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Bill Clinton
William Jefferson "Bill" Clinton (born William Jefferson Blythe III, August 19, 1946) is the former 42nd President of the United States and served from 1993 to 2001. At 46 he was the third-youngest president. He became president at the end of the Cold War, and was the first baby boomer president. His wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, is currently the United States Secretary of State. Each received a Juris Doctor (J.D.) from Yale Law School.
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John von Neumann
John von Neumann (December 28, 1903 – February 8, 1957) was a Hungarian American mathematician who made major contributions to a vast range of fields, including set theory, functional analysis, quantum mechanics, ergodic theory, continuous geometry, economics and game theory, computer science, numerical analysis, hydrodynamics (of explosions), and statistics, as well as many other mathematical fields. He is generally regarded as one of the greatest mathematicians in modern history. The mathematician Jean Dieudonné called von Neumann "the last of the great mathematicians", while Peter Lax described him as possessing the most "fearsome technical prowess" and "scintillating intellect" of the century. Even in Budapest, in the time that produced geniuses like Theodore von Kármán (b. 1881), Leó Szilárd (b. 1898), Eugene Wigner (b. 1902), and Edward Teller (b. 1908), his brilliance stood out.
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Oskar Morgenstern
Oskar Morgenstern (January 24, 1902 – July 26, 1977) was a German-born Austrian economist. He, along with John von Neumann, helped found the mathematical field of game theory (see von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem).
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Émile Borel
Félix Édouard Justin Émile Borel (7 January 1871 – 3 February 1956) was a French mathematician[http://www.univ-lille1.fr/asa_2/mathematiques/mathematiques-2.htm Emile Borel's biography] - Université Lille Nord de France and politician.
http://wn.com/Émile_Borel
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Definition
The zero-sum property (if one gains, another loses) means that any result of a zero-sum situation is Pareto optimal (generally, any game where all strategies are Pareto optimal is called a conflict game).Situations where participants can all gain or suffer together are referred to as non-zero-sum. Thus, a country with an excess of bananas trading with another country for their excess of apples, where both benefit from the transaction, is in a non-zero-sum situation. Other non-zero-sum games are games in which the sum of gains and losses by the players are sometimes more or less than what they began with.
Solution
For 2-player finite zero-sum games, the different game theoretic solution concepts of Nash equilibrium, minimax, and maximin all give the same solution. In the solution, players play a mixed strategy.
Example
A | B | C | |
1 | |||
2 |
A game's payoff matrix is a convenient representation. Consider for example the two-player zero-sum game pictured at right.
The order of play proceeds as follows: The first player (red) chooses in secret one of the two actions 1 or 2; the second player (blue), unaware of the first player's choice, chooses in secret one of the three actions A, B or C. Then, the choices are revealed and each player's points total is affected according to the payoff for those choices.
Example: Red chooses action 2 and Blue chooses action B. When the payoff is allocated, Red gains 20 points and Blue loses 20 points.
Now, in this example game both players know the payoff matrix and attempt to maximize the number of their points. What should they do?
Red could reason as follows: "With action 2, I could lose up to 20 points and can win only 20, while with action 1 I can lose only 10 but can win up to 30, so action 1 looks a lot better." With similar reasoning, Blue would choose action C. If both players take these actions, Red will win 20 points. But what happens if Blue anticipates Red's reasoning and choice of action 1, and goes for action B, so as to win 10 points? Or if Red in turn anticipates this devious trick and goes for action 2, so as to win 20 points after all?
Émile Borel and John von Neumann had the fundamental and surprising insight that probability provides a way out of this conundrum. Instead of deciding on a definite action to take, the two players assign probabilities to their respective actions, and then use a random device which, according to these probabilities, chooses an action for them. Each player computes the probabilities so as to minimise the maximum expected point-loss independent of the opponent's strategy. This leads to a linear programming problem with the optimal strategies for each player. This minimax method can compute provably optimal strategies for all two-player zero-sum games.
For the example given above, it turns out that Red should choose action 1 with probability 4/7 and action 2 with probability 3/7, while Blue should assign the probabilities 0, 4/7, and 3/7 to the three actions A, B, and C. Red will then win 20/7 points on average per game.
Solving
The Nash equilibrium for a two-player, zero-sum game can be found by solving a linear programming problem. Suppose a zero-sum game has a payoff matrix where element is the payoff obtained when the minimizing player chooses pure strategy and the maximizing player chooses pure strategy (i.e. the player trying to minimize the payoff chooses the row and the player trying to maximize the payoff chooses the column). Assume every element of is positive. The game will have at least one Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium can be found (see ref. [2], page 740) by solving the following linear program to find a vector ::Minimize: ::: :Subject to the constraints: :: ≥ 0 :: ≥ 1.
The first constraint says each element of the vector must be nonnegative, and the second constraint says each element of the vector must be at least 1. For the resulting vector, the inverse of the sum of its elements is the value of the game. Multiplying by that value gives a probability vector, giving the probability that the maximizing player will choose each of the possible pure strategies.
If the game matrix does not have all positive elements, simply add a constant to every element that is large enough to make them all positive. That will increase the value of the game by that constant, and will have no effect on the equilibrium mixed strategies for the equilibrium.
The equilibrium mixed strategy for the minimizing player can be found by solving the dual of the given linear program. Or, it can be found by using the above procedure to solve a modified payoff matrix which is the transpose and negation of (adding a constant so it's positive), then solving the resulting game.
If all the solutions to the linear program are found, they will constitute all the Nash equilibria for the game. Conversely, any linear program can be converted into a two-player, zero-sum game by using a change of variables that puts it in the form of the above equations. So such games are equivalent to linear programs, in general.
Non-zero-sum
Economics
Many economic situations are not zero-sum, since valuable goods and services can be created, destroyed, or badly allocated, and any of these will create a net gain or loss. Assuming the counterparties are acting rationally with symmetric information, any commercial exchange is a non-zero-sum activity, because each party must consider the goods it is receiving as being at least fractionally more valuable than the goods it is delivering. Economic exchanges must benefit both parties enough above the zero-sum such that each party can overcome its transaction costs.See also:
Psychology
The most common or simple example from the subfield of Social Psychology is the concept of "Social Traps". In some cases we can enhance our collective well-being by pursuing our personal interests — or parties can pursue mutually destructive behavior as they choose their own ends.
Complexity
It has been theorized by Robert Wright in his book Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny, that society becomes increasingly non-zero-sum as it becomes more complex, specialized, and interdependent. As former US President Bill Clinton states:}}
Extensions
In 1944 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern proved that any zero-sum game involving n players is in fact a generalized form of a zero-sum game for two players, and that any non-zero-sum game for n players can be reduced to a zero-sum game for n + 1 players; the (n + 1) player representing the global profit or loss.
Misunderstandings
Zero–sum games and particularly their solutions are commonly misunderstood by critics of game theory, usually with respect to the independence and rationality of the players, as well as to the interpretation of utility functions. Furthermore, the word "game" does not imply the model is valid only for recreational games.
References
Further reading
External links
Category:Non-cooperative games Category:International relations theory
ar:مجموع صفري ca:Joc de suma nul·la cs:Hra s nulovým součtem de:Nullsummenspiel es:Juego de suma cero fr:Jeu à somme nulle ko:제로섬 게임 is:Núllsummuleikur it:Gioco a somma zero he:משחק סכום אפס nl:Nulsomspel ja:ゼロ和 no:Nullsumspill nds:Nullsummenspeel pl:Gra o sumie stałej pt:Soma-zero ru:Антагонистическая игра sk:Hra s nulovým súčtom sr:Нулта сума fi:Nollasummapeli sv:Nollsummespel th:เกมศูนย์ uk:Ігри антагоністичні ur:صفر حاصل جمع zh:零和博弈This text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.