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# U.S. Policy in a Time of Transition

## Ending Occupation, Enhancing Israel's Security, Realizing Palestinian Sovereignty

An Independent Study Group Report

Geoffrey Aronson  
Col. Philip Dermer (Ret.)

*In cooperation with Stimson*

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# Executive Summary

This paper establishes a broad policy framework for addressing a crucial element of the regional Middle East mosaic. Solving the long-festering conflict between Israel and Palestine is a critical prerequisite for the creation of a stable regional economic and security environment responsive to the concerns of its peoples as well as to the vital strategic interests of the United States.

The status quo is untenable. It jeopardizes the prospect of ending Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory and retards the establishment of a strategically secure Israel. It also prevents the creation of a sovereign and secure Palestinian state, living side by side and at peace with Israel, and endangers progress toward broader regional security and stability.

U.S. leadership is vital because the parties to the conflict are demonstrably incapable of solving the conflict themselves, thus obstructing the achievement of a central objective of U.S. policy. The United States retains the unchallenged instruments of national power to mobilize the parties and the international community to resolve this issue. Having established that a solution represents a vital national security interest of the United States, the failure to realize this objective impairs the United States' ability to influence important events in the region and beyond. It also undermines trust and diminishes U.S. credibility.

The United States must be prepared to *define* the parameters of an agreement, particularly as they relate to the core issues of Israeli and Palestinian security and sovereignty, *implement* them through leadership of a robust third-party mechanism, and *achieve* a treaty of peace that reflects the requirements of international law, resulting in fulfillment of the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and including recognition of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the states of Israel and Palestine.

The United States must exercise leadership of the transition from a state of conflict to an era of peace that accommodates the legitimate security interests of each party and recognizes the right of each state to live in peace and security, supported by a multifaceted security framework that enhances stability and transparency and that addresses the ability of each party to deter and to defend against challenges.

The action plan proposed here broadly outlines what roles the United States and its international and regional partners should play to support the interests of all the parties. The core of this U.S.-led plan is the establishment of a workable, hands-on security support mechanism on the ground that addresses the two principal issues upon which U.S. interests are engaged—security and sovereignty for Israel and Palestine. It specifically does not address many other significant issues, including, for example, Jerusalem, borders, and refugees.

The entity that will consolidate peace is the U.S.-led Independent Monitoring and Verification Organization (IMVO). IMVO is a determined, visible, and active mechanism for securing the peace. It allows for critical issues related to security to be addressed in a transparent and multilateral framework.

A U.S.-led deployment as envisioned through IMVO fosters transformation of the security environment in the region, enabling Israel to permanently remove its forces from the new Palestinian state, building confidence in a peace agreement's viability, reducing tensions, and adding a key, stabilizing layer of local and regional deterrence. This deployment enhances Israel's security—a key U.S. objective—while enabling another key objective—affording the state of Palestine a viable territory for independence, security, and sovereignty.

## Principal Recommendations

- ▶ The creation of a permanent and recognized border between Israel and Palestine should include minor and agreed-upon changes in the 1949 armistice line to take into account some Israeli settlements. Compensatory swaps of Israeli territory to Palestine can make a useful contribution to this objective.
- ▶ A final status agreement establishes a new basis, other than the presence of settlements and settlers, for accommodating legitimate Israeli security interests. Continuing Israeli deployment of forces in the sovereign state of Palestine represents a disproportionate and destabilizing response to challenges that can be better addressed without compromising Palestinian sovereignty. Unless agreed to by the parties, there should be no Israeli presence in sovereign Palestinian areas.
- ▶ In order for Palestine to realize its aspirations for sovereignty and statehood, it must have a visible military/security force. Weapons and technology limitations must be agreed to by the parties and verified by the Independent Monitoring and Verification Organization, recognizing also that the evolution of security arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will differ because of their unique security realities.
- ▶ The Palestinian state should adopt a defensively-based security strategy. Its forces will maintain law and order, protect Palestine's borders from infiltration and smuggling, and fight crime and terrorism. They will deploy limited deterrent forces along Palestine's borders, combined with early warning and intelligence shared with its neighbors. However insufficient as a permanent model for the future, the Gaza security paradigm stands as a real-world window onto a key element of a plausible future security environment where intentions and capabilities are moderated by an interest in reducing or avoiding conflict.





# Preface

These are new and unsettled times in the Middle East. The peoples of the region are crying out for governments that respect their citizens and treat them with dignity. Their demands deserve to be heard. The Arab Spring will succeed to the extent that it supports the power and legitimacy of this popular and unyielding demand for public engagement. The times also call for revitalized American leadership to advance U.S. national interests in this rapidly changing regional environment, and in so doing, establish the necessary conditions for a stable system of regional security.

Resolution of the festering conflict between Israel and Palestine remains a critical and vital national security interest of the United States and a necessary prerequisite for fully realizing the uncertain promise of the Arab Spring. As a new era dawns in the Middle East and North Africa, the creation of a firm foundation for peace and security that includes the state of Israel living in peace and within recognized boundaries alongside the state of Palestine remains a core U.S. interest. American leadership in this arena will help secure the promise of stable, popular governments that are attentive to the tremendous domestic challenges ahead and the popular expectations that now dominate the region's agenda. This policy review addresses two related issues where the vital interests of the parties and those of the United States meet. American leadership is necessary if there is to be a durable solution that accommodates legitimate Israeli security interests and the requirements of Palestinian sovereignty.

There are numerous and critical issues that remain outside the scope of this effort. We have not drawn a border. We have not addressed the resolution of refugee claims or Jerusalem. What we *have* done, however, is to make the case for an active, reinvigorated effort led by the United States to advance the establishment of a solid foundation for peace and reconciliation, built upon the recognition and satisfaction of core Israeli and Palestinian interests in a manner that promotes the vital U.S. interest in a lasting peace agreement.

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# I. Introduction: U.S. Policy Options

The Middle East is engaged in the most momentous upheaval since the end of the Second World War. Governing institutions established in the aftermath of the war are viewed by the peoples of the region as in need of urgent reform if not outright replacement. Today the people of the region are saying “Enough!”

Popular participation and popular sovereignty are the watchwords of the Arab Spring. The outlook of the United States has also changed radically. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted in a 2005 speech in Cairo, the postwar Arab governing institutions—in particular the autocratic regimes of military rule forged out of the collapse of British colonialism—no longer serve U.S. interests. This transformation in Washington’s thinking was previewed in the policy of regime change in Iraq. The United States can only be advantaged by regional developments that place primacy on popular rule, development of democracy, and maximizing the potential of millions of young people coming of age throughout the Arab world.

The purpose of this paper is not, however, to prescribe U.S. policy for the region in its entirety, but to establish a policy framework for addressing a crucial element of the regional mosaic. The current state of affairs between Israel and the Palestinians is untenable: It precludes the termination of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory. It jeopardizes the establishment of a strategically secure and democratic Israel and undermines the creation of a sovereign and secure Palestinian state, living side by side and at peace with Israel. The status quo also prevents progress toward broader regional security and stability. Ending the long-festering conflict between Israel and Palestine is a critical prerequisite for the creation of a stable regional economic and security environment responsive to the concerns of its peoples as well as to the vital strategic interests of the United States.

President Barack Obama has asserted,

It is a vital national security interest of the United States to reduce these conflicts because whether we like it or not, we remain a dominant military superpower, and when conflicts break out, one way or another we get pulled into them. And that ends up costing us significantly in terms of both blood and treasure.

Gen. James Mattis, commander of U.S. Central Command, has highlighted the direct connection between continuing stalemate and the threat posed to U.S. interests in the region and beyond. In congressional testimony in March 2011, Mattis stated,

This is a defining moment for the people of the region and, by extension, a critical moment for Central Command to remain engaged with our partners and to clear away obstacles to peace and prosperity. On that note, while Israel and the Palestinian territories are not in my assigned theater, lack of progress toward a comprehensive Middle East peace affects U.S. and CENTCOM security interests in the region.

I believe the only reliable path to lasting peace in this region is a viable two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. This issue is one of many that is exploited by our adversaries in the region, and it is used as a recruiting tool for extremist groups.

The lack of progress also creates friction with regional partners and creates political challenges for advancing our interests by marginalizing moderate voices in the region. By contrast, substantive progress on the peace process would improve CENTCOM's opportunity to work with our regional partners and to support multilateral security efforts.

The policy consequences of this sober assessment are clear. The United States is, in Obama's words, "in a moment of transition." It cannot leave this festering problem hostage to the all-too-evident political shortcomings of its antagonists and their demonstrated incapacity to resolve their dispute on their own or through the "good offices" provided for decades by U.S. governments and others. This old paradigm has proven inadequate to the task. The failure to secure Israel's future on terms other than via its continuous unilateral use of force and unending occupation, and the associated failure to establish a Palestinian state at peace with Israel, represents a significant strategic liability for the United States. The United States must, therefore, be prepared to establish a new political-security paradigm in order to protect and advance its interests and to create a firm foundation for peace and mutual security. It must lead when the parties to the conflict cannot and put forward central parameters of an agreement to resolve the antagonisms manifested by continuing stalemate.

The policy options in this paper rest on two main pillars. The first pillar is a refreshed strategic security vision based on the premise that an end to Israeli occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state at peace with Israel best suit U.S. national security interests, as well as those of Israel and the new Palestinian state. This vision puts forward explicit U.S. policies, for the first time, to resolve the tension between Israel's legitimate security requirements and Palestinian sovereignty. The second pillar consists of robust operational measures on the ground, highlighted by a U.S.-led international monitoring and verification security architecture that supports the new security vision as a bridge to peace.

The policies outlined here support the road toward a two-state solution by ending occupation and accommodating the strategic security interests of both parties, thus enhancing long-term security for Israel, independence and sovereignty for Palestine, and promoting the prospects for regional security.

## II. Defining the U.S. Interest

The Arab Spring is both a challenge for the United States to define its interests in a rapidly changing environment, as well as an opportunity for it to realize them.

- ▶ If revolution in Iran in 1979 was the first sign of the end of an era, its aftermath is also a cautionary tale that revolution may not always, or even necessarily, work in the United States' favor. As the Arab Spring unfolds, the lesson is to embrace change as it moves societies away from dictatorship, regimes of emergency rule, and the crushing of civil society and toward democracy and the creation of representative political and governing institutions that derive legitimacy from citizens.
- ▶ The United States aspires to establish a stable regional environment in the Middle East in which threats and the use of force are minimized and where appropriate cooperative mechanisms are in place to successfully confront unilateral actions that undermine stability. The national interests of the United States are best served in a regional environment that is open for trade, investment, and cooperation and supported by robust mutual security mechanisms.
- ▶ The United States has a national interest in Israel existing as a secure and independent nation in which citizens are free to determine their own political, religious, and social character. For Israel to be part of a stable regional environment—at peace with its neighbors, democratic, and with secure and recognized boundaries—requires both an end to occupation and the fulfillment of national self-determination for the people of Palestine. An agreement that enhances Israel's security and that enables the exercise of Palestinian sovereignty is a key objective for U.S. policy.
- ▶ The United States has a national interest in welcoming Palestine into the family of nations. The establishment of a Palestinian state will enable the people of Palestine to exercise national self-determination and freely choose their own destiny—pursuing national reconstruction and devising an all-encompassing solution to decades of dispersion and diaspora—in an environment characterized by peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with its neighbors.



### III. The Need for U.S. Leadership

What are the policy consequences of the characterization of the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a “vital national security interest of the United States”? Such an assessment testifies to the fact that the issue is of such importance to the United States that resolving it is a top priority that must be pursued in a manner that does not subordinate vital U.S. interests to those of other parties. In contrast, the status quo jeopardizes U.S. interests. The national interest of the United States requires an end to Israeli occupation and the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state living at peace with the state of Israel, and with both existing within secure and recognized borders.

- ▶ U.S. leadership is vital because the parties to the conflict are demonstrably incapable of resolving their conflict themselves, thus obstructing the achievement of a central objective of U.S. policy. This assessment is at odds with the almost instinctive and intuitive assumption that Washington “cannot want an end to the conflict more than the parties themselves.” More than one president has expressed this sentiment in a manner that suggests the concept is self-evident. If, however, the U.S. commitment to achieving an outcome that by definition meets U.S. national security requirements is left hostage to the interests of other (warring) parties, then Washington cedes the strategic initiative to them, promising not only continued instability, but also the perpetuation of a conflict that costs the United States in blood and treasure, and which by its own estimation threatens vital national security interests. Simply stated, defining the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in this manner *requires* Washington to be prepared—more so than the parties to the conflict—to seek a durable solution, not primarily for their sake, but for its own. Such a commitment will transform the regional environment and mobilize the interest of the parties themselves in U.S. leadership.
- ▶ The United States remains the only power with the unchallenged instruments needed to mobilize the parties and the international community to resolve this issue. Having established that a solution represents a critical security requirement, the failure to achieve one impairs Washington’s ability to influence important events in the region and beyond. Such a situation undermines trust in the United States’ capabilities and diminishes U.S. credibility.





## IV. Defining the Core Issues

The United States has a vital national interest in *defining* parameters of an agreement, particularly as they relate to the core issues of security and sovereignty; *realizing* these parameters in a treaty of peace between the parties that reflects the principles of international law; and *implementing* the parameters through leadership of a robust third-party mechanism in a process that results in fulfilling the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and recognition of the sovereignty, independence, security, and territorial integrity of the states of Israel and Palestine.

In this critical sense, this action plan articulates a U.S. view of the parameters of an agreement that not only supports U.S. interests, but also helps ensure that an active and determined U.S. leadership will do everything in its power to realize and sustain that agreement. The termination of occupation, the enhancement of Israeli security, the realization of Palestinian sovereignty, and the promotion of U.S. interests are the complementary objectives of this initiative.

The purpose of this policy paper is to suggest the broad outlines necessary to shape this outcome, not to present a detailed peace agreement or address the multitude of issues relating to security and sovereignty that require sustained discussion and negotiation. The two parties, in concert with international partners, will work out detailed arrangements consistent with the approach outlined below.

### A. Security Principles for Peace—View from Washington

The United States has a vital national interest in a security framework that accommodates the legitimate security interests of each party and recognizes the right of each state to live in peace and security, supported by a multifaceted security framework that enhances stability and transparency, and that addresses the ability of both parties to deter and to defend against challenges.

#### 1. Mutual Security

Absolute security for either Israel or Palestine is an unattainable, illusory goal. The quest for such an objective is itself destabilizing. To be lasting and effective, the security of Israel and a Palestinian state must be mutual and reciprocal. An end to occupation, the creation of an agreed-upon border between the two states, and an agreed-upon mechanism for ending the conflict and its associated claims will transform relations between former enemies.

Israel and Palestine each have legitimate security concerns and requirements. These need not be mutually exclusive or antagonistic. They can be convergent and mutually reinforcing. It is preferable to structure in a multilateral framework, rather than a bilateral arrangement, agreed-upon measures that will result in legitimate constraints on Palestinian sovereign behavior and that will address Israel's legitimate concerns beyond its border. Palestinian security will also be enhanced through such measures.

## **2. Robust and Multifaceted Third-Party Mechanisms**

Military imbalances of the kind inherent in the relationship between Israel and Palestine will remain. They can be an invitation for renewed adventurism and instability, increasing tactical and strategic threats to peace. These factors highlight the central importance of vibrant and multidimensional third-party mechanisms to promote stability and consensual resolution of conflicts.

There is a central and multifaceted role to be played by third parties, under U.S. leadership, in the security framework to be created as a key element of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. A core tenet of the new arrangement is to operationalize the transition to a post-conflict era. The prevention of conflict through transparent, inclusive, non-coercive mechanisms for dispute resolution, at all levels, and regional and international participation energized by active U.S. leadership are key elements of this new strategy.

The Independent Monitoring and Verification Organization (IMVO) will secure the strategic transition from uncertainty and conflict to the end of belligerence and the establishment of a sustainable peace. It will assure that each party is meeting its responsibilities and certify the effective contribution of all parties to maintaining the peace. After certification that each party is capable and committed to exercising the wide range of responsibilities necessary for the maintenance of peace, relevant missions of IMVO will disband, with the parties' assent.

## **3. Post-conflict Cooperation**

Under vigorous U.S. leadership, the security prism of each party will be transformed, enabling the legitimate concerns of both parties to be addressed in a new, post-conflict environment characterized by cooperation, transparency, minimization of threats to security, and effective and committed international support of this transformation.

## B. Security for Israel

The vital national interests of the United States are best served by a final status agreement in which Israel's legitimate security requirements are accommodated in a manner consistent with the sovereignty of Palestine.

The United States is committed to establishing a framework of peace that realizes Israel's right to live in peace and security within secure and recognized borders and accommodates Israel's legitimate security interests, meets the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 242, and ends the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Israel's security will be *enhanced* by an end to occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state at peace with it.

The United States remains committed to maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge (QME). This commitment is a cornerstone of U.S. policy toward the state of Israel. A U.S.-Israeli security dialogue in this new era reinvigorates Israel's QME and operates as part of this new vision. The result is a win-win for Israel. This commitment recognizes the extensive range of existing bilateral consultation and discrete agreements. It accommodates evolving asymmetric, conventional, and non-conventional regional threats. It recognizes that even as Israel makes an historic accommodation with Palestine, Israel will require a credible deterrent posture.

The security challenges faced by Israel are dynamic. Nevertheless, it is possible to outline key Israeli security concerns:

- ▶ An attack in which non-conventional weapons are used.
- ▶ An attack in which conventionally armed surface-to-surface missiles are used.
- ▶ Attacks from opponents across borders. These attacks can be asymmetrical— Hamas forces in Gaza and Hezbollah forces in Lebanon currently have such tactical capabilities—or they can be conventional, for example, the War of Attrition waged by Egypt after the 1967 war.
- ▶ Classic, conventional large-scale Arab army/air land movements like those in 1948 and 1973. The objectives of such an attack range from imposing a strategic defeat on Israel to recovering territories lost to occupation or, as in the case of the joint Syrian-Egyptian attack in October 1973, to creating conditions that will lead to a political settlement.
- ▶ Continued efforts by Arab or jihadist elements to infiltrate the frontier and launch terror attacks against the Israel Defense Forces, government installations, or the general public.

These are serious and continuing military challenges. Rather than positioning the United States (and Israel) as perpetually hostage to their malign influence, it is far

better to confront them in an environment characterized by active and effective U.S. leadership in the establishment and preservation of a framework that enshrines an end to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, fulfills a component of the Arab Peace Initiative promising Israel peace and recognition, and creates institutions to maintain the peace and to resolve differences.

For decades the U.S. commitment to Israel's QME has been a cornerstone of bilateral cooperation. Yet not all the security challenges faced by Israel are best addressed by technological or military measures. The United States is committed to creating an environment that minimizes the threat of a strategic attack by any type or combination of forces. This objective will be enhanced through continued intelligence sharing and open and transparent coordination with Palestinians and others in order to deter, intercept, and defeat assaults across frontiers. The United States remains resolute in supporting Israel's ability to defend itself and to maintain strong deterrent forces against strategic threats in accordance with its current commitments.

### **C. Sovereignty for Palestine**

The national interest of the United States is best served by a final status agreement in which the legitimate security requirements of Palestine's neighbors are accommodated in a manner consistent with the powers of sovereignty that the state of Palestine will exercise. Under the U.S. vision and action plan, Palestine assumes particular significance in terms of ending the conflict with Israel and in its place in the regional political and security order.

The new Palestinian state will be sovereign, secure, viable, at peace with its neighbors, and anchored by the establishment of a regional security framework led by the United States.

The capacity of any state to act in a sovereign manner is critical to its national identity and its ability to enhance or undermine regional stability. No nation can long survive, however, without due consideration for its neighbors and the broader international community. The parties themselves recognize that constraints on the exercise of sovereignty are an ever-present, and growing, characteristic of the system of sovereign states that exists today. Such limitations do not undermine the sovereign essence of the state. They serve a useful purpose when they are agreed upon and proportionate. In this respect, the sovereign powers of the state of Palestine will be no different than any other nation. The United States believes that agreed-upon limitations on the exercise of sovereign power in return for mutually advantageous security and stability will be a useful and necessary aspect of any agreement between Israel and Palestine. The record of negotiations over the last decade supports this principle.

## V. A Palestinian Security Doctrine for Statehood

The Gaza Strip and the West Bank are inseparable elements of Palestinian sovereignty. Palestinian statehood will create an entirely new context for refashioning existing security force structure and doctrine. The new state of Palestine will be confronted with a complex mix of security challenges that will be addressed by immature government institutions operating in a domestic environment with a troubled history of political and security division.

Palestine, like any country, will have the sovereign right to a competent, nationally recognized security force to act not only in defense of its borders against aggression, but also to counter internal challenges. While it would be unrealistic to burden Palestinian forces with missions they cannot be reasonably expected to perform—for example, to provide Israel with absolute security—it would also be unwise to constrain their ability to perform core security functions. The most appropriate means of fulfilling these responsibilities is to establish forces with a limited ability to project military force in defense of Palestine’s borders—that is, a doctrine of defensive security—backed by appropriate third-party security mechanisms and competent internal security capabilities.

The newly structured Palestinian Security Forces mission set would include the following:

1. Forging a national identity/consensus
2. Border protection/defense
3. Civil policing
4. Counterterrorism
5. Participation in international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions

The security regimes now in place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not reflect principles suited to a long-term stable relationship with Israel based upon a framework of peace, mutual recognition, recognized borders, and third-party security participation.

In shaping a relevant security doctrine for Palestine within the context of peace, the United States cannot afford to ignore the realities created in Gaza in the aftermath of Israel's disengagement.<sup>1</sup> The security environment around the Gaza Strip is particularly challenging. The current force structure there is based on entirely different principles than those operating in the West Bank. In Gaza, a Palestinian army under a unilateral chain of command and in full control of defined territory engages Israeli forces, threatens and is threatened by Israel, and fights to defend its control of Gaza and its interests within the political-social context of the divided Palestinian Authority. As a result, Gaza's security environment more closely resembles the tensions and lack of stability consistent with unresolved state-to-state conflict.

In contrast, in the West Bank, Palestinian forces are precluded from arming or deploying in a manner consistent with enforcement of a national security doctrine or the defense of a defined and agreed-upon homeland. Palestinian force structure and doctrine are, by agreement with Israel, currently subordinated to Israeli interests.

As long as these differences in Palestinian security regimes persist, the security regime in the Gaza Strip, in the context of peace, will necessarily differ, at least at the outset, from security arrangements in the West Bank. In the construction of a peace agreement that results in secure, agreed-upon borders and the creation of peaceful relations, the elements now in place in Gaza—continuing, if diminished, effective Israeli control of Gaza's borders, a Palestinian security system with a mission to defend itself and its territory despite its limited capability to do so, and the creation of a limited, if somewhat effective, deterrent force based upon indigenous and smuggled rockets and mortars—will need to be evaluated against the requirements for consolidating the post-conflict environment. The vital challenge is to fashion a peace agreement between the parties that by resolving outstanding issues removes the critical incentive for the use of force by all parties.

It will be necessary to engage Egypt and Jordan as well as other Arab nations in multilateral arrangements to address these challenges. In particular, the creation of a new security environment in Gaza affects Egyptian interests, which will have to

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1 The defining qualities of the current security regime engaging Israel, Gaza, and Egypt were enabled as a consequence of unilateral Israeli policy choices—principally, the decision to base its post-Gaza evacuation defense doctrine on an informal, inherently unstable “state-on-state” deterrence model and pained acceptance of a new Palestinian (Hamas) military structure whose mobilization and armament were limited only by its capabilities (economic, smuggling, and local production) in the territories under its control. The situation thus created reflects a classic, hostile, and unstable border standoff. For Israel and many in the international community, its responsibilities as the occupying power in Gaza continue in a new context of “diminished responsibility.” Notwithstanding an on-again, off-again unofficial *hudna* (cease-fire), relations between Israel and Gaza are strategically unstable. They have nonetheless exhibited a modicum of operational stability based on informal “rules of the game.” However inadequate as a security model in an era of peace, this relationship is seen by Israel as preferable to the model of military occupation it abandoned in 2005. The authorities in Gaza see the standoff as confirmation of the utility and the costs of their rejectionist view of Israel.

be accommodated. Changes in Israel's security doctrine and supporting operational deployments will also need to be addressed to take into account the importance of mutual security and the exercise of sovereign powers by Palestine.





## **VI. Creating the Independent Monitoring and Verification Organization (IMVO)**

The IMVO gives institutional and international expression to U.S. leadership of an international partnership committed to moving from an environment characterized by conflict to one characterized by peace. The IMVO proposal goes beyond the prescriptions of President George W. Bush's June 2002 road map and President Obama's May 2011 speech in that it sets out a detailed exposition of U.S. positions on central elements of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that results in the creation of a Palestinian state.

This action plan broadly outlines the roles the United States and its international partners should play to meet the interests of all the parties. It differs conceptually and operationally from its myriad predecessors. It aims to keep the peace rather than to rationalize and moderate the conflict, and its deployment is a resolute expression of this strategic objective. The core of the U.S.-led plan is the establishment of a workable, hands-on security support mechanism on the ground.

IMVO represents a determined, visible, and active organization for final status and beyond. It allows for critical issues related to security to be addressed in an open and transparent multilateral framework. It accepts historical and contemporary realities and presumes differences can be buffered by an earnest, multilateral security mechanism.

The strategic security interests of all the parties are intertwined. Addressing these interests in tandem can firmly establish long-sought local stability and anchor a broader regional security network favorable to U.S. interests. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians is considered an "object" of U.S. efforts or reforms, but active and willing participants, forming a security framework that serves the interests of the United States and its regional allies, without diminishing their sovereign right to act in self-defense.

Many of the institutional elements or systems that could make up or contribute to the mission have been or are already in theater, for example, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), Olive Harvest, United Nations Peacekeeping Organizations, European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), and others. It is preferable that any new multinational organizations developed be clearly U.S.-led and -staffed in key positions.

IMVO will transform the security environment in the region, enabling Israel to permanently remove its forces from the new Palestinian state, building confidence in a peace agreement's viability, reducing tensions, and adding a key layer of local and regional deterrence.

The IMVO is not intended to be nor will it be configured for classic military deterrence or as a trip-wire force. It is not an offensive “boots on the ground” combat deployment, but a robust peace-monitoring and verification mission. The very fact of its physical presence offers a potent and visible symbol of the U.S. (and international) commitment and therefore adds a de facto layer of deterrence against destabilizing actions by any party. This deployment enhances Israel's security—a key U.S. objective—while enabling another key objective—affording the state of Palestine a viable platform for independence, security, and sovereignty.

This paper supports a readiness to consider the introduction of IMVO operational responsibilities during a defined period as a transitional bridge to peace. Issues related to the strategic security of both parties (for example, early warning) might prove to be particularly suited to the introduction of IMVO capabilities in this manner. The main constraint to such a deployment, however, remains the risk that the introduction of IMVO during a transitional period might rationalize central aspects of continuing Israeli occupation rather than facilitate its termination.

## **A. Policy Assumptions for IMVO**

The United States is committed to leadership of an international, third-party deployment mechanism. The basic policy premises and operational structures of the IMVO include the following:

- ▶ An end to occupation and securing a two-state solution is the policy objective. Palestinian sovereignty can be enabled in a manner that does not do disproportionate harm to the legitimate interests of Palestine's neighbors. A final status agreement will provide for Israel's complete withdrawal from all sovereign Palestinian territory, airspace, and territorial waters. Israel will cede effective control over Palestine's territory, sea, and airspace, ending its effective control of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
- ▶ Israel and the new state of Palestine will cooperate, particularly in areas where their national interests overlap or intersect.
- ▶ The peace treaties between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Jordan are vital components of a transformed regional security environment. Egypt and Jordan are key players in promoting the Arab Peace Initiative and the transition to a post-conflict environment.

- ▶ The parties agree to a U.S.-led, multifaceted international third-party presence to assist them in meeting their new security requirements, particularly regarding early warning, border protection, and the transition of the Palestinian Security Forces' national security doctrine and capacity building. IMVO's structure and organization can be established in short order after an initial training period. The United States Security Coordinator (USSC), European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), and other government training mechanisms will continue and expand their efforts as necessary in support of IMVO. Other missions in the region are available for support, utilization, or expansion—for instance, United Nations Peacekeeping, Multinational Force and Observers, and so on.

## **B. IMVO Primary Missions**

IMVO is the key U.S.-led operational mechanism for monitoring, evaluating, and institutionalizing peaceful relations and transparent working venues between Israel and Palestine. The IMVO represents an unprecedented demonstration—in policy and operational terms—of the international commitment generally and the United States' dedication in particular to insure the transition from a state of conflict to an era of peace.

The organization will be staffed by professionals with practical experience in each of the subcomponent mission sets noted below. Drawing from the lessons of the USSC, the geographical location of the headquarters is best placed in the region, with liaison offices in Israel and Palestine, to initiate operations in a timely manner. The Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) concept of the Geneva Initiative provides a valid reference as a useful model. IMVO facilitates the opportunity for understandings applicable to emergency situations and contingency operations relevant to all parties. Jordan, Egypt, and other international parties will be invited to send representatives to participate in IMVO activities. Other Arab parties will be asked to send observers.

Key IMVO mission tasks include the following:

- ▶ Monitoring compliance, evaluation, and verification of final status agreements
- ▶ Deterrence (as a consequence of its presence)
- ▶ Confidence building
- ▶ Resolving disputes
- ▶ Manning and securing independent or joint early warning stations

- ▶ Escorting and monitoring commercial and military traffic along a West Bank–Gaza corridor
- ▶ Conducting independent, spontaneous inspections
- ▶ Overseeing and facilitating operations, jointly and independently, along borders, international crossing sites, airspace, and maritime areas
- ▶ Facilitating information sharing regarding active local and strategic threats
- ▶ Sustaining, mentoring, evaluating, and verifying Palestine Security Forces' technical competencies and refining efforts toward a national security/defense reorganization and doctrine that addresses commonalities between the West Bank and Gaza Strip while acknowledging the different security environments in which they exist

The IMVO will have a sufficient degree of flexibility built into its governance and staff structure to adapt to conditions unforeseen by the parties. It will have the capability to expand and contract the mission as necessary. It is envisioned that the IMVO will downsize its mission over time, as operations between the parties mature and become more efficient and mutual trust is institutionalized. IMVO will, together with the parties, prepare an exit strategy and plan.

# VII. Resolving the Central Issues of Security and Statehood

## A. General Security Premises

### 1. General Security Premises—View from Israel

Israel insists that Palestine in its entirety must be a “non-militarized state,” the terms of which it has yet to clearly define, but which include the following:

- ▶ Extensive and detailed weapons and technology restrictions and limits on Palestinian armaments.
- ▶ Detailed restrictions on the size and construct of Palestinian security forces.
- ▶ An Israeli residual military/security presence—personnel, technology, and equipment—in the Jordan Valley/Jordanian border to address myriad challenges from the “East” and to prevent the deployment of hostile military power west of the Jordan River.
- ▶ The complete absence of a Palestinian strategic defensive or operational offensive capability (that is, heavy armor, artillery, ballistic missiles, rockets, fighters/bombers, naval combatants) and border defenses limited to basic small arms.<sup>2</sup>

### 2. General Security Premises—View from Palestine

There is an emerging Palestinian consensus as represented by a unified Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/Islamic Resistance Organization ( Hamas) view of future Palestinian security. The PLO appears to be prepared to limit types and numbers of weapons in its arsenal. It insists on uncompromised freedom of

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2 Israel has applied these conditions to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Given events since Fateh's forced exit from Gaza in the summer of 2007, however, this set of negotiating principles has not been applied by Israel in the same fashion to the Gaza Strip. Although Israel's long-term security policy objectives in the West Bank build upon the status quo (as long as “quiet” is maintained), in regard to Gaza, Israel believes that Gaza's current ability to project power, however limited, beyond its borders and thus threaten Israel will have to be undone in the context of peace. Israel's current policy toward Gaza is firmly fixed in the direction of the “rules of war” rather than the law of occupation. It has informally established a “no-go” zone within Gaza along the length of its perimeter with Israel. It desires a permanent end to cross-border attacks. Israel would like to see a self-actuating demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration program that will result in a Palestinian security force in Gaza that mirrors the situation in the West Bank—that is, as stated above, the absence of a Palestinian strategic defensive or offensive capability and no border defenses beyond basic small arms.

movement for (limited) security forces in its own territory for air, sea, and ground. It has no security demands requiring deployments beyond its own borders. It recognizes that economic limitations will constrain the size and capabilities of Palestinian forces. It opposes any Israeli security-related presence—actual, residual, or virtual in any form or manner—on its territory.

Hamas's focus, as represented in Gaza at present, remains centered on consolidating its exclusive control of its "space," and deploying and arming for deterrence against Israeli actions. As noted, the rules of the game in Gaza are completely different from those operating between Israeli and Palestinian forces in the West Bank. In Gaza, they are the rules of war as conducted between two enemy states. Hamas is not a party to official Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and has not formally addressed many of the central issues identified in this paper. Hamas, even as it pursues policies toward Israel dictated by *raison d'état*, continues to challenge the international consensus in support of a peace agreement.

### **3. Security in an Era of Peace**

Mutual security and robust third-party engagement are key elements of a post-conflict U.S. security strategy. The United States is committed to Israel's security and its ability to prevail militarily over any combination of security threats (outlined above).

Settlements will be stripped of their historical and political functions as instruments for the implementation of Israel's security doctrine in the West Bank, just as they were in Sinai as a consequence of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and in the Gaza Strip as a consequence of disengagement. A final status agreement must establish a new basis—that is, other than the presence of settlements and settlers—for defining and accommodating legitimate Israeli security interests.

Israel insists upon a continuing long-term military and early warning presence in unspecified locations in the Jordan Valley and along the border with Jordan to address direct and indirect threats emanating from the "East" via Jordan—that is, from Syria and Iraq—and also strategic ballistic missile threats from Iran. It is the view here that these concerns are legitimate, but they do not establish a compelling rationale for a continued presence of Israeli forces or its own technological systems in Palestine as part of a final status arrangement.

Continuing Israeli deployment of forces in the sovereign state of Palestine is a disproportionate and destabilizing response to challenges that can be better addressed without compromising Palestinian sovereignty. No Israeli presence will be authorized in any form, direct or remote, in sovereign Palestinian areas unless agreed to by the parties. The United States, through IMVO and other avenues, will develop open and transparent information-sharing regimes for

the various security subcomponents and share data with the parties. A visible deployment of IMVO coupled with advancements in technology and use of drones, aerostats, remote sensing, biometrics, and networked automation, as well as manned systems already or formerly operating in theater (the Olive Harvest intelligence and surveillance mission), will enable IMVO to synthesize its human and technological capabilities in support of the mission.

For Palestine to realize its aspirations for sovereignty and statehood, it must have a visible military and security face that is seen by its citizens as providing them security. The terms *de-militarized* or *non-militarized*, currently used to describe Palestinian forces, obscure more than they clarify. Whatever term is adopted, weapons and technology limitations must be agreed to by the parties and verified by the IMVO, recognizing also that the security trajectories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will differ because of their different security realities.

Palestinian control over a Gaza–West Bank corridor benefits security capacity. A divided or cantoned geography hinders Palestinian and IMVO deployment, requiring multiple and redundant security operational efforts and costs. Such a corridor can be maintained without disproportionate cost to Israeli security.

In Gaza, a new security paradigm was created by Israel's redeployment in 2005. The intent was to improve Israel's strategic security through the withdrawal of permanently stationed Israeli military forces and removal of all settlements and settlers from the Gaza Strip. The resulting security environment has arguably fulfilled this basic objective.<sup>3</sup> However insufficient as a model for the future, the Gaza paradigm stands as a real-world window onto a key element of a plausible future security environment where intentions and capabilities are moderated by an overall interest in reducing conflict and maintaining peace.

The PLO is willing to accept unspecified limitations on the procurement and deployment of weapons by the state of Palestine. Its security strategy will be defensively based. Its forces will maintain law and order, protect its borders from infiltration and smuggling, and fight crime and terrorism. Its forces will offer

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3 In the context of the 2005 disengagement, neither Israel nor the international community insisted upon agreed restrictions on Palestinian armaments or force size, composition, or doctrine in Gaza, as is currently the case in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, there is currently no bilateral venue or third-party mechanism for security cooperation and coordination as for the West Bank. Hamas commands a standing centralized security apparatus, much sought after in the West Bank, which still maintains six different "arms" with varying influences and loyalties. Hamas's weapons inventory reflects its particular security objectives, subject to limitations that are self-imposed due to fiscal and internal political constraints and continuing international efforts to counter arms smuggling into Gaza. From a strategic balance of power perspective, Hamas cannot take on Israel force-on-force or threaten Israel's existence. Indeed, the power that Israel can bring to bear dwarfs anything in Hamas's limited arsenal. The impact of conflict upon daily life in Israel and Gaza should not be minimized, and both parties can be expected to continue to act against threats. However admittedly problematic the current tensions between Israeli and Palestinian forces in and around the Gaza Strip are, an unstable deterrence is in effect that in some measure belies both Hamas's revolutionary doctrine and Israel's wishes.



limited operational deterrence along its borders, combined with shared early warning and intelligence. International involvement is expected to monitor and verify Palestinian compliance with these missions.

In Gaza, the existing system of deterrence and punitive tactical provocations and responses offers a far different and more complex paradigm than the security environment now in place in the West Bank, and this reality cannot but affect the transition there to a post-conflict security strategy. While a unified security doctrine is the goal for Palestine, the existing security environment along the Gaza frontier is currently defined by a tenuous deterrent relationship between Israeli and Palestinian forces. This fact cannot be ignored or wished away. Enhancing mutual security in this arena will require IMVO and the parties themselves, at least in the short term, to adopt in the Gaza Strip a mix of policy and security tools different from those of the West Bank.

## **B. The Border between Israel and Palestine**

### **1. The Border between Israel and Palestine—View from Israel**

In Israel's view, the 1949 armistice line is not necessarily instructive or prescriptive as a guide for determining a mutually agreed-upon border. Israel's border with Palestine on the West Bank will be based upon demography and undefined settlement blocs, including those throughout East Jerusalem. Land swaps of unstated value may be acceptable or required. There must be some type of Israeli early warning presence or forward, pre-positioned stocks in Palestine of undetermined duration to address Israeli security concerns. The border with the Gaza Strip is the armistice line modified by subsequent understandings (in the 1950 modus vivendi agreement).<sup>4</sup>

### **2. The Border between Israel and Palestine—View from Palestine**

The 1949 armistice line is the only basis for a two-state solution that includes East Jerusalem as the recognized capital of Palestine. Land swaps of equal size and value, however, are an acceptable mechanism that enables Palestine to be compensated for Israel's agreed upon territorial interests in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip on all territories occupied by Israel in 1967, however, is the preferred option. No foreign forces or presence, except that of third parties upon agreement, will be permitted. There is some question about the 1950 modus vivendi agreement.

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<sup>4</sup> On February 22, 1950, a modus vivendi to the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement clarified the armistice line delimiting the Gaza Strip.

### **3. Borders in an Era of Peace**

The United States supports the creation of a permanent, recognized, and secure border between Israel and Palestine with minor and agreed changes to the 1949 armistice line to take into account some settlements, with compensatory swaps of Israeli territory to Palestine. IMVO will be deployed to the agreed-upon border for verification and monitoring. Mechanisms will be established with Israeli and Palestinian forces to address timing and hand-off issues. IMVO personnel will staff and monitor Israel-Palestine border-crossing locations agreed to by the parties.

## **C. The Jordan-Palestine Border/Jordan Valley**

### **1. The Jordan-Palestine Border/Jordan Valley—View from Israel**

In concert with Israel's concerns outlined above, the Jordan-Palestine border and Jordan Valley are of particular security interest to Israel. This concern is due to the geography of the West Bank and lessons from Israel's previous conflicts with its Arab neighbors. Israel seeks allowance for regulated and coordinated access to sovereign Palestinian territory during peacetime, as well as storage and pre-positioned stocks and autonomous early warning positions at key locations within Palestine. Visual surveillance is sought along the length of the Jordan-Palestine border. Israel insists upon arrangements for its military deployment into the Jordan Valley and deployment along the border in case of "national emergency."

### **2. The Jordan-Palestine Border/Jordan Valley—View from Palestine**

Palestine is opposed to a residual Israeli presence in any form, human or virtual, on Palestine's borders with a third state or within its sovereign territory. It opposes establishing agreed-upon conditions under which Israeli military forces could move into Palestine, including the Jordan Valley, or deploy along the Palestine-Jordan border.

### **3. Border Security—View from Jordan**

Jordan has a critical national security interest in maintaining the security and operational effectiveness of its border with Palestine. Stability, transparency, and management according to internationally acceptable standards are basic and essential prerequisites.

### **4. Statehood and Border Security**

Israel prefers an active defense forward to the Jordan Valley and Jordan River basin, with some measure of permanent access to or presence in Palestine beyond its agreed-upon border. This deployment is considered by this study

group to be diplomatically problematic and of questionable military utility. It does not provide an answer to the security threats that Israel faces now or in the foreseeable future.<sup>5</sup> The maintenance of an Israeli security presence in Palestine would exact a disproportionate price on Palestinian sovereignty, and it is inconsistent with the principles of mutual security adopted as a key element of peace. Without compromising the right of any nation to take action in its own self-defense, the new security model places a premium on transparent, multilateral efforts to promote stability and offers a shared and enhanced mechanism for the protection of the interests of Israel, Palestine, and Jordan, as well as those of the United States and the international community.

### **5. The Jordan-Palestine Border/Jordan Valley—IMVO Requirements**

IMVO will establish the necessary expertise on the ground, including the technology needed to support compliance monitoring, early warning, and border surveillance. The IMVO's strategic effort will be realistically geared toward a system of strategic and local early warning, competent management and monitoring of border-crossing sites, and a visible and competent Palestinian (and Jordanian and Egyptian) security presence along Palestine's borders. This layered system offers clear advantages for all parties compared to an Israeli military deployment beyond its sovereign borders. Joint and independent IMVO posts and patrols will be established as necessary along the Jordan Valley and border area, with Palestinian security forces and tripartite patrols in effect along shared Israeli-Palestinian borders. Judicious and economical use of commercial and military technology, aerostats, un-manned aerial vehicles, ground and remote sensing technology, and permanent and portable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems will be utilized at the discretion of IMVO. Sites will be utilized in coordination with the parties. IMVO will not establish independent static posts along the borders.

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5 Some military analysts, including leading Israelis, consider the eastern line of the West Bank range of hills (Judea and Samaria) to be a strategic natural barrier performing a channeling function to a major conventional advance from the east. There is limited depth or room to maneuver infantry and armored formations between the Jordan River and eastern slopes of the West Bank. Approaching forces from the east based on armored or mechanized units would be forced onto five surfaced roads in wadis (valleys) leading up the steep slopes of the hills. Armor movements from east to west are possible, but primarily in a terrain-constricted, linear fashion—they cannot deploy or mass forces abreast—and are relegated to the existing roads in the valley systems that provide access to the plateau. Invading forces must also concentrate on the bridgeheads of the east bank of the Jordan River prior to crossing. North-south tactical maneuver and travel are possible for invading forces but would be restricted to the primary singular axis afforded by Highway 90.

## **D. Border Crossings**

### **1. Border Crossings—View from Israel**

Israel views its border crossings with Palestine primarily through a security prism. There are extensive restrictions in place for security-related and dual-use goods, merchandise, services, and people of interest entering into Palestine. Israel believes that Palestine's border-crossing points should not be unilaterally supervised by Palestinians. At a minimum, a third party should be present on the Palestinian side, and there should be allowance for remote Israeli observation.

### **2. Border Crossings—View from Palestine**

Crossings between Palestine and Egypt and Palestine and Jordan will be managed and regulated according to international standards and, if agreed, may include additional arrangements with Israel. Crossings will be operated as commercial crossings allowing for free and efficient movement of goods, services, and people. There will be no overt or covert Israeli presence, direct or indirect, at Palestine's (non-Israel) border locations. The presence and participation by a third-party verification and monitoring mission is acceptable.

### **3. Border Crossings**

Border-crossing site establishment, procedures, regulations, operation, and security are to be conducted bilaterally between the relevant parties as fully sovereign entities. Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel are principal, equal players in establishing a regime of effective, secure, and transparent border management, facilitated by IMVO as agreed.

Unless agreed by the parties, there will be no permanent or remote Israeli presence along Palestine's border with third countries.

IMVO will be present at all main crossing venues on Palestine's border(s) with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan during the transition period and for an agreed period of time thereafter. It will share situation reports with principal parties. There will be no uniformed third-party presence unless agreed and coordinated by the relevant parties.

### **4. Border Crossings—IMVO Requirements**

IMVO will establish required teams and technology to support efficient border-crossing operations in accordance with international standards. Current Jordan River Valley crossing sites—Allenby/King Hussein (Jericho), Bet Shean/Sheikh Hussein (Tiberias)—will be maintained. Regarding the Jordan-Palestine border, IMVO will perform its functions on both sides of the border at the invitation of Jordan, particularly the movement of Palestinian citizens and security forces for

training. Regarding the Egypt-Palestine border, IMVO will perform its functions on both sides of the border at the invitation of both parties, primarily concerning the movement of Palestinian citizens and security forces for training. The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) as already established and practiced, but under IMVO leadership, is a viable entity to initiate and staff, evaluate, and monitor these efforts.

## **E. The Electromagnetic Spectrum**

### **1. The Electromagnetic Spectrum—View from Israel**

Israel insists upon some measure of control over Palestine’s civil and military electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).

### **2. The Electromagnetic Spectrum—View from Palestine**

Palestine demands full sovereign control over its EMS, which it will operate and be allocated in a manner consistent with international standards and practice, that is, the International Telecommunications Union. IMVO involvement is accepted.

### **3. The Electromagnetic Spectrum**

Palestine’s independent and sovereign ownership and operation of its EMS, with shared protocols for development and expansion, as well as notification of issues and threats, offers a sound foundation to accommodate legitimate Israeli and Palestinian requirements. Israel’s demand for control of sovereign Palestinian EMS constitutes a disproportionate infringement on Palestinian sovereignty.

### **4. The Electromagnetic Spectrum—IMVO Requirements**

This arena is one of the more complicated and technical aspects of final status arrangements, and as a consequence, of IMVO mission determination and requirements. The required technical expertise and procedures for international monitoring and verification will be established to ensure the proper application and uninterrupted operation of sovereign EMS operations within Palestine and Israel. Legitimate public safety and security requirements will be met, and the apportionment and management of the commercial spectrum will be subject to mutual agreement. Where necessary, shared protocols will be in effect. IMVO will facilitate understandings and arrangements for exceptions to EMS policies during times of emergency. Guarded and cut-out frequencies and independent usage of shared channels for specific time periods may be considered.

## **F. Sovereign Airspace**

### **1. Sovereign Airspace—View from Israel**

Israel wants a role in determining where Palestinian airports are located and in establishing a unified airspace control regime or mechanism in lieu of overriding Israeli control. It rejects the reopening of Qalandia airport (Jerusalem) and Gaza airport.

Israel is interested in the use of Palestinian airspace for military training exercises.

### **2. Sovereign Airspace—View from Palestine**

Palestinian officials demand full control over Palestine's airspace and intend to accede to relevant international conventions.

No unilateral access by Israel (or any other nation) into Palestine's airspace is envisaged.

No Israeli military training is to be permitted unless it is coordinated directly.

Palestine reserves the right to reopen Qalandia airport (Jerusalem) and consider construction of an airport in the vicinity of Jericho. Gaza airport will reopen.

### **3. Palestine's Sovereign Airspace**

The United States supports full sovereign Palestinian control of its national airspace. Independent Palestinian control of its airspace, however, is to be supported by joint air control centers. Arrangements will be made for full and timely access to air traffic control data to relevant Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian, and Jordanian bodies.

Israel's use of Palestinian airspace above a certain altitude (out of line of sight from the ground) is viable if agreed to by both parties.

International verification and monitoring for air traffic control operations will be in effect for both civil and military aviation, particularly in the vicinity of borders.

### **4. Sovereign Airspace—IMVO Requirements**

Establish a joint air control center as a deconfliction element staffed through appropriate participation of all parties and headquartered in Israel with a remote forward and relay site at a suitable location in the West Bank. IMVO will assist in reestablishing a Palestinian rotary wing element and standard operating procedures; facilitate discussions on establishment of Palestinian civil airport(s); invite participation and observers from Jordan and Egypt; and

facilitate understandings and arrangements governing combined use of airspace during times of emergency.

## **G. Early Warning**

The areas for early warning facilitation include the eastern Mediterranean adjacent to Israel and Palestine, adjacent territorial maritime border areas, the Jordan Valley, and the Jordan-Palestine and Egypt-Israel borders.

### **1. Early Warning—View from Israel**

A wide-ranging and long-term residual Israeli early warning presence in several locations in the West Bank for purposes of operational early warning is necessary. In addition, Israel wants pre-positioned sites in Palestine to be authorized for emergency deployment, logistics, and supply.

### **2. Early Warning—View from Palestine**

No residual Israeli military presence, pre-positioned sites, or early warning security systems, manned or remote, in sovereign Palestinian territory, will be permitted.

### **3. Early Warning**

Early warning systems established and technologies applied will be manned, staffed, operated, and monitored jointly by IMVO and the party on whose sovereign territory they are located. Joint operations will be encouraged where there are shared mission foci. Over the horizon protocols are already part of the current U.S.-Israeli bilateral security relationship. These understandings support Palestine's strategic security interests as well.

### **4. Early Warning—IMVO Requirements**

Ground stations in Palestine and Israel will be jointly manned by host-nation personnel and the IMVO. Data and information obtained will be shared at the discretion of IMVO.

IMVO will not interfere with independent national collection efforts within sovereign borders, but will identify practices that hinder the establishment of trust and transparency or retard confidence-building measures.

## H. Maritime Security

### 1. Maritime Security—View from Israel

Israel believes that there is no need for a bilateral agreement as the issue is governed by international law. It maintains the prerogative of continuing independent monitoring and security activities off Gaza's coast, with intrusive verifications and activities as necessary.

### 2. Maritime Security—View from Palestine

The PLO supports full Palestinian ownership and control of the Gaza seabed and airspace according to international conventions and laws. It rejects any residual Israeli presence or independent activities in Palestine's defined territorial waters.

It considers the creation of a seaport in Gaza to be a sovereign Palestinian decision.

Palestine is prepared to work with the international community and neighboring countries to establish the full scope of maritime activities.

### 3. Maritime Security

The prudent exploitation of the seabed for the acquisition of petroleum and other resources offers both parties a unique opportunity for cooperation. Palestine has a sovereign right to control and provide security and to undertake normal maritime and port activities in its territorial waters according to international norms and standards.

Any residual or visible Israeli naval or security presence in Gaza's territorial waters would have a disproportionate and destabilizing security impact on the exercise of Palestinian sovereignty.

### 4. Maritime Security—IMVO Requirements

An IMVO maritime capability will be created, and independent IMVO and joint naval operations and patrols will be established.<sup>6</sup> In addition, a customs and port activities monitoring element will be created. IMVO will facilitate understandings and arrangements for use of the Gaza port during times of emergency. Egypt will be invited to participate in IMVO maritime activities.

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<sup>6</sup> Control and exploitation of natural resources on and under the seabed will be agreed to by the parties in accordance with international law and convention.



## I. West Bank–Gaza Linkage

### 1. West Bank–Gaza Linkage—View from Israel

There is a range of Israeli views regarding a potential corridor route and basic principles governing operation and ownership.

### 2. West Bank–Gaza Linkage—View from Palestine

There must be at least one land link between the West Bank and Gaza to realize effective contiguity and integration of transportation, telecommunication, security, services, and logistics. Israel's security concerns can be accommodated.

### 3. West Bank–Gaza Linkage

Palestine requires a secure and functional territorial link between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Procedures for numbers and types of access are to be established for commercial and security purposes, and VIP and private use.<sup>7</sup>

### 4. West Bank–Gaza Linkage—IMVO Requirements

IMVO will undertake operational planning, joint coordination, and escort and facilitation at the selected route(s) terminal points. The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) will be considered for leadership of this effort.

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<sup>7</sup> One precedent is the link during the Cold War from West Germany through East Germany for travel to and from Berlin. From an aviation perspective, a precedent was established by Royal Jordanian commercial flights over Israeli territory and the Oslo-era Palestinian Authority Security Force helicopter detachment. IMVO will facilitate a combined operations room to coordinate and monitor air and ground traffic.

## VIII. Additional Confidence-Building Measures in Support of IMVO

It is understood that the deployment of working, hands-on systems provides an important confidence-building measure as well as a deterrent to destabilizing actions across security and non-security fronts. Additional, supplementary confidence-building measures will be utilized to support third-party efforts.

Officers and observers from the Arab League will be invited to participate in various aspects of IMVO. They will accompany IMVO officials on their official duties in Palestine, as well as on Palestine's (non-Israel) borders.<sup>8</sup>

IMVO will facilitate understandings that address discrete coordination measures as necessary in emergencies and for time-sensitive contingency operations. Israelis and Palestinians can work on sensitive issues involving joint standard operating procedures for shared interests, including those necessary in the unlikely event of a conventional or other large-scale attack that endangers both nations. These measures could include identification and establishment of joint wartime locations for command and control, force deconfliction, intelligence gathering, threat identification and designation, early warning, forward air control, search and rescue, and so on. All parties understand that notwithstanding such agreed-upon measures, in the event of a "national emergency" neither party will be constrained from taking unilateral actions it deems to be in its vital national interest. In keeping with its mission, IMVO will also work with the parties to establish agreed-upon threat definitions and joint levels of alert for various threat scenarios.

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<sup>8</sup> IMVO will request a liaison and team presence on the Jordanian and Egyptian sides of the border as well. United Nations Peacekeeping and Multinational Force and Observers are contemporary precedents for this activity.



## IX. Conclusion


President Obama has noted that the United States is in an “era of transition” as it seeks to define and preserve its interests in a rapidly changing and sometimes revolutionary international environment. This policy paper is both a response to these uncertain times and a guide for navigating them. It outlines a results-oriented paradigm for resolving the bitter antagonisms between Israelis and Palestinians that have eluded solution for decades. It rests upon a new, if unremarkable assumption—that the United States, in order to advance its own interests, is obliged to draw a picture of the future of relations between Israel and a new state of Palestine and to lead the parties, as well as the international community, in realizing it.

This effort focuses on the critical, interdependent elements of this relationship—the enhancement of Israel’s security and the creation and recognition of Palestinian sovereignty. These are not incompatible or mutually exclusive objectives. Yet, without a firm, clear-eyed, and unyielding view of its own interest in their achievement, the United States will continue to be frustrated in its pursuit of an equitable diplomatic solution, and the peoples of Israel and Palestine will continue to suffer the increasing costs of unending strife.




# Annex. IMVO Organizational Chart


## Independent Monitoring and Verification Organization



## Technical Teams



## IMVO Consultative Mechanisms - Overview







## X. Study Group Members

**Thomas Pickering** is Vice Chair of Hills & Company. Ambassador Pickering served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1997–2000, and was U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation, India, El Salvador, Nigeria, Jordan, and Israel. He was also Ambassador and Representative to the United Nations from 1988–1991.

**Geoffrey Aronson** is director of research and publications at the Foundation for Middle East Peace. He has consulted for numerous international organizations on a variety of political and security issues in the Middle East.

**Philip Dermer** is a retired US Army colonel with thirty years of service, most recently as one of the Army's foremost Middle East regional experts. He served in senior military and civilian venues throughout the Middle East and Washington, DC.

**Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr.** is Chairman of the Stimson Center and President of Palmer Coates LLC. Ambassador Bloomfield is a former State Department and Department of Defense senior official. In addition to serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs from 2001–2005, he has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

**William Fallon** is a retired United States Navy four-star admiral with a distinguished record of service spanning four decades. His last military assignment was as head of the U.S. Central Command from March 2007–March 2008.

**Ellen Laipson** is president and chief executive officer of the Stimson Center and director of the Middle East/Southwest Asia program there. She has served in numerous high-level appointments at the NSC, State Department and within the intelligence community with a focus on analysis and policymaking on Middle Eastern and South Asian issues.

**John Raidt** is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was a professional staff member of the 9/11 Commission, and has served as a senior staff member in the U.S. Senate. He was also a deputy to General James L. Jones (USMC-Ret.), Special Envoy for Middle East Regional Security, focusing on resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

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Amb. Thomas R. Pickering, *Chairman*

Geoffrey Aronson

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Col. Philip Dermer (Ret.)

Adm. William Fallon (Ret.)

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