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


Perceptions and Reality

Public Attitudes
to Immigration

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Introduction

[It is easy to miss the key patterns and nuances in the noise \[...\]. This review attempts to help the reader see a more complete picture of public attitudes to immigration, by bringing a wide range of attitudinal data together in one place.](#)

Attitudes towards immigration are one of the most researched areas of public policy, mostly in countless opinion polls, but also in more in-depth studies, often focusing on particular issues or communities.

However, a lot of this repeats and confirms what we know – that there is widespread concern in Britain – and there have been few attempts to bring the evidence together in one place¹. It is therefore easy to miss the key patterns and nuances in the noise, or to get fixated on fine points of conflicting interpretations.

This review therefore attempts to help the reader see a more complete picture by bringing a wide range of attitudinal data together in one place.

Our aim was to be both comprehensive and neutral in our coverage and discussion of public attitudes. Of course, we are likely to have failed in both: we will have missed some sources (not least because new studies are being conducted every week) and it is impossible to be completely balanced in our selection of evidence and how we discuss it. There are a number of examples of debates around immigration and integration where people can use the same source data and come to directly opposing conclusions (the measurement of area segregation comes to mind); the same is true with aspects of public attitudes data.

We have, however, attempted to link back to original sources as much as possible (providing a resource for others to use) and have, as far as possible, separated our outline of what the surveys say from our own interpretation of what they mean.

Even in our own discussion, we have attempted to avoid applying a frame or underlying purpose: for example, that we are examining opinion in order to then “sell” immigration to people more effectively, or on the other hand to highlight the messages that would raise concern further. Again, this is very difficult to achieve, but important to attempt to be of broad use to policy-makers and practitioners.

Approach to the research

The approach to this research has involved several steps to ensure the report is as comprehensive in its scope and as balanced as possible.

We began with an initial trawl of sources to understand the range of available data we might be able to draw on. A consultation was then carried out with recognised experts in the area of public attitudes to immigration (listed in the appendices) who were asked to signpost other sources of data and for their views on the structure and content of the report. Following the consultation, a comprehensive review and search for data was undertaken among sources of opinion surveys and the academic literature in an effort to collate all that was relevant for the purposes of the report. We have also conducted some new data analysis to try to fill some of the evidence gaps we came across in the process of collating the existing data.

Structure of the report

The report is structured around key themes, after an initial review of overall attitudes to immigration in Chapter 1. Chapters 2 to 4 examine public attitudes towards the economic, fiscal and cultural impact of immigration, respectively. Chapter 5 focuses on the views of the public towards different immigrant groups, while Chapter 6 looks at the national versus local perception gap and the relationship between media output and views of immigration. The final chapter examines views of the government's handling of immigration.

For clarity, Figure sources have been included at the end of the report, along with endnotes, a bibliography and a list of data sources used.

Note on methodology

The sources we draw on for this report have used different modes of data collection, some more robust than others, though all are based on samples that are claimed

to be representative of the British public (or other elite audiences such as MPs, where specified).

Different modes of data collection (for example, telephone, online, face-to-face) can influence how people respond to surveys, particularly on subjects that are perceived to be sensitive (so-called mode effects). For example, we know socially unacceptable views are more likely to be reported using a self-completion mode, such as online or paper self-completion questionnaires, than an interviewer administered mode, such as telephone or face-to-face². Whilst we are unable to take full account of any potential mode effects associated with the sources we draw on for this report, we have borne these in mind, and have noted the mode of each source used in the data sources section at the end of this report.

The design of the questionnaire can also unintentionally create bias via context or order effects. Some of the sources we have drawn from are based on questionnaires that are devoted entirely to the topic of immigration, whilst other findings are from questionnaires that only ask a few questions on the issue, amongst a range of other things. Again, we cannot account for the impact questionnaire context may have on the findings we report in all cases, but by listing the data sources at the end of the report we have hopefully made it easier to find the questionnaires used.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Will Somerville and Unbound Philanthropy for the opportunity to write this report. We would also like to thank all the people (listed in the appendices) who we consulted during the scoping phase and/or following the first draft of the report.



Immigration
and
population
change

The flows of people in and out of the country can change relatively quickly, due to economic circumstances, changes in policy or broader structural changes (such as the accession of states to the European Union). Our information on who lives here is, however, much less nimble: the Census is currently still the most comprehensive source we have (but only happens every 10 years), and migration statistics are subject to several caveats and limitations.

However, the picture of significant change in our population over the last few years is still clear from the data.

1.1 The context

Big shifts in our national population...

On Census night 2011, the population of England and Wales was 56.1 million, which had grown by 3.7 million in the 10 years since the last census, an increase of 7.1%. This was the largest growth in the population of England and Wales in any 10-year period since census-taking began in 1801.³ The same was true in Scotland, which witnessed a 5% rise in population from 2001, the fastest growth rate between two censuses in the last century,⁴ whilst the population of Northern Ireland grew by 7.5% over the same period.⁵

In England and Wales, 56% of the population increase between 2001 and 2011 was due to migration.⁶ Over the last decade the trend in Scotland has turned from one of net out-migration to one of net in-migration; in 2010/11 Scotland's net migration gain was 27,000, the highest since migration estimates started in 1951.⁷ Northern Ireland also witnessed a shift to net inward migration from 2002 after a period of net emigration in the 1970s and 1980s and a more balanced picture in the 1990s.⁸

In the UK as a whole, the foreign born population nearly doubled between 1993 and 2011 from 3.8 million to over 7 million, increasing in almost every year. The share of the foreign born population resident in Scotland in 2011 stood at 4.9%; in Northern Ireland 1.5%; in London 37.2%.⁹

In 2011, the most common countries of birth for foreign born residents of the UK were India, Poland, Ireland and Pakistan.¹⁰

In England and Wales, Poland showed by far the largest percentage increase in the top ten countries of birth, with a nine-fold rise over the last decade following its accession to the EU in 2004.¹¹

Around half (3.8 million) of all usual residents of England and Wales on census day who were born outside the UK arrived between 2001 and 2011, and almost 40 per cent had arrived since 2004.¹² Of course, this will partly reflect that more recent arrivals will not have been affected by mortality and return or onward migration as much as earlier arrivals – but the shift in the pace of change of immigration is clear.

...and bigger shifts to come?

The UK population is projected to increase by 4.9 million to 67.2 million over the ten year period to 2020. This increase is equivalent to an average annual rate of growth of 0.8 per cent or a total increase of 7.3% over the ten year period.¹³

If past trends continue, the population will continue to grow, reaching 73.2 million by 2035. This is due to natural increase (more births than deaths) and because it is assumed there will be more immigrants than emigrants (a net inward flow of migrants).¹⁴

All regions have seen change, but there are wide variations...

All regions in England and Wales showed an increase in usual residents born outside the UK between 2001 and 2011; the largest numerical increases were in London and the South East. London had both the largest proportion of usual residents born outside the UK (37 per cent of its resident population) and non-UK nationals (24 per cent of its resident population).¹⁵

Trends in local area segregation are complex and disputed, depending on the measure used. But by one key measure, neighbourhood residential segregation decreased in more local authorities than it increased for all of England and Wales's largest minority ethnic groups between 2001 and 2011.¹⁶

Increasing residential mixing in inner and outer London and major urban centres is the dominant pattern of change in segregation. Large cities such as Leicester, Birmingham, Manchester and Bradford have seen a decrease in segregation for most ethnic groups.¹⁷ In most Inner London Boroughs, and in Slough, Luton and Leicester no single ethnic group accounts for the majority of the population.

Whilst ethnic minority groups remain clustered in certain diverse urban areas, the greatest proportional growth in the ethnic minority population is, not surprisingly, in more rural parts of England and Wales, where there were fewest minorities in 2001.

Figures 1.1 and 1.2 to the right outline some of the key changes in population and immigration patterns over recent decades, including shifts in country of origin.

1.2 Public attitudes

In this initial section on the attitudinal data we focus on overall views of immigration, bringing together the various ways in which concern has been measured. We then look at some of the major sub-group differences over time, and finally assess the accuracy of our view of the scale of immigration.

1.2.1 Measuring concern about immigration

Immigration as a key issue facing the country

There are a number of ways to measure and understand concern about immigration at an overall level, and we will explore a range of these in the following sections. Firstly, there are measures of salience – how important the issue seems to people, compared with other issues.

Figure 1.1: Population size, proportion foreign born and the growing gap between immigration and emigration from the early 1990s





Figure 1.2: Top 10 Countries for foreign-born residents in England and Wales, 2001 and 2011



Ipsos MORI has been asking about the most important issues facing Britain since the 1970s (our “Issues Index”), and the pattern for immigration/race relations is shown below, compared with actual changes in net migration (the first time we have brought these data together for the full range of the Issues Index, back to 1974). This is an unprompted question (where the categories are not shown to respondents), so in one sense it is quite a “pure” measure of concern – and it does seem to have a relationship with changes in immigration numbers.

The first peak in concern about immigration/race relations was near the beginning of the data series, in August 1978, where 27% of the population said it was one of the top issues facing the country. This then receded until another peak in October 1985, but at a lower level (this is likely to be related to the “race relations” element of the statement: the peak will be related to the race riots seen in a number of UK cities in 1985). Concern about immigration and race issues then remained low, until a much more dramatic and sustained increase from around 1999/2000.


Net migration on the other hand has gone through regular cycles of peaks and troughs, but the overall trend has been clearly upwards over the period.

But as Figure 1.3 shows the two do seem to be related: the early peaks in concern coincide with surges in net migration; the period of relatively low concern about immigration is during a time of cyclical but relatively stable net migration; and the latest sustained increase in concern follows the surge in net migration in the early 2000s. Indeed, it could be said that there is a lag in this most recent pattern: it took a while for the public to notice and become concerned about the steep increase in net migration from 1999 onwards.

Of course, the relationship is far from perfect, and it is not possible from this simple cross-sectional data to say that the increase in numbers is directly driving views. But the relationship is clear enough to conclude that the number of immigrants is important to public concern.

However, it is also worth noting that one of the downsides of these salience measures is that they are influenced by what else is on people’s minds: in particular, economic concerns tend to trump all others, so, for example, the decline in mentions of immigration around 2008 is likely to be at least partly related to the surge in concern about the economy.


Figure 1.3: Immigration as an important issue by UK net migration, 1974 - 2013



Most recently, between 2012 and 2013, there has been a notable consistent increase in concern about immigration, as economic concerns have eased somewhat (for example, the proportions picking out immigration has increased from 20% in January 2012 to 38% in August 2013, whilst the proportion selecting the economy has decreased from 61% to 43% over the same period).¹⁸

This overall trendline does not give the full picture of the importance of immigration relative to other concerns – ie where it came in the overall ranking of issues. Figure 1.4 outlines this changing pattern of which issues come out as the single most important - and shows that immigration has been top a number of times, particularly between 2006 and 2008.


Figure 1.4: Most mentioned issue in Ipsos MORI Issues Index, 2005 - 2012



Another way we have measured the salience of key issues over the years is by asking MPs to list the topics that their constituents most contact them about. This is a measure not of the MPs' own concerns, but of the prevalence of issues raised by their constituents.

Figure 1.5 overlays the results from this "MP's postbag" question against mentions of race relations/immigration in our Issues Index. The trend lines appear to complement one

Figure 1.5: Immigration as an important issue by mentions of asylum/immigration/refugees to the MP's postbag question, MPs Survey, 1983 - 2013




another, with mentions of immigration in the MPs' question rising in the late 1990s and into the 2000s then slightly falling away more recently, as is the case with the Issues Index.

However, the rising salience of immigration reported by MPs appears to pre-date that seen in the Issues Index, with the MPs' trendline showing a steady upward trajectory from the early 1990s.¹⁹ It is perhaps too strong to say that the MP's Postbag data provided an "early warning" of coming national concerns, but it does suggest this more active group who make representations to MPs were quicker to spot immigration as an issue. Interestingly, we find no similar relationship with other issues: for example, MP's postbag data on crime closely follows the peaks and troughs of national concern, and consistently high contact with MPs on housing issues seems to be unrelated to the level of national concern over the period.

Two further points are worth noting in this context. First, it does not seem to be the case that this more active group who get in touch with their MP were just always more concerned about immigration: very few MPs said they were approached about the issue in the mid/late-1980s. And second, at the peak of concern in 2006 nearly eight in ten MPs said immigration was one of the key issues that was raised with them, a quite extraordinary level of concern.

Similar salience questions to our Issues Index are asked internationally, although over shorter periods. Figure 1.6 draws on Eurobarometer data stretching back a decade, and shows that the pattern seen in the UK is not the norm: we have been consistently more likely to view immigration as an issue of national importance than most other countries in Europe.²⁰

Figure 1.6: Importance of immigration, among Britons compared with other people in Europe




The relationship we observe in the UK between the salience of immigration and the level of immigration over time means we might expect to see a similar relationship in other European countries between salience and actual levels of immigration at a given point in time. This is not in fact the case, as Figure 1.7 shows: there is virtually no relationship between levels of net migration and concern across the EU27 countries (and the same is true for every measure of stock or flow of migration or immigration that we examined).

Of course, these are measuring very different relationships that will be affected by the context faced in each country. There may well be a stronger relationship between changes in immigration flows and levels of concern *within* different countries over time – but still this lack of relationship does highlight the weakness of pure scale of immigration as an explanatory factor for concern *across* countries.

Figure 1.7: Immigration as an important issue by 2011 net migration


What do you think are the two most important issues facing (YOUR COUNTRY) at the moment?



The Ipsos Global @dvisor survey also provides an international measure of the salience of immigration across 24 countries over time, but asks more directly about issues of concern rather than importance.²¹ Unlike the Issues Index, the question is prompted and asks about “immigration control” specifically, which is likely to be a narrower concept than when people think of “immigration” generally.

Nevertheless, the trend is still the same. During the last round of Global @dvisor, in June 2013, immigration control was the ninth most mentioned issue (mentioned by 11%) when respondents from all countries were asked *Which three of the following topics do you find the most worrying in your country?* However, in the UK immigration control was the second most mentioned issue, by 43%, just behind unemployment and jobs at 46%. Figure 1.8 compares the trend in mentions of immigration control in the UK with the average across all countries. Since the inception of Global @dvisor, immigration control has been mentioned in the UK between three to four times more frequently than the global average.

Figure 1.8: Concern about immigration control, among Britons compared with people from other parts of the world



So from each of the various measures of national concerns, it is clear that immigration is a top concern for people in the UK over recent years, it has some relationship with immigrant numbers and we are more worried than nearly all other major countries.


“There are too many immigrants and we are overcrowded”

But there are many other ways to measure concern about immigration. These include questions on whether people believe there are too many immigrants, of which there are a number of variations. Unfortunately these have not been asked in a consistent format for as long as the salience question, so it is more difficult to assess whether they are as related to levels of immigration – but the indication is that they may not be.

Figure 1.9 pulls together data from a number of sources for a consistent “too many immigrants” question that we have traced back to 1989, with the two data points for 1978 taken from a similar question asked by Gallup. This shows very little relationship with changes in concern as measured by the Issues Index or actual net migration levels. For the two 1978 data points, 70% and 62% of the public felt Britain was in danger of “being swamped” by people with different cultures – this is in a year when net migration was negative and year-on-year had been since the 1960s.²² Similarly, agreement with the “too many immigrants” statement was 63% in 1989 when immigration was barely registering on the Issues Index and net migration figures were still low. While there have been some fairly erratic peaks and troughs (which may be related to survey methodology differences) there was very little sustained increase in this “too many immigrants” question as immigration increased as national issue: the average level of agreement across the surveys asked in 2006-13 was around 69%.²³

Interestingly, the Transatlantic Trends series of surveys find slightly lower levels of agreement with a “too many” question, at 55% in the latest survey in 2013.²⁴ This may be related to the different question wording: Transatlantic Trends asks about “people not born in the UK” rather than “immigrants”. While these should be equivalent, it is likely that people react differently to the terms. It is also worth noting that the UK still stands out on this version of the question: we are still the most likely to feel there are “too many” foreign-born of all the countries included in the study.

Figure 1.9: Immigration as an important issue compared with the trend in the proportion of the British public who agree there are too many immigrants in the UK




Later chapters go into detail on specific dimensions of concern about immigration, but one overview measure that is often linked in surveys of attitudes to immigration (and is sometimes presented as nearly equivalent) is the belief that Britain is overcrowded. Of course, there can be many reasons why people may view the country as overcrowded, but as we have seen, immigration is key to recent population growth, and will be high in many people’s minds when considering overcrowding.

Again, there is relative consistency in views on overcrowding between questions and over time: in 2007 76% of Britons believed the UK was “already overcrowded”.²⁵ In 2011, two-thirds of us thought the UK would be a better place if fewer people lived in it.²⁶

We have not been able to identify long-term question trends on perceptions of overcrowding to compare with changes in actual population density and immigration levels. However, international comparisons suggest a weak relationship between population density and concern about immigration - and again emphasise our unusual view of immigration - as Figure 1.10 shows.

We are one of the most densely populated major countries, but a number of countries with similar or higher population densities (Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands) have much lower levels of concern about immigration.²⁷ Of course, this may say as much about the limitations of simple population density measures as indicators of perceived overcrowding as anything else.

Figure 1.10: Immigration as an important issue by population density, 2011




We can also ask whether immigration is a problem...

There are also questions that ask directly whether immigration is a problem for the country or locally. As with other measures of concern looked at so far, we consistently find around two-thirds to three quarters responding that immigration is a problem for the country: this question was asked as part of Ipsos MORI's tracker for the UK Border Agency (UKBA) in several surveys between 2006 and 2009 and the range was 69-76%.²⁸ Similarly, a September 2013 poll by YouGov showed 68% considered immigration a problem for Britain.²⁹

Figure 1.11: Attitudes on immigration as an opportunity or problem, among Britons compared with other people in Europe

Some people say that immigration is more of a problem for COUNTRY. Others see it as more of an opportunity for COUNTRY. Which comes closer to your point of view?



A slightly different picture is shown by the Transatlantic Trends survey. When asked whether immigration is a “problem” or an “opportunity” for Britain we tend to see slightly lower proportions selecting a “problem”, for example, 64% in the 2013 survey.³⁰ This is likely to be related to question framing, and in particular explicitly including the option that immigration could be an opportunity (rather than just a problem or not). However, the difference is slight and again it is worth noting that the proportion selecting “problem” in the UK is still higher than any other country surveyed (as shown in Figure 1.11).

However, there is a huge difference in stated concern depending on whether the question asks about the country as a whole or the respondents’ local area. For example, from the UKBA tracker survey, while around 70% consider immigration a problem for the country, less than 20% think it is a problem locally.³¹ This is examined in more detail in Chapter 6.

Support for reductions in immigration

Given the patterns seen above, it is not surprising that there is widespread support for reductions in immigration. A number of different questions show similar patterns, including a series on the Citizenship Survey, which consistently show over three quarters saying the number of immigrants coming to Britain should be reduced (from 2007/08 to 2010/11).

	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11
Increased a lot/little	5	5	3	3
Remain the same as it is	16	19	19	21
Reduced a little	25	25	21	24
Reduced a lot	53	51	56	53
Reduced a lot/little	79	77	78	77

Source: Citizenship Survey. Q: Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain should be increased, reduced or remain the same?

The same question has been asked on the British Social Attitudes Survey, stretching back to 1995. The findings show two things: firstly, that the proportion of Britons who feel immigration should be reduced a lot has increased since 1995 (mostly between 1995 and 2003); but secondly, even in 1995 when net migration was around 60,000 (clearly within the “tens of thousands” target for the current government), the large majority of the public (63%) still wanted the number of immigrants reduced.

	1995	2003	2008	2011
Increase a lot/little	4	5	4	3
Remain the same as it is	27	16	17	18
Reduce a little	24	23	23	24
Reduce a lot	39	49	55	51
Reduce a lot/little	63	72	78	75

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey. Q. The number of immigrants to Britain should...

1.2.2 Who and which areas are most concerned?

There are a number of important differences in views between sub-groups of the population and area types. We outline just a selection of the key patterns in this review (and signpost to more detailed reports where available).


Do immigrants have different views on reducing immigration?

One particularly interesting group to consider is past immigrants themselves. Using data from the 2010-11 Citizenship Survey it is possible to isolate respondents born abroad and still be left with a sizeable sample, as this wave interviewed a significant boost sample of minority ethnic groups. We have therefore been able to segment immigrants by year of arrival, into five categories.

As Figure 1.12 shows, attitudes of immigrants on reducing immigration tend to become closer to the nationally representative sample the longer ago someone arrived in the UK. For example, 70% of those immigrants who arrived pre-1970 call for some

Figure 1.12: Attitudes to the level of immigration by people not born in the UK and their year of arrival

Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?



reduction in immigration. While this is not quite as high as the aggregate national picture, it is much closer to it than attitudes among recent immigrant groups. There seems to be something of a step-change in attitudes between the 1991-2000 immigrants and the 1971-1990 immigrants, where a clear majority of latter are in favour of reductions, while the more recent group are closer to those who have arrived since 2000 in their attitudes. This may be a function of both length of time in the UK and the different types of immigrants that arrived during these periods.


Age, generation, social class and other individual characteristics

There are a number of interesting variations in levels of concern by other key demographic characteristics. Firstly, there are clear age and/or generation effects. This can be seen in new analysis of Ipsos MORI's Issues Index by generation, drawing on our newly constructed dataset that includes over half a million interviews since 1996 (see Figure 1.13 below).

This paints a picture of each generation being similarly unconcerned in the mid-1990s, then concern increasing for all in the late 1990s, but at varying rates. In particular, a generational gap opened up, in strict generational order, with the oldest cohort most likely to be concerned and the youngest least: by 2013, the pre-war generation were twice as likely as generation Y to consider immigration a problem (a 19 percentage point gap).

Figure 1.13: Differences by generation in importance of immigration over time


What would you say is the most important issue/other important issues facing Britain today?



Our new generation-based analysis of British Social Attitudes Survey questions on whether immigration should be increased or reduced paints a similar picture – and also highlights the shifting position of baby boomers. The pattern in Figure 1.14 shows a relatively large gap between the pre-war generation and the rest of the population in the mid-90s, but the baby boomers in particular then moving closer to this oldest group, particularly in the 2008 and 2011 surveys. This suggests a lifecycle effect (where concern increases with age) may be working alongside these generational differences (and this is confirmed in our more detailed analysis of Ipsos MORI data).³²


The two younger generations were also increasingly likely to call for reductions up until the 2008 survey, but this slipped back in the 2011 survey, leaving a fairly wide gap between the generations (although it is worth noting that around two-thirds of the youngest generation are still in favour of a reduction).

Figure 1.14: Attitudes to reducing immigration by generation in BSA 1995 - 2011



There is a similarly varied pattern in changes in calls for reduced immigration among different social grades, as shown in Figure 1.15. The highest social class was least likely to call for a reduction in 1995, while unskilled and skilled manual workers were most likely to. The relative position by 2011 was not hugely changed, but professional classes increased the most – while at the other end of the social class scale, unskilled workers shifted very little.

Figure 1.15: Attitudes to reducing immigration by occupational skill-level in BSA 1995-2011




Looking at the Issues Index by social grade shows it is again the C2 (skilled manual workers) group that register the highest levels of concern. Interestingly, in contrast with

the generational analysis where immigration became a key issue for older groups before the rest of the population, Figure 1.16 shows that the salience of immigration increased at a similar rate for most social classes until 2001/2002 when views then started to diverge significantly. However, this gap was somewhat closed later in the 2000s, and by 2013, there was much less difference between the classes.

Figure 1.16: Differences by social grade in importance of immigration over time

What would you say is the most important issue/other important issues facing Britain today?



Recent work published by Lord Ashcroft on public attitudes towards immigration reflects the importance of age, class and education in shaping views. His report, *Small island: Public opinion and the politics of immigration*³³ suggests there are seven segments of opinion among Britons on the topic of immigration.

“Universal Hostility” (16% of the population): the most negative group, hostile to all aspects of immigration and with nine in ten saying it is one of the top three issues facing the country. Members of this group are most likely to be working class, middle-aged and with low levels of formal education.

“Cultural Concerns” (16%): largely composed of older people, many of whom are owner-occupiers, this group believe immigration has on the whole been bad for the UK. In particular they are concerned about cultural changes in their local area and/or in society, as well as the pressure of immigration on public services. They are less likely than average to say they have lost out to immigrants, either in the jobs market or in accessing benefits or other public services.

“Competing for Jobs” (14%): while being no less likely than those in ‘Cultural Concerns’ to think the disadvantages of immigration outweigh the advantages overall, this group is most

concerned about the impact of immigration on jobs and wages. Although they acknowledge that immigrants often work hard for low pay doing jobs that others will not, they are more likely than average to think immigrants take jobs that would otherwise go to British people and/or that they push down wages.

“Fighting for Entitlements” (12%): This group also places immigration at the top of its list of concerns, and is predominantly concerned about its impact on competition for public services and benefits. This group is older than average with relatively low levels of formal education.

“Comfortable pragmatists” (22%): Comprising largely of graduates and professionals, this group shows little concern about immigration as an issue. Most have a balanced view, believing immigration has put pressure on the economy and public services, but that it has also enriched the country and society.

“Urban Harmony” (9%): Predominantly young and based in urban centres, particularly London, this group is the most ethnically diverse of all the segments. While recognising the cultural and economic benefits of immigration, this group has mixed views on immigration. Being concentrated in urban centres they are more likely than average to have seen and felt the impact of immigration on competition for work, wages, access to housing or other public services and the character of the local area.

“Militantly Multicultural” (10%): Dominated by graduates and professionals, with the greatest concentration of public sector employees, this group is overwhelmingly positive about nearly every aspect of immigration. They value the economic and cultural contribution of immigrants and are twice as likely as average to employ immigrants to clean or do building jobs. For this group, immigration comes at the very bottom of their list of concerns for the country.

As is often the case with this type of segmentation, the internal coherence of some of the groups is not always clear – but the main points are worth highlighting: there is a spectrum of views, which are weighted towards the sceptical, and based on different priorities.

Area characteristics

As well as individual characteristics it is useful to examine how views vary between types of areas.


For example, our new analysis of the 2010/11 Citizenship Survey, focusing on the White British population, shows there is an interaction between views of immigration among this group and the ethnic diversity of neighbourhoods. Generally speaking the White British population in areas with the lowest levels of ethnic diversity would most

like to see reductions in immigration. So, for example, in the 10% least ethnically diverse wards, the proportion self-identified as White British who think that immigration should be reduced a lot is 64%. This falls steadily as ethnic diversity rises, so that in the highest 10% of wards it is 44%.

And there seems to be a similar relationship with rate of change in populations. We have matched 2011 Census data on the rate of change of the foreign born population within a local authority against data from the 2010/11 Citizenship Survey, as shown in Figure 1.17.

Figure 1.17: Attitudes on the level of immigration among White British people born in the UK, by the share of the foreign born population in the local authority that arrived between 2004 and 2011

Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?



The White British population in areas with the most change in the foreign born population between 2004 and 2011 is least likely to say that the amount of immigration should be reduced (although this is still the majority in these areas).

While this may at first glance seem counter-intuitive, there are a number of explanations. For example, it is likely to be related to the longer history of migration in these areas, which will result in local people and structures that are better at coping with change, as echoed in the findings of a recent report published by the Home Office. This report used cluster analysis to classify local authorities within England and Wales into 12 discrete groups on the basis of key migration and socio-economic indicators, reflecting the different volumes and types of migrants they have received. The report suggests that the areas of largest historical migration are better equipped to deal with the social and public service challenges posed by new migrants.³⁴


Using the 2010/11 Citizenship Survey, we have grouped respondents by their local authority into the 12 clusters produced for the Home Office report. Figure 1.18 confirms the view that White Britons living in the “Superdiverse” and “Cosmopolitan London/periphery” clusters are least likely to want to reduce immigration a lot, whilst “Northern manufacturing and industrial towns” and areas of “low migration” are amongst the most likely to want to see immigration reduced a lot.

Those most in favour of reducing immigration a lot are White Britons living in “asylum dispersal areas”. These are areas with high worklessness and high social housing levels where the threat of competition for resources from asylum seekers who are heavily welfare dependent is likely to be keenly felt (examples given in the report include Bolton, Portsmouth, Swansea and Rotherham).

However, perhaps the most striking pattern in this analysis is that even in those already-diverse areas that are best equipped according to this classification, still around two thirds of the population would like to reduce immigration levels – although this is much more likely to be only “a little” than those living in less diverse areas.

Figure 1.18: Attitudes on the level of immigration among White British people born in the UK, by twelve clusters created from Home Office cluster analysis

Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?



1.2.3 But we hugely overestimate the extent of immigration

Concern about immigration is therefore widespread: it varies significantly by group and area, but still the majority in just about all groups would like it to be reduced. But it’s important to bear in mind that people also hugely overestimate its extent.


In Ipsos MORI’s most recent survey on this, the mean estimate of the proportion that the foreign-born population make up of the UK is 31% and the median 26%, compared with the official estimate of around 13%, (which increases to 14% if the central estimate of illegal migrants resident in the UK is taken into account³⁵). This is clearly massively out – and while this has been seen across a number of studies, it is still important to remind ourselves that on average people think that three in ten of the population are immigrants.

Yet, Britons are not unique in overestimating this figure: results from the Transatlantic Trends Survey shown in Figure 1.19 demonstrate that all countries overestimate the size of its foreign born population to an extent.³⁶ In this example, however, Britons do seem likely to overestimate more wildly than most; among the ten European countries surveyed, only residents

of Portugal overestimate to a greater extent than Britons, as do the US. It is worth noting that the Portuguese and US figures look something of an anomaly in this particular study: in previous surveys the mean estimate in Portugal was 21% and in the US it was similar to the UK.³⁷


Figure 1.19: Estimated vs actual foreign born population

In your opinion, what percentage of the total (COUNTRY) population are immigrants? You can answer any number between 0 and 100.



One question this clearly raises is whether levels of overestimation are related to levels of concern about immigration: that is, are we more worried if we overestimate more? As Figure 1.20 shows, there does appear to be some relationship between these two variables across countries, although Portugal and the US are clear outliers. In any case, as we will discuss, we cannot conclude from this that overestimations cause concern – there are good reasons to think overestimations may also be a result of concerns.

Figure 1.20: Overestimation of foreign born population vs too many foreign born people in COUNTRY




A recent survey by Ipsos MORI for the Royal Statistical Society and King's College London followed up people who had significantly overestimated the number of immigrants (those who estimated 26% or more, twice the official estimate), telling them the official estimate and asking them why they think they overestimated. Of course, there are significant limitations in asking people how they form their opinions, but the answers (shown in Figure 1.21) still help us understand conscious justifications for these estimation errors.

The two most widely selected reasons were that people come here illegally and so aren't counted, and that they still believe the proportion is much higher than 13%: i.e. people reject the official data. The next group of reasons are around what people believe they see, either in their local area or in other towns and cities, illustrating our propensity to generalise from personal experience.³⁸ Media impacts come relatively low down the list of reasons (which we will return to in Chapter 6).

Figure 1.21: Reasons given for overestimation of the UK's foreign born population

According to the last Census in 2011, the percentage of the UK population that was born in another country is actually 13%. Why do you think the percentage is much higher?



1.3 Discussion

We are clearly worried about immigration...

There is a large degree of consistency between many of the various measures of concern about immigration outlined above. Measures that have long trends, such as whether there are too many immigrants or calls to reduce the number of immigrants both had agreement levels in the early 60% in the mid or late 1980s. Both then increased, so that by the mid-late 2000s the call to reduce the number of immigrants was consistently at 75%+ and agreement that there are too many immigrants was just slightly lower than this at

around 68-70%. Other more recent measures such as whether immigration is a problem, or more generally that the country is overcrowded have all seen around 70-80% agreement in the last few years.

This suggests two points. First, concern about immigration as a general issue is very real and widespread, and is not greatly affected by how you ask about it. But secondly it also suggests that even if immigration was much reduced, we are still likely to see a high baseline of concern when measuring views through these types of questions: if nearly two-thirds wanted a reduction in immigration in 1995 when net migration was running at around 60,000, there is a good chance we will see concern remain high even if the government could get back down to this level.

Of course, it is impossible to say whether the public would react in the same way now to the same objective conditions. On the one hand, we could argue that it was the pace of change that concerned people, and if this is significantly slowed, their concerns will also subside. But there are probably stronger reasons to think this wouldn't be the pattern: we are likely to be more sensitised to immigration as an issue after years of focus on it; our trust in the system and figures is low and so we will be sceptical of reported change; we will judge as much on our perceptions of stock (ie including immigrants that are already here) as flow, and so any changes will now take a long time to affect views.

This is part of the reason why measures of salience such as the Issues Index are important indicators of relative levels of concern and priority. This measure moves much more over time compared with the relatively static opinion measures outlined above, and does seem to have a much greater relationship with actual immigrant numbers. Most importantly, the surge in concern in the early 2000s followed rather than preceded the increase in immigrant numbers, which suggests this was not some phantom concern based on anticipated change. Of course, it is impossible to make a direct causal link, and there are still questions about whether it was based on direct personal impact or media coverage of the issue, as we will examine later – but that there is some link seems clear.

These salience measures, however, have their own drawbacks - most importantly that there is a zero-sum aspect to them. In particular, when the economy goes wrong, it trumps everything else and mentions of all other issues tend to decline. This does not mean other issues are no longer a worry to people, or that the measure is no use – we just need to interpret the findings differently depending on the context. In particular, it is important to look at the rank of issues as well as the percentage saying each. In recent years this would have shown that immigration never really went away as a top concern: as we have seen in recent months, as economic concerns subside somewhat, a new surge in people selecting immigration was very predictable.

The public were worried before elite groups...

And it seems fair to say that the public's concern about the increase in immigration in the early 2000s was not taken seriously as quickly as they would have liked, as has been covered in a number of studies and commentary pieces.³⁹ The analysis here of trends in our Issues Index and BSA among different social groups shows that the top social classes were slower to see immigration as a concern.

This is likely to form at least part of the explanation for the lack of focus on immigration in mainstream political discussion at the time: as has been argued elsewhere, openness to the world was part of the progressive, metropolitan zeitgeist amongst opinion formers in the late 1990s/early 2000s, and this group was relatively less exposed to the potentially negative impacts and sense of threat from high immigration.⁴⁰ This fits with the “policy gap hypothesis” developed by Gary Freeman in 1994, which suggests that, across countries, the more restrictive immigration policy that the public would favour is often not delivered because of the more open perspectives of interest groups both inside and outside government.

And there remain wide gaps between groups...

But while all groups increased their level of concern about immigration, there remain wide gaps between different segments of the population. In particular, the oldest generation (those born per-1945) are much more concerned than the youngest, as are those in skilled manual work compared with higher social classes. Between areas, there remain the patterns we have seen for a number of years, with less diverse regions and districts tending to be most concerned about immigration. This is not just a function of immigrants in diverse areas supporting more immigration (as the analysis shows, immigrants are more supportive, but this reduces over time), but reflects differences in views among the native population – which in turn will be related to how capable they and local services are in accommodating further immigration.

But it is important not to mischaracterise these segmentations. Even in “superdiverse” and “cosmopolitan” areas, a majority are in favour of at least a little reduction in immigration. There have been suggestions that the population can broadly split into three, with 25% significantly against immigration and unlikely to shift their views, 25% pro-immigration and 50% in the middle who have concerns but could be convinced. While this is not a bad basis for thinking about the population’s view, it seems too positive a reading: there appear to be more people strongly against immigration than in its favour, and many in the middle group seem to be starting from a much more sceptical viewpoint than this implies.

We do have a massive misperception of the scale of immigration...

While the consistency of concern is compelling, we know that most have a very mistaken idea of immigration in mind when answering these questions.

At a basic level, we are grossly wrong on the scale of immigration, on average estimating that it is more than twice the actual level. Does this mean we should just discount views, given they are, on average, based on such wild misperceptions of scale? This would be wrong, for a number of reasons.

First, there are problems inherent in these type of estimation questions. Many of us just struggle with proportions, and so will not be reporting our true views (which is suggested by the massively wrong outliers, where some are likely to have misinterpreted the question or got the maths wrong). They are also very susceptible to how we frame responses, as our experimental survey showed: we can pull down proportions quite significantly by giving people a range of categories to choose from that just start lower.⁴¹

And maybe more importantly, cause and effect in these type of estimation questions is complicated. That is, we don't just have "accuracy goals" in mind when answering these sorts of questions, we also have "directional goals": whether consciously or not, some of us may be trying to express our concern as much as get the right answer. It is arguable that our worry may cause our overestimation as much as the other way around – social psychologists call this "emotional innumeracy". This is supported by other experimental surveys that reward people if they come up with correct answers on issues where they are likely to have an emotional reaction – people are much less wrong when accuracy goals are incentivised.⁴²

We also know these overestimates exist on other issues. For example, in the same study we asked people to estimate the proportion of the population that are aged over 65: the average estimate is even more wrong, at 36% compared to the real proportion of 16%. This doesn't mean we should dismiss the public's concerns about our ageing population and care for older people.

We are also not alone in overestimating immigration, although we do tend to overestimate to a greater extent than most other countries in Europe. And there does seem to be a relationship between levels of overestimation and concern, albeit with some outliers. However, it would be wrong to assume from this that the higher concern amongst Britons about immigration is driven by our greater tendency to overestimate the immigrant population – for similar reasons to above, as cause and effect can run both ways. The important practical point here is that "myth-busting" exercises are likely to have limited impact on concern: even if we could correct perceptions of the scale of immigration (which would be tricky given the lack of trust in immigration data), we are unlikely to see large shifts in concern. However, this does not mean that we should give up on informing the public: it seems wrong that we are so significantly mistaken about the basic scale of such a key issue.

What is "immigration"?

An important limitation of all of these overall measures of scale and concern is that they attempt to sum up views under a single simple label of "immigration". And more than that, it seems very likely that most people have at best a shaky and at worst a very wrong image of immigration in mind when answering them. Scott Blinder has helpfully identified the concept of "imagined immigration" in this context, and we know (as we will see later) that what people report as top of mind are very small groups such as asylum-seekers.⁴³ Further, people find it difficult to articulate what they are thinking about when asked those type of questions – and so it is likely that it is even more nebulous or based on vague collections of stereotypes than even this suggests.

So we need to treat all of these general questions with caution, while not dismissing the concerns they clearly reflect. Indeed, we face similar problems across a range of policy areas: we know from our previous review of perceptions of crime⁴⁴ that all sort of things from low-level anti-social behaviour to terrorist attacks inform a general fear of crime. However, in the context of immigration, it does mean that as well as this general reassurance on the scale and control of immigration, we need to look carefully at the less common but important studies on views of specific immigrant groups, as we do in later chapters.



Economic and
labour market
impact of
immigration

There are a number of aspects to the economic impact of immigration, each with measurement challenges, and disagreement on assumptions. It is important to bear in mind the limitations of economic measurements: even our core economic indicators (such as overall GDP) are subject to significant revision over time as more data becomes available and models are changed⁴⁵: it is a much greater challenge to measure the economic contribution of one constantly-shifting group, and so these estimates need to be treated with caution.

2.1 The context

Impact on productivity and GDP per capita

There is relatively clear evidence that immigration contributes to higher GDP: for example, +£6 billion in 2006.⁴⁶ But GDP per head is probably a more meaningful measure of economic impact, as this will be more related to aggregate living standards as experienced by the population.⁴⁷

The Office for Budget Responsibility has recently concluded, however, that there is no consensus in the literature on the size of any contribution to productivity and GDP per capita made by migrants.

The evidence suggests a higher proportion of migrants have degree-level qualifications than natives, and this has been rising over time. This may reflect the functioning of the visa tier system, which restricts entry to the UK to non-EU low-skilled immigrants, but is more open to highly skilled non-EU migrants and those coming to the UK for post-graduate study.⁴⁸ This implies immigration may have a positive impact on productivity. On the other hand, Labour Force Survey (LFS) data suggests immigrants are underemployed in occupations that do not match their qualifications, which could mean their potential contribution to productivity may not fully materialise as a result. Research by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) shows a “downgrading” of immigrants upon arrival, where they will be filling jobs below their skills/qualification levels.⁴⁹

It also seems likely that any past effects will have been uneven across different segments of the population or regions: for example, IPPR’s recent policy review argues the economic benefits of the period of high immigration were widely but not evenly spread, but the social impacts were concentrated in communities that often lacked the resources to cope or respond.⁵⁰

Immigrants in the labour market

The increase in the number of immigrants in the workforce has been even more dramatic than overall population changes in recent years, which is not surprising given the age profile of immigrants. The number of foreign-born people of working age in the UK increased from 2.9 million in 1993 to nearly 6 million in 2011.⁵¹

The share of foreign-born people in total employment increased from 7.2% in 1993 to 14.4% in 2011, and the share of foreign citizens in total employment increased from 3.5% in 1993 to 9.2% in 2011.⁵²

Compared to the early 2000s, the presence of foreign-born workers has grown fastest in relatively low-skilled sectors and occupations, as is consistent with the evidence of underemployment of immigrants. The increase in the share of foreign-born workers was fastest among process operatives (e.g. transport drivers, food, drink and tobacco process operators), up from 8.5% in 2002 to 28.2% in 2011.⁵³

Impact on wages and employment

Insofar as a consensus is possible, the UK research suggests the impact of immigration on average wages and employment is small. Manacorda et al (2006) find little evidence of overall adverse effects of immigration on employment and wages for UK-born, while Lucchino et al (2012), looking at national insurance number registrations by foreign nationals and changes in unemployment benefit claims, concluded unemployment did not rise faster or fall more slowly in areas where migration was higher.⁵⁴ Looking at the period 1997-2005, Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) find that an increase in the number of migrants at a rate of one per cent of the UK-born working age population resulted in an increase in average wages of 0.2 to 0.3 per cent. However, a different study, focusing on the period 2000-2007 finds that a one per cent increase in the share of migrants in the UK working age population lowers average wages by 0.3 per cent (Reed and Latorre, 2009)⁵⁵. While these last two pieces of research reach different conclusions, they agree that the effect on average wages is small.

There is evidence, however, for more significant effects along the wage distribution. Analysis by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) concludes that immigration depresses wages at the lower end of the wage distribution but leads to slight wage increases in the upper part of the wage distribution. Using data from the Labour Force Survey, the Centre for Economic Performance also concludes that there may be some downward pressures on the low wage market where many new migrants tend to find work.⁵⁶

Projected economic impact

Projections by the Office for Budget Responsibility estimate that immigration will ultimately have a positive effect on GDP and per capita growth, given that migrants are more concentrated in the working age population.⁵⁷ However, the OBR's projections are based on the assumption that immigrants have the same economic profile as the UK-born population, which empirical evidence, as we have seen, suggests is not the case.

Figure 2.1: Total number of foreign-born working-age people in the UK




Figure 2.2: Percentage of those in employment who are migrants




Figure 2.3: Top 10 occupations by workforce share, all migrants





Figure 2.4: Top 10 occupations by workforce share, recent migrants (arrived in the last 5 years)




2.2 Public attitudes

Public perceptions of the economic impact of immigration seem less uniformly negative than overall attitudes: there is still significant concern, but at a lower level and with more variation, depending on the particular focus of the questions.

2.2.1 Perceptions of overall economic impact

This is reflected in overall rating questions. Ipsos MORI polling shows that, between 2006-2011, around 40% of the British public have consistently felt immigration is bad for the economy overall, with typically a slightly smaller proportion thinking that immigration is good for the economy, as shown in Figure 2.5.⁵⁸

Figure 2.5: Attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration over time, from BSA, ESS and Ipsos MORI



The European Social Survey (ESS) also asks a question about the economic impact of immigration, but uses a numerical scale from 0-10, with 0 being bad for the economy and 10 being good. The proportion answering 0-4 in the UK has remained remarkably consistent (around 44% in the five rounds from 2002 to 2012), higher than the proportion answering 6-10, which rose from 27% in 2002 to around a third in each subsequent round since then.⁵⁹

This same question wording was also used in the 2011 British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey. This, however, showed a significantly wider gap, with 51% replying 0-4 (bad for the economy) and 30% replying 6-10 (good for the economy).⁶⁰ This more negative view is also in line with an international survey by Ipsos MORI in 2011, where 49% said immigration is bad for the economy and 27% said good.

In contrast with these two surveys, however, the Ipsos MORI UK-only survey in 2011 showed a much narrower gap between good and bad for the economy, with 39% saying bad and 37% saying good.⁶¹ This is one of the few occasions where different representative surveys paint rather different pictures – although the general picture of more evenly split perceptions than overall views of immigration still holds.

A poll by YouGov in September 2013 paints a slightly more positive picture of perceptions of the long-term economic impact of immigration. The question begins with the preamble “Here are some statements that have been made about immigrants who have settled in Britain in the past 50 years or so. In each case, please say whether you think the statement is true or untrue”. To the statement “Immigration has, on balance, been good for Britain’s economy”, 50% considered this to be true and 41% felt this was untrue.⁶²


Sub-group variations in assessments of the economic impact of immigration, however, do closely mirror those seen for views of immigration overall. Analysis of BSA and European Social Survey data by Rob Ford, Gareth Morrell and Anthony Heath has shown that economically vulnerable groups have tended to be more negative in their assessment of the economic impact of immigration compared with people from professional occupations and with higher reported income – reflecting the patterns seen in the previous chapter.

Further, comparing findings from the 2002 ESS and the 2011 BSA, Britons who are likely to feel economically threatened by immigration have become more negative in

their views over time, to a greater extent than those who are less likely to feel threatened, representing an increased “polarisation” of views.⁶³

Our own generational analysis of ESS data provides a further perspective on this. Looking at attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration over time, Figure 2.6 shows


Figure 2.6: Generational differences in economic impact of immigration over time



that respondents in the younger generations have become more positive, while those born before 1945 have remained negative. However, the key pattern is the changing position of baby boomers: this cohort was the most positive in 2002, but are the most negative ten years on. There is now a significant generational divide on attitudes to the economic impact of immigrants.

Comparing the UK with other European countries, data from the 2012 round of the European Social Survey shows the UK as slightly more negative than average in terms of our assessment of the economic impact of immigration. As Figure 2.7 shows, the other large economies in Europe, such as Germany and Spain, are more positive than the UK, as are most other Western European and Scandinavian countries. Those countries that are more negative are the former Soviet states of central Europe, Cyprus, Portugal and Israel.

Figure 2.7: Attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration, among Britons compared with other people in Europe



A similar pattern is seen in findings from the Ipsos MORI Global @dvisor, carried out in June 2011, where we are again marginally more negative about immigration's economic impact than most other major European countries, as shown in Figure 2.8.

The same can be seen with a slightly different question, focusing on economic growth. When asked in a survey from 2012 whether they agreed with the statement, "Immigration is vital for economic growth", only 25% in the UK agreed, while 46%

disagreed. This made us the most negative of seven Western European and Scandinavian countries included. These were France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Denmark – who are also more positive than us on other economic questions.⁶⁴

When we look at findings from ESS amongst Western European countries over time we find that as well as being the most negative, Britons have been the most consistent in their view of the economic impact of immigration over the six rounds from 2002 to 2012, as shown in Figure 2.9.

2.2.2 Perceptions of immigration and the recession

A number of polls have focused on the impact of immigration specifically on the current recession and our likelihood of recovery

Figure 2.8: Attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration, among Britons compared with other people in Europe

Please tell whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Immigration is good for the economy of [COUNTRY]





Figure 2.9: Attitudes towards economic impact of immigration over time, among Britons compared with other people in Europe



– and generally these show a similarly split view (with more negative than positive) as with overall economic assessments. For example, an Ipsos MORI poll in February 2011 showed that 39% believe immigration will damage economic recovery by taking away jobs from people already living here; 21% said immigration would make no difference to the economic recovery and 31% said immigrants' skills and labour are necessary to help the recovery.⁶⁵


There is, however, again some evidence of hardening of views in more recent times, as response to this question changed when we asked it 9 months later (October 2011) in a survey for British Future: this showed that 55% thought immigration would damage the recovery.⁶⁶ This change might be explained by the fluctuating economic context: there was a significant focus on whether the economy may be experiencing a “double-dip” recession around the time of this survey.⁶⁷

Lord Ashcroft's poll, published in September 2013, seems to suggest a much larger majority of people now think immigration is damaging the recovery: he found three-quarters of the public (77%) think a “clamp down” to dramatically reduce immigrant numbers would ‘help the economy by reducing pressure on public services, cutting the benefits bill, and making it easier for British people to find jobs’.⁶⁸ However, this should be interpreted with caution: it rolls together a number of issues, including pressure on benefits and public services (which as we will see tend to elicit more negative views) and uses quite dramatic language to describe the actions required (see Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004) for further discussion of these effects⁶⁹).

It's also worth noting that there are large variations in responses to these types of

Figure 2.10: Attitudes towards the impact of immigration on the jobs market, among Britons compared with other people in Europe

Please tell whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Immigrants in [COUNTRY] have made it more difficult for [COUNTRY] people to get jobs



questions between socio-demographic groups, as with overall economic assessments. Responses to the British Future poll conducted at the end of 2011 showed 64% of people in social grades D or E agree immigration to the UK will damage economic recovery by taking away jobs from people already living here, compared with 41% of people in grade A or B. And looking across regions, residents of the East Midlands (65%) and Yorkshire and Humber (62%) were much more likely to feel this way compared to people living in London (39%).⁷⁰

2.2.3 Perception of impact on the labour market and jobs

Perceptions of immigration’s impact on the labour market and jobs are more clearly negative than most of these overall economic assessments. Various question approaches have been used when measuring this - but they tend to come out with over six in ten saying immigration has a negative impact on the labour market for the native population.

This is seen in an Ipsos MORI survey in June 2011, where 62% of Britons agree that immigrants have made it more difficult for British people to get jobs, the highest out of the countries included, as shown in Figure 2.10.⁷¹

When asked about the relationship with unemployment in the UK in 2012, 66% think immigration has caused unemployment to rise more than it would have done, only 4% say immigration has caused unemployment to rise less than it would have done and 20% not much difference.⁷² This is not just a recent perception linked to current economic difficulties: in January 2008, before the economic downturn had fully taken hold, two-thirds (66%) of Britons agreed with the statement, “Migrant workers are undercutting British workers in terms of pay and taking our jobs as a result”.⁷³


And similarly in 2008, 63% said a sharp reduction in immigration would be good for Britain’s economy, because it would mean “more jobs for British-born workers”, while just 25% said a sharp reduction in immigration would be bad for Britain’s economy because it would lead to severe shortages of workers in some key industries and services.⁷⁴

Most recently, a YouGov poll in September 2013 showed 61% of Britons think “immigrants are taking the jobs and driving down wage rates of British-born workers seeking low paid jobs”.⁷⁵

A number of these questions are perhaps not as tightly constructed as we would like, mixing concepts and linking more than one element in a single statement. Yet, in some sense this makes the consistency of responses, with around 61-66% of people expressing a negative view of immigration’s labour market impact, more notable: of course, this may just reflect a consistent proportion of the population who view immigration negatively, rather than considered responses on each element of the issues raised.

There is one source of data, however, that shows a slightly less negative view of the labour market impact of immigration. Figure 2.11 shows trend data for the UK from Transatlantic Trends: in 2009, 2010 and 2011, the proportion agreeing immigrants take away jobs from the native born was significantly larger than the proportion disagreeing. However, in 2013 this gap narrowed

Figure 2.11: Attitudes towards the impact of immigration on the jobs market over time



to a size previously seen in 2008, before the Recession took hold, with only 51% agreeing. This seems difficult to explain given the consistency in other studies outlined above, and we will need to see if it is maintained. In any case, it is worth noting that the UK still remains much more negative on this measure in the Transatlantic Trends survey than other developed Western European countries (around one in three residents of Spain, Italy and France agree immigrants take jobs from natives, just 18% think so in Germany).⁷⁶

There are further ways to get an idea of the importance of labour market impacts to concerns about immigration. For example, the Citizenship survey followed up those who said they wanted a reduction in immigration, asking why. As Figure 2.12 shows, the top reason from all given was that it causes job shortages (37%), although overcrowding and the pressure on public services and welfare are not far behind.⁷⁷

Figure 2.12: Reasons given for why the number of immigrants coming to Britain should be reduced

And why do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be reduced? Why else?



Interestingly though, when asked about the causes of youth unemployment in the UK, immigration is not a top reason. According to an Ipsos MORI survey for British Future in November 2011, migrants are fifth among the reasons given for young people being out of work (10%), behind the global economy (19%), the present coalition government (17%), the previous Labour government (12%) and businesses that won't provide apprenticeships (12%).⁷⁸

Responses to questions solely on the wage impact of immigration reflect a general lack of certainty among the population, and perhaps therefore the importance of how questions are framed. For example, a straightforward but broad impact question on the 2011

Transatlantic Trends Survey shows that 52% of people agree that “immigrants bring down the wages of British citizens” while 42% disagree.⁷⁹ Agreement is higher than the European average, but not the highest measured (55% in Spain).

This lower level of agreement than other labour market impact questions may reflect the different focus: people are less certain that immigrants are having a general deflationary impact on wages, but are more likely to believe that undercutting is happening and that this can impact native employment levels.

Do immigrants fill skill gaps and create work?

There have been a number of different question approaches to get at the impact of immigration on skill shortages, and each provides a slightly different perspective. For example, when we ask for a fairly factual assessment – whether immigrants help to fill jobs where there are shortages of workers, we get high levels of agreement: 66% agree (31% disagree), which is just below the average of the largest five European countries surveyed in the 2013 Transatlantic Trends immigration survey (France, Germany, Italy, Spain are the others).⁸⁰

And there are very similar high levels of agreement that “a lot of immigrants are doing jobs that British workers don’t want to do” at 67%.⁸¹ Further, there are generally more positive than negative views of immigrants’ work ethic: a much larger proportion of people think immigrants work harder than people born here (45%), than the opposite (8%); 41% think there is not much difference.⁸²

When asked which two things are the biggest benefits of immigration to Britain, the most mentioned according to Lord Ashcroft’s 2013 poll is ‘immigrants often do jobs that need doing but British people don’t want to do’ (49%), followed by ‘immigrants are often prepared to work harder for lower pay than British workers’ (38%).⁸³

Britons are also more likely than not to think immigrant workers have been crucial to the running of the NHS. Half of the public (50%) think it is either definitely or probably true that the NHS would “collapse” were it unable to recruit a significant number of nurses each year from abroad; 36% think this is probably or definitely untrue.⁸⁴

However, whilst we recognise that immigrants fill jobs where there are shortages of workers, and do jobs we don’t want to do, it cannot be automatically assumed that people view this as a positive reason for immigration. For example, you get a very different picture when you ask whether Britain needs immigrants for these roles. The Ipsos MORI tracking survey for UKBA showed that from 2006-2009 only around one in four (22-25%) agreed “we need more immigrants to do jobs that British people do not want to do”.⁸⁵

Finally though, there are some questions that frame the employment impact of immigrants more positively. According to the 2013 Transatlantic Trends Survey, 52% of the British public agree with the statement, *Immigrants help create jobs as they set up new businesses* (43% disagree), which is a slightly more positive view than the European average for the largest five European countries (48%).⁸⁶ An Ipsos MORI survey for British Future in November 2011 also showed 47% felt people born outside the UK had had a positive effect in terms of entrepreneurship and starting businesses, 11% said a negative impact and 34% said no effect either way.⁸⁷

Overall, some of these more detailed findings may partly explain the somewhat less negative view of the overall economic impact of immigration compared with perceptions of its labour market impact: we could agree that immigrants can be important in creating jobs, doing the work we don't want to do and working hard, while still being concerned about their more direct impact on the availability of jobs. Of course, this is also clearly a case where asking for opinions on the aggregate labour market impact of such a diverse group as immigrants can only ever be of limited value (as discussed below).


Our focus on skills

These concerns about the impact on opportunities for native British workers do not translate quite so clearly into calls for positive discrimination in favour of the native population. The public is split down the middle over whether British workers should get priority in job market: 45% think British companies should prioritise giving jobs to British workers, even if they require more training or it means turning down better qualified or more skilled foreign workers – but 47% think British companies should prioritise giving jobs to the people with the best qualifications and skills, even if it means British workers sometimes lose out to foreign workers.

As with other questions, there is a relationship between views and social class, with those in higher classes (ABC1) more open to skilled immigrants (54% agreement with latter) than those in lower social classes (C2DE - 38% agreement).⁸⁸

Figure 2.13: Attitudes towards giving priority to skilled immigrants in demand, among Britons compared with other people in Europe

Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Priority should be given to immigrants with higher education and qualifications who can fill shortages among certain professions in (Country)




This more balanced and tentative view on taking direct action to help British workers may reflect our general cultural focus on “fairness” (as we will return to in the discussion) – but it may also be related to our apparent focus on the importance of skill levels and filling skills gaps for the acceptability of immigration.

For example, we reported much higher levels of agreement that priority should be given to those with required skills than other European countries in a 2011 Ipsos MORI survey: 58% agreed, compared with an average closer to 40% among the other countries included,

as Figure 2.13 shows.⁸⁹ Of course, this may also just reflect our overall higher level of concern about immigration: greater selectivity on skills clearly implies lower absolute numbers.

However, Rob Ford’s analysis of the 2011 British Social Attitudes Survey illustrates that people’s attitudes on immigration control also vary considerably when we disaggregate migrants to ask about different types, characterised by their labour market position, their region of origin and their motive for migrating. When migrants were described as professionals, net support for settlement in the UK was very positive, regardless of the migrants’ origin or motive for migrating. When migrants were described as unskilled labourers, net support was negative, in each combination with region and motive.

Figure 2.14: Views of labour migrants, by migrant characteristics



The description of the migrant’s cultural background (Muslim from Pakistan or from Eastern Europe) was seen to have some effect on attitudes to settlement, but the effect was smaller when migrants were described as professionals looking for work, and non-existent when described as professionals coming to fill jobs. As Ford suggests, this seems to point to the pre-eminence of economic considerations, associated with migrants’ skill levels and their ability to contribute to the UK, over cultural considerations in thinking about who should be allowed to settle here.⁹⁰

2.2.4 Perceptions of impact at a personal level

As with general views of immigration, how specific you are about the level of geography or grouping you are asking about will affect views. There do not seem to be any questions that ask for respondents’ views on the local economic or labour market effects of immigration, or even for particular job markets/sectors. But some questions do ask about personal impact – and as we might expect, views are less negative, although there is some variation by sub-group.

For example, 31% agree they personally would be financially better off if immigration were restricted but 44% disagree and 24% don't know.⁹¹ This is clearly not conceptually equivalent to assessments of the general economic impact of immigration, but still it does provide a contrast with the c40-50% who think immigration is bad for the economy overall, and the c60% who usually think it is bad for the labour market.

According to Lord Ashcroft's poll a slightly higher proportion of the public (36%) report that they or someone else in their family have found it harder to find work or are paid less because of competition from immigrants.⁹² This is quite a remarkable finding – that one third of the population would claim a fairly direct experience of a negative outcome from immigration. As we might expect, these findings vary significantly between social groups: among 18-24 year old men the proportion rises to 50%, to 44% among C2s and 46% among DEs, which compares with 25% of ABs. A different question from 2008, focused solely on direct personal experience, found that 21% of the entire adult population (not just job-seekers) say they personally had problems very or fairly often in finding work because of lower paid migrant workers in their area.⁹³

2.3 Discussion

More positive perceptions of the economic impact of immigration than expected?

The key overall pattern in the attitudinal data shown here is that people are less negative about the economic impact of immigration than its overall impact – although on most measures they are still more negative than positive, and negative views may have, if anything, increased in recent years. People also tend to be more negative about the labour market impacts of immigration than its impact on the economy as a whole, despite recognising some advantages from immigrant labour and enterprise.

Views will be based on little study of the evidence – but some personal experience?

The relatively balanced views of the economic impact of immigration in some way reflects the general agreement among economists that the actual aggregate impact is small, whether this is positive or negative. Of course, public opinion will not be based on a reading of this economic evidence and the split in views will reflect both their general uncertainty of the economic case and that this aggregate picture is a balance of quite different perspectives between social groups.

The relatively more negative stance on labour market impacts of immigrants could be explained in a similar way. It seems pretty clear that around two-thirds of the population do not believe that a “lump of labour” view of the job market is a fallacy, and see additional workers from abroad automatically resulting in greater competition for a fixed number of jobs and/or lower wages. Of course this is perfectly reasonable: it is fallacious that there is a lump of labour at an aggregate level, but an individual's experience may well be of increased competition. This is reflected in the remarkably large proportions who report being personally affected in either finding work or wage levels: whether this reflects the economic reality, the scale of this perception reflects the extent of concern.

As highlighted, this will also be experienced differently in different parts of the labour market, with those in lower skilled work arguably more susceptible to these effects (as is clear from the dramatic changes in immigrants' share of employment in relatively low skilled sectors, shown at the start of this chapter), and therefore more likely to be concerned.

And it seems clear that, if anything, views are becoming more polarised between groups in recent years. This is seen in analysis by other researchers which shows those who were concerned about economic impacts becoming more so. Our analysis of generational differences here shows a similar pattern: the generations were quite close together on the economic impacts of immigration in 2002, but by 2012, younger generations had moved away from older groups, to leave a significant generational gap, particularly as baby boomer attitudes hardened.

But it is also worth noting that immigrants are not always automatically blamed for all economic ills: while the top reason for wanting immigration reduced (according to one question) is the impact on jobs for native workers, it comes some way down the list of explanations for youth unemployment.

What do we want to do?


However, it remains clearly the case that more people believe that the country would be better off economically if we reduce the extent of immigration. This is particularly the case when immigration is presented to respondents as needed or vital: we may accept that immigrants are currently fulfilling roles, but we don't think it needs to be like that, and tend to feel that a different solution could be found.

Interestingly, however, we seem more sure about reducing immigration as a reaction to its perceived economic downside than allowing immigration to continue but positively discriminating in favour of native workers. This may simply be because we would like immigration reduced for a number of other reasons, or we see it as a simpler and more workable solution.


It is likely, though, to also have some relationship with our sense of fairness. Taking these findings together with our unusually high focus on skills levels as a pre-requisite for immigration, and our much lower levels of objection to highly skilled immigrant workers fulfilling particular job roles paints a picture of a country that would be uncomfortable discriminating against immigrants once here, and so would much prefer to reduce the issue at source. As we will see, this provides an interesting contrast with our preferences for action on welfare, where we are much happier to discriminate against immigrants – perhaps because this appeals to our sense of fairness (that people need to have contributed to be supported), rather than working against it.

Our views are more nuanced on the specifics

Finally, of course, questions on the economic impact of immigration or immigrants face the familiar problem of lumping a huge range of people together in a single term, and expecting respondents to report a coherent and consistent response. The problem with doing this is perhaps clearer with some of these questions on economic impact than anywhere else. For example, our "imagined immigration" or mental image will be very



different when 52% of us agree that “immigrants” create new jobs compared with when 58% agree “immigrants” take jobs away from the native population: a large proportion of the population could reasonably agree with both. Again, this does not mean that we should dismiss the general sense of threat that many feel – but we should also shape policy responses in light of the more specific questions on particular groups.



Fiscal and
resource
impact of
immigration

Chapter Three

Understanding the fiscal and resource impact of immigration is also beset with measurement challenges, particularly in the absence of longitudinal data that measures impact consistently over time. Nevertheless, a number of studies have been conducted on this topic, and we summarise some of the key points below.

3.1 The context

The fiscal impact of migrants...

...on overall public finances

The age profile of migrants makes it probable that they will be net fiscal contributors to the UK's public finances. The fact that migrants tend to arrive as working age adults means the UK avoids the cost of paying for their education, although any children that arrive with migrants may draw on the state for this. Once in work, the tax receipts from migrants are likely to exceed the services drawn from the state.⁹⁴

The greater number of adults in the working age population relative to those not in work decreases the dependency ratio between these two groups. Hence, in the short-term migration can be seen to contribute to decreasing the dependency ratio.⁹⁵

However, if migrants choose to remain in the UK into old age, this effect is likely to diminish over time as they retire and become net fiscal consumers.⁹⁶

Specifically on Accession 8 countries, in the 4 years following EU enlargement (2004-2008) migrants made a positive contribution to public finances in the UK. Although they tend to be in low-paid jobs, their participation and employment rate is high and they are 59% less likely to be in receipt of benefits and 57% less likely to live in social housing.⁹⁷

However, information recently released by the Department for Work and Pensions under the Freedom of Information Act shows the number of non-UK nationals claiming out of work benefits rose from 289,000 in February 2008 to 407,000 in February 2012.⁹⁸ This has been attributed to the growth in the UK's foreign born population, but also to claims being made at a higher rate. People from EU accession countries showed the largest percentage increase in claims, with nearly a four-fold increase since 2008. This group, however, made up less than 1 per cent of total working age benefit claims in February 2012, while comprising two per cent of the UK's overall population, according to the 2011 Census. This rise in claims has

been accompanied by a downturn in the employment rate of recent migrants (those who have been in the UK for less than 5 years) since 2008.⁹⁹ At this stage it is not clear how this changes the overall fiscal impact of immigration.

However, looking forward to the possible future net fiscal impact from immigration, recent analysis by the Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that an annual net inward migration of 140,000 per annum from 2016 would lead to the net debt to GDP ratio reaching 99% by 2062-63 – while assuming zero gross migration (“natural change” in Figure 3.1) would increase the net debt to GDP ratio to over 174%. These estimates rest on the assumption that migrants tend to be more concentrated in the working age group.¹⁰⁰

...on education

There is little evidence or agreement on the impact of migration on state education. The tentative conclusion is the impact seems to be low overall, though this may vary across areas, with particular localities likely to be affected by pupil churn or extra demand for primary school places.¹⁰¹

According to research by the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR), of the total £223bn state expenditure on education in 2009/10, 12.5% was spent on immigrants and their children. (In this analysis, migrant children were defined as children living at home with parent(s) who were born abroad. Where two parents were in the household and one was not a migrant each child was given a weight of 0.5). Spending per head is therefore slightly lower than for natives.¹⁰²

Fertility rates for non-UK born women are higher than for UK born women, with a total fertility rate (TFR) for non-UK born women of 2.28 children per woman compared to a TFR of 1.89 for the UK born in 2011. However, the difference has been reducing more recently (ONS, 2012d).¹⁰³

...on housing

UK-born individuals and foreign-born individuals have similar levels of social rented tenure (about 17% of UK-born individuals and 18% of foreign-born individuals were in social housing during 2011).¹⁰⁴

The foreign-born population is three times as likely to be in the private rental sector (37% were in this sector in 2011), compared to the UK-born (13%), and has much lower rates of home-ownership (44% compared with 70% of the UK-born).¹⁰⁵

...on health services

Immigrants tend to use hospital and NHS services at the same rate as the native born population.¹⁰⁶

However, a lack of understanding of UK systems and other barriers have made it challenging for health services to provide effective services to some migrant groups.¹⁰⁷

Poor English skills amongst some migrant groups can also have an adverse impact. Research by NIESR identifies interpretation costs as a key additional cost for the health service, while anecdotal evidence from health professionals suggests appointments take longer when a migrant has poor English language skills.¹⁰⁸

The NHS has relied heavily on foreign-born staff in recent years, with a particularly sharp increase in NHS staff from outside the EEA in the early 2000s. Only 47% of nurses recruited in 2001/2 trained in the UK compared to over 90% a decade earlier. Between 2002 and 2003 the number of doctors trained outside the EEA more than doubled, representing 60% of all doctors registering with General Medical Council (GMC).¹⁰⁹ These numbers have since fallen; approximately a quarter of doctors currently registered with the GMC obtained their primary medical qualification outside the EEA.¹¹⁰

Differences by migrant group

As highlighted, immigrants are a diverse group, and different types of migrant will have significantly different impacts on public services and finances. There is little systematic evidence that unpicks this, but broad themes are suggested in a recent Home Office review.

Firstly, international students and non-EEA skilled workers are likely to have low impacts on public services, making a lower demand on most services than the average.¹¹¹


Those who arrive in the UK to seek asylum are likely to have the highest impact on services compared with other groups, because of their particular circumstances and levels of need.¹¹²

The negative impacts will also be greater for illegal workers, as they will often live in poor conditions, will not contribute taxes, and will struggle to integrate with the community in which they live.¹¹³

Weaknesses with calculating impact

Most of the assessments of migrants’ fiscal impact rely on static studies, as there is a lack of longitudinal data to assess changes in immigrant economic activity over time¹¹⁴ and many public services don’t record the migrant status of users.¹¹⁵

Figure 3.1: OBR estimates of public debt by migration scenarios



3.2 Public attitudes

3.2.1 Access to welfare

Before looking at attitudes to immigrants’ access to welfare, it is important to acknowledge the very widespread negative views of the welfare system in general in Britain over recent years. According to an Ipsos MORI survey conducted for the BBC in 2011, just a quarter of the public feel the benefits system is working effectively at present in Britain (24%), while nearly three quarters think politicians need to do more to reduce the amount of money paid out in benefits (72%).¹¹⁶

These attitudes reflect a long trend of falling support for welfare spending, as outlined in our recent generational analysis: all generations have become less supportive of welfare benefit spending over recent years, with younger generations tending to be the least supportive. In aggregate, our pride in the welfare state as a whole is also declining, but this is almost entirely generational: younger cohorts have less understanding of and attachment to the concept of the welfare state, and so as older groups die out, aggregate opinions are shifting.¹¹⁷


Our own and others’ recent research argues that this is in part related to a dilution of the contributory principle of welfare: the increase in means-testing and generally greater complexity of welfare benefits in particular has resulted in greater confusion and less

attachment. Across a range of studies we and others have conducted, the importance of establishing a greater sense that welfare payments should be linked to contribution comes across strongly from the public.¹¹⁸

This context is likely to be behind a great deal of our negative views of immigrants' access to welfare. For example, the importance to the British public of preventing access to benefits for new migrants is seen in findings from the Transatlantic Trends Survey, 2011, as shown in Figure 3.2.¹¹⁹ Over half of us say that it is very important that new migrants do not use social benefits when we're coming to a view on whether to accept them - which is more than twice the level seen in any other country included in the study.

Figure 3.2: The importance of ensuring immigrants with a low level of education do not use social benefits, among Britons compared with other people in Europe

How important do you think the following attributes are for admitting immigrants with a low level of education to COUNTRY? They won't use social benefits



Findings from Lord Ashcroft's poll of public attitudes to immigration underline the level of specific concern about immigrants' fiscal impact on the UK: 'immigrants claiming benefits and using public services when they've contributed nothing in return' was regarded as the most concerning thing about immigration to Britain, according to 62% of the public. This compares to just 27% who said 'immigrants taking jobs that would otherwise go to British workers, or pushing down wages in general'.¹²⁰

This is further seen in findings from Ipsos MORI tracking surveys between 2008 and 2009: just over three-quarters of the public agree with the statement that "*migrants should not have full access to benefits until they become citizens*".¹²¹ In the context of this question "becoming a citizen" was undefined, but the high level of agreement is likely to reflect the support for delay and until they are committed to the country and contributing.

Other findings seem to confirm this. A YouGov poll in January 2012 found 53% of people say we should allow foreign-born British residents to claim benefits if they have a record of

working and paying taxes (the most selected category by some distance). Only 12% say we should allow foreign-born British residents to claim benefits if they become British citizens¹²² and only 15% of people select the option to allow anyone legally living in Britain to claim benefits if they are entitled to them. A record of contributing can be seen as the crucial factor in play here.

Once migrants have a history of contribution to the state in taxes, the majority of the public support their right to draw benefits and use services. In a 2012 poll, Ipsos MORI found 58% of Britons think people born abroad who have worked and paid taxes in Britain for 15 years should be able use public services and receive welfare benefits. In contrast, fewer than half of the public (40%) would grant access to public services and benefits to someone born in Britain who is currently looking for work, but has never been employed here.¹²³ This again suggests that contribution, regardless of whether the person is born in the UK or abroad, is seen as a key determinant of access to services and welfare entitlements.

But this is not the public's perception of immigrants' relationship with welfare: they tend to believe that immigrants receive more than they pay in, and get unfair priority on many aspects of state support.

For example, according to a survey in 2008, the majority of the public (59%) believed most immigrants pay less in taxes than they receive in benefits and public services; 15% say they pay in more and 13% say roughly the same.¹²⁴ Similarly, a poll in September 2013 showed that nearly two-thirds of the public (64%) think it is true that immigrant families receive more than their "fair share of welfare payments".¹²⁵


And approaching this from the other direction, an Ipsos MORI survey found that 58% of people think there are groups of people in Britain who receive unfair priority when it comes to public services, like housing, health services and schools. And it is immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees who receive the most number of mentions when the public is asked which group

is most likely to receive this unfair priority.¹²⁶ This represents a significant shift in perceptions of who is prioritised unfairly: when a similar question was asked on BSA in the 1980s, single parents were singled out.

As Figure 3.3 shows, immigrants are also the top group the public think should have their benefits cut to reduce the welfare bill.¹²⁷ There are, however, interesting differences by age and social grade. Only those aged 18-34 are more likely to mention another group, the long-

Figure 3.3: Groups deemed the highest priority to have their benefits cut

And which ONE, if any, of the following groups do you believe is the highest priority to have their benefits cut...




term unemployed, as a priority for benefit cuts than immigrants, while people of a lower social grade are much more likely to target immigrants for cuts than people with a higher social grade.

3.2.2 Public and social services


However, it is not just immigrants' access to welfare benefits but their broader impact on public services that concerns people. Over six waves between 2006 and 2009, the Ipsos MORI tracking study for UKBA asked those who said immigration was a problem in Britain why they felt that way.¹²⁸ The question was asked open-ended, without any prompting and so can be seen as a good measure of top-of-mind concerns about immigration. As Figure 3.4 shows, abuse of/burden on public services was the most mentioned by some distance at every wave, except for in February 2009 (at the height of economic concerns), where pressure on jobs and employment was mentioned most.

Figure 3.4: Reasons given among people who view immigration as a problem in Britain



The very high importance placed on pressure on public services is also suggested by simple correlations across international studies. Figure 3.5 is based on findings from Ipsos MORI's Global @dvisor study and shows, firstly, the very high agreement in Britain that immigration puts too much pressure on public services (76%).¹²⁹ But it also shows the very strong relationship between the belief that there are too many immigrants in the country and this concern about the impact of migrants on public services. This relationship cannot demonstrate any causal link and is only based on a very small number of country cases, but it is stronger than other similar cross-analysis: for example, there appears to be a stronger relationship between negative views on immigration and immigrants' impact on public services than other key factors such as their impact on the economy or jobs.

Figure 3.5: Relationship in European countries between the belief that there are too many immigrants and the concern that immigrants place too much pressure on services



3.2.3 Social housing and housing shortages

The shortage of affordable homes is an increasing concern for segments of the public, as shown by an increase in mentions in our Issues Index in recent months (up to its highest level in five years in August 2013) and a recent Ipsos MORI poll which found 80% of people think there is a housing crisis in Britain.¹³⁰ It is perhaps not surprising then that when services and resources are asked about individually it is concern about the impact of migrants on housing that often comes out top.

Research by Ipsos MORI for British Future found that people are likely to feel more strongly that immigration has had a negative impact on the availability of housing (69% negative) than schools or the NHS (45% negative for each).¹³¹


The perception of a negative impact on housing from immigration is seen elsewhere. A YouGov poll in June 2013 found migration to be the biggest perceived cause of housing shortages. When asked “Which, if any, of the following do you think are causing the MOST pressure on the amount of affordable housing that is available in Britain?”, 44% say “more people migrating into Britain than leaving”, which received more mentions than “lack of social housing available” (39%), “the economic downturn meaning less people can afford to buy” (37%) and “lack of Government investment in building new homes” (30%).¹³²

As well as creating increased competition, there is evidence to suggest that many people think migrants receive unfair access to social housing. For example, a poll in September 2013 has shown 58% think it is true that immigrants who apply for council housing often go unfairly to the front of the queue; 26% think this is untrue and 15% don’t know. By social grade, the proportion who thinks this is true rises to 67% among C2DEs.¹³³

Similarly, findings from our reanalysis of the Citizenship Survey show a sustained level of concern at around one in five white people who think other races would be treated better than them on housing allocations (as shown in Figure 3.6). This contrasts with a decline in perceptions of prejudice among minority ethnic groups on this and other questions. Of

course, this does not identify immigrants directly, focusing instead on discrimination by race, but it is likely to reflect feelings towards immigrants.

Figure 3.6: Attitudes towards racial discrimination by council housing department/housing association by ethnicity




3.2.4 There are different perspectives on the resource pressures from immigration

As we outlined in an earlier chapter, the Citizenship Survey 2010/11 also followed up people who said they would like to see immigration reduced with a question asking why – and further analysis of this shows some important differences in perspective between key groups.

In particular, there is a clear relationship between the nature of concern and income levels. Concern about immigrants as a drain on public service resources rises significantly with income, while job-related concern declines as income rises. Concern about housing is at a similar level for those with incomes below £30,000 per year, and much lower for those with incomes above that level. These patterns are understandable, but it is worth reminding ourselves that there

Figure 3.7: Reasons given among people who view immigration as a problem in Britain by income

And why do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be reduced? Why else?



are not only different levels of concern about immigration between groups but also very different drivers of these – and resource concerns are not driven by people at the bottom of the income spectrum.

3.3 Discussion

We see immigrants as a burden on public services...

The available evidence suggests that immigrants are probably, on balance, net fiscal contributors to the UK – but most of the public do not hold that view. If anything, people are much clearer in their own minds that immigrants place a burden on public services and the benefit system than they are about the overall economic impact of immigration. And this seems to be vitally important to our overall impression of immigration: it comes top of reasons for stated concerns about immigration and looking across countries it is most correlated with the view that there are too many immigrants.

Of course, our negative perspective is understandable. First, people will not have a whole system perspective on the fiscal contribution of immigrants: the tax contribution of immigrants is invisible, but their use of services and receipt of benefits will be visible to many directly and through the media. Secondly, people will not see supply of services as elastic: more money per head may come in as a result of immigration, but local services will not be seen to scale up to reflect the increased numbers, at least in the short-term.


It is particularly difficult to expect people to shift this judgement at a time of severe cuts: convincing them that more severe cuts would be needed if it wasn't for immigrants seems problematic. This is, of course, also partly because our views will be informed by the now familiar problems of our “imagined immigration” being much more likely to be based on asylum-seekers, illegal immigrants and other groups who are less likely to be net contributors.

...focusing on contribution is therefore likely to be key

As mentioned in the previous chapter, many people are reluctant to discriminate against immigrants in the labour market – but this chapter shows they are much more willing to discriminate on immigrants' access to welfare benefits and even broader support from public services and the state. This may be explained by our focus on the requirement for people to contribute before taking out (which applies to native-born groups too).

It is therefore easy to understand why immigrant access to support can cause such anger and seems so highly related to overall negative attitudes to immigration: we believe in the importance of contributing (which is linked to our strong sense of fairness), but not only are recent arrivals seen to be given immediate equal access, there is a suspicion among many that they are given preferential access.

Policy therefore needs to reflect our focus on fairness and contribution: measures to restrict access to benefits to those who have contributed or give more to those who have contributed more seem essential to our support for the welfare system as a whole, and this is likely to be even more the case for immigrants.



Our analysis of how concerns vary between groups adds to this picture. There is a very different pattern here to what we find with the perceived job-market pressures from immigration: it is the better off that are most likely to highlight the impact of immigrants on public services and benefits as a reason for its reduction. On the one hand, this is very explainable, as these richer groups are less likely to be affected by the employment and housing pressures that immigrants are seen to bring for others. But it also highlights that this perception of public service pressure is not isolated among those at the bottom.



Cultural impact of immigration

Chapter Four

There is less objective information as context for the cultural impact of immigration than is available for previous themes. We will look at attitudes towards the cultural impact of immigration, feelings of Britishness, national values, perceptions of integration and community cohesion. By way of context, we have outlined below some of the key data and discussions on area integration, household mixing and English language.

4.1 The context

Area segregation

Area segregation in the UK has been measured in different ways, these different measures lead to different conclusions and this in turn has led to extensive discussion of the real nature of change in our local areas. While not focused solely on the segregation of immigrants, these measures still provide useful context to discussions of whether our towns and cities are becoming more or less segregated – but the picture is complex and depends significantly on how you construct the measures.

The Index of Dissimilarity (ID) measures the evenness with which two groups are distributed across an area (segregation), relative to their distribution across a larger area, while Lieberman's Isolation Index (II) measures the probability of contact with someone from another group (isolation).

Research shows the segregation of ethnic minority groups, measured by ID, is decreasing. However, the isolation of ethnic minority groups, measured by II, appears to be increasing. This is explained by the fact that II, unlike ID, is highly sensitive to the proportional size of a group, so that as minority groups grow in size, their members' probability of contact with other people from the same group increases, thereby increasing their isolation from other groups. Given the sizeable increase in the UK's foreign born population over the last decade, as well as the higher fertility rates and lower mortality rates of ethnic minorities compared with the White British population, it is unsurprising that ethnic minorities' isolation has increased. On the other hand, the fact that segregation has decreased for ethnic minorities suggests they are 'spreading out'.¹³⁴

This is seen in analysis of segregation change between 2001 and 2011 by the Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity. Ethnic minority populations of England and Wales were found to live in more mixed areas in 2011 than ever before and this mixing has accelerated in the past ten years.¹³⁵

Mixed ethnicity and household integration

The proportion of the population claiming mixed ethnic identity was 1.2 million or 2.2% in 2011. It has increased from 672,000 since 2001 (1.3%), a near doubling. The total number of people with parents of different ethnicities is in reality likely to be much greater than this, as many choose to identify with one of their parents' ethnicities.¹³⁶


The proportion of mixed households has grown in 346 out of 348 local authorities. Excluding one-person households, 1 in 8 households now include more than one ethnic group.¹³⁷

English language

As the public attitudes data will show, speaking and understanding English is seen as a key factor in the cultural integration of immigrants. Reliable direct measures of English language ability among immigrants are scarce, but there are indications that this will be a challenge for a significant minority of immigrants: across the whole population 2% report that they do not speak English well, and 8% do not speak English as their main language; both of these will be concentrated in the foreign-born population.¹³⁸

4.2.1 Overall assessments of the cultural impact of immigration

Figure 4.1: Attitudes towards the cultural impact of immigration, among Britons compared with other people in Europe




Overall assessments of the cultural impact of immigration in Britain tend to show the population fairly evenly split, with roughly equal proportions saying it has been good and bad for our culture.

This is shown over six waves of European Social Survey (ESS) (2002-2012). Respondents are shown a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 representing the statement Britain's "cultural life is undermined by immigrants" and 10 representing the statement Britain's "cultural life is enriched by immigrants". For the purposes of this analysis, scores 0-4 have been aggregated into "immigrants undermine cultural life", and scores 6-10 have been aggregated into "immigrants enrich cultural life".

Looking at how the UK compares on this measure to other European countries, it is clear from the 2012 ESS round (shown in Figure 4.1) that we are among the most negative about the cultural impact of immigrants. Only Greece, Russia, Czech Republic, Israel and Slovakia are more likely to say their country's cultural life has been undermined by immigrants.

Among Western European countries, Figure 4.2 shows that the UK has consistently been the most negative about the cultural impact of immigration, according to findings from ESS. From 2002 to 2012

Figure 4.2: Attitudes towards cultural impact of immigration over time, among Britons compared with other people in Europe



the proportion of Britons who think cultural life is undermined by immigrants has remained more or less on a par with those who think the country's cultural life is enriched. Elsewhere, however, attitudes have been more positive, with Sweden the country that is most positive and most consistent in its attitudes.

A more straightforward agree/disagree statement from the 2013 Transatlantic Trends Survey shows a similarly balanced picture for the UK: 46% agree that

immigration poses a "threat to our national culture", but 51% disagree. Despite this, the UK is still the most negative on this measure amongst the major European countries surveyed: indeed agreement in many other countries is significantly lower, with Italy at 24%, Germany 21%, France 34%, and Spain 18%.¹³⁹

When we look at the net scores on the ESS question by generation (as shown in Figure 4.3) we see patterns that are familiar from other examples in this review: there is a clear generational hierarchy (younger cohorts are more positive than older cohorts) and the baby boomers are more likely to have become more negative over time than others, somewhat closing the gap on the pre-war generation, who are most negative.

However, the cultural impact of immigration is extremely difficult to get at in structured survey questions – and it is possible to argue for a fairly wide range of perspectives, depending on the focus of the question.

For example, a fairly positive view can be seen in questions such as recent findings from the 2013 round of Transatlantic Trends.

Here, 63% of the public agree that ‘immigrants enrich our culture’ while 33% disagree. The contrast with the ESS question above is likely to be driven by not explicitly including negative descriptor of cultural impact (ie “undermine” in the ESS question). From an international perspective, this finding also contrasts somewhat with the findings from ESS, as the UK is in the middle on this measure compared with other major European countries (in Italy and France 54% and 60% agree respectively; in Germany and Spain, 71% and 66% agree respectively).

Figure 4.3: Attitudes towards cultural impact of immigration over time by generation





Figure 4.4: Attitudes towards different cultural, economic and service impacts of immigration

What effect, if any, would you say people born outside the UK who have moved to Britain have had upon the following?



Similarly, from 2006 to 2009, over six waves of surveys, the proportion of the British public who agreed with the statement “*Immigrants make Britain more open to new ideas and cultures*” was always between 53% and 58%, with the proportion disagreeing between 28% and 22%.¹⁴⁰


We also get a fairly positive view of the impact of immigration when we ask about very particular cultural spheres in which immigrants may have an effect. The data displayed in Figure 4.4, taken from a survey conducted by Ipsos MORI for British Future in November 2011, shows people were, on balance, positive about each of the possible cultural impacts of immigration they were asked about – in contrast with the economic or service impacts of immigrants, which are generally seen to be negative.¹⁴¹

However, we need to be careful in interpreting these more positive results: they do not show how much people value these outcomes (enriching our culture, opening us to new ideas, impacting on particular sectors), and there are other questions that suggest more people are

worried about what we are losing than are happy about what we are gaining.

Figure 4.5: Attitudes towards contribution of immigrants in making country a better place to live, among Britons compared with other people in Europe

Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Immigrants make (COUNTRY) a more interesting place to live



For example, only a third of people (33%) agree that immigration has made Britain a “more interesting place to live”, while 42% disagree.¹⁴²

However, interestingly, in contrast to the ESS question above, we are slightly more positive on this measure than the average across other countries included in the study and significantly more positive than many other major countries such as Italy and Spain, as Figure 4.5 shows.

And finally, perhaps not surprisingly, when the cultural impact of

immigration is framed as a loss, more people are negative about the impact of immigration. For example, a YouGov poll in March 2012 showed that almost two-thirds (64%) of the British public agree with the statement “I am concerned that Britain is losing its traditional culture” which was preceded with the preamble “Now thinking about immigration, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements”; only 18% disagreed. Of course, while the question was framed to be focused on immigration, some may also be thinking about wider reasons for our loss of tradition. This question was also asked across six other European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark) and interestingly Britons were significantly more likely to agree with the statement, 11 percentage points ahead of France in second.¹⁴³


4.2.2 Multiculturalism and assimilation

There is a similarly rather contingent picture with our attitudes towards whether cultural differences should be maintained and celebrated or reduced, depending on the phrasing used in the questions. However, overall, we mostly seem to want immigrants to fit in, but not to completely lose their own identity.

On the one hand, in a survey from 2008 a clear majority disagree that it is a good thing that foreigners in Britain keep the “lifestyle” which they had at home (64%), and just 22% agree, which was down from 36% in 1997, as Figure 4.6 shows.¹⁴⁴

Figure 4.6: Attitudes towards foreign people keeping the lifestyle they had in their home country over time

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is a good thing that foreigners in Britain keep the lifestyle which they had at home.



In contrast, a poll for the Sunday Times in April 2011 showed a lower proportion, 41%, think people from other countries who come to live in Britain should leave behind their own cultural traditions and try to live like British people. This is higher than the 32% who think there is nothing wrong with people from other countries who come to live in Britain continuing to follow their own cultural traditions – but the balance of opinion is less clearcut.¹⁴⁵

And on the Transatlantic Trends Survey in 2011, the majority (59%) agree that people who come to Britain should try to act like people from Britain, but a substantial proportion disagree (39%). Interestingly, the level of agreement to this question is the lowest of the five European countries surveyed – that is, we seem more accepting of difference on this measure than other countries.¹⁴⁶

This weaker demand for assimilation can also be observed in public attitudes towards a variant of Norman Tebitt’s “cricket test”, put to people in a poll by Ipsos MORI for British Future in November 2011. Six in ten (60%) of the public think people from abroad who settle in the UK should be able to support the sporting team of the countries they came from, even against British teams, without people saying this shows they aren’t trying to fit in here; 15% think the opposite and 26% think neither. When asked the same question but about the children of people born abroad, there is more of a demand for British teams to be supported (23%)

although half of respondents still think children should be allowed to support their parent's country of origin without being seen as unwilling to integrate (50%); 28% think neither.¹⁴⁷

On the basis of the above findings, we would expect to find that attitudes towards "multiculturalism" are slightly more negative than positive – and this does seem to be the case. In a 2008 survey by Ipsos MORI, respondents were asked to read a pair of opposite statements, "*Multiculturalism threatens the British way of life*" and "*Multiculturalism makes Britain a better place to live*" and select which was closer to their view. Overall, 30% put themselves closer to multiculturalism makes Britain better and 38% said they see multiculturalism as a threat.¹⁴⁸

A September 2013 survey provides a more positive view of our long-term perspective: when asked to think about the impact of immigration over the last 50 years, 54% think that "it is one of Britain's strengths that it is a more multicultural society than it used to be", while 36% think this is untrue.¹⁴⁹ Again, it should not be a particular surprise that views over this timeframe are more positive, as the cultural contrast with 50 years ago will be very significant: indeed perhaps the most striking part of this is the finding that over a third of us think the much more mono-cultural society of 50 years ago would be a strength.

Of course, there is likely to be limited understanding of what is meant by "multiculturalism" – but questions that try to get at the concepts behind it pose challenges. For example, fewer people (27%) select "*We should celebrate the rich diversity of cultures and values between different groups in Britain*" as closest to their views than "*We should share a common culture and set of values in Britain*" (41%).¹⁵⁰ These are clearly not exclusive options, but still help paint a picture of greater scepticism about recent multiculturalism than support.

4.2.3 Britishness and values

Our fairly uncertain and nuanced views on how to deal with the cultural identity of immigrants may reflect our own rather nebulous sense of national identity in Britain. This has been much discussed in the last couple of years, particularly around our hosting of the 2012 Olympics, and how the opening ceremony summed up a complex mix of national characteristics and institutional pride.¹⁵¹ As you might expect, structured surveys struggle to get at views on these concepts, and even more so on how immigrants fit into the picture.

However, there are a few sources that provide useful context and are worth noting – and each paints a picture of not much change. Firstly, our sense of belonging to Britain has remained pretty steady over the last decade, or even slightly increased: according to the Citizenship Survey, 85% said they had a very or fairly strong sense of belonging to Britain in 2003, which rose slightly to 88% in 2010/2011. Looking over a longer period, our pride in being British has also remained very constant: according to one survey source, just over half agreed that they were very proud to be a British national in 2008, which had barely shifted from the earliest measure in 1981.¹⁵²

Interestingly, we seem to have a higher sense of national pride than most other European nations, but significantly lower than other Anglophone countries: 80% of US and 70% of Canadian residents say they are very proud of their nationality, compared with 46% of British people in this particular survey series.¹⁵³

Attempts to sum up what our pride and national identity are based on struggle to get at the complexity of our views. So, for example, when we ask without any prompting what

comes to mind when people think of the British way of life, the single most popular category is “don’t know”; no one or group of characteristics dominate beyond this.¹⁵⁴

But more structured questions provide a clearer picture, although each source is limited by what is included in the question: the top values we associate with ourselves seem to be respect for the law, tolerance, politeness and freedom of speech; and our key individual characteristic is our sense of humour, followed by friendliness and tolerance again.¹⁵⁵ Clearly the most notable aspect of this, in light of what we have seen on attitudes to immigration, is that tolerance of difference features consistently highly in most of these sorts of lists: we come back to this in the discussion.

Any discussion of values raises two further questions: do immigrants have a similar or different view of our national identity or sense of belonging; and does our level of attachment to Britishness affect our views of immigration?


Values integration and the relationship between cultural attitudes and immigration

On that first question, research conducted on behalf of the Migration Advisory Committee¹⁵⁶ highlights the challenges of measuring and focusing on “values integration” as a measure of success in dealing with immigration. Firstly, as Figure 4.7 shows, there is an important interaction between length of residence and sense of belonging to Britain: as we might expect, more recent arrivals report a lower sense of belonging, but long-term immigrants actually have a higher sense of belonging than the native-born population with native parents.

In the long-term, then, immigration does not seem to be a direct threat to national feelings of belonging as a result of immigrants themselves having lower attachment. However, this does suggest that there will be a shorter-term dilution of attachment (and of course there is the possibly more widespread issue of whether immigration reduces the native-born population’s sense of belonging, as we return to in the following).


There are similarly interesting variations between these groups on views of maintaining traditions and equal opportunities, as Figure 4.8 shows. In particular, immigrants from outside Europe have significantly greater focus on maintaining traditions than other groups, and while this declines

Figure 4.7: Proportion of respondents who feel they belong to Britain, native born with native parents compared to recent (settled within past seven years) and established (moved over seven years ago) migrants



over time, it remains significantly higher even for long-term immigrants from outside Europe. The pattern of support for equal opportunities is more stepped, with all immigrant groups remaining more focused on this than the native born population.

Figure 4.8: Proportion of respondents who feel (i) ethnic groups should maintain traditions (ii) government should ensure equal opportunities for all groups, native born with native parents compared to recent (settled within past seven years) and established (moved over seven years ago) migrants



Of course, these differences are only important if we believe that “values convergence” is an important part of the successful integration of immigrants, or, alternatively, that diverse values are a problem (which from earlier findings certainly seems to be the perspective of a significant minority of the UK population). There has been much less focus on these issues in the UK than many other (particularly European) countries, which in itself is illustrative: the idea of requiring immigrants to come into line with existing attitudes has been much less common in the UK, perhaps reflecting our greater focus on tolerance of difference.

As mentioned above, the second key question is whether our views of cultural identity affect our views of immigration – in particular, are our views on national identity related to our overall openness to immigration? Analysis of the 2002 European Social Survey suggests they are: at the individual level, cultural and national identity, economic interests and the level of information about immigration are all important predictors of overall attitudes to immigration. Indeed ‘symbolic’ predispositions, such as preferences for cultural unity, have a stronger statistical effect on immigration attitudes than economic dissatisfaction. The analysis showed opposition to immigration is higher when respondents endorse the value of cultural homogeneity, regardless of how economic consequences are perceived. And this relationship between a preference for cultural unity and opposition to immigration was significant in each of the twenty countries studied.¹⁵⁷

So while we see weaker and more muddled relationships between cultural attitudes and support for immigration at an overall aggregate level, at an individual level, our cultural outlook does seem to be important in shaping views, as we might expect.

The importance of English language

Finally in this section, it is important to acknowledge the importance of speaking and understanding English to our sense of national identity. First, in a question that uses a different list of what makes us British to the ones discussed earlier, speaking English is the third most mentioned aspect of being British (by 41%), behind respect for people's right to free speech, even if you don't agree with them (50%) and respect for the law (46%).¹⁵⁸

And this is reflected in our extremely high levels of agreement that immigrants should be made to learn English seen consistently in the Ipsos MORI/UKBA tracker between 2006 and 2009: agreement was consistently around 90% and never dropped below 87%.¹⁵⁹

Research by Britain Thinks on behalf of British Future attempted to bring together the different themes of Britishness to identify core aspects through qualitative research. Speaking English was seen as one of three key attributes, alongside obeying British laws and paying taxes. When these were put together into a single survey statement (*"To belong to our shared society, everyone must speak our language, obey our laws and pay their taxes – so that everyone who plays by the rules counts as equally British, and should be able to reach their potential"*) there was a very high level of agreement at 83%, suggesting these conditions do provide a broad base for our understanding of the conditions for belonging. Interestingly, agreement was even higher amongst UKIP supporters (93%).¹⁶⁰

4.2.4 Area integration and community cohesion

People tend to be fairly negative when they are asked directly what impact they think immigration is having on various aspects of area integration and community cohesion. A poll in April 2011 showed 62% think current levels of immigration are making good community relations difficult to achieve,¹⁶¹ and a poll in 2012 showed seven in ten people agreed with the statement *"I am concerned that Britain's society is becoming increasingly divided because of immigration"*, a higher proportion than in any of the six other European countries surveyed.¹⁶²


A similarly concerned picture is shown in different question types: for example, it is immigration that is identified as causing more tension in British society as a whole today, as well as in people's local area, than anything else. An Ipsos MORI survey for British Future in November 2012 found that tension between immigrants and people born in Britain is the most mentioned issue when respondents are asked to think about causes of tension in British society (57%) and in their local area (41%). Tension between taxpayers and welfare claimants is the second most mentioned in both scenarios (47% and 39% respectively).¹⁶³

Similarly, a YouGov survey in January 2008 showed that immigration is thought to be the greatest cause of a decline in community spirit (24%). Consumerism was the second most mentioned cause (22%).¹⁶⁴

However, a slightly different picture is seen when people are asked more specific questions. For example, the public is more evenly split on whether immigrants are integrating well. According to the 2013 Transatlantic Trends Immigration Survey, 48% think they are, while 46% think they are integrating poorly. And when asked about the children of immigrants, people are more positive: 55% believe children of immigrants are integrating well, 38% think poorly.¹⁶⁵

And there is an interesting contrast between our overall sense of belonging to our areas and our stated view on how immigration has affected our view of our neighbourhoods. As Figure 4.9 shows, our sense of belonging to our neighbourhood has in fact increased from 70% to 78% between 2003 and 2011, alongside similar increases in feelings of belonging to our local area and to Britain¹⁶⁶. But within this period we have also seen a doubling in the proportion of the population who agree with the statement that My area doesn't feel like Britain any more because of immigration: this was only 12% in 2005, but had grown to 25% by 2008.¹⁶⁷ While not directly comparable, Lord Ashcroft's recent poll, published in September 2013, suggests even more widespread concern about area change: 36% agreed 'the character of my local area has changed for the worse in recent years because of the scale of immigration'.¹⁶⁸

Figure 4.9: Belonging to neighbourhood, local area and Britain




These patterns also don't sit very well with apparently positive trends in other measures: for example, the proportion who say that people respect ethnic differences has increased to a near universal 87% in 2011 (from 79% in 2003) and a similar proportion (86%) say people from different backgrounds get on well in their area, up from 80% over the same period.¹⁶⁹ There are a number of possible explanations for this, which we return to in the discussion below.

In this context, it is also worth noting the large number of studies that have tried to unpick the relative importance of neighbourhood diversity in explaining various measures of community cohesion, often focusing on aspects of trust in other people. This follows the work by Robert Putnam in the US that appeared to show a clear relationship between increasing diversity and decreasing trust over time and between areas.¹⁷⁰ However, the evidence from the UK appears to be less clear-cut, and the conclusion from most studies is that deprivation rather than diversity is more important in explaining differing levels of trust across areas.

For example, a study by Sturgis et al concludes that “the diversity-trust relationship is characterised by its weak and contingent nature”. A similar point is made quite neatly in a chart from another study by Twigg et al, shown in Figure 4.10.¹⁷¹ Here different levels of ethnic diversity are represented by the lines, so that the blue line represents the most diverse areas and the red line the least diverse. The chart therefore shows the various levels of trust for different levels of diversity and deprivation (more deprived to the right of the chart). This shows two things: that deprivation is more related to trust overall (the range of trust from high-to-low deprivation is greater than high-to-low diversity); and the impact of diversity is practically non-existent in the most deprived areas, although it does have an effect in less deprived areas.


Figure 4.10: Perceived levels of social cohesion and trust by diversity and deprivation



The suggestion that it is economic deprivation, rather than ethnic diversity, which is negatively related to social cohesion is corroborated in analysis of Citizenship Survey data for the Migration Advisory Committee. The analysis found that the primary negative influence on survey respondents’ perceptions of their local area is the level of social deprivation rather than by the level of new migration.¹⁷²

Figure 4.11: Attitudes towards preference for ethnically homogeneous areas to live in

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I would rather live in an area where people are from the same ethnic background as me



However, even if there is little measurable effect on trust or community cohesion from higher neighbourhood diversity, it remains the case (as shown in Figure 4.11) that a significant minority of the population (29%) say they would prefer to live in areas where people are from the same ethnic background as them (four in ten of those aged 65+). However, this appears to have declined in the 2000s: four in ten agreed with this statement in 2003, including 18% who strongly agreed.¹⁷³

4.3 Discussion

The cultural impact of immigration is more muddled...

The evidence on the cultural impact of immigration seems more muddled, contradictory and contested than most other areas we look at in this review. This includes on ostensibly simple factual questions such as whether minority communities are becoming more or less segregated geographically and how different groups are integrating at an individual level. A lot depends on the evidence selected and the frame used.

However, it is also clear that some apparent contradictions are not actually inconsistent: the public can be split on whether immigrants contribute to our culture while a clear majority can still be worried about what we are losing as a country; we can have a positive view of the impact of immigration on particular areas such as food or music while being worried about the broader cultural impact; we can be more in favour of common values while not wanting complete assimilation; in international comparisons, we can be mid-table in agreeing immigration makes Britain more interesting while being most likely to think it is on balance bad for our culture.

But there are still some patterns that seem less easy to explain. For example, there is an apparent disconnect between the high levels and positive trends in some key measures of identity and belonging, and the more negative views about, and trends in, the impact of immigration on these types of factors. If immigration was an important negative factor in how the population as a whole feels about our areas and attachment to the country, we would expect to see these aggregate measures decline.

Concepts are difficult to define and measure

One interpretation of this, then, is that recent shifts in immigration are actually relatively unimportant to our overall sense of identity and belonging, and the relatively negative response to immigration's impact when asked directly is an issue of framing: we react negatively because of wider concerns about immigration.

However, this is probably too dismissive of cultural concerns. This pattern may equally reflect the difficulties of capturing these sorts of factors in structured questionnaires. We are trying to get at the "lived experience" of how immigration impacts on the cultural life of the population as a whole, but surveys are typically not the best way to do this.

Our lack of a strong understanding of citizenship and our ill-defined sense of Britishness may also be a factor here. On the one hand this fairly nebulous concept makes it easier to accept difference (particularly as tolerance of others is explicitly mentioned in most


lists of our most valued characteristics), but on the other hand it also may heighten the sense of threat, particularly where stronger, more visibly different cultural groups come in. The international comparisons of different questions are particularly illustrative here: where the emphasis is on threat or loss of traditional identity, Britons are among the most worried, but where the emphasis is on the benefits that openness brings, we're often mid-table or even among the more positive.

Our openness has then, paradoxically, contributed to us being unprepared for debates about how far to expect incoming populations to conform, and adds to the sense of confusion. This is in contrast to many other countries where there has been much more focus on "values convergence". However, this has shifted in Britain in recent years. As one study concludes: *Crucially the central principle has shifted towards a loosely framed public acceptance that migrants themselves must change outlooks and behaviours in order to "fit in". In many other western democracies this may not be novel, let alone challenging. In Britain today it represents a substantive move away from the past.*¹⁷⁴

What do people want to do?

This shift in perspective is an important first step in increasing public confidence in the handling of the impact of immigration. But the practical responses, beyond simply reducing numbers, are generally less clear-cut. The exception to this is on English language. This has been a clear demand for a great many years, and, from a public perspective, little seems to have been done to address it. Polling suggests this is much more important to people than other practical mechanisms such as citizenship tests or classes (although these are also supported), perhaps reflecting our recognition that capturing "Britishness" in such tests is likely to be difficult.

However, it is important to recognise that there is a substantial minority (perhaps a third of the population) who would just prefer less diversity, and that this is a strongly held perspective for many in this group. Indeed, while at an aggregate level it may be more clearcut that the impact of immigration on factors such as public services is negative, at an individual level, our preferences for cultural uniformity may well be more important drivers of our attitudes to immigration. Of course, this comes close to a circular argument, and gives policy-makers little to get hold of – but does suggest the importance of celebrating and emphasising the "traditional" or native aspects of national identity as much as the benefits that diversity brings.



Which types
of immigrants
and
immigration?

As noted throughout this review, overall perceptions of immigration are problematic, because they cover such a wide range of people and circumstances, and our top of mind image (or “imagined immigration”) is very different from the real breakdown of immigrant groups. We look in more detail at these issues in this chapter, including how views on different types of immigrants vary.

5.1 The context

Student migration

All data sources agree that student migration now constitutes the largest single category of migration to the UK (compared with work, family, and asylum).¹⁷⁵

2011 student immigration from outside the EU has been estimated at 180,000 (2011, International Passenger Survey (IPS)), with higher estimates from data on visas issued (237,000) and landing cards from passenger entries (248,000).¹⁷⁶

On average, student migrants have shorter stays in the UK than those who migrate for family or work; among students entering the UK in 2006, 17% remained in the UK with legal leave to remain by 2011.¹⁷⁷

Student migration from the Americas has been falling, but a greater number of students are entering the UK from Asia, up from 114,000 in 2008 to 161,000 in 2011.¹⁷⁸

In 2012, Higher Education Institutions made up 75% of visa applications of students accepted for study, up from 56% in 2010. This mainly reflects a decrease in such visa applications from other types of educational institutions, including further education colleges and English language schools.¹⁷⁹

Asylum migration

From 1985 to 1988, asylum applications to the UK (excluding dependents) numbered around 4,000 per year. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and end of Communism in Eastern Europe led to yearly averages of 32,000 applications between 1990 and 1997. Applications then rose to a peak of 84,130 in 2002, largely caused by conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and have since declined steadily with the number of applications averaging 22,000 per year from 2005 to 2012.¹⁸⁰

Asylum applicants and their dependents comprised an estimated 7% of net migration in 2011, down from 49% in 2002, but up from 4% in 2010.¹⁸¹

In 2011 the UK received 0.41 asylum applicants per 1000 people in its population, below the European average of 0.65.¹⁸²

EU migration

Inflows to the UK of EU migrants were mainly flat for the 1991-2003 period, averaging close to 61,000 per year. After the accession to the EU in 2004 of the A8 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia), there was a significant rise; the average annual inflow for the period 2004-2011 was around 170,000 migrants.¹⁸³

EU inflows account for close to 31% of total migration inflows, a share that has remained fairly stable since 2005. A8 workers accounted for close to 14% of total migration inflows to the UK in 2011, a share that has decreased since the 2007 peak (about 20%).¹⁸⁴

The number of A8 citizens working in the UK was estimated at 658,000 in the third quarter of 2012 according to the Labour Force Survey (LFS).¹⁸⁵

The number of National Insurance Number (NINO) allocations to A8 citizens in the first quarter of 2012 was 35,540. This represents a significant decrease from the peak in the first quarter of 2007 (111,440). The number of NINO allocations to A2 (Romanian and Bulgarian) citizens in the first quarter of 2012 was 6,190.¹⁸⁶

The income gap between the A8 countries and the UK suggests that there still exists an incentive for migration.¹⁸⁷

Non-European Labour Migration

Non-European labour migration increased from 1991 until the mid-2000s but has decreased since then, according to multiple data sources. IPS estimates of non-EU labour migration increased from 19,000 in 1991 to a peak of 114,000 in 2004 before declining to 52,000 by 2010.¹⁸⁸

Family migration

According to IPS estimates, non-EU family migration to the UK has increased from an average of 35,000 per year in the 1990s to 56,000 in 2010, or 17% of all non-EU immigration that year. These estimates include both dependents and family unification migrants.¹⁸⁹

Family migration, like overall migration to the UK, increased from 1997 to the mid-2000s, peaking at 74,000 in 2004 and 2006. Also similar to other categories of migration, family migration declined later in the 2000s. But initial increases in family migration were smaller in magnitude than similar shifts in migration for work or study. As a result of these trends, family migration comprises a smaller share of overall migration now than it did in the 1990s.¹⁹⁰

Illegal immigration


The consensus among researchers is that the majority of irregular migrants in the UK are likely to be visa overstayers, i.e. migrants who entered the UK legally but overstayed their residence permit, rather than illegal entrants.¹⁹¹

The most recent estimate of the number of irregular migrants and their UK-born children resident in the UK puts the figure between 417,000 to 863,000 (central estimate 618,000) at the end of 2007. The study also estimates that about two thirds (central estimate of 442,000) of irregular migrants lived in London at the end of 2007 and that the number of refused asylum seekers in London in irregular status increased by around 131,000 since 2001.¹⁹²

The estimated number of irregular migrants in the UK is among the highest in the EU, but estimates obviously differ in methodology and quality.¹⁹³

The chart below reflects some of these key shifts in the composition of inward migration over recent years.

Figure 5.1: Composition of immigration to the UK, 1991-2012




5.2 Public attitudes

5.2.1 Perceptions of the make-up of immigrants

In a survey for the Migration Observatory in September 2011, Ipsos MORI asked people what types of groups they had in mind when thinking of immigrants. The most mentioned were people who come here to apply for refugee status (asylum) (62%), despite these being the least common immigrant type. The least mentioned group were people who come here to study (29%), even though student migrants comprised the largest category of migrant to the UK in 2011. The actual proportions and survey responses are compared in Figure 5.2 (with the survey responses rebased to represent the share of mentions, to give a clearer idea of relative focus).¹⁹⁴

Figure 5.2: 'Imagined immigration' vs actual composition of long-term international migration 2011



Of course, being most widely recalled in a question like that does not mean that people necessarily think that asylum-seekers make up the largest proportion of immigrant groups. Research from 2002 does, however, seem to indicate massive overestimation of the scale of asylum applications at that time: an Ipsos MORI poll found the public over-estimated actual numbers by a factor of 10.¹⁹⁵

However, more recent data suggests we are slightly more accurate. In a 2013 survey we asked what proportion of immigrants

people thought were asylum-seekers: the average estimate is that they make up 21% of immigrants, which is three times the actual proportion – but maybe slightly lower than we would expect based on questions such as those above (although a third said they didn't know).¹⁹⁶

5.2.2 Views on particular groups

Comparing views of migrant types

Before looking in detail at the available evidence on attitudes to particular immigrant types, it is useful to review an overall question, which asks whether people would like each of a range of groups reduced, increased or to remain the same.


As Figure 5.3 shows, people are least likely to want to reduce skilled migrants (31%) and students (32%). The majority of people, however, want to see the number of asylum seekers (56%), non-British extended family members (57%) and low skilled workers reduced (64%).¹⁹⁷

It is notable that calls for reduction are lower in each of these individual categories than they are when we just ask about reducing “immigration” as a whole (when 77% say they want it reduced), with some very significantly lower. However, when

we re-analyse the data looking across responses, 79% would like to see at least one of the groups reduced, which is very similar to that overall figure.

Figure 5.3: Attitudes towards level of immigration by different categories of migrants

Please tell us if you think each of these groups of immigrants should be increased, kept the same, or reduced.




Asylum-seekers and refugees

Our views on asylum-seekers do not at first glance appear to be entirely consistent. Tracking polling by Ipsos MORI from 2006 to 2009, plus a single update survey conducted in 2011 presents a very steady picture of our attitudes: around seven in ten in each survey say that we should accept fewer asylum-seekers – but a similar proportion say we must protect genuine asylum-seekers who need refuge in Britain¹⁹⁸, as shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4: Attitudes towards asylum seekers

To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with each statement...?





Different studies show significant support for Britain stopping offering asylum altogether: a 2012 poll for the Red Cross showed 43% agreed with this, although 46% disagreed.¹⁹⁹ But on the other hand, Ipsos MORI's polling for UKBA also found that people at risk of torture or persecution by their own governments were always the most mentioned group when people were asked which migrant groups should be given priority to come to Britain.²⁰⁰

Clearly part of the explanation for these contrasts will be the suspicion among many that not all asylum seekers are genuine. There is relatively little recent data on this, but a 2003 poll by YouGov found that two-thirds of people felt a small minority (25% or fewer) of asylum seekers were genuinely fleeing persecution in their own countries.²⁰¹ Of course, this poll was conducted at a time just after the number of asylum seekers coming to Britain comprised close to 50% of inward migration – but it is likely that suspicions remain.

Figure 5.5: Assessments of size of asylum applications

Below are a number of statements about how Britain and our public services have changed over the last few years. For each one I would like you to tell me whether you think it is true or false:

Asylum applications are higher now than 5 years ago



Another contributing factor is likely to be our overestimations of the scale of asylum that we outlined earlier. And we still believe it is increasing: in a 2013 poll 63% of us believed that asylum applications were higher than five years ago, when this was not the case.²⁰² Even more markedly, 80% thought applications were higher in 2005 than five years before, even though they had seen a dramatic fall (as shown in Figure 5.5). Of course, there will be many reasons for this misperception: our shaky understanding of asylum, as well as the difficulties we have distinguishing between stocks and flows in these types of

questions, and just that it takes us a while to notice changes. However, the point remains that we are more likely to believe asylum is increasing, regardless of the trends.

A further explanation of this apparent contradiction is likely to be to do with our lack of faith in the system: we may support the principle of asylum, but want the practice reduced or stopped because we do not believe we can administer it effectively. We cover views of confidence in government in a later chapter, but there is evidence for this in relation to the asylum system: for example, the 2012 poll commissioned by the Red Cross showed that only 15 per cent of people think the UK asylum system is efficient and fair.²⁰³

Student migrants

People who come to Britain to study are not often top of mind as immigrants, as shown by the poll for the Migration Observatory in which only 29% mentioned this group, despite it now being the single biggest migrant category.²⁰⁴

The same poll showed attitudes towards student migrants are more positive than attitudes to immigrants overall. Half of the public think foreign students have a positive effect on Britain, 15% think negative.²⁰⁵ In contrast, as we have seen, only around a third think immigration as a whole has been good for the economy.

The public do not appear to discriminate between people coming to study at University, at English language schools or in other courses of study, when they are asked whether they wish to reduce or increase each of these groups. As shown in Figure 5.3 at the start of this section, the average for increase/remain the same is 56% and reduce is 32% - but the disaggregated percentages for the individual groups were not statistically different from one another, as shown in the table below.²⁰⁶

Q. For each of the following groups, please tell us whether the number of people coming to Britain should be increased, reduced or kept the same.

	Increased a lot	Increased a little	Kept the same	Reduced a little	Reduced a lot
University students	5%	10%	42%	16%	15%
Students coming here to learn English in language schools	5%	11%	40%	14%	19%
Students in other courses of study (further education)	4%	10%	42%	15%	17%

Source: Ipsos MORI/Migration Observatory (September 2011)

This is perhaps slightly counter-intuitive, as we may expect greater objection or suspicion of English language courses compared with Universities for example, given the publicity from the government's clampdown on language and other FE colleges deemed to be providing a loophole for people with no intention of studying to get into the UK.²⁰⁷

Given that there is relatively little call for a reduction in foreign student numbers, we may expect widespread support for excluding students from the net migration target. But, in fact, opinion is split: 40% do say foreign student numbers should not be included in immigration figures – but 53% think they should be, according to a poll in December 2012.²⁰⁸ This is likely to reflect our focus on the need for greater control of any aspects of immigration, even those we are relatively less concerned about.


Labour migration

Our attitudes to the labour market impact of immigrants and views of particular labour migrants are covered in Chapter 2.

Nationality and ethnicity

The British public also feels differently about immigrants depending on their country of origin or ethnicity. At a simple overview level, findings from the European Social Survey show that consistently from 2002 to 2012, the British public appears less open to immigrants of a different race/ethnic group from the British majority compared with immigrants of the same race/ethnic group.

Figure 5.6: Attitudes towards migrants from the same, different ethnic background as majority and towards migrants from poorer countries



The differences are not huge, but further questions that focus on more particular ethnic and national groups show a much wider range. For example, detailed research into this has been done by Robert Ford of Manchester University. Using pooled data from six British Social Attitudes surveys between 1983 and 1996 he showed clear evidence of an 'ethnic hierarchy' in public preferences. All non-white immigrant groups were opposed more than white groups, immigrants from Australia and New Zealand being the least opposed of all migrant groups and Eastern Europeans being the most opposed of all white groups. The public also distinguished between non-white groups, with immigrants from Hong Kong the least opposed, followed by those from Africa and the West Indies; immigrants from South Asia were the most opposed.


Ford also found generational change in attitudes to immigrants with lower discrimination between groups among the young and larger differences in attitudes between cohorts for immigrants from less supported origin countries. The major driver of these generational differences was found to be the greater presence or absence of authoritarian and ethnocentric values within the cohorts; the more liberal and less ethnocentric values of young Britons were strongly reflected in their views about immigration.²⁰⁹

Figure 5.7 shows a similar pattern based on our own analysis of more recent ESS data. All generations are more opposed to immigrants of a different race/ethnic group than they

are to immigrants of the same race/ethnic group. However, the spread in views from oldest to youngest cohorts is much greater for the question on those of different ethnic groups, and this is driven by the more markedly negative views of the oldest cohort (those born before 1945).

Figure 5.7: Attitudes towards migrants from the same, different ethnic background as majority by generation


To what extent do you think [country] should...?



A more recent question than that used for Ford's analysis, from Ipsos MORI's immigration tracker for the UKBA conducted in 2007, shows a similar pattern - but asks about slightly more detailed categories and reflects slightly more recent shifts in views (see Figure 5.8). This suggests two additional points. Firstly, by 2007 we did not automatically favour ethnically white countries over non-white, with Eastern European countries in particular breaking that pattern, and the A2 countries singled out (even in 2007).²¹⁰

Figure 5.8: Attitudes towards migrants from different countries/regions of origin

Which of these groups of people do you think should be given priority to come and work in Britain?
And which of these groups, if any, do you think should not be allowed to come and work in Britain at all?



And secondly, Ford's analysis treated South Asia as one region, whilst the items asked about in the Ipsos MORI survey split out Commonwealth Indian sub-continent countries from Asian countries. The Ipsos MORI survey shows a more positive view of immigration from the Commonwealth Indian sub-continent than from other Asian countries. The same is true of Commonwealth African countries and other African countries, with immigrants from the former being opposed less than immigrants from the latter. This may result from the existing historical migration flows and the legacy of Britain's imperial connections.

Preference for certain nationalities over others also seems to be linked to our perception of their contribution, as has been recently shown in polling by YouGov for Prospect.²¹¹ Respondents were shown a list of countries and asked whether immigrants from each of them make a positive or negative contribution to life in Britain today. As shown in Figure 5.9, our perceptions of contribution by different groups tend to reflect our perceptions of preference and priority.


Illegal immigration

Perceptions of the scale and implications of illegal immigration seem likely to be an important factor driving overall attitudes to immigration.

If the most recent central estimate of the number of illegal immigrants is added to the total of measured immigration, illegal immigrants would make up around 7% of the total immigrant population. We do not know of a recent question that asks people for their estimate of the size of the illegal immigrant population of

Figure 5.9: Attitudes towards the contribution to British life of immigrants from different parts of the world

Overall, do you think immigrants from each of the following parts of the world make a positive or negative contribution to life in Britain today?



the UK, but other findings suggest estimates are likely to be considerably higher than this. For example, according to the UK Transatlantic Trends Survey, 2011, a third of the public (34%) think "most" immigrants are here illegally and this proportion has remained more or less the same since 2008.²¹²

And, as we have seen, in a recent Ipsos MORI survey people who grossly overestimated the size of the foreign born population of the UK (estimating 26% or more, around twice the official estimate) were asked why they thought it was higher than the official statistic. The most mentioned reason was because illegal immigration/people coming into the country illegally are not counted.²¹³

It is more difficult to reliably unpick how much of this focus on illegal immigration colours overall views of immigration. There is certainly some evidence that it may be an important factor. For example, when asked to rate their concern about the two separately in the Transatlantic Trends Survey 2013, 80% said they were worried about illegal immigration, compared with only 41% who said they were worried about legal immigration. As Figure 5.10 shows, these measures have been relatively consistent since 2008 – and clearly the level of concern about illegal immigration is much closer to the concern we have seen for immigration as a whole (where, for example, around two-thirds consider immigration as a whole as a “problem”).²¹⁴


And similarly, an Ipsos MORI survey for the Migration Observatory in 2011 showed that the majority of people said they would like to see immigration reduced among “only illegal immigrants” (28%) or “mostly illegal immigrants” (26%), while a third would prefer immigration reduced equally among legal and illegal immigrants (35%).²¹⁵ Of course, we need to be cautious in

concluding that only a minority therefore are concerned about legal immigration or would like to see it reduced: it mainly illustrates that dealing with illegal immigration is a higher priority for many.

More recently, these concerns about illegal immigration have led to support from most people (79%) for the ‘go home, or face arrest’ adverts on the side of vans that were driven round London.²¹⁶

Just 17%, however, thought the scheme would be effective in persuading illegal immigrants to leave the UK (the government came to a similar conclusion and stopped the initiative), but most agree (60%) it shows the government is serious about dealing with the problem.

Figure 5.10: Concern about legal and illegal immigration



5.3 Discussion

Our “imagined immigration” is very wrong...

As we have noted throughout this review, survey questions typically do not define the term “immigrants”, leaving each respondent to answer on the basis of their own unstated conception of who immigrants are.²¹⁷ And we have also seen throughout this review that these perceptions are often badly wrong – and systematically biased towards immigrant

types of greater concern: we underestimate groups we are least worried about (such as students) and overestimate groups we are more worried about (such as asylum seekers).

Immigrants' labour market position, skill level, likelihood of drawing on state resources, their country of origin, their ethnicity and legality all affect how we view them – and on each of these, we're likely to have a very mistaken idea of the make-up of the immigrant population.

But would a more accurate view change attitudes?

This, therefore, raises concerns about how “real” our views are, compared with if we had an accurate picture of immigrants. And there is some evidence of a direct impact between misperceptions and concern: for example, Scott Blinder has shown that associating immigrants with asylum seekers and permanent immigrants is related to greater levels of support for reducing overall immigration levels.²¹⁸

This raises two key questions: can our mental image of immigration be shifted – and if it could, would it change our overall concern about immigration? There appears to be relatively little chance of each, at least in the short term, for a number of reasons.

First, our trust in immigration statistics is very low, and in some respects this is for good reason, given the limitations to many of the measures we have. It is no surprise then that where the facts we're presented with don't fit our frame or expectations, the facts are rejected, not the frame. Second, we seem to have long memories and slow-moving perceptions of changes in immigration: the shock of the significant increase in overall immigration and asylum applicants in particular in the mid-2000s is still working its way through. This is not unusual in public policy and services, and as with many of the misperceptions we have identified over the years, we need to be realistic about the cognitive space the general public gives to these issues²¹⁹: we have little time or inclination to become fully informed of the latest position. Social psychologists would relate this to our “availability heuristic” – we take shortcuts when coming to views that draw on easily recalled information, even where this is imperfect.

But even if we could convince people to trust a picture of immigration that doesn't fit with their mental image, it is questionable whether it would greatly shift views. As outlined earlier, part of the reason for our misperception is that we focus on the groups that concern us most: it is an emotional reaction rather than an accuracy problem. Related to this, our apparent focus on illegal immigration should not lead us to conclude that people are not concerned about legal immigration: there will be a contrast effect in these questions, and people will be providing an indication of their relative priorities rather than absolute views.

What should we do?

However, as also outlined earlier there is a significant danger in accepting that our inaccurate picture of immigration is fine because it reflects our concerns and emotional reactions: this is just as partial as the view that if we just inform people fully they will come to a more “rational” view of immigration. However, this presents a conundrum for political leaders interested in a more informed debate: attempting to correct these misperceptions immediately encourages distrust in the messenger, and means further points are more difficult to get across.

This is an incredibly difficult challenge to meet – but the attitudinal data on more specific groups does at least point to more practical implications. For example, it seems clear that a key focus needs to be on dealing with groups of most concern, particularly illegal immigrants and control of the asylum system. The paradox in our views of asylum seekers (where we support the principle, but want it reduced in practice) seems likely to be a great deal to do with our doubts in the system (although the fiscal impacts may also be in peoples' minds). Only in the context of a belief that these are more under control will messages about other aspects of the immigration debate be heard. But of course this may also reinforce our misperceptions, focusing attention on relatively small and negatively viewed aspects of immigration, which will continue to colour wider views.



Local-national perception gaps and the media

This section picks up on the gaps between local and national concerns about immigration, and considers some of the reasons for these. We also examine the role of the media in this, and more generally in forming views on immigration. Objective information on the latter is again difficult to come by, although there have been a number of content analysis studies of media coverage of immigration.

6.1 The context

Media coverage of immigration

According to the Migration Observatory's content analysis of British print media between 2010 and 2012, the most common descriptor of the word "immigrants" across all newspaper types is "illegal", which was used in 10% of mid-market stories, 6.6% of tabloid stories and 5% of broadsheet stories.²²⁰

The "EU" and "Eastern Europe" are used as the primary geographic reference points for discussions about immigrants and migrants, especially in tabloid coverage.²²¹

Refugees and asylum seekers are described using different sets of terms. Asylum seekers, but not refugees, are described as "failed", more than any other descriptor, and about three times more frequently in mid-market newspapers than tabloids or broadsheets (although the scale of this is relatively low: out of 1000 analysed items "failed" was used as a descriptor in 21 cases in mid-market newspapers, and in 7 cases for both tabloids and broadsheets). Asylum seekers, but not refugees, are associated with "immigrants" in all three publications types, and with "illegal" in the mid-market papers and "destitute" and "vulnerable" in the broadsheets. The discourse around the word "refugees" is much more international in nature and more specifically associated with international crises. The word "refugees" is often used in phrases with "camp", "the UN" and "war".²²²

Comparing against research by Baker et al. (2008), The Migration Observatory suggests British press coverage since the late 1990s and early 2000s has developed more distinct vocabularies to describe immigrants and migrants compared with asylum seekers and refugees, though this is truer for refugees than asylum seekers.²²³

Content analysis by the BBC Trust reported in July 2013, showed a slight increase in the breadth of opinion reflected in BBC output on immigration between 2007 and 2012. The report also notes, however, a slowness in the past by the BBC to accommodate opinion

on immigration which politicians were uncomfortable in voicing, and challenges the BBC to pay more attention to others capable of giving expression to important aspects of the public mood.²²⁴

This content analysis shows senior politicians are most cited as sources on immigration, above non-politicians and less senior MPs. Audience research associated with the Trust review showed there was a strong feeling that politicians were given too great a voice on the BBC. The report concludes the reluctance of politicians to broach questions about immigration in the past meant the BBC had not provided these views to the public, that there is no persuasive evidence of significant segments of opinion not being given appropriate weight, but that it is still too driven by a Westminster perspective.²²⁵


6.2 Public attitudes

6.2.1 Personal, local and national concerns

There is a clear perception gap between the importance of immigration as a national issue and the importance of immigration to individuals personally. This can be seen in Figure 6.1 from Eurobarometer, which plots both questions in the UK and the EU27 as a whole.²²⁶ This shows that the UK is much more concerned in both these questions than Europe as a whole; our personal concern is much lower than our national

Figure 6.1: Immigration as an important issue at a national and personal level, among Britons compared with other people in Europe

What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment?




concern, but still generally much higher for people from other European countries. In fact, in the latest survey we're as likely to be personally concerned about immigration as respondents from other European countries are for their country as a whole. But the gap between our level of national concern and personal concern is also greater than we see in European countries - in absolute terms, and, for most of the surveys,

in proportional terms too. That is, we generally seem to have a bigger perception gap between our national and personal concern than other countries.

Of course, it should not be particularly surprising that our national and personal concerns differ: our mindset when answering these questions are very different. As shown in Figure 6.2, also from Eurobarometer, there is generally very little relationship between the two questions across a range of top issues. More than that, only one of the concerns listed is selected by more than 20% as a personal concern. As much as anything this probably illustrates that we should not attempt to use the same list to measure both levels of issue: personal concerns will be much more to do with personal relationships, family, money worries and national concerns will translate in different ways (for example, we are likely to see higher levels of response if we ask about job security rather than unemployment at a personal level).

Figure 6.2: Issues of importance at a national and personal level, UK only




Comparisons between local and national concerns are rather more meaningful – and so the gap between concern about immigration at these two levels is more interesting. Again, these types of gaps exist in other policy areas, such as crime and health services – but they are particularly striking with immigration.

For example, Figure 6.3 shows responses to a tracker survey Ipsos MORI conducted for the UKBA between 2006 and 2009 and then an additional poll conducted by Ipsos MORI in February 2011 which replicated the same questions – and it illustrates the consistent c50 percentage point gap between national and local concerns.²²⁷ As a comparison, with crime measures (the policy area that tends to show the next biggest gap), we typically find a local-national gap of around 30-35 percentage points.²²⁸

On the one hand, we shouldn't expect equivalence as they are measuring different things – but the scale of the gap is still striking, and the interaction between the two measures is still useful to understand.

Figure 6.3: Immigration as a problem in Britain and the local area


Overall how much of a problem, if at all, do you think immigration is in Britain at the moment? And how much of a problem, if at all, do you think immigration is in your local area at the moment?



immigration a problem nationally but not locally (as we would expect from Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.4: Immigration a problem/not a problem in Britain and the local area

Overall how much of a problem, if at all, do you think immigration is in Britain at the moment? And how much of a problem, if at all, do you think immigration is in your local area at the moment?



and those who don't think immigration is a problem at either level.

However, on the attitudinal questions this nationally concerned/locally unconcerned group is much closer to those who think immigration is a problem both nationally and locally, as we might expect: it is seeing immigration as a national issue that mostly drives views of whether it is good for Britain or there are too many immigrants, although seeing it as local issue as well clearly adds to negative views.

We have therefore reanalysed Ipsos MORI's February 2011 survey, to identify four groups: those who regard immigration as a problem nationally but not locally; those who regard immigration a problem locally and nationally; those who see immigration as a problem locally but not nationally; and those who consider immigration not to be a problem either nationally or locally.

As can be seen from Figure 6.4, the majority of people consider

The table below outlines some of the key attitudinal and demographic differences between the three main groupings. Given the relatively small sample size in this study, we need to be careful with interpretation, but in general terms, it is clear the profile of the group who are concerned nationally but not locally tends to be somewhere between those who think immigration is a problem both nationally and locally

A similar picture is repeated with demographic and behavioural measures, although there are a couple of notable exceptions. First, the “nationally concerned/locally unconcerned” are less likely to be young and more likely to be old than the other two groups, and related to that they are more likely to be retired. And second, they are more likely to be readers of mid-market newspapers (16%) and less likely to read no newspapers at all than the other groups.

	Immigration a problem nationally but not locally (base: 483)	Immigration a problem nationally and locally (base: 248)	Immigration not a problem nationally or locally (base 206)
	%	%	%
'Immigration is generally good for Britain'			
Agree	35	23	70
Disagree	38	56	3
'There are too many immigrants in Britain'			
Agree	74	93	14
Disagree	10	2	60
Age			
15-34	25	32	40
35-54	33	37	35
55-64	16	15	15
65+	26	16	11
Gender			
Male	46	45	57
Female	54	55	43
Work status			
Employed full-time or self employed	44	48	51
Employed part-time	12	11	18
Retired	30	21	16
Studying	6	6	9
Unemployed and seeking work	4	7	4
Social grade			
AB	30	14	38
C1	28	26	35
C2	20	29	12
DE	22	31	15
Newspaper readership			
Broadsheet	17	8	30
Mid-market	16	9	6
Tabloids	21	27	9
None of these	49	56	59

	Immigration a problem nationally but not locally (base: 483)	Immigration a problem nationally and locally (base: 248)	Immigration not a problem nationally or locally (base 206)
	%	%	%
Ethnicity			
White	93	95	86
Non-White	7	6	14
Qualifications			
GCSE or equivalent	21	32	15
Vocational qualifications	9	16	6
A-level or equivalent	15	16	11
Degree or above	28	10	51
No qualifications	17	19	9

6.2.2 Impact of the media

The impact of the media on attitudes to contentious issues like immigration (and others like welfare) has been much discussed, but it is notoriously difficult to identify convincing evidence of a causal relationship between media coverage and opinion.

In theory, the most direct source of evidence is what people themselves say is important to forming their views. For example, a 2011 survey by Ipsos MORI asked people which two sources they use to access information about immigration and asylum. Figure 6.5 shows the findings, with news programmes on TV and radio the most mentioned (55%), followed by TV documentaries and national newspapers. Personal experience comes after these media sources.²²⁹

Figure 6.5: Reported sources of information about immigration and asylum in Britain

People get their information about immigration and asylum in Britain from many sources. From this list, which two sources would you say provides you personally with most of your information about immigration and asylum in Britain?



However, the phrasing of this as “information” is likely to influence responses, and may downplay personal experience that would inform more general attitudes. For example, a different take on this is provided by our recent survey for the Royal Statistical Society shown in Chapter 1, which followed up those who overestimated the extent of immigration to understand what they were basing this on.²³⁰ Here the responses reflect much less emphasis on media outlets, which come after personal experience: people are more likely to report either what they see in their local areas, or when they visit other towns and cities, than media sources as the reason they think immigration is higher than it actually is.


Of course, in any case there are significant problems with these types of questions that ask people what their views are based on: we often don’t know, or find it hard to articulate, particularly in structured surveys.

It is therefore useful to attempt more analytical approaches - that is, looking at what factors are most associated with particular views, and where media consumption fits within this. The table in the previous section of this chapter is a very simple example of this – and does seem to show some association between thinking immigration is a problem nationally but not locally and readership of mid-market newspapers. The effect is not particularly large (ie it will not explain a great deal of the variation in views, given the relatively small proportion of this group who are mid-market newspaper readers), but other analysis shows a similar pattern.

For example, a simple cross-tabulation using Citizenship Survey 2010-11 data shows attitudes towards reducing/increasing immigration vary significantly by newspaper readership, with readers of the Guardian, Financial Times and the Independent less in favour of reducing immigration, Times readers slightly more in favour, with mid-market and tabloid readers overwhelmingly in favour of reduction. The Daily Telegraph stands out as the only broadsheet whose readers are significantly in favour of reduction.

Figure 6.6: Attitudes to the level of immigration by newspaper readership


Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?



A similar pattern of concern by newspaper readership is also in evidence when we examine mentions of immigration in Ipsos MORI's Issues Index over time (as shown in Figure 6.7), drawing on our dataset of over half a million records (which allows more detailed and reliable analysis than other available sources). Readers of the Daily Mail and the Daily Express are the most likely to be concerned about immigration, and have been so for some time. Readers of The Daily Star were amongst the most concerned in the middle to late part of the 2000s, but their relative level of concern has fallen since 2010. Readers of the Guardian are the least concerned: they had tracked closely with readers of the Independent, but now stand apart – and nearly as far below the level of concern among non-readers of newspapers as Mail readers are above.

It is also worth noting that Mail and Express readers did not have significantly higher levels of concern about immigration back in 1996, when the data series shown here begins: there does not seem to be something innate in readers of these papers to view immigration as a top issue regardless of conditions.

Figure 6.7: Differences by newspaper readership in importance of immigration over time




This is important in reminding us about the wide differences in our individual perspective – and this is also illustrated by polling by the Red Cross in 2012 that looked at attitudes to coverage of refugees and asylum seekers. In this study, for example, 70% of Guardian readers think newspaper reporting is inaccurate – which was in stark contrast with tabloid and middle-market readers who were generally much more likely to say the coverage was accurate (74% of Daily Star reader and 47% of Express readers). Similarly, broadsheet readers were likely to respond that press treatment of refugees and asylum seekers was unfair, with tabloid and middle market readers suggesting the opposite.²³¹ Of course, this may be less a reflection of perceptions of trustworthiness of the media on this issue than whether we believe media output reflects our views.

But, of course, the patterns in Figure 6.7 may also partially reflect differences in the make-up of readers of these newspapers, and it is therefore more meaningful to look at variations after controlling for other characteristics. Ipsos MORI attempted to do this in a study from 2005 that used regression analysis to isolate the influence of newspaper readership on public attitudes toward the top five most important issues of the time (terrorism, the NHS, immigration, education and crime), using an aggregated dataset of around 10,000 interviews.²³²

One key point stands out from this: newspaper readership is much more likely to be significantly related to concern about immigration, after controlling for other demographic differences, than any other issue measured. Indeed, as Figure 6.8 shows, the four most important predictors in terms of proportion of variance explained were all whether people read particular newspapers – the Daily Mail, Daily Express and Sun readers were all more likely to raise immigration as an issue (after controlling for demographic differences), while Guardian readers were less likely. In contrast, newspaper readership appeared rarely as an explanatory variable for all of the other issues, and never as the most important variable.

Figure 6.8: Variables related to mentions of race relations/immigration in Issues Index



However, there remain problems with this analysis. Firstly, even in showing that there is an important independent association here, the model is relatively weak: we can explain little of the difference in opinions using these factors alone (only around 7%).

And secondly, of course, these types of models cannot identify causation: people can select newspapers (and other media outlets) that confirm their already held views. The analysis did show some indication of a longitudinal effect, which helps build the case – where concern among readers of certain titles increased alongside coverage increases (in March/April 2004 on discussion of EU expansion) while those who read no newspapers did not shift in their views - but the effects were again relatively weak or inconsistent.

There is one further point that is worth outlining in the context of media influence on opinions – that of trust. A number of studies show our low levels of trust in many media outlets: for example, journalists always come near the bottom of our long-running question series on trust in professions, with typically only around 20% saying they trust them to tell the truth; there is variation between different types of media, with broadsheet journalists more trusted than

tabloid, and newsreaders more trusted still; but overall, international comparisons show we have a very low level of trust in the media as a whole.²³³


However, it is important to recognise that there is a distinction between trust and influence on opinion, and this is acknowledged by the public themselves. This is seen in findings from a different policy area, but is likely to apply equally in immigration: when we asked people who they trusted most as a source of information on the exam system, the media came out at the bottom of the list, below teachers, exam bodies and even government departments. But in the same survey people also said the media were the biggest influence on their views; the impact of media coverage is not just driven by trust but also weight of exposure.²³⁴

Studies in other countries also struggle to identify definitive proof of a media effect - although some show interesting patterns. For example, Abrajano and Singh, analysing the views of the Spanish-speaking population in the US, show that Latinos who use Spanish news sources are more likely to be aware of recent immigration initiatives and hold more favourable opinions towards illegal immigrants than those Latinos who use English news sources. Content analysis shows that Spanish-language news organizations cover immigration in a more positive manner when compared with English-language news coverage of immigration.²³⁵ Unpicking cause and effect here, however, is obviously difficult.

A similar pattern is also seen in analysis of the five waves of ESS between 2002 and 2010 by Hericourt and Spielvogel. Their research suggests media exposure is a key determinant of beliefs about immigration: individuals who spend more time informing themselves on social and political matters through newspapers and radio have a better opinion on the economic impact of immigration relative to individuals which devote time to other types of contents.²³⁶ Again, however, it is not possible to identify a straightforward causal relationship from this.

But while it is difficult to find proof of media impact, it is very easy to find examples of misuse of immigration information in newspapers, as the box below illustrates.

Misuse of statistics



**IMMIGRATION
SOARS
20% IN
A YEAR**

On 26th August 2011 the Daily Express headline read "Immigration soars 20% in a year" (see image left). Other papers ran similar headlines. However, the organisation Full Fact shows this headline was based on quarterly migration statistics released by the ONS showing a 21% rise in net long-term migration for the year ending December 2010 compared to the year ending December 2009. Immigration was relatively stable over this period (rising 4%), with a fall in emigration accounting for the rise in net migration. Readers will take the Daily Express's headline to mean there were 20% more people entering the UK in 2010 than in 2009, which was not the case.

6.3 Discussion

Local/national perception gaps do not devalue concerns

The evidence of a clear and unusually large perception gap between local and national concerns about immigration could be seen as compelling evidence that views are formed at least partially by secondary information, of which media coverage is likely to be key.

This does, at first, seem to be a reasonable conclusion – but it is not the only explanation. In particular, it is not the case that national concerns should reflect a simple aggregation of local concerns: that may seem logical – that if you have a representative range of local areas covered in a national survey that local views should add up to be the same as national views.

But there are a number of ways in which this breaks down. Firstly, you may not have any local concern, but think there are problems somewhere in the country and so see that as a national problem. You may also be basing your opinion on your own personal experience of visiting other areas: we know from detailed questionnaire testing that people often have a very local frame of reference when asked about their “local area” (the few streets around them), and so they may still have personal experience of the impact of immigration that concerns them, in their local town/city or other places they visit regularly. There are also further social-psychology explanations as seen in other work on local/national perception gaps: for example, we seem susceptible to “hometown favouritism”, where people are generally likely to think their personal life or area is better than the average (partly as a self-justification for choosing it).²³⁷


Therefore we cannot entirely dismiss national measures as reflecting only an imagined or media-created issue that does not really affect quality of life.

But the media still seems to have an important effect

However, from all the evidence seen here, it still seems highly likely that the media does have some sort of effect on public attitudes. This is not through the media telling people what to think and the public accepting it: there are now several long traditions in the study of media impacts that outline how the media reinforce and interact with public opinion, from McCombs agenda-setting theory²³⁸ to the importance of consonance (the consistency of messages across media sources) and dependency (the extent to which people have other sources of information on the issue, beyond the media).²³⁹

It is impossible to unpick the relative importance and relevance of these different theories with the data we have here: however, it seems clear that there is likely to be a reinforcing interaction between the public, politicians and the media, with cause and effect running in all directions.

However, it is much clearer that some media coverage unreasonably exaggerates and scare-mongers - and there is enough evidence to suggest that the media have an independent effect on views of immigration that the accuracy and balance of their coverage needs more careful scrutiny.



Of course the challenge here is that this effect is generally not from the inaccurate reporting of data – and therefore the impact of bodies like the UK Statistics Authority and FullFact, while important, will be limited. Even the content analysis of the descriptors used in media coverage is not hugely compelling. Instead, the real driver of views is the vivid anecdote, which may be based on vanishingly small (but correct) instances. We know that these stick with people, but they are very difficult to monitor and control.

Our increasingly diverse use of media sources through online outlets will complicate the picture of media impacts (although note that the online editions of conventional media are still hugely important in setting the agenda for social media²⁴⁰). And as the analysis here shows, newspaper readership is still the greatest differentiator of our views on immigration, and is perhaps the most important benefit of analysing attitudes in this way: it reminds us of the huge diversity of views and how far our own perceptions may be from others’.



Politics,
government
and
competence

Chapter Seven

As the previous chapters suggest, as well as the media, political discourse is likely to be crucial to understanding perceptions of immigration – and conversely, our views of political parties' positions on immigration are a key aspect of how we judge them overall. Our perceptions of the competence of politicians and government more generally have also been flagged as vital issues in informing views, so we also look at that in more detail here. Contextual information is again limited, but it is useful to try to outline key features of the institutional and political context.

7.1 The context

Institutional context

The UK Border Agency, until March 2013, had been responsible for the operational management and regulation of immigration to the UK. This had involved responsibility for (i) immigration and settlement, managing all “in-country” operational areas such as casework functions and enforcement, (ii) managing work outside the UK such as issuing visas overseas, and (iii) enforcement and crime such as undertaking criminal cases and managing the processes of detention and removal.

UKBA was embroiled in a number of controversies during its existence. In November 2011, the Home Affairs Select Committee issued a report that found that 124,000 deportation cases had been shelved by the UKBA and put in a “controlled archive”.²⁴¹ The report claims the term “controlled archive” was used to try to hide the fact it was a list of lost applicants. In the same month, the Home Office suspended senior figures at UKBA and Heathrow airport for allegedly telling staff to relax identity checks on non-EU nationals.²⁴²

A Home Affairs Select Committee Report in October 2012 showed UKBA's backlog in quarter two of 2012 was 302,064.²⁴³ In January 2013, immigration inspectors uncovered an additional UKBA backlog totaling more than 16,000 cases.²⁴⁴

In March 2013, it was announced UKBA would be abolished and its work returned to the Home Office, split between an organization focusing on the visa system and another focusing on immigration law enforcement.²⁴⁵

Positions of parties

The Coalition government has pledged to reduce immigration to the “tens of thousands” by the end of the current parliament, in May 2015. Non-EU labour immigration has been restricted to

entrepreneurs, investors and people of exceptional talent and a threshold on minimum pay has been introduced for those who wish to stay in the UK permanently. Efforts have been made to reduce student entry to the UK, and entry for family reunification. The government also announced earlier this year that it will look to bring in laws so short-term migrants pay for NHS care, and landlords are required to check the immigration status of tenants.

During Labour's previous term in office Ed Miliband claims Labour became "too disconnected from the concerns of working people" on immigration, despite instituting the points-based system in 2005 to try to create a more rule-bound regime for managing economic migration. In its policy announcements since the last election, Labour has focused its emphasis on addressing the negative impacts of immigration, rather than on the issue of numbers. In particular, Labour has emphasised improving regulation of the labour market and enforcement of the minimum wage, and on ensuring British employers invest in training and up-skilling people in their local area, rather than relying on cheap labour from overseas.

The Liberal Democrats have historically taken a liberal position on immigration policy, but Nick Clegg is of the view that this has held back support for his party. As such, while the Coalition government's efforts to bring down immigration have been led for the most part by the Conservatives, they have been supported by the Liberal Democrats. In March 2013 Mr Clegg announced plans to introduce a bond payment for immigrants that they get back when they leave the country. The Liberal Democrats are also proposing to introduce exit checks (also supported by other parties) and a regional points-based system for immigrants if elected in 2015, as well as to give attention to deportation and border enforcement.

The UK Independence Party (UKIP) has seen recent successes in local and by-elections, and their position on immigration appears to be key to this. With regards to limiting immigration, UKIP has pledged to introduce a five year freeze on immigration for permanent settlement and to strictly regulate any immigration thereafter, restricting access to benefits and social housing for immigrants until they have paid taxes for five years. These policies are not viable without the UK withdrawing from the EU, which UKIP is committed to.

7.2 Public attitudes


7.2.1 Rating of government, border control and role of EU

All the measures of people's satisfaction with government's handling of immigration that we have managed to identify are negative, often considerably so, and apply to the years under Labour as well as the years of Coalition government.

Figure 7.1: Attitudes towards government's handling of immigration

Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way the government is dealing with immigration and asylum? *(used for 2006-2009 data points)*

Thinking about the steps that have been taken to manage immigration, would you say that the government has been doing a very good job, a good job, a poor job, or a very poor job? *(used for 2010-2013 data points)*




The Ipsos MORI tracker for UKBA from 2006 to 2009 showed around two-thirds of the public consistently felt dissatisfied with the way the government was dealing with immigration and asylum²⁴⁶, while data from Transatlantic Trends for 2010, 2011 and 2013 reflects a very similar pattern²⁴⁷, as Figure 7.1 shows.

Britons are among the most likely to rate their government's performance poorly, according to the 2013 Transatlantic Trends Survey, shown in Figure 7.2; only residents of Italy and Spain were more critical.²⁴⁸

Figure 7.2: Attitudes towards government's handling of immigration, among Britons compared with other people in Europe

Thinking about the steps that have been taken to manage immigration, would you say that the government has been doing a very good job, a good job, a poor job, or a very poor job?



This poor rating of performance is likely to be related to negative views of both recent policy and its implementation. For example, YouGov polls in August 2004, April 2004 and April 2009 showed around 80% think the government's policies on immigration and asylum were not tough enough.²⁴⁹ Ipsos MORI's immigration tracker for UKBA consistently showed a similar percentage thinking laws on immigration should be tougher between 2006 and 2009.²⁵⁰

And strongly negative views of implementation also stretch back for

at least a decade. For example, in August 2003, 84% disagreed that the government's policies to keep immigration under control were working²⁵¹, and in April 2004 78% disagreed that the government's policies to keep immigration under control are working reasonably well.²⁵² In June 2006, 81% disagreed that the government was in control of asylum and immigration.²⁵³ Unfortunately, there do not appear to be any comparable questions asked during the present Coalition government, but it seems unlikely that this

will have improved significantly, given other findings: for example, a poll from January 2012 showed that three-quarters think Britain is currently protecting its borders badly against people entering the country illegally.²⁵⁴

Our focus on border control and enforcement seems particularly strong compared with other countries. Britons are the most likely to highlight border controls as the best means of controlling illegal immigration, to a greater degree than other European countries. According to the 2011 Transatlantic Trends Survey, 44% of Britons believe reinforcing border controls would be most effective at reducing illegal immigration, from a range of policy options, as Figure 7.3 shows. This compares with 20% of people in France, Italy and Spain, and 15% of people in Germany.²⁵⁵

This may be related to our perspective as an island nation: we perhaps feel we should be more capable than other European countries of enforcing border controls effectively. Given this, and our more generally negative perspective on the European Union than any other European country,²⁵⁶ it is no surprise that we are significantly more likely than people in other European countries to favour national, as opposed to European, control over immigrant numbers, as shown in Figure 7.4.²⁵⁷

The same result was found in a YouGov survey of six European countries in March 2012. Eight in ten (79%) Britons thought immigration should be controlled by national governments, a higher proportion than any other country included in the study (as Figure 7.4 shows).²⁵⁸

The British public's belief in the value of borders in controlling immigration can also be seen in polling we conducted in 2011, in the wake of concerns about the movement of North African irregular migrants through Europe caused by the Arab Spring. When asked whether people support or oppose the reintroduction of border controls in the Schengen zone (the

Figure 7.3: Attitudes towards policies designed to reduce illegal immigration, among Britons compared with other people in Europe

Thinking about policies designed to reduce illegal immigration which could be adopted in (COUNTRY) at the national level, which one of the following do you think would be the most effective in reducing illegal immigration?





Figure 7.4: Attitudes towards institution responsible for deciding the number of immigrants allowed into country, among Britons compared with other people in Europe



area of free travel in continental Europe) Britons were the most likely to register support (74%), even though we are not ourselves in the zone; the average across the nine European countries was much lower (56%). Among those who supported the reintroduction of border controls Britons were most likely to cite ‘controlling immigration’ as the reason (58%), again much higher than the average (42%).²⁵⁹

And on the issue of Romanian and Bulgarian migration to the UK, which is an increasing focus of political and media

discussion, eight in ten of the public think border controls should still apply to this group after 2014 (79%), when temporary restrictions on the type of jobs open to people from the two countries are due to expire.²⁶⁰

7.2.2 Targets and limits

Given what we’ve seen above, it is no surprise that there is high and consistent support for government setting strict limits on immigration numbers: around eight in ten of the population agreed that “the government should set a strict limit on the number of immigrants allowed into Britain each year” in each of a number of surveys in the Ipsos MORI/UKBA tracker between 2006-2009²⁶¹, and 77% agreed there must be an annual limit on the number of immigrants in a YouGov survey in 2012, compared with 67% of people in France, 65% in Italy and 56% in Germany.²⁶²


Similarly, across a number of polls from November 2011 onwards we see around 8 in 10 supporting government plans to reduce immigration to the “tens of thousands”.²⁶³ However, this is likely to reflect support for a general significant reduction than a particular attachment to this target: surveys on particular targets present a more muddled picture.

For example, Figure 7.5 shows what people thought when they were asked to set the limit themselves in a survey from 2011. Just under half think there should be replacement, “one in, one out” (30%), or no immigration at all (18%). Thirteen per cent support net immigration above 100,000, while around one in six don’t know (17%).²⁶⁴

The next question in the same survey asked about support or opposition for reducing net immigration specifically to 40,000 in future years (although undefined); seven in ten (69%)

Figure 7.5: Attitudes towards preferred level of net migration

To stop the population rising to 70 million, net immigration needs to be cut from around 240,000 last year to around 40,000 in future years. In your opinion, which of the following is the right level of NET immigration for Britain (i.e. the number of people who enter minus the number of people who leave)?




support this proposal. This is a significantly higher level of acceptability to the public than we would derive from the previous question, given 62% said they wanted a target below 25,000 per year – but this reflects the difficulties people have with the specifics of immigration numbers and targets. It is worth noting that there are also likely to be questionnaire context effects here, as the preamble to the previous question mentions that a limit of 40,000 would stop the population rising above 70 million, something which 76% said they were concerned about in the same survey.

This slightly confused picture on the specific level to set targets is also seen when we look at agreement with the statement “Reduce net immigration with the eventual aim of balanced migration (no more in than out) to reduce the population growth”. Here almost two-thirds agree (63%, in 2011).²⁶⁵ This is, however, more future-looking and makes an explicit link to population growth, both of which may affect responses.

Of course it is no surprise that people are not clear on the precise figures they would like, and there is little point in focusing on this when the preference for significant reductions is clear. Indeed, this is reflected in David Cameron’s rather imprecise pledge to reduce immigration to the “tens of thousands” - and it is therefore unsurprising to see very widespread and consistent support for this (at around 80%), as shown in Figure 7.6.

However, it is just as clear that most are sceptical about the ability of the Coalition to deliver this. In April 2011, 60% said they think the Coalition Government will fail to get immigration down to the “tens of thousands”²⁶⁶, and if anything this view seems to have hardened since (although differences in the question may explain the shift): as the chart shows around three quarters of people in November 2011, January 2012 and December 2012 said it was “unlikely” that David Cameron will be able to deliver this pledge.²⁶⁷ The variations in support for the principle and scepticism about delivery between voters for different parties is also interesting. Firstly, around two-thirds of Labour and LibDem voters support the idea – but are more likely to think it will not be delivered. And Conservative voters are much more supportive, but still a majority doubt it will be delivered.

Figure 7.6: Level of support for and confidence in David Cameron's pledge to reduce immigration to the "tens of thousands"



December 2012	Conservative	Labour	Liberal Democrats
Support	93	73	72
Unlikely	63	85	70
%			

There are also consistently high levels of overall support for a range of possible government measures to restrict immigrants' access to a range of public services and benefits, as we would expect from previous chapters – for example:

70% support only allowing European migrants to claim job seekers allowance for more than six months if they have a "realistic prospect" of finding work.

75% said that they'd support changing the law so that only those who'd been resident in the UK for a fixed period would have access to emergency NHS treatment.

78% agree that the Government should do more to make sure foreign nationals pay to use the NHS.

81% support not allowing people to join the council house waiting list until they have been in Britain for two years.

81% support fining landlords who rent homes to illegal immigrants.

86% support increasing fines for companies that employ illegal immigrants.


86% said that they would support a law that meant EU migrants would only have access to benefits after a certain amount of time.²⁶⁸

7.2.3 Politicians – overall trust and trust on immigration

As well as being linked to high expectations of effective national control over immigration and the desire among many for immigration to be substantially reduced, dissatisfaction with successive governments’ performance on immigration is likely to also be influenced by the level of trust we have in politicians.

Overall, our levels of trust in politicians are low, and they have been since at least 1983, when Ipsos MORI started asking this question on our trust in different professions to tell the truth. Politicians have always been among the least trusted, battling it out with journalists at the bottom of the league table, as Figure 7.7 shows.

Figure 7.7: Veracity in professions



This then suggests that our scepticism about the trustworthiness of politicians is far from new, and we are not going through a particular “crisis of trust.” However, there are more worrying trends in our levels of trust on different questions in other studies. For example, as Figure 7.8 based on British Social Attitudes data shows, we’re now three times as likely as we were in 1986 to believe that political parties will almost never act in the interests of the country over their own interests (although this is a slight improvement on the figures at the height of the expenses scandal).

However, when compared with other European countries, UK residents’ trust in politicians is similar to the level found in Germany and higher than in most Eastern and Southern European countries (as Figure 7.9 shows). It tends to be the smaller central and western European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, as well as the Scandinavian countries, that register higher levels of trust in politicians than the UK.

Figure 7.8: Trust in government to place needs of the country above the interests of their own political party





Figure 7.9: Trust in politicians, among Britons and other people in Europe

Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.



Given all we have seen in this review so far, we should expect to see low levels of trust in politicians on immigration specifically. Various polls between 2003 and 2009 all paint a very similar picture, with around 75-80% lacking trust in the government on immigration. For example, a YouGov poll in April 2004 showed three quarters of the public (75%) do not trust

the government to tell the truth about asylum and immigration in Britain.²⁶⁹ In October 2007, an Ipsos MORI poll showed a similar proportion (80%) disagree that the government is open and honest about immigration.²⁷⁰ Again, there do not seem to be questions specifically on trust since the last General Election – but the patterns seen in ratings of the parties in the next section suggest that this is unlikely to have improved substantially.


7.2.4 Rating of political parties

Ipsos MORI has asked the public since the 1970s who they think is the best party on immigration. In the 1970s the data shows the Conservatives well ahead of Labour on the issue (respectively around 50% to 20% in 1977/8). The question was not asked through the 1980s and 1990s when immigration was less of an issue, but by the 2000s, the Conservatives' rating as the best party on immigration had narrowed to an average of around 30%, compared with around 20% for Labour.

Figure 7.10 shows more frequent measures by YouGov since 2010, which paints a similar picture of a consistent Conservative lead, which has, however, narrowed over time. In the last poll before the May 2010 general election in the UK, The Conservatives were seen to be the best party on immigration by some considerable margin (38% to Labour's 15%). This commanding lead continued through the rest of 2010 and into 2011, but started to narrow in the second half of 2011 and has continued on the same slow descent since.

As Figure 7.10 indicates, the falling support for the Conservatives as the best party on immigration is not accounted for by an improvement in Labour's position, which has changed very little since the election, or in the position of the Liberal Democrats, who have lost ground on the issue. Rather, it is the growth of "Other" parties (which unfortunately is not disaggregated but will be driven by UKIP) that has made up the difference, and which is now on a par with Labour.

Figure 7.10: Best party on asylum and immigration



Lord Ashcroft's recent poll does separate out UKIP and shows the main parties and UKIP even closer: in this survey the Tories are on 31%, UKIP on 24%, Labour on 23% with the Liberal Democrats on 7%.²⁷¹

Support for UKIP's position on immigration is also shown in a separate YouGov poll in March 2013. The poll showed UKIP are the most trusted party to be able to deal with the issue of immigration, at 24% compared with 19% for the Conservatives and 12% for Labour. One in three, however, said none of the parties could be trusted (29%).²⁷²

7.2.5 The Coalition government on immigration

As we can see from the previous chart, both partners in the Coalition government are now less likely than they were when elected to be seen as the best party on immigration. This is despite the significant support for the Coalition government's flagship policy aim, to reduce immigration to the 'tens of thousands', and similarly high support for a number of more specific policies on restricting access to benefits and public services. This will be partly related to a lack of confidence in their ability to deliver these outcomes, but as Lord Ashcroft's polling shows, it will also be due the challenge of communicating with the public on immigration policy.

The table below shows results from Lord Ashcroft's poll which listed the steps taken by the Coalition government to try to reduce immigration to the UK, asking respondents whether they thought each was a good idea, and whether the government had done it. Support for many measures is high, but awareness of them is low – the highest level of awareness is just over 40% (for reforming the student visa system and the crackdown on bogus colleges).²⁷³ While it is unrealistic to expect a large majority of the public to be aware of each of these policies, these often very low levels of awareness will no doubt affect the public's rating of the Coalition's record on immigration.

Support for and awareness of Coalition policies on immigration

	Good idea	Government has done
	%	%
Reform the student visa system and crack down on bogus colleges	87	42
Make it a legal requirement for those applying to settle in the UK to speak better English and pass a 'Life in the UK' test	81	41
Introduce a minimum probationary period of five years to deter sham marriages	81	25
Impose an annual limit on migration from outside the EU	76	34
Introduce tougher language requirements on overseas students and empower the Border Agency to refuse entry to students who cannot speak English	75	30
Introduce a minimum earning threshold for anyone wanting to bring in a spouse or partner from outside Europe	70	25
End the right of overseas students to stay in Britain for two years to look for a job after their course ends	58	23
Cap the number of people employers are allowed to bring into the country to work in skilled professions	57	23
Introduce a minimum pay threshold for those applying to stay in the UK permanently	56	21

In this context, the view among many that the government is not listening to the public on immigration makes sense, a view that has grown stronger over the last couple of years. In April 2011, 47% disagreed that the government is listening to public opinion over immigration, 19% agreed.²⁷⁴ A year later, views were more negative: in March 2012, 62% disagreed to the same question, 13% agreed.²⁷⁵

These concerns are likely to be linked to the view that immigration has been discussed too little in the UK over the last few years; 62% felt this way in April 2011. Again, we do not have earlier measures, but suspect views were no more positive during Labour's term in office. Views also vary significantly between sub-groups, in ways that we have seen throughout this review. Young people are less likely to feel immigration has been discussed too little (44%) while those 60 and over are most likely to (75%). There is also a split by social grade: 56% of ABC1s compared with 70% of C2DEs think immigration has been discussed too little.²⁷⁶

In the same month as this poll (April 2011), David Cameron made a high profile speech²⁷⁷ about immigration and the survey found 73% agreed that the PM was right to raise the issue of immigration at that time. However, a smaller but still significant proportion felt he was trying to score political points before the upcoming elections (51%).²⁷⁸ Of course, while this may seem slightly inconsistent, it is


perfectly reasonable to agree with both statements. As Figure 7.11 shows, the perception of politicking is very much related to voting intentions, but there is greater consistency across supporters of the different political parties for raising the issue, with 59% of Labour supporters saying he was right to raise it.

Finally, it is worth highlighting the changing position of party supporters on their levels of concern about immigration over time, using new analysis from

our political aggregate dataset. Figure 7.12 shows three key points. Firstly, UKIP voters actually started with similar levels of concern about immigration to Conservative voters in 2002 (the first time there were sufficient UKIP voters to identify separately). However, since then they have grown away from the Conservatives and all other voters in their immigration focus. This will no doubt be partly due to UKIP's shifting emphasis, but also a refinement of their supporter base, as they have attracted more supporters who have a particular focus on this issue.


Secondly, it is notable how closely Labour and LibDem supporters have tracked throughout the entire period, with LibDem supporters a long way from supporters of their

Figure 7.11: Views of David Cameron's speech on immigration in April 2011



Coalition partners. And finally, those who say they are undecided on how to vote tend to be closer to Labour and LibDem views than the Conservatives, which highlights the challenges facing political parties in appealing across such a wide variety of views.

Figure 7.12: Differences by voting intention in importance of immigration over time



7.3 Discussion

We have a negative view of successive governments' immigration policy and practice

By just about all measures, we hold a dim view of both the recent Labour and current Coalition governments' performance on immigration. We think policy should be tougher (in terms of entry restrictions, access to support or public services and rules governing immigrants' participation in the labour market once here) and that implementation needs to be better, with a particular emphasis on border control and keeping track of immigrant populations.

Of course, this disconnect between public preferences on immigration and perceived performance is not new or particularly unusual: in 1994 Gary Freeman first put forward his "policy gap hypothesis" that immigration policy tends not to reflect more "restrictive" public opinion across a range of countries because of the more open perspectives of interest groups both inside and outside government.

And of course, it is worth noting that we are not that positive about a wide range of government policies and actions: it is not only on immigration where we doubt government decisions and efficacy. However, it is the saliency of immigration that makes it a particular focus: governments will always be more mindful of public opinion when voters count the issue as among the most important facing the country.

What can government and political parties do?

The current government's stated aim of reducing net migration is a direct reaction to this - and it does have public support. It is clearly a flawed target, even as driver of public reassurance: it measures net additions to the UK population, but pure numbers of residents is only part of people's concerns, and a target for a reduction solely in immigration would more directly address what people want to see.

But it is at least simple. The lack of awareness of so many of the current government's actions on immigration highlights the communication challenges facing all policy-makers seeking to reassure the public on immigration control. People have limited interest in finding out the detail and any government's ability to communicate a more nuanced picture is limited.

However, the government also has limited control over delivering even the immigration reduction side of the net migration equation. One third of all immigration to the UK is from the EU, which the national government currently has no control over. This will partly explain why our faith in the net migration target being met is so low. And this lack of control is something that particularly bothers UK residents: we have much greater support for national sovereignty on immigration and border control than other countries. Expectations and desire for control are therefore high – and can only be currently met by reducing aspects of immigration that are of relatively lower concern to people or that they positively support, such as incoming students and skilled workers.

This leaves government and politicians with a straightforward but unenviable choice: to prioritise our desire for reduced immigration over what we may choose if we were better informed, and what may make most sense for the economy. The current government has made their choice, and given that a majority say they would like student numbers included in the net migration target, it seems reasonable for them to conclude that our desire for any type of reduction currently outweighs our likely assessment of the downsides.

And of course, if the current government does manage to reduce net migration to below 100,000 this could have a significant impact on perceptions: we are more likely to notice something being achieved when we do not expect it to be. It is unlikely to completely satisfy people, but it may reinforce the Conservative's political advantage on the issue.

The position for Labour is more difficult. The public opinion data outlined throughout this report suggests they are on the right lines by framing the immigration debate around "fairness": this is a powerful driver of our views. However, their apparent avoidance of commitment to a particular level of reduction in immigration levels will make it harder to engage a large proportion of the immigration-sceptic public: for many, the sheer weight of numbers is a threat to fairness.

And this seems set to become only more difficult in 2014, with the combination of the European Elections, the lifting of restrictions on the A2 countries and the increasing focus this is likely to bring to UKIP and their much more restrictive perspective. Perceptions of immigration – and the difference between these and reality – will be one of the key political battlegrounds in the run-up to the 2015 general election.



Afterword

Our aim for this review has been to gather and outline as many of the important sources of survey data and analysis on attitudes to immigration as we can. The hope is this will help inform debates, which too often get stuck on the latest poll that shows the general preference of most of the public is for less immigration. This is undoubtedly true, as shown throughout this review, but it doesn't take us very far – and there are important nuances in opinions across issues and between groups.

Our aim has not been to come to conclusions on what should be done as a result. As is the case with even supposedly “objective” data on immigration, so much is open to interpretation, depending on your focus and the frame that you apply.

This debate is only going to get more heated as we head into 2014, with Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants in the news, the European elections, UKIP's increasing prominence and all parties staking out policies and positions ahead of the general election in 2015. We hope that this review, and the accompanying summary – “10 things we should know about attitudes to immigration” – helps to move on our understanding of national perceptions.

Acknowledgements

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Sir Andrew Green	Migration Watch
Professor John Salt	University College London
Dr Rob Ford	Manchester University
Sunder Katwala	British Future
Dr Neil Gavin	Liverpool University

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Figure 1.8 Ipsos Global @dvisor (Global average includes: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United States, United Kingdom)	Figure 1.18 Citizenship Survey, 2010/11; Home Office, Social and Public Service Impacts of Migration at the Local Level (July 2013) (Base: White British respondents born in the UK)	Figure 2.7 European Social Survey, 2012	Figure 3.2 Transatlantic Trends, 2011
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Recreated from Saggar, S.
et al. (2012) The Impacts of

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and Integration

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Recreated from Saggar, S.
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Figure 5.3
Ipsos MORI/Oxford Migration
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2011. *Students category is
an aggregate of findings for:
University students, Students
coming here to learn English in
language schools and students
in other courses of study
(Further education)

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Figure 6.1
Standard Eurobarometer 70-79,
2008-2013

Figure 6.2
Standard Eurobarometer 79 ,
UK only, Spring 2013

Figure 6.3
Ipsos MORI/UKBA, 2006-2009;
Ipsos MORI, February 2011

Figure 6.4
Ipsos MORI, February 2011

Figure 6.5
Ipsos MORI, February 2011

Figure 6.6
Citizenship Survey, 2010/11

Figure 6.7
Ipsos MORI Issues Index

Figure 6.8
Ipsos MORI Issues Index

Figure 7.1
Ipsos MORI/UKBA, 2006-2009;
Transatlantic Trends, 2010-2013

Figure 7.2
Transatlantic Trends, 2013

Figure 7.3
Transatlantic Trends, 2011

Figure 7.4
Transatlantic Trends , 2011

Figure 7.5
YouGov, November 2011

Figure 7.6
YouGov/Sunday Times,
November 2011, January 2012
October 2012, December 2012

Figure 7.7
Ipsos MORI/British Medical
Association

Figure 7.8
British Social Attitudes, 1986-
2011

Figure 7.9
European Social Survey, 2012

Figure 7.10
YouGov Best Party Political
Tracker

Figure 7.11
YouGov/Sunday Times, April
2011

Figure 7.12
Ipsos MORI Issues Index

Data sources

Name	Agency	Client	Dates of Fieldwork	Mode
BBC Future State of Welfare	Ipsos MORI	BBC	16-18 Sep 2011	Telephone
BBC Multiculturalism Survey	Ipsos MORI	BBC	7-9 Apr 2005	Telephone
BBC Rivers of Blood Survey	Ipsos MORI	BBC	11-13 Apr 2008	Telephone
British Future - State of the Nation Poll	Ipsos MORI	British Future	30 Nov-6 Dec 2011	Online
British Future - State of the Nation Poll	Ipsos MORI	British Future	23-27 Nov 2012	Online
Channel 4 Britishness Poll	Ipsos MORI	Channel 4	27 Jan-7 Feb 2012	Face-to-face
Global @dvisor Immigration Survey	Ipsos MORI	N/A	Jun 2011	Online
Asylum and Immigration - Marketing Survey	Ipsos MORI	N/A	4-10 Feb 2011	Face-to-face
Migration Observatory Understanding Immigration Poll	Ipsos MORI	Migration Observatory	2-8 Sep 2011	Face-to-face
Migration Watch Immigration & Multiculturalism Survey	Ipsos MORI	Migration Watch	16-21 Jan 2003	Face-to-face
Readers Digest Poll	Ipsos MORI	Readers Digest	20-24 Jul 2000	Face-to-face
Perceptions Survey	Ipsos MORI	Royal Statistical Society	31 May-11 Jun 2013	Online
Real Trends – Living in Britain	Ipsos MORI	N/A	9 May-5 Jun 2008	Online and self-completion
The Sun Immigration Survey	Ipsos MORI	The Sun	31 Oct-1 Nov 2007	Telephone
The Sunday Times Immigration Survey	Ipsos MORI	The Sunday Times	11-13 Aug 2006	Telephone
UKBA Immigration Tracker W1	Ipsos MORI	UKBA	18 Nov-14 Dec 2006	Face-to-face
UKBA Immigration Tracker W2	Ipsos MORI	UKBA	19 May-24 Jun 2007	Face-to-face
UKBA Immigration Tracker W3	Ipsos MORI	UKBA	16 Nov-17 Dec 2007	Face-to-face
UKBA Immigration Tracker W4	Ipsos MORI	UKBA	1 Aug-5 Sep 2008	Face-to-face
UKBA Immigration Tracker W5	Ipsos MORI	UKBA	6 Feb-9 Mar 2009	Face-to-face
UKBA Immigration Tracker W6	Ipsos MORI	UKBA	7 Aug-7 Sep 2009	Face-to-face
Best Party Trend on Asylum and Immigration	Ipsos MORI	N/A	N/A	Telephone
Too many immigrants in Great Britain Trend	Ipsos MORI	N/A	N/A	Face-to-face, self-completion and telephone
Angus Reid Immigration Survey	Angus Reid	N/A	1 Dec 2011	Online
Angus Reid Immigration Survey	Angus Reid	N/A	18-18 Nov 2009	Online
Get Britain Out: EU Referendum Survey	ComRes	N/A	23-25 Jan 2013	Online
Transatlantic Trends Immigration Survey 2009-2011	TNS Opinion	Transatlantic Trends	1-17 Sep 2009; 27 Aug-13 Sep 2010; 25 Aug-18 Sep 2011	Telephone
Transatlantic Trends Immigration Survey 2013	TNS Opinion	Transatlantic Trends	3-27 Jun 2013	Telephone/Face-to-face
YouGov Population Survey	YouGov	Population Matters	10-12 May 2012	Online
YouGov Immigration and Asylum Survey	YouGov	The Sun	11-14 Aug 2003	Online
YouGov Immigration and EU Survey	YouGov	N/A	24-26 Jan 2012	Online
YouGov Immigration and Impact Survey	YouGov	Migration Watch	6-8 Jan 2010	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Cambridge University	13 Apr-20 May 2011	Online

Name	Agency	Client	Dates of Fieldwork	Mode
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Mail on Sunday	2-3 Apr 2004	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Sunday Times	14-15 Apr 2011	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Sunday Times	5-6 January 2012	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Sunday Times	13-14 Dec 2012	Online
YouGov Immigration and Europe Survey	YouGov	Cambridge University	24 Feb-6 Mar 2012	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Juniper TV	17-21 Jan 2008	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Migration Watch	26-28 Jun 2006	Online
YouGov Immigration and Population Survey	YouGov	Migration Watch	8-9 May 2011	Online
YouGov Immigration and Population Survey	YouGov	Migration Watch	3-4 Nov 2011	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Migration Watch	16-18 Jan 2007	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Migration Watch	25-26 Nov 2010	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	N/A	25-26 Mar 2013	Online
YouGov Immigration and Integration Survey	YouGov	Cambridge University	7-8 May 2013	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Migration Matters	9-10 May 2013	Online
YouGov Immigration Survey	YouGov	Prospect	1-2 Sep 2013	Online
YouGov Best Party on Immigration Trend	YouGov	N/A	Feb 2010-Nov 2013	Online
Special Eurobarometer 380 - awareness of home affairs	TNS Opinion	European Commission	Dec 2011	Face-to-face
Standard Eurobarometer	Various	European Commission	Apr 2003-May 2013	Face-to-face
Datasets				
European Social Survey	Various	N/A	N/A	Mixed mode
British Social Attitudes Survey	NatCen	N/A	N/A	Face-to-face and self-completion
Citizenship Survey	Various	N/A	N/A	Face-to-face
Ethnic Minorities British Election Study	TNS BMRB	N/A	N/A	Face-to-face
World Values Survey	Various	N/A	N/A	Face-to-face or telephone
Population and Household Estimates for England and Wales	ONS	N/A	27 Mar 2011	Self-completion
First results on Population and Household estimates for Scotland - Release 1C (Part 1)	National Records of Scotland	N/A	27 Mar 2011	Self-completion
Census 2011: Key Statistics for Northern Ireland at Northern Ireland and LGD level	Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency	N/A	27 Mar 2011	Self-completion
High Level Summary of Statistics Trends for Population and Migration	Scottish Government Statistics	N/A	N/A	Self-completion
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency	Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency	N/A	N/A	N/A
Population Density	Statistics4U	N/A	N/A	N/A

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