Veteran Iran watcher Robini Wright looks at the state of political rights and dissidents in post-Rouhani Iran.
3 weeks ago • 0 notesA clear, no-nonsense appraisal of Iran’s new president after one year in office. An excellent take by Iran veteran analyst Shaul Bakhash.
4 weeks ago • 0 notesLong video of the panel discussion dealing with all aspects of US-Iran relations. Hamid Biglari was the moderator who posed the toughest questions he could devise.
1 month ago • 0 notesAs the nuclear talks with Iran move towards the six month Joint Plan of Action (JPA) timeline, all of the talk is about the United States and Iran. But Europe is a major player.
Two new European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) publications recommend how and why Europe should maximise the chances of a diplomatic solution, including if talks need to be extended beyond July.
In a policy memo, ECFR visiting fellow Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi suggests that at this stage in the six-month JPA nuclear deal between Iran and major world powers, fears that this interim deal would lead to the unravelling of the sanctions regime and a European commercial rush back into the Iranian market, have not been realised. Tabrizi however warns that the opposite may be the case - that Europe’s difficulties in even making good on some of the limited concessions granted under the JPA risks undermining Rouhani’s domestic standing, his ability to showcase the benefits of reaching a nuclear deal and subsequently negotiating flexibility could be weakened, and Iranian confidence that de-sanctioning can happen. This could negatively impact the nuclear talks. (Linked here).
ECFR policy fellow, Ellie Geranmayeh, in a separate policy brief argues that a final nuclear deal would advance Europe’s interests both on the non-proliferation front and in opening new channels for addressing regional conflicts and security concerns with Iran, including on Syria. If a deal is agreed, Europeans can play a key role in implementing it. In the more likely event of the existing JPA needing to be extended to give negotiators more time, then European deliverables may be necessary in exchange for Iran continuing its JPA commitments. At the same time Europe should devise a damage limitation plan in case of a breakdown caused by the these stumbling blocks of hardliners in Tehran or US Congress.
Geranmayeh outlines four broad trajectories that could shape the future of the nuclear talks and recommends how Europe should react in each: (1) a settlement is reached by the interim deal deadline; (2) the interim deal needs to be extended; (3) US Congress blocks implementation of a final deal; and (4) negotiations derail. In the third scenario, she argues that Europe should pursue its own interests and recommends that if Tehran shows commitment to diplomacy and to the agreements reached, Europe should attempt to salvage negotiations by taking a more independent line on Iran through altering the scope of its unilateral sanctions and working to ring-fence European entities from the secondary impact of US sanctions. (Linked here).
1 month ago • 0 notesRep. Doggett discusses ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran and his opposition to provisions in the NDAA.
Boy, I wish this Texan were MY congressman. No mincing words: “There are few greater threats to the security of American families than those which could arise from the failure of the ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran. Parts of this bill seek to disrupt the Administration’s tough, persistent diplomacy. Some would assign to Israel the job of starting what could become World War III—even the Bush-Cheney Administration rejected that approach. Iranian Revolutionary Guard hardliners may ultimately doom these negotiations; our responsibility is to ensure that hardliners here don’t do the obstruction for them… .”
1 month ago • 0 notesNBC News was granted exclusive access to both US and Iranian negotiators in the diplomacy that produced the initial agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. This is their reconstruction of those events. Very professional, but also a sobering reminder of just how far we have left to go.
1 month ago • 1 noteJust think about it. Netanyahu makes speech after speech raising alarm about Iran, including a whole speech at the UN with a cartoon bomb about to go off. He wanted the US to go to war with Iran because of the “threat.”
Now the former head of Israel’s atomic energy organization says all that was simply untrue — and was done for political reasons.
Brig.-Gen.Uzi Eilam is convinced that Iran is a decade away from a bomb, and is unsure that this is what Tehran even wants.
"The Iranian nuclear program will only be operational in another 10 years," declares Eilam, a senior official in Israel’s atomic program. "Even so, I am not sure that Iran wants the bomb."
"Netanyahu is using the Iranian threat to achieve a variety of political objectives," he said. "These declarations are unnecessarily scaring Israel’s citizens…"
2 months ago • 0 notesAn excellent survey of the end game of the Iran nuclear negotiations by the former French ambassador to Tehran, François Nicoullaud
2 months ago • 0 notesGary Sick
A government negotiating with another government is almost inevitably required to conduct a second negotiation with its own domestic constituents whose own interests will be affected by the outcome. The classic image is the negotiator facing his foreign adversary over one table, then swiveling around to confront his domestic adversaries at a second table.In the current negotiations with Iran over the future of its nuclear program, the United States is facing something even more daunting. It is engaged in at least four separate negotiations at the same time:
1) Direct talks with Iran
2) Consultations with its negotiating partners in the so-called P5+1 – the five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany – who must develop a unified bargaining position
3) Congress of the United States
4) Allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, whose interests will be impacted by the outcome.
Success in one dimension of this chess match does not necessarily guarantee success in any of the others, although in the end a successful final outcome will require at least a measure of success in all four dimensions. Ironically, crafting an agreement with Iran could prove to be the easiest part of the diplomatic game. The most difficult challenge may be in the domestic political arena, particularly in the United States. Iran’s hardliners are also poised to challenge potential concessions.
The following is a brief snapshot of the board so far:
Engagement with Iran
By almost any measure, direct contact between U.S. negotiators and their counterparts in Iran has exceeded expectations. American official contact with Iranian officials has been rare, sporadic, and often almost illicit for most of the past 35 years, since the Iranian revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis. U.S. diplomats were often instructed to avoid even casual contact with Iranian dignitaries at routine diplomatic functions. The United States and Iran occasionally worked together openly, such as at the Bonn conference in December 2001, when Hamid Karzai was selected as the president of a new Afghan government. But the relationship had never been able to transcend longstanding political animosity.
The progress of negotiations so far has been achieved by coordination and discipline among the six major powers—Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States—who sit on the same side of the table opposite Iran. The cohesion appears to be genuine. The talks have also not been contaminated by policy clashes—especially between Washington and Moscow—over Syria, the Crimea, and East Asia, which could have intruded on the Iran negotiations.The parties have also not digressed from the main topic into other important but tangential issues, such as human rights abuses, ties to extremist forces such as Hezbollah, and Tehran’s support for the Syrian government. The major powers appear to have decided to defer such discussions until the nuclear issue has been resolved one way or another.
Many senators, both Republicans and Democrats, are intensely skeptical of the talks. Even before negotiations had begun in earnest, 59 senators from both parties supported a new round of sanctions, including a commitment to support Israel in the event it should attack Iran, a clear signal about potential future opposition. The Obama administration strongly opposed the bill, which did not get sufficient Democratic support to bring it to a vote.
The concerns of regional states – notably Israel and Saudi Arabia– constitute the fourth dimension of this complex negotiation that a senior U.S. official has described as a Rubik’s Cube. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been outspoken in questioning the prospective nuclear deal, especially if Tehran is allowed to retain any ability to enrich uranium. In a CNN interview on April 27, he denounced it as “a terrible deal,” since it would leave Iran as a nuclear threshold state. He told an American audience: “Don’t let it happen.” That perspective could influence Congressional opposition.Gary Sick, principal White House aide for Iran and the Persian Gulf on the Carter administration’s National Security Council, is now executive director of Gulf/2000, an international online research project on the Persian Gulf at Columbia University.
Click here to read his chapter on the Carter administration and Iran.
A brilliant reality check about the real situation in Iran today, from the incomparable Farideh Farhi
2 months ago • 0 notes