April 1945, Germany. The East Front had almost reached Berlin. Last natural barriers against the upcoming Red Army were the rivers Oder and Neisse. In the early hours on April 16 1945, the Berlin offensive began with a massive bombardment by thousands of artillery pieces and Katyusha rockets in a barrage which was sustained for several days. Shortly afterwards and well before dawn, the 1st Belorussian Front attacked across the Oder, and the 1st Ukrainian Front attacked across the Neisse. The 1st Belorussian Front was the stronger force, but it had the more difficult assignment and was facing the majority of the German forces. The initial attack by the 1st Belorussian Front was a disaster; Heinrici anticipated the move and withdrew his defenders from the first line of trenches just before the Soviet artillery obliterated them. The light from 143 searchlights, which were intended to blind the defenders, was diffused by the early morning mist and made useful silhouettes of the attacking Soviet formations. The swampy ground proved to be a great hindrance and under a German counter-barrage, Soviet casualties were enormous. Frustrated by the slow advance, or on the direct orders of Stalin, Zhukov threw in his reserves, which in his plan were to have been held back to exploit the expected breakthrough. By early evening, an advance of almost six kilometres had been achieved in some areas, but the German lines remained intact. In the south, the attack by the 1st Ukrainian Front was keeping to plan. Zhukov was forced to report that the Battle of the Seelow Heights was not going as planned. Stalin, to spur Zhukov, told him that he would give Konev permission to wheel his tank armies towards Berlin from the south. On the second day, the 1st Belorussian Front staff were reduced to combing the rear areas for any troops which could be thrown into the battle. The Soviet tactic of using massed attacks was proving more costly than usual. By nightfall of April 17, the German front before Zhukov remained unbroken, but only just. To the south, Army Group Centre (under the command of General Ferdinand Schörner) was not proving such a hindrance. IV Panzer Army on the north flank of his formation was falling back under the weight of the 1st Ukrainian Front Attack. He kept his two reserve Panzer divisions in the south covering his centre, instead of using them to shore up the IV Panzer Army. This was the turning point in the battle, because by nightfall the positions of both the Army Group Vistula and southern sectors of Army Group Centre were becoming untenable. Unless they fell back in line with the IV Panzer Army, they faced envelopment. In effect, Konev's successful attacks on Schörner's poor defences to the south of the battle of the Seelow Heights were unhinging Heinrici's brilliant defence. The cost to the Soviet forces in making this initial breakthrough was very high. Between 1 April and 19 April, the Soviets lost over 2,807 tanks. During the same period, the Allies in the west lost 1,079 tanks

• published: 26 May 2011
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