Temporal parts is a concept used in contemporary metaphysics in the debate over the persistence of material objects. Objects typically have parts that exist in space—a human body, for example, has spatial parts like hands, feet, and legs. Some metaphysicians believe objects have temporal parts as well. A temporal part would thus be something like "the first year of a person's life", or "all of a table from between 10:00 a.m. on June 21, 1994 to 11:00 p.m. on July 23, 1996".

Originally it was argued that those who believe in temporal parts believe in perdurantism, that persisting objects are wholes composed entirely of temporal parts. This view was contrasted with endurantism, the claim that objects are wholly present at any one time (thus not having different temporal parts at different times). This claim is still commonplace, but philosophers like Ted Sider believe that even endurantists should accept temporal parts.

Not everyone was happy with the definition by analogy: some philosophers, such as Peter van Inwagen, argued that—even given the definition by analogy—they still had no real idea what a temporal part was meant to be (1981: 133), whilst others have felt that whether temporal parts existed or not is merely a verbal dispute (Eli Hirsch holds this view).