renoncement. Ils ont aussi conféré au FN la responsabilité d’appliquer ses idées”. Pour Le Pen, ce weekend est un tournant dans la vie politique puisqu’il représente, d’après elle, le moment où le peuple français se tourne vers les idées nationalistes en masse et exprime par là son désir démocratique d’un virage vers la droite dure. Le quart des suffrages exprimés en faveur de son parti semblent suffisant pour justifier un changement de cap drastique : “Le président de la République doit maintenant prendre les dispositions qui s’imposent pour que l’Assemblée devienne nationale, représentative du peuple et à même de mener la politique d’indépendance que le peuple a choisie ce soir.” Il n’en faut pas plus pour Jean-Marie Le Pen pour demander la démission du François Hollande. Continue reading →

As far as Marine Le Pen is concerned: “The people have spoken.” The leader of the Front National, which has taken 25% of the French vote in the European Parliamentary elections claims her party is now “number one” in France.

“Our people demand one type of politics,” she told jubilant supporters. “They want French politics by the French, for the French, with the French. They don’t want to be led any more from outside, to submit to laws … Tonight is a massive rejection of the European Union.”

And a ripple effect appears to have already reached the Elysée Palace. Embattled French president, Francois Hollande, called a crisis meeting of his cabinet after which he gave a televised statement in which he outlined what appears to be a major shift in attitude, saying that the EU had become “remote and incomprehensible” to many people.

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Traduction de l’anglais : Amélie Marriq (université de Bath)

Nombreux sont ceux qui estiment que les partis d’extrême-droite seront les grands gagnants des prochaines élections européennes. Certains sondages suggèrent même que le Front National en France, le Parti pour la liberté aux Pays-Bas, le Parti de la liberté d’Autriche, le Parti populaire danois ainsi que le Parti pour l’indépendance du Royaume-Uni (UKIP) pourraient remporter les élections dans leur pays respectif.Ce n’est pas vraiment une surprise, étant donné les circonstances extrêmement favorables dans lesquelles s’est déroulée la montée de ces mouvements populistes et nativistes. Les élections de second ordre comme les Européennes se sont toujours avérées bénéfiques aux partis minoritaires : elles fournissent l’occasion aux eurosceptiques et nationalistes de mener une campagne négative “facile”, qui s’en prend à des institutions que l’électorat ne saisit pas vraiment et auxquelles il ne s’intéresse pas tellement.

La situation économique favorise elle aussi la montée des partis d’extrême-droite, étant donné que les partis au pouvoir, qu’ils soient de gauche ou de droite, ont été obligés d’adopter des mesures d’austérité douloureuses. Malgré des signes de reprise économique, de nombreux pays souffrent encore des conséquences de la crise, et les prévisions à court et à long terme ne laissent rien présager de bon. Fin 2013, contrairement aux signes précoces de reprise économique vantés par les gouvernements, 68 % des personnes ayant répondu au sondage Eurobaromètre ont déclaré que la situation actuelle de leur pays n’était pas bonne, et 50 % des sondés estiment que le pire est à venir. Dans un tel contexte, il n’est pas étonnant de voir une partie de la population inquiète de la situation actuelle avoir tendance à se tourner vers une politique d’exclusion nationaliste alternative. Continue reading →

Distrust of EU institutions, not far right, is real threat to our European future

By Aurelien Mondon, University of Bath

It is widely predicted that far-right parties will be the big winners of the 2014 European elections. Some polls have even suggested that the French Front National, the Dutch Party for Freedom, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Danish People’s Party and the UK Independence Party could be the winning parties in their respective countries.

This is hardly surprising as the rise of these populist, nativist movements has taken place in extremely favourable circumstances. Secondary elections have always proven beneficial for parties beyond the mainstream. The Eurosceptic side, whether opportunistic or ideological, is able to run an “easy” negative campaign, attacking institutions which the public doesn’t properly understand and in which it is not very interested.

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Marine Le Pen called the results of last weekend’s French local elections an “earthquake” – co-opting a phrase used about her father’s accession to the second round of the presidential elections in 2002. There is no doubt that the Front National did well in the first round on Sunday, winning in one town in the north and sending up to 229 candidates to the second round next weekend, almost doubling its 1995 record. For Le Pen, Sunday confirmed “the end of the bipolarisation” of French politics: “the French had freed themselves from the obsolete Left/Right choice”.

The reporting of these elections had the FN all over it. For centre-left Libération “the Front National is at the centre of the game”. Right-wing Le Figaro stressed the FN’s breakthrough – Steeve Briois, winner in formerly left-wing Hénin-Beaumont, was a symbol of this “blue Marine” wave. Le Monde ran countless articles analysing this potential “earthquake” while Le Parisien featured a prominent picture of Le Pen’s advisor Florian Philippot. The FN even made the front page of the Wall Street Journal, and many other newspapers across the globe.

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By Aurelien Mondon, University of Bath and Benjamin Bowman, University of Bath

Participation is commonly viewed as the cornerstone of liberal democracy. In Europe, however, the decades since the 1980s have been marked by falling participation and increased disillusionment with institutional politics. These trends are most striking among young people – those within the rough boundaries of 15 to 25 years old – an electoral demographic increasingly alienated by mainstream politics.

Meanwhile, this distrust and disillusionment in older voters has precipitated the resurgence of populist anti-immigration parties across Europe. By positioning themselves beyond the left/right divide, against the establishment, some of these parties have mobilised a growing part of the discontented. In this context, the young vote appears as a natural target for the protest parties on the right, but is it likely to follow their call?

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Mondon, Aurelien. 2014. “The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Democratic Contender?” Modern & Contemporary France:1-20. doi: 10.1080/09639489.2013.872093.

Full text:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09639489.2013.872093

Abstract:

The impressive result obtained by Marine Le Pen in the 2012 presidential elections has raised many questions regarding her ability to break the glass ceiling which many had thought unreachable for the Front National (FN). For some, this progression in the polls was a consequence of the softening of the discourse of the party and Le Pen moving away from her father’s more radical stance. However, the fact that this rise came after five years of Sarkozist presidency should not be underestimated, and the context following Sarkozy’s 2007 election can be seen as partly responsible for the FN reaching new heights. What this article will argue is that the new status acquired by the FN in 2012 was dramatically facilitated by the campaign by the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), which continued the legitimisation of the Le Pens’ party rhetoric and allowed it to enter the selective category of respectable, ‘democratic’ and ‘republican’ parties. To highlight this development, this article will focus on three themes: the exaggerated state of crisis, the use of populism and the vilification of Islam through the use of neo-racist rhetoric by both the UMP and the FN.
Les résultats impressionnants obtenus par Marine Le Pen lors de l’élection présidentielle de 2012 ont démontré que le Front National (FN) avait dépassé un nouveau seuil. Pour certains, cette progression était le résultat du processus de modération et du délaissement des techniques plus radicales de Jean-Marie Le Pen. Bien que la stratégie de Marine Le Pen fût un succès, les cinq années de présidence sarkoziste ont également joué un rôle prépondérant dans la poussée électorale du FN. Cet article va montrer que la nouvelle stature du FN a en fait été facilitée par la campagne de l’Union pour une Mouvement Populaire (UMP), qui a poursuivi sa légitimation du parti des Le Pen, et lui a permis de rentrer dans la cour des partis ‘démocratiques’ et ‘républicains’. Pour étudier ce développement, cet article va se concentrer sur trois thèmes de campagne déterminants: un sentiment de crise exagéré, une utilisation abusive du populisme, et la stigmatisation de l’Islam grâce à une rhétorique néo-raciste.

Marine Le Pen, the leader of the Front National in France, recently threatened to sue anyone who labelled her party as “extreme right”. This is interesting in many respects, most notably because it demonstrates the new-found confidence of a party increasingly portrayed as a normal, “democratic”, “republican” contender in the French political landscape.

Today, the Le Pens’ legitimisation strategy is commonly promoted beyond the party. It is implicitly accepted within mainstream politics and the media, but also increasingly within sections of academia – despite a large body of evidence suggesting the need for caution.

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Long before a new poll put France’s National Front ahead of the mainstream UMP, conservatives have increasingly courted the far-right’s voters. François Picard’s panel sees the trend playing out elsewhere across the continent.

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‘Common sense’ is usually believed to be just that: common sense. I have it, you have it, everyone has it. Or more precisely, only those we disagree with, and therefore many of our politicians, seem to lack it. It’s just the way things should be, or how they used to be ‘back in the good old days’. Defining common sense, however, is not that simple. Most of us will claim unconvincingly that everyone knows what it is; that it is something so obvious that it does not need to be defined. If pushed, many would probably say that it is merely the natural or logical state of things, the answer we all know deep down is true. But do we really? Is one’s common sense the same as one’s neighbours’, countrymen’s and women’s or political opponents’? Is one’s common sense born out of nature, logic, or any other objective force; does it reflect our own prejudices and deep-seated beliefs; or is it created, theorised and imposed by various groups over others? In academic circles, the concept of common sense is often linked to that of hegemony, or as Peter Thomas defined it, ‘a strategy aiming at the production of consent, as opposed to coercion’. For Thomas, drawing on the works of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, ‘hegemony involves a leading social group securing the (active or passive) consent of other social strata rather than unilaterally imposing its decrees upon unwilling “subjects”’. It is akin to what Rancière and others have called the politics of consensus: common sense is created when a group in society imposes its vision as one that cannot be challenged.
In Australia, as elsewhere, ‘common sense’ has become an essential political prize in the liberal democratic struggle. Our politicians are often accused, or accuse each other, of acting ‘non-sensically’, of misunderstanding the people’s general will, of being ‘out of touch’. Alternatively, politicians often claim to represent the ‘practical’ or ‘sensible’ viewpoints of the majority and give weight to such claims through the use of colloquialisms. Tony Abbott, for example, used the term ‘fair dinkum’ eight times in a memorable debate against Julia Gillard in 2010, and more recently declared, against evidence, that ‘the vast majority of asylum seekers who arrive by boat are not fair dinkum refugees’. Another favourite among politicians is a ‘fair go’. Yet what is a ‘fair go’? Can we assume that the most left-wing Labor supporter will agree with an ardent Liberal’s conception? That a Queenslander’s definition will be the same as that of a Victorian? That a farmer’s will resemble that of a pundit? That an asylum seeker will be on the same wavelength as a One Nation supporter?

From:

Mondon, A. (2013) ‘Fair dinkum politics or the death of politics’, in Tavan, G. (ed.) State of the Nation: Essays for Robert Manne. Melbourne: Black Inc.

We are discussing these and other issues with our guest speakers Dr. Aurélien Mondon of the University of Bath and Lila Caballero, head of projects at Counterpoint research center.

Read more: http://voiceofrussia.com/radio_broadcast/25298789/254637838/