

Please insert
inject more
coins

Defcon XXI

Press start

Me ?

- Nicolas Oberli (aka Balda)
- Swiss security engineer
 - No, I don't speak swedish
- CTF enthusiast
- Retro gamer
- Beer drinker / brewer
- N00b speaker
 - Any comments welcome

It all started so simply...

- I wanted to add coin handling to my MAMEcab
- Bought a coin acceptor on an auction site



Coin handling devices

- All kind of machines use coin handling devices
 - ATMs
 - Vending machines
 - Casino game machines
 - ...
- Multiple devices are used in those machines

Coin / Bill acceptors

- Used to count coins and bills
- Can detect coin/bill value
- Detects false coins/bills



Coin hopper

- Used to give coins back to the customer
 - One hopper per coin value
 - Gives back coins one by one



Communication protocols

- Multiple protocols are used to communicate with these devices
 - Parallel
 - Serial (RS232)
 - MDB
 - ccTalk
- The protocols are very vendor-specific
- ccTalk is what we will be talking about

ccTalk ?

- “coin-controls-Talk”
- Semi-proprietary protocol
 - Maintained by Money Controls LLC, England
 - Protocol specs available on cctalk.org
 - Some parts of the specs are only available after signing a NDA :-)

ccTalk ?

- Request / response messages
- UART data transmission
 - Uses only one wire for both sending and receiving
 - 9600 bits/s, 8N1, TTL signals (0 - 5V)
- Each device has its own address on the bus
 - By default 1=controller, 2=coin acceptor

ccTalk message format

- All frames use the same format



- Header is the actual command sent to the device
 - Header == 0 means it's a response
- Payload length can vary from 0 to 252
 - Data length != packet length
- Checksum is the complement to 0xFF of the packet

ccTalk headers

- Each command is assigned a *header*
 - Since its coded in a byte, 256 possible commands
 - From the doc :


Header 246 - Request manufacturer id.....	9
Header 245 - Request equipment category id.....	9
Header 244 - Request product code	9
Header 243 - Request database version	9
Header 242 - Request serial number	10
Header 241 - Request software revision	10
Header 240 - Test solenoids	10
Header 239 - Operate motors	11
Header 238 - Test output lines	11
Header 237 - Read input lines	11
Header 236 - Read opto states	12
Header 235 - Read last credit or error code	12

Sample communication

- 02 00 01 FE ff
 - Sample poll from @01 to @02
- 01 00 02 00 FD
 - Response from @02 to @01
- 02 00 01 F6 07
 - Request manufacturer ID
- 01 03 02 00 4E 52 49 11
 - Response (length 3) : NRI
 - (ASCII encoded)

Coin acceptor handling

- The controller polls a coin acceptor using header 229
 - The response contains the following payload



- Counter is incremented for each event generated by the acceptor
 - Event counter cycles from 1 to 255

Coin acceptor results

- The last five results are sent in the response
 - Result A contains the validation channel
 - A device can recognize a certain amount of different coins which are organized in channels
 - Either set by the manufacturer or by config
 - Result B contains the error code (Bad coin, mechanical error, ...)
 - Again, the codes are vendor specific
 - Sometimes, results A and B are switched

Initial project

- Implemented the ccTalk protocol to handle a coin acceptor
- Use a Teensy in keyboard mode
 - When a coin is inserted, determine its value and send the corresponding number of keystrokes to MAME

Can we do more ?

- Other vending machines may use other headers and / or functions
- It is difficult to track responses
 - You need to decode the request first
- There is no open source sniffer for ccTalk...

Introducing ccSniff/ccParse

- Python utilities used to sniff data on a ccTalk bus and parse the sniffed data to a readable format
 - Use a ccTalk library developed from scratch
- Can use a bus pirate to sniff
 - It's the best way, since it can handle UART signals correctly

Demo !

ccParse 0.2 - 67 messages

```
<cctalk src=2 dst=1 length=4 header=0 data=01040404>  
<cctalk src=1 dst=2 length=0 header=230>  
<cctalk src=2 dst=1 length=2 header=0 data=ffff>  
<cctalk src=1 dst=2 length=0 header=188>  
<cctalk src=2 dst=1 length=1 header=0 data=01>  
<cctalk src=1 dst=2 length=0 header=229>  
<cctalk src=2 dst=1 length=11 header=0 data=000000000000000000000000>
```

```
= In response to : Read buffered credit or error codes  
<cctalk src=1 dst=2 length=0 header=229>
```

```
= Payload decoding
```

```
Event Counter : 0
```

```
Result A 0 - Result B 0
```

```
Result A 0 - Result B 0
```

```
Result A 0 - Result B 0
```

```
Result A 0 - Result B 0
```

```
Result A 0 - Result B 0
```

```
= Raw dump of packet
```

```
010b0200000000000000000000000000f2
```

Can we do even more ?

- What if we can inject some data on the bus ?
 - Like telling the controller “Hey ! I'm the coin acceptor and I received a LOT of money !”
- The problem is, we only have one wire for the whole bus
 - Both us and the device receive the request at the same time
 - This means we would answer at the same time and jam the signal

ccTalk multidrop commands

- Used by the controller to resolve addressing conflicts
 - Header 251 – Address change
 - Used by the controller to force a device to change its address in case of conflicts

Device in the middle

- No checks are made to ensure that the request is valid
 - Simply tell the device at address x that it needs to change its address to y
- Using these requests, we are now able to hijack the device
 - It allows us to intercept all communication between the controller and the device

Injection scheme



Timing

- We need to be sure that we won't jam the current traffic
- At 9600b/s, it takes 1.04ms to send a byte
- Specs indicate that devices need to be polled every 200ms
 - Largely enough time for us

Device hijacking

- To hijack a device on the bus :
 - Scan the bus to search for silence
 - If sufficient periods of silence, prepare injection
 - Craft an address change packet
 - Wait for silence period, then inject packet
 - Respond to requests from the controller
 - When finished, set the device to its original address
- Remember, we need to do this while the bus is in use

Introducing ccJack

- Automates the hijacking process
- Can emulate any device by sniffing the current responses and reply the same
- Can use a bus pirate to sniff and inject

Example : Inject coins !

- Once the coin acceptor is hijacked, just respond by incrementing the counter
 - It is also possible to modify the coin code to increase the value of the injected coin
- Be careful ! The counter must be higher or equal to the last value
 - Any lower value will make the controller throw an error and likely reset itself

Demo !

More ?

- As the acceptor is “offline”, we can do whatever we want to it
 - Some coin acceptors can be recalibrated by ccTalk
 - Look for headers 201 and 202
 - What if one cent becomes \$1 ?
 - The path the coin takes after being accepted can be modified
 - Look for headers 209 and 210
 - What if the new path is the money return ?


Isn't there any protection ?

- Some devices only respond after having been provided a PIN code
 - Only for a subset of commands
 - Depends on the device / firmware / vendor
 - Well, just wait for the PIN to be sent by the controller
 - Check for header 218
 - We can “help” it by pulling the power cord
 - It *could be possible* that the PIN code is the same for a vending machine model


Encryption

- In later versions of the specs, the ccTalk payload and headers can be encrypted
 - Two encryption methods available
 - Proprietary encryption – 24 bit key
 - DES encryption – 56 bit key
 - Use a pre-shared key between the controller and the devices
- Encryption uses different headers
 - Header 229 vs header 112
 - Still possible to get values from the “unencrypted” header

Bus access



Bus access - Cont



Future - Research fields

- More things to discover on the protocol
 - Encryption support seems suspicious
 - Keys can be transferred using ccTalk
 - Proprietary and closed-source encryption could be weak
 - Some devices accept dumping their internal memory by ccTalk
 - It is possible to upload a new firmware to the devices using ccTalk

Conclusions

- Specific protocols can be fun to analyze
 - You never know where you can find exotic protocols
- ccTalk definitely needs more attention
 - Since it transports money-related information, there are interesting applications
- If you don't have one, get a bus pirate
 - It's pure awesomeness !

Availability

- ccTools available on my GitHub account
 - <https://github.com/Baldanos/ccTools>
- More information about ccTalk after Defcon on my website
 - <http://www.balda.ch>

Many thanks !

Any questions ?

@Baldanos
<http://www.balda.ch>

Did I mention I LOVE beer ?