The Crimea Precedent & the Post-Soviet De Facto States

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The well-known Political Science blog The Monkey Cage, now owned by the Washington Post (now owned by Jeff Bezoswe all work for Amazon nowposted earlier today a concise 3 graph summary of what our De Facto State Research Survey reveals about likely attitudes amongst different ethnic groups in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria (we left out our research results from Nagorny Karabakh since it is not directly supported by the Russian Federation and has its own unique features). We want to thank The Washington Post and particularly Erik Voeten of Georgetown for his assistance in swinging open the door of the Monkey Cage sufficiently to let two Irish political geographers propel some hopefully useful place-based knowledge into the maelstrom of debate that engulfs us post-Crimea. It is painful to summarize years of research into a few paragraphs but at least we didn’t have to write it as a bumper sticker.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/20/how-people-in-south-ossetia-abkhazia-and-transnistria-feel-about-annexation-by-russia/

Posted in Abkhazia, Armenia, August War, Caucasus conflict, Current affairs, De Facto States, ethnic cleansing, Five Day War, forced displacement, Geography, Nagorny Karabakh, Putin, Russia, Saakashvili, World political map | Tagged | 1 Comment

Putin’s Annexation of Crimea Speech Annotated

Its often claimed by critics that ‘critical geopolitics’ is too preoccupied with texts, with speeches, with words. This lazy characterization fails to appreciate the centrality of ‘speech acts’ in the practice of international relations, and the attentiveness of critical geopolitical work to not only the ritual and performance that accompanies discursive action, but to the affective and unconscious dimensions revealed by speech (Klaus Theweleit, after all, is cited in Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Texts, speeches and words are part of a broader cultural practice, in this case a geopolitical cultural practice, and they organize and give meaning to decisions like invading a country, overthrowing its local government, imposing a new one, hastily staging a spectacle of voting, and then anointing the whole exercise legal justification for taking territory from another state. These latter characterizations, of course, affirm a rather different reality than that described below. With our words, we create worlds. This invention is facilitated by state rituals and a strong sense of occasion (c.f. the large literature on state improvisations, occasions, stateness, etc). The speaking of words become the public proclamation of new state truths, the making of new geopolitical realities.

Why did Russia seize Crimea, and why did it do so when it did? These are questions scholars will debate for some time. There are competing hypotheses:

1. The Geostrategic Explanation.

Russia acted as it did to protect its only warm water port, the home of the Black Sea fleet in Sevastapol. It was a decision that emerged from the dominance of a military mindset in the Kremlin, and is a mark of the power of the Russian navy as a force in foreign policy decision making.

2. The Imperialist Explanation.

Russia is an inherently expansionist empire, irrespective of regime type: Tsarist, Communist, ‘democratic,’ competitive authoritarian. This is an essential element of its ‘DNA’ and this imperial character will inevitably return during moments when the state is more powerful than its neighbors. Its borders are temporary frontiers. The Tsar decides and his subjects obey. Folks on the political Right tend to adhere to this explanation. They tend to cast the question of Russia as a civilizational struggle, one that affirms essentialized existential difference.

3. The Regime Type Explanation.

Russia is a hybrid regime, a particular mix of authoritarianism and popular democracy. Because the Russian Presidential form of governance concentrates so much power in a Putin’s hands, he has the ability and capacity to take radical foreign policy decisions without meaningful check to his actions. The Crimean decision is indicative of further drift towards super-presidentialism and state authoritarianism in the Russian Federation.

4. Offensive Realist Explanation.

Russia is acting like any other great power. In an anarchic and competitive state system, great powers with some offensive military capability can never be certain of the intentions of other states. Because Ukraine was a bordering state with territorial control over a vital military security asset of the Russian Federation, and because the key national security portfolio of the Ukrainian state had called into perceived enemies of Russia, it was rational of Russia to invade Crimea in order to acquire strategic control over this militarily vital territory. This explanation considers regime type largely irrelevant, and discourse superfelous.

5. The Improvised Instrumentalization of Russian (Geopolitical Cultural) Affect Explanation.

After the failure of the Russian gambit to secure Ukraine to the Eurasian Customs Union, and the advent of a pro-Western government in Kiev, the Putin inner circle made the decision to invade Crimea for multi-causal reasons. The Black Sea naval base was a consideration but it was inseparable from an affective imaginary geography of Crimea’s place in a glorious Russian past. The decision was not ‘strategic’ or ‘rational’ or regime-determined but a geopolitical gambit (pre-conceived and likely already war-gamed) that involved the coordinated use of military actions and political technologies in order to unfold ‘managed secession’ (‘secession in a box’) and a theatre of legalism while simultaneously generating an affective wave that would legitimate the regime, its actions and subsequent plans. The action, in sum, was a continuation of the spectacle of the Winter Olympics. It was ‘affective geopolitics.’

I find the latter explanation, the one that places the production of geopolitical affect and legitimacy at its center, the most compelling. My ongoing work on the August 2008 war explores this theme. Lets review the first section of the speech (only part available; will post rest as it becomes available) for evidence supporting the different hypotheses. Watching the visuals of the speech provides a whole other layer of meaning, of body language, authority, anger, affect, tears, etc. Its really quite compelling (but beyond what I can do here). Affect researchers could measure applause duration, volume, etc. Putin’s speech resonated in the room. Lets see what polling data reveals about how strongly his move resonates (i) with what groups within the public as a whole, and (ii) for how long. There is a latent tension within Russian geopolitical culture between imperial nationalism and ethno-nationalism that is worth watching. See the excellent piece on this by Goode and Laruelle.

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Vladimir Putin addressed State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society representatives in the Kremlin.

PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA VLADIMIR PUTIN: Federation Council members, State Duma deputies, good afternoon.  Representatives of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol [one day old but nevertheless sounding official!] are here among us, citizens of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol!

Dear friends, we have gathered here today in connection with an issue that is of vital, historic significance to all of us. A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance with democratic procedures and international norms.

More than 82 percent of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96 percent of them spoke out in favour of reuniting with Russia. These numbers speak for themselves. [There are many reasons to challenge these reported statistics -- authorities did not have access to the central electorate database, for example, while prior survey and demographic data would suggest these figures are highly unlikely, not to mention the 'non-choice' of the ballot construction -- but their citation as seemingly technical outcomes is part of the mobilization of rhetoric of legitimacy here]

To understand the reason behind such a choice it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other.

Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea. [the Russian version of the 'spiritual geopolitics' or 'necro-geopolitics' - 'where ever are our graves, here is our nation' -- discussed in Bosnia Remade] This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valor. [symbolic affective places; I think this is the key phrase in the whole speech. Memory of a glorious past]

Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples’ cultures and traditions. This makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has been lost over the centuries. Russians and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and people of other ethnic groups have lived side by side in Crimea, retaining their own identity, traditions, languages and faith. [Crimea is like a little Russia, the multicultural imperial Russian world-as-exhibition. There are lots of internal contradictions in Russian geopolitical culture between an imperial multiethnic mission sensibility and commitments to singular history, confession -- Prince Vladimir above -- and nation as the Russian ethos. See Charles King on this in the context of Crimea

Incidentally, the total population of the Crimean Peninsula today is 2.2 million people, of whom almost 1.5 million are Russians, 350,000 are Ukrainians who predominantly consider Russian their native language, and about 290,000-300,000 are Crimean Tatars, who, as the referendum has shown, also lean towards Russia. [another Pinnocchio moment for Putin]

True, there was a time when Crimean Tatars were treated unfairly, just as a number of other peoples in the USSR. There is only one thing I can say here: millions of people of various ethnicities suffered during those repressions, and primarily Russians.

Crimean Tatars returned to their homeland. I believe we should make all the necessary political and legislative decisions to finalise the rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars, restore them in their rights and clear their good name.

We have great respect for people of all the ethnic groups living in Crimea. This is their common home, their motherland, and it would be right – I know the local population supports this – for Crimea to have three equal national languages: Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar.

Colleagues,

In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to generation, over time, under any circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our country went through during the entire 20th century. [here is an explicit appeal to the eternal timeless national geo-body, a nation where legal borders don't matter, just imaginary affective ones] 

After the revolution, the Bolsheviks, for a number of reasons – may God judge them – added large sections of the historical South of Russia to the Republic of Ukraine. This was done with no consideration for the ethnic make-up of the population, and today these areas form the southeast of Ukraine. [an explicit signal that these territories too are part of the eternal national geo-imaginary; are they next?]  Then, in 1954, a decision was made to transfer Crimean Region to Ukraine, along with Sevastopol, despite the fact that it was a city of union subordination. This was the personal initiative of the Communist Party head Nikita Khrushchev. What stood behind this decision of his – a desire to win the support of the Ukrainian political establishment or to atone for the mass repressions of the 1930’s in Ukraine – is for historians to figure out.

What matters now is that this decision was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even then. The decision was made behind the scenes. Naturally, in a totalitarian state nobody bothered to ask the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol. [in taking the disputed territory as the self-determination unit, rather than Ukraine as a whole, Putin cleverly contrasts his legitimacy to that of the godless Communists] They were faced with the fact. People, of course, wondered why all of a sudden Crimea became part of Ukraine. But on the whole – and we must state this clearly, we all know it – this decision was treated as a formality of sorts because the territory was transferred within the boundaries of a single state. Back then, it was impossible to imagine that Ukraine and Russia may split up and become two separate states. However, this has happened.

Unfortunately, what seemed impossible became a reality. The USSR fell apart. Things developed so swiftly that few people realised how truly dramatic those events and their consequences would be. Many people both in Russia and in Ukraine, as well as in other republics hoped that the Commonwealth of Independent States that was created at the time would become the new common form of statehood. They were told that there would be a single currency, a single economic space, joint armed forces; however, all this remained empty promises, while the big country was gone. It was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realised that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered.[surprisingly strong language here; generates one of Putin's anger point public poses]

At the same time, we have to admit that by launching the sovereignty parade Russia itself aided in the collapse of the Soviet Union. And as this collapse was legalised, everyone forgot about Crimea and Sevastopol ­– the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.

Now, many years later, I heard residents of Crimea say that back in 1991 they were handed over like a sack of potatoes. This is hard to disagree with. And what about the Russian state? What about Russia? It humbly accepted the situation. This country was going through such hard times then that realistically it was incapable of protecting its interests. However, the people could not reconcile themselves to this outrageous historical injustice. All these years, citizens and many public figures came back to this issue, saying that Crimea is historically Russian land and Sevastopol is a Russian city. Yes, we all knew this in our hearts and minds, but we had to proceed from the existing reality and build our good-neighbourly relations with independent Ukraine on a new basis. Meanwhile, our relations with Ukraine, with the fraternal Ukrainian people have always been and will remain of foremost importance for us. (Applause)

Today we can speak about it openly, and I would like to share with you some details of the negotiations that took place in the early 2000s. The then President of Ukraine Mr Kuchma asked me to expedite the process of delimiting the Russian-Ukrainian border. At that time, the process was practically at a standstill.  Russia seemed to have recognised Crimea as part of Ukraine, but there were no negotiations on delimiting the borders. Despite the complexity of the situation, I immediately issued instructions to Russian government agencies to speed up their work to document the borders, so that everyone had a clear understanding that by agreeing to delimit the border we admitted de facto and de jure that Crimea was Ukrainian territory, thereby closing the issue.

We accommodated Ukraine not only regarding Crimea, but also on such a complicated matter as the maritime boundary in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. What we proceeded from back then was that good relations with Ukraine matter most for us and they should not fall hostage to deadlock territorial disputes. However, we expected Ukraine to remain our good neighbour, we hoped that Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine, especially its southeast and Crimea, would live in a friendly, democratic and civilised state that would protect their rights in line with the norms of international law.

However, this is not how the situation developed. Time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to forced assimilation. [situation description: the outrage]  Moreover, Russians, just as other citizens of Ukraine are suffering from the constant political and state crisis that has been rocking the country for over 20 years.

I understand why Ukrainian people wanted change. They have had enough of the authorities in power during the years of Ukraine’s independence. Presidents, prime ministers and parliamentarians changed, but their attitude to the country and its people remained the same. They milked the country, fought among themselves for power, assets and cash flows and did not care much about the ordinary people. They did not wonder why it was that millions of Ukrainian citizens saw no prospects at home and went to other countries to work as day labourers. I would like to stress this: it was not some Silicon Valley they fled to, but to become day labourers. Last year alone almost 3 million people found such jobs in Russia. According to some sources, in 2013 their earnings in Russia totalled over $20 billion, which is about 12% of Ukraine’s GDP.

I would like to reiterate that I understand those who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the authorities that do not satisfy the people. However, those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day. [the plot against Russia]

The new so-called authorities began by introducing a draft law to revise the language policy, which was a direct infringement on the rights of ethnic minorities. However, they were immediately ‘disciplined’ by the foreign sponsors of these so-called politicians. One has to admit that the mentors of these current authorities are smart and know well what such attempts to build a purely Ukrainian state may lead to. The draft law was set aside, but clearly reserved for the future. Hardly any mention is made of this attempt now, probably on the presumption that people have a short memory. Nevertheless, we can all clearly see the intentions of these ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World War II. [our enemies, the Nazis]

It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to. Many government agencies have been taken over by the impostors, but they do not have any control in the country, while they themselves – and I would like to stress this – are often controlled by radicals. In some cases, you need a special permit from the militants on Maidan to meet with certain ministers of the current government. This is not a joke – this is reality.

Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. In view of this, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities.

Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part.

First, we had to help create conditions so that the residents of Crimea for the first time in history were able to peacefully express their free will regarding their own future. However, what do we hear from our colleagues in Western Europe and North America? They say we are violating norms of international law.  Firstly, it’s a good thing that they at least remember that there exists such a thing as international law – better late than never. [Putin cannot seem to resist these 'nose thumb' gestures in his speeches, the position of the disrespected subaltern who talks back; he seems to love this positionality]

Secondly, and most importantly – what exactly are we violating? True, the President of the Russian Federation received permission from the Upper House of Parliament to use the Armed Forces in Ukraine.  However, strictly speaking, nobody has acted on this permission yet.  Russia’s Armed Forces never entered Crimea; they were there already in line with an international agreement.  True, we did enhance our forces there; however – this is something I would like everyone to hear and know – we did not exceed the personnel limit of our Armed Forces in Crimea, which is set at 25,000, because there was no need to do so. [Wow! hey presto, we did not invade Ukraine!]

Next. As it declared independence and decided to hold a referendum, the Supreme Council of Crimea referred to the United Nations Charter, which speaks of the right of nations to self-determination. Incidentally, I would like to remind you that when Ukraine seceded from the USSR it did exactly the same thing, almost word for word. Ukraine used this right, yet the residents of Crimea are denied it.  Why is that?

Moreover, the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central authorities. Pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the UN International Court agreed with this approach and made the following comment in its ruling of July 22, 2010, and I quote: “No general prohibition may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council with regard to declarations of independence,” and “General international law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence.” Crystal clear, as they say.

[Western sponsorship of the independence of Kosovo as precedent justifying the action of Crimea. Beyond the obvious difficulties with this parallel, Putin is about to go way beyond this 'precedent by annexing Crimea. Albania did not annex Kosovo. Western legal performativity surrounding Kosovo clearly induces contempt from Putin and now he's shoving it back in the face of the US, as he promised to do at the time with his boomerang remark]

I do not like to resort to quotes, but in this case, I cannot help it. Here is a quote from another official document: the Written Statement of the United States America of April 17, 2009, submitted to the same UN International Court in connection with the hearings on Kosovo. Again, I quote: “Declarations of independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not make them violations of international law.” End of quote.  They wrote this, disseminated it all over the world, had everyone agree and now they are outraged. Over what? The actions of Crimean people completely fit in with these instructions, as it were. For some reason, things that Kosovo Albanians (and we have full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not allowed. Again, one wonders why.

[The opposite is not true either: because they are not violations, they are, therefore, lawful. The International Court decision on Kosovo, as specialists know, dodged the whole issue of secession and ruled narrowly on UDIs. That Putin feels the need to cite specific sentences from the Obama administration's legal reasoning on the Kosovo case reveals a mirroring strategy on his part, an almost obsessive need to mock and expose yet also mimic Western legal performativity]

We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is some special case. What makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues? It turns out that it is the fact that the conflict in Kosovo resulted in so many human casualties.  Is this a legal argument? The ruling of the International Court says nothing about this. This is not even double standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to make everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black tomorrow. According to this logic, we have to make sure every conflict leads to human losses. [Fascinating! He attacks the substantive core of the 'remedial secession' argument but his affective pre-convictions lead him to jump to another of his 'nose thumb' conclusions. Cynical use of 'cynical'? No, I think this genuinely angers Putin, and the issues comes back to one of respect, status, and honor for Russia] 

I will state clearly – if the Crimean local self-defence units had not taken the situation under control, there could have been casualties as well. Fortunately this did not happen. There was not a single armed confrontation in Crimea and no casualties. Why do you think this was so? The answer is simple: because it is very difficult, practically impossible to fight against the will of the people. Here I would like to thank the Ukrainian military – and this is 22,000 fully armed servicemen. I would like to thank those Ukrainian service members who refrained from bloodshed and did not smear their uniforms in blood.

[OBE =overtaken by events later that day, which underscores the volatility of the situation he created]

Other thoughts come to mind in this connection. They keep talking of some Russian intervention in Crimea, some sort of aggression. This is strange to hear. I cannot recall a single case in history of an intervention without a single shot being fired and with no human casualties.

Colleagues,

Like a mirror, [yes!!]  the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what has been happening in the world over the past several decades. After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. Key international institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, they are sadly degrading. Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle “If you are not with us, you are against us.” To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall. [Putin as accumulation of his resentments, yet he also identified with Bush in public when he was in White House]

This happened in Yugoslavia; we remember 1999 very well. It was hard to believe, even seeing it with my own eyes, that at the end of the 20th century, one of Europe’s capitals, Belgrade, was under missile attack for several weeks, and then came the real intervention. Was there a UN Security Council resolution on this matter, allowing for these actions? Nothing of the sort. And then, they hit Afghanistan, Iraq, and frankly violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called no-fly zone over it they started bombing it too. [a parade of geopolitical resentments]

There was a whole series of controlled “colour” revolutions. Clearly, the people in those nations, where these events took place, were sick of tyranny and poverty, of their lack of prospects; but these feelings were taken advantage of cynically. Standards were imposed on these nations that did not in any way correspond to their way of life, traditions, or these peoples’ cultures. [In this passage we have evidence that Putin now shares the Right's vision of the world as composed of fundamental civilizational blocs. The 'standards were imposed' is a jab at the IMF and the European Union. At Valdai, Putin elaborated a sophisticated geo-economic version of this, one organized around protecting uncompetitive Soviet-era industries upon which thousands depend. This is, in essence, a rejection of neoliberalism] As a result, instead of democracy and freedom, there was chaos, outbreaks in violence and a series of upheavals. The Arab Spring turned into the Arab Winter.

A similar situation unfolded in Ukraine. In 2004, to push the necessary candidate through at the presidential elections, they thought up some sort of third round that was not stipulated by the law. It was absurd and a mockery of the constitution. And now, they have thrown in an organised and well-equipped army of militants.

We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. [civilizational geopolitical bloc thinking] And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We are constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want to strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open and fair. But we saw no reciprocal steps.

On the contrary, they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not concern you.” That’s easy to say.

[This is a critique Putin has had for a long time. No doubt Obama heard it when he first met Putin. As a man of remarkable emotional intelligence, it will be very interesting to read Obama's memoirs on this, and his read of  Putin more generally. Clearly, successive US leaders have under-estimated the depth of feeling Putin has about Russia's poor treatment in the post-Cold War period. Ikenberry and Deudney underscore how the post-Cold War settlement was undermined by the lack of strategic restraint on the part of Western powers. Jack Matlock provides some insight into this mentality with some diplomatic empathy. On the potential for a post 9-11 US-Russian alliance against terror, and its squandering by the Bush administration, see our article.]

It happened with the deployment of a missile defence system. In spite of all our apprehensions, the project is working and moving forward. It happened with the endless foot-dragging in the talks on visa issues, promises of fair competition and free access to global markets.

Today, we are being threatened with sanctions, but we already experience many limitations, ones that are quite significant for us, our economy and our nation. For example, still during the times of the Cold War, the US and subsequently other nations restricted a large list of technologies and equipment from being sold to the USSR, creating the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls list. Today, they have formally been eliminated, but only formally; and in reality, many limitations are still in effect.

In short, we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today. [This is quite a conclusion, effectively declaring that the Cold War is back on because 'the West' never trusted Russia and sought to integrate it. It returns as the civilizational struggle it was for some before 1947]. They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally. [It is important to underscore the transition he makes here from a specific US Cold war policy to a general undifferentiated 'they', homogenizing all the EU states and NATO with the US. This is the move of a civilizational bloc thinker].

After all, they were fully aware that there are millions of Russians living in Ukraine [the performative here is the groupness imagined by ethnonationalism, "Ruskii" not "Rossissiki." Ethnic Russians or Russophones are constituted as part of the extended Russian nation] and in Crimea [the two geographic units are not spoken of separately]. They must have really lacked political instinct and common sense not to foresee all the consequences of their actions. Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. You must always remember this. [affect: bravado]

Today, it is imperative to end this hysteria, to refute the rhetoric of the cold war and to accept the obvious fact: Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected.

At the same time, we are grateful to all those who understood our actions in Crimea; we are grateful to the people of China, whose leaders have always considered the situation in Ukraine and Crimea taking into account the full historical and political context, and greatly appreciate India’s reserve and objectivity. [calling out other great powers as potential allies; vision of anti-Western alliance here. China has officially condemned the Crimea action in generic terms]

Today, I would like to address the people of the United States of America, the people who, since the foundation of their nation and adoption of the Declaration of Independence, have been proud to hold freedom above all else. Isn’t the desire of Crimea’s residents to freely choose their fate such a value? Please understand us.

I believe that the Europeans, first and foremost, the Germans, will also understand me. Let me remind you that in the course of political consultations on the unification of East and West Germany, at the expert, though very high level, some nations that were then and are now Germany’s allies did not support the idea of unification. Our nation, however, unequivocally supported the sincere, unstoppable desire of the Germans for national unity. I am confident that you have not forgotten this, and I expect that the citizens of Germany will also support the aspiration of the Russians, of historical Russia, [we know where this begins but where does it end? How is this notion given geographic form? What point in the past is privileged above others. In short, this is a formula for geopolitical revisionism] to restore unity.

I also want to address the people of Ukraine. I sincerely want you to understand us: we do not want to harm you in any way, or to hurt your national feelings. We have always respected the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state, incidentally, unlike those who sacrificed Ukraine’s unity for their political ambitions. They flaunt slogans about Ukraine’s greatness, but they are the ones who did everything to divide the nation. Today’s civil standoff is entirely on their conscience. I want you to hear me, my dear friends. Do not believe those who want you to fear Russia, shouting that other regions will follow Crimea. We do not want to divide Ukraine; we do not need that. [On this remark, stock markets rose. But surely the key question, given his privileging of 'historical Russia' is 'where is Ukraine'? He can be perfectly consistent in saying he doesn't want to 'divide Ukraine' but hold that certain parts of contemporary Ukraine contain, by historic accident, parts of historic Russia. further, he has previously asserted that he 'respected the territorial integrity of Ukraine' and then moved against Crimea. The authentic Ukraine he has in mind may be much smaller than the contemporary state, perhaps one centered on western Ukraine].  As for Crimea, it was and remains a Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean-Tatar land.

I repeat, just as it has been for centuries, it will be a home to all the peoples living there. What it will never be and do is follow in Bandera’s footsteps! [Contradiction here, of course, between 'respecting' and declaring that it can't have an orientation one reserves the right to frame]

Crimea is our common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory should be part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian. [Wow! A quite remarkable statement and principle, with echoes of nineteenth century geopolitical thinking. Strategic territories should belong to the strong and the strong have a paternal mission to territories vital to regional stability]  Otherwise, dear friends (I am addressing both Ukraine and Russia), you and we – the Russians and the Ukrainians – could lose Crimea completely, and that could happen in the near historical perspective. Please think about it.

Let me note too that we have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining NATO. What would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the future? It would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory, [again that phrase 'military glory'] and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia. These are things that could have become reality were it not for the choice the Crimean people made, and I want to say thank you to them for this.

But let me say too that we are not opposed to cooperation with NATO, for this is certainly not the case. For all the internal processes within the organisation, NATO remains a military alliance, and we are against having a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard or in our historic territory. [the clear articulation of the spatial dimension to security, one that is militarily anachronistic yet far from it in symbolic terms] I simply cannot imagine that we would travel to Sevastopol to visit NATO sailors. Of course, most of them are wonderful guys, but it would be better to have them come and visit us, be our guests, rather than the other way round. [Putin the cad, the man's man capable of jokey male banter. As long as none are wearing bright pants! Remarkable]

Let me say quite frankly that it pains our hearts to see what is happening in Ukraine at the moment, see the people’s suffering and their uncertainty about how to get through today and what awaits them tomorrow. Our concerns are understandable because we are not simply close neighbours but, as I have said many times already, we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other. [I feel your pain; there's almost a perverse pleasure in all this, a dismembering followed by sympathy with the victim]

Let me say one other thing too. Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means. But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure that these people’s rights and interests are fully protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability and territorial integrity.

We want to be friends with Ukraine and we want Ukraine to be a strong, sovereign and self-sufficient country. Ukraine is one of our biggest partners after all. We have many joint projects and I believe in their success no matter what the current difficulties. Most importantly, we want peace and harmony to reign in Ukraine, and we are ready to work together with other countries to do everything possible to facilitate and support this. But as I said, only Ukraine’s own people can put their own house in order.

Residents of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the whole of Russia admired your courage, dignity and bravery. It was you who decided Crimea’s future. We were closer than ever over these days, supporting each other. These were sincere feelings of solidarity. It is at historic turning points such as these that a nation demonstrates its maturity and strength of spirit. The Russian people showed this maturity and strength through their united support for their compatriots.

Russia’s foreign policy position on this matter drew its firmness from the will of millions of our people, our national unity and the support of our country’s main political and public forces. I want to thank everyone for this patriotic spirit, everyone without exception. Now, we need to continue and maintain this kind of consolidation so as to resolve the tasks our country faces on its road ahead.

Obviously, we will encounter external opposition, but this is a decision that we need to make for ourselves. Are we ready to consistently defend our national interests, or will we forever give in, retreat to who knows where? Some Western politicians are already threatening us with not just sanctions but also the prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front. I would like to know what it is they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth column, this disparate bunch of ‘national traitors’, [Ugh! Potentially ugly. Domestic protest is the work of outsiders, the standard rhetoric of conceited tyrants who bind their fate to that of the nation as a whole. An attack on Putin is an attack on Russia's glory].  or are they hoping to put us in a worsening social and economic situation so as to provoke public discontent? We consider such statements irresponsible and clearly aggressive in tone, and we will respond to them accordingly. At the same time, we will never seek confrontation with our partners, whether in the East or the West, but on the contrary, will do everything we can to build civilised and good-neighbourly relations as one is supposed to in the modern world.

Colleagues,

I understand the people of Crimea, who put the question in the clearest possible terms in the referendum: should Crimea be with Ukraine or with Russia? We can be sure in saying that the authorities in Crimea and Sevastopol, the legislative authorities, when they formulated the question, set aside group and political interests and made the people’s fundamental interests alone the cornerstone of their work. The particular historic, population, political and economic circumstances of Crimea would have made any other proposed option – however tempting it could be at the first glance – only temporary and fragile and would have inevitably led to further worsening of the situation there, which would have had disastrous effects on people’s lives. The people of Crimea thus decided to put the question in firm and uncompromising form, with no grey areas. [the heroic people acting spontaneously] The referendum was fair and transparent, and the people of Crimea clearly and convincingly expressed their will and stated that they want to be with Russia.

Russia will also have to make a difficult decision now, taking into account the various domestic and external considerations. What do people here in Russia think? Here, like in any democratic country, people have different points of view, but I want to make the point that the absolute majority of our people clearly do support what is happening.

The most recent public opinion surveys conducted here in Russia show that 95 percent of people think that Russia should protect the interests of Russians and members of other ethnic groups living in Crimea – 95 percent of our citizens. More than 83 percent think that Russia should do this even if it will complicate our relations with some other countries. A total of 86 percent of our people see Crimea as still being Russian territory and part of our country’s lands. And one particularly important figure, which corresponds exactly with the result in Crimea’s referendum: almost 92 percent of our people support Crimea’s reunification with Russia. [fascinating that he feels the need to cite precise public opinion statistics. Why? The modern equivalent of cheering crowds greeting the Tsar?]

Thus we see that the overwhelming majority of people in Crimea and the absolute majority of the Russian Federation’s people support the reunification of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol with Russia.

Now this is a matter for Russia’s own political decision, and any decision here can be based only on the people’s will, because the people is the ultimate source of all authority.

Members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, citizens of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol, today, in accordance with the people’s will, I submit to the Federal Assembly a request to consider a Constitutional Law on the creation of two new constituent entities within the Russian Federation: the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and to ratify the treaty on admitting to the Russian Federation Crimea and Sevastopol, which is already ready for signing. I stand assured of your support.

A truly monumental speech. While the other hypotheses will have their partisans, I would argue that we need to take seriously the performativity on display as Putin makes this move. This is about a military base but one inseparable from notions of ‘military glory.’ This is about an imperial geopolitical culture struggling in a globalized world but not one destined to reproduce an inherent expansionist logic. This is about the power-policy process in Russia, and super-presidentialist politics, but that institutional organization of power does not explain Crimea on its own. This is about great power insecurity but not in the culture & regime agnositic way offensive realist understand it. Instead, we need to grasp the resentments and cynicism, the loathing and longing, the pride and emotion being channelled by Putin. This is ‘affective geopolitics,’ ‘hot’ not cold ‘hardheaded’ geopolitics. This is Putin’s move but one impossible to explain without understanding Russian geopolitical culture, its contradictions and unresolved questions.

Is Putin ultimately a KGB manipulator, an orchestrator, an instrumental user not true believer? Inner motivations are, to a certain extent, irrelevant: public display is what matters. The last word should belong to Oscar Wilde whose Gwendolen, in The Importance of Being Earnest declares:

“In matters of grave importance, style, not sincerity is the vital thing.”

Posted in Abkhazia, Affect, August War, Current affairs | 9 Comments

What if Ukraine had Nukes?

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John Mearsheimer’s op ed yesterday in the NYT (which had the virtue of a title telling you what it was doing) re-iterated an argument he made in Foreign Affairs in 1993, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent.” This argument holds that Ukraine should not have promised to give up the nuclear arsenal on its territory when the Soviet Union was dissolved. Those weapons, it is claimed, would have been an ultimate guarantee of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Also, Ukraine’s “balancing” of Russia would have placed an important restraint on its proclivity for imperial nationalism. According to Goldgeier and McFaul account this attitude was shared by some in the Pentagon at the time, as well as by some nationalist minded Ukrainians. They recount that James Baker had yell at Ukrainian foreign minister Zelko at a meeting May 23-24 1992 in Lisbon because of backsliding and ambivalence on the centralized ‘command and control’ commitment made earlier (p. 56)

Mearsheimer’s argument is another instance of the internal contradictions of offensive realism, how it is sustained by particularistic cultural assumptions and ‘cognitive biases’ while claiming to proceed for mere ‘strategic logic.’ (I’ll try to write more on this if I get time; the arguments are fairly obvious to critical discursive-minded scholars, and I’m sure many in contemporary IR have made them). In this case, it is claimed that nuclear weapons in the hands of Ukrainian leaders over the last two decades would have left the world all better off, and further, we would not now be faced with a potential invasion of Ukraine beyond Crimea. Really? Nuclear weapons in a state with a weak command and control system, with predatory criminal elites, and transnational smuggling networks? No invasion because the Russian leadership is a rational actor? I don’t think so. What we’re facing is potentially horrible but not nearly as horrible as the prospect of a nuclear exchange in central Europe.

Thank you James Baker for that.

 

Posted in Current affairs | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Bosnia by the Black Sea? Could Crimea be another BiH?

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I have an op ed on this topic on the Open Democracy Russia website under the title “Could Crimea Be Another Bosnia?”

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/gerard-toal/could-crimea-be-another-bosnia-republika-srpska-krajina

For Bosnia specialists, below is the source I used for the opening quote. Specialists will know I analyzed this ‘performative structure’ in my long article on Dodik’s referendum discourse in Nationalities Papers though it was cited incorrectly as Croatian Radio 1990 when it should have, obviously, been 1991, and I incorrectly attributed it to Karadzic whereas Nikola Koljevic, SDS’s BiH President at the time, is the figure reported as using that characterization.

Also, Bosnian specialists will know that there is considerable debate over the significance of October Memorandum passed by the Socialist Assembly and the relationship of ‘sovereign’ to ‘independent.’ Izetbegovic stressed that sovereignty did not mean independence. As we know, the “independence” declaration came later after the Feb 29-March 1 1992 referendum. This understanding equates “independent” with “independent state” in the international interstate system. There is a second more localized understanding of independent, that of a coherent unified (“within its existing borders”) non-encumbered singular actor in a federal system (with a legal right to secession from this system). This, of course, was a stepping stone to the first meaning, which is why Karadzic’s SDS members were dramatically upping the ante after the (depending on your perspective) illegal maneuvre or democratic majority vote on the Memorandum of Sovereignty in October 1991. In the end, to avoid confusion, I dropped the word ‘independent’ though this is how Ana Trbovich described (my emphasis) the Memorandum  A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (Oxford, 2008) p. 220: “The proposed Memorandum declared the republic a sovereign and independent state within its existing boundaries…”

__________________________________________________

November 14, 1991, Thursday

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SERBS VOTE OVERWHELMINGLY TO STAY IN YUGOSLAVIA

SOURCE: Text of report from Sarajevo

(c) Croatian Radio, Zagreb 1600 gmt 11 Nov 91

SECTION: Part 2 Eastern Europe; C. SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT; YUGOSLAVIA; EE/1229/C1/ 1;

LENGTH: 513 words

Who is against Yugoslavia is against us, and now, after the plebiscite, we have enough arguments to prevent the separation of the whole of Bosnia-Hercegovina from Yugoslavia, Radovan Karadzic, president of the SDS, said at a press conference today in reaction to the referendum of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

It is clear after the plebiscite that the statistical figures of the last census were incorrect and that the number of Serbs is higher. In some municipalities the number of Serbs who voted was about 1,000 higher than had been stated in the census, Vojislav Maksimovic, chairman of the SDS deputies’ club, stated at the same press conference.

The plebiscite of the Serbian people is a democratic reply to undemocratic pressures, and it is now clear that Bosnia-Hercegovina does not have to be either sovereign or independent as far as the people are concerned, Nikola Koljevic, member of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency from the SDS ranks, said. The plebiscite has provided Europe with an indication as to where a solution to the problem of Yugoslavia should be looked for. But we in Yugoslavia do not need their recipes, Momcilo Krajisnik, President of the Assembly of the Serbian Nation, said, going on to add that as early as in the course of the current week that same Assembly would verify the results of the plebiscite and pass decisions to reflect its outcome.

In the light of the above it is quite clear what motives were behind the plebiscite and what further steps the SDS is going to take. This was a plebiscite in which people were allowed to cast votes by producing only an identification card, without adequate lists or any control.

According to the organisers the voting also took place in other republics and countries. Results have already been received from Switzerland, America, Sweden, and Germany and are expected from the Soviet Union from Bosnia-Hercegovina Serbs who work there.

After the counting of votes it became clear that the turnout at some polling stations had been larger than the number of names on election lists. According to Radovan Karadzic, almost 100% of votes were for while the number of those who voted against was below 1%. In the light of their statement that they expected over 1,500,000 voters to cast their vote, it is easy to conclude that one of the aims of the plebiscite was that over 51% of Bosnia-Hercegovina adolescents were for Yugoslavia. But this will be very difficult to prove.

[Note Tanjug (in English 2050 gmt 11 Nov 91) noted ''Apart from Serbs, members of other ethnic communities born or living in Bosnia-Hercegovina were also allowed to vote if they wished so, but on differently-coloured ballots.'' The report went on ''Asked by journalists what would happen now, Karadzic said this depended on the other two partners in the government coalition - the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). SDS can agree with HDZ and SDA on everything except the position of Bosnia-Hercegovina in Yugoslavia, Karadzic said.'']

Posted in Bosnia, Bosnian war, Current affairs, De Facto States, Political Borders, Political Geography, Putin, Radovan Karadzic, referendum, Rhetoric, unilateral declaration of independence | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment

Where’s His Mind? Putin’s Press Conference Annotated

Ever since the cited Merkel’s comment in Peter Baker’s NYT report on Sunday 2 March that Putin is “in another world,” loads of the punditocracy have tackled the question of Putin’s mindset (my initial reaction was that he’d abandoned his usual cagey caution and launched the invasion out in a mix of impatience, self-righteousness, and masculinist ‘decisionism’, the Caesarism Giuliani admires). Today’s press conference was a chance to assess the man and his reasoning. For Julia Joffe of The New Republic, it was confirmation that he’d ‘lost his mind.’ Many others propounded similar views. Well I think that is extreme, and runs the risk of condemning before understanding, a common problem with commentary on Russia (but driven in part by the need for concision, as well as an understandable desire to express outrage). Amidst affective storms, we’re all knocked about somewhat (there is no outside to affect/emotion).

I think there are three points worth noting about this press conference:

1. The Plot Against Russia.

Throughout, Putin circles back to a contest with Western and unseen forces who are “pushing” and engaging in “provocations” in Ukraine. What is unfolding is a geopolitical game. He sees it and is prepared to match the provocations of those challenging Russian interests.

2. The Internal Contradictions of Legitimacy Claims.

Putin has always claimed unimpeachable legitimacy for his actions. Throughout the press conference he presents himself as a sensible leader interested in constitutional procedure, democracy, stability and that which is legitimate. Yet, his deployment of Russian forces to Crimea and public presentation of these as local self-defense forces is transparently untrue. Why has he put himself in this position? I think he made a calculation based on territorial-military grounds, and sought to simulate legitimacy around it based on provocations, threats and violence. The latter has proven challenging, and is a massive source of illegitimacy for him.

3. Surly Hubris.

I think the press conference reveals a leader confident in his positions and reasoning, but also with sufficient ‘demonstrative needs’ to publicly slap down those who push too hard against his reasoning. He is a Soviet-socialized, middle aged, self-assured Caesarist with humiliation fears and less emotional intelligence than a leader should have. He is, in sum, more confident than he should be about his gambit in Crimea.

I don’t think Putin has lost his mind, is in another world, or his own world. What he articulates are familiar geopolitical storylines and interpretative strategies updated to make sense of events in Ukraine. His default interpretative mode is suspicious, cynical and conspiratorial, an indication of successful socialization in a spy agency. His actions, and how he characterizes them, consequently, should be read with these interpretive strategies in mind.

________

It takes a considerable degree of confidence to face the media in a situation like this. That slouch indicated a bit too much confidence, an impatience with the normal rules. He was in charge, and doing it his way.

This is translated text and thus misses many of the performative aspects of his speech at the press conference. Measuring affective production and resonances is hard but it can be done [change in tone of voice, eye movement, other body language, audience reactions like loudness or length of applause as well as the corporal reaction machines used in focus group watching of speeches]. Its a task that has to be left aside here for now.

So lets see what’s on his mind (my comments following highlighted italics in bold below; the source is translated text on Kremlin.ru site).

Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine

March 4, 2014, 15:40 Novo-Ogaryovo, Moscow Region

The President of Russia met with media representatives to answer a number of their questions, in particular with regard to the situation in Ukraine.

PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA VLADIMIR PUTIN: Good afternoon, colleagues,

How shall we do this? This is what I’d like to suggest: let’s have a conversation, rather than an interview. Therefore, I would ask you to begin by stating all your questions, I will jot them down and try to answer them, and then we will have a more detailed discussion of the specifics that interest you most.

Let’s begin.

QUESTION: Mr President, I would like to ask (you took a lengthy pause, so we have quite a few questions by now) how you assess the events in Kiev? Do you think that the Government and the Acting President, who are currently in power in Kiev, are legitimate? Are you ready to communicate with them, and on what terms? Do you yourself think it possible now to return to the agreements of February 21, which we all talk about so often?

QUESTION: Mr President, Russia has promised financial aid to Crimea and instructions were issued to the Finance Ministry yesterday. Is there a clear understanding of how much we are giving, where the money is coming from, on what terms and when? The situation there is very difficult.

QUESTION: When, on what terms and in what scope can military force be used in Ukraine? To what extent does this comply with Russia’s international agreements? Did the military exercises that have just finished have anything to do with the possible use of force?

QUESTION: We would like to know more about Crimea. Do you think that the provocations are over or that there remains a threat to the Russian citizens [the prevailing Russian narrative on justification for the invasion; on the rich history and political coding of the word provokatsiya see Anne Applebaum here] who are now in Crimea and to the Russian-speaking population? What are the general dynamics there – is the situation changing for the better or for the worse? We are hearing different reports from there.

QUESTION: If you do decide to use force, have you thought through all the possible risks for yourself, for the country and for the world: economic sanctions, weakened global security, a possible visa ban or greater isolation for Russia, as western politicians are demanding?

QUESTION: Yesterday the Russian stock market fell sharply in response to the Federation Council’s vote, and the ruble exchange rates hit record lows. Did you expect such a reaction? What do you think are the possible consequences for the economy? Is there a need for any special measures now, and of what kind? For instance, do you think the Central Bank’s decision to shift to a floating ruble exchange rate may have been premature? Do you think it should be revoked?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Fine, let us stop here for now. I will begin, and then we will continue. Don’t worry; I will try to answer as many questions as possible.

First of all, my assessment of what happened in Kiev and in Ukraine in general. There can only be one assessment: this was an anti-constitutional takeover, an armed seizure of power. [the collapse of both here may reveal his worldview but 'armed seizure of power' is the prevailing visual in Crimea, and this rhetoric thus boomerang's on Putin] Does anyone question this? Nobody does. [eh, actually yes] There is a question here that neither I, nor my colleagues, with whom I have been discussing the situation in Ukraine a great deal over these past days, as you know – none of us can answer. The question is why was this done?

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that President Yanukovych, through the mediation of the Foreign Ministers of three European countries – Poland, Germany and France – and in the presence of my representative (this was the Russian Human Rights Commissioner Vladimir Lukin) signed an agreement with the opposition on February 21. I would like to stress that under that agreement (I am not saying this was good or bad, just stating the fact) Mr Yanukovych actually handed over power. He agreed to all the opposition’s demands: he agreed to early parliamentary elections, to early presidential elections, and to return to the 2004 Constitution, as demanded by the opposition. He gave a positive response to our request, the request of western countries and, first of all, of the opposition not to use force. [after he had unleashed it twice, and failed twice] He did not issue a single illegal order to shoot at the poor demonstrators. [Wonder if the Russian has same level of contempt as this has in English] Moreover, he issued orders to withdraw all police forces from the capital, and they complied. He went to Kharkov to attend an event, and as soon as he left, instead of releasing the occupied administrative buildings, they immediately occupied the President’s residence and the Government building – all that instead of acting on the agreement.

I ask myself, what was the purpose of all this? I want to understand why this was done. He had in fact given up his power already, and as I believe, as I told him, he had no chance of being re-elected. Everybody agrees on this, everyone I have been speaking to on the telephone these past few days. What was the purpose of all those illegal, unconstitutional actions, why did they have to create this chaos in the country? [hyper selective in suggesting that these begin post-agreement] Armed and masked militants are still roaming the streets of Kiev. This is a question to which there is no answer. Did they wish to humiliate someone and show their power? [case for projection here; it is within these terms Putin's actions can be understood] I think these actions are absolutely foolish. The result is the absolute opposite of what they expected, because their actions have significantly destabilised the east and southeast of Ukraine.

Now over to how this situation came about. [classic self-interested situation description follows. What is interesting is that the historic narrative, which excludes the Soviet period, is premised on a question over Ukraine's independence. Implicitly he's suggesting that the whole country has suffered and is in need of help, which is not incorrect]

In my opinion, this revolutionary situation has been brewing for a long time, since the first days of Ukraine’s independence[recall Putin's rhetoric about Ukraine being a cobbled together, made-up country, echoing ominously, to my mind at least, 1990s Serb nationalist rhetoric about BiH being 'artificial'] The ordinary Ukrainian citizen, the ordinary guy suffered during the rule of Nicholas II, during the reign of Kuchma, and Yushchenko, and Yanukovych. Nothing or almost nothing has changed for the better. Corruption has reached dimensions that are unheard of here in Russia. [wonder why these levels are not heard about in Russia?] Accumulation of wealth and social stratification – problems that are also acute in this country – are much worse in Ukraine, radically worse. Out there, they are beyond anything we can imagine imagination. Generally, people wanted change, but one should not support illegal change.

Only use constitutional means should be used on the post-Soviet space, where political structures are still very fragile, and economies are still weak. Going beyond the constitutional field would always be a cardinal mistake in such a situation.  Incidentally, I understand those people on Maidan, though I do not support this kind of turnover. I understand the people on Maidan who are calling for radical change rather than some cosmetic remodelling of power. Why are they demanding this? Because they have grown used to seeing one set of thieves being replaced by another. [here Maidan protestors are presented as reasonable, understandable but just a little later below they are presented as foreign trained provocateurs]  Moreover, the people in the regions do not even participate in forming their own regional governments. There was a period in this country when the President appointed regional leaders, but then the local Council had to approve them, while in Ukraine they are appointed directly. We have now moved on to elections, while they are nowhere near this. And they began appointing all sorts of oligarchs and billionaires to govern the eastern regions of the country. No wonder the people do not accept this, no wonder they think that as a result of dishonest privatisation (just as many people think here as well) people have become rich and now they also have all the power.

For example, Mr Kolomoisky was appointed Governor of Dnepropetrovsk. This is a unique crook. He even managed to cheat our oligarch Roman Abramovich two or three years ago.  Scammed him, as our intellectuals like to say. They signed some deal, Abramovich transferred several billion dollars, while this guy never delivered and pocketed the money. When I asked him [Abramovich]: “Why did you do it?” he said: “I never thought this was possible.” I do not know, by the way, if he ever got his money back and if the deal was closed. [a scene of one person taking advantage of another, something that appears to rankle Putin. The citation of Abramovich, owner of Chelsea, resident of 'Londongrad' and peripatetic oligarch, gives us some insight into a more complex spatiality alongside the territorial terms of the conflict] But this really did happen a couple of years ago. And now this crook is appointed Governor of Dnepropetrovsk. No wonder the people are dissatisfied. They were dissatisfied and will remain so if those who refer to themselves the legitimate authorities continue in the same fashion.

Most importantly, people should have the right to determine their own future, that of their families and of their region, and to have equal participation in it. I would like to stress this: wherever a person lives, whatever part of the country, he or she should have the right to equal participation in determining the future of the country.

Are the current authorities legitimate? The Parliament is partially, but all the others are not. The current Acting President is definitely not legitimate. There is only one legitimate President, from a legal standpoint. Clearly, he has no power. However, as I have already said, and will repeat: Yanukovych is the only undoubtedly legitimate President.

There are three ways of removing a President under Ukrainian law: one is his death, the other is when he personally stands down, and the third is impeachment. The latter is a well-deliberated constitutional norm. It has to involve the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the Rada. This is a complicated and lengthy procedure. It was not carried out.  Therefore, from a legal perspective this is an undisputed fact.

Moreover, I think this may be why they disbanded the Constitutional Court, which runs counter to all legal norms of both Ukraine and Europe. They not only disbanded the Constitutional Court in an illegitimate fashion, but they also – just think about it – instructed the Prosecutor General’s Office to launch criminal proceedings against members of the Constitutional Court. What is that all about? Is this what they call free justice? How can you instruct anyone to start criminal proceedings? If a crime, a criminal offence, has been committed, the law enforcement agencies see this and react. But instructing them to file criminal charges is nonsense, it’s monkey business.

Now about financial aid to Crimea. As you may know, we have decided to organise work in the Russian regions to aid Crimea, [I am puzzled by this, perhaps a function of the translation. 'Russian regions' is without referent; within Russia?, in Ukraine?, outside Crimea]  which has turned to us for humanitarian support. We will provide it, of course. I cannot say how much, when or how – the Government is working on this, by bringing together the regions bordering on Crimea, by providing additional support to our regions so they could help the people in Crimea. [this is confusing and not at all clear. Reading between the lines, the spaces he appears to recognize are: Crimea, a distinctive space, Russia's regions bordering Ukraine and Russian regions within Ukraine beyond Crimea. The latter two seem blurred, which might be ominous]  We will do it, of course.

Regarding the deployment of troops, the use of armed forces.  So far, there is no need for it, but the possibility remains. I would like to say here that the military exercises we recently held had nothing to do with the events in Ukraine.  This was pre-planned, but we did not disclose these plans, naturally, because this was a snap inspection of the forces’ combat readiness. We planned this a long time ago, the Defence Minister reported to me and I had the order ready to begin the exercise. As you may know, the exercises are over; I gave the order for the troops to return to their regular dislocations yesterday.

What can serve as a reason to use the Armed Forces? Such a measure would certainly be the very last resort.

First, the issue legitimacy. As you may know, we have a direct appeal from the incumbent and, as I said, legitimate President of Ukraine, Mr Yanukovych, asking us to use the Armed Forces to protect the lives, freedom and health of the citizens of Ukraine.

What is our biggest concern? We see the rampage of reactionary forces, nationalist and anti-Semitic forces going on in certain parts of Ukraine, including Kiev. [in Yugoslavia, Milosevic saw himself as fighting Western spy services, reactionary nationalists and anti-semites, the 'desire to be a Jew' being one pecularity of the Serbian 'dream book' (Zivkovic 2011). A not dissimilar complex is being drawn together here by Putin] I am sure you, members of the media, saw how one of the governors was chained and handcuffed to something and they poured water over him, in the cold of winter. After that, by the way, he was locked up in a cellar and tortured. What is all this about? Is this democracy? Is this some manifestation of democracy? He was actually only recently appointed to this position, in December, I believe. Even if we accept that they are all corrupt there, he had barely had time to steal anything.

And do you know what happened when they seized the Party of Regions building? There were no party members there at all at the time. Some two-three employees came out, one was an engineer, and he said to the attackers: “Could you let us go, and let the women out, please. I’m an engineer, I have nothing to do with politics.” He was shot right there in front of the crowd. Another employee was led to a cellar and then they threw Molotov cocktails at him and burned him alive.  Is this also a manifestation of democracy? [the standard outrage scenes, affectively yoked to the signifier 'democracy.' Message: western 'democracy' equals chaos and terrorism].

When we see this we understand what worries the citizens of Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian, and the Russian-speaking population in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. It is this uncontrolled crime that worries them. Therefore, if we see such uncontrolled crime spreading to the eastern regions of the country, and if the people ask us for help, while we already have the official request from the legitimate President, we retain the to use all available means to protect those people. We believe this would be absolutely legitimate. This is our last resort.

Moreover, here is what I would like to say: we have always considered Ukraine not only a neighbour, but also a brotherly neighbouring republic, and will continue to do so. Our Armed Forces are comrades in arms, friends, many of whom know each other personally. I am certain, and I stress, I am certain that the Ukrainian military and the Russian military will not be facing each other, they will be on the same side in a fight.

Incidentally, the things I am talking about – this unity – is what is happening in Crimea. You should note that, thank God, not a single gunshot has been fired there; there are no casualties, except for those crushed by the crowd about a week ago. What was going on there? People came, surrounded units of the armed forces and talked to them, convincing them to follow the demands and the will of the people living in that area. There was not a single armed conflict, not a single gunshot. [no violence = we are accepted but if there were violence then threat of chaos is real. Legitimacy claimed no matter what]

Thus the tension in Crimea that was linked to the possibility of using our Armed Forces simply died down and there was no need to use them. The only thing we had to do, and we did it, was to enhance the defence of our military facilities because they were constantly receiving threats and we were aware of the armed nationalists moving in. [key threat scenario for him] We did this, it was the right thing to do and very timely. Therefore, I proceed from the idea that we will not have to do anything of the kind in eastern Ukraine.

There is something I would like to stress, however. Obviously, what I am going to say now is not within my authority and we do not intend to interfere. However, we firmly believe that all citizens of Ukraine, I repeat, wherever they live, should be given the same equal right to participate in the life of their country and in determining its future. [here is the boldest contradiction; no interference yet "we firmly believe..", and clearly will back up with armed force, i.e. interference]

If I were in the shoes of those who consider themselves the legitimate authorities, I would not waste time and go through all the necessary procedures, because they do not have a national mandate to conduct the domestic, foreign and economic policy of Ukraine, and especially to determine its future.

Now, the stock market. As you may know, the stock market was jumpy even before the situation in Ukraine deteriorated. This is primarily linked to the policy of the US Federal Reserve, whose recent decisions enhanced the attractiveness of investing in the US economy and investors began moving their funds from the developing markets to the American market. This is a general trend and it has nothing to do with Ukraine. I believe it was India that suffered most, as well as the other BRICS states. Russia was hit as well, not as hard as India, but it was. This is the fundamental reason.

As for the events in Ukraine, politics always influence the stock market in one way or another. Money likes quiet, stability and calm. However, I think this is a tactical, temporary development and a temporary influence.

Your questions, please.

QUESTION: Mr President, can you tell us if you expected such a harsh reaction to Russia’s actions from your western partners? Could you give us any details of your conversations with your western partners? All we’ve heard was a report from the press service. And what do you think about the G8 summit in Sochi – will it take place?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Regarding the expected reaction, whether the G8 will meet and about the conversations. Our conversations are confidential, some are even held over secure lines. Therefore, I am not authorised to disclose what I discussed with my partners. I will, however, refer to some public statements made by my colleagues from the west; without giving any names, I will comment on them in a general sense.

What do we pay attention to? We are often told our actions are illegitimate, but when I ask, “Do you think everything you do is legitimate?” they say “yes”. Then, I have to recall the actions of the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, where they either acted without any UN sanctions or completely distorted the content of such resolutions, as was the case with Libya. There, as you may know, the resolution only spoke of closing the airspace for government aircraft, while it all ended with bomb attacks and special forces land operations. [clearly the Libyan action, resulting in the murder of an autocrat who once seemed secure, rankles Putin. It is the latest in a list of remembered geopolitical anger points]

Our partners, especially in the United Sates, always clearly formulate their own geopolitical and state interests and follow them with persistence. Then, using the principle “You’re either with us or against us” they draw the whole world in. And those who do not join in get ‘beaten’ until they do.

Our approach is different. We proceed from the conviction that we always act legitimately. I have personally always been an advocate of acting in compliance with international law. I would like to stress yet again that if we do make the decision, if I do decide to use the Armed Forces, this will be a legitimate decision in full compliance with both general norms of international law, since we have the appeal of the legitimate President, and with our commitments, which in this case coincide with our interests to protect the people with whom we have close historical, cultural and economic ties. Protecting these people is in our national interests. This is a humanitarian mission. We do not intend to subjugate anyone or to dictate to anyone. However, we cannot remain indifferent if we see that they are being persecuted, destroyed and humiliated. However, I sincerely hope it never gets to that. [here is the essence of the 'preventative responsibility to protect in a privilaged sphere of influence' doctrine. The slippage from 'genocide' to 'humiliation' is very interesting, and underscores the centrality of notions of honor/humiliation, in Putin's foreign policy and Russian geopolitical discourse more generally. See Tsygankov's book on this theme]

QUESTION: How do you asses the reaction of the west to the events in Ukraine and their threats regarding Russia: are we facing the possibility of sanctions or withdrawal from the G8?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Regarding sanctions. It is primarily those who intend to apply them that need to consider their consequences. I believe that in the modern world, where everything is interconnected and interdependent, it is possible to cause damage to another country, but this will be mutual damage and one should bear this in mind.  This is one thing.

The second and the most important thing. I have already told you what motivates us.  And what motivates our partners? They supported an unconstitutional armed take-over, declared these people legitimate and are trying to support them. By the way, despite all of this we have been patient and even ready to cooperate; we do not want to disrupt our cooperation. As you may know, a few days ago I instructed the Government to consider how we can maintain contacts even with those powers in Kiev that we do not consider legitimate in order to retain our ties in the economy and industry. We think our actions have been absolutely reasonable, while any threat against Russia is counterproductive and harmful.

As for the G8, I do not know. We will be ready to host the summit with our colleagues. If they do not want to come – so be it.

QUESTION: Can I add about contacts? The way I see it, you consider the Prime Minister of Crimea Mr Aksyonov to be a legitimate representative of government authorities. [subtle dig at Putin since he's also an installed by the street]  Are you ready to have any contacts with those who consider themselves the legitimate authorities in Kiev?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I have just spoken about it. You must have missed it. [Snap! A clear put down; whose the boss here; this is actually quite petty and may reveal a certain pleasure in public humiliation of those who challenge him. This 'Tsarist' attitude, publicly firing people on TV, seems part of Russian political culture]

QUESTION: I mean, at the top level for a political solution.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I do not have a partner at the top level there. There is no president there, and there cannot be one until the general elections.

As for Crimea, the Parliament there was formed in 2010, in December 2010 if I remember correctly. There are 100 MPs representing six political parties. After the previous Prime Minister resigned, the Crimean Parliament, in compliance with the existing legislation and procedures elected a new Prime Minister at a session of the Crimean Supreme Council. He is definitely legitimate.  They have complied with all the procedures envisaged by the law; there is not a single violation. However, when a few days ago a group of armed men tried to occupy the building of the Crimean Supreme Soviet, this caused the concern of the local residents. It seemed as though someone wanted to apply the Kiev scenario in Crimea and to launch a series of terrorist attacks and cause chaos. Naturally, this causes grave concern among the local residents. That is why they set up self-defence committees and took control over all the armed forces. [they not us, externalizing of responsibility onto local Crimeans]

Incidentally, I was studying the brief yesterday to see what they took over – it is like a fortified zone. There are several dozen C-300 units, several dozen air-defence missile systems, 22,000 service members and a lot more.  However, as I said, this is all in the hands of the people of Crimea and without a single gunshot. [portraying actions as local bottom-up]

QUESTION: Mr President, a clarification if I may. The people who were blocking the Ukrainian Army units in Crimea were wearing uniforms that strongly resembled the Russian Army uniform. Were those Russian soldiers, Russian military?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Why don’t you take a look at the post-Soviet states. There are many uniforms there that are similar. You can go to a store and buy any kind of uniform. [a punky attitude here; see above about desire to make fun, to mock, to humiliate]

QUESTION: But were they Russian soldiers or not?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Those were local self-defence units. [An incredible transparent lie revealing a need to adhere to the fiction of local-level actions in response to the threat from Kiev. Why expose oneself to transparent ]

QUESTION: How well trained are they? If we compare them to the self-defence units in Kiev…

VLADIMIR PUTIN: My dear colleague, look how well trained the people who operated in Kiev were. As we all know they were trained at special bases in neighbouring states: in Lithuania, Poland and in Ukraine itself too. They were trained by instructors for extended periods. They were divided into dozens and hundreds, their actions were coordinated, they had good communication systems. It was all like clockwork.  Did you see them in action? They looked very professional, like special forces. Why do you think those in Crimea should be any worse? [An incredible passage in which he externalizes Kiev onto what he presumes are hostile states and then implicitly concedes that Russia is, therefore, playing the same game. His counter-intelligence background undoubtedly predisposes him to see the world in terms of plots and provocations, of unseen hands rather than surfaces. The desire for a little bravado leads him to wink somewhat at his own ostensibly sincere script here].

QUESTION: In that case, can I specify: did we take part in training Crimean self-defence forces?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: No, we did not. [Pinocchio nose developing]

QUESTION: How do you see the future of Crimea? Do you consider the possibility of it joining Russia?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: No, we do not. Generally, I believe that only residents of a given country who have the freedom of will and are in complete safety can and should determine their future. If this right was granted to the Albanians in Kosovo, [Kosovo, like Libya, is a geopolitical anger point for Putin, one that partially fueled the August 2008 war]  if this was made possible in many different parts of the world, then nobody has ruled out the right of nations to self-determination, which, as far as I know, is fixed by several UN documents.  However, we will in no way provoke any such decision and will not breed such sentiments.

I would like to stress that I believe only the people living in a given territory have the right to determine their own future. [key question, of course, is how is the 'given territory' defined, and determined?]

QUESTION: Two questions. You said that sending troops into Ukraine is an extreme measure, but you are nevertheless not ruling it out. Still, if Russian troops enter Ukraine, it could start a war. Doesn’t that bother you?

And a second question. You say that Yanukovych did not give the order to shoot people. But somebody shot at the protestors. And clearly, these were snipers, trained snipers.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: You know, some people, including those who were recently among the protestors, have expressed the opinion that these were provocateurs from one of the opposition parties. Have you heard this? [Putin is citing intelligence intercepts that were only released March 6th, intelligence he clearly had access to, though these merely speculate rather than determine] 

REPLY: No, I have not heard this.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Look at these materials – they are freely available. That is why it is very difficult to get to the bottom of the situation. But you and I saw for ourselves when the Berkut fighters stood there with their shields and were shot at – and those were not air weapons that were used against them but assault weapons that pierced their shields. That is something we saw for certain. As for who gave the orders – that I do not know. I only know what Mr Yanukovych told me. And he told me that he did not give any orders, and moreover, he gave instructions – after signing a corresponding agreement – to even withdraw all militia units from the capital.

If you want, I can tell you even more. He called me on the phone and I told him not to do it. I said, “You will have anarchy, you will have chaos in the capital. Think about the people.” But he did it anyway. [So, provocation protestors may have been snipers -- unproven --, some on the ground did shoot -- true --, Yanukovych said he didn't order firing, yet Putin in effect believes that he did] And as soon as he did it, his office was seized, and that of the government, and the chaos I had warned him about and which continues to this day, erupted.

QUESTION: What about the first question? Are you concerned that a war could break out?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I am not concerned, because we do not plan and we will not fight with the Ukrainian people.

QUESTION: But there are Ukrainian troops, there is the Ukrainian army.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Listen carefully. I want you to understand me clearly: if we make that decision, it will only be to protect Ukrainian citizens. And let’s see those troops try to shoot their own people, with us behind them – not in the front, but behind. Let them just try to shoot at women and children! I would like to see those who would give that order in Ukraine.

QUESTION: Can I ask a question, Mr President? Our colleagues, my colleagues, who are currently working in Ukraine, are saying practically every day that the situation for the Berkut fighters is only getting worse (perhaps with the exception of Crimea). In particular, in Kiev, there are injured Berkut officers who are in hospitals now, where nobody is treating them and they are not even getting fed. And their families, including elderly family members, they simply cannot leave the house, because they are not being allowed; there are barricades all around, they are being humiliated. Can you comment on this? And can Russia help these families and colleagues? [fascinating that despised riot police are object of pity, and seen as victims]

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Yes, this issue is of great concern to us. After all, these are not Russia’s Interior Ministry officers, and we were not managing the situation there. But out of humanitarian considerations, it would be good if our human rights organisations got involved in this as well; we might ask Vladimir Lukin, either alone or together with his colleagues, representatives from France, Germany and Poland, with whom he participated in developing the well-known document of February 21, 2014, to go on location and see what is happening there with these Berkut officers, who have not broken any laws and acted in accordance with their orders. They are military service members, they stood there facing bullets, they were doused with fire and had Molotov cocktails thrown at them. They have been wounded and injured and are now in a hospital. It is even hard to imagine – even prisoners of war are being fed and treated. But they not only stopped treating them, they even stopped feeding them. And they have surrounded the building where these fighters’ families live and are bullying them. I think that human rights organisations must pay attention to this. And we, for our part, are ready to provide them with medical care here in Russia.

QUESTION: Mr President, getting back to the West’s reaction. Following the US Secretary of State’s harsh statement, the Federation Council suggested that we recall our ambassador to the United States. Do you support this idea?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: The US Secretary of State is certainly an important person, but he is not the ultimate authority that determines the United States’ foreign policy. We hear statements from various politicians and representatives of various political forces. This would be an extreme measure. If necessary, it will be used. But I really don’t want to use it, because I think Russia is not the only one interested in cooperation with its partners on an international level and in such areas as economy, politics and foreign security; our partners are just as interested in this cooperation. [Putin has apparently already calculated that he can isolate the Crimea question from Russia's role in addressing collective security questions, almost as if he sees Crimea as 'domestic politics' about which different 'non-interference' rules apply.] It is very easy to destroy these instruments of cooperation and it would be very difficult to rebuild them.

QUESTION: Russia got involved in Yanukovych’s fate. How do you see his future role and his future destiny?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: You know, it is very hard for me to say; I have not analysed it carefully. I think he has no political future, and I have told him so. As for “getting involved in his fate” – we did this on purely humanitarian grounds. Death is the easiest way for getting rid of a legitimate president, and I think that is what would have happened. I think they would have simply killed him. Incidentally, the question arises: what for?

After all, look at how it all began, what triggered these events. The formal reason was that he did not sign the European Union Association Agreement. Today, this seems like nonsense; it is ridiculous to even talk about. But I want to point out that he did not refuse to sign the association agreement. He said: “We have carefully analysed it, and its content does not correspond with our national interests. We cannot sharply increase energy prices for our people, because our people are already in a rather difficult position. We cannot do this, and that, and that. We cannot immediately break our economic ties with Russia, because our cooperation is very extensive.”

I have already presented these figures: out of approximately 14 billion [dollars] in export, approximately 5 billion represents second and third technological processing level products exported to Russia. In other words, just about all engineering products are exported to Russia; the West is not buying any Ukrainian products. And to take all this and break it apart, to introduce European technical standards in the Ukrainian economy, which, thankfully or unfortunately, we are not using at the moment. We will adopt those standards at some point, but currently, we do not have those standards in Russia. This means the next day, our relations and cooperation ties will be broken, enterprises will come to a standstill and unemployment will increase. And what did Yanukovych say? He said, “I cannot do this so suddenly, let’s discuss this further.” He did not refuse to sign it, he asked for a chance to discuss this document some more, and then all this craziness began.

And why? Did he do something outside the scope of his authority? He acted absolutely within the scope of his authority; he did not infringe on anything. It was simply an excuse to support the forces opposing him in a fight for power. Overall, this is nothing special. But did it really need to be taken to this level of anarchy, to an unconstitutional overthrow and armed seizure of power, subsequently plunging the nation into the chaos where it finds itself today? I think this is unacceptable. And it is not the first time our Western partners are doing this in Ukraine. [Memory of Orange Revolution] I sometimes get the feeling that somewhere across that huge puddle, in America, people sit in a lab and conduct experiments, as if with rats, without actually understanding the consequences of what they are doing. [an extraordinary claim, revealing a certain paranoid geopolitical vision born, no doubt, from his KGB/FSB socialization] Why did they need to do this? Who can explain this? There is no explanation at all for it.

The same thing happened during the first Maidan uprising, when Yanukovych was blocked from power. Why did we need that third round of elections? In other words, it was turned into a farce – Ukraine’s political life was turned into a farce. There was no compliance with the Constitution at all. You see, we are now teaching people that if one person can violate any law, anyone else can do the same, and that’s what causes chaos. That is the danger. [In passages like this, and others above and below, we hear Putin the conservative, the law & order leader, someone spiritually closer to the Right than the Left. Yet this side of him is never acknowledged by the Right in the US who still see him as a closet Communist. Wrong!] Instead, we need to teach our society to follow other traditions: traditions of respecting the main law of the nation, the Constitution, and all other laws. Of course, we will not always succeed, but I think acting like this – like a bull in a china shop is counterproductive and very dangerous.

Please.

QUESTION: Mr President, Turchynov is illegitimate, from your point of view.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: As President, yes.

QUESTION: But the Rada is partially legitimate.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Yes.

QUESTION: Are Yatsenyuk and the Cabinet legitimate? And if Russia is concerned about the growing strength of radical elements, they grow stronger every time they find themselves facing a hypothetical enemy, which in their view, they currently consider Russia and Russia’s position of being ready to send in troops. [a semi-critically minded question(!), its implication being that controversial Russian action plays into the hands of anti-Russian nationalist forces, which is absolutely correct, as we've seen] Question: does it make sense and is it possible to hold talks with moderate forces in the Ukrainian government, with Yatsenyuk, and is he legitimate?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Listen, it seems like you didn’t hear what I have said. [hey, who's the boss!] I already said that three days ago, I gave instructions to the Government to renew contacts at the government level with their colleagues in the corresponding ministries and departments in Ukraine, in order not to disrupt economic ties, to support them in their attempts to reconstruct the economy. Those were my direct instructions to the Russian Government. Moreover, Mr Medvedev is in contact with [Arseniy] Yatsenyuk. And I know that Sergei Naryshkin, as speaker of the Russian parliament, is in contact with [Oleksandr] Turchynov. But, I repeat, all our trade and economic and other ties, our humanitarian ties, can be developed in full only after the situation is normalised and presidential elections are held. [elections = normalization! But will Crimea be part of Ukraine when they are held. That it may not is evidence for the short-sightedness of Putin's gambit since Ukraine is likely to tilt more steadily towards the EU without the Crimean electorate]

QUESTION: Gazprom has already said that it is reverting to its old gas prices beginning in April.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Gazprom could not have said that; you were not listening carefully [boss talk] or it did not express itself clearly. Gazprom is not reverting to the old prices. It simply does not want to extend the current discounts, which it had agreed to apply or not apply on a quarterly basis. Even before all these events, even before they hit the crisis point. I know about the negotiations between Gazprom and its partners. Gazprom and the Government of the Russian Federation agreed that Gazprom would introduce a discount by reducing gas prices to $268.50 per 1,000 cubic metres. The Government of Russia provides the first tranche of the loan, which is formally not a loan but a bond purchase – a quasi-loan, $3 billion dollars in the first stage. And the Ukrainian side undertakes to fully repay its debt that arose in the second half of last year and to make regular payments for what they are consuming – for the gas. The debt has not been repaid, regular payments are not being made in full.

Moreover, if the Ukrainian partners fail to make the February payment, the debt will grow even bigger. Today it is around $1.5-1.6 billion. And if they do not fully pay for February, it will be nearly $2 billion. Naturally, in these circumstances, Gazprom says, “Listen guys, since you don’t pay us anyway, and we are only seeing an increase in your debt, let’s lock into the regular price, which is still reduced.” This is a purely commercial component of Gazprom’s activities, which plans for revenues and expenditures in its investment plans like any other major company. If they do not receive the money from their Ukrainian partners on time, then they are undercutting their own investment programmes; this is a real problem for them. And incidentally, this does not have to do with the events in Ukraine or any politics. There was an agreement: “We give you money and reduced gas rates, and you give us regular payments.” They gave them money and reduced gas rates, but the payments are not being made. So naturally, Gazprom says, “Guys, that won’t work.”

QUESTION: Mr President, [German Federal Chancellor] Merkel’s Press Service said after your telephone conversation that you had agreed to send an international fact-finding mission to Ukraine and set up a contact group.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I said that we have people who have the training and skills needed to be able to examine this issue and discuss it with our German colleagues. This is all possible. I gave the instruction accordingly to our Foreign Minister, who was to or will meet with the German Foreign Minister, Mr Steinmeier, yesterday or today to discuss this matter.

QUESTION: All eyes are on Crimea at the moment of course, but we see what is happening in other parts of Ukraine too, in the east and south. We see what is happening in Kharkov, Donetsk, Lugansk and Odessa. People are raising the Russian flag over government buildings and appealing to Russia for aid and support. Will Russia respond to these events?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Do you think we have not made any response? I think we’ve just spent the last hour discussing this response. In some cases though, the developments taking place are unexpected in my view. I will not go into the specific details of what I am referring to here, but the reaction that we are seeing from people is understandable, in principle. Did our partners in the West and those who call themselves the government in Kiev now not foresee that events would take this turn? I said to them over and over: Why are you whipping the country into a frenzy like this? What are you doing? But they keep on pushing forward. Of course people in the eastern part of the country realise that they have been left out of the decision-making process.

Essentially, what is needed now is to adopt a new constitution and put it to a referendum so that all of Ukraine’s citizens can take part in the process and influence the choice of basic principles that will form the foundations of their country’s government. But this is not our affair of course. [Brilliant condensation of the contradictory impulses at work in Putin's discourse here: boss talk about what is needed, yet 'not our affair.'] This is something for the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian authorities to decided one way or another. I think that once a legitimate government is in place and a new president and parliament are elected, which is what is planned, this will probably go ahead. If I were them, I would return to the matter of adopting a constitution and, as I said, putting it to a referendum so that everyone can have their say on it, cast their vote, and then everyone will have to respect it. If people feel they are left out of this process, they will never agree with it and will keep on fighting it. Who needs this kind of thing? But as I said, this is all not our affair.

QUESTION: Will Russia recognise the planned presidential election that will take place in Ukraine?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Let’s see how it goes. If it is accompanied by the same kind of terror that we are seeing now in Kiev, we will not recognise it.

QUESTION: I want to come back to the West’s reaction. As all this tough talk continues, we have the Paralympics opening in a few days’ time in Sochi. Are these Games at risk of ending up on the brink of disruption, at least as far as international media coverage goes?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I don’t know, I think it would be the height of cynicism to put the Paralympics at risk. We all know that this is an international sports event at which people with disabilities can show their capabilities, prove to themselves and the entire world that they are not people with limitations, but on the contrary, people with unlimited possibilities, and demonstrate their achievements in sport. If there are people ready to try to disrupt this event, it would show that these are people for whom there really is nothing sacred.

QUESTION: I want to ask about the hypothetical possibility of using the military. People in the West have said that if Russia makes such a decision, it would violate the Budapest Memorandum, under which the United States and some NATO partners consecrated territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for its promise to give up nuclear weapons. If developments take this turn, could global players intervene in this local conflict and turn it into a global conflict? Have you taken these risks into account?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Before making public statements, and all the more so before taking practical steps, we give issues due thought and attention and try to foresee the consequences and reactions that the various potential players could have.

As for the Memorandum that you mentioned, you said you are from Reuters, is that right?

RESPONSE: Yes.

VLADIMIR PUTIN:  How do the public and political circles in your country view these events that have taken place? It is clear after all that this was an armed seizure of power. That is a clear and evident fact. And it is clear too that this goes against the Constitution. That is also a clear fact, is it not?

RESPONSE: I live in Russia.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Good on you! You should join the diplomatic service; you’d make a good diplomat. Diplomats’ tongues, as we know, are there to hide their thoughts. So, we say that what we are seeing is an anti-constitutional coup, and we get told, no, it isn’t. You have probably heard plenty of times now that this was not an anti-constitutional coup and not an armed seizure of power, but a revolution. Have you heard this?

RESPONSE: Yes.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Yes, but if this is revolution, what does this mean? In such a case it is hard not to agree with some of our experts who say that a new state is now emerging in this territory. This is just like what happened when the Russian Empire collapsed after the 1917 revolution and a new state emerged. And this would be a new state with which we have signed no binding agreements. [the analogy here seems to suggest that right-wing Bolsheviks forced the collapse of an 'empire' country, Ukraine, and it will now fragment just as the Tsarist Empire did.]

QUESTION: I want to clarify a point. You said that if the USA imposes sanctions, this would deal a blow to both economies. Does this imply that Russia might impose counter-sanctions of its own, and if so, would they be a symmetrical response?

You spoke about gas discounts too. But there was also the agreement to buy $15 billion worth of Ukrainian bonds. Ukraine received the first tranche at the end of last year. Has payment of the remaining money been suspended? If Russia provides aid, on what specific economic and political terms will this be done? And what political and economic risks are you taking into consideration in this case?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: To answer your question, we are in principle ready to look at taking the steps needed to make the other tranches available with regard to the purchase of bonds. But our Western partners have asked us not to do this. They have asked us to work together through the IMF to encourage the Ukrainian authorities to carry out the reforms needed to bring about recovery in the Ukrainian economy. We will continue working in this direction. But given that Naftogaz of Ukraine is not paying Gazprom now, the Government is considering various options.

QUESTION: Mr President, is the dynamic of events in Ukraine changing for the better or for the worse?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Overall, I think it is gradually starting to level out. We absolutely must send the signal to people [the generic signifier but implicitly assumes these are pro-Russian Russophones, which is only one segment, and probably a minority segment; other groups will feel less secure] in Ukraine’s southeast that they can feel safe, and know that they will be able to take part in the general political process of stabilising the country.

QUESTION: You have made several mentions now of future legitimate elections in Ukraine. Who do you see as compromise candidate? Of course you will say that this for the Ukrainian people to decide, but I ask you all the same.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: To be honest, I really don’t know.

RESPONSE: It seems that the people also don’t know, because no matter who you talk to, everyone seems to be at a loss.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I really can’t say. You know, it’s hard to make predictions after events of this kind. I have already said that I do not agree with this method of taking power and removing the incumbent authorities and president, and I strongly oppose this kind of method in Ukraine and in the post-Soviet area in general. I oppose this because this kind of method does not inculcate legal culture, respect for the law. If one person can get away with doing this, it means that everyone is allowed to try, and this only means chaos. You have to understand that this kind of chaos is the worst possible thing for countries with a shaky economy and unstable political system. In this kind of situation you never know what kind of people events will bring to the fore. Just recall, for example, the role that [Ernst] Roehm’s storm troopers played during Hitler’s rise to power. Later, these storm troopers were liquidated, but they played their part in bringing Hitler to power. [the analogy uber ales, still going strong in 21st century!] Events can take all kinds of unexpected turns.

Let me say again that in situations when people call for fundamental political reform and new faces at the top, and with full justification too – and in this I agree with the Maidan – there is a risk too that you’ll suddenly get some upstart nationalist or semi-fascist lot sprout up, like the genie suddenly let out of the bottle – and we see them today, people wearing armbands with something resembling swastikas, still roaming around Kiev at this moment – or some anti-Semite or other. This danger is there too.

QUESTION: Just today, incidentally, the Ukrainian envoy to the UN said that the crimes committed by Bandera’s followers were falsified by the Soviet Union. With May 9 coming closer, we can see now who is in power there today. Should we even have any contacts with them at all?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: We need to have contact with everyone except for obvious criminals, but as I said, in this kind of situation, there is always the risk that events of this kind will bring people with extreme views to the fore, and this of course has serious consequences for the country.

QUESTION: You said that we should make contact with everyone. Yulia Tymoshenko was planning it seems, to come to Moscow.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: As you know, we always worked quite productively with all of the different Ukrainian governments, no matter what their political colour. We worked with Leonid Kuchma, and with [Viktor] Yushchenko. When I was Prime Minister, I worked with Tymoshenko. I visited her in Ukraine and she came here to Russia. We had to deal with all kinds of different situations in our work to manage our countries’ economies. We had our differences, but we also reached agreements. Overall it was constructive work. If she wants to come to Russia, let her come. It’s another matter that she is no longer prime minister now. In what capacity will she come? But I personally have no intention of stopping her from coming to Russia.

QUESTION: Just a brief question: who do you think is behind this coup, as you called it, in Ukraine?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: As I said before, I think this was a well-prepared action. Of course there were combat detachments. They are still there, and we all saw how efficiently they worked. Their Western instructors tried hard of course. But this is not the real problem. If the Ukrainian government had been strong, confident, and had built a stable system, no nationalists would have been able to carry out those programs and achieve the results that we see now.

The real problem is that none of the previous Ukrainian governments gave proper attention to people’s needs. Here in Russia we have many problems, and many of them are similar to those in Ukraine, but they are not as serious as in Ukraine. Average per capita [monthly] income in Russia, for example, is 29,700 rubles, but in Ukraine, if we convert it into rubles, it is 11,900 rubles, I think – almost three times lower than in Russia. The average pension in Russia is 10,700 rubles, but in Ukraine it is 5,500 rubles – twice lower than in Russia. Great Patriotic War veterans in Russia receive almost as much as the average worker each month. In other words, there is a substantial difference in living standards. This was what the various governments should have been focusing on right from the start. Of course they needed to fight crime, nepotism, clans and so on, especially in the economy. People see what is going on, and this creates lack of confidence in the authorities.

This has continued as several generations of modern Ukrainian politicians have come and gone, and the ultimate result is that people are disappointed and want to see a new system and new people in power. This was the main source of fuel for the events that took place. But let me say again: a change of power, judging by the whole situation, was probably necessary in Ukraine, but it should have taken place only through legitimate means, in respect for and not in violation of the current Constitution. [interesting admission, but refusal to allow that legitimate protesting means were attacked, outlawed, fired upon]

QUESTION: Mr President, if Crimea holds a referendum and the people there vote to secede from Ukraine, that is, if the majority of the region’s residents vote for secession, would you support it?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: You can never use the conditional mood in politics. I will stick to that rule.

QUESTION: Is Yanukovych even still alive? There have been rumours that he died.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I have seen him once since he arrived in Russia. That was just two days ago. He was alive and well and wishes you the same. He’ll still have a chance of catching a cold at the funeral of those who are spreading these rumours of his demise.

QUESTION: Mr President, what mistakes do you think Yanukovych made over these last months as the situation intensified in Ukraine?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I would rather not answer this question, not because I do not have an opinion to express, but because I do not think it would be proper on my part. You have to understand, after all…

QUESTION: Do you sympathise with him?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: No, I have completely different feelings. Anyone in this office bears an enormous responsibility on their shoulders as head of state, and they have rights and also obligations. But the biggest obligation of all is to carry out the will of the people who have entrusted you with the country, acting within the law. And so we need to analyse, did he do everything that the law and the voters’ mandate empowered him to do? You can analyse this yourselves and draw your own conclusions.

QUESTION: But what feelings do you have for him? You said “not sympathy, but other feelings”. What feelings exactly?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Let’s talk later.

QUESTION: You said just two questions back that we must above all send a clear signal to people in the south and southeast of Ukraine. The southeast, that’s understandable, but…

VLADIMIR PUTIN: We need to make our position clear to everyone, really.

We need to be heard by all of Ukraine’s people. We have no enemies in Ukraine. Let me say again that Ukraine is a friendly country. Do you know how many people came from Ukraine to Russia last year? 3.3 million came, and of that number almost 3 million people came to Russia for work. These people are working here – around 3 million people. Do you know how much money they send back home to Ukraine to support their families? Count up the average wage of 3 million people. This comes to billions of dollars and makes a big contribution to Ukraine’s GDP. This is no joking matter. We welcome all of them, and among the people coming here to work are also many from western Ukraine. They are all equal in our eyes, all brothers to us.

QUESTION: This is just what I wanted to ask about. We are hearing above all about the southeast of Ukraine at the moment, which is understandable, but there are ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people living in western Ukraine too, and their situation is probably even worse. They probably cannot raise their heads at all and are a downtrodden minority there. [victimized, cowered co-ethnics? Co-ethnics beyond our borders solidarity appeal, a historically explosive discourse]  What can Russia do to help them?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Our position is that if the people who call themselves the government now hope to be considered a civilised government, they must ensure the safety of all of their citizens, no matter in which part of the country, and we of course will follow this situation closely.

Thank you.

 

Posted in Affect, Current affairs, Libya, Political Borders, Political Geography, Presidency, Putin, state theory, World political map | 2 Comments

Hubris: the Russian Version

David Corn and Michael Isakoff’s book Hubris is a detailed journalistic account of how masculinist swagger, geopolitical pre-convictions and ideological zeal lead a relatively small group of war entrepreneurs to fabricate  a case for the invasion of Iraq on faulty intelligence grounds, and thereafter how gross incompetence and myopia created a quagmire for the United States.

What we are seeing play out in the Crimea is a Russian version of this hubris. Like Iraq, this is a war launched on faulty and misleading intelligence. There was no immanent threat to the lives of ethnic Russians in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. There was a popular revolt against the democratically elected government of Viktor Yanukovich. Absent its injudicious use of force on 30 November 2013, there is a good likelihood that this government would likely still be in power, albeit with serious legitimacy problems. Instead, the government used force, then rushed through a series of extreme anti-democratic laws, and the stakes in the protest became existential as both sides escalated. The EU-Russian brokered agreement was violated by the protestors, the introduction of a cabinet before encamped protestors for their approval or not suggested mob rule, the appointment of Svoboda members to government and especially national security position grounds for legitimate concern from Moscow about the Black Sea Sevastapol naval base, and the repeal of the status of the Russian language in the eastern districts beyond Crimea an unnecessary provocation. There was, in short, heightened polarization and a generalized crisis of legitimacy. But there was no armed threat to ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine. Nor was any violent action taken when pro-Russian protestors (aka a mob) stormed the government building in Simferopol, ousted its prime minister and announced a referendum on autonomy. The Ukrainian government’s response to events in Crimea has been the opposite of Yanukovich’s reaction to the Kiev protests.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin set in motion invasion plans based on the false premise that there was an immanent threat. And, in aggressively invading the Crimea, they set in motion a provocation and humiliation that advanced greatly the possibility of violence. That this has not occurred in any widespread way is a minor miracle, but the situation obviously remains delicate and fragile. While some ethnic Russians have ‘welcomed the invaders as liberators’ there is likely a silent constituency in Crimea and beyond — some ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Ukrainian Tartars — that is deeply concerned about the geopolitical game being played in their region.

It looks like the Kremlin is setting in motion steps to create by ‘active measures’ a new de facto state in the Crimea along the lines of Transnistria. Whether this statelet project will achieve a degree of internal legitimacy, and whether it will seek annexation by the Russian Federation is uncertain at this point. My sense is that the Kremlin has bitten off much more than it can chew here, and that this whole thing may come crashing down amidst  local legitimacy crises. These could spread to Russia and Putin’s regime in the summer. If that happens, then Putin will have emulated Bush in a similar ignominious fashion. But, that, however, is  probably wishful thinking. There’s a bumpy road ahead before we get to that moment, if we ever do.

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Glory

So, you’ve spent years preparing for it, billions building it, and defied the naysayers by hosting what surely was a spectacular success, it was, wasn’t it, really, do you think so…..?

And now you’re left with an empty feeling, and are a bit annoyed that the naysayers, those underminers, those that won’t ever allow you a victory, started their own sport distraction, the game they always play, pushing, advancing our enemies, the West’s agenda, covering for, apologizing for the fascists….

But, timing is everything, and there’s an historic opportunity for renewed glory to be had. History favors the bold, doesn’t it? And, what a legacy this would be, even greater than Sochi, yes, reversing what those non-Russian Soviets did to Mother Russia, cutting away at its historic lands, its body.

So, lets seize the moment, gather Russia’s historic lands, our vital interests, storied spaces, and the consequences be damned. Crimea will come to home to us. Glory to Mother Russia. Glory. 

[tomorrow we will sober up]

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