Tatmadaw တပ်မတော်
Service branches	File:MMarmyflag.svg Myanmar Army Myanmar Navy Myanmar Air Force Myanmar Police Force
Leadership
Commander-in-Chief	Vice-Senior General Min Aung Hlaing
Minister of Defense	Lieutenant General Hla Min
Deputy Commander-in-Chief	General Soe Win
Manpower
Military age	16 to 49 years of age
Available for military service	14,747,845 males, age 15–49 (2010 est.), 14,710,871 females, age 15–49 (2010 est.)
Fit for military service	10,451,515 males, age 15–49 (2010 est.), 11,181,537 females, age 15–49 (2010 est.)
Reaching military age annually	522,478 males (2010 est.), 506,388 females (2010 est.)
Active personnel	492,000 (ranked 9th)
Reserve personnel	72,000 (Paramilitary)
Expenditures
Budget	$2.04 billion[1] (2011)
Percent of GDP	4.75% (2011)
Industry
Domestic suppliers	KaPaSa Industries (Myanmar Defence Industries)
Foreign suppliers	People's Republic of China  Ukraine  Russia  India  Serbia  Singapore  Indonesia  Israel

The Myanmar Armed Forces, officially known as Tatmadaw (Burmese: တပ်မတော်; MLCTS: tap ma. taw, IPA: [taʔmədɔ̀]) is the military organization of Burma, also known as Myanmar. The armed forces are administered by the Ministry of Defense and are composed of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Auxiliary services include Myanmar Police Force, People Militia Units and Frontier Forces, locally known as Na Sa Kha.

Currently, the draft is officially revived. In the past, all service personnel were volunteers in theory, although the government was empowered to undertake conscription if considered necessary for Myanmar's defense. In practice, it has been claimed that the Tatmadaw regularly kidnap and conscript children^[2] and use civilians as forced labour and human mine-sweepers.^[3] The Tatmadaw has been engaged in a bitter battle with ethnic insurgents, political dissidents and the narco-armies^[4] since the country gained its independence from Great Britain in 1948.

An official publication has revealed that almost one-quarter of Myanmar's new national budget will be allocated to defense. The Government Gazette reports that 1.8 trillion kyat (about $2 billion at free market rates of exchange), or 23.6% of the 2011 budget will go to defense.^[5]

History[link]

Feudal era[link]

The Royal Armed Forces, was the armed forces of the Burmese monarchy from the 9th to 19th centuries. It refers to the military forces of the Pagan Dynasty, the Ava Kingdom, the Toungoo Dynasty and the Konbaung Dynasty in chronological order. The army was one of the major armed forces of Southeast Asia until it was defeated by the British over a six-decade span in the 19th century.

The army was organized into a small standing army of a few thousand, which defended the capital and the palace, and a much larger conscription-based wartime army. Conscription was based on the ahmudan system, which required local chiefs to supply their predetermined quota of men from their jurisdiction on the basis of population in times of war. The wartime army also consisted of elephantry, cavalry, artillery and naval units.

Firearms, first introduced from China in the late 14th century, became integrated into strategy only gradually over many centuries. The first special musket and artillery units, equipped with Portuguese matchlocks and cannon, were formed in the 16th century. Outside the special firearm units, there was no formal training program for the regular conscripts, who were expected to have a basic knowledge of self defense, and how to operate the musket on their own. As the technological gap between European powers widened in the 18th century, the army was dependent on Europeans' willingness to sell more sophisticated weaponry.

While the army held more than its own against the armies of the kingdom's neighbors, its performance against more technologically advanced European armies deteriorated over time. While it defeated the Portuguese and French intrusions in the 17th and 18th centuries respectively, the army could not stop the advance of the British Empire in the 19th century, losing all three Anglo-Burmese wars. On 1 January 1886, the millennium-old Burmese monarchy and its military arm, the Royal Burmese Army, were formally abolished by the British.

Second World War[link]

Post Independence era[link]

Air Force personnel

At the time of Myanmar's independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw was weak, small and disunited. Cracks appeared along the lines of racial background, political affiliation, organisational origin and different services. Its unity and operational efficiency was further weakened by the interference of civilians and politicians in military affairs, and the perception gap between the staff officers and field commanders. The most serious problem was the tension between Karen Officers, coming from the British Burma Army and Bamar officers, coming from the Patriotic Burmese Force (PBF).^[6]

In accordance with agreement reached at the Kandy Conference in September 1945, the Tatmadaw was reorganised by incorporating the British Burma Army and the Patriotic Burmese Force. The officer corps shared by ex-PBF officers and officers from the British Burma Army and Army of Burma Reserve Organisation (ARBO). The British also decided to form what were known as "Class Battalions" based on ethnicity. There were a total of 15 rifle battalions at the time of independence and four of them were made up of former members of PBF. None of the influential positions within the War Office and commands were manned with former PBF Officers. All services including military engineers, supply and transport, ordnance and medical services, Navy and Air Force were commanded by former Officers from ABRO and British Burma Army.^[6]

The War Office was officially opened on 8 May 1948 under the Ministry of Defence and managed by a War Office Council chaired by the Minister of Defence.^[6] At the head of War Office was Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Air Staff, Adjutant General and Quartermaster General. Vice Chief of Staff, who was also Chief of Army Staff and the head of General Staff Office. VCS oversee General Staff matters and there were three branch offices: GS-1 Operation and Training, GS-2 Staff Duty and Planning; GS-3 Intelligence. Signal Corps and Field Engineering Corps are also under the command of General Staff Office.^[8]

According to the war establishment adopted on 14 April 1948, Chief of Staff was under the War Office with the rank of Major General. It was subsequently upgraded to a Lieutenant General. Vice Chief of Staff was a Brigadier General. The Chief of Staff was staffed with GSO-I with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, three GSO-II with the rank of Major, four GSO-III with the rank of captain for operation, training, planning and intelligence, and one Intelligence Officer (IO). The Chief of Staff office also had one GSO-II and one GSO-III for field engineering, and the Chief Signal Officer and a GSO-II for signal. Directorate of Signal and Directorate Field Engineering are also under General Staff Office.^[8]

Under Adjutant General Office were Judge Advocate General, Military Secretary, Vice Adjutant General. The Adjutant General (AG) was a Brigadier General whereas the Judge Advocate General (JAG), Military Secretary (MS) and Vice Adjutant General (VAG) were Colonels. VAG handles adjutant staff matters and there were also three branch offices; AG-1 planning, recruitment and transfer; AG-2 discipline, moral, welfare, and education; AG-3 salary, pension, and other financial matters. The Medical Corps and the Provost Marshall Office were under the Adjutant General Office.^[8]

The Quarter Master General office also had three branch offices: QG-1 planning, procurement, and budget; QG-2 maintenance, construction, and cantonment; and QG-3 transportation. Under the QMG office were Garrison Engineering Corps, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps, Military Ordnance Corps, and the Supply and Transport Corps.^[8]

Both AG and QMG office similar structure to the General Staff Office, but they only had three ASO-III and three QSO-III respectively.^[8]

The Navy and Air Force were separate services under the War office but under the Chief of Staff.^[8]

Reorganisation in 1956[link]

As per War Office order No. (9) 1955 on 28 September 1955, the Chief of Staff become Commander in Chief, the Chief of Army Staff become Vice Chief of Staff (Army), the Chief of Naval Staff become Vice Chief of Staff (Navy) and the Chief of Air Staff become Vice Chief of Staff (Air).^[6]

On 1 Jaunuary 1956, War Office was officially renamed as Ministry of Defence. General Ne Win became the first Chief of Staff of Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) to command all three services - Army, Navy and Airforce - under a single unified command for the first time.^[6]

Brigadier General Aung Gyi was given the post of Vice Chief of Staff (Army). Brigadier General D. A Blake became commander of South Burma Subdistrict Command (SBSD) and Brigadier General Kyaw Zaw, a member of the Thirty Comrades, became Commander of North Burma Subdistrict Command (NBSD).^[6]

Caretaker Government[link]

Due to deteroriating political situations in 1957, the then Prime minister of Burma, U Nu invited General Ne Win to form a "Caretaker Governement" and handed over power on 28 October 1958. Under the stewardship of the Military Caretaker Government, parliamentary elections were held in February 1960. Several high ranking and senior officers were dismissed due to their involvement and supporting various political parties.^[6]

1962 Coup d'etat[link]

The elections of 1960 had put U Nu back as the Prime Minister and Pyidaungsu Party (Union Party) led civilian government resume control of the country.

On 2 March 1962, the then Chief of Staff of Armed Forces, General Ne Win staged a coup d'état and formed the "Revolutionary Council".^[11] Around midnight the troops began to move into Yangon to take up strategic position. Prime Minister U Nu and his cabinet ministers were taken into protective custody. At 8:50 am, General Ne Win announce the coup over the radio. He said "I have to inform you, citizens of the Union that Armed Forces have taken over the responsibility and the task of keeping the country's safety, owing to the greatly deteriorating conditions of the Union." ^[12]

The country would be ruled by the military for the next 12 years. The Burma Socialist Programme Party became the sole political party and it the majority of its full members were military.^[13] Government servants underwent military training and the Military Intelligence Service functioned as the secret police of the state.

1988 Coup d'etat[link]

At the height of the Four Eights Uprising against the socialist government, Former General Ne Win, who at the time was Chairman of the ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), issued a warning against potential protestors during a televised speech. He stated that if the "disturbances" continued the "Army would have to be called and I would like to make it clear that if the Army shoots, it has no tradition of shooting into the Air, it would shoot straight to hit".^{[citation needed]}

Subsequently, the 22 Light Infantry Division, 33 Light Infantry Division and the 44 Light Infantry Division were redeployed to Yangon from front line fighting against ethnic insurgents in the Karen states. Battalions from three Light Infantry Divisions, augmented by infantry battalions under Yangon Regional Military Command and supporting units from Directorate of Artillery and Armour Corps were deployed during the suppression of protests in and around the then capital city of Yangon. Initially, these troops were deployed in support of the then People's Police Force (now known as Myanmar Police Force) security battalions and to patrol the streets of the capital and to guard government offices and building. However, at midnight of 8 August 1988 troops from 22 Light Infantry Division guarding Yangon City Hall opened fire on unarmed protesters as the crack down against the protests begin.

The armed forces under General Saw Maung formed a State Law and Order Restoration Council, repealed the constitution and declared martial law on 18 September 1988. By late September the military had complete control of the country.

Doctrine[link]

First phase (post-independence/civil war era)[link]

The first phase of the doctrine was developed in early 1950s to cope with external threats from more powerful enemies with a strategy of Strategic Denial under conventional warfare. The perception of threats to state security was more external than internal threats. The internal threat to state security was managed through the use of a mixture of force and political persuasion. Lieutenant Colonel Maung Maung drew up defence doctrine based on conventional warfare concepts, with large infantry divisions, armoured brigades, tanks and motorised war with mass mobilisation for the war effort being the important element of the doctrine. The objective was to contain the offensive of the invading forces at the border for at least three months, while waiting for the arrival of international forces, similar to the police action by international intervention forces under the directive of United Nations during the war on Korean peninsula. However, the conventional strategy under the concept of total war was undermined by the lack of appropriate command and control system, proper logistical support structure, sound economic bases and efficient civil defence organisations.

At the beginning of 1950s, while Tatmadaw was able to reassert its control over most part of the country, Kuomintang (KMT) troops under General Li Mai, with support from United States, invaded Burma and used the country's frontier as a springboard for attack against People's Republic of China, which in turn became the external threat to state security and sovereignty of Burma. The first phase of the doctrine was tested for the first time in Operation "Naga Naing" in February 1953 against invading KMT forces. The doctrine did not take into account logistic and political support for KMT from United States and as a result it failed to deliver the objectives and ended in humiliating defeat for the Tatmadaw. The then Tatmadaw leadership argued that the excessive media coverage was partly to blame for the failure of Operation "Naga Naing". For example, Brigadier General Maung Maung pointed out that newspapers, such as the "Nation", carried reports detailing the training and troops positioning, even went as far to the name and social background of the commanders who are leading the operation thus losing the element of surprise. Colonel Saw Myint, who was second in command for the operation, also complained about the long lines of communications and the excessive pressure imposed upon the units for public relations activities in order to prove that the support of the people was behind the operation.^[6]

Second phase (KMT invasion/BSPP era)[link]

Despite failure, Tatmadaw continued to rely on this doctrine until the mid 1960s. The doctrine was under constant review and modifications throughout KMT invasion and gained success in anti-KMT operations in the mid and late 1950s. However, this strategy became increasingly irrelevant and unsuitable in the late 1950s as the insurgents and KMT changed their positional warfare strategy to hit and run guerrilla warfare.^[14][15] At the 1958 Tatmadaw's annual Commanding Officers (COs) conference, Colonel Kyi Win submitted a report outlining the requirement for new military doctrine and strategy. He stated that 'Tatmadaw did not have a clear strategy to cope with insurgents', even though most of Tatmadaw's commanders were guerrilla fighters during the anti-British and Japanese campaigns during the Second World War, they had very little knowledge of anti-guerrilla or counterinsurgency warfare. Based upon Colonel Kyi Win's report, Tatmadaw begin developing an appropriate military doctrine and strategy to meet the requirements of counterinsurgency warfare.

This second phase of the doctrine was to suppress insurgency with people's war and the perception of threats to state security was more of internal threats. During this phase, external linkage of internal problems and direct external threats were minimised by the foreign policy based on isolation. It was common view of the commanders that unless insurgency was suppressed, foreign interference would be highly probable,^[16] therefore counterinsurgency became the core of the new military doctrine and strategy. Beginning in 1961, the Directorate of Military Training took charge the research for national defence planning, military doctrine and strategy for both internal and external threats. This included reviews of international and domestic political situations, studies of the potential sources of conflicts, collection of information for strategic planning and defining the possible routes of foreign invasion.^[6] In 1962, as part of new military doctrine planning, principles of anti-guerrilla warfare were outlined and counterinsurgency-training courses were delivered at the training schools. The new doctrine laid out three potential enemies and they are internal insurgents, historical enemies with roughly an equal strength (i.e. Thailand), and enemies with greater strength. It states that in suppressing insurgencies, Tatmadaw must be trained to conduct long-range penetration with a tactic of continuous search and destroy. Reconnaissance, Ambush and all weather day and night offensive and attack capabilities along with winning the hearts and minds of people are important parts of anti-guerrilla warfare. For countering an historical enemy with equal strength, Tatmadaw should fight a conventional warfare under total war strategy, without giving up an inch of its territory to the enemy. For powerful enemy and foreign invaders, Tatmadaw should engage in total people's war, with a special focus on guerrilla strategy.^[6]

To prepare for the transition to the new doctrine, Brigadier General San Yu, the then Vice Chief of Staff (Army), sent a delegation led by Lieutenant Colonel Thura Tun Tin was sent to Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and East Germany in July 1964 to study organisation structure, armaments, training, territorial organisation and strategy of people's militias. A research team was also formed at General Staff Office within the War Office to study defence capabilities and militia formations of neighbouring countries.

The new doctrine of total people's war, and the strategy of anti-guerrilla warfare for counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare for foreign invasion, were designed to be appropriate for Burma. The doctrine flowed from the country's independent and active foreign policy, total people's defence policy, the nature of perceived threats, its geography and the regional environment, the size of its population in comparison with those of its neighbours, the relatively underdeveloped nature of its economy and its historical and political experiences. The doctrine was based upon 'three totalities': population, time and space (du-thone-du) and 'four strengths': manpower, material, time and morale (Panama-lay-yat). The doctrine did not develop concepts of strategic denial or counter-offensive capabilities. It relied almost totally on irregular low-intensity warfare, such as its guerrilla strategy to counter any form of foreign invasion. The overall counterinsurgency strategy included not only elimination of insurgents and their support bases with the 'four cut' strategy, but also the building and designation of 'white area' and 'black area' as well.

In April 1968, Tatmadaw introduced special warfare training programmes at "Command Training Centres" at various regional commands. Anti-Guerrilla warfare tactics were taught at combat forces schools and other training establishments with special emphasis on ambush and counter-ambush, counterinsurgency weapons and tactics, individual battle initiative for tactical independence, commando tactics, and reconnaissance. Battalion size operations were also practised in the South West Regional Military Command area. The new military doctrine was formally endorsed and adopted at the first party congress of the BSPP in 1971.^[17] BSPP laid down directives for "complete annihilation of the insurgents as one of the tasks for national defence and state security" and called for "liquidation of insurgents through the strength of the working people as the immediate objective". This doctrine ensures the role of Tatmadaw at the heart of national policy making.

Throughout BSPP era, the total people's war doctrine was solely applied in counterinsurgency operations, since Burma did not face any direct foreign invasion throughout the period. In 1985, the then Lieutenant General Saw Maung, Vice-Chief of Staff of Tatmadaw reminded his commanders during his speech at the Command and General Staff College:

In Myanmar, out of nearly 35 million people, the combined armed forces (army, navy and air force) are about two hundred thousand. In terms of percentage, that is about 0.01%. It is simply impossible to defend a country the size of ours with only this handful of troops... therefore, what we have to do in the case of foreign invasion is to mobilise people in accordance with the "total people's war" doctrine. In order to defend our country from aggressors, the entire population must be involved in the war effort as the support of people dictate the outcome of the war.

Third phase (SLORC/SPDC era)[link]

The third phase of doctrinal development of Myanmar Armed Forces came after the military take over and formation of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988 as part of armed forces modernization programme. The development was the reflection of sensitivity towards direct foreign invasion or invasion by proxy state during the turbulent years of the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example: the unauthorized presence of a US aircraft carrier Battle Group in Myanmar's territorial waters during the 1988 political uprising as evidence of an infringement of Myanmar's sovereignty. Also, the Tatmadaw leadership was concerned that foreign powers might arm the insurgents on the border to exploit the political situation and tensions in the country. This new threat perception, previously insignificant under the nation's isolationist foreign policy, led Tatmadaw leaders to review the defense capability and doctrine of the Tatmadaw.^[18]

The third phase was to face the lower level external threats with a strategy of strategic denial under total people's defence concept. Current military leadership has successfully dealt with 17 major insurgent groups, whose 'return to legal fold' in the past decade has remarkably decreased the internal threats to state security, at least for the short and medium terms, even though threat perception of the possibility of external linkage to internal problems, perceived as being motivated by the continuing human rights violations, religious suppression and ethnic cleansing, remains high.^[18]

Within the policy, the role of the Tatmadaw was defined as a `modern, strong and highly capable fighting force'. Since the day of independence, the Tatmadaw has been involved in restoring and maintaining internal security and suppressing insurgency. It was with this background that Tatmadaw's "multifaceted" defence policy was formulated and its military doctrine and strategy could be interpreted as defence-in-depth. It was influenced by a number of factors such as history, geography, culture, economy and sense of threats. Tatmadaw has developed an 'active defence' strategy based on guerrilla warfare with limited conventional military capabilities, designed to cope with low intensity conflicts from external and internal foes, which threatens the security of the state. This strategy, revealed in joint services exercises, is built on a system of total people's defence, where the armed forces provide the first line of defence and the training and leadership of the nation in the matter of national defence. It is designed to deter potential aggressors by the knowledge that defeat of Tatmadaw's regular forces in conventional warfare would be followed by persistent guerrilla warfare in the occupied areas by people militias and dispersed regular troops which would eventually wear down the invading forces, both physically and psychologically, and leave it vulnerable to a counter-offensive. If the conventional strategy of strategic denial fails, then the Tatmadaw and its auxiliary forces will follow Mao's strategic concepts of 'strategic defensive', 'strategic stalemate' and 'strategic offensive'.^[18]

Over the past decade, through a series of modernisation programs, Tatmadaw has developed and invested in better Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence system; real-time intelligence; formidable air defence system; and early warning systems for its 'strategic denial' and 'total people's defence' doctrine.^[18]

Organisational, Command and Control structure[link]

[edit] Before 1988^[19]

Overall command of Tatmadaw (armed forces) rested with the country's highest ranking military officer, a General, who acted concurrently as Defence Minister and Chief of Staff of Defence Services. He thus exercised supreme operational control over all three services, under the direction of the President, State Council and Council of Ministers. There was also a National Security Council which acted in advisory capacity. The Defence Minister cum Chief-of-Staff of Defence Services exercised day-to-day control of the armed forces and assisted by three Vice-Chiefs of Staff, one each for the army, navy and air force. These officers also acted as Deputy Ministers of Defence and commanders of their respective Services. They were all based at Ministry of Defence (Kakweyay Wungyi Htana) in Rangoon/Yangon. It served as a government ministry as well as joint military operations headquarters.

The Joint Staff within the Ministry of Defence consisted of three major branches, one each for Army, Navy and Air Force, along with a number of independent departments. The Army Office had three major departments; the General (G) Staff to oversee operations, the Adjutant General's (A) Staff administration and the Quartermaster General's (Q) Staff to handle logistics. The General Staff consisted two Bureaus of Special Operations (BSO), which were created in April 1978 and June 1979 respectively. These BSO are similar to "Army Groups" in Western armies, high level staff units formed to manage different theatres of military operations. They were responsible for the overall direction and coordination of the Regional Military Commands (RMC) with BSO-1 covering Northern Command (NC), North Eastern Command (NEC), North Western Command (NWC), Western Command (WC) and Eastern Command (EC). BSO-2 responsible for South Eastern Command (SEC), South Western Command (SWC), Western Command (WC) and Central Command (CC).^[20] The Army's elite mobile Light Infantry Divisions (LID) were managed separately under a Staff Colonel. Under G Staff, there were also a number of directorates which corresponded to the Army's functional corps, such as Intelligence, Signals, Training, Armour and Artillery. The A Staff was responsible for the Adjutant General, Directorate of Medical Services and the Provost Marshal's Office. The Q Staff included the Directorates of Supply and Transport, Ordnance Services, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, and Military Engineers.

The Navy and Air Force Offices within the Ministry were headed by the Vice Chiefs of Staff for those Services. Each was supported by a staff officer at full Colonel level. All these officers were responsible for the overall management of the various naval and air bases around the country, and the broader administrative functions such as recruitment and training.

Operational Command in the field was exercised through a framework of Regional Military Commands (RMC), the boundaries of which corresponded with the country's Seven States and Seven Divisions.^[21] The Regional Military Commanders, all senior army officers, usually of Brigadier General rank, were responsible for the conduct of military operations in their respective RMC areas. Depending on the size of RMC and its operational requirements, Regional Military Commanders have at their disposal 10 or more infantry battalions (Kha La Ya).

1988 to 2005[link]

Tatmadaw Command Structure as of 2000

The Tatmadaw's organizational and command structure dramatically changed after the military coup in 1988. In 1990, the country's most senior army officer become a Senior General (equivalent to Field Marshal rank in Western armies) and held the positions of Chairman of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), Prime Minister and Defence Minister, as well as being appointed Commander in Chief of the Defence Services. He thus exercised both political and operational control over the entire country and armed forces.

From 1989, each Service has had its own Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff. The Army Commander in Chief is now elevated to full General (Bo gyoke Kyii) rank and also acted as Deputy Commander in Chief of the Defence Services. The C-in-C of the Air Force and Navy hold the equivalent of Lieutenant General rank, while all three Service Chiefs of Staff were raised to Major General level. Chiefs of Bureau of Special Operations (BSO), the heads of Q and A Staffs and the Director of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) were also elevated to Lieutenant General rank. The reorganization of the armed forces after 1988 resulted in the upgrading by two ranks of most of the senior positions.

A new command structure was introduced at the Ministry of Defence level in 2002.The most important position created is the Joint Chief of Staff (Army,Navy, Air Force)that commands commanders-in-chief of the Navy and the Air Force.

The Office of Strategic Studies (OSS, or Sit Maha Byuha Leilaryay Htana) was formed around 1994 and charged with formulating defence policies, and planning and doctrine of the Tatmadaw. The OSS was commanded by Lieutenant Geneneral Khin Nyunt, who is also the Director of Defence Service Intelligence (DDSI). Regional Military Commands (RMC) and Light Infantry Divisions (LID) were also reorganized, and LIDs are now directly answerable to Commander in Chief of the Army.

A number of new subordinate command headquarters were formed in response to the growth and reorganization of the Army. These include Regional Operation Commands (ROC, or Da Ka Sa), which are subordinate to RMCs, and Military Operations Commands (MOC, or Sa Ka Kha), which are equivalent to Western infantry divisions.

The Chief of Staff (Army) retained control of the Directorates of Signals, Directorate of Armour Corps, Directorate of Artillery Corps, Defence Industries, Security Printing, Public Relations and Psychological Warfare, and Military Engineering (field section),People's Militias and Border Troops, Directorate of Defence Services Computers (DDSC), the Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

Under the Adjutant General Office, there are three directorates: Medical Services, Resettlement, and Provost Martial. Under the Quartermaster General Office are the directorates of Military Engineering (garrison section), Supply and Transport, Ordnance Services, and Electricaland Mechanical Engineering.

Other independent department within the Ministry of Defence are Judge Advocate General, Inspector General, Military Appointment General, Directorate of Procurement, Record Office, Central Military Accounting, and Camp Commandant.

All RMC Commander positions were raised to the level of Major General and also serve as appointed Chairmen of the State- and Division-level Law and Order Restoration Committees. They were formally responsible for both military and civil administrative functions for their command areas. Also, three additional regional military commands were created. In early 1990, a new RMC was formed in Burma's north west, facing India. In 1996, the Eastern Command in Shan State was split into two RMCs, and South Eastern Command was divided to create a new RMC in country's far south coastal regions.^[22]

In 1997, the SLORC was abolished and the military government created the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The council includes all senior military officers and commanders of the RMCs. A new Ministry of Military Affairs was established and headed by a Lieutenant General. This new ministry was abolished after its minister Lt. Gen. Tin Hla was sacked in 2001.

2005 to 2010[link]

In 18 October 2004, the OSS and DDSI were abolished during the purge of General Khin Nyint and military intelligence units. OSS ordered 4 regiment to raid in DDSI HeadQuarter in Yangon.At the same time, all of the MIU in the whole country were raided and arrested by OSS corps.Nearly two thirds of MIU officers were arrested for long years. A new military intelligence unit called Military Affairs Security (MAS) was formed to take over the functions of the DDSI, but MAS units were much fewer than DDSI's and MAS was under control by local Division commander.

In early 2006, a new Regional Military Command (RMC) was created at the newly formed administrative capital, Naypyidaw.

Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of Myanmar Armed Forces (from 1945 onwards)[link]

Rank structure[link]

Myanmar army ranks and insignia[link]

Myanmar navy ranks and insignia[link]

Myanmar air force ranks and insignia[link]

Service branches[link]

[edit] Myanmar army (Tatmadaw Kyee)

The Myanmar Army has always been by far the largest service and has always received the lion's share of Burma's defence budget.^[24][25] It has played the most prominent part in Burma's struggle against the 40 or more insurgent groups since 1948 and acquired a reputation as a tough and resourceful military force. In 1981, it was described as "probably the best [army] in Southeast Asia, apart from Vietnam's".^[26] The judgment was echoed in 1983, when another observer noted that "Myanmar's infantry is generally rated as one of the toughest, most combat seasoned in Southeast Asia".^[27]

[edit] Myanmar air force (Tatmadaw Lei)

Personnel: 23,000 ^[28]

The Myanmar Air Force was formed on 16 January 1947, while Myanmar (also known as Burma) was still under British rule. By 1948, the new air force fleet included 40 Airspeed Oxfords, 16 de Havilland Tiger Moths, 4 Austers and 3 Supermarine Spitfires transferred from Royal Air Force with a few hundred personnel. The primary mission of Myanmar Air Force since its inception has been to provide transport, logistical, and close air support to Myanmar Army in counter-insurgency operations. in its entire history, the air force has never been in air to air battle.^[29]

[edit] Myanmar navy (Tatmadaw Yay)

The Myanmar Navy is the naval branch of the armed forces of Burma with estimated 19,000 men and women. The Myanmar Navy was formed in 1940 and, although very small, played an active part in Allied operations against the Japanese during the Second World War. The Myanmar Navy currently operates more than 122 vessels. Before 1988, the Myanmar Navy was small and its role in the many counterinsurgency operations was much less conspicuous than those of the army and air force. Yet the navy has always been, and remains, an important factor in Burma's security and it was dramatically expanded in recent years to a provide blue water capability and external threat defense role in Burma's territorial waters. Its personnel number 19,000 (including two naval infantry battalions).^[29]

[edit] Myanmar police force (Myanmar Ye Tat Hpwe)

The Myanmar Police Force, formally known as The People's Police Force (Burmese: ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့; MLCTS: Pyi Thu Yae Tup Pwe), was established in 1964 as independent department under the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was reorganised on 1 October 1995 and informally become part of Tatmadaw. Current Director General of Myanmar Police Force is Brigadier General Khin Yi with its headquarters at Yangon. Its command structure is based on established civil jurisdictions. Each of Burma's seven states and seven divisions has their own Police Forces with headquarters in the respective capital cities.^[30] Israel and Australia often provide specialists to enhance the training of Burma's police.^{[citation needed]} Personnel: 72,000 (including 4,500 Combat/SWAT Police)

[edit] Myanmar Frontier Forces (Na Sa Kha)

The Frontier Forces (Na Sa Kha) are now found on all five of Burma's international borders. They consist primarily of Tatmadaw personnel (including intelligence officers) assisted by members of the Myanmar Police Force, Immigration and Custom officials. Its total strength is unknown.

Military intelligence[link]

Human rights abuses[link]

Forced labour[link]

According to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions several hundred thousand men, women, children and elderly people are forced to work against their will by the Burmese army. Individuals refusing to work may be victims of torture, rape or murder. The International Labour Organization has continuously called on Burma to end the practice of forced labour since the 1960s. In June 2000, the ILO Conference adopted a resolution calling on governments to cease any relations with the country that might aid the junta to continue the use of forced labour.[4]

Torture and rape[link]

A 2002 report by The Shan Human Rights Foundation and The Shan Women's Action Network, Licence to rape, details 173 incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence, involving 625 girls and women, committed by Burmese army troops in Shan State, mostly between 1996 and 2001. The authors note that the figures are likely to be far lower than the reality. According to the report, "the Burmese military regime is allowing its troops systematically and on a widespread scale to commit rape with impunity in order to terrorize and subjugate the ethnic peoples of Shan State. The report illustrates there is a strong case that war crimes and crimes against humanity, in the form of sexual violence, have occurred and continue to occur in Shan State. The report gives clear evidence that rape is officially condoned as a 'weapon of war' against the civilian populations in Shan State." Furthermore, the report states that "25% of the rapes resulted in death, in some incidences with bodies being deliberately displayed to local communities. 61% were gang-rapes; women were raped within military bases, and in some cases women were detained and raped repeatedly for periods of up to 4 months."^[31]

In a 2003 report, "No Safe Place: Burma's Army and the Rape of Ethnic Women", Refugees International document the widespread use of rape by Burma’s soldiers to brutalize women from five different ethnic nationalities.^[32]

Children's rights[link]

According to Human Rights Watch [5], recruiting and kidnapping of children to the military is commonplace. An estimated 70,000 of the country’s 350,000-400,000 soldiers are children. There are also multiple reports of widespread child labour.

Defence industries[link]

The Myanmar Defence Industries (DI) consists of 13 major factories throughout the country that produce approximately 70 major products for Army, Navy and Air Force. The main products include automatic rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, complete range of mortar and artillery ammunition, aircraft and anti aircraft ammunition, tank and anti-tank ammunition, bombs, grenades, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines such as the M14^[33][34] pyrotechnics, commercial explosives and commercial products, and rockets and so forth. DI have produced new assault rifles and light machine-guns for the infantry. The MA series of weapons were designed to replace the old German-designed but locally manufactured Heckler & Koch G3s and G4s that equipped Burma's army since the 1960s.

Factories[link]

The major factories of the DI are the following:

• Weapons Factory
• Bombs & Grenades Factory
• Tungsten Carbide Factory
• Machine Gun Factory
• Filling Factory
• Propellants Factory
• Heavy Artillery Ammo Factory
• Small Arms Ammo Factory
• Brass Mills
• Tungsten Alloy Factory
• Tank Ammo Factory
• Explosives Factory
• Medium Artillery Ammo Factory

Heavy Industries[link]

Heavy Industries were established with Ukrainian assistance mainly to assemble the BTR-3U fleet of the Myanmar Army. Total of 1,000 BTR-3U wheeled APCs are to be assembled in Burma over the next 10 years from parts sent by Ukraine. The BTR-3U is fitted with a number of modern weapon systems including 30 mm gun, 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun, 30 mm automatic grenade launcher and anti-tank guided weapons. HI has also built APC/IFV such as MAV 1, MAV 2 and BAAC APCs. Little is known about MAV infantry fighting vehicles but it appeared that only 60% of the components are produced locally and some vital components such as fire control systems, turrets, engines and transmissions are imported from China NORINCO industries. Apart from BTR 3Us, MAVs and BAACs, HI is also producing a number of military trucks and jeeps for the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Products[link]

Products of DI are as follow:-

• BTR3U (180 nos/yr)
• MAV-1 IFV (20 nos/yr)
• Heavy Truck (400 nos/yr)
• 4x4 6 tons truck (400 nos/yr)
• Humvee (prototypes)(first seen in the 61st Armed Forces Day Parade)
• 105 mm Howitzers (production started in 2006 with the help of Singaporean technicians)
• 120 mm mortar MA 6 (50 nos/yr)
• 14.5 mm AAA (50 nos/yr)
• 12.7 mm HMG (200 nos/yr)
• 0.5" HMG (150 nos/yr)
• MA series small arms (60,000 nos/yr)
• RPG (1,500 nos/yr)
• Grenade Launcher (7,000 nos/yr)
• 81/60 mm mortars (1,200 nos/yr)
• 155/130/122/105 mm ammunitions
• 120/81/60 mm mortar bombs
• small arms ammunitions (60 millions nos/yr)
• grenades/rockets
• 57/77/122 mm rockets and up to 500 kg dumb bombs for Air Force
• 25/37/40/57 mm ammunitions for navy

See also[link]

Current events/Southeast Asia portal

• Military Intelligence of Myanmar
• Aung San
• Royal Burmese Army
• Military history of Burma

References[link]

External links[link]

• Burma Library Archives

v t e Burma (Myanmar) topics History Prehistory Pyu city-states Pagan Kingdom Myinsaing Kingdom Pinya Kingdom Sagaing Kingdom Ava Kingdom Prome Kingdom Hanthawaddy Kingdom Mrauk U Kingdom Toungoo Dynasty Restored Hanthawaddy Kingdom Konbaung Dynasty British rule Japanese occupation State of Burma Union of Burma Socialist Republic Union of Myanmar Geography Hkakabo Razi Mount Popa Indawgyi Lake Inle Lake Irrawaddy River Chindwin River Salween River Sittang River Politics Constitution President List Vice President Assembly of the Union (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) Political parties CPB NLD NUP SNLD Elections Foreign relations Defunct Monarch Prime Minister Economy Kyat Demographics Languages Ethnic groups Women Culture Burmese language Cinema Cuisine Literature Music Public holidays Other Buddhism Christianity Censorship Communications Etymology HIV/AIDS Human rights (LGBT rights) Military Roman Catholicism Prostitution Scouting Transportation Women's League of Burma Current events 2011–2012 Burmese political reforms Burmese by-elections, 2012

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi MP AC
Chairman of the National League for Democracy
Incumbent
Assumed office 27 September 1988
Preceded by	Position established
Member of the Pyithu Hluttaw for Kawhmu
Incumbent
Assumed office 2 May 2012
Preceded by	Soe Tint
Majority	46,730 (71.38%)[1]
Personal details
Born	(1945-06-19) 19 June 1945 (age 67) Rangoon, British Burma (now Yangon)
Political party	National League for Democracy
Spouse(s)	Michael Aris (1972–1999)
Relations	Aung San (father) Khin Kyi (mother)
Children	Alexander Kim
Alma mater	University of Delhi St Hugh's College, Oxford University of London
Religion	Theravada Buddhism
Awards	Rafto Prize Nobel Peace Prize Jawaharlal Nehru Award International Simón Bolívar Prize Olof Palme Prize Bhagwan Mahavir World Peace

This article contains Burmese script. Without proper rendering support, you may see question marks, boxes, or other symbols instead of Burmese script.

Aung San Suu Kyi MP AC (Burmese: ; MLCTS: aung hcan: cu. krany, IPA: [ʔàʊɴ sʰáɴ sṵ tɕì]; born 19 June 1945) is a Burmese opposition politician and General Secretary of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Burma. In the 1990 general election, the NLD won 59% of the national votes and 81% (392 of 485) of the seats in Parliament.^{[2][3][4][5][6][7][8]} She had, however, already been detained under house arrest before the elections. She remained under house arrest in Burma for almost 15 of the 21 years from 20 July 1989 until her most recent release on 13 November 2010,^[9] becoming one of the world's most prominent (now former) political prisoners.^[10]

Suu Kyi received the Rafto Prize and the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 1990 and the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. In 1992 she was awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding by the government of India and the International Simón Bolívar Prize from the government of Venezuela. In 2007, the Government of Canada made her an honorary citizen of that country;^[11] at the time, she was one of only four people ever to receive the honor.^[12] In 2011, she was awarded the Wallenberg Medal.^[13]

On 1 April 2012, her opposition party, the National League for Democracy, announced that she was elected to the Pyithu Hluttaw, the lower house of the Burmese parliament, representing the constituency of Kawhmu;^[14] her party also won 43 of the 45 vacant seats in the lower house.^[15] The election results were confirmed by the official electoral commission the following day.^[16]

Suu Kyi is the third child and only daughter of Aung San, considered to be the father of modern-day Burma.

Name[link]

A family portrait, with Aung San Suu Kyi (in white) as a toddler, taken in 1947, shortly before her father's assassination.

Aung San Suu Kyi derives her name from three relatives: "Aung San" from her father, "Suu" from her paternal grandmother and "Kyi" from her mother Khin Kyi.^[17] She is frequently called Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Daw is not part of her name, but is an honorific, similar to madame, for older, revered women, literally meaning "aunt."^[18] She is also often referred to as Daw Suu by the Burmese (or Amay Suu, lit. "Mother Suu," by some followers),^[19][20] or "Aunty Suu", and as Dr. Suu Kyi,^[21] Ms. Suu Kyi, or Mrs. Suu Kyi by the foreign media. However, like other Burmese, she has no surname (see Burmese names). The pronunciation of her name is approximated as "Awn Sahn Sue Chee," although the "ch" in "Chee" is unaspirated.^[22]

Personal life[link]

Part of a series on the
Democracy movements in Burma
The fighting peacock flag
Background
Post-independence Burma
Internal conflict in Burma
Burmese Way to Socialism
State Peace and Development Council
Mass protests
8888 Uprising · Protests of 2007
Concessions and reforms
Roadmap to democracy New constitution Reforms of 2011
Elections
1990 · 2010 · 2012
Organizations
National League for Democracy · 88 Generation Students Group · Burma Campaign UK · Free Burma Coalition · U.S. Campaign for Burma · Generation Wave · All Burma Students' Democratic Front · The Irrawaddy · Democratic Voice of Burma · Mizzima News
Figures
U Nu · Aung Gyi · Tin Oo · Aung San Suu Kyi · Min Ko Naing · Thein Sein
Related topics
Human rights in Burma · Politics of Burma · Foreign relations of Burma
v t e

A portrait of Khin Kyi and her family in 1948. Aung San Suu Kyi is seated on the floor.

Aung San Suu Kyi was born in Rangoon (now named Yangon).^[23] Her father, Aung San, founded the modern Burmese army and negotiated Burma's independence from the British Empire in 1947; he was assassinated by his rivals in the same year. She grew up with her mother, Khin Kyi, and two brothers, Aung San Lin and Aung San Oo, in Rangoon. Aung San Lin died at age eight, when he drowned in an ornamental lake on the grounds of the house.^[17] Her elder brother emigrated to San Diego, California, becoming a United States citizen.^[17] After Aung San Lin's death, the family moved to a house by Inya Lake where Suu Kyi met people of very different backgrounds, political views and religions.^[24] She was educated in Methodist English High School (now Basic Education High School No. 1 Dagon) for much of her childhood in Burma, where she was noted as having a talent for learning languages.^[25] She is a Theravada Buddhist.

Aung San Suu Kyi at the age of six.

Suu Kyi's mother, Khin Kyi, gained prominence as a political figure in the newly formed Burmese government. She was appointed Burmese ambassador to India and Nepal in 1960, and Aung San Suu Kyi followed her there, she studied in the Convent of Jesus and Mary School, New Delhi and graduated from Lady Shri Ram College in New Delhi with a degree in politics in 1964.^[26][27] Suu Kyi continued her education at St Hugh's College, Oxford, obtaining a B.A. degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics in 1969. During her time in Oxford, she fell in love with a Pakistani man but the relationship ended in tears.^[28] After graduating, she lived in New York City with a family friend who was once a popular Burmese pop singer.^[28] She worked at the UN for three years, primarily on budget matters, writing daily to her future husband, Dr. Michael Aris.^[29] In 1972, Aung San Suu Kyi married Aris, a scholar of Tibetan culture, living abroad in Bhutan.^[26] The following year she gave birth to their first son, Alexander Aris, in London; their second son, Kim, was born in 1977. Subsequently, she earned a PhD at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London in 1985. She was elected as an Honorary Fellow in 1990.^[26] For two years she was a Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies (IIAS) in Shimla, India. She also worked for the government of the Union of Burma.

In 1988 Suu Kyi returned to Burma, at first to tend for her ailing mother but later to lead the pro-democracy movement. Aris' visit in Christmas 1995 turned out to be the last time that he and Suu Kyi met, as Suu Kyi remained in Burma and the Burmese dictatorship denied him any further entry visas.^[26] Aris was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1997 which was later found to be terminal. Despite appeals from prominent figures and organizations, including the United States, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Pope John Paul II, the Burmese government would not grant Aris a visa, saying that they did not have the facilities to care for him, and instead urged Aung San Suu Kyi to leave the country to visit him. She was at that time temporarily free from house arrest but was unwilling to depart, fearing that she would be refused re-entry if she left, as she did not trust the military junta's assurance that she could return.^[30]

Aris died on his 53rd birthday on 27 March 1999. Since 1989, when his wife was first placed under house arrest, he had seen her only five times, the last of which was for Christmas in 1995. She was also separated from her children, who live in the United Kingdom, but starting in 2011, they have visited her in Burma.^[31]

On 2 May 2008, after Cyclone Nargis hit Burma, Suu Kyi lost the roof of her house and lived in virtual darkness after losing electricity in her dilapidated lakeside residence. She used candles at night as she was not provided any generator set.^[32] Plans to renovate and repair the house were announced in August 2009.^[33] Suu Kyi was released from house arrest on 13 November 2010.^[34]

Aung San Suu Kyi arrvies to give speech to the supporters during 2012 by-election campaign at her constituency Kawhmu township, Myanmar on 22 March 2012.

Political beginnings[link]

Coincident with Aung San Suu Kyi's return to Burma in 1988, the long-time military leader of Burma and head of the ruling party, General Ne Win, stepped down. Mass demonstrations for democracy followed that event on 8 August 1988 (8–8–88, a day seen as auspicious), which were violently suppressed in what came to be known as the 8888 Uprising. On 26 August 1988, she addressed half a million people at a mass rally in front of the Shwedagon Pagoda in the capital, calling for a democratic government.^[26] However in September, a new military junta took power.

Influenced^[35] by both Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence^[36][37] and more specifically by Buddhist concepts,^[38] Aung San Suu Kyi entered politics to work for democratization, helped found the National League for Democracy on 27 September 1988,^[39] but was put under house arrest on 20 July 1989. Offered freedom if she left the country, she refused.

One of her most famous speeches was "Freedom From Fear", which began: "It is not power that corrupts, but fear. Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it and fear of the scourge of power corrupts those who are subject to it."

She also believes fear spurs many world leaders to lose sight of their purpose. "Government leaders are amazing", she once said. "So often it seems they are the last to know what the people want."^[40]

Political career[link]

Suu Kyi meets with Edgardo Boeninger of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in 1995.

1990 general election[link]

In 1990, the military junta called a general election, in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) received 59% of the votes, guaranteeing NLD 80% of the parliament seats. Some claim that Aung San Suu Kyi would have assumed the office of Prime Minister;^[41] in fact, however, as she wasn't permitted, she did not stand as a candidate in the elections (although being a MP isn't a strict prerequisite for becoming PM in most parliamentary systems). Instead, the results were nullified and the military refused to hand over power, resulting in an international outcry. Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest at her home on University Avenue (16°49′32″N 96°9′1″E / 16.82556°N 96.15028°E / 16.82556; 96.15028) in Rangoon, during which time she was awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 1990, and the Nobel Peace Prize the year after. Her sons Alexander and Kim accepted the Nobel Peace Prize on her behalf. Aung San Suu Kyi used the Nobel Peace Prize's 1.3 million USD prize money to establish a health and education trust for the Burmese people.^[42] Around this time, Suu Kyi chose non-violence as an expedient political tactic, stating in 2007, "I do not hold to non-violence for moral reasons, but for political and practical reasons,"^[43] however, nonviolent action as well as civil resistance in lieu of armed conflict are also political tactics in keeping with the overall philosophy of her Theravada Buddhist religion.

1996 attack[link]

On 9 November 1996, the motorcade that she was traveling in with other National League for Democracy leaders Tin Oo and U Kyi Maung, was attacked in Yangon. About 200 men swooped down on the motorcade, wielding metal chains, metal batons, stones and other weapons. The car that Aung San Suu Kyi was in had its rear window smashed, and the car with Tin Oo and U Kyi Maung had its rear window and two backdoor windows shattered. It is believed the offenders were members of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) who were allegedly paid 500 kyats (@ USD $0.5) each to participate. The NLD lodged an official complaint with the police, and according to reports the government launched an investigation, but no action was taken. (Amnesty International 120297)^[44]

House arrest[link]

Aung San Suu Kyi has been placed under house arrest for 15 of the past 21 years, on different occasions, since she began her political career,^[45] during which time she was prevented from meeting her party supporters and international visitors. In an interview, Suu Kyi said that while under house arrest she spent her time reading philosophy, politics and biographies that her husband had sent her.^[46] She also passed the time playing the piano, and was occasionally allowed visits from foreign diplomats as well as from her personal physician.^[47]

The media were also prevented from visiting Suu Kyi, as occurred in 1998 when journalist Maurizio Giuliano, after photographing her, was stopped by customs officials who then confiscated all his films, tapes and some notes.^[48] In contrast, Suu Kyi did have visits from government representatives, such as during her autumn 1994 house arrest when she met the leader of Burma, General Than Shwe and General Khin Nyunt on 20 September in the first meeting since she had been placed in detention.^[26] On several occasions during Suu Kyi's house arrest, she had periods of poor health and as a result was hospitalized.^[49]

The Burmese government detained and kept Suu Kyi imprisoned because it viewed her as someone "likely to undermine the community peace and stability" of the country, and used both Article 10(a) and 10(b) of the 1975 State Protection Act (granting the government the power to imprison people for up to five years without a trial),^[50] and Section 22 of the "Law to Safeguard the State Against the Dangers of Those Desiring to Cause Subversive Acts" as legal tools against her.^[51] She continuously appealed her detention,^[52] and many nations and figures continued to call for her release and that of 2,100 other political prisoners in the country.^[53][54] On 12 November 2010, days after the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won elections conducted after a gap of almost 20 years, the junta finally agreed to sign orders allowing Suu Kyi's release,^[55] and Suu Kyi's house arrest term came to an end on 13 November 2010.

UN involvement[link]

The UN has attempted to facilitate dialogue between the junta and Suu Kyi.^[56] On 6 May 2002, following secret confidence-building negotiations led by the UN, the government released her; a government spokesman said that she was free to move "because we are confident that we can trust each other". Aung San Suu Kyi proclaimed "a new dawn for the country". However on 30 May 2003 in an incident similar to the 1996 attack on her, a government-sponsored mob attacked her caravan in the northern village of Depayin, murdering and wounding many of her supporters.^[57] Aung San Suu Kyi fled the scene with the help of her driver, Ko Kyaw Soe Lin, but was arrested upon reaching Ye-U. The government imprisoned her at Insein Prison in Rangoon. After she underwent a hysterectomy in September 2003,^[58] the government again placed her under house arrest in Rangoon.

The results from the UN facilitation have been mixed; Razali Ismail, UN special envoy to Burma, met with Aung San Suu Kyi. Ismail resigned from his post the following year, partly because he was denied re-entry to Burma on several occasions.^[59] Several years later in 2006, Ibrahim Gambari, UN Undersecretary-General (USG) of Department of Political Affairs, met with Aung San Suu Kyi, the first visit by a foreign official since 2004.^[60] He also met with Suu Kyi later the same year.^[61] On 2 October 2007 Gambari returned to talk to her again after seeing Than Shwe and other members of the senior leadership in Naypyidaw.^[62] State television broadcast Suu Kyi with Gambari, stating that they had met twice. This was Suu Kyi's first appearance in state media in the four years since her current detention began.^[63]

The United Nations Working Group for Arbitrary Detention published an Opinion that Aung San Suu Kyi's deprivation of liberty was arbitrary and in contravention of Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, and requested that the authorities in Burma set her free, but the authorities ignored the request at that time.^[64] The U.N. report said that according to the Burmese Government’s reply, "Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has not been arrested, but has only been taken into protective custody, for her own safety", and while "it could have instituted legal action against her under the country’s domestic legislation ... it has preferred to adopt a magnanimous attitude, and is providing her with protection in her own interests."^[64]

Such claims were rejected by Brig-General Khin Yi, Chief of Myanmar Police Force (MPF). On 18 January 2007, the state-run paper New Light of Myanmar accused Suu Kyi of tax evasion for spending her Nobel Prize money outside of the country. The accusation followed the defeat of a US-sponsored United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Burma as a threat to international security; the resolution was defeated because of strong opposition from China, which has strong ties with the military junta (China later voted against the resolution, along with Russia and South Africa).^[65]

In November 2007, it was reported that Suu Kyi would meet her political allies National League for Democracy along with a government minister. The ruling junta made the official announcement on state TV and radio just hours after UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari ended his second visit to Burma. The NLD confirmed that it had received the invitation to hold talks with Suu Kyi.^[66] However, the process delivered few concrete results.

On 3 July 2009, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon went to Burma to pressure the junta into releasing Suu Kyi and to institute democratic reform. However, on departing from Burma, Ban Ki-moon said he was "disappointed" with the visit after junta leader Than Shwe refused permission for him to visit Suu Kyi, citing her ongoing trial. Ban said he was "deeply disappointed that they have missed a very important opportunity."^[67]

Periods under detention[link]

• 20 July 1989: Placed under house arrest in Rangoon under martial law that allows for detention without charge or trial for three years.^[56]
• 10 July 1995: Released from house arrest.^[17]
• 23 September 2000: Placed under house arrest.^[45]
• 6 May 2002: Released after 19 months.^[45]
• 30 May 2003: Arrested following the Depayin massacre, she was held in secret detention for more than three months before being returned to house arrest.^[68]
• 25 May 2007: House arrest extended by one year despite a direct appeal from U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to General Than Shwe.^[69]
• 24 October 2007: Reached 12 years under house arrest, solidarity protests held at 12 cities around the world.^[70]
• 27 May 2008: House arrest extended for another year, which is illegal under both international law and Burma's own law.^[71]
• 11 August 2009: House arrest extended for 18 more months because of "violation" arising from the May 2009 trespass incident.
• 13 November 2010: Released from house arrest.^[72]

2007 anti-government protests[link]

Protests led by Buddhist monks began on 19 August 2007 following steep fuel price increases, and continued each day, despite the threat of a crackdown by the military.^[73]

On 22 September 2007, although still under house arrest, Suu Kyi made a brief public appearance at the gate of her residence in Yangon to accept the blessings of Buddhist monks who were marching in support of human rights.^[74] It was reported that she had been moved the following day to Insein Prison (where she had been detained in 2003),^{[75][76][77][78]} but meetings with UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari near her Rangoon home on 30 September and 2 October established that she remained under house arrest.^[79][80]

2009 trespass incident[link]

U.S. Senator Jim Webb visiting Suu Kyi in 2009. Webb negotiated the release of John Yettaw, the man who trespassed in Suu Kyi's home, resulting in her arrest and conviction with three years' hard labour.

On 3 May 2009, an American man, identified as John Yettaw, swam across Inya Lake to her house uninvited and was arrested when he made his return trip three days later.^[81] He had attempted to make a similar trip two years earlier, but for unknown reasons was turned away.^[82] He later claimed at trial that he was motivated by a divine vision requiring him to notify her of an impending terrorist assassination attempt.^[83] On 13 May, Suu Kyi was arrested for violating the terms of her house arrest because the swimmer, who pleaded exhaustion, was allowed to stay in her house for two days before he attempted the swim back. Suu Kyi was later taken to Insein Prison, where she could have faced up to five years confinement for the intrusion.^[84] The trial of Suu Kyi and her two maids began on 18 May and a small number of protesters gathered outside.^[85][86] Diplomats and journalists were barred from attending the trial; however, on one occasion, several diplomats from Russia, Thailand and Singapore and journalists were allowed to meet Suu Kyi.^[87] The prosecution had originally planned to call 22 witnesses.^[88] It also accused John Yettaw of embarrassing the country.^[89] During the ongoing defence case, Suu Kyi said she was innocent. The defence was allowed to call only one witness (out of four), while the prosecution was permitted to call 14 witnesses. The court rejected two character witnesses, NLD members Tin Oo and Win Tin, and permitted the defense to call only a legal expert.^[90] According to one unconfirmed report, the junta was planning to, once again, place her in detention, this time in a military base outside the city.^[91] In a separate trial, Yettaw said he swam to Suu Kyi's house to warn her that her life was "in danger".^[92] The national police chief later confirmed that Yettaw was the "main culprit" in the case filed against Suu Kyi.^[93] According to aides, Suu Kyi spent her 64th birthday in jail sharing biryani rice and chocolate cake with her guards.^[94]

Her arrest and subsequent trial received worldwide condemnation by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations Security Council,^[95] Western governments,^[96] South Africa,^[97] Japan^[98] and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Burma is a member.^[99] The Burmese government strongly condemned the statement, as it created an "unsound tradition"^[100] and criticised Thailand for meddling in its internal affairs.^[101] The Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win was quoted in the state-run newspaper New Light of Myanmar as saying that the incident "was trumped up to intensify international pressure on Burma by internal and external anti-government elements who do not wish to see the positive changes in those countries' policies toward Burma".^[89] Ban responded to an international campaign^[102] by flying to Burma to negotiate, but Than Shwe rejected all of his requests.^[103]

On 11 August 2009 the trial concluded with Suu Kyi being sentenced to imprisonment for three years with hard labour. This sentence was commuted by the military rulers to further house arrest of 18 months.^[104] On 14 August, U.S. Senator Jim Webb visited Burma, visiting with junta leader Gen. Than Shwe and later with Suu Kyi. During the visit, Webb negotiated Yettaw's release and deportation from Burma.^[105] Following the verdict of the trial, lawyers of Suu Kyi said they would appeal against the 18-month sentence.^[106] On 18 August, United States President Barack Obama asked the country's military leadership to set free all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.^[107] In her appeal, Aung San Suu Kyi had argued that the conviction was unwarranted. However, her appeal against the August sentence was rejected by a Burmese court on 2 October 2009. Although the court accepted the argument that the 1974 constitution, under which she had been charged, was null and void, it also said the provisions of the 1975 security law, under which she has been kept under house arrest, remained in force. The verdict effectively meant that she would be unable to participate in the elections scheduled to take place in 2010 – the first in Burma in two decades. Her lawyer stated that her legal team would pursue a new appeal within 60 days.^[108]

2009: International pressure for release, and Burmese general election 2010[link]

It was announced prior to the Burmese general election that Aung San Suu Kyi may be released "so she can organize her party,"^[109] However, Suu Kyi was not allowed to run.^[110] On 1 October 2010 the government announced that she would be released on 13 November 2010.^[111]

Burma's relaxing stance, such as releasing political prisoners, was influenced in the wake of successful recent diplomatic visits by the US and other democratic governments, urging or encouraging the Burmese towards democratic reform. U.S. President Barack Obama personally advocated for the release of all political prisoners, especially Aung San Suu Kyi, during the US-ASEAN Summit of 2009.^[112]

Democratic governments^[which?] hoped that successful general elections would be an optimistic indicator of the Burmese government's sincerity towards eventual democracy.^[113] The Hatoyama government which spent 2.82 billion yen in 2008, has promised more Japanese foreign aid to encourage Burma to release Aung San Suu Kyi in time for the elections; and to continue moving towards democracy and the rule of law.^[113][114]

In a personal letter to Suu Kyi, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown cautioned the Burmese government of the potential consequences of rigging elections as "condemning Burma to more years of diplomatic isolation and economic stagnation".^[115]

The Burmese government has been granting Suu Kyi varying degrees of freedom throughout late 2009, in response to international pressure. She has met with many heads of state, and opened a dialog with the Minister of Labor Aung Kyi (not to be confused with Aung San Suu Kyi).^[116]

Suu Kyi was allowed to meet with senior members of her NLD party at the State House,^[117] however these meeting took place under close supervision.

2010 release[link]

Aung San Suu Kyi addresses crowds at the NLD headquarters shortly after her release.

Aung San Suu Kyi meets with US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in Yangon (1 December 2011)

On the evening of 13 November 2010, Suu Kyi was released from house arrest.^[118] This was the date her detention had been set to expire according to a court ruling in August 2009^[119] and came six days after a widely criticized general election. She appeared in front of a crowd of her supporters, who rushed to her house in Rangoon when nearby barricades were removed by the security forces. The Nobel Peace Prize laureate had been detained for 15 of the past 21 years.^[120] The government newspaper New Light of Myanmar reported the release positively,^[121] saying she had been granted a pardon after serving her sentence "in good conduct".^[122] The New York Times suggested that the military government may have released Suu Kyi because it felt it was in a confident position to control her supporters after the election.^[121] The role that Suu Kyi will play in the future of democracy in Burma remains a subject of much debate.

Her son Kim Aris was granted a visa in November 2010 to see his mother shortly after her release, for the first time in 10 years.^[123] He visited again in 5 July 2011, to accompany her on a trip to Bagan, her first trip outside Yangon since 2003.^[124] Her son visited again in 8 August 2011, to accompany her on a trip to Pegu, her second trip.^[125]

Discussions were held between Suu Kyi and the Burmese government during 2011, which led to a number of official gestures to meet her demands. In October, around a tenth of Burma's political prisoners were freed in an amnesty and trade unions were legalised.^[126][127]

In November 2011, following a meeting of its leaders, the NLD announced its intention to re-register as a political party in order contend 48 by-elections necessitated by the promotion of parliamentarians to ministerial rank.^[128] Following the decision, Suu Kyi held a telephone conference with U.S. President Barack Obama, in which it was agreed that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would make a visit to Burma, a move received with caution by Burma's ally China.^[129] On 1 December 2011, Suu Kyi met with Hillary Clinton at the residence of the top-ranking US diplomat in Yangon.^[130]

On 21 December 2011, Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra met Suu Kyi in Yangoon, becoming Suu Kyi's "first-ever meeting with the leader of a foreign country".^[131]

On 5 January 2012, British Foreign Minister William Hague met Aung San Suu Kyi and his Burmese counterpart. This represented a significant visit for Suu Kyi and Burma. Suu Kyi studied in the UK and maintains many ties there, whilst Britain is Burma's largest bilateral donor.

2012 by-elections[link]

In December 2011, there was speculation that Suu Kyi would run in the 2012 national by-elections to fill vacant seats.^[132] On 18 January 2012, Suu Kyi formally registered to contest a Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) seat in the Kawhmu Township constituency in special parliamentary elections to be held on 1 April 2012.^[133][134] The seat was previously held by Soe Tint, who vacated it after being appointed Construction Deputy Minister, in the 2010 election.^[135] She ran against Union Solidarity and Development Party candidate Soe Min, a retired army physician and native of Twante Township.^[136]

Aung San Suu Kyi (Center) gives speech to the supporters during 2012 by-election campaign at her constituency Kawhmu township, Myanmar on 22 March 2012.

On 3 March 2012, at a large campaign rally in Mandalay, Suu Kyi unexpectedly left after 15 minutes, because of exhaustion and airsickness.^[137]

In an official campaign speech broadcast on Burmese state television's MRTV on 14 March 2012, Suu Kyi publicly campaigned for reform of the 2008 Constitution, removal of restrictive laws, more adequate protections for people's democratic rights, and establishment of an independent judiciary.^[138] The speech was leaked online a day before it was broadcast.^[139] A paragraph in the speech, focusing on the Tatmadaw's repression by means of law, was censored by authorities.^[140]

Suu Kyi has also called for international media to monitor the upcoming by-elections, while publicly pointing out irregularities in official voter lists, which include deceased individuals and exclude other eligible voters in the contested constituencies.^[141][142] On 21 March 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi was quoted as saying "Fraud and rule violations are continuing and we can even say they are increasing."^[143]

When asked whether she would assume a ministerial post if given the opportunity, she said the following:^[144]

I can tell you one thing – that under the present constitution, if you become a member of the government you have to vacate your seat in the national assembly. And I am not working so hard to get into parliament simply to vacate my seat.

On 26 March 2012, Suu Kyi suspended her nationwide campaign tour early, after a campaign rally in Myeik (Mergui), a coastal town in the south, citing health problems due to exhaustion and hot weather.^[145]

On 1 April 2012, the NLD announced that Suu Kyi had won the vote for a seat in Parliament.^[146] A news broadcast on state-run MRTV, reading the announcements of the Union Election Commission, confirmed her victory, as well as her party's victory in 43 of the 45 contested seats, officially making Suu Kyi the Leader of the Opposition in the lower house.^[147]

Although she and other MP-elects were expected to take office on 23 April when the Hluttaws resume session, National League for Democracy MP-elects, including Suu Kyi, said they might not take their oaths because of its wording; in its present form, parliamentarians must vow to "safeguard" the constitution.^[148][149] In an address on Radio Free Asia, she said "We don't mean we will not attend the parliament, we mean we will attend only after taking the oath... Changing that wording in the oath is also in conformity with the Constitution. I don't expect there will be any difficulty in doing it."^[150]

On 2 May 2012, National League for Democracy MP-elects, including Aung San Suu Kyi, took their oaths and took office, though the wording of the oath was not changed. ^[151] According to the Los Angeles Times, "Suu Kyi and her colleagues decided they could do more by joining as lawmakers than maintaining their boycott on principle." ^[152]