

**FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

**1969–1976
VOLUME XVII**

**CHINA,
1969–1972**



**DEPARTMENT
OF
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Washington



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1972

Volume XVII

China 1969–1972

Editor Steven E. Phillips
General Editor Edward C. Keefer

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H. W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. This volume documents the Nixon administration's decision to open high-level discussions with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as well as its ongoing relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan from 1969 to 1972. In addition there are smaller chapters on U.S. relations with Mongolia

and on the question of the U.S. attitude toward Tibet and its exiled leader, the Dali Lama. Unlike previous volumes on China, the U.S. policy toward Chinese representation is not included in this volume. It is presented in great detail in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972, published in 2004. Since the Nixon opening to China was so interconnected with the question of triangular diplomacy among Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, the soon to be published volumes on the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, 1969–October 1970; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, are necessary companion volumes to this one. This is especially true for volume XIII, which coincides with serious consideration of the opening to China and contains many transcripts of Presidential tape recordings and memoranda of Kissinger telephone conversations that discuss the impact of the opening to Beijing on U.S.-Soviet relations and Sino-Soviet relations.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVII

Engaging the People's Republic of China in a dialogue is perhaps the most dramatic and far reaching decision undertaken by the Nixon administration. It ended two decades of hostility and lack of formal contact between Washington and Beijing, with the exception of the fruitless ambassadorial talks at Warsaw that had been going on sporadically for 15 years. The decision to contact the leadership of the People's Republic of China through intermediaries was one of the most closely held secrets in the U.S. Government, known only to Kissinger, Nixon, and a handful of National Security Council Staff members. It was not shared with Secretary of State William Rogers or his Department of State. This volume covers the initial signals between the United States and the People's Republic of China indicating that both sides desired a dialogue—although the exchange is seen only through U.S. sources. The volume highlights the role of the Pakistan President Yahya Khan and Pakistan Ambassador to the United States Aga Hilaly as the principal intermediaries between Washington and Beijing, but provides coverage of other intermediaries, including Romanians, as well as famous signals, such as the Chinese invitation to the U.S. Ping Pong team to visit China.

The volume documents the lead up to the initial Kissinger visit to Beijing in July 1971, his next visit in October 1971, and President Nixon's historic visit of February 1972. Through a variety of sources—telegrams, memoranda, memoranda of conversation, telephone conversations, transcripts of Presidential tape recordings, and briefing books with extensive handwritten annotation by Nixon—the volume documents how the President wanted Kissinger initially to engage the Chinese. Kissinger's conversations in Beijing are covered in detail and

the excitement that he felt during this first trip clearly comes through the official record. It is not difficult to see that Kissinger believed he had a special bond with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. The October 1971 trip by Kissinger is also covered in detail with similar documentation. The volume contains extensive documentation on President Nixon's February 1972 trip and the issuing of the Shanghai Communiqué. After the Nixon visit, the United States sought to regularize its contacts with the People's Republic of China, and this process is documented in the last chapter on China that includes documentation on Kissinger's June 1972 visit to Beijing.

Although the volume concentrates heavily on the People's Republic of China, there is considerable documentation on U.S. relations with the Republic of China during the 1969–1972 period. There is also documentation on a government-wide reexamination of U.S.-PRC relations that served as background to the more far-reaching decisions taken in secret by Kissinger and the President.

Additional documentation on China is published in the companion electronic volume, *Foreign Relations*, volume E-13, Documents on China, 1969–1972. The electronic volume presents 175 documents, most of which are cited in the footnotes of this print volume, that relate to high-level contacts between the People's Republic of China and the United States. Typically, the print volume presents the shorter (and sometimes more subjective) summary memorandum of a conversation or important message, while the electronic volume contains the verbatim memorandum of conversation or the full text of messages exchanged.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the date and time of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as

found, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

The Advisory Committee has reviewed this volume.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA

and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of the files all private and personal materials. All *Foreign Relations* volumes that include materials from NARA's Nixon Presidential Materials Project are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, "Classified National Security Information" and other applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 1999 and was completed in 2005, resulted in the decision to withhold 5 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 2 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 39 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation presented here provide an accurate account of the Nixon administration's policy toward China from 1969 to 1972.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The

editors wish to express gratitude to the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access.

Steven E. Phillips collected the documentation for this volume and selected and edited it, under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, then Chief of the Asia and America's Division, now General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Kristin L. Ahlberg did the copy and technical editing. Susan C. Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division, and Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

Marc J. Susser

The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

August 2006

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Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department’s indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at Archives II include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. These papers are a key source for the Nixon–Ford subseries of *Foreign Relations*.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The Nixon Presidential Materials staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVII

The Nixon Presidential Materials, presently housed at the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, are the single most important source of documentation for those interested in Sino-American relations during the first Nixon administration. The Nixon Presidential Materials are scheduled to be transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, California over the next few years.

Foreign policy research in the Nixon Materials centers around the National Security Council (NSC) Files, which include Country Files, the President's Daily Briefing materials, backchannel messages, VIP Visit Files, topical files related to Vietnam and China, Name Files, Files of NSC staffers, and Kissinger's Office Files. The NSC files contain about 1,300 archive boxes of materials. In particular, the Country Files for the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (Boxes 518–529); President's File—China Trip (Boxes 846–851); and Files for the President—China Materials (1031–1038) hold the most complete documentation of high-level policy making.

There are several collections in the NSC Files that contain scattered, but often unique, documentation on the evolution of America's China policy, including the chronological files for various NSC staff members such as Alexander M. Haig, Robert Houdek, Anthony Lake, Jon Howe, Harold Saunders, and Richard Solomon. Finally, Kissinger's Office Files overlap considerably with the Kissinger Papers at the Library of Congress (discussed below). This collection includes materials from the Presidential transition (November 1968–January 1969), overseas trips, and Country Files (Boxes 86–100 cover China).

Besides the NSC Files, the Nixon Materials include the White House Central Files, which have Staff Member and Office Files, subject files and name files. There also exists the White House Special Files, which include Staff Member and Office Files, Subject Files, and Name Files. The White House Central Files generally contain less sensitive materials, but add some insight into the connection between the domestic and foreign policies of the Nixon White House. The Special Files' Staff Member Office Files collection includes the files of H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and most other important White House

staff members. It also holds the President's Office Files (POF), which have the President's Handwriting File (copies of documents with President Richard M. Nixon's handwritten comments) and Memoranda for the President. The Memoranda for the President is a chronological collection of memoranda of conversation or other documentation of meetings attended by Nixon. It includes meetings related to domestic politics and foreign policy, and often contains records of talks with foreign leaders. While only a small portion of the NSC Files have been declassified, much of the Central and Special Files are available to the public. Binders with complete box lists for these materials are available at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project.

One important resource is the White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary, which lists all those who met with the President at the White House or while he was traveling. The Diary also indicates telephone calls to and from the President and has a daily record of "Presidential Movements."

The White House tapes, which began in February 1971, provide an invaluable record of Nixon foreign policy and life in the White House. Conversations were recorded from the Oval Office, Cabinet Room, Camp David, Nixon's private office in the Executive Office Building (EOB), as well as the White House and Camp David telephones. A tape log outlining the topics of each conversation and providing specific conversation numbers, time, date, and names of those on the tape has been prepared by the staff at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. An abbreviation, acronym, and name list has also been provided by Nixon Project to help narrow the search of the tapes. The tapes themselves vary greatly in quality; those from the EOB office are difficult to hear, while those in the Cabinet Room or over the telephone are often quite clear.

The NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) contain documents distributed prior to each NSC meeting (71 meetings held from 1969 to 1972), Special Review Group (49 meetings), Senior Review Group (91 meetings), Washington Special Actions Group (153 meetings), Defense Program Review Committee (23 meetings), Verification Panel (45 meetings), Vietnam Special Studies Group (7 meetings), and the NSC Intelligence Committee (1 meeting), along with detailed minutes of most of these meetings. There is a guide to the H-Files available at the National Archives.

After the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Henry A. Kissinger Papers located in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress are second in importance. While the Kissinger papers contain copies of many of the most important items found in the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the chief advantage of these files is that they are well-organized and contain fewer materials on administrative

matters of little value to most researchers. The most useful parts of the Kissinger Papers are the Chronological Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Memoranda for the President, and a collection of documents organized by country under the Geopolitical Files heading. The Kissinger papers also contain records of Kissinger's telephone conversations (telcons). The telcons, prepared by members of the NSC staff, include Kissinger's talks with President Nixon, Secretaries Rogers and Laird, other top U.S. officials, foreign diplomats (including "unofficial" go-betweens involved in Japanese textile negotiations), scholars, and newspaper, magazine, and television reporters (who comprise about one-third of the total number of conversations). Copies of the Kissinger telephone conversations are also available at the National Archives and are open to the public. Another unique item in the Kissinger papers is a typed version of Kissinger's daily schedule. This is found under Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule, though the schedule before August 31, 1970, has not been located. For an overview of the entire collection, researchers are advised to consult "Henry Kissinger: A Register of his Papers in the Library of Congress," prepared by the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in 1996. Access to these papers currently requires permission from Kissinger.

Since Nixon and Kissinger dominated the formulation and implementation of China policy, the files of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are of less importance for the 1969–1972 period than for earlier administrations. The White House deliberately excluded these agencies from involvement in rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC). These files are, however, important sources of information for researching America's increasingly troubled relationship with the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC). The Central Files of the Department of State are most valuable for information on day-to-day interaction with the ROC and for some information on events within the PRC. The Lot Files of the Department of State containing some useful information are the records of the Executive Secretariat (S/S), the organization charged with managing the paperwork of the Secretary of State (Lots 71 D 175 and 72 D 318) and the Conference Files, a consolidated grouping of documents related to trips by the Secretary, the President, and the Vice President. This latter collection includes many memoranda of conversation with foreign leaders and correspondence from high-level American officials while they were on travel or at the United Nations in New York.

For relevant records of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense, see the following list.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and Records Administration below.

INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1970s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files

AID (US) CHINAT, ROC, U.S. economic aid to the ROC
 AID (US) 8 CHINAT, U.S. grants and technical assistance to the ROC
 AID (US) 15 CHINAT, P.L.-480 assistance to the ROC
 CSM 1 CHICOM, Chinese Communist doctrine, objectives
 CSM 1-1, Communist schisms, deviation
 CUL CHICOM, cultural activities related to the People's Republic of China (PRC)
 CUL CHINAT, cultural activities related to the Republic of China (ROC)
 DEF 12-1 CHICOM, nuclear testing, PRC
 DEF ASIA SE, regional military affairs, Southeast Asia
 DEF CHICOM, military affairs, PRC
 DEF CHINAT, military affairs, ROC
 DEF 1 CHINAT, defense policy, plans, readiness, ROC
 DEF 1 CHINAT-US, defense policy, plans, readiness, ROC-US.
 DEF 1-4 CHINAT, air defense, ROC
 DEF 6 CHINAT, armed forces, ROC
 DEF 6-5 CHINAT, paramilitary forces, ROC
 DEF 15 CHINAT, bases and installations, ROC
 DEF 15 CHINAT-US, bases and installations, ROC-US.
 DEF 15-3 CHINAT-US, status of forces, ROC-US.
 DEF 15 HK, bases and installations, Hong Kong
 DEF 19 US-CHINAT, U.S. military assistance to the ROC
 DEF 19-8 US-CHINAT, U.S. provision of military equipment and supplies to the ROC
 E CHICOM or CHINAT, general economic affairs, PRC or ROC
 E HK, general economic affairs, Hong Kong
 E 5 MONG, economic development, Mongolia
 FN CHICOM or CHINAT, financial affairs, PRC or ROC
 FN HK, financial affairs, Hong Kong
 FT CHICOM-US, question of trade with the PRC
 FT CHICOM-1 US, general policy on the question of trade with the PRC
 INT 6, collection of intelligence
 INCO TEXTILES CHINAT, industries and commodities, textiles, ROC
 ORG 1 OSD-STATE, State-Defense coordination
 ORG 3-2, chiefs of mission and principal officers
 ORG 7 FE, travel by officials of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

XVI Sources

- ORG 7 S, travel by the Secretary of State
- PET CHINAT, petroleum, ROC
- POL ASIA/ASIA SE, political affairs and relations, Asia/Southeast Asia
- POL 1 ASIA SE-US, U.S. general policy toward Southeast Asia
- POL CAN-CHICOM, political affairs and relations, Canada and the PRC
- POL CHICOM, political developments, PRC
- POL 1 CHICOM, U.S. general policy toward the PRC
- POL 1-3 CHICOM, general policy evaluation, PRC
- POL 2 CHICOM, general reports and statistics, PRC
- POL 13-2 CHICOM, PRC students and youth groups
- POL 15-1 CHICOM, PRC head of state
- POL 16 CHICOM, independence and recognition, PRC
- POL CHICOM-CHINAT, political affairs and relations, PRC China-ROC
- POL 27 CHICOM-CHINAT, military operations, PRC-ROC
- POL 1 CHICOM-FR, general policy, PRC and France
- POL CHICOM-JAPAN, political affairs and relations, PRC and Japan
- POL CHICOM-US, political affairs and relations, PRC and the U.S.
- POL 1 CHICOM-US, U.S. general policy toward the PRC
- POL 27-7 CHICOM-US, U.S. prisoners of war, hostages, civilian internees in the PRC
- POL 31-1 CHICOM-US, air disputes and violations, PRC and the U.S.
- POL CHICOM-USSR, political affairs and relations, PRC and the U.S.S.R
- POL 32-1 CHICOM-USSR, territory and boundary disputes, violations, incidents, PRC and the U.S.S.R.
- POL CHINAT, political developments, ROC
- POL 2 CHINAT, general reports and statistics, ROC
- POL 7 CHINAT, travel and visits by high-level ROC officials
- POL 15-1 CHINAT, ROC head of state
- POL 16 CHINAT, independence and recognition, ROC
- POL 29 CHINAT, political prisoners, ROC
- POL CHINAT-CHICOM, political affairs and relations, ROC and PRC
- POL CHINAT-FR, political affairs and relations, ROC and France
- POL 1 CHINAT-FR, ROC general policy toward France
- POL CHINAT-US, political affairs and relations, ROC and the U.S.
- POL 1 CHINAT-US, U.S. general policy toward the ROC
- POL 17 CHINAT-US, ROC diplomatic and consular representation in the U.S.
- POL 1 CHINAT-VIET S, ROC general policy toward South Vietnam
- POL 23-10 COMBLOC, travel controls, Communist Bloc countries
- POL HK, political affairs and relations, Hong Kong
- POL 23-8 HK, demonstrations, riots, protests, Hong Kong
- POL HK-US, political affairs and relations, Hong Kong and the U.S.
- POL 7 JAPAN, visits of Japanese leaders
- POL 16 MONG, question of recognition of Mongolia
- POL MONG-US, political affairs and relations, Mongolia and the U.S.
- POL 7 ROM, travel and visits by high-level Romanian officials
- POL 17 ROM-POL, Romanian diplomatic and consular representation in Poland
- POL TAIWAN, political affairs and relations, Taiwan (ROC)
- POL TIBET, political affairs and relations, Tibet
- POL 19 TIBET, political issues concerning Tibet
- POL 30-2 TIBET, Tibetan exile political activities
- POL 19 TIBET/UN, the Tibet issue in the United Nations
- POL 19 TIBET/US, U.S. policy with respect to Tibet
- POL 1 US, general policy, background, U.S.
- POL 2 US, general reports and statistics, U.S.
- POL 7 US-KENNEDY, files related to visits and meetings of Ambassador David Kennedy

POL 7 US–KISSINGER, files related to visits and meetings of Henry A. Kissinger
POL 7 US/NIXON, President Nixon's overseas visits, head of state visits to the U.S.
POL 15–1 US/NIXON, President Nixon's meetings and correspondence with heads of state
POL 17 US–CHICOM, U.S. diplomatic and consular representation in the PRC
POL 7 USSR, travel and visits by high-level Soviet officials
POL 27 VIET S, military operations, South Vietnam
SOC CHICOM or CHINAT, social conditions in the PRC or ROC
STR 9–1, strategic trade controls on trade with the PRC
TR 8 CHICOM, trade promotion and assistance, fairs and exhibitions, PRC
UN 3 GA, United Nations General Assembly
UN 6 CHICOM, Chinese representation question in the United Nations

Lot Files

DS/IM Files: Lot 96 D 695

Files of U. Alexis Johnson, 1958–1973. This lot file combines lots 90 D 407, 408 and 410. Memoranda of conversation, correspondence files, personal files, and 12 audiotapes.

EA/ACA Files: Lot 71 D 144

Files of Paul H. Kreisberg, Officer in Charge of Mainland China Affairs, 1965–1970, as maintained by the Office of Asian Communist Affairs

EA/ROC Files: Lot 71 D 187

Political files, 1968–1969, from the Office of Republic of China Affairs

EA/ROC Files: Lot 71 D 516

Matters related to economic and defense issues on Taiwan, 1969–1970, from the Office of Republic of China Affairs

EA/ROC Files: Lot 72 D 140

Top Secret files, including briefing materials and records of visits, 1961–1968, as maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs, later by the Republic of China desk in the office of East Asian Affairs, and later by the Office of Republic of China Affairs

EA/ROC Files: Lot 72 D 145

Political files, 1970 and previous years, from the Office of Republic of China Affairs

EA/EX Files: Lot 72 D 276

Miscellaneous top secret files from 1953, 1967, 1969 and 1970, from the EA Message Center, filed by the Executive Secretariat

EA/ROC Files: Lot 73 D 38

Political files, 1970–1971, from the Office of Republic of China Affairs

EA/RA Files: Lot 73 D 418

Telegrams, airgrams, reports and correspondence, 1966–1972, from the Office of Regional Affairs

EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25

Political files, 1964–1972, from the Republic of China desk in the Office of East Asian Affairs and later by the Office of Republic of China Affairs

XVIII Sources

EA/PRC/M Files: Lot 74 D 192

Hong Kong and Macau subject files, 1971–1972, from the Office of People's Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

EA/PRC/M Files: Lot 74 D 213

NSC Under Secretaries Memorandum 91, travel and trade with the PRC, 1969–1973, from the Office of People's Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

EA/PRC/M Files: Lot 74 D 400

PRC subject files, 1971, from the Office of People's Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

EA Files: 74 D 471

Letters and memoranda prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1972–1973

EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 61

Economic and defense files, 1968–1972, from the Office of Republic of China Affairs

EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76

Political files, 1954–1973, and miscellaneous Top Secret files, 1955–1973, from the Office of Chinese Affairs, later by the Republic of China desk in the Office of East Asian Affairs, and later by the Office of Republic of China Affairs

EA/ROC Files: Lot 78 D 138

Files on political, defense, and legislative matters, 1971–1975, from the Office of Republic of China Affairs

EA/ROC Files: Lot 79 D 120

Top Secret files, 1961–1972, from the Republic of China desk in the office of East Asian Affairs, and later by the Office of Republic of China Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

EA/ROC Files: Lot 79 D 307

Ambassadorial talks: Warsaw, 1969–1973, and top secret documents related to China, 1961–1977, from the Office of People's Republic of China and Mongolian Affairs

Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240

Files of William P. Bundy as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1962–1970

EAP Files: Lot 89 D 436

China files of William H. Gleysteen, 1969–1977, from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

EAP/CM Files: Lot 96 D 539

Top secret China documents, 1971–1987, from the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

INR/REA Files: Lot 74 D 499

Files relating to the Republic of China, 1969–1970, from the Office of Regional Affairs

INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99

National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence Estimates, Telegrams, and Memos, 1952–1985, from the Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific

INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110

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S/P Files: Lot 71 D 382

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Files of Policy Planning Director Winston Lord (1973–1977), covering the period 1969–1977

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S/S Files: Lot 72 D 319

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S/S Files: Lot 83 D 277

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S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305

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Abbreviations

- A/A**, anti-aircraft
A/AID, Office of the Administrator, Agency for International Development
AA, Afro-Asian
AB, air base
ABC, American Broadcasting Company
ABF, attacks by fire
ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACA, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACTION, Federal agency that coordinates domestic volunteer efforts
ADB, Asian Development Bank
ADOA, Air Defense Operations Agreement
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Air Force; also Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFB, air force base
AFL-CIO, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFP, Agence France Press
AID, Agency for International Development
AID/NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development
AMB, ambassador
AMCITS, American citizens
AMH, Alexander Meigs Haig, Jr.
AMCONGEN, American Consul General
AMCONSUL, American Consul
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States
AP, Associated Press
APC, armored personnel carrier; also Accelerated Pacification Campaign
AR, Albanian Resolution (UN)
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARVN, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
ASA, Association of Southeast Asia
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASPAC, Asian and Pacific Council
- B-52**, United States Air Force strategic bomber
Backchannel, a method of communication outside normal bureaucratic procedure; the White House, for instance, used “backchannel” messages to bypass the Department of State
BNDD, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
- C-130**, United States Air Force transport plane
C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State
CA, circular airgram
CAF, Chinese Air Force (ROC)
CANDEL, Canadian Delegation

XXVIII Abbreviations and Terms

CAP, Combined Action Platoon
CAT, Civil Air Transport
CCA, Chinese Communist Army
CCK, Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jinguo); also Ching Chuan Kang Airbase in Taiwan
CCN, Chinese Communist Navy
CCP, Chinese Communist Party
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CENTO, Central Asian Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact)
Chicom(s), Chinese Communist(s)
CHIDEL, Chinese delegation
CHINAT, Chinese Nationalist(s)
CHIREC, Chinese recognition (involves bilateral relations between the PRC or ROC and a third country)
CHIREP, Chinese representation (UN)
CHMAAG, Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group (ROC)
CI, counterinsurgency
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIA/ONE, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates
CIAP, Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress
CIB, Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIA)
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
CIF, Chinese Irregular Forces
CINC, Commander in Chief
CINCMEAFSA, Commander in Chief, Middle East, South Asia, and Africa South of the Sahara
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCPAC/POLAD, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Political Advisor
CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command
CINCUNK, Commander in Chief of United Nations Forces in Korea
CINCUSARPAC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific
CIP, commodities import program
CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CL, classified
CM, Chairman's (of JCS) memorandum
CMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
Cocom, Coordinating Committee on Export Controls
Codel, Congressional delegation
Col, Colonel
COMECON, Council on Mutual Economic Assistance
COMINT, communications intelligence
Comite, committee
COMUSMACV, Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSTDC, Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
CONG, Congress or congressman
CONGEN, Consul General
CONUS, continental United States
COSVN, Central Office for South Vietnam
CPR, Chinese People's Republic (also PRC)
CPT, Thai Communist Party
CSA, Chief of Staff of the Army
CSAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force

- CST**, Central Standard Time
CT, Thai Communist Insurgents; also Country Team
CTZ, corps tactical zone
CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CY, calendar year
- D**, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State
D/INR, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
DA, Department of the Army
DAO, defense attaché office
DATT, defense attaché
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DDO, Deputy Directorate for Operations
DDP, Deputy Directorate for Plans
DefMin, minister of defense
DefSec, Defense Secretary
Del, delegate; delegation
Dept, Department of State
Depcirtel, circular telegram from the Department of State
DepFonMin, deputy foreign minister
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DirGen or DG, Director General
Dis or Dissem, dissemination
DL, development loan
DMZ, demilitarized zone
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
DOS, Department of State
DPM, Deputy Prime Minister
DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee
DPRG, Defense Program Review Group
DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
DTG, date/time/group
- E**, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
E/ORF, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
E/ORF/ICD, Office of International Commodities, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/ACA, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/ANZ, Office of Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Islands Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/LC, Office of Laos/Cambodian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

XXX Abbreviations and Terms

- EA/ROC**, Office of Republic of China Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- EA/ROK**, Office of Republic of Korea Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- ECAFE**, United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
- ECOSOC**, United Nations Economic and Social Council
- ELR**, Elliot L. Richardson
- Emb**, Embassy
- Emboff**, Embassy officer
- Embtel**, Embassy telegram
- EOB**, Executive Office Building
- EST**, Eastern Standard Time; also estimated
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUR/CAN**, Office of Canada Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUR/SOV**, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Exdis**, exclusive distribution
- Ex-Im**, Export-Import Bank of Washington
- F-4 (Phantom)**, twin engine turbo jet, all weather, supersonic tactical fighter bomber with two crew members
- F-5 (Freedom Fighter)**, twin engine, supersonic light tactical fighter with one or two crew
- F-100**, single engine, supersonic fighter aircraft
- F**, fighter (designation used for United States fighter aircraft)
- FAC**, Foreign Assets Control
- FAO**, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
- FANK**, Forces Armées Royales Khmeres (Khmer National Armed Forces)
- FAR or FARK**, Forces Armées Royales Khmeres (Royal Khmer Armed Forces)
- FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- FBIS**, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
- FE**, Far East; also Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
- Flash**, indicates message of highest priority requiring the attention of the Secretary of State
- FM**, foreign minister; also from
- FMS**, foreign military sales
- FODAG**, United States Mission to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture
- FonMin**, foreign minister
- FonOff**, foreign office
- FonSec**, foreign secretary
- FR**, France
- FRC**, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland
- FSO**, Foreign Service Officer
- FWE**, free world forces
- FT**, foreign trade
- FY**, fiscal year
- FYI**, for your information
- GA**, United Nations General Assembly
- GAO**, General Accounting Office
- GATT**, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
- GDP**, gross domestic product
- Gen**, General

- GIMO**, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)
GIO, Government Information Office (ROC)
GMT, Greenwich Mean Time
GNP, gross national product
GOC, Government of Canada; also Government of Cambodia
GOI, Government of India; also Government of Indonesia
GOJ, Government of Japan
GOVT, government
GPO, Government Printing Office
GRC, Government of the Republic of China
GSA, General Services Administration
GUB, Government of the Union of Burma
GVN, Government of Vietnam
GVR, Government of the Republic of Vietnam
- H**, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
H.E., His Excellency
HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee
HK, Hong Kong; also initials for Henry Kissinger
HKG, Hong Kong Government
HMG, Her Majesty's Government, United Kingdom
hq, headquarters
HR, House Resolution
HUD, Department of Housing and Urban Development
- I**, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
IBMND, Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of National Defense (ROC)
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
ICC, International Control and Supervision Commission
ICJ, International Court of Justice
ICRC, International Committee, Red Cross
IFI, International Financial Institution
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INFO, information
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DDR/REA, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/EAP, East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INR/OD, Office of the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INR/RA, Regional Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INTEL, intelligence
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IQ, important question
IRBM, intermediate range ballistic missile
IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

XXXII Abbreviations and Terms

J, Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State
J/PM, Office of Politico-Military Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

JCRR, Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, Republic of China (ROC)

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum

JHH, John Herbert Holdridge

JUSMAG, Joint United States Military Group

JUSPAO, Joint United States Public Affairs Office

K, Kissinger

KHR, Khmer Republic

KMT, Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, ROC), also called the Guomindang (GMD)

KT, kilotons

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

LA, Latin America

LDC, less developed country

LDX, long distance xerography

Limdis, limited distribution

LOC, lines of communication

LPF, Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao)

LTA, long-term agreement (textiles)

LTG, Lieutenant General

M-1, World War II-era U.S. military rifle

M-14, semi automatic U.S. military rifle

M-16, U.S. military field rifle

M-113, armored personnel carrier

M, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management

mm, millimeter

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAC, Military Assistance Command

MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MAP, Military Assistance/Aid Program

MASE, Military Assistance Service Funded

MBA, Military Base Agreement

MBFR, Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks

MemCon, memorandum of conversation

MFA, multifiber agreement

MIA, missing in action

MIG, A. I. Mikoyan and M. I. Gurevich (Soviet fighter aircraft named for their two most important designers)

MIL, military

MILAD, military adviser

MinDef, minister of defense

MisOff, mission officer

MND, Ministry of National Defense (ROC)

MOD, minister; also ministry of defense

MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC)

MONG, Mongolia

MP, member of parliament

MPR, Mongolian People's Republic

MR, military region; also memorandum for the record

MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile
MT, metric ton

NARA, National Archives and Records Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO, non-commissioned officer
NE, northeast
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/INC, Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal and Maldives Islands, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
NEA/PAE, Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
NEA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development
Niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NIC, National Intelligence Council
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NLF, National Liberation Front
NLF SVN, National Liberation Front of South Vietnam
nm, nautical mile
Nodis, no distribution (other than to persons indicated)
Noform, no foreign dissemination
Notal, not received by all addressees
NPT, Nonproliferation Treaty
NSA, National Security Agency
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
NSC IG/EA, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group on East Asia
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NT, New Taiwan Dollar, ROC's unit of currency
NVA (also NVNA), North Vietnamese Army
NVA/VC, North Vietnam/Viet Cong
NVN, North Vietnam
NZ, New Zealand

OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OBE, overtaken by events
OCI, Office of Current Intelligence
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
O & M, operations and maintenance
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
ONE, Office of National Estimates (CIA)
OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/ISA, Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OUSD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State; also President
PA, purchase authorization

XXXIV Abbreviations and Terms

PACAF, Pacific Air Force
PACOM, Pacific Command
PACFLT, Pacific Fleet
PARA, paragraph; also Policy Analysis Resource Allocation
PAO, public affairs officer
PAVN, People's Army of Vietnam
PD, presidential determination
PDB, President's Daily Brief
PermRep, permanent representative
PIAIB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PL, public law; also Pathet Lao
PL-480, Public Law 480 (Food for Peace)
PLA, People's Liberation Army (PRC)
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; also prime minister
PM/ISP, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PMG, Politico-military Group
PNG, persona non grata
POF, President's Office Files (Nixon Presidential Materials)
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants; Poland; political
POLAD, political adviser
PolOff, political officer
POW, prisoner of war
PR, public relations
PRC, People's Republic of China (see also CPR)
PRES, the President
PriMin, prime minister

R & D, research and development
RCD, Organization of Regional Cooperation for Development
RD, rural development
reftel, reference telegram
rep, representative
res, resolution
RET'D, returned
RG, record group or review group
RMN or RN, Richard Nixon
RNC, Republican National Committee
ROC, Republic of China (see also GRC)
ROK, Republic of Korea (South Korea)
ROVN or RVN Republic of Vietnam
RPT, repeat
RVN, Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/AL, Ambassador at Large
S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State
S/PRS, Office of Press Relations, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State
S/S-S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State
SA, supporting assistance
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

- SAM**, surface-to-air missile
SAR, search and rescue missions
SC, United Nations Security Council
SCA, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
SCI, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State
SE, southeast
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEACoord, Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee
SEAMEC, Southeast Asia Monetary Exchange Council
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Secdef, Secretary of Defense
Secstate, Secretary of State
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washington
Secy, Secretary of State
Secy Gen, Secretary General
Septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group (NSC)
SIGINT, signals intelligence
SIOP, Single Integrated Operations Plan (for strategic nuclear weapons)
SITREP, situations report
SLBM, submarine launched ballistic missile
SMOF, Staff Member and Office Files (Nixon Presidential Materials)
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOF(A), Status of Forces (Agreement)
SOP, standard operating procedure
SR, strategic reserve
SR-171, U.S. high altitude reconnaissance aircraft
SRG, Senior Review Group
Subj., subject
SVN, South Vietnam
SYG, United Nations Secretary General
- TA**, technical assistance
TAC, tactical; also tactical air command
TACAIR, tactical air
TACS, Tactical Air Control System
TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentsvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
TC, technical cooperation
TCC, Troop Contributing (to Vietnam) Countries
TDC, Taiwan Defense Command
TDY, temporary duty
TIAS, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (publication series from the Department of State)
TIM, Taiwan Independence Movement
Toaid, series indicator for telegrams to the Agency for International Development
Todel, series indicator for telegrams to the delegation at the Paris Peace Talks
TOR, terms of reference
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while outside of Washington
Tosit, to the White House Situation Room
TS, top secret

XXXVI Abbreviations and Terms

- U-S/M**, Under Secretaries' memorandum
U-2, single engine, high altitude reconnaissance aircraft with one crew member (U.S.)
U, Office of the Under Secretary of State; also unclassified
UH, utility helicopter (Huey)
UK, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN, United Nations
UNCURK, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UNSTO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UPI, United Press International
US, United States
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USAID, United States Agency for International Development
U.S.C., United States Code
USDA, United States Department of Agriculture
USDAO, United States Defense Attaché Office
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USINFO, United States Information Service
USIS, United States Information Service (overseas branches of USIA)
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USN, United States Navy
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST, United States Treaty
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations
- VC**, Vietcong
VC/NVA, Vietcong/North Vietnamese
VCI, Viet Cong Infrastructure
VN, Vietnam
VNAF, Vietnamese Air Force
VOA, Voice of America
VOLAGS, voluntary agencies
VP, Vice President
VSSG, Vietnam Special Studies Group
- WESTPAC**, Commander, Western Pacific
WH, White House
WHCF, White House Central Files
WHO, World Health Organization; also White House Office (series indicator for White House messages)
WNRC, Washington National Records Center
WPR, William P. Rogers
WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group
- Z**, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)

Persons

- Abrams, General Creighton W., Jr.**, USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; thereafter, Army Chief of Staff, USA
- Abshire, David M.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from April 8, 1970
- Agnew, Spiro T.**, Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1969
- Aichi Kiichi**, Foreign Minister of Japan until July 1971
- Aldrich, George H.**, Acting Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, January–October 1969; thereafter, Deputy Legal Adviser
- Aalgaard, Ole**, Norwegian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China
- Allen, Ward P.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until June 1971
- Annenberg, Walter H.**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom from April 1969
- Armstrong, Oscar Vance**, Deputy Chief of Mission in Taipei, October 1969–May 1971; Political Advisor, CINPAC, May 1971–July 1973; Director, People's Republic of China and Mongolian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, from July 1973
- Armstrong, Willis C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from February 14, 1972
- Atherton, Alfred L., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from March 1970
- Bahr, Egon**, State Secretary, West German Federal Chancellery
- Bao Dai**, last emperor of the Nguyen Dynasty; head of state of non-Communist Vietnam, 1949–1955
- Barger, Herman H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1970–1973
- Barnett, Robert W.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until January 1970
- Barzel, Rainer**, leader of the Christian Democratic Union and candidate for chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1972
- Beam, Jacob D.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March 14, 1969
- Behr, Colonel Robert M.**, USAF senior staff member, National Security Council, 1969–1971
- Bergsten, C. Fred**, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/International Economic Affairs, January 1969–June 1971
- Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali**, Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, December 7–17, 1971; thereafter, President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defense of Pakistan
- Blatchford, Joseph H.**, Director of the Peace Corps, May 1969–June 1971; also, Director of ACTION from July 1971
- Braderman, Eugene M.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities, Bureau of Economic Affairs, until June 1971
- Brandt, Willy**, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 1969; thereafter, Chancellor
- Bray, Charles W., III**, Director, Office of Press Relations, Department of State after February 1971
- Brewster, Robert C.**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, July 1969–August 1971

- Brezhnev, Leonid**, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Brown, Winthrop G.**, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until April 1972
- Bruce, David K.E.**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom until March 1969; also, head of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, 1970–1971
- Bundy, William P.**, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until May 4, 1969
- Burns, Dr. Arthur F.**, Counselor to the President, January 1969–January 1970; thereafter, Chairman, Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
- Bush, George H.W.**, Representative (R-Texas) until January 1970; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from February 16, 1971
- Butterfield, Alexander P.**, Deputy Assistant to the President, January 1969–January 1973
- Butz, Earl L.**, Secretary of Agriculture from December 1971
- Cadieux, Marcel**, Canadian Ambassador to the United States from October 23, 1969
- Caradon, Lord (Hugh Mackintosh Foot)**, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations until June 1970
- Cargo, William I.**, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from August 4, 1969
- Ceausescu, Nicolae**, First Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and President of Romania
- Chafee, John H.**, Secretary of the Navy, January 31, 1969–May 4, 1972
- Chang Wen-chin**, Director, Western European and America Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, October 1971–June 1972; Assistant to the Foreign Minister from June 1972
- Chapin, Dwight**, Special Assistant to the President, 1969–1971; Deputy Assistant to the President, 1971–1973
- Chapin, Frank**, member, National Security Council staff and staff secretary to the 303/40 Committee
- Chew, Vice Admiral John L.**, Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
- Chi P'eng-fei**, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, until April 1971; Acting Foreign Minister until February 1972; Foreign Minister from February 1972
- Chiang Ching**, wife of Mao Tse-tung; also, member, Chinese Communist Party Politburo during April 1969
- Chiang Ching-kuo, General**, son of Chiang Kai-shek; Minister of Defense, Republic of China, until 1969; Vice Premier of the Executive Yuan, 1969–1972; Premier from 1972; member, Kuomintang (Guomintang) Standing Committee and the Republic of China National Security Council
- Chiang Kai-shek**, President of the Republic of China; Chair, Republic of China National Security Council; Director-General, Kuomintang
- Chiang Kai-shek, Madame**, wife of Chiang Kai-shek; born Soong Mayling (Song Meiling)
- Chiao (Ch'iao) Kuan-hua**, Deputy [Vice] Foreign Minister, People's Republic of China
- Chien Fu (Fredrick F.)**, Deputy Director of the North American Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, until 1969; Director, 1969–1972; Director-General of the Government Information Office from 1972
- Chou En-lai**, Premier of the People's Republic of China
- Chow (Chou) Shu-kai**, ROC Ambassador to the United States until May 1971; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1971–1972; Minister without Portfolio from 1972
- Cleveland, Paul M.**, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until February 1970; Special Assistant and Staff Director, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs from February 1970

- Cline, Ray S.**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October 26, 1969
- Collins, Michael**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, December 15, 1969–April 11, 1971
- Connally, John B., Jr.**, member, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1970; Secretary of the Treasury, February 1971–June 1972
- Cromer, Earl of (George Rowland Stanley Baring)**, British Ambassador to the United States from February 8, 1971
- Cross, Charles T.**, Ambassador to Singapore, September 15, 1969–November 18, 1971
- Crowe, Sir Colin**, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1970–1973
- Crowe, Philip K.**, Ambassador to Norway from May 1, 1969
- Cronk, Edwin M.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Trade Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, October 1969–June 1972; Ambassador to Singapore from June 27, 1972
- Curran, Robert T.**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, August 1970–September 1972; thereafter, Deputy Director of Personnel for Management
- Cushman, Lieutenant General Robert E., Jr.**, USMC, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, May 7, 1969–December 31, 1971; thereafter, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps from January 1, 1972
- Davies, Richard T.**, Consul General in Calcutta until August 1969; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, August 1970–December 1972; Ambassador to Poland from December 2, 1972
- Davies, Rodger P.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Davis, Jeanne W.**, Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat 1970–1971; Staff Secretary, NSC Staff Secretariat, from 1971
- De Gaulle, Charles**, President of France until April 28, 1969
- Deng Xiaoping**, former Deputy Premier of the People's Republic of China
- Denney, George C., Jr.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State until April 1970; Deputy Director, Directorate for Management, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, April 1970–November 1973
- Dent, Frederick B.**, Secretary of Commerce from December 1972
- De Palma, Samuel**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from February 7, 1969
- Dobrynin, Anatoliy F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
- Donelan, Joseph F., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration from June 14, 1971
- Doolin, Dennis J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs responsible for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
- Douglas-Home, Sir Alexander Frederick**, British Foreign Secretary from June 19, 1970
- Eagleburger, Lawrence S.**, member, National Security Council staff, 1969–1970
- Eden, Sir Anthony**, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 26, 1951–April 7, 1955; Prime Minister, April 6, 1955–January 9, 1957
- Ehrlichman, John D.**, Counsel to the President, January–November 1969; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs from November 1969
- Eliot, Theodore L., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 10, 1969
- Ellsworth, Robert**, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, May 1969–June 1971
- Enders, Thomas O.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Monetary Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, until August 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission in Belgrade, August 1969–December 1971; Deputy Chief of Mission in Phnom Penh from January 1972

XL Persons

- Farland, Joseph S.**, Ambassador to Pakistan, September 19, 1969–April 30, 1972; thereafter Ambassador to Iran
- Farley, Philip J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs until August 1969; thereafter Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Fazio, V. James**, Assistant Director, White House Situation Room, 1971–1972
- Feng Chi-chung**, Commander-in-Chief, Republic of China Navy until 1970; Director, Joint Operations Training Department, Ministry of National Defense, 1970–1972; thereafter, Deputy Minister of Defense
- Fessenden, Russell**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, July 1971–December 1972
- Ford, Gerald R.**, Representative (R-Michigan)
- Freeman, Charles W., Jr.**, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, from June 1971
- Freeman, John**, British Ambassador to the United States, March 17, 1969–February 1971
- Froebe, John A., Jr.**, member, National Security Council staff, from 1971
- Froehlke, Robert F.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, January 1969–June 1971; thereafter Secretary of the Army
- Fukuda Takeo**, Foreign Minister of Japan, July 5, 1971–July 7, 1972
- Fulbright, J. William**, Senator (D-Arkansas); Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Gandhi, Indira**, Prime Minister of India
- Getz, John I.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, January 1969–February 1972
- Gleysteen, William H., Jr.**, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, September 1969–June 1971; thereafter, Deputy Chief of Mission in Taipei
- Godley, George McMurtrie**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until May 1969; Ambassador to Laos after July 24, 1969
- Grant, Lindsey**, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia, February 1969–August 1970; member, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State, June 1971–November 1972
- Green, Marshall**, Ambassador to Indonesia until January 1969; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1, 1969; also, Chairman, Special Group on Southeast Asia from May 1970
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union
- Habib, Philip C.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until May 1969; member of U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks until October 1971; Ambassador to Korea from September 30, 1971
- Haig, Brigadier General Alexander Meigs, Jr.**, USA, Senior Military Advisor to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 1969–June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, June 1970–January 1973; thereafter, Army Vice Chief of Staff
- Haldeman, H.R.**, Assistant to the President
- Halperin, David**, member, National Security Council staff, 1971
- Halperin, Morton**, Assistant for Programs, National Security Council staff until September 1969
- Handley, William J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until May 1969; thereafter, Ambassador to Turkey
- Hannah, John A.**, Administrator, Agency for International Development, March 28, 1969–October 7, 1973
- Hardin, Clifford M.**, Secretary of Agriculture, January 1969–December 1971
- Harlow, Bryce N.**, Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, January 1969–January 1970; thereafter, Counselor to the President

- Heath, Edward**, British Prime Minister from June 19, 1970
- Helms, Richard M.**, Director of Central Intelligence
- Herz, Martin F.**, Political Counselor in Saigon until June 1970; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Hilaly, Agha**, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States until late 1971
- Hillenbrand, Martin J.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, February 7, 1969–April 30, 1972; Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from May 1, 1972
- Ho Chi Minh**, leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party and President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam until his death on September 3, 1969
- Hodgson, James D.**, Secretary of Labor from July 1970
- Holdridge, John Herbert**, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State until July 1969; thereafter, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia
- Hormats, Robert D.**, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/International Economic Affairs, 1970–1972
- Howe, Lieutenant Commander Jonathan**, USN member, National Security Council Staff, 1970–1972
- Hsiung Hsiang-hui**, People's Republic of China diplomat and assistant to Chou En-lai; also, PRC Ambassador to Mexico from April 1972
- Huang Chen**, PRC Ambassador to France
- Huang Hua**, PRC Ambassador to the United Arab Republic until July 1969; PRC Ambassador to Canada, July 1971; PRC Chief Delegate, UN Security Council and PRC Ambassador to the United Nations from November 1971
- Hughes, Thomas L.** Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until August 1969
- Hummel, Arthur W., Jr.**, Ambassador to Burma, until July 22, 1971; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from February 1972
- Hyland, William, G.**, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/Europe, from 1970
- Ingersoll, Robert Stephen**, Ambassador to Japan from February 29, 1972
- Irwin, John N., II**, Under Secretary of State, September 1970–July 1972; Deputy Secretary of State from July 13, 1972
- Jenkins, Alfred le Sesne**, Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State from July 1971
- Jenkins, Walter E., Jr.**, Deputy Chief of Mission in Warsaw until July 1970
- Johnson, Lyndon B.**, President of the United States, November 22, 1963–January 20, 1969
- Johnson, U. Alexis**, Ambassador to Japan until January 1969, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 7, 1969
- Judd, Walter**, Representative (R-Minnesota), 1943–1963
- Jurich, Anthony J.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security Affairs, Department of the Treasury
- Karamessines, Thomas H.**, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
- Katz, Julius L.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
- Kearns, Henry**, President and Chairman, Board of Directors of the United States Export-Import Bank
- Keating, Kenneth B.**, Ambassador to India, May 1, 1969–July 26, 1972
- Kennedy, David M.**, Secretary of the Treasury, January 1969–January 1971; Ambassador at Large for Foreign Economic Development from February 11, 1971; U.S. Permanent Representative, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, from March 17, 1972

- Kennedy, Colonel Richard T.**, USA, member, National Security Council staff, 1970–1972; Director, National Security Council Planning Group, 1971–1972
- Khan, Agha Muhammad Yahya**, President of Pakistan, March 31, 1969–December 20, 1971
- Khan, Mohammad Ayub**, President of Pakistan until March 25, 1969
- Kiesinger, Kurt Georg**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 21, 1969
- Kim Jong Pil**, Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea from June 3, 1971
- Kishi Nobusuke**, former Prime Minister of Japan
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1969
- Klein, Herbert G.**, White House Director of Communications
- Kleindienst, Richard G.**, Deputy Attorney General, January 1969–June 1972; thereafter, Attorney General
- Kosciusko-Morizet, Jacques**, French Permanent Representative to the United Nations, February 1970–May 1972; French Ambassador to the United States from May 1972
- Kosygin, Aleksei N.**, Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
- Kotschnig, Walter M.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until 1971
- Kreisberg, Paul, H.**, Director, Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, March 1969–July 1971; Deputy Chief of Mission in Dar es Salaam, July 1971–August 1972
- Kubisch, Jack B.**, Deputy Chief of Mission in Paris from December 1971
- Kuznetsov, Vasily V.**, Soviet Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, 1953–1955; thereafter, First Deputy Foreign Minister
- Ladd, Bruce C., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State from 1971
- Lai Ming-tong**, Commander-in-Chief, Republic of China Air Force, until 1970; thereafter, Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of National Defense
- Laird, Melvin R.**, Secretary of Defense
- Lake, W. Anthony**, member, National Security Council Planning Group, 1970–1971
- Le Duan**, General Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers' Party (later the Vietnamese Communist Party)
- Le Duc Tho**, member, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Politburo; head of DRV delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
- Lee Kuan Yew**, Prime Minister of Singapore
- Lee Teng-hui**, Senior Specialist, JCRR, until 1970; Chief of the Rural Economic Division, JCRR, 1970–1972; Minister without Portfolio, 1972
- Lei Yang**, People's Republic of China Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw
- Li Hsien-nien**, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China; member, Chinese Communist Party Politburo, 9th Central Committee, April 1969
- Li Kwoh-ting**, Minister of Economic Affairs, Republic of China, from until 1969; Minister of Finance from 1969
- Lincoln, George**, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
- Lin Piao**, Minister of Defense, People's Republic of China, until September 1971; also, Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist Party Politburo until September 1971
- Linder, Harold Francis**, Ambassador to Canada until July 9, 1969
- Linowitz, Sol M.**, U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States and U.S. Representative to the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress until May 1, 1969
- Liu Shao-chi**, member, Standing Committee, Chinese Communist Party, Politburo, 1956; President of the People's Republic of China until purged in 1967 during the Cultural Revolution and died in prison in November 1969

- Lon Nol, General, FARK**, First Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Defense of Cambodia; Acting Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, June 1969; Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense after March 18, 1970
- Loomis, Henry**, Deputy Director, United States Information Agency
- Lord, Winston**, member, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, until 1969; member, National Security Council Planning Group; staff member for United Nations Affairs, National Security Council Operations Staff from 1971
- Lucet, Charles**, French Ambassador to the United States until May 1972
- Lynn, James T.**, General Counsel, Department of Commerce
- Lynn, Dr. Laurence E. Jr.**, Director, National Security Council Program Analysis Staff, 1969–1971
- Macomber, William B.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October 2, 1969; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (title changed to Management after July 12, 1971)
- Malik, Yakov Alexandrovich**, Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations General Assembly, 1948–1952 and 1968–1976
- Malik, Adam**, Foreign Minister of Indonesia and President, United Nations General Assembly, 1971
- Malraux, André**, French novelist and politician; also, Minister of State (France) responsible for cultural affairs until 1969
- Mansfield, Mike**, Senator (D-Montana), Senate Majority Leader
- Mao Tse-tung**, Chairman, Chinese Communist Party and Politburo of the People's Republic of China
- McCain, Admiral John S., Jr.**, USN, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, until September 1, 1972
- McClellan, Robert**, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business
- McConaughy, Walter P., Jr.**, Ambassador to the Republic of China
- McCloskey, Robert J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Press Relations, Bureau of Public Affairs, and Special Assistant to the Secretary from July 1969; also, Ambassador at Large
- McConnell, General John P.**, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, until August 1, 1969
- McCormack, John W.**, Representative (D-Massachusetts) until 1970; also, Speaker of the House of Representatives until 1970
- McCracken, Paul W.**, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, January 1969–November 1971
- McGovern, George S.**, Senator (D-South Dakota) and Democratic nominee for president in 1972
- McManis, David**, member, National Security Council staff, 1970–1971; Director of the White House Situation Room, 1971–1972
- McNamara, Robert S.**, former Secretary of Defense; President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank
- Meany, George**, President, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
- Meeker, Leonard C.**, Legal Adviser, Department of State, until July 13, 1969; Ambassador to Romania from July 22, 1969
- Menon, Vengali Krishnan Krishna**, former Indian Minister of Defense; former head of the Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
- Messmer, Pierre**, Prime Minister of France from July 6, 1972
- Meyer, Armin H.**, Ambassador to Iran until May 30, 1969; Ambassador to Japan until March 27, 1972
- Meyer, Francis G.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, September 26, 1969–May 31, 1971

- Mitchell, John**, Attorney General, January 20, 1969–February 15, 1972
- Moore, Jonathan**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, September 1969–June 1970
- Moorer, Admiral Thomas H.**, USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1, 1970; thereafter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Moose, Richard M.**, member, National Security Council staff, 1969–1970
- Morris, Roger**, member, National Security Council staff, 1969–1971
- Mosbacher, Emil, Jr.**, Chief of Protocol, Department of State, January 28, 1969–June 30, 1972
- Moser, Leo J.**, Political Officer in Taipei until August 1971; thereafter, Country Director for China (Republic of China), Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
- Moynihan, Daniel P.**, Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs, January 1969–December 1969; Counselor to the President, January 1970–January 1971
- Nehru, Jawaharlal**, leader of India's Congress Party and former Indian Prime Minister
- Neubert, Joseph W.**, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, until June 1970; thereafter, Acting Deputy Director for Planning, Planning and Coordination Staff
- Neumann, Robert G.**, Ambassador to Afghanistan
- Ngo Dinh Diem**, President of the Republic of Vietnam, 1955–1963
- Nguyen Van Thieu**, President of the Republic of Vietnam
- Nixon, Richard M.**, President of the United States
- Noyes, James H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1971
- Nutter, G. Warren**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, March 4, 1969–January 30, 1972
- O'Connor, Roderic L.**, Assistant Administrator for East Asia, Agency for International Development, August 1969–June 1971; Coordinator for Supporting Assistance, July 1971–September 1972
- Ohira Masayoshi**, Japanese Foreign Minister, July 7, 1972–July 12, 1974
- Osborn, David Lawrence**, Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo until July 1970; thereafter, Consul General in Hong Kong
- Osgood, Robert E.**, Assistant for Programs, National Security Council staff, 1969–1970; Director, National Security Council Planning Staff, 1970–1971
- Packard, David M.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 24, 1969–December 13, 1971
- Park Chung-hee**, President of the Republic of Korea
- Passman, Otto E.**, Representative (D-Louisiana)
- Pauls, Rolf**, West German Ambassador to the United States
- Pedersen, Richard E.**, Counselor, Department of State
- Peterson, Peter G.**, Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy, 1971–1972; Secretary of Commerce from January 27, 1972
- Phouma, Souvanna**, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Laos
- Platt, Nicholas**, Chief, Asian Communist Areas Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, February 1969–January 1970; Chief, North Asian Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, January 1970–March 1971; Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat Staff, March 1971–June 1972; Director, Executive Secretariat from June 1972
- Podgorny, Nikolai V.**, Chairman, Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet
- Poher, Alain**, Interim President of France, April 28–June 20, 1969
- Pollack, Herman**, Director, Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State

- Pompidou, Georges**, President of France from June 20, 1969
- Porter, William J.**, Ambassador to the Republic of Korea until August 18, 1971
- Pranger, Robert J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia, 1970; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, 1971
- Prentice, Colgate S.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from October 1969
- Pursley, Brigadier General Robert E.**, USAF, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Commander of U.S. forces in Japan from November 1972
- Quainton, Anthony C.E.**, Political and Economic Officer in New Delhi until July 1969; Office of India, Ceylon, Nepal and Maldiv Islands, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, July 1969–September 1972
- Rahman, Mujibur**, Prime Minister of Bangladesh from 1972
- Read, Benjamin H.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State until February 14, 1969
- Renner, John C.**, Director, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, August 1970–July 1972; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Trade Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, from July 1972
- Resor, Stanley R.**, Secretary of the Army until June 30, 1971
- Richardson, Elliot L.**, Under Secretary of State, January 1969–June 1970; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from June 1970
- Ritchie, Albert Edgar**, Canadian Ambassador to the United States until January 1970
- Rockefeller, Nelson A.**, Governor of New York
- Rockwell, Stuart W.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until March 1970
- Rodman, Peter W.**, member, National Security Council staff, 1970–1972
- Rogers, William P.**, Secretary of State
- Rumsfeld, Donald**, Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, May 1969–January 1971; Counselor to the President, January 1971–January 1973; also, U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Rush, Kenneth W.**, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, July 8, 1969–February 20, 1972; Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 23, 1972
- Rusk, Dean**, Secretary of State until January 20, 1969
- Ryan, General John D.**, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force from August 1, 1969
- Samuels, Nathaniel**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, March 28, 1969–May 31, 1972
- Sato Eisaku**, Prime Minister of Japan until July 6, 1972
- Saunders, Harold H.**, member, National Security Council staff, 1969–1971
- Scali, John**, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for ABC News until 1971; thereafter, Special Consultant to the President
- Scheel, Walter**, Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Foreign Minister from October 22, 1969
- Schlesinger, James R.**, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, January 1969–August 1971; Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, August 1971–February 1973
- Schmidt, Adolph W.**, Ambassador to Canada
- Schmidt, Helmut**, Defense Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, October 22, 1969–July 7, 1972; Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, July 7–December 15, 1972; Minister of Finance, December 15, 1972–May 6, 1974; thereafter, Chancellor
- Schneider, David T.**, Country Director, India, Ceylon, Nepal, Maldiv Islands, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State from August 1969
- Schroeder, Gerhard**, lawyer and politician; member, Bundestag, Federal Republic of Germany, Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of Defense during much of the 1960s

- Schumann, Maurice**, French Foreign Minister from June 24, 1969
- Scott, Hugh D.**, Senator (R-Pennsylvania), Senate Minority Leader from 1969
- Seaborg, Glenn T.**, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission until 1971
- Seamans, Robert C., Jr.**, Secretary of the Air Force from February 15, 1969
- Shakespeare, Frank M.**, Director, United States Information Agency from February 7, 1969
- Sharp, Mitchell**, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs
- Shen Ch'ang-huan**, ROC Ambassador to the Holy See until 1969; Ambassador to Thailand, 1969–1972; Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1972
- Shen, James C. H.**, Vice Foreign Minister, Republic of China, until 1971; Ambassador to the United States from May 18, 1971
- Shimoda Takeso**, Japanese Ambassador to the United States until September 1970
- Shoesmith, Thomas P.**, Country Director, Republic of China, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, until August 1971; Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo from August 1972
- Shultz, George P.**, Secretary of Labor, January 20, 1969–June 10, 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget, June 1970–May 1972; thereafter, Secretary of the Treasury and Assistant to the President
- Sihanouk, Prince Norodom**, Cambodian head of state until 1970; leader of government-in-exile in Peking from 1970
- Sirik Matak (Sisowath Sirik Matak)**, Prince and cousin of Norodom Sihanouk; ally of Lon Nol; Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia; member of the High Political Council from 1970
- Sisco, Joseph J.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until February 9, 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; also, Chairman, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from February 7, 1969
- Smith, K. Wayne**, Director, National Security Council Policy Analysis Branch, 1971–1972
- Smyser, W. Richard**, adviser to the delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1969; member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia, 1970–1972
- Sneider, Richard L.**, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia, May 1969–September 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission in Japan, September 1969–July 1972; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from August 1972
- Sonnenfeldt, Helmut**, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/Europe, January 1969
- Soong Chang-chih**, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Republic of China Navy, until 1970; Commander-in-Chief from 1970
- Spiers, Ronald I.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, August 1969–September 1969; thereafter, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
- Springsteen, George S., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs until June 1972; Acting Assistant Secretary of State from June 1972
- Stans, Maurice**, Secretary of Commerce, January 20, 1969–January 27, 1972
- Steadman, Richard C.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 1969
- Stein, Herbert**, member, Council of Economic Advisers, January 1969–November 1971; chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, from January 1972
- Stevenson, John R.**, Legal Adviser, Department of State, from July 8, 1969
- Stewart, Michael**, British Foreign Secretary until June 19, 1970
- Stoessel, Walter J.**, Ambassador to Poland until August 5, 1972; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from August 25, 1972
- Strauss, Franz Josef**, leader, Christian Social Union, Federal Republic of Germany; former Minister of Defense; Minister of Finance until October 21, 1969

- Suharto**, President of Indonesia
- Sullivan, William H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from April 1969; also, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam
- Sun Yun-suan**, Minister of Communications, Republic of China, until 1969; thereafter, Minister of Economic Affairs
- Swank, Emory C.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, June 1969–September 1970; Ambassador to Cambodia from September 3, 1970
- Symington, W. Stuart**, Senator (D-Missouri); Chairman, Subcommittee of U.S. Security Arrangements and Commitments Abroad, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Tanaka Kakeui**, Prime Minister of Japan from July 6, 1972
- Tarr, Curtis W.**, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 1969–1970; Director, Selective Service System, 1970–1972; Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs from May 1, 1972
- Taylor, Vice Adm. Rufus L.**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until February 1, 1969
- Thant, U**, Secretary-General of the United Nations until December 1971
- Thayer, Harry E. T.**, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, until August 1970; advisor on political affairs, United States Mission to the United Nations, from June 1971
- Tibbets, Margaret J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, June 1969–May 1971
- Torbert, Horace Gates, Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October 1970
- Treize, Philip H.**, U.S. Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development until July 7, 1969; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, July 8, 1969–November 27, 1971
- Trudeau, Pierre-Elliott**, Prime Minister of Canada
- Tsai Wei-ping**, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China
- U Thant**, see Thant, U
- Unger, Leonard**, Ambassador to Thailand
- Ushiba Nobuhiko**, Japanese Ambassador to the United States from September 21, 1970
- Vaky, Viron P. (Pete)**, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, January–May 1969; member, National Security Council Operations Staff/Latin America, May 1969–1972; Ambassador to Costa Rica from September 11, 1972
- Van Hollen, Christopher**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, May 1969–September 1972; Ambassador to Sri Lanka from September 21, 1972
- Vaughn, Jack, H.**, Director of the Peace Corps
- Volcker, Paul A.**, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs
- Waldheim, Kurt**, Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1972
- Walters, Lieutenant General Vernon A.**, Military Attaché to Paris until March 1971; thereafter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from May 2, 1972
- Warner, John W.**, Under Secretary of the Navy until April 1972; Secretary of the Navy from May 4, 1972
- Warnke, Paul C.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 15, 1969
- Watson, Arthur K.**, Ambassador to France, April 8, 1970–October 30, 1972
- Wei Tao-ming**, Foreign Minister of the Republic of China until May 1971; Senior Advisor to the President from 1971
- Weinberger, Caspar W.**, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970–1971; Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 1971–1972; Director from 1972

XLVIII Persons

Westmoreland, General William C., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, until June 30, 1972

Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 2, 1970

Wilson, James Harold, British Prime Minister until June 19, 1970

Wilson, James M., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from August 1970; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, February 1972; U.S. Representative for Micronesian status negotiations from November 1972

Wright, W. Marshall, Country Director, Philippines, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State; member, National Security Council Operations Staff/African and UN Affairs, June 1970–April 1972; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, April–December 1972; thereafter, Acting Assistant Secretary

Xuan Thuy, former Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Chief delegate to the Paris Peace Talks until 1970

Yang Hsi-kun, ROC representative to the United Nations General Assembly until 1971; thereafter, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Yen Chia-kan, Premier of the Executive Yuan, Republic of China, until 1972; Vice President of the Republic of China

Yost, Charles W., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, January 22, 1969–February 25, 1971

Yeh Chien-ying, Marshall, Vice Chairman, Military Council of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 1967; member of the Central Committee and Politburo

Ziegler, Ronald L., Press Secretary to the President

Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R., Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Operations from July 1, 1970

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.¹

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."

¹ NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Document 257.

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: "propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations."²

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.³ In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA's activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper "scope and magnitude" of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare.⁴ The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and

² NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, printed *ibid.*, Document 292.

³ Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, "Implementation of NSC-10/2," August 12, 1948, printed *ibid.*, Document 298.

⁴ NSC 10/5, "Scope and Pace of Covert Operations," October 23, 1951, in Michael Warner, editor, *The CIA Under Harry Truman* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 437-439.

the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.⁵

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.⁶ The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other

⁵ William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; the text of NSC 5412 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*.

⁶ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147–148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50–51. The texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2 are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*.

agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.⁷

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.⁸

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.⁹

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who es-

⁷ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, vol. X, Documents 270 and 278.

established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.¹⁰

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.¹¹

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.¹²

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,¹³ which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and "politically sensitive" covert

¹⁰ For text of NSAM No. 124, see *ibid.*, vol. VIII, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed *ibid.*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Document 56.

¹¹ For text of NSAM No. 303, see *ibid.*, Document 204.

¹² *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56–57.

¹³ For text of NSDM 40, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. II, Document 203.

operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d'etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.¹⁴

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a "finding" and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.¹⁵

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54-55, 57.

¹⁵ Public Law 93-559.

¹⁶ Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

China, 1969–1972

China, 1969

1. Memorandum From Richard L. Sneider of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

Republic of China (GRC) Armed Forces Reorganization and Reduction
Recommendation for Clearance of Telegram

Background

For some time, there has been concern that the GRC armed forces are larger than necessary for the defense of Taiwan and are imposing an increasing burden on its economic development given declining U.S. military assistance and the cessation three years ago of grant economic assistance. Additionally, the GRC has been pressing for U.S. provision of sophisticated military equipment, particularly F-4s.² Last August, our message finally got across and the GRC suggested that we begin consultations on force reduction and reorganization plans providing for modernization of key elements of the GRC forces.³ The GRC suggested that we propose a three-year reorganization plan.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action.

² Since mid-1968, President Chiang, Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo, and other Republic of China officials had urged the United States to provide a squadron of F-4 fighter aircraft to the CAF. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Documents 319, 322, 325, 327, and 329. On December 28, 1968, McConaughy met with President Chiang to discuss military equipment for the ROC. Chiang stated that if the United States could not transfer the planes to the CAF, the U.S. Air Force should station a squadron of its own F-4Cs on the island. (Telegram 13 from Taipei, January 4, 1969; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL CHINAT–US) In telegram 171 from Taipei, January 18, McConaughy reported: “although the President [Chiang] remains most anxious for the transfer of F4C squadron to GRC, I believe he recognizes that this is unlikely in the foreseeable future.” (Ibid.)

³ As reported in telegram 3963 from Taipei, August 2, 1968, *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Document 322, footnote 2.

Proposed Action

Attached for your clearance is the proposed State/Defense response.⁴ It is the result of months of careful study and consideration, including coordination with CINCPAC. It proposes that instead of providing the GRC with a finished plan, a joint U.S.–GRC Consultative Committee be set up to assist the GRC in developing its own plan taking fully into account limitations of projected U.S.–GRC resources. This approach would force the GRC to undertake systematic analysis of resource availability.

Except for a conditional commitment on helicopters (a major item on the GRC acquisition list) the message makes no firm commitment with respect to future U.S. assistance. There is, however, clear implication that grant military assistance on a decreasing scale and some military credit sales would be continued assuming agreement on the force reduction/modernization program. Guidelines are provided for the U.S. representatives on the joint Consultative Committee, calling for

- (1) a break [*brake?*] on rising GRC defense spending;
- (2) a GRC force capable of defending Taiwan and the Penghus taking into account GRC unilateral commitments with respect to the Offshore Islands; and,
- (3) within this framework a reduction and modernization of the GRC forces.

The most sensitive aspect of the proposal is that it defines the role of the GRC forces as defense of Taiwan and the Penghus and by inference unilaterally the Offshore Islands. Without specifically saying so this eliminates offensive capabilities (return to the Mainland) from GRC military planning. The U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan and the Penghus is reiterated so that this is taken into account in the force reorganization discussions. However, Embassy Taipei is specifically instructed not to volunteer any statements on the U.S. response in the event the Offshore Islands are attacked, but if the GRC raises this question, to refer them to the 1955 Joint Congressional Resolution.⁵ This Resolution authorizes the President to employ U.S. forces in the event of an armed attack against the Offshore Islands if he judges that it would be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus.

⁴ Attached but not printed. It was sent as telegram 19013 to Taipei, February 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6 CHINAT-US) The telegram called for the establishment of a “USG–GRC Joint Consultative Committee” to assist with the force reorganization/reduction plan.

⁵ House Joint Resolution 159 (84th Congress, 1st session) was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 25, 1955, and by the Senate as Senate Joint Resolution 28 on January 28. *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. II, Document 56 contains the full text of the resolution and related background information.

Recommendation

I would recommend approval of the proposed telegram. It represents a very thorough consideration of a most knotty and sensitive issue. It is consistent with our commitments to the GRC and with our efforts to reduce military assistance to it and to persuade the GRC to undertake a more rational consideration of resource allocation between defense spending and economic development. The principal alternatives are (a) to continue in the present mold dealing with haphazard and other ill-considered requests for modern equipment and a continued spiraling up of GRC defense expenditures; or (b) to cut off grant military assistance or threaten to do so with the object of forcing economies on the GRC but with the attendant risk that this could provoke a crisis of confidence regarding all U.S. commitments to the GRC. We could also give the GRC our own reorganization plan but it would be much preferable to guide them to think through their own problems.

RS

2. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, January 26, 1969, 1055Z.

245. Subject: Possible Italian and Canadian Recognition of ChiComs: Conversation with President Chiang. Reference: Taipei 00243.²

1. I saw President Chiang privately for one hour at my request on January 25 to discuss prospective Italian and Canadian recognition of Chinese Communists.³ This meeting followed immediately after

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 16 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Brussels, Hong Kong, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, and USUN.

² Telegram 243 from Taipei, January 24, reported McConaughy's views on the possible ROC reaction to Italian and Canadian moves toward recognition of the PRC. He urged that "renewed efforts be made to determine lengths (if any) to which Italy and Canada prepared to go to resist Chicom pressure to force a complete break with Taipei." (Ibid.)

³ In addition to Italy and Canada, other Western European nations informed the United States of their intentions of holding talks with the PRC with the ultimate goal of establishing diplomatic relations. Analysis of the potential for diplomatic initiatives from Italy, Canada, Belgium, and West Germany are in Intelligence Note 6, January 6, and INR Research Memoranda REU 3.1 through 3.4, January 24-29 (ibid.) and *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XXX, Document 314.

Congressman Buchanan and I were entertained at tea by the President.⁴ I told him I was in close touch with Foreign Office on all phases of situation but implications of the impending diplomatic moves in Rome and Ottawa were so serious that I felt direct consultation with him was desirable. Generalissimo said matter was a major preoccupation with him and he had planned to ask me to call if I had not taken the initiative.

2. I set forth as persuasively as I could the case for GRC to stand fast in Rome and Ottawa through any period of GOI or GOC exploratory negotiations with Peking. I pointed out seriously prejudicial repercussions which could be anticipated if ChiComs won recognition and diplomatic foothold in these capitals; mentioned the fanatical unwillingness of Peking to even consider establishment of diplomatic relations anywhere if GRC representation remained on scene; pointed out how Peking rigidity on this issue could be exploited by GRC refusing to budge during period of unilateral announcement of recognition or statement of intent to negotiate for establishment of relations. I said GRC could perhaps play a spoiling role in efforts of these two Western nations to establish relations with Chinese Communists, provided GRC was willing to “sweat out” a period of some awkwardness and mild embarrassment, in the interests of any important objective. It was just possible that GRC could at least delay the consummation of any agreement to establish diplomatic relations.⁵ A delaying action could buy time for both our governments to consider the problem more thoroughly and to conduct any conversations with Rome or Ottawa which might be called for. I said we of course appreciated that GRC could not accept unbearable affronts to its national prestige and the self-respect of its representatives, but we felt that such a situation might not develop, at least during the time needed for taking stock. I noted there was a distinction between a mere statement of recognition by one side, and actual bilateral establishment of diplomatic relations and exchange of representatives. I urged him to make the latter step rather than the former the touchstone for his decision on whether to break relations.

⁴ Reference is to Congressman John Hall Buchanan, Jr. (D–Alabama).

⁵ Bundy suggested the same strategy to ROC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai. (Telegram 11528 to Taipei, January 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 CHICOM) In telegram 20761 to Taipei, February 8, the Department reported that Chow Shu-kai had met with Rogers on February 7 to urge the United States to prevent the Canadian Government from making any public announcement of talks with the PRC. Otherwise, Chow offered, the ROC “might first lodge protest,” and then take other unspecified actions. Rogers suggested that if the ROC must respond: “it would be best to limit response to expressions of regret, avoiding any threats or setting conditions on future of its relations with Canada.” (Ibid.) No other record of the conversation has been found. Further documentation on Canadian recognition of the PRC is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI.

3. Generalissimo said matter had been thoroughly considered in high councils of his government, and all factors carefully weighed. It was considered judgment of entire group that GRC could not afford to undergo the humiliation of staying on after recognition extended to Chinese Communists. He did say that he would not take the initiative to break relations on basis of mere preliminary, unofficial or equivocal statements of intent, but once a formal, unqualified statement of recognition was issued, he was convinced that his government had no choice but to terminate relations and withdraw its representatives immediately.

4. Generalissimo reviewed history of unpleasant event leading up to French recognition of Chinese Communists and severance of relations with GRC in early 1964.⁶ He recalled that GRC had stuck it out in Paris for several painful weeks at behest of USG. During this period GRC representative in Paris had suffered well nigh unendurable slights and insults which were hurtful to national pride and it had all been for nothing since DeGaulle easily put the GRC in a completely impossible situation. He felt that any country which formally and publicly accorded recognition to ChiComs had already crossed the bridge, and nothing that GRC could do at that stage would alter the situation. Host government could always make situation of unwanted Embassy staff completely untenable without directly ordering them to leave. So he could not accept my advice beyond what he had said about holding on until recognition announcement was official and clear.

5. Generalissimo said he had held on so long in French case because France was still a great power, a permanent member of Security Council, a wielder of great influence in many African countries important to GRC and because Gaullist group had long record of close and sometimes beneficial relationships with GRC going back to Chungking days in World War II. Also Generalissimo believed at the time that DeGaulle was still essentially anti-ChiCom. He recalled DeGaulle had written him that his only reason for recognizing ChiComs was to take an action contrary to US policy.

6. Generalissimo said that none of the reasons which had prompted him to stage holding action in Paris applied in the case of Italy. He felt there would be no reason for trying to hold out for a single day after the leftist government now in power in Italy recognized Peking.

7. Generalissimo recognized that Canadian Government did not have any leftist coloration, and he thought Ottawa situation not analogous to that in Rome. He seemed perhaps too relaxed about Canadian situation, apparently assuming that any Canadian move toward Peking would only come by slow stages and that Canadians would

⁶ See *ibid.*, 1964–1968, vol. XXX, Document 11.

show more consideration than Italians for position of GRC. I told him that we feared adverse action might be taken by Canadian Cabinet as early as next week.

8. Generalissimo reiterated that countries seeking to establish relations with ChiComs “would only despise” his government if he sought to continue relations when he knew GRC was not wanted. He said his government and his people could not again stand the sort of insults that had been taken from the French. He expressed the hope that the prompt and decisive action which his government will take by withdrawing at once from any capital which recognizes the Chinese Communists will have a deterrent effect on other governments which might be considering the same action. It would show such governments that they will have to choose between his government and the Chinese Communists, and cannot have it both ways.

9. President Chiang said he felt that current restiveness of various countries as to China policy was related to events in the US. He thought that some countries which were inclined to move toward recognition of ChiComs had decided that current US period of transition and settling in process would be an opportune time for a quick move. We thought these wavering countries were also influenced by their misinterpretation of USG’s own ambassadorial level diplomatic contacts with ChiComs at Warsaw, and by a misreading of context of President Nixon’s praiseworthy references to peace, conciliation and negotiation in his inaugural address.

10. President Chiang said that while his government was doing, and would continue to do, all it could to protect its diplomatic position, he felt that USG held the real key to the problem. He thought that only the US, by making its firm opposition emphatically known, could prevent damaging “snowball effect” after the Italian action.⁷

McConaughy

⁷ In a January 24 meeting with Italian Ambassador Egidio Ortona, Bundy discussed Italy’s possible recognition of the PRC. Bundy informed Ortona that U.S. concerns were threefold: a) the effect on existing Italian relations with the Nationalist Chinese; b) the effect on non-Communist countries of East Asia; and c) the “particular” effect Italian actions would have upon the PRC’s influence on the Paris Peace Talks. Bundy suggested that Italian actions might well encourage hardliners in Peking and their “friends or sympathizers” in Hanoi. He concluded: “While we are not urging that Italians refrain from this action, we hope that they will weigh its implications very seriously and inform us fully as possible concerning their intentions with respect to Taipei, timing, and other aspects of actually carrying it out.” (Telegram 12510 to Rome, January 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 CHICOM) According to notes of a January 27 telephone conversation between Bundy and U. Alexis Johnson, Bundy stated: “We would go so far as to express concern to Italians.” Both men “agreed that we should take it easy.” (Ibid., U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, January–March 1969) General instructions on the U.S. response to diplomatic recognition of the PRC are in telegram 19933, February 7; *ibid.*, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 CHICOM.

3. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 1, 1969.

I noted in your January 31 report the interesting comments from a Polish source.² I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this Administration is “exploring possibilities of rapprochement [*sic*] with the Chinese.” This, of course, should be done privately and should under no circumstances get into the public prints from this direction. However, in contacts with your friends, and particularly in any ways you might have to get to this Polish source, I would continue to plant that idea.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 341, Subject Files, HAK/President Memoranda, 1969–1970. No classification marking. A typed note, attached but not printed, reads: “Copy sent red tag to Dick Sneider on 4 Feb 69 by Col Haig.” The memorandum was not initialed or signed.

² Apparent reference to the President’s January 31 daily briefing memorandum, in which Kissinger informed Nixon of a CIA report on a “Polish source.” This source claimed that his government believed the “Americans ‘know the Chinese are now more anti-Soviet than anti-American’ and are exploring the possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese.” (Ibid., Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs) The Daily Briefs file contains materials from the Department of State and CIA. These reports were summarized by the NSC staff into a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, which often included the original submissions from CIA or State, along with important telegrams or intelligence reports as attachments. For more information on intelligence and other documents provided to Nixon, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume II. Haig’s review of “Handling Information for President Nixon” is in his January 17 memorandum to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1319, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 1 of 19)

³ Nixon’s handwritten notes from meetings held January 20–21 covered a wide range of domestic and international issues, including China. He wrote in part: “Chinese Communists: Short range—no change. Long range—we do not want 800,000,000 living in angry isolation. We want contact—will be interested in Warsaw meetings. Republic of China—cooperative member of international community and member of Pacific community.” (Ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 1, President’s Handwriting File, January 1969) Nixon had hinted of his interest in better relations with the mainland government prior to becoming President. For example, see his 1967 article, “Asia after Vietnam,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 1, October 1967, pp. 111–125, and “Nixon’s View of the World—From Informal Talks,” *U.S. News and World Report*, September 16, 1968, p. 48. In his memoirs, Nixon points to his April 1967 trip to Europe, East Asia, and Southeast Asia as the time when his views on a new policy toward China began to coalesce. See Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, vol. I (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 280–285.

4. National Security Study Memorandum 14¹

Washington, February 5, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director for Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. China Policy

The President has directed that a study be prepared on U.S. Policy Towards China, on U.S. objectives and interests involved and the broad lines of appropriate U.S. policies. The study should incorporate alternative views and interpretations of the issues involved. It should include summary statements of the conceptions and policy lines of the previous administration.

The Study should include the following:

1. The current status of U.S. relations with Communist China and the Republic of China;
2. The nature of the Chinese Communist threat and intentions in Asia;
3. The interaction between U.S. policy and the policies of other major interested countries toward China;
4. Alternative U.S. approaches on China and their costs and risks.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia perform this study.²

The paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by March 10.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-134, NSSM Files, NSSM 14. Secret.

² Winthrop G. Brown, Acting Chairman of the East Asia and Pacific Interdepartmental Group, oversaw the completion of this study, the first draft of which was submitted to the NSC Senior Review Group on April 29 and discussed in a May 15 meeting. See Document 13. A summary of the CIA response to NSSM 14 is printed as Document 12.

5. **Memorandum From Richard L. Sneider of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, February 6, 1969.

SUBJECT

Rapprochement with the Chinese

In a memorandum to you, the President suggested that we encourage the attitude that his Administration is "exploring possibilities of a rapprochement with the Chinese," but to do this privately without it getting into print.² I have several suggestions on ways and means and one concern.

My concern is the danger of a leak in this town, even of messages passed through diplomatic channels. I think the message, which is much worthwhile, can be gotten across in other ways:

(1) By failing to calm down the Soviets and other Eastern Europeans when they express concerns about a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement. The Russians have been particularly active in expressing their concerns about what might happen at Warsaw and would probably get the point if we just refused to reassure them.

(2) By passing the message back to the Polish source³ [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

(3) By the posture we take at Warsaw where the Russians and the Poles will fully record our statements.

RS

P.S. Hal Sonnenfeldt and I feel, however, that before we start out on this tactical line, the basic policy implications should be studied. This will be done in the context of the NSSM on East-West relations as well as the subsequent NSSM on China policy.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I. Secret. Kissinger's handwritten comment at the top of this memorandum reads: "Where is memo?"

² Document 3.

³ See footnote 2, Document 3.

⁴ Reference is to National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 10, East-West Relations, January 28, 1969. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 10) NSSM 14, U.S. China Policy, is printed as Document 4.

6. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 12, 1969.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Peking and Instructions for the February 20 Warsaw Meeting

The Secretary of State has sent you a recommended position and proposed instructions for the February 20 Warsaw meeting with the Chinese Communists.² I have edited these instructions slightly to remove polemics and in one case to eliminate an implication that we might be prepared to remove our presence from Formosa. The instructions cover a number of continuing problems with Peking, such as the question of Americans held prisoner by the Communists and our desire for an understanding with Peking on assistance and return of astronauts. They also cover a broad range of contingencies that might arise during the Warsaw talks.

The principal issue facing us is the basic posture we should adopt at Warsaw. The attached memorandum (Tab A) discusses the four broad options open to us. As edited, the State Department instructions (Tab B) fall basically within the third option, namely to indicate our willingness to enter into serious negotiations with Peking, make proposals on scientific exchanges, and invite specific proposals from the Chinese.³

Right now, the third option has several advantages: (1) it would cause less concern to the Republic of China, presently very sensitive because Canada and Italy are moving to recognition of Peking; (2) it

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Top Secret; Exdis. This memorandum and the options described in Tab A were taken from a February 11 memorandum from Sneider to Kissinger. (Ibid.) In September and November of 1968, the United States proposed renewing ambassadorial talks between the United States and the PRC that had commenced in Geneva in 1955 and moved to Warsaw in 1957. Talks had been suspended since the 134th meeting on January 8, 1968, and U.S. attempts to restart talks during the spring of 1968 had failed. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Documents 311, 331, and 332.

² Rogers forwarded the draft instructions for the February 20 meeting under cover of an undated memorandum and a cable written by Kreisberg and Platt (EA/ACA) on February 3. The instructions had been cleared by Bundy, Brown, and Barnett (EA). Rogers' covering memorandum and its attachments are also attached but not printed. The Department of State copies of these documents are in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1967–69, POL CHICOM-US.

³ See footnote 2 above.

would reduce the risk that other countries might misinterpret any initiative on our part as marking a fundamental change in China policy in response to, or in connection with, Canadian recognition of Peking; and (3) it avoids prejudging U.S. China policy before the National Security Council undertakes its full dress review in late March.

Recommendation

That you approve the instructions at Tab B.

Approve⁴

Disapprove

Amended

Tab A⁵

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Warsaw Talks

Background

On November 15, the U.S. proposed deferring the next Warsaw meeting until next February after being unable to obtain any answer from the Chinese Communists on their intentions with respect to the scheduled November 20 meeting. The Chinese responded on November 25, much more promptly than usual, with a letter and subsequent press release proposing the talks for February 20. In contrast to communications over recent years, the Chinese reply was less abusive and revived an old Chinese proposal for a joint declaration of adherence to the Bandung Conference five principles of "peaceful co-existence." This proposal was loosely linked to the usual Chinese Communist demand for U.S. military withdrawal from Taiwan. There have been other

⁴ President Nixon initialed this option. On February 13 Richard Moose sent a memorandum to the Department of State Executive Secretariat detailing several slight changes to the draft cable. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-US) The instructions were sent on February 15 to Warsaw as telegram 24916. (Ibid.)

⁵ Secret.

indications of a Chinese interest in returning to a “softer foreign policy” emphasizing state relations rather than being revolution-oriented. While there is no evidence Peking is seeking a *détente* with us, it is clear that Peking wishes to resume some form of dialogue with us at Warsaw.

Speculation as to possible Chinese Communist motivations focusses on five possibilities:

- (a) Internal difficulties, which continue, may increase the desire for an easing of external relations;
- (b) The continuing Paris peace talks coupled with the declining military fortunes of the North Vietnamese;
- (c) As a reaction to increased Sino-Soviet tensions;
- (d) As an effort to explore the views of the new Administration of President Nixon;
- (e) As an effort to probe for softness in U.S. positions, particularly in our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

An additional factor to take into account is that there may be divided counsel in Peking on relations with the United States—although there is no evidence of a fundamental shift of attitude towards the U.S. in the Warsaw talks proposals or in subsequent propaganda. At a minimum, we have a retreat from extremist positions taken during the height of the Great Cultural Revolution.

As a first step to test Chinese Communist intentions, we have proposed that the locus of the talks be shifted from a building provided by the Poles to either the U.S. or Chinese Embassy where Soviet/Polish eavesdropping will not be possible. Any serious talks with the Chinese are foreclosed by the present building. The Chinese have rejected this proposal but left the door open for discussion of it at the February 20 Warsaw meeting. In addition, we have been informed that the Chinese Communists will be represented by their *Chargé* in Poland, in the continued absence of Ambassador Wang. (Almost all Chinese Ambassadors were called back to Peking many months ago for “re-education” during the height of the cultural revolution. They have not been returned.)

U.S. China Policy

In the past, the debate on China policy has focussed on the questions of recognition and UN representation, and U.S. tactics were built around proposals to expand contacts with the mainland. The debate on recognition and UN representation is essentially, in my view, a fruitless exercise given the opposition of both Chinas to any two-China policy—although we will constantly be faced with the problems in preventing an erosion of the Republic of China position. Similarly, efforts to expand contacts with the mainland have brought no response although they have the value of signalling our interest in a broader re-

lationship with Peking. We have one more major play to make in this string—the offer to resume non-strategic trade with the mainland.

The Warsaw talks offer an opportunity to shift the focus of our policy: to seeking a *modus vivendi* with the Communist Chinese which provides greater stability for East Asia, (a) without abandoning our commitment to Taiwan or undermining its position, or (b) damaging the interests of our Asian allies, principally Japan. More specifically, our policy would be directed towards seeking specific, self-enforceable arrangements with Peking which give some substance, and not lip service, to “peaceful co-existence.”

Alternative U.S. Positions at Warsaw

At Warsaw, four broad options are open to us.

Option 1

At the one extreme, we could indicate that we are prepared to negotiate a normalization of relations with Peking based on an agreement for peaceful relations between the U.S. and Communist China and non-interference in the affairs of other countries. The proposal might be sweetened by an offer to resume non-strategic trade. The Chinese Communists would, however, be informed that our proposal is without prejudice to our relations with and commitment to the Republic of China. This approach, explicitly emphasizing normalization, would represent a basic change in U.S. policy—although we have been implicitly moving in this direction.

Advantages

(1) A normalization of relations on this basis, accepted by Peking, would accomplish a shift in relations with the U.S. from an ideological confrontation to state relations and a shift in Peking’s policy away from political warfare directed against other Asian and less developed nations.

(2) The proposal, even if not accepted, would encourage elements within the Peking leadership who may be arguing that the U.S. is not a hostile force and that serious efforts should therefore be made to reach an understanding with it.

Disadvantages

(1) If not preceded by a probing of the mainland position, the Chinese Communists might interpret the proposal as “softness” on our part.

(2) The proposal, even if not accepted, could cause a crisis of confidence in Taiwan and seriously upset the Japanese Government which is trying to hold the line against both conservative and left-wing pressures for a more conciliatory policy towards Peking.

(3) The proposal is likely to lead Japan and other countries to try to get out in front of the U.S., with some countries quickly recognizing Communist China and others moving to change their position on UN representation.

To sum up: Given the low probability of an affirmative Peking response, this alternative involves considerable risks without prospect of immediate gains.

Option 2

The U.S. could indicate that we are prepared to enter into serious discussions or negotiations with respect to our policies with the exception of our commitment to Taiwan. This proposal might be combined with a specific offer or hint of our willingness to review our military presence in the Taiwan area if the Chinese renounce the use of force to settle this dispute.

Advantages

(1) This proposal would represent a move to greater flexibility on our part and a positive invitation to the Chinese Communists. It would also demonstrate that President Nixon's Administration is prepared to take a more conciliatory approach to Peking in response to the shift in Peking's line on the Warsaw talks as set forth in its November 25 note.

(2) It would likewise encourage whatever more conciliatory elements may exist within the Peking leadership.

(3) If this approach were not combined with an offer of strong military presence in Taiwan, it would provide time to consider U.S. China policy within the U.S. Government and to consult with other countries on specific steps to implement it.

Disadvantages

(1) This approach is likely to leave Japan and other interested Asian countries jittery about a possible change in U.S. policy without eliciting an immediate positive response from Peking.

(2) It may not go far enough to force any serious reconsideration of policy in Peking.

(3) The specific offer on Taiwan would bring a quick and negative response from the Republic of China, already agitated by Canadian and Italian initiatives to recognize Peking. In addition it raises the issue of whether we are prepared to withdraw from our bases in Taiwan given the possibility of negotiations with respect to our Okinawan bases.

Option 3

We could pick up the Chinese reference to peaceful coexistence and ask whether they have any specific proposals to make. We would

not, however, take any specific or generalized initiatives beyond indicating our willingness to hear out the Chinese.

Advantages

(1) This approach would emphasize our interest in developing a stable, peaceful environment in East Asia without committing us to any new actions at this time.

(2) It would cause the least concern with our allies of Asia and in fact would probably be welcome.

(3) It would permit a probe of Peking intentions and emphasize that the monkey is on its back for specific initiatives.

Disadvantages

(1) This approach is less likely to elicit a positive response from Peking, either immediately or in the longer term.

(2) It is likely to be construed by Peking and others as a holding action rather than a new initiative on our part.

Option 4

We could take the initiative and clobber the Chinese for past transgressions. This approach would signal a very tough stance and would probably close the door to any meaningful exchanges for some time—assuming that there is any possibility under the present circumstances.⁶

⁶ The PRC cancelled the meeting on February 18, ostensibly due to the defection of Chinese Chargé d'Affaires Liao Ho-shu (Liao Heshu) in the Netherlands on January 24. See "Spokesman of Chinese Foreign Ministry Information Department Issues Statement," *Beijing Review*, February 21, 1969, p. 4. The Department of State documentation on Liao's defection is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 CHICOM. Stoessel reported these developments in telegram 427 from Warsaw, February 18. (Ibid.) Stoessel's report was forwarded to Nixon in the President's February 18 daily briefing memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 2, President's Daily Briefs) INR attributed the cancellation to PRC internal politics rather than the diplomat's defection: "We regard Peking's abrupt decision to postpone the 135th meeting as the latest and most striking evidence of disagreement and indecision at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership." (INR Intelligence Note 102, February 18; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-US) The CIA had reported that "it is unlikely that there will be any change in Chinese Communist position or softening of attitude toward the United States in the upcoming 20 February Warsaw meeting." (Intelligence Information Cable TDCS-K-314/01387-69, February 10; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I) The United States responded to the cancellation on March 12 with a letter to the PRC Embassy in Warsaw, rejecting claims that the United States "engineered" the defection of Liao, and adding that "I am instructed to inform your Government that the United States Government remains ready at an early date to continue the series of Ambassadorial-level meetings between our two governments, either here in Warsaw or elsewhere at a mutually agreeable location." (Telegram 37867 to Warsaw, March 12; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-US)

7. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–8–69

Washington, February 27, 1969.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAM

The Problem

To assess China's strategic weapons program and to estimate the nature, size, and progress of these programs through the mid-1970's.

Conclusions

A. The development of strategic weapons systems has been given a high priority in China. Despite economic and political crises over the past decade, work has continued and the Chinese already have in place many of the research and development and production facilities necessary to support important ongoing strategic weapons programs.

B. As a result of these efforts, Communist China already has a regional nuclear strike capability in the sense that it could now have a few thermonuclear weapons for delivery by its two operational medium jet bombers. China could also have some fission weapons in stock.

C. This limited capability will undergo modest augmentation in the next few years as the Chinese produce medium jet bombers and move ahead with the development of strategic missiles and compatible thermonuclear warheads. Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) deployment could begin this year or more probably in 1970, reaching a force of some 80–100 launchers in the mid-1970's.

D. As for intercontinental ballistic missiles, if the Chinese achieved the earliest possible initial operational capability (IOC) of late 1972, the number of operational launchers might fall somewhere between 10 and 25 in 1975. In the more likely event that IOC is later, the achievement of a force of this size would slip accordingly.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-037, SRG Meeting, China NPG [Part 1], 5/15/69. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem. Another copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R1012, NIE and SNIE Files. According to a note on the covering sheet, the CIA and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on February 27 except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. This estimate was included with the materials for the May 15 SRG meeting of the NSC. The updated version of this estimate—NIE 13–8/1–69—is printed as Document 42. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 578.

E. But many uncertainties remain which leave in doubt the future pace, size, and scope of the Chinese program. In general, the Chinese are taking more time in the development and production of modern weapons systems than we judged likely several years ago. China lacks the broad base in technical and economic resources essential to rapid progress in the complex field of modern weapons. This situation has been aggravated, and will to some degree be prolonged, by the disorders, confusion, and uncertainties of the domestic political situation.

F. We have no evidence on how Chinese leaders will adjust the competing priorities between advanced weapons production and deployment and the investment requirements for healthy growth in agriculture and the general industrial sectors. At a minimum, however, we believe Chinese planners will come to recognize, if they do not already, that China cannot begin to match the nuclear strike capability of the superpowers. This may lead them to forego large-scale deployments of early missile systems, hoping to gain an important deterrent effect and added political influence from the possession of a relatively few operational missiles and aircraft.

G. So long as the Chinese strategic force remains relatively small and vulnerable, a condition which is likely to persist beyond the period of this estimate, the Chinese will almost certainly recognize that the actual use of their nuclear weapons against neighbors or the superpowers would involve substantial risks of a devastating counterblow to China.

H. We believe that for reasons of national prestige the Chinese will attempt to orbit a satellite as soon as possible. An attempt this year would probably involve the use of a modified MRBM as a launch vehicle.

[Omitted here are paragraphs 1–44, comprising the Discussion portion of the estimate, which include General Considerations and Trends and Prospects (Nuclear Program, Nuclear Materials Production, Delivery Systems, The ICBM Program, and Space Program).]

8. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, March 5, 1969, 1100Z.

643. Subject: GRC Force Reorganization/Reduction/Modernization. Ref: State 019013.²

1. I made presentation on USG thinking on GRC force reorganization/reduction/modernization to Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo late afternoon March 4. I was accompanied by Admiral Chew, General Ciccolella and DCM Armstrong.³ I had requested the appointment on Feb. 28, and date was set at the end of my conversation March 3 with the Minister regarding his recent trip to Korea (Taipei 0617⁴). I had identified to him the general subject I wished to discuss, without of course going into any of the substance of our views. Although I indicated to Minister at that time that I would be accompanied by others mentioned above, only other Chinese present was Gen Wen, his usual interpreter and note-taker.

2. In presenting our thoughts, I closely followed all of the points in reftel (with the explanation of the US \$5 million FMS credit modified per subsequent telegrams⁵). In leading into the presentation I emphasized the very careful study given to the matter by senior levels in

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF CHINAT. Secret; Exdis.

² See footnote 4, Document 1.

³ Vice Admiral John L. Chew, USN, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command; Major General R.G. Ciccolella, USA, Chief, MAAG; and Oscar Vance Armstrong, Deputy Chief of Mission.

⁴ Telegram 617 from Taipei, March 3, reported on a conversation between McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo concerning the latter's visit to the Republic of Korea, February 24–28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I)

⁵ In telegram 591 from Taipei, February 28, the Embassy requested clarification of telegram 19013 to Taipei. Specifically the Embassy wanted to know whether the United States would provide data on projected military assistance to the ROC prior to the development of a force reorganization plan, and whether the Departments of State and Defense were seeking a reduction in the "absolute level of military expenditures." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6 CHINAT) In joint telegram 33064 to Taipei, March 4, the Departments of State and Defense replied that such data should be made available and that "our minimum objective is to persuade GRC to develop force reorganization/reduction plan which, while meeting essential defensive requirements, stabilizes defense expenditures as close to current ratio of GNP as possible. If GRC can develop plan which will meet those requirements at reduced ratio of defense expenditures to GNP, thus freeing resources for more constructive uses, so much the better and we would wish to encourage GRC to make serious effort in that direction." (Ibid., DEF 19 CHINAT)

Washington. Throughout the 25-minute presentation I gave full emphasis to those points which made most evident the tangible benefits which the GRC could anticipate from the procedures we were proposing. I also emphasized our realization that primary responsibility for decision on force reorganization rested with the GRC and that our proposal of course was not intended to encroach in any way on ROC governmental responsibilities. At end of presentation I called on Admiral Chew and General Ciccolella, as we had agreed beforehand, and each of them briefly stated his desire to cooperate fully in the suggested procedures.

3. CCK listened closely to the presentation without comment. At end he said he would like clarification of one point in my remarks: was a decision on the helicopter co-production proposal conditional on the reorganization of the armed forces. (During my presentation, CCK had requested General Wen to interpret into Chinese only that portion of my remarks dealing with the helicopter project and the 5 million FMS credit.) I replied that I was not sure of the meaning of his question. I commented that perhaps he was asking whether a favorable USG decision on the helicopter project was contingent on GRC accepting our proposal for a joint consultative committee. If so, we were not establishing any such condition but we believed that consideration of the project in the joint committee discussions would facilitate a decision.

4. CCK then said that although he had mentioned the matter of force reorganization to General Ciccolella and to me in the past, it was an internal GRC matter.⁶ Because of the friendly relationships that existed, he had solicited MAAG's ideas. He said that establishment of a joint consultative committee would have important adverse "political" implications. It would be a departure from past practice, under which the Ministry had made its views known directly to MAAG and solicited MAAG comments. CCK then said that he does not concur in the proposal to establish a joint consultative committee and hopes that the USG will not pursue the proposal. Instead, planning should proceed in the same manner as in the past. He said that this was not only his own view but he was confident that it was also the view of his government. He said that he also believes that the establishment of such a joint committee would not be to the advantage of the US.

⁶ McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo held preliminary discussions on several occasions in early 1969. As reported in telegram 362 from Taipei, February 5, the Defense Minister "told me [McConaughy] GRC intended to both reorganize its armed forces and to reduce their strength." (Ibid., DEF 6 CHINAT)

5. He then turned to the helicopter co-production project.⁷ He said that if his impression of the US position was correct, that is, that in the absence of force reorganization the US would not concur in the project, then this is a “most unfriendly” position. The GRC had made this proposal long ago, and there is no question about the need for it and its importance. He said that he did not see why lengthy discussions were required and he hoped the question of force reorganization and the helicopter proposal could be treated separately.

6. I replied that I thought the Minister had misinterpreted my remarks, as I had not said that a favorable decision on the helicopter proposal was directly tied to force reorganization. I reminded him that he had raised with us the question of force reorganization. I said that the USG was not yet prepared to make a decision on the helicopter project and that we believed that the joint consultative committee would be a good forum in which to examine the matter further. I said that if the joint consultative committee is not established, USG would still give full consideration to the helicopter proposal. However, I thought it unlikely in view of the scope of the questions involved, that the project could be approved this fiscal year. In order not to prejudice the decision, we were suggesting that the GRC use the remaining \$5 million of the \$20 million of FY69 FMS credit for other mutually agreed high priority items and the USG would reserve \$5 million of FY70 FMS credit on the same basis as in FY69. I reiterated that in any event, the USG would continue to give careful consideration to the helicopter project. The military need for helicopters was recognized, and the US Mission here was prepared to assist the GRC in assuring that the full case for the helicopter project was placed before Washington.

7. In view of the strongly negative and obviously deeply felt position CCK had taken on the idea of a joint consultative committee, I decided that further argumentation in that meeting would only exacerbate the problem. As it was obvious that CCK did not desire to elaborate his comments, I moved towards terminating the conversation. I had taken with me an Official Informal-style letter to CCK incorporating almost verbatim the points in para 8 of reftel. In view of CCK’s allergic reaction I decided not to leave this letter since it might constrain him to make a written negative reply which would serve no useful purpose. Instead, I offered to have sent over to General Wen my talking

⁷ Chiang Ching-kuo attempted to tie United States assistance for helicopter production to force reorganization/reduction, telling McConaughy “that GRC continues to think about possibilities of force reorganization and reduction in context of compensatory modernization of material.” Reported in telegram 529 from Taipei, February 24. (Ibid.) Requests for assistance for the helicopter co-production project often occurred in tandem with requests for F-4 aircraft. See footnote 2, Document 1.

paper. We did so that evening, using the exact text of the letter minus the conventional opening and closing paragraphs.

8. It is regrettable that CCK reacted to our presentation in this manner. Since he reacted so immediately, explicitly, and forcefully, and since he mentioned with assurance "the views of his government", I am inclined to suspect that he must have received some prior intimation of the nature of our proposal. In any event, he made his emphatically negative reaction unmistakably clear and conspicuously avoided giving any impression that he wished to give the matter further consideration or discuss it at a later date.

9. Obviously our proposal for a joint consultative committee touched a very sensitive nerve related to Chinese pride and notions of sovereign prerogatives. CCK may well have felt that we were attempting to obtain a greater influence over GRC planning for its armed forces than we now exert through long established procedures. It is also possible that whatever his own views, he would consider it very difficult for him to justify concurrence with our proposal to the President, armed forces, and key members of the party and the Legislative Yuan.

10. Since above drafted Pol Counselor had luncheon with Gen. Bat Wen, who promptly broached this subject. After Pol Counselor had reiterated our rationale for joint committee proposal, Wen commented on CCK's negative reaction to proposed joint consultative committee. He said Defense Minister was completely opposed to idea. Wen said CCK concerned about motives behind US proposal. He is inclined to believe US more interested in force reduction than modernization or anything else. Gen. Wen recalled long history of US efforts persuade GRC to reduce size of its army. He recalled serious loss of influence and transfer of Chinese like Gen. Tiger Wang of CAF, who on US urging had tried in late 1950s to achieve reduction in GRC armed forces. Gen. Wen said CCK in advocating force reorganization had already taken exposed position and was vulnerable to criticism from the President and opposition from army elements. CCK, however, was trying to counter this opposition by advocating modernization and increased firepower along with force reorganization (reduction). CCK felt that formation of joint committee would make him even more vulnerable. What is more, Gen. Wen said, CCK did not want to have representatives from GRC economic or other ministries involved in or aware of MND plans, including force reduction. CCK felt his courage in advocating force reorganization (including reduction) under present circumstances was not fully appreciated by us. In response to question about CCK's hasty reaction to Ambassador's proposal, Gen. Wen said CCK had foreknowledge of general proposals to be discussed, and had consulted with others (Wen implied President Chiang) prior to meeting. Therefore, CCK's response was not premature answer given

without full consideration US position, but represented considered opinion based partly on factors mentioned above.

11. As to the main question concerning where we go from here on force reorganization and helicopter project, there is precious little if any prospect that CCK will reverse his position. We should consider whether we can by other means achieve some of the objectives we envisioned for the joint committee. Some preliminary thoughts on these questions will be embodied septel.⁸

12. Department requested repeat to Defense, JCS and CINCPAC.

McConaughy

⁸ McConaughy further elucidated his views in telegram 708 from Taipei, March 11. He wrote, "Despite his [Chiang Ching-kuo's] rejection of the joint committee idea, I believe that the decision that MAAG should not formally present a full-fledged reorganization plan to the GRC is a sound one, and General Ciccolella agrees." McConaughy informed the Department of State that he and his staff would attempt to introduce "gradually and informally" the major elements of the reorganization plan through MAAG and Ministry of National Defense channels. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6 CHINAT)

9. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 13–69

Washington, March 6, 1969.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA

The Problem

To survey recent Chinese foreign policy and alternate lines of development in the near term; to define the nature of the Chinese threat in Asia, and to estimate Chinese intentions in the area; and to estimate the longer term outlook for Chinese foreign policy.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-037, SRG Meeting, China NPG [Part 1], 5/15/69. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the covering sheet, the CIA and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on March 6 except for the representatives from the AEC and FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. For the full text of this SNIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, pp. 527–539. This estimate was included with the materials for the

Conclusions

A. The Chinese Communist regime has fallen far short of its aspirations for a position of dominance in East and Southeast Asia and for the leadership of the world revolution. Neither its efforts at conventional diplomacy nor at supporting revolutionary struggles have been pursued consistently or with a regard to objective realities. Mao's ideological pretensions have earned China the enmity of the USSR, and his bizarre domestic programs have cost China greatly in prestige and respect elsewhere in the world. Yet China's location and size, and the traditional apprehensions of its neighbors, ensure for it a major impact upon Asia regardless of the policy it follows.

B. As long as Mao is the dominant figure, major changes in China's international posture do not appear likely. Mao will remain an insurmountable obstacle to any accommodation with the USSR, and there is little alternative to continuing hostility toward the US. A failure by the Vietnamese Communists to achieve their aims might require some shift in tactics, but the Chinese would almost certainly not launch an overt attack, nor would they be likely to open a major new front of conflict.

C. Nevertheless, Chinese aspirations for political dominance in Asia will persist. Almost certainly Mao and his immediate successors will not expect to achieve this by military conquest, although force and violence figure strongly in Mao's doctrines. The Chinese may hope that the possession of a strategic capability will give China greater freedom to support "people's war" or, more remotely, to engage in conventional war in Asia by diminishing the possibility of nuclear attack on China. Whatever Chinese hopes, however, the actual possession of nuclear weapons will not necessarily make China more willing to risk a direct clash with the US; indeed, it is more likely to have a sobering effect.

D. Whatever modifications in Chinese policy flow from its advance into the nuclear age, the principal threat from China will for many years be in the realm of subversion and revolutionary activity—mainly in Southeast Asia. In South Vietnam and Laos, Peking must take account of Hanoi's direct interests. China's policy toward Cambodia will be largely conditioned by Sihanouk's attitude. If he moves

May 15 SRG meeting. According to a March 5 memorandum from Holdridge (then with INR/REA) to George C. Denney, Jr. (INR/OD), this SNIE was discussed by the USIB on February 26 and 28. Holdridge mentioned that the INR/REA staff felt that the original version had "overemphasized the failure of Peking's foreign policy in Asia and overlooked the major role assured for China by her location, population, and traditional fears of her neighbors." He also emphasized that "the Chinese may hope that possession of a strategic [nuclear] capability will limit the possibility of a nuclear attack by the U.S. and the USSR and thus give China a freer hand to support people's war, or more remotely, engage in conventional war in Asia." (Ibid., RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, SNIE 13-69)

very far toward accommodation with the US, Peking's pressures against him—now minimal—would be increased. The Chinese may see Thailand as a more lucrative target for a Chinese-sponsored "people's war." Peking is already providing some training and support, but even the Chinese must realize that the Thai insurgency faces a long, difficult fight. The Chinese have a more clear-cut choice in Burma, and whether they significantly increase the insurgency or restore more normal diplomatic relations could be an indicator of trends in Peking's foreign policy.

E. The rest of Southeast Asia is less important in Peking's immediate scheme because the Chinese lack direct access and current prospects for insurgency in these areas are minimal. Peking seeks to weaken and embarrass India, but not to confront it directly so long as there is no threat to Tibet.

F. It is in the area of conventional diplomacy, which suffered severely in the Cultural Revolution, that Peking could most easily achieve significant changes. Restoration of normal diplomacy would facilitate a trend toward recognition of Peking, and this would in turn put pressure on other countries, particularly Japan, which does not want to be left behind in opening relations with the mainland. Taipei would undoubtedly suffer diplomatic losses in this process.

G. The departure of Mao could, in time, bring significant change in China's relations with the outside world. There could be contention and struggle for leadership that would freeze major policies during a long interregnum. But on balance, we believe Mao's departure will generate a strong movement toward modifying his doctrines.

H. A less ideological approach would not necessarily make China easier to deal or live with in Asia. Pursuit of its basic nationalist and traditional goals could sustain tensions in the area, and a China that was beginning to realize some of its potential in the economic and advanced weapons fields could become a far more formidable force in Asia than is Maoist China.

[Omitted here are paragraphs 1–43, comprising the Discussion portion of the estimate. These include Introduction, Immediate Prospects, The Chinese Threat in Asia (Military Power, People's War, Politics and Diplomacy, and China's Vital Interests: Korea and Taiwan), and the Post-Mao Perspective.]

10. Memorandum to Members of the 303 Committee¹

Washington, March 14, 1969.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OVER COMMUNIST CHINA— POLITICAL FACTORS

1. Except for satellites, no overhead reconnaissance has been conducted over mainland China since March 27, 1968. The stand-down was ordered at the instance [*insistence?*] of Secretary Rusk in part because the level of drone reconnaissance over South China in the preceding months, when combined with the frequency of inadvertent overflights of the Chinese border with North Vietnam by US military aircraft conducting bombing raids on North Vietnamese targets, may have given the Chinese reason to believe that the US was being deliberately provocative. The stand-down also anticipated President Johnson's speech of March 31, announcing the partial bombing halt.

2. In the light of the extended stand-down of overflights of China the resumption of such flights now would undoubtedly be looked upon by the Chinese as signalling a shift in US policy. Moreover, the resumption would be taken as an indication of the policy line toward China which will be forthcoming from the new Administration. It can be assumed that Peking interpreted the 1968 stand-down on overflights as an intentional US decision suggesting that US actions against the mainland were not under consideration or at least imminent; the resumption could signify to Peking that the converse may now be the case. This signal would reach Peking at a time when there are signs of serious disagreement in the Chinese leadership over how to deal with the United States and would tend to strengthen the hand of those advocating a hard line towards us.

3. The intensity of Peking's reaction against resumed US overflights would increase considerably if any of the aircraft involved were shot down over mainland China. As has been the case in the past, we

¹ Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files. Top Secret; Idealist; Byeman. Chapin sent the memorandum on March 17 to all agency representatives (Kissinger, U. Alexis Johnson, Packard, Mitchell, and Helms) of the 303 Committee. The Committee met on March 11 to discuss U-2 photographic reconnaissance of Northeast China, SR-71 flights over South China, [*text not declassified*]. The northeast China mission was designed to examine missile construction, while the flights over southern China were to observe fighter aircraft, as well as logistical and support facilities. [*text not declassified*]. While no agreement was reached on these three operations, the Committee reached a consensus that the use of drone reconnaissance over South China was acceptable. (Memorandum for the record, March 13; *ibid.*)

can expect the Chinese to put on display wreckage of downed aircraft as tangible evidence of US provocations and hostility.

4. The net result would likely be to extend the period in which the Chinese stance toward the United States will be essentially one of enmity. A curtailment in US hopes of dealing with the Chinese Communists on anything approaching a reasonable basis would also ensue. While for motives which are not wholly apparent the Chinese acted to postpone the Ambassadorial-level talks scheduled to be held in Warsaw on February 20, they nevertheless hinted that the talks might be resumed when the atmosphere had improved. With renewed overflights, however, an improvement in the atmosphere sufficient to permit a resumption of the talks might be delayed materially. Another possibility is that the Chinese decision on release of the American yachtsmen recently seized near Hong Kong might be affected or resumption of overflights used as a pretext for not releasing them.

5. Finally, the chances are good that the resumption of US overflights of the China mainland would be leaked in the United States, and in any event Chinese Communist publicization of the overflights (e.g., in displaying the downed aircraft) would make their existence known. Those elements in the United States who are seeking to improve Sino-US relations will then almost inevitably blame the Administration rather than the Chinese for lack of progress in the desired direction.²

² Kissinger forwarded a decision memorandum to Nixon on March 22. The President approved the following recommendation: "That you approve resumption of a aerial reconnaissance in South China, but limited at this time to overflights by the 147 H/T drone. All such missions will be subject to approval by the 303 Committee on a monthly basis in accordance with current procedures governing reconnaissance operations." (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, March 22; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, NSC Files, Box CL 301, 303 Committee) According to the memorandum for the record prepared by Chapin, after a "spirited" meeting of the 303 Committee on March 25, it was decided to reconsider the U-2 overflight mission in 3 months [*text not declassified*]. (Memorandum for the Record, March 27; National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files) In late April, through a series of telephone conversations and memoranda, the President and Kissinger made clear that they wanted to resume offshore reconnaissance flights around China. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1319, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 2 of 19)

11. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Chinese Communist Ninth Party Congress

I attach evaluations of the recently-concluded Ninth Party Congress prepared by CIA and the Department of State (Tabs B and C)² covered by a brief summary analysis prepared by my staff (Tab A.)

The analysis suggests a continuing stalemate, with Mao Tse-tung unable to push through his visionary economic and social programs in the face of opposition within the Party, but with that opposition unable to force its policies upon Mao. The real power of the Army, and particularly of the Army leadership at provincial levels, continues to grow. The attention of the leadership remains focused upon domestic issues and probably upon the contest for power, but because of divided councils there is not even a clear mandate as to the direction of future domestic policies.

Tab A**The Chinese Communist Ninth Party Congress**

The Ninth Party Congress closed on April 24, after an unusually long meeting lasting more than three weeks. Documentation as to what happened at the Congress is unusually sparse, consisting only of the speech given by Lin Piao to open the Congress, a brief and unilluminating new Constitution, and the Communiqué issued at the Congress' close. The editorials which normally give an indication of policy decisions in such a Chinese conclave were missing this time, or gave confused signals as to policy direction.

The most dramatic features of the Congress were the evidence of continued policy differences, the failure to resolve the existing power

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I. Confidential with Top Secret Attachment. Sent for information. Notations on the memorandum indicate the President saw it, and that it was returned from the President on May 1.

² Tab B is an undated CIA report and Tab C is INR Intelligence Note 316, April 25. Both are attached but not printed.

stalemate between Mao and the leaders who resist his revolutionary programs, the focus upon domestic issues, the failure to resolve those issues in any clear fashion, and the lack of foreign policy initiatives.

1. The continuation of deep *differences* was documented by the following evidence:

—the unusual length of the meeting, and the paucity of press coverage.

—the failure to evolve a coherent program or to endorse Mao's specific programs.

—the pleas for unity in the Communiqué.

—the failure to condemn specific opponents of the cultural revolution (aside from Liu Shao-ch'i), or to call for further specific steps of "purification".

2. The *power stalemate* was evidenced by the lists of Party officials which came out of the meeting. While Mao has succeeded in excluding from power a number of leaders who oppose him, he has not been able to dictate a new leadership to the Party.

—The top leadership of twenty-four remains unchanged from the pre-Congress list. It consists only in part of Mao's close adherents and continues to contain a number of administrators and senior Army officials who probably resist his programs.

—Normally, the Central Committee is listed in order of rank; this time, the new Central Committee is listed in the Chinese equivalent in alphabetical order. It has been expanded, apparently packed with both low-level Maoist representatives and military men.

—The increased power of provincial leaders is demonstrated. Provincial leaders (most of whom are military and most of whom are probably conservative) have consolidated and probably expanded their power. The Army probably remains in effective control of China outside the center.

—However, the standing committee of the new Politburo has been reduced to five persons, and Mao can probably count on a regular majority. This suggests a continuing gap between orders from the center and execution at provincial levels.

3. *The continued absorption with domestic issues* is clear. Doctrinal issues and ritual justification for Mao's class-oriented view of society dominated the documents, and it is safe to assume that competition for positions in the new hierarchy was the key issue at the meeting. Foreign policy was nearly ignored.

4. This is not to say that any consensus emerged as to what domestic policy should be. *The direction of policy was not determined.* The failure either to endorse Mao's program or to set up any workable alternative makes it almost certain that China will flounder for the next year or two without clear policy direction.

—There was no real endorsement of a new "great leap forward", nor was there any specific endorsement of policies, Maoist or otherwise.

—From other reports, we believe that actual current planning recognizes that there will be very limited capital investment, and instead emphasizes development of agricultural production and economic stabilization measures.

—This emphasis conflicts with Mao's wish to move 40 million city dwellers to the countryside, to revamp educational policy and to place it under the control of peasants and workers, and to expand the socialist institutions in the countryside. Newspaper editorials suggest a continuing argument concerning all these policies.³

5. *Foreign policy* will continue to be subject to the general Maoist position, which emphasizes revolutionary struggles and thereby generates suspicion of Communist China in third countries. At the same time there is no indication that the Chinese leaders intend to become less cautious in avoiding foreign commitments.

—Support for class struggles in Southeast Asia, India and Israel was reaffirmed by Lin Piao, but given little emphasis.

—Denigration of the US was pro forma.

—Lin Piao mentioned that the Chinese had refused an urgent Soviet request to discuss the border issue, but he indicated that China was considering whether to engage in border discussions. A momentary damping down of Soviet polemics against China suggests that in early April the Soviets indeed expected there might be some hope for negotiation. The polemics resumed as the Congress closed, suggesting that this hope has evaporated.

—The public statements did not manifest any Chinese concern that war with the US or the USSR is imminent.

—Treatment of Vietnam was perfunctory, and the Chinese have not endorsed the North Korean position during the recent tension.

—The ineffectiveness of the Maoist line in foreign policy is suggested by China's isolation. The Congress had kind words for no governments and for only one Party, the Albanian. A combination of moralistic rigidity towards other Communists, together with a professed desire to see the overthrow of non-Communist neighbors, would appear likely to earn the hostility of both.

³ Nixon's handwritten comment above this paragraph reads: "H.K. note Mao fights the educated establishment!"

12. Summary of the CIA Response to NSSM 14¹

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY PAPER ON NSSM 14: UNITED STATES CHINA POLICY

I. There is no evidence to indicate that the PRC intends to expand its borders or to pursue its objectives by armed conquest, except possibly in the case of Taiwan.

A. The primary objectives of the present regime in Peking include treatment as a major world power and as a primary source of revolutionary leadership; accommodation of its policies by other Asian states; and control of Taiwan.

II. There is little prospect for change in China's attitudes and policies regarding the US while the present leadership obtains, and the US has a limited ability to influence these attitudes and policies.

A. Any US "overtures" to Communist China would be primarily intended to have an impact on China's post-Mao leadership.

B. The immediate post-Mao leadership will share the same nationalism and inexperience in dealing with the West, but the new leadership's ideological fervor may be moderated by domestic political requirements, economic and military development needs, relations with third countries, and somewhat different generational perspectives.

III. Two major alternative strategies to our present policy are available—intensified deterrence and isolation, or reduction of points of conflict and international isolation.

A. Intensified deterrence and isolation is based on the assumption that a post-Mao leadership would be most inclined to moderate² its policies toward the US under the strain of repeated policy failures and growing frustration over China's isolation.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 14. Secret. A May 15 short covering memorandum from [*name not declassified*] Executive Staff, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, indicated that the summary, prepared by CIA, "is being circulated to members of the Review Group at the request of Mr. Morton Halperin." The final version of the response to NSSM 14 is printed as Document 23. The CIA comments were based upon the April 29 draft response to NSSM 14, not printed. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-037, SRG Meeting, China NPG [Part 2], 5/15/69)

² A handwritten correction changed "moderate" to "alter."

1. In the military phase of this strategy the US would expand its military and economic support to Asian countries and increase the forward deployment of strategic and tactical nuclear forces.

2. The political approach would involve vigorous US efforts to support the GRC's international position and to convince Peking that it cannot gain acceptance into the international community on its present terms.

3. The economic phase would call for stronger pressures on our allies to restrict trade with Communist China.

B. The strategy of reducing points of conflict and international isolation would be based on the assumption that a gradual relaxation of external pressures will be most likely to cause a post-Mao leadership to reassess US attitudes and intentions toward China and China's role in international affairs.

1. The military phase would involve a de-emphasis of the military aspect of our policy of containing the PRC while at the same time maintaining an offshore or mid-Pacific deterrence posture toward any overt Chinese attack against US allies in Asia.

2. The political phase could involve public recognition that the PRC exercises authority over the mainland, unilateral reduction or elimination of political measures designed to isolate Peking, and attempts to expand diplomatic contacts.

3. The economic aspect of the strategy would entail a relaxation of trade controls to the COCOM level.

13. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 15, 1969, 2:10–3:55 p.m.

SUBJECTS

US China Policy; Nuclear Planning Group Issues

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry Kissinger

State

Donald McHenry

Arthur Hartman

Winthrop Brown (China only)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Lord forwarded the minutes through Halperin to Kissinger on May 19 under a covering memorandum. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

Defense
G. Warren Nutter
CIA
R. Jack Smith
JCS
LTG F. T. Unger
OEP
Haakon Lindjord
USIA
Henry Loomis
Treasury
Anthony Jurich (China only)
NSC Staff
Richard Sneider (China only)
Morton Halperin
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Winston Lord

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the NSC schedule.]

China

State will revise the summary paper and perhaps parts of the basic paper along the following lines:²

—A restatement, possibly with alternatives, of our longer term objectives toward China.

—Under the policy option of “Reduction in Tension”, a separation of those issues appropriate for early decision (trade and travel), those dependent on other issues (use of Taiwan as a base), and those of a longer term nature (US policy toward Taiwan, the Offshore Islands, the UN, and perhaps diplomatic relations).

[Omitted here is a brief discussion concerning the Nuclear Planning Group.]

China (2:10 PM–3:30 PM)

Kissinger said that the essential question is whether the NSSM 14 paper adequately presents the problem: is our current policy the best possible mix for both long and short term US interests with regard to

² Reference is to the response to NSSM 14 (Document 4). The April 29 response was forwarded to the NSC on April 30 by Brown who was serving as the “Acting Chairman, East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969) The final version of this paper is printed as Document 23.

China? The three principal choices are (a) continue present course, (b) intensify containment, and (c) reduction in tension.³ Are these the principal choices for the NSC, or are they phony? For example, does anybody favor intensifying our pressures on China? The President has made it clear that he does not wish to be presented with artificial options.

Lindjord wondered if intensification of pressures would moderate Chinese behavior.

Unger said that he and his staff believed that we should stay with our present policy. His staff thought that either toughening or easing up our policy could be characterized as phony options because our current policy is working so well. He believed, however, that the NSC should see the options because of the importance of the issues.

Kissinger wondered whether the basic question shouldn't be posed differently: what do we want from China over the longer term and what can we reasonably expect to do to influence that outcome? He believed that a nation of 700 million people, surrounded by weaker states, could be a security threat no matter what type of policy it pursued.⁴ The paper seems to be based on the hypothesis that countries are usually peaceful; if they are aggressive, it is because of their leaders and that you therefore must change the minds of the leadership. Which of our problems with China are caused by its size and situation and which of them are caused by its leadership? Asking such questions might inform us how we can influence the Chinese leadership. Are the paper's three options real ones in dealing with this question. A tougher policy suggests a balance of power approach; we must create a situation so that China has a minimum physical incentive to expand. A softer approach suggests our influencing leaders who are not expansionists.

Brown believed China would expand its influence inevitably in trade and other fields. The issue is how the Chinese go about doing this, in a way that reflects a hostile adversary relationship with us or a more normal competitive relationship between great powers. We should be seeking, to the extent that we can, to move the Chinese away from hostility and the danger of conflict.

In response to Kissinger's question, Brown and Unger confirmed that the East Asian IG agreed on the statement of objectives, and that

³ Reference is to the three major options presented in the April 29 draft response to NSSM 14: A. "Present Policy," B. "Intensified Deterrence and Isolation," or C. "Reduction of Points of Conflict and International Isolation." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969)

⁴ Kissinger inserted the word "external" immediately before the word "policy" in this sentence (Ibid.)

the issues revolve around the method of pursuing those objectives. Nutter believed Kissinger's formulation in terms of leadership or geopolitical factors was useful. He personally was reasonably impressed with the success of our present policy, believing that we have done the maximum to restrain aggressive intents while leaving ourselves flexibility to adapt to changing conditions. In response to Kissinger's query whether Chinese lack of aggression was due to US policy or internal problems, Nutter said that it was principally the latter, but that an alternative policy would not have helped us any more.

Kissinger wondered whether the tougher policy option should not be dropped since no one seemed to be supporting it. Smith believed that the soft and tough options defined the outer limits of our choices and therefore helped to structure the paper. Sneider mentioned that some people (at least outside the bureaucracy) would support the tougher option. Halperin remarked that some specific steps that people advocate, e.g., use of Taiwan as a base, could have the effects of pursuing a tougher policy. Sonnenfeldt suggested that this option could be relevant if the Chinese change their policy, and therefore should be left in the paper, at least as a contingency. (Although no definitive decision was reached, the consensus appeared to be to leave in all the three policy options.)

Kissinger questioned whether anyone believed that the objectives in relation to China were adequately covered. For example, did the options relate to Objective B of avoiding an alliance between the mainland government and any other major hostile state. Halperin suggested that one argument for the softer option was that it could discourage the Chinese from rebuilding their ties with the Soviets, while the tougher option would be designed to make it appear too dangerous to the Chinese to have an operative alliance with the Soviets.

Loomis had some difficulty focusing the paper. His agency's primary point of view was our China policy's cost and our relations with third countries on other unrelated issues. To many nations we appear mired in the past, supporting Taiwan as the real Chinese Government. We are paying a greater price in other areas than we may recognize, a point that he does not believe the paper really addresses.

Kissinger wondered whether we could frame the China issues as whether our policy should be dominated by security considerations (i.e., a balance of power approach) or by desire for a more conciliatory attitude.

Smith thought that the paper correctly places the problem in a longer term perspective, stating that little could be done in the near future, and considering policies which some day might yield a return when changes in Chinese leadership or circumstances occurred. The essential issue is how to get China to relate to the rest of the world

community. Kissinger noted that this is where foreign policy only starts, and Sneider/Halperin remarked that that is the problem—we are trying to move relations toward a situation of “normal” hostility. Hartman suggested that a more normal relationship would entail greater predictability. Halperin suggested greater communication and Sneider suggested less isolation.⁵

Kissinger asked whether we care if China maintains her policy of isolation so long as this is coupled with a relatively low level of aggression. Loomis suggested that isolation means wrong information and therefore a greater chance for erratic behavior. In response to Kissinger’s remark that few crises have been started by China, Loomis mentioned India and Unger noted Thailand, Burma and aid to North Vietnam and North Korea. Kissinger wondered whether such policies were prompted by lack of understanding or rather by good understanding. Brown and Halperin noted that Chinese policies make us maintain large forces and spend perhaps \$15 billion per year. In response to Kissinger’s query whether the relationship of “normal” hostility would put an end to subversive threats, Halperin said it would not while Brown opined that a softer US approach increases that possibility while a tougher one decreases it.

Halperin noted two aspects of our relations with the Soviet Union which could be useful in a changed relationship with China. Our bilateral relations in certain ways moderate Soviet behavior and provide for communication and understanding that reduce uncertainties. If these are desirable objectives with China, the question is whether you achieve them through a softer or a tougher policy. In response to Kissinger’s question, Halperin thought the basic choice is really between status quo and some easing. Unger pointed out that the paper emphasizes that easing up our policy will bring us little in return in the near future because of the present Chinese leadership.

Kissinger wondered whether we really wanted China to be a world power like the Soviet Union, competing with us, rather than their present role which is limited to aiding certain insurgencies. Smith suggested that bringing China into the world community might make her more manageable and her policies less prone to erratic uncertainty while Sneider emphasized possible long term changes.

⁵ On the day of this meeting, Halperin sent a memorandum to Kissinger with Sneider’s concurrence, stating that “we feel that the ‘Movement towards Reduction of Tension’ option presents the most prudent course toward the PRC. *However*, as it is now presented in the paper, the option mixes short-range and longer-range considerations without adequate differentiation between the two.” (Ibid.)

Kissinger stressed that it is important that the President, in order to make a choice, have a feel for what his decision is likely to accomplish. Brown said that the paper admits that there would not be much short term change, but tries to consider certain elements which might have long run effect, which might improve our relations with other countries, and which might satisfy certain aspects of public opinion.

Kissinger wondered what operating decisions the NSC could make, and Sneider mentioned trade and the Offshore Islands. Sneider said that the paper asks (a) what is our preferred long term strategy, and (b) what if anything can we do in the short term given the inflexibility of the situation. Kissinger formulated the basic problems as being (a) what do we want China to be like, and (b) what US policies help to bring this about.

Nutter mentioned Sino-Soviet difficulties and Kissinger suggested that this was a key issue. What is our view of the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, how much can we influence them, should we favor one or the other, etc. Brown noted that China thinks that we favor the Soviet Union, while Unger suggested that present policy gives us the flexibility to take advantage of Sino-Soviet developments. Kissinger noted that the Soviets and Chinese each think we are playing with the other.

In response to Kissinger's suggestion that the policy options in the paper might result in an academic decision by the NSC, Brown stated that he thought that selection of the third option (Reduction of Tension) would be a major move. Kissinger agreed that it would be major, but suggested that it is difficult to ask people to make such a decision without giving them a picture of the world that we wish and how we go about getting there.

Sonnenfeldt listed several issues outside of our direct China policy that bear very heavily on our relations with that country, e.g., SALT; security guarantees for India in relation to the NPT; arms policy toward Pakistan; post-Vietnam security guarantees in Asia; and recognition of Mongolia. We can take these questions piecemeal on their merits or we can attempt to weave them into a coherent policy whole. Brown agreed that the very importance of China means that it interrelates with many other issues. How might we make this looming presence less hostile?

Kissinger wondered how we want to go about this. Some Kremlinologists believe that any attempt to better our relations with China will ruin those with the Soviet Union. History suggested to him that it is better to align yourself with the weaker, not the stronger of two antagonistic partners. It is not clear to him that you achieve better relations with the Soviets necessarily because of a hard policy toward China and vice versa. Everyone agrees that we wish to reduce the risk of war

with 700 million people, but the question is whether alignment with the Soviets, more conciliatory posture toward China or some combination would best achieve this end. Smith believed that Soviet concerns about improving relations with China could be somewhat moderated by measures that we could take such as consultation. He would not agree that better Chinese US relations automatically means worse US Soviet relations.

There was further discussion on how to recast the summary, including Kissinger's view that there should be focus on the picture of the Chinese US relations we desire and the policy to achieve these over the middle-longer range. Hartman and Smith pointed out that the paper makes clear that there is little prospect for near term change in our relations with China but the question is what policies might we pursue to put ourselves in a position to influence future Chinese leaders or take advantage of other long term changes.

Nutter suggested that emphasis on balance of power considerations leads to one set of conclusions while emphasis on better relations leads to another set. Sneider said that these need not be inconsistent and he cited our present relations with the Soviets which mix cooperation, competition and attempts to undermine influence.

Kissinger still believed that the paper did not make clear what the desirable role of China in the world should be nor explore fully enough the US-China-Soviet Union triangular relationship, to which Sneider added Japan. Kissinger noted that he had no quarrel with the desirability of reducing tension, but he persisted in wondering whether an isolated China, so long as it caused no major problems, is necessarily against our interests. A China that was heavily engaged throughout the world could be very difficult and a dislocating factor. Why is bringing China into the world community inevitably in our interest?

Smith suggested because we think she will be less dangerous, and Brown stated that we assume that she is going to expand her world role in any event and our objective is to influence the way she acts. Kissinger suggested that while this could be one objective, an alternative formulation could be that it is not in our interest—or at least our task—to bring China in. We need not strive to isolate her, but it may not be worth great investment in US policy to move positively. Fifteen years from now we may look back with nostalgia on the Chinese role today in the world. Brown noted that the paper assumes that China will not remain isolated because of its very size and population and that therefore the question remains how we might be able to bring about better Chinese behavior as they emerge from present isolation.

Halperin suggested that there were four principal criteria for policy, based on the assumption that we cannot have much short

term impact: how does our China policy affect our objectives with non-Communist countries; how does it affect our relations with the Soviets; what impact does it have on a sudden irrational Chinese entrance on the world scene; and how does it affect the eventual emergence on the world scene. Arguments about alternative policies could be structured around these criteria. Loomis suggested adding Communist Asian countries, while Kissinger noted that there was insufficient treatment of the Soviet Union and Japan.

Brown said that State would take another crack at the section on objectives. Nutter noted that it is important to fit China into the great power relationships, including the Soviet Union. There was further discussion of specific elements including the issue of using Taiwan as a base which is keyed to Okinawa decisions. Halperin suggested that the question of Taiwan bases should be considered in the context of overall China policy while Unger pointed out the short term military imperatives in contrast with only long term political changes.

Sneider noted that China policy is difficult because the short term threat is much less than the longer term threat; we have more flexibility in the short term because of the nature of the threat but we have less flexibility because of the Chinese attitudes.

It was agreed that because there is no urgent need for decisions and because of the need to redo parts of the paper, that China would not be on the NSC schedule next week.

Kissinger mentioned that his staff appeared to prefer the option of a gradual movement toward reduction in tension. Brown confirmed that this was State's inclination and noted that Secretary Rogers had already suggested this publicly.⁶

There followed some discussion of which issues, under this option, were appropriate for near term decisions and which could or would have to wait for the longer term. There was consensus at the close with Kissinger's categorization of the three sets of issues under the option of reducing tensions:

⁶ On March 27 Rogers told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, despite the PRC cancellation of the Warsaw meetings and its internal political conflicts, "We nevertheless continue to look forward to a time when we can make progress toward a more useful dialogue to reduce tensions, resolve our differences, and move to a more constructive relationship." (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 14, 1969, p. 312) In his April 21 speech at the Associated Press annual luncheon, Rogers declared that the United States "shall take initiatives to reestablish more normal relations with Communist China and we shall remain responsive to any indications of less hostile attitudes from their side." (*Ibid.*, May 12, 1969, p. 399)

- a. Those that could be taken immediately if it were decided to change our policy—trade and travel.
- b. Those dependent on other decisions—use of Taiwan as a base.
- c. Longer range problems—overall policy toward Taiwan, Off-shore Islands, United Nations and possible diplomatic recognition.

As a result of the Review Group discussion, it was therefore decided that State would revise the summary paper, and perhaps sections of the basic paper in order to recast US objectives and to separate the short run and longer range issues under the policy option of moving toward a reduction in tension.

[Omitted here is discussion concerning the Nuclear Planning Group.]

14. National Security Decision Memorandum 17¹

Washington, June 26, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT

Relaxation of Economic Controls Against China²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-210, NSDM Files, NSDM 17. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Laird, Helms, and Wheeler.

² National Security Study Memorandum 35, "U.S. Trade Policy toward Communist Countries," March 28, called for study of "policy towards COCOM, U.S. differential controls, trade with Eastern Europe, Asian Communist and Cuban trade embargoes, and extraterritorial effects of trade controls." The actual study and discussion that followed focused upon Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, purposely excluding Cuba and Asia. (NSSM 35, March 28; *ibid.*, Box H-142, NSSM Files, NSSM 35) The paper resulting from NSSM 35, as well as supporting materials, are in National Security Council, Secretariat Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, May 7, 1969. NSSM 35 and related papers are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XXXI.

The President has decided, on broad foreign policy grounds, to modify certain of our trade controls against China.³ He has decided, in principle, that we should:

(1) Remove the restraints in the Foreign Assets Control regulations upon foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms on transactions with China that are regarded as non-strategic by COCOM.⁴

(2) Modify the Foreign Assets Control regulations prohibiting purchase of Communist Chinese goods to permit Americans travelling or resident abroad to purchase Chinese goods in limited quantities for non-commercial import into the U.S.

(3) Modify the administration of the Foreign Assets Control regulations and Export Controls to permit general licenses for export of food, agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizer and pharmaceuticals.

(4) Follow these steps, at the earliest appropriate time, by modifying import and export controls in non-strategic goods to permit a gradual development of balanced trade.

The President desires early implementation of these decisions. He has, therefore, directed that the Under Secretaries Committee super-

³ On June 11 Sneider informed Kissinger that in conversations with Green and others, Nixon showed he was “interested” in China policy and “seemed to favor a few short-term steps which would not offer real prospect of reciprocity, such as relaxation of trade and travel controls.” (Memorandum from Sneider to Kissinger, June 11; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 957, Haig Chronological File, HaigChron–June 1969) This effort had many similarities to attempts to modify trade and travel policies during the last months of the Johnson administration. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Documents 302–306, 313, 328, and 336.

⁴ On June 21 Richardson informed Kissinger of four economic restrictions that could be lifted. He also detailed benefits of these changes: 1) “remove the irritant which extraterritorial aspects of our trade controls create in our relations with our allies,” 2) indicate desire for increased contacts with the PRC, 3) simplify administrative procedures and remove an irritant to Americans traveling overseas, and 4) “remove elements of our policy which have little or no effect on China.” (Memorandum from Richardson to Kissinger, June 21; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 957, Haig Chronological File, HaigChron–June 1969) Attached to another copy of the memorandum is a note from Richardson suggesting that a NSDM would be the best way to implement these changes, and that the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce could develop a plan for media, congressional, and diplomatic handling of this issue. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 17) Kissinger presented these proposals to Nixon on June 23. Nixon wrote “ok” beside each proposal but rejected one of the Richardson/Kissinger recommendations by writing “no” in the margin: “We could remove the restrictions precluding U.S. firms from supplying petroleum to ships owned or chartered by Communist China or any ship destined for China.” This recommendation commented that this “restriction hurts our oil companies through loss of trade far more than it bothers the Chinese.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, June 23; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 957, Haig Chronological File, HaigChron–June 1969) It was not included in NSDM 17. Kissinger then divided suggestion 4 of his June 23 memorandum into items (3) and (4) of NSDM 17.

wise the preparation of the following documents, to be submitted to him by July 7, 1969.

- (1) Implementing regulations (to be developed by State, Commerce, and Treasury);
- (2) A press and diplomatic scenario (to be developed by State);
- (3) A scenario for Congressional consultation (to be developed by State and Treasury).⁵

The President has directed that until he decides when and how this decision is to be made public, the SECRET/SENSITIVE classification of this project be strictly observed.

Henry A. Kissinger

⁵ On June 28 Eliot informed the Under Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury that Green would chair the inter-agency group charged with preparing materials for the Under Secretaries Committee meetings dealing with NSDM 17. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 17) Specific procedures for implementing NSDM 17, as well as information on the PRC's reaction, are *ibid.*, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FT 1 CHICOM-US.

15. National Security Study Memorandum 63¹

Washington, July 3, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-155, NSSM Files, NSSM 63. Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences²

The President has directed a study of the policy choices confronting the United States as a result of the intensifying Sino-Soviet rivalry and the current Soviet efforts to isolate Communist China.

The study should consider the broad implications of the Sino-Soviet rivalry on the U.S., Soviet, Communist Chinese triangle and focus specifically on alternative U.S. policy options in the event of military clashes between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The study should also examine alternative policy approaches in the event of continued intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict short of a military clash.

The President has directed that the paper be prepared by an ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and including representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.³

The study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by August 15.

Henry A. Kissinger

² In February, a CIA report noted that “the Soviet Union is continuing to strengthen its military forces on the Chinese border.” The report concluded that “the upgrading of forces and command structure east of Lake Baikal appears to go beyond the requirements for border security. It suggests that the Soviets are developing a capability for offensive operations against North China should the need arise.” (“Recent Military Developments Along the Sino-Soviet Border,” Intelligence Memorandum 69–5, February 5; *ibid.*, Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs) Kissinger briefed Nixon on armed conflict along the Sino-Soviet border on March 3. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, March 3; *ibid.*, Box 3, President’s Daily Briefs) Kissinger noted, “This shooting incident was the first of its kind, although there have been previous instances of provocations by the Chinese.” In a later report, Kissinger informed Nixon that “Soviet forces in regions adjacent to the Sino-Soviet border have more than doubled since late 1964 and now total about 285 thousand troops.” (March 29; *ibid.*, Box 4, President’s Daily Briefs) Tension between the PRC and the Soviet Union increased through the spring and summer of 1969, when armed clashes spread to the western border region, the Chinese declared their expectation of war, and the Soviets proposed to form a multinational collective security system that would in effect contain the PRC. On June 24 Haig sent Kissinger a “very significant document” from the CIA, which detailed Soviet concerns over the possibility of improved relations between the United States and PRC. Haig wrote, “The report, together with others we have picked up, simply confirm that a concerted effort on our part to at least threaten efforts at rapprochement with the Chicomps would be of the greatest concern to the Soviets.” (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, June 24; *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. III)

³ Rogers designated Richardson to serve as chair of the ad hoc group of representatives from State, Defense, NSC, and CIA who were charged with producing this report. Information on this group is *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 63.

16. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, July 4, 1969, 1350Z.

2445. Subject: Meeting with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo re GRC Raid on Chicom Boats.² Department pass CIA and Defense.

1. I met late this afternoon with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo at my request to obtain full and authoritative statement of rationale behind GRC raid on ChiCom boats off Fukien coast, and to express concern at possible unfortunate psychological and political effects of the action at this juncture.

2. I referred to undesirability of any hostile action even on very limited scale at this time. I underscored importance of refraining from any move which might heighten tension in Taiwan Straits area or elsewhere in East Asia. I mentioned the negative effect which any such action might have on the negotiation effort in Paris, and efforts generally to improve the prospects for peace in the area. I spoke of the extent that this action might play into the hands of elements in the U.S., the UN and elsewhere that are inclined to be critical toward or unsympathetic with the GRC. I said the Central News Agency news release on the subject had given foreign wire services something of a basis for playing up the incident and portraying it in terms that were probably rather exaggerated. This would give those who are opposed to the GRC another stick with which to belabor it as an instigator of unwarranted and provocative actions tending to increase tensions at a time when it was all-important to relax tensions. I expressed regret that neither [*name not declassified*] nor myself had been informed of the intention to stage the raid and that the first we knew of the incident was when we saw the Central News Agency press release. I then acknowledged with thanks the very comprehensive account of the entire event when Gen

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 1429Z. Kissinger included a summary of this telegram in the President's July 5 daily briefing memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 9, President's Daily Briefs)

² On the evening of July 2 at least five small boats under the command of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense (IBMND) attacked several PRC vessels near Tacheng, Fukien Province. A few junks and perhaps one wooden gunboat were sunk. All the attacking boats returned to the offshore island of Matsu (Mazu) without incident. According to information gathered by the U.S. Naval Attaché in Taipei, the operation was "mainly political to test Chicom reaction." (Telegram 2442 from Taipei, July 4; *ibid.*, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. II) Further documentation is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA East Asia Files: FRC 330 83 0123, 1969 Raid on Chicom Boats.

Chou of the NSG had given [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] earlier today [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].³ I told the Vice Premier I had spoken in candor as a friend and (I) was trying to give him a view of the matter which was perhaps different from the angle from which he had seen it. I invited him to comment with the same frankness.

3. Vice Premier responded by thanking me for my frank summary of the incident as it could be viewed from abroad. He said he had been partially but not fully aware of this “other view”. He accepted my summation with good grace. He assured me that the GRC did not want to cause or contribute to instability in the East Asia region. He said this was merely a small-scale probing action and not different in nature or size from various other probes undertaken in previous years, the latest in 1966.⁴ It was carried out not by GRC naval forces but by “sea guerrillas” who are a part of the “Anti-Communist National Salvation outfit”. He said that it was a “very local” encounter well off the mainland coast, some distance northeast of the Min River estuary. He said the probe had no military objective, of course, and the boats lost by the ChiComs were of no military value. He said the object was to test the efficiency of the ChiCom radar detection net against small craft in bad weather, and to ascertain the degree of alertness of the ChiCom personnel. The probe had established the inadequacy of the ChiCom radar against this type of incursion, since the GRC boats were returning to their bases by the time the Chinese Communists reacted. He thought the knowledge gained from the probe would have some utility.

4. The Vice Premier said the probing action was also undertaken to boost the morale of the GRC specialized personnel who took part. They had been under training for two years without having had any mission to carry out until now. It was decided to try them out when the weather conditions were exactly right.

5. In answer to a question from me, the Vice Premier said he did not believe the ChiComs would undertake any major military action by way of reprisal. They might try to attack some of the GRC supply vessels, as had happened before. He said the GRC would be on guard against such attempts. He did not think the ChiCom reaction would

³ Not found.

⁴ For information on the 1966 raid, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Document 193. However, in a July 3, 1969, memorandum to Brown and Green, Shoemith wrote: “The last such action that we know of was on May 29, 1967, when a GRC commando team reportedly made a landing on the Shantung Peninsula, killed ‘more than ten’ Chinese Communists and damaged one ChiCom patrol boat. Subsequent intelligence reports indicated that the results of this action had been exaggerated to a considerable extent.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 CHICOM)

be either greater or less than on earlier occasions. In answer to a further question he expressed doubt that ChiCom propaganda would attempt to exploit the incident. He thought they would consider it "not to their interest" to do so, since an acknowledgment of the raid by them would amount to a confession of weakness or inadequacy of their security measures. The ChiCom practice did not permit any such admissions.

6. In answer to my observation about the GRC failure to keep in touch with us in advance, the Vice Premier said that he would instruct the new Defense Minister, and through him the Intelligence Bureau, that in future all such projects would be discussed in advance with [name not declassified].

7. Vice Premier expressed earnest hope that this event "would not be overstressed" in the United States. I told him that the conversation had been very helpful and would assist us in placing the matter in the right perspective. I took official note of his assurance that there would be advance discussion of any planned undertaking along this line in future and expressed the hope that the provision for such advance discussion would obviate the sort of difficulty that had cropped up yesterday and today.

8. *Comment:* I believe CCK fully understands our concern over the international repercussions of the raid and the way GRC publicized it without informing us.⁵ His assurance that GRC will in the future

⁵ Referring to the Dulles–Yeh exchange of notes (December 10, 1954; see *Foreign Relations* 1952–1954; vol. XIV, Documents 402 and 403), Shoesmith wrote to Green on July 7: "We have sought to restrain limited GRC operations against the mainland not so much by insisting on prior consultations and concurrence as by warning that we would not feel obliged to come to its assistance in the event of retaliation against an 'unauthorized' action, and more recently, by making clear our opposition on policy grounds to 'provocative' acts, without clearly defining the meaning of the term." Shoesmith concluded, "on the basis of available evidence, the recent GRC hit-and-run attack on Chinese Communist ships falls within the category of those actions for which, at least since 1960, we have not required the GRC to inform us or to obtain our concurrence in advance." (Memorandum from Shoesmith through Brown and Barnett to Green, July 7; National Archives, RG 59, EA/EX Files: Lot 72 D 276, Miscellaneous Top Secret Files)

The Department of State's response to McConaughy stated that "we agree that CCK's assurance that GRC will in future consult [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in advance on 'all such projects' is of considerable importance, and wish to take maximum advantage of that opening to strengthen restraints on GRC actions of a potentially provocative nature." (Telegram 117284 to Taipei, July 16; *ibid.*, Central Files 1967–69, POL CHICOM–CHINAT) McConaughy then reconfirmed this understanding with Chiang Ching-kuo, reporting that "we now have an assurance from CCK which is a milestone in the long and somewhat ambiguous record of our position with the GRC on this subject." (Telegram 2814 from Taipei, July 29; *ibid.*) Officials in Washington announced that they were satisfied: "It seems clear that we now have explicit commitment of CCK that any future action against mainland, regardless of nature or size, will be matter joint US–GRC discussion and agreement." (Telegram 138446 to Taipei, August 16; *ibid.*)

consult in advance is of considerable importance. Having made our point I do not believe it would be useful or necessary to make additional representations about this incident at this time. We recognize Department's problems in coping with press (and perhaps Congressional) queries. However I believe it would now be in our interest to get matter into as low a key as feasible. I assume of course that we will not get into detailed dialogue with press on when GRC must consult under treaty obligations.

McConaughy

17. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Relaxation of Economic Controls Against China

You will remember that you approved three measures liberalizing our trade controls against China.² You also ordered that they be held in abeyance until passage of the Export Control Act, and that the Under Secretaries Committee prepare in the meantime plans for implementing your decision.

Elliot Richardson has now put forward a memorandum, with which I agree, recommending that you not wait until passage of the Act and authorize implementation of the decision before you depart on July 23 (Tab A³). He makes the following three points:

1. The decision would demonstrate the flexibility you now have in administering trade controls and thus would emphasize the lack of need for amending the Act. This would be helpful in obtaining its straight extension.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Printed from an unsigned copy.

² See Document 14.

³ Attached at Tab A but not printed is the July 10 memorandum from Richardson on behalf of the Under Secretaries Committee. The three options below are taken almost verbatim from Richardson's memorandum.

2. A delay, which might be as much as 60–90 days, might lead us into a period where unforeseen circumstances; e.g., worsening of the Sino-Soviet border situation, could preclude the announcement and thus cause us to lose the diplomatic benefits we are seeking. Such a delay would also increase the likelihood of press leaks and attendant difficulties.

3. If you wait to announce this decision until you return from Bucharest,⁴ it probably would be tied in with speculation regarding a putative anti-Soviet purpose in the Bucharest stopover. This would give your decision overly overt anti-Soviet significance.

The Under Secretaries Committee has also prepared implementing instructions,⁵ and has raised the question of how to handle announcement of the decision. I recommend that the decision be leaked in low-key fashion. If a Congressional presentation is desirable, you have two choices.

1. Mention the decision at a meeting of the Joint Leadership at which some other business is being taken up.

2. Have Bryce Harlow mention the decision to a few selected Congressional leaders.

I lean toward the latter.

*Recommendation*⁶

1. That you approve announcing your decision in low-key fashion.

2. If a Congressional presentation is desirable, that it be handled by Bryce Harlow.

⁴ President Nixon visited Romania on August 3, 1969, as part of his around-the-world trip.

⁵ The policy was announced to all diplomatic posts in telegram 120569, July 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, FT 1 CHICOM-US) The regulations were published in the *Federal Register* on July 23, 1969. (34 *Federal Register* 12165)

⁶ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation, but the changes were announced in a “low-key fashion.”

18. National Security Study Memorandum 69¹

Washington, July 14, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia

The President has directed the preparation of a study on U.S. nuclear policy in Asia.

The study should examine four broad areas:

1. *U.S. strategic nuclear capability against China.* A range of possible situations in which a U.S. strategic nuclear capability against China would be useful should be examined. The study should consider possible target systems in China and U.S. capability to attack those systems. The implications for U.S. strategic force requirements, for war planning and the required command and control systems and procedures and for the definition of strategic sufficiency should be examined.

2. *U.S. theater nuclear capability in the Pacific.* The study should examine the role of the U.S. theater nuclear capability in the Pacific for both deterrence and defense against possible Chinese attacks and against other forms of aggression against both Allied and non-Allied countries. Under what types of circumstances and how might U.S. theater nuclear forces be employed in improving war outcomes? The study should examine alternative postures and basing arrangements for theater nuclear forces in the light of possible roles for U.S. strategic forces, taking account inter alia of the pending reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

3. *Nuclear assurances.* The study should analyze the current legal and political status of our commitments, both to Allied and non-Allied countries, concerning our actions in the face of nuclear aggression or threats of aggression. This should take into account our obligations under the UN Charter; our various alliances; the Non-Proliferation Treaty (including the Security Council Resolution and Senate testimony), and statements by U.S. officials. In the light of the results obtained under

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 69. Secret. Copies were sent to Wheeler and Smith (ACDA). Little substantive discussion took place on this NSSM until March 1971 (See Document 108).

paragraphs 1 and 2 above, possible modifications to our assurances should be discussed and evaluated.

4. *Nuclear proliferation.* The paper should consider for each option examined the possible effects on proliferation of nuclear weapons and on prospects for wider adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This study should be performed by an Interagency Group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense and including representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. A representative of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should participate in the Nuclear Assurances and Nuclear Proliferation phases of the study. This study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by 30 September 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger

19. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Changes in Regulations Relating to China

As I told you on the phone,² our people who are most knowledgeable on the subject have considered other actions, including cultural exchanges, we might take relating to China of a more modest

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Richardson forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a July 17 note, in which he urged that the Republic of China be given at least 24 hours notice of the changes, and that Bryce Harlow contact key Congressmen. (Ibid.) A handwritten comment by an unknown hand at the bottom of the note indicates that it was "handled orally." On July 21 David Dean, Political Counselor at the Embassy in Taipei, informed Frederick Chien, Acting Director of North American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the impending changes to FAC and passport regulations. (Telegram 2684 from Taipei, July 21; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FT 1 CHICOM-US) See also footnote 5, Document 17.

² Not found.

nature than what we had previously planned. I am afraid there is not very much other than the following:

(1) *Authorization of Tourist Purchases*. We both agree, and I understand that the President is also amenable, that we still go ahead with the changes embodied in NSDM 17,³ paragraph (2), to permit tourists to purchase Chinese Communist goods in limited quantities for non-commercial import into the United States.

(2) *Authorization to Export Food Grains*. We might modify paragraph (3) of NSDM 17 to provide only for export of food grains rather than food of all types, agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizers and pharmaceuticals. This would be a more modest step, which is not entirely new, since President Kennedy offered in 1961 to consider the export of food grains to China. U.S. reaction was favorable but Peking denounced the move as hypocritical. Decision on food grains now would have the advantages of being a humanitarian gesture and a move welcomed by our grain producers who are excluded by our own regulations from a large potential market. It would merely offer the Chinese access to a commodity already available from other countries. It is unlikely that Peking would respond at this time by shifting purchases to us rather than buying from present trading partners.

(3) *Removal of Travel Restrictions*. We could eliminate our existing restrictions on travel. In addition to China, however, these restrictions also cover North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba. This is a complicating factor, and I would prefer that we consider the whole question of these regulations when they come up for renewal in mid-September.⁴

I have had some second thoughts on the variation of this that we discussed, namely, a blanket authorization for travel to China of Congressmen, students, scholars, and journalists looking toward the possibility of exchanges in these categories. I fear that this proposal, tagged

³ Document 14.

⁴ In March 1969 Richardson had favored immediately lifting the travel restrictions, but was told by Rogers to wait for White House approval. Rogers stated that he intended to revisit the issue in September. (Record of a telephone conversation between Richardson and Rogers, March 12 and March 14; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Under Secretary of State, Telephone Conversations, March 1969) On September 15 the Department of State announced that travel restrictions to China, Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam would remain unchanged for the time being but would expire after 6 months. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 27, 1969, pp. 362–363) On March 16, 1970, the Department of State published the same announcement about travel restrictions but added a short statement: “With respect to mainland China, however, we follow a more liberal policy [than for Cuba, North Korea, or North Vietnam] of passport validation and give validation for any legitimate purpose.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 13, 1970, pp. 496–497) See also Document 35.

onto the first two, would undermine the effects we seek. As a matter of fact, we have been validating passports for virtually anyone going to China for any purpose other than simple tourism. Congressmen, academicians and journalists (plus Red Cross representatives and medical scientists) are among those who almost always have their passports validated and whose travels are among the 300 we have approved. I fear that the blanket authorization for these categories would be interpreted, particularly by the knowledgeable public, as a gimmick unless we expect the Chinese to respond, which they almost certainly would not do. Moreover, we could again be faced with the question why we are not doing this for the other countries to which travel is now proscribed. This would put too much of a political pall on this measure and on the whole package. I would rather that we deal with this and other aspects of the travel problem also in the context of the termination of the travel restrictions in September.

To sum up, I think we can go ahead immediately with the first and, hopefully, the second proposal. I believe the third would muddy the waters and detract from the other two. In any event, I understand that we would move on the other elements of NSDM 17 at an early appropriate time.

ELR

20. Editorial Note

In 1969 President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger informed many world leaders of their interest in improving ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC). During his first overseas visit in February and March, Nixon told French President Charles de Gaulle that there existed "considerable sentiment" in the Department of State "not only in favor of a Soviet-U.S. détente, but also for a lineup of the Soviets, Europe and the U.S. against the Chinese." Nixon noted that this might be a good short-range policy, but that in the longer term it was in the U.S. interests to recognize China and the Soviet Union as "great powers" and build "parallel relationships with them." He conceded that this was "largely theoretical as it was difficult to have relations with the Chinese." (Memorandum of conversation between President Nixon and General De Gaulle, March 1, 1969; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 447, President's Trip Files, Memcons—Europe) Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI.

During his around-the-world trip, July 24–August 3, Nixon discussed China with leaders of Pakistan and Romania. On August 2 Nixon told Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu that the United States opposed the PRC entering the United Nations because of the PRC's attitude toward its neighbors, not "China's internal policy." He added that "our policy is to have good relations with the Soviet Union and eventually, when China changes its approach to other nations, we want to open communications channels with them to establish relations." The President emphasized that the United States did not intend to become involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict and would not "join in a bloc to fence off China." Finally Nixon told Ceausescu that "if it serves your interest and the interest of your government, we would welcome your playing a mediating role between us and China." (Memorandum of conversation between President Nixon and President Ceausescu, August 2; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon President Nixon and President Ceausescu August 2–August 3, 1969) Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIX.

The most serious discussion occurred in Pakistan. A report on the meeting between Nixon and President Yahya Khan states that the two men discussed Sino-Soviet, Sino-Pakistani, and Sino-American relations. Nixon agreed with Yahya that China should be engaged in the international community but added that the American public was not ready to accept rapprochement. Nixon commented that he could not accept the PRC's admission into the UN "over-night" but promised to work toward that end. (Report attached to memorandum from Harold Saunders to Kissinger, September 2; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I) On August 2 Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman recorded in his diary that Nixon felt Yahya "made a strong impression as a real leader, very intelligent, and with great insight into Russia-China relations." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, The Complete Multimedia Edition*, Sony Electronic Publishing, 1994) See Documents 26, 39, 54, and 55 for further information on the eventual Sino-American contact through Pakistan. In 1971 Winston Lord wrote a 7-page memorandum to Kissinger, listing the major contacts between the United States and the PRC through Pakistan, Romania, and other sources. (Memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, April 17, 1971; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1033, Files for the President—China Material, Miscellaneous Memoranda Relating to HAK's Trip to PRC, July 1971)

21. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 6, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

GRC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai
Dr. Kissinger
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member

Dr. Kissinger told Ambassador Chow that President Nixon wanted him to pass along assurances to President Chiang that there had been no change in basic US policy toward Communist China. There may have been speculation to the effect that a change had occurred from the news reporting of President Nixon's trip,² but such was not the case. The purpose of President Nixon's trip was to put the US in a position to work with maximum effect in Asia, to gain tactical flexibility with respect to Vietnam and put maximum pressure on Hanoi, and then take care of other problems. The US recognized that the outcome of the Vietnam war would determine the future US role in Asia. If we did badly, this role would diminish; if we did well our position would be enhanced. The President had said on every occasion that we would stand by our commitments.

In response to a question from Ambassador Chow on whether or not a dialogue had occurred in Romania on the subject of opening talks with Communist China, Dr. Kissinger stated that there had been no such dialogue.³ He reiterated that there had been no change in the US position regarding Peking and we were not talking with it anywhere.

Ambassador Chow asked if we had noted any signs of shifts in attitude toward Peking on the part of the Philippines, Thailand and Japan and expressed particular concern about the Philippines. Dr.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III. Secret. Drafted by Holdridge and approved by Kissinger on August 7 with instructions to "hold in W[hite] H[ouse]." (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, August 7; *ibid.*) The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

² Reference is to Nixon's around-the-world trip, during which he held talks with the leaders of South Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Romania.

³ See Document 20. Even prior to Nixon's trip, this issue was raised in a July 17 meeting among Chin Hsiao-yi, Personal Secretary to Chiang Kai-shek, other ROC officials, Green, and Froebe: "Mr. Chin took note skeptically of rumors that President Nixon's Romanian trip carried implications for U.S. relations with Communist China—that the U.S. wanted Romania as a go-between in improving contacts with Peking. Mr. Green replied that there was no truth to such speculation." (Memorandum of conversation, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON)

Kissinger said that we were not aware of any shifts, and mentioned that we had received the impression that the Filipinos were very much afraid of the Chinese Communists.

Turning to the Chinese representation issue in the UN, regarding which Ambassador Chow expressed some apprehensions, Dr. Kissinger declared that our position had not changed and that we would continue to support the GRC this year. We had also taken President Chiang's advice on how to handle Outer Mongolia.⁴

Ambassador Chow referred to some of the difficulties which his government anticipated in a number of areas, and how a change in one country's stand on Chinese representation (e.g. by Canada or Italy) might affect others in a sort of domino theory.⁵ Dr. Kissinger reassured him by saying once again that President Nixon had specifically asked that he be called in and told that we had not changed our basic policy. The President also wanted to express his high regard for President Chiang. Ambassador Chow thanked Dr. Kissinger for these words.

Dr. Kissinger then departed for another appointment, and Mr. Holdridge concluded the meeting by reporting to Ambassador Chow what had been said on the Vietnam question during the President's trip: the US and GVN had been extremely forthcoming in demonstrating their sincerity in support of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam and the time had now come for the other side to respond, and that the US would stay in Vietnam until the South Vietnamese people were free to decide their own future without outside interference.

John H. Holdridge

⁴ See Documents 271 and 272.

⁵ See Document 2.

22. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, August 8, 1969, 1021Z.

3031. Subj: Secretary Rogers' August 3 Meeting With President Chiang.

(*Note:* Conversation has been reconstructed in slightly condensed form but very close paraphrase in exact actual sequence in order to convey its full flavor. Language is verbatim only where quotation marks are used. Ambassador McConaughy drafted record, and it was sent telegraphically to Secretary's party for review, since Ambassador Pedersen and Assistant Secretary Green also took extended notes of conversation. Secretary's cabled clearance of August 7 received today.)

1. Summary: During meeting with Secretary Rogers on August 3, President Chiang first asked if Asian visits of President Nixon and Secretary signified a particular US interest in some sort of new collective security arrangement among free Asian countries. Secretary responded that there was no such interest at this time although US was of course very much interested in regional cooperation. President Chiang said US position corresponded closely to that of his government. In response to President Chiang's query, Secretary gave extensive rundown Vietnam situation and US approach to problem. President Chiang generally agreed with this approach but cautioned against any expectation that USSR or ChiComs will help in any way and said that great care should be exercised regarding number and timetable of US troop withdrawal. President then launched into discussion of US policy on China, saying that policy under Secretary Dulles was correct but policy has been not so well defined since then. In particular, he questioned any attempt at "compromise" or "rapprochement" as being foredoomed to failure and as tending to embolden the ChiComs and consolidate their position. He attributed virtually all the woes of the free world in Asia since 1949 to the US permitting takeover of China Mainland by ChiComs. President Chiang asked if President Nixon is disposed to encourage ROC to go back and free the Chinese people, or "freeze" it on Taiwan. The Secretary, after stating we cannot turn clock back to either

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966-1972, Entry 3051B: Lot 70 D 387, Box 74, Secretary's Trip to the Far East, July-August 1969, CF 384. Secret; Priority; Exdis. From July 26 to 28, Rogers accompanied President Nixon on his trip to the Philippines and Indonesia. From July 28 through August 10, Rogers visited Japan, South Korea, the ROC, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand. He was in Taiwan from August 1 to 3. An English-language record of this conversation, provided by the ROC Government to McConaughy, is attached to an August 27 memorandum from Shoemith to Green, and is *ibid.*, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHINAT-US.

Eisenhower–Dulles or Kennedy period, said President Nixon’s position is one of continued support of the Republic of China. US would be happy if ROC could return to the Mainland by peaceful political means, but any sort of military venture would not be realistic to consider. President asked if it is US policy to encourage ROC to “surrender Quemoy and Matsu,” and Secretary said it was not. President then asked if it was US policy that ROC have the capability to defend itself, and Secretary said it was. In response to Secretary’s question, President said GRC is not desirous of attempting invasion of Mainland because it does not have the capability. Secretary noted that there is therefore agreement on question of posture towards the Mainland. Remainder of conversation largely devoted to President’s complaints of inadequacy of US military aid in view of ChiCom threat. He expressed doubt whether GRC in present circumstances could hold out more than 3 days against full ChiCom attack on Taiwan. He voiced specifically desire for more Nike–Hawk missiles and for Phantom F–4 aircraft² and observed that if there is a military crisis in this area and ROC is unable fulfill its defensive role, US inevitably would become deeply involved. End summary.

[Omitted here is a detailed account of the discussion between Rogers and Chiang.]

McConaughy

² See Documents 1 and 8.

23. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 14¹

Washington, August 8, 1969.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

I. PROBLEM

China is not today a major economic power nor, except in certain applications of its land army, is its military power on a par with that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–023, NSC Meeting (San Clemente), 8/14/69, Briefings: Korea; China. Secret. This is the final version of the response to NSSM 14 (Document 4). The document was largely drafted in EA. Comments on early drafts are in National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, Political Files, NSSM 14. An early draft was discussed in an NSC Senior Review Group meeting on May 15 and returned to

of the US and the USSR. States in Asia, however, feel the weight of China's looming mass, and others believe China has a claim to great power status, including representation in the UN Security Council. Many Americans agree. The US has had a special concern since the 19th Century, complicated by a mystique that has sometimes distorted our sense of what China is and should be; since the Korean War, however, Communist China and the US have been in an adversary relationship. US policies toward China affect to some extent our relations with virtually all third countries. The policies of the US toward most of Asia are closely related to the kind and degree of threats that Peking may present to the US or other countries in the area.

The appropriate US policy towards China depends on answers to the following questions: What are the US interests relating to China? How do the policies of China today affect these interests? How might Chinese policies evolve over the short and long term?² How can the US advantageously influence that evolution? How does present US China policy—and how would alternative policies—affect our interests with regard to third countries, particularly the Communist and non-Communist states of Asia and the Soviet Union? This paper examines these questions in considering the possible range of US objectives and options in our relations with China.

II. PREMISES AND FACTORS³

Premises

Current hostility between the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC) stems from a number of causes including US support for the Republic of China (GRC) and commitment to defend Taiwan, the Korean War, an array of conflicting ideological premises and national objectives, including Peking's endorsement of armed revolutions, and US defense

Brown and the Interdepartmental Group for revisions (see Document 13). Talking points for the President and Kissinger, an outline of NSSM 14 prepared by the NSC staff, and an analysis of U.S. China policy were prepared for an August 14 NSC meeting to be held at San Clemente, California. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-023, NSC Meeting (San Clemente), 8/14/69, Briefings: Korea; China) An August 11 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger stated that the response to NSSM 14 "will be designed primarily as an informal update for members of the Security Council." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Items to Discuss with the President) NSSM 14 was superseded by NSSM 106, China Policy (Document 97) and NSSM 124, Next Steps Toward the People's Republic of China (Document 117).

² "Short-" and "long-term" are not easily defined. They could be interpreted as Mao and post-Mao era, or in some cases, as pre- and post-Viet Nam settlement. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ For a fuller discussion of premises and factors involved in US China policy, see Tab A. [Footnote in the source text. Tab A, attached but not printed, is entitled "Premises and Factors."]

commitments in Asia. Although China faces serious problems in national economic development, it will continue to be ruled by a Communist government and will gradually become stronger militarily, possibly acquiring a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles within the next fifteen years. Peking's policies toward the United States may moderate somewhat under a post-Mao leadership, but Chinese efforts to assert their influence in Asia will result in rivalry with the US regardless of the nature of the Peking regime. Whatever the PRC's actual intentions and capabilities, most other Asians are uneasy about mainland China's long-range objectives in the area, and this concern is reinforced by China's encouragement of revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. As China's power grows, there will be an increasing tendency on the part of other states to recognize the PRC as representing "China", even at the expense of the GRC.

Chinese Objectives and Capabilities

The *present* Peking regime wants other Asian states to accommodate their policies to those of the PRC and eventually model their societies and governments on that of Communist China. Peking wants to be treated as a major world power and as the primary source of revolutionary ideological leadership, and to gain control of Taiwan. China has provided a limited input of funds and training for insurgencies around its border and given selective economic assistance to governments whose attitudes it seeks to influence. It has also engaged in similar activity in other LDC's, especially in Africa. Thus far these efforts have met with little success.

Peking has the ability to launch a major armed attack against any of its immediate neighbors, but we have no evidence of PRC intent to expand its borders or pursue its objectives by armed conquest, except possibly for Taiwan. Peking thus far has not used its limited nuclear weapons capability directly to threaten other Asian states.

The PRC's ability to attain its objectives is limited by 1) severe economic problems, particularly in agriculture; 2) political confusion internally and ineptness externally imposed by Maoist ideology; and 3) a military capability geared largely to defensive operations by its huge land army and constrained by increasing domestic responsibility for the armed forces.

There is substantial agreement that those aspects of Chinese policy that adversely affect US interests are unlikely to change over the short run and that, in the long run, no matter how Chinese policy may evolve, US and Chinese interests will remain in conflict in substantial respects. However, over the next five to ten years, depending in part on when Mao dies, certain changes are possible. These are presented below in the form of two contrasting alternatives. It is recognized that neither alternative is likely to emerge in toto, as described. What is

more likely is an evolution lying between the two extremes, probably incorporating elements of each scenario.

1. In one possible evolution, the Chinese could move towards a policy of more aggressive action. This could involve:

- a. increasing their support for insurgency movements in Asia and elsewhere;
- b. employing direct nuclear threats;
- c. employing the threat of conventional military action, particularly against Asian neighbors;
- d. launching military operations against the Offshore Islands and/or Taiwan, or against the Soviet Union.

2. We believe, however, that it is more likely that China's policy ultimately will moderate, given an international climate conducive to moderation. Domestic economic pressures and the emergence of a more pragmatic leadership in Peking to cope with these pressures would contribute to such an evolution. This could involve:

- a. seeking improved relations with the US and/or Japan, in part as a counter-balance to Soviet pressures;
- b. reducing their concrete support for revolutionary movements;
- c. seeking increased contact with the nations of Asia and membership in international organizations;
- d. developing an interest in measures to control the nuclear arms race.

A question can legitimately be posed as to whether or not it is in US interests for Peking to become more engaged in the international scene. If Peking should choose to pursue a more pragmatic and moderate foreign policy, pressures by the nations of Asia for accommodating Peking and for accepting the PRC into international organizations would build rapidly. Peking's emergence from its self-imposed isolation would thus pose new challenges for US policy in Asia and would probably result in certain short-term losses to ourselves and our allies. Over the long term, however, evolution of Peking's policies toward moderation would offer the prospect of increased stability in East Asia. Since it does not lie within the United States' power to prevent Peking from breaking out of its isolation, the issue posed for the US is whether this evolution will take place in spite of US resistance or whether the US will be seen as willing to accept and live with Peking's entry into the international community and do what it can to take advantage of the change. US failure to adjust its policies to accord with the changed environment would strengthen the impression of US inflexibility and lend credit to Peking's rationale for continued hostility towards the US.

The GRC and Taiwan

The Taiwan issue, including US support for the GRC, is a primary obstacle to an improvement in US/PRC relations. Peking seeks not only

the removal of the US military presence from the Strait area and Taiwan, but also US acceptance of its claim that Taiwan is an internal matter. Taiwan has occupied an important position in US strategic planning. We are committed by treaty, however, only to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. While US policies over the years have created certain constraints on our actions, the US has made no commitments to the GRC that would require its consent to a change in our relations with the PRC. The GRC's insistence that it is the legal government of all of China of which it claims Taiwan is a part lies at the heart of the mainlander-dominated political structure on Taiwan. The Taiwanese population of the island is resentful of mainlander domination but undoubtedly prefers the GRC to the PRC. They probably hope that Taiwan will remain separate from the mainland and looking primarily to the US to maintain this separation. While Chiang Kai-shek is in control, the GRC will adhere firmly to its claim to be the only rightful government of China. It may, however, tacitly accommodate to US policies and actions which take into account the fact of Peking's control over the mainland, and to a limited extent has already done so.

Relationship of North Viet-Nam and North Korea to Chinese Interests

Although North Viet-Nam and North Korea pursue largely independent policies, sometimes in conflict with those of the PRC, Peking has a major national security interest in their continued existence and would almost certainly intervene militarily if the Communist regime of either country were seriously threatened.

Japan and the Soviet Union

The bi-polar situation that characterized Asia in the past is shifting toward a four-sided relationship among the US, the Soviet Union, Japan and Communist China. The Soviet Union has become with the US one of Peking's two principal antagonists, and Japan's economic strength and growing sense of nationalism will likely lead it toward an increasingly significant political role in Asia. Although under present circumstances there is little likelihood that Peking will alter its rigid and defiant stance vis-à-vis the US, the USSR, and Japan, a future Chinese leadership may seek, through the manipulation of its relations with these three states, to achieve limited rapprochement with one or more of them.

The possible impact of current Sino-Soviet tensions on US policy toward the Soviet Union and China will be discussed in detail in NSSM 63.

US Policy as a Factor Influencing PRC and Third Country Attitudes

The United States ability to influence the attitude and policies of present Chinese leaders is probably very limited, aside from the re-

straining influence of US military power. Future Chinese leaders' perspectives may be altered, however, by considerations of domestic political control, by the need for economic development and by China's relations with third countries. US actions to alter what Peking perceives as the US "threat" could contribute to this. The impact which US actions toward Peking have on third countries depends upon the geographic proximity of each state to China. Any improvement in Sino-US relations will eventually produce pressures in most countries on China's periphery for greater accommodation with Peking. This need not be hostile to US interests in the long-run if it allows for continuing US political and economic relations with these countries even though at a reduced level of intimacy than previously.

UN Considerations

The question of China's representation in the United Nations is inseparable from the claims of both the PRC and the GRC to be the government of all of China and derives its importance largely as a reflection of support for those claims. Although a substantial number of UN members feel that it is a serious defect in the UN system for nearly one quarter of the world's population not to have a direct spokesman in the UN, there is also widespread unwillingness to deny membership to the GRC. Both the PRC and the GRC, however, strongly oppose any two-Chinas arrangements; and under present circumstances support in the General Assembly is inadequate for adoption of two-Chinas proposals because of opposition by member states concerned with their bilateral relations with Peking or Taipei.

The margin of support for our present position in the General Assembly and Security Council is narrow and could be jeopardized by developments outside the UN, such as increased diplomatic recognition of the PRC.

III. US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES RELATING TO CHINA

If there were no conceivable prospect for a change in the attitudes of the leaders of the PRC and the policies they are currently following except in the direction of greater militancy, the choice of options for US policy would be meager and bleak. The key considerations might be when, not whether, a major Sino-US conflict might take place, how the US should best prepare to meet such a challenge, and whether or not consideration should be given to preempting a Chinese attack. Our objectives under such circumstances would focus either on strengthening our own military posture and that of our allies, and on isolating the PRC to the extent possible, or on deciding in advance to reduce or abrogate US commitments and involvement in all areas in which a direct Sino-US conflict might occur.

There is little reason to believe, however, that this present level of conflict and antagonism will endure indefinitely. US long-range objectives and interests can, therefore, plausibly be set in more flexible terms and in the direction of the achievement of an improved and more relaxed relationship with the PRC. These can be summarized as:

a. To deter aggression in East Asia *and* avoid a direct US–PRC armed confrontation or conflict, including the outbreak of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait area, while pursuing the objectives below.

b. To prevent alliance between a mainland government and any other major state directed against the US or other friendly state.

c. To maintain a balance of influence in East Asia which preserves the independence of the states of the area and enables them to maintain friendly political and economic relations with other countries, including the US.

d. To obtain Chinese acceptance of such a system of independent states and Peking's cooperation with other Asian countries in areas of common economic and social activity and interest.

e. To achieve a relaxation of tensions between the US and the PRC, including participation of the PRC in discussions on measures for arms control and disarmament, and the normalization of US political and economic relations with the PRC.⁴

f. To achieve a resolution of the future status of Taiwan without the use of force and, if possible, consistent with the desires of the people on Taiwan.⁵

g. To maintain access to Taiwan to the extent necessary for our strategy in meeting our defense commitment to the GRC and, as needed, our strategic requirements elsewhere, *or alternatively*, to maintain access to Taiwan to the extent necessary for our strategy in meeting our defense commitment to the GRC.⁶

h. So long as Taiwan remains separate from the mainland, to encourage continued growth of its economy and an increasing contribution to regional economic development.

⁴ For a discussion of major alternative policies and problems for the US in improving relations with Peking, see Tab F, *Diplomatic Contacts and Relations with the PRC*. [Footnote in the source text. None of the tabs is printed.]

⁵ The relationship between mainlanders and Taiwanese on Taiwan and the complex problem that this presents in relation to other US objectives makes it desirable at the present time to avoid choosing definitively how best to achieve this objective; by the ultimate political unification of Taiwan and the mainland; the establishment in some way of an independent Taiwan state; or the indefinite continuation of the present situation. For a discussion of major alternative policies and problems in this regard, see Tab C, *The GRC and Taiwan*. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ For a discussion of major alternative policies and problems for the US in resolving the Taiwan question, see Tab D, *Taiwan as a US Military Base*. [Footnote in the source text.]

IV. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

A. Present Strategy

Present strategy has assumed that there is at present only a very limited military threat from China. It also has assumed that, in the short run, US efforts to reduce Chinese hostility toward the US or toward those of its neighbors that are closely aligned with the US will achieve extremely limited results.

In the longer run, it hypothesizes a China that could be militarily more dangerous to the US but with new leaders who could shift the emphasis of Chinese policy in a number of different ways, including to diminished hostility toward the US, and that the US posture may over time be a factor in influencing such change.

The strategy has therefore included two elements: deterrence of any possible direct Chinese threat across its borders or to the US, and limited efforts to suggest to the Chinese the desirability of changing their policies in the direction of a more tolerant view of other states and of the present world political system. Partly because of other policy considerations, the first element has been given somewhat greater stress than the second.

Under our present strategy the US has continued to recognize the Government of the Republic of China as the legal government of China and to support it in the international community. However, in bilateral relations, the US has dealt with the PRC as the government controlling the mainland and with the GRC only concerning the territory over which it has actual control.

We have a commitment to the GRC to assist in the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, but we have indicated to both the GRC and the PRC that we oppose the use of force in the Taiwan Strait area by either side. We have sought to maintain access to military bases in Taiwan both for use in meeting US commitments elsewhere in Asia and for general war contingencies.

We have maintained a virtually total embargo on all trade and other financial transactions with Peking and resisted efforts by other countries to liberalize strategic controls.

We have tried to avoid a direct US-PRC military confrontation or conflict while supporting defensive military and counterinsurgency efforts of independent nations on China's periphery.

We have sought to reduce tension, promote reconciliation with the PRC, and encourage greater Chinese contact with the outside world and with the US, through (i) public statements, (ii) relaxation of controls on travel and cultural exchanges, and specific offers for greater US-PRC contact, (iii) our ambassadorial conversations in Warsaw, and (iv) avoidance of provocative military actions. We have not extended this policy to embrace UN membership.

The questions now posed are these: Is such a policy adequate to deal with the long-term problem of Communist China? If not, what are the alternatives?

There are two major variants to our present strategy by which US objectives might be pursued under present circumstances. Both assume that current Chinese policies can be changed but take different approaches toward how US policy can contribute to an acceleration of the change. Neither alternative completely excludes aspects of the other but each is set forth in a sharply differentiated form in order to clarify the differences. It is assumed that a third alternative, total US withdrawal from involvement in the Asian area where US and Chinese interests impinge on one another, would not further the US objectives described in Section IV [III] above.

B. Intensified Deterrence and Isolation

This strategy would be based on calculations that (1) the strain of repeated policy failures and of growing frustration over China's isolation would cause a post-Mao leadership to reassess China's role in international affairs and alter its policies in a manner that would reduce the conflict between the US and Chinese objectives, and that (2) US efforts to improve relations with Peking have not succeeded in leading China to perceive a need to moderate her policies. To limit Peking's success in pursuit of present policies and strengthen the credibility of the US commitment to its Asian allies, the US could increase its military and economic support of Asian countries to demonstrate that insurgencies supported and encouraged by Peking will fail; strengthen US offensive and defensive capability to demonstrate to Peking that its development of advanced weapons will not affect US deterrent capability, and strive to convince Peking that it cannot gain acceptance into the international community on its present terms.

Opponents of this approach argue that present deterrent capability against China is sufficient and that further attempts to isolate Peking may well increase the present dangers which Peking poses. According to this view, there is no prospect that China's present form of government will be changed by force, and it is impossible effectively to isolate a nation as large as China.

C. Reduction of PRC's Isolation and Points of US-PRC Conflict

This strategy would be based on a calculation that (1) a relaxation of external pressures will be most likely to cause a post-Mao leadership to reassess US attitudes and intentions toward China and China's role in international affairs and that (2) present US policy has given too much weight to deterrence and not enough to steps designed to open up for Peking the possibility of and benefits from greater cooperative involvement in the world. To encourage this reassessment, the US,

while maintaining its defense commitments and continuing to deter any possible overt Chinese attack against US allies in Asia, could gradually de-emphasize the military aspect of our containment of the PRC, unilaterally reduce or eliminate economic and political measures designed to isolate Peking, and acquiesce in the PRC's fuller participation in the international community.

Opponents of this approach argue that unilateral US gestures without demanding corresponding conciliatory steps by Peking will be taken as an indication that the PRC's present militant approach has been successful and would add to existing frictions with our Asian allies. It is further argued that, since there is small likelihood of an early change in Peking's attitudes, China's greater involvement in the world community would simply disrupt present efforts toward international cooperation and complicate US relations with third countries.

[Omitted here is an 11-page discussion of Policy Approaches in Pursuit of the Alternative Strategies. The report also includes eight annexes: Premises and Factors, Modes of Military Deterrence, the GRC and Taiwan, Taiwan as a U.S. Military Base, Offshore Islands, Diplomatic Contact and Relations with the PRC, China and the UN, and Trade.]

24. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11/13-69

Washington, August 12, 1969.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

THE USSR AND CHINA

The Problem

To estimate the general course of Sino-Soviet relations over the next three years.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, SRG Meeting, Sino-Soviet Differences, 11/20/69. Secret; Controlled Dissem. This NIE supersedes NIE 11-12-66; see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XXX, Document 223. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate except for the representatives from the FBI and the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdictions. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, pp. 543-559. This estimate was included with the materials for the November 20 Senior Review Group meeting of the NSC. See Document 47.

Conclusions

A. Sino-Soviet relations, which have been tense and hostile for many years, have deteriorated even further since the armed clashes on the Ussuri River last March. There is little or no prospect for improvement in the relationship, and partly for this reason, no likelihood that the fragments of the world Communist movement will be pieced together.

B. For the first time, it is reasonable to ask whether a major Sino-Soviet war could break out in the near future. The potential for such a war clearly exists. Moreover, the Soviets have reasons, chiefly the emerging Chinese nuclear threat to the USSR, to argue that the most propitious time for an attack is soon, rather than several years hence. At the same time, the attendant military and political uncertainties must also weigh heavily upon the collective leadership in Moscow.

C. We do not look for a deliberate Chinese attack on the USSR. Nor do we believe the Soviets would wish to become involved in a prolonged, large-scale conflict. While we cannot say it is likely, we see some chance that Moscow might think it could launch a strike against China's nuclear and missile facilities without getting involved in such a conflict. In any case, a climate of high tension, marked by periodic clashes along the border, is likely to obtain. The scale of fighting may occasionally be greater than heretofore, and might even involve punitive cross-border raids by the Soviets. Under such circumstances, escalation is an ever present possibility.

D. In the light of the dispute, each side appears to be reassessing its foreign policy. The Soviets seem intent on attracting new allies, or at least benevolent neutrals, in order to "contain" the Chinese. To that end Moscow has signified some desire to improve the atmosphere of its relations with the West. The Chinese, who now appear to regard the USSR as their most immediate enemy, will face stiff competition from the Soviets in attempting to expand their influence in Asia.

[Omitted here is the 11-page Discussion section in four parts—Political Background, The Military Dimension, Prospects, and Impact of the Dispute Elsewhere in the World. Also omitted are a 3-page annex entitled Territorial Claims and a map of the eastern and western border between the Soviet Union and the PRC.]

25. President Nixon's Notes on a National Security Council Meeting¹

San Clemente, California, undated.

Helms San Clemente—N.S.C.

China

Cultural Revolution

1. Mao believed enthusiasm for revolution was ebbing

- a. Technicians in ascendancy
- b. Too much like U.S.S.R.—“Fat, non revolutionary”

2. 1965—purged elite

Red Guard from youth mobilized

1. Some of top leaders were skeptical.
2. Army called in in February of 67—and at later times—to bring calm.

—1. Military carried out orders with gusto.

—2. Some of students sent to countryside and state farms.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Personal Files, Box 51, Speech File, NSC Meeting, September 1969. No classification marking. The meeting was held on August 14. Nixon's handwritten notes were transcribed by the editor for this volume. An August 9 memorandum from Kissinger to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, George A. Lincoln, indicated that Helms would give a 25-minute "assessment of present Chinese Communist situation, including development of their nuclear capability and political trends." (Ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-023, NSC Meeting (San Clemente), 8/14/69, Briefings: Korea; China) The President's notes suggest that he was listening to Helms' briefing. Although typed minutes from the portion of the meeting devoted to South Korea are in the National Security Council files, no record of discussion of NSSM 14 or China policy was found. (Ibid.) Nor have the materials used in the Helms briefing been located in the CIA files. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the President, Kissinger, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Mitchell, Lincoln, Wheeler, Richardson, Helms, Halperin, Haig, Lynn, Holdridge, and Green attended the meeting, which lasted from 9:39 a.m. to 12:25 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Kissinger's personal account of this meeting states that "the President startled his Cabinet colleagues by his revolutionary thesis (which I strongly shared) that the Soviet Union was the more aggressive party and that it was against our interests to let China be 'smashed' in a Sino-Soviet war. It was a major event in American foreign policy when a President declared that we had a strategic interest in the survival of a major Communist country, long an enemy, and with which we had no contact." (Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), p. 182). Laird's files contain talking points on Sino-American relations that concluded: "It is assumed that United States policy toward Communist China remains unchanged, with the exceptions of the decisions concerning mainland travel of US citizens and limited purchases of goods of mainland Chinese origins." (Talking Paper for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSC Meeting of 14 August 1969; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 75 0103, 335 NSC)

3. Revolution showed army loyal—but unable to cope with civilian tasks.

1. Public discipline deteriorated
 - a. Once proud of it.
2. Enemy got a set back.

Party Congress = to rebuild unity.

1. But much factionalism in all institutions
2. But Peking calls shots
 - a. No war lordism.

Radical Social program. Education and health have been put on back burner

Theme of preparing for war—played heavily.

1. But to unify country.
2. Not to wage war.

Sino–Soviet:

1. U.S.S.R. =# [one] enemy (over U.S.)
2. China sent delegation to Moscow for trade talks.
 - a. Doesn't want a Soviet confrontation.
3. Last event below previous levels, but both sides play them up.
4. China does not expect Soviet attack, but are nervous now—try to settle.
5. Condemn Brezhnev's Asian collective security pact vigorously.

Decline in productivity and trade until 1968.

1. Grain supply is reasonably good.

Nuclear weapons tests proceed.

1. Chinese have done better job than French have.
2. Could have 1972 initial capability of I.C.B.M. but 1975 more likely, when they could have 25.

Aircraft production.

1. Kept at modest levels.
2. A few SAMs (from Soviets).

Largest land army in world.

1. 162 divisions.
2. Below U.S.

30 Russian—full strength.

26. **Memorandum From Lindsey Grant and Hal Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, August 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Pakistan: Mediation in Sino/US Relations²

Two communications from Jim Spain in Rawalpindi may be worthy of your review:³

Tab A: The Pakistanis are working in the belief that President Nixon told President Yahya that the US wished to seek an accommodation with Communist China and would appreciate the Pakistani's passing this word to Chou En-lai and using their influence to promote this. Yahya is apparently debating whether to call in the Chicom Ambassador to convey the message or whether to wait until he sees Chou En-lai, probably some months hence.

Tab B: Spain believes that in retrospect, reports of Nur Khan's views of Communist China—including Nur's midnight talk with you in Lahore—seem to indicate that the Pakistanis were delivering a message which the Chinese wanted us to hear to the effect that they regard the threat to them from the USSR as more imminent than from us and that they would react sharply.

Spain may be over-reading the Chinese intention to communicate specifically with us via Nur Khan. They have been expressing their concern at Soviet behavior widely enough; Nur Khan just happened to be in China when the Chinese leaders, legitimately, are absorbed with the Soviet problem. He himself made clear to you that he did not bear a message from the Chinese, and the only indication that the Paks themselves may think that the Chinese were talking for our benefit is a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Grant signed for himself and Saunders. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: "This is to be strictly WH matter. I want *no* discussion outside our bldg. Has Hal talked to Hilaly[?]"

² See Document 20.

³ Tab A is an August 16 letter from James W. Spain, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Pakistan. Tab B is an August 7 letter from Spain; an August 1 memorandum of conversation of a meeting held in Lahore among Kissinger, Spain, Saunders, and Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator Air Marshal Nur Khan; and [text not declassified]. All attached but not printed.

remark by the Pak Ambassador in Peking. (This all of course leaves the Prague story still tantalizingly in the air.)⁴

Whether or not President Nixon actually intended to encourage President Yahya to an effort at mediation (and only he of course can answer that), we are inclined to believe that Yahya's efforts will do us no harm and may actually do some good. They will underline the sincerity of US interest in improved relations, even if (as is most likely) the Chinese do not respond in any way.

There are several practical dangers in letting the word get around that we have asked others such as the Paks to pursue a *détente* between US and Communist China. All of them are manageable.

a. We may generate excessive expectations as to what is negotiable, with consequent fears in Southeast Asia, and with pressures from some quarters of US opinion to go further to show good faith to the Chinese. At this point in history, the Chinese do not seem to harbor any illusions that they could use us effectively against the Soviet threat by seeking a rapprochement, and most other Chinese objectives must be won *against* us rather than *with* us, so we have little reason to expect that present US bids will pay off in the near future.

b. We will make the Soviets nervous.

c. In the UN context, any reports of a US willingness to improve relations with Communist China always generate rumors that we are slackening our support for the Republic of China, with a danger of erosion of the vote on the Chinese representation issue.

The first of these problems fades quickly with time, and can be met by reiterating our assessment that the Chinese are unlikely to seek better relations in the short term.

The effect of Soviet nervousness is moot. We have already decided to show them that we are capable of dealing with China, anyway.

The third problem is particularly topical, with the UNGA coming up shortly. It can probably be best met by making explicit what has been implicit for eight years: that our objection is to any effort to seat the Chinese Communists *at the expense of* the GRC. This line is itself justified by

—the long-term need to place ourselves in a position from which we can move to accept Chinese Communist membership.

—the need to show consistency with our position that we do not seek to isolate China.

⁴ Apparent reference to a series of stories that surfaced in Prague in mid-July that connected Romanian-American talks to Sino-American rapprochement. (Telegram 1812 from Prague, July 10, and telegram 1863 from Prague, July 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/NIXON)

—the fact that this line is much more acceptable to most other countries than is a continued opposition to Chinese Communist entry.

Pressures for Chinese Communist entry into the UN will mount if China continues to move toward a more subtle and less doctrinaire foreign policy. Even from our own standpoint, Chinese Communist entry would have its advantages as well as its disadvantages. Moreover, we would be in a stronger tactical position fighting for the GRC's right to stay than in trying to resist Chinese Communist participation. It is also quite possible that we would eventually lose, in any case, or that the GRC would refuse to remain in a UNGA which invited the Chinese Communists in. In either case, the diplomatic defeat for the US would seem much smaller if we had been seen not as opposing Chinese Communist entry but as trying to save a place for the GRC.

27. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Contingencies

The two options being examined for the contingency of major Sino-Soviet hostilities should be subjected to much more rigorous examination and debate. As things now stand, the first approach—strict impartiality—seems likely to break down completely in the execution, and the second—shading toward China—could have major consequences in our relations with the USSR.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for information. A covering note reads: "The attached memo (Tab A) represents a highly personal and apparently minority view of our choices in the event of major hostilities between Russia and China. Still, you might find it worth reading before the interagency paper is submitted next week." Kissinger's handwritten comment reads: "Note to Hyland: 1st class paper. Thanks. HK." Regarding the interagency paper, see Document 29.

Impartiality

This exists only in theory. In practice, the US will have to make choices which will have the net effect of a distinct sympathy for one or the other side.

Consider the following problems:

—do we continue bilateral and four-power Middle East talks with the USSR? If strict impartiality means business as usual, we should continue them; but this will be subject to the interpretation that we are condoning Soviet “aggression;”

—would we start or continue SALT? If we did the Soviets and most of informed opinion in the world (and in China) would see it as favorable to the USSR; if we refused to talk this would be a clear retaliation, not impartiality;

—would we continue negotiations on a seabeds disarmament treaty?

—consider a UN resolution condemning the USSR (introduced by Albania); could we abstain? Moscow would be overjoyed; could we vote against the USSR and be impartial, etc.?

The point is, that in an effort to be truly impartial, we would probably wind up clearly supporting the USSR, unless we were prepared to take specific actions to indicate our disapproval, which would then amount to support to China. Indeed, trying to be even-handed and impartial or neutral once China has been attacked by major force, is clearly tantamount to supporting the USSR.

Even if all of the specific problems could be miraculously sorted out, the world at large and domestic opinion is going to scrutinize our position and conclude that we favor one side.

One way out of this dilemma could be not to adopt an avowed policy of impartiality but one of enlightened self-interest, regulating our reactions, statements, and actions to the actual situation. As many have pointed out a Sino-Soviet war, for a limited period and if limited in scope, is by no means a disaster for the US. It might just be the way to an early Vietnam settlement. It might also be a “solution” to the China nuclear problem.

In any case, it is worth considering the option of being mildly pro-Soviet, trying at the same time to be mildly pro-Chinese, depending on the scope and duration of hostilities.

In other words, instead of measuring our various actions against the criteria of impartiality or neutrality, to measure each against the national objectives of the United States, which are in the process of being defined in the NSSM-63 study.²

² Documents 15 and 40.

Partiality Toward China

This variant does not seem to be very well thought through. Two reasons have been advanced:

- we will incline toward China to extract some Soviet concessions;
- we will incline toward China to prevent a shift in the Asian “balance” (the argument apparently being that a major defeat of China would result in Soviet predominance).

The notion of extracting Soviet concessions, once major hostilities have begun, is extremely naive.³ The Soviets are not going to attack China in some quixotic mood. If they take this drastic step, they will be fully and totally committed to pursue it to the end. They are already working up deep racial and political emotions in Russia. The Soviet leaders believe we should share their concern about China, and expect, at the least, sympathy and understanding for whatever actions they might take. They will almost certainly regard American gestures to China as sheer hypocrisy.

If this argument is even close to the mark, then the Soviet reaction to our slight partiality toward China is likely to be massively hostile. They might not be able or want to do anything about it at the time, but it will poison Soviet-American relations for a very long time.

The notion of supporting China to some small degree because of the effect on the Asian balance is rather fatuous. Only a slight knowledge of history suggests that foreign conquest of China is not very likely (the Soviets are not so inexperienced as to believe they can conquer China). A quick “victory” simply is not in the cards. The alternative of a long, inconclusive struggle is another problem, but it need not be decided in any contingency plan at this moment.

If the Soviet blow brings down the present regime, this would not be a great disaster. A replacement would have to be anti-Soviet to come to power. The alternative of a pro-Soviet faction surfacing in Peking after an attack is too remote to be discussed; even if the Soviets could find such Chinese leaders, their tenure in China would be brief, and their authority would not extend beyond a few provinces.

The idea that we can build up political credit with the Chinese leaders by displaying our sympathies is not very convincing. If we were serious in this regard we should take actions to forestall a Soviet strike, which the Chinese could claim we have full knowledge of (cf. press reports of such a strike in all US papers on August 28).⁴

³ This is not to say that the Soviets would not pay some price in advance to prevent a more accommodating US policy toward China. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ Chalmers M. Roberts, “U.S. Fears Chance of Sino-Soviet War is Rising: Russia Reported Eyeing Strikes at China A-Sites,” *Washington Post*, August 28, 1969, p. A-1.

If the strike does occur, the only way to gain a real credit in Peking would be a straightforward anti-Soviet campaign. Anything short of this will probably be regarded by the Chinese as a charade. Indeed, the Chinese could already conclude that we know of Soviet intentions and are colluding with them. If and when it becomes public knowledge that the Soviets did in fact mention to us a strike against Chinese nuclear facilities, the Chinese will simply write us off as Moscow's tacit ally.

In sum, there is a considerable danger that by trying to be slightly sympathetic towards Peking we will court a massive overreaction from the USSR and still accomplish very little in the eyes of this or any other Chinese leadership.

28. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 28, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Agha Hilaly
Harold H. Saunders

On Dr. Kissinger's instructions relayed via Colonel Haig, I made an appointment with Ambassador Hilaly immediately after he returned to Washington from the West Coast and made the following points:

1. Dr. Kissinger asked me to call.
2. I understand that when Presidents Nixon and Yahya met, President Nixon said that the U.S. would welcome accommodation with Communist China and would appreciate it if President Yahya would let Chou En-lai know this.²
3. We thought perhaps there might be some uncertainty about what we had in mind and wanted to clarify our point along these lines:
 - a. The President did not have in mind that passing this word was urgent or that it required any immediate or dramatic Pakistani effort. He regards this as important but not as something that needs to be done immediately.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Cookies II, Chronology of Exchange with the PRC, February 1969–April 1971. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders on August 29. The meeting was held in the Pakistani Embassy.

² See Documents 20 and 26.

b. What President Nixon had in mind was that President Yahya might at some natural and appropriate time convey this statement of the U.S. position in a low-key factual way.

4. We would like to establish a single channel for any further discussion of this subject should President Yahya have any questions about what President Nixon intended or any impressions of Chinese views which he might wish to relay to President Nixon. We would like to see Ambassador Hilaly and Dr. Kissinger as the two points of contact.

The Ambassador said he felt there was no misunderstanding on this subject. To confirm, he walked to his desk and picked up what looked like 10 legal-sized pages which apparently constituted his record of the debriefing President Yahya had given him on the talk with President Nixon.

Reading from various parts of this record, he reconstructed the conversation between the two Presidents along the following lines:

1. President Nixon said that he thoroughly understands Pakistan's points of view toward China.

2. President Yahya, discussing China's view of the world, said that China feels surrounded by hostile forces—India, Soviet Union and the United States in Southeast Asia. China seeks no territory or war but will fight with no holds barred if war is thrust upon it. President Yahya stated his view that there is a need for a dialogue with China to bring China into the community of nations.

3. President Nixon stated it as his personal view—not completely shared by the rest of his government or by many Americans—that Asia can not move forward if a nation as large as China remains isolated. He further said that the US should not be party to any arrangements designed to isolate China. He asked President Yahya to convey his feeling to the Chinese at the highest level. When President Yahya said it might take a little time to pass this message, President Nixon replied that President Yahya should take his own time and decide for himself the manner in which he would communicate with the Chinese.

In concluding the conversation, Ambassador Hilaly said that Chou En-lai had been invited to Pakistan and had accepted but it was not clear when he would come. He said President Yahya might, in a conversation with the Chinese Ambassador, simply say that the US had no hostile intent toward Communist China but he would wait until he sees Chou En-lai to convey President Nixon's specific views.

Harold H. Saunders³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

29. Memorandum for the Record of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

San Clemente, California, September 4, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger
The Attorney General
Admiral Nels Johnson
Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
Assistant Secretary G. Warren Nutter
Thomas Karamessines
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
John H. Holdridge

1. The group agreed that while the draft was a good first cut, some adjustments would have to be made to make the paper more specific and more useful.² It was agreed that the section on Vietnam should be strengthened and that the implications of a Soviet blockade of the China mainland would need to be examined from the legal standpoint in detail. An international study of neutrality was required. In addition, further study on the question of the US relationship with the Soviets was required. For example, in the event of a Soviet attack, would we drop discussions with the USSR on SALT, the Middle East and Berlin.

2. It was also generally agreed that the position of impartiality would have the practical consequences of helping the Soviets. Dr. Kissinger proposed, and the rest agreed, that in such circumstances we might try to get something from the Soviets. There were possibly opportunities which might exist for us in other areas such as Korea and Vietnam.

3. On the question of the public position to be taken by the US in the UN or elsewhere, there was concurrence on the point that we could not condone a nuclear exchange, and that if we wanted to quiet things down we must say so. On asking for a ceasefire, it was accepted that for the US to ask for one without at the same time condemning the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-071, WSAG Meeting, 9/4/69, Sino-Soviet. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Holdridge prepared talking points for Kissinger. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, September 3; *ibid.*)

² Reference is to a paper entitled "Immediate U.S. Policy Problems in Events of Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities." The draft version is *ibid.*, Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970.

Soviets would appear to the Chinese as “collusion.” With such a condemnation, however, it was acceptable to ask for a ceasefire.

4. Dr. Kissinger remarked that 2 factors are involved: the actual situation, and what the Chinese perceived. He felt strongly that the definition of impartiality would be to establish a position which in the next decade would focus Chinese resentment entirely on the Soviets, and not on the US.

5. Another point raised by Dr. Kissinger was the undesirability of creating a situation in which a country would establish a principle of resorting to nuclear weapons to settle a dispute. If such a principle were established, the consequences for the US would be incalculable. It was not enough for us to deplore the effects of nuclear weapons on health and safety factors and we must make this very plain to the Soviets despite the US nuclear policy in Europe.

6. With respect to the paper itself, it was agreed that it should be refined into two alternatives: a situation in which major hostilities were in progress, and a situation in which the Soviets launched a surgical strike against Chinese nuclear centers. There was general agreement that a surgical strike would probably lead to greater hostilities, but for the purpose of the paper this distinction should be made.

7. The group also agreed that section four—what to do to deter—was most pertinent and urgent. The Soviets, in fact, might be getting the idea that we are encouraging them and our record should be clear.

8. Dr. Kissinger observed that as in the Korea papers it would be helpful to know something about what DEFCON should be entered into. He added that it would be insane for Eastern European countries to attempt to approach the US if the Soviets were to knock out the Chinese nuclear capacity.

9. A problem was noted in where to contact the Chinese—Warsaw would probably be out. What we said to the Chinese, though, would not need to accord with what we said publicly.

10. Additional problems were noted concerning US reconnaissance. We faced something of a dilemma in that the time we wanted the most information there might be a cutback in the ways to get it. It was accepted that we would continue as fully as we could with reconnaissance flights, perhaps standing farther off the coast.

11. There was some questioning of the inclusion of a civil defense posture.³

³ A “Summary of Conclusions” listed decisions taken by the WSAG as outlined in this memorandum for the record. (Ibid., Box H-071, WSAG Meeting, 9/4/69, Sino-Soviet)

30. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee¹

Washington, September 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

CIA Covert Action Program Against Communist China

1. Summary

This memorandum describes the covert action program of CIA which is directed against Communist China. CIA seeks approval to continue this program. Communist China, because of current ferment, appears especially vulnerable to the program's extensive, varied, but carefully targeted efforts: clandestine radio operations to Communist China [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]; political action groups, with related newspaper, journal and magazine publications [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]; use of world-wide covert press placements; balloon-delivered leaflets [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]; black operations originating from Headquarters and field stations; assistance to the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) overt radio broadcasts to the mainland; and the establishment of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] political action agents [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

The program fund levels for these activities are: [*dollar amount not declassified*] in Fiscal Year 1969, of which over half is for the purchase and installation of new radio transmitting equipment, and [*dollar amount not declassified*] in Fiscal Year 1970.

In the field these activities are coordinated with the U.S. chief of mission, as appropriate. At Headquarters they are coordinated with the Department of State at the Assistant Secretary level.

2. Background

Communist China, weakened by the Cultural Revolution, is re-defining its internal and external policies and there are indications it may re-emerge into the world society. The recent Ninth Party Congress

¹ Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files, China. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A handwritten notation on the first page indicates the 303 Committee approved the memorandum at the October 16 meeting. According to the minutes of that meeting, attended by Kissinger, Mitchell, Packard, U. Alexis Johnson, and Helms: "The consensus was that this is a worthwhile program and its continuation was approved." (Memorandum for the record by Frank Chapin; *ibid.*, 303 Committee, 1969 Minutes) The 303 Committee became the 40 Committee after President Nixon signed NSDM 40 on February 17, 1970, thus updating NSC 5412/2.

set a wobbly course for China's recovery from internal chaos. Preliminary indications are that ideology will be again stressed with emphasis on constant revolution for China and, where possible, for the rest of the world. The Chinese people appear weary of internal conflict and the lack of individual material progress. These weaknesses in the Chinese Communist system are vulnerabilities which the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] covert action program is designed to exploit.

The program aims to further U.S. policy objectives by supplementing such U.S. overt efforts as Voice of America with covert activities which, if attributed to the U.S., would embarrass the U.S. Government, compromise our foreign assets, or reduce the credibility and impact of the operation.

The program conceives that continued lack of success at home and abroad will lead the Chinese Communist regime to adopt more sensible practices and policies. We do not seek to overthrow the Mao regime, but rather we work to induce moderation and greater internal orientation. In addition, we attempt to widen the Sino-Soviet split and to exacerbate relations between Communist China and North Vietnam and North Korea.

This program was approved by the 303 Committee on 28 April 1967.² The Committee commended a progress report on the success of the black radios on 16 August 1968. A proposal to provide additional transmission facilities to both overt and covert radio operations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was approved by the 303 Committee on 22 April 1969.³

[Omitted here is a 9-page discussion of activities concerning China.]

² See *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XXX, Document 254.

³ As outlined in a memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee, April 10 (Subject: Improvements in Radio Propaganda Broadcasts to China), and approved according to a memorandum for the record by Frank Chapin, April 24. (Ibid., Subject Files, China and ibid., 303 Committee, 1969 Minutes)

31. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 9, 1969, 3:15–4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation with the President Concerning China and U.S.-Chinese Contacts

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Henry Kissinger
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

At the President's request, I described to him the procedures we followed in Warsaw for communicating with the Chinese Embassy. The President asked if I could pass a message to the Chinese privately, and I assured him that I could do so by addressing a letter to the Chinese Chargé which would be delivered by an Embassy officer.

The President wondered what would happen if I attempted to talk directly with the Chinese Chargé at a diplomatic reception at one of the neutral embassies in Warsaw. I said I did not know but that I could certainly attempt to make such a contact. The President requested me to do so on an appropriate occasion following my return to Warsaw. If I was able to engage the Chinese Chargé in conversation I could say that I had seen the President in Washington and that he was seriously interested in concrete discussions with China. Any reactions from the Chargé to such an approach obviously would be of the greatest interest.

If the press noted my conversation with the Chargé and inquired about it, the President said I should be noncommittal in my comments, although I might say that the U.S. is interested in good relations with all countries. The President also remarked that, if I did see the Chinese Chargé at a reception, it might also be well for me to seek out the Soviet representative subsequently to keep things in balance.

The President commented that, in general, any person in a responsible position in the U.S. Government must realize that we should

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL CHICOM–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held in the White House. Although Stoessel's memorandum notes that the meeting began at 3 p.m., the President's Daily Diary indicates that the President, Kissinger, and Stoessel met from 3:15 to 4:05 p.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) According to another copy of the memorandum, Stoessel forwarded it through the Executive Secretariat to Kissinger on September 20. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III)

seek on a long-range basis to better relations with Communist China. We cannot leave that tremendous country and people isolated.

The President spoke of the reactions he had received on his Far Eastern trip to Brezhnev's interest in a collective security pact in Asia. Of course, the Philippines and Thailand were opposed; Pakistan was also against such a pact, since they are playing up to the Chinese. The interesting thing for the President was that India and Indonesia were also opposed.

The President thought that countries in the Far East feared the possibility of a Soviet-U.S. cabal against the Chinese. A Soviet-U.S. "deal" would be bad enough in itself, but the Far Eastern countries see that it could also strengthen the Soviets to the extent that they might be able to take over China in the sense of controlling its policies and actions. If this happened, a Soviet-Chinese bloc would be created which would be dangerous to world peace and specifically to the neighbors of China.

The President noted that we had made a small gesture toward the Chinese lately and it was interesting that the Chinese had not rejected this out of hand. We could go further and put the Chinese on the same basis as the Soviet Union concerning trade. This was something which should be considered.

The President said that, of course, there are issues such as U.N. membership for Communist China which are of concern, but these are short-run political problems which will be resolved eventually. In our own interests we must be prepared to deal with China on trade matters and other things which are of concrete importance.²

² Based on instructions that he received in this meeting, Stoessel struggled to make contact with the Chinese in October and November, but there were few occasions attended by both U.S. and PRC diplomats. Stoessel's letters to various Department of State officials concerning his contacts with PRC officials are *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Walter J. Stoessel Files, China Talks (Warsaw). A meeting was finally arranged in early December (see footnote 2, Document 53).

32. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 17, 1969, 4:45–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Status Review of WSAG Papers

PARTICIPATION

Henry A. Kissinger—Chairman

State

U. Alexis Johnson

William Cargo

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

CIA

Thomas H. Karamessines

JCS

Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson

NSC Staff

Col. Alexander M. Haig

Harold H. Saunders

John H. Holdridge

William G. Hyland

Col. Robert M. Behr

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. Sino-Soviet Paper²—agreed actions:
 - a. Re-do section on reconnaissance capability.
 - b. Strengthen section on Soviet blockade of China with special emphasis on U.S. military responses should the Soviets deny access to Hong Kong or interfere with U.S. shipping on the high seas.
 - c. Take another look at the operational consequences of “partiality” or “impartiality,” especially in the light of U.S. actions that can be taken in NVN.
 - d. Delete section on civil defense.

[Omitted here is a short section on decisions related to Korea.]

The meeting began at 4:45 P.M. with Secretary Johnson in the chair in the absence of Kissinger who was detained in the President’s office.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Colonel Robert M. Behr who forwarded the minutes through Haig to Kissinger on September 22. (Ibid.)

² Reference is to a paper entitled “Immediate U.S. Policy Problems in Event of Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities.” An early draft of the paper prepared for this meeting is *ibid.* The final version is Document 43.

The acting chairman suggested that the agenda be limited to a wrap-up of the Korean papers and a discussion of the Sino-Soviet paper. The Middle East papers are not yet, he stated, in a form to be addressed by the principals. He called upon Cargo to set the stage for discussion of the Sino-Soviet paper.

Cargo reported that the paper generally reflects the guidance which emanated from the WSAG meeting on September 4, 1969 (held at San Clemente). Alternative situations—a Soviet “surgical” strike and a condition of widespread, major hostilities—have been built in. The intelligence and reconnaissance sections have been expanded. An annex treating the legal aspects of a Soviet blockade has been added. A new Section IV has been written dealing with U.S. advantages in negotiating with the Soviet Union if a policy of strict impartiality is followed. He remarked that further work is needed in the discussion of U.S. responses to Soviet denial of access to the Port of Hong Kong or interference with U.S. shipping on the high seas. The revisions to the paper, he said, have been accomplished with no substantial interagency differences.

Secretary Johnson raised a point of form—an ambiguous use of asterisks in Section III. This will be corrected. He then questioned whether the discussion of overhead reconnaissance capabilities reflected an accurate statement of U.S. capabilities. In short, can the program provide a “tactical” intelligence gathering capability?

Karamessines gave an excellent run-down of the U.S. program and its schedule of events. He described the gaps in coverage (in time as well as geographical area) were an effort to be made to “telescope” the schedule to achieve a given observation requirement. The only prudent assumption one can make is that photographic coverage of a specified geographic area (at a given time) will not be possible in the near future. In a protracted conflict situation, however, a useful observation pattern could be established.

Secretary Johnson inquired how long it takes to prepare for satellite development once a mission order is received. Karamessines said that a vehicle could be launched in fifteen days, with a five day “hold on the pad” period. After that time the equipment would have to be re-cycled.

Secretary Johnson asked if one could follow land order of battle. Karamessines replied affirmatively, saying that movement of major troop elements is relatively easy to detect with overhead photography. Admiral Johnson added that photo coverage is complemented by COMINT, which also gives good data on air movement.

Secretary Johnson asked Karamessines to re-draft the paragraph on reconnaissance. An accurate description of U.S. capability is needed. Karamessines agreed to do so, noting that the wording would be such as to avoid classification problems. Admiral Johnson offered the assistance of DIA specialists. The offer was accepted.

The group then turned to a discussion of a Soviet blockade of the China coast. Secretary Johnson asked for recommendations on how to improve the paper. Cargo said the Soviets could attempt either a blockade of the Chinese coastline or a measure similar to the U.S. quarantine imposed during the Cuba crisis. In either event, the consensus of his working group was that the appropriate U.S. response would be to accept as lawful the Soviet attempt to interdict commerce to the Chinese mainland and seek through diplomatic means to protect the right of U.S. ships to navigate freely, without interference, to neutral ports in the area, but accepting no measures of Soviet verification and control. The real problem, he noted, would arise if the Soviets get hard-nosed and deny access to Hong Kong and interfere with shipping on the high seas. Secretary Johnson observed that not only American nationals in Hong Kong but the whole colony would be held hostage should access be denied. The colony could probably not survive longer than three weeks if food were not introduced either by running the blockade or through Red China. While there would be room for much tactical maneuvering the situation would nevertheless be difficult. Most difficult would be a determination of an appropriate military response. This part of the paper, he said, needs more work. In developing the draft State and Defense should not be bound by the composition of the present working group, but should bring in additional individuals from the departments who can contribute imaginatively. Karamessines said the group should not lose sight of the overall situation—that of major Sino-Soviet hostilities. He wondered if the Soviets might not be somewhat flexible. Admiral Johnson said that whether they were or weren't flexible would not, operationally, mean as much as the opportunity for the U.S. to provide relief by the use of naval escort vessels. The China coast is long and a total blockade inordinately difficult. The Soviets could, however, mine the approaches to Hong Kong harbor, but they probably couldn't impose an air blockade.

Nutter remarked that the Soviet option to blockade China calls for consideration of a parallel situation in Vietnam. Could we expect, if we respected the Soviet blockade, that they would honor a blockade of Vietnam? Secretary Johnson thought the idea had merit and asked Cargo to work it into the paper.

Admiral Johnson wondered whether, in the context of Sino-Soviet hostilities, the U.S. should consider applying greater pressure on North Vietnam. Nutter thought it possible, remarking that over time—two months or so—the internal situation in China would probably deteriorate making that nation less willing to support North Vietnam. Secretary Johnson asked whether such considerations didn't go beyond the scope of the paper, perhaps being more germane to the NSSM 63 study. After considerable discussion of the pros and cons, the group agreed to introduce two additional ideas into the section on Vietnam. We could consider heavy military pressure, including landing of forces

north of the DMZ, or we could offer an attractive (but undefined) “carrot” in an effort to lessen Hanoi’s intransigence. Admiral Johnson cautioned that budget cuts now being worked out will inevitably impair the U.S. ability to conduct amphibious operations in North Vietnam. Hyland thought the idea of a landing contradicted the paper’s general theme of impartiality in that the net effect of such an operation would be detrimental to Chinese interests. All agreed that Vietnam is *our* problem and in trying to solve it, U.S. interests come first.

(Kissinger joined the group at 5:41 P.M. Secretary Johnson briefed him on what had happened in his absence.)

Kissinger reflected on the idea of a blockade of Haiphong in the context of how much sooner, in the event of such an action, the North Vietnamese could be driven to a breaking point.

After considerable speculation about what could be done in North Vietnam (considering additionally the effects on both China and the USSR), Kissinger asked Cargo to lay out the strategic choices with respect to North Vietnam in the event of Sino-Soviet hostilities. (Were such hostilities to occur, the President would immediately ask what to do about Vietnam.) Additionally, he asked Karamessines to prepare for the group an estimate of the current supply situation in North Vietnam, including stockpile quantities and location.

Kissinger inquired how civil defense considerations got into the paper. Since no one had a good answer, it was agreed the section could be deleted.

[Omitted here is a short discussion on Korea.]

No definite date was set for the next WSAG meeting other than that one would be required before Secretary Johnson returns from vacation on October 6, 1969.³

The meeting adjourned at 6:30 P.M.

³ Although the Sino-Soviet conflict was also on the agenda for the September 29 WSAG meeting, it was only briefly discussed. The meeting minutes noted that “Kissinger was called out of the meeting but paused long enough to respond to a question from Cargo pertaining to the Sino-Soviet study and its relationship to the NSSM 63 report. Cargo said that the two efforts were distinctly different, especially in their time frames. He questioned the real utility of developing a detailed analysis, in the NSSM 63 report, of the contingency involving an escalating crisis or rapid deterioration of the overall Sino-Soviet situation. Kissinger deferred to Cargo’s judgment on how the problem should be approached but requested that neither paper neglect to examine the relationship between courses of action and their probable outcome.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970)

33. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, September 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Kosygin's Mission to Peking

Very little is known of the origins or purposes of Kosygin's visit to Peking. Judging from the characterization of the talks by both sides—"frank" (Chinese) and "useful" (Soviets)—there was no significant movement toward an accommodation.

The fact that the talks were held against a background of sharply-rising border tensions does suggest, however, that each side had an interest in attempting to check what seemed to be a gathering momentum toward large and more serious clashes.

The initiative apparently came from the Soviets perhaps using the Romanians or North Vietnamese as intermediaries. The Soviets may have seen an advantage in appearing to take the lead in trying to reach an understanding, whether the Chinese agreed to the meeting or not. Should hostilities ensue, the Soviets would thus be in a position to present themselves as the aggrieved party. At the same time, the actual Soviet motive may have been to put on the record for Chinese benefit their refusal to tolerate a protracted border conflict. This is the line they took in recent letters to other Communist parties. It may not necessarily reflect a Soviet decision to escalate, but rather an effort to pressure and deter the Chinese.

The Chinese motive is a question, since so far they have been quite consistent in rejecting third party intervention or direct Soviet appeals. The Chinese willingness to receive Kosygin could reflect the more flexible Chinese diplomacy which seems to have been developing in recent months. However, the Chinese would not wish to appear to be resistant to Kosygin's visit, especially since third parties in the Communist world were apparently involved, and would want to appear at least as "reasonable" as the Soviets. In their public treatment they took pains to minimize its significance by stating that Kosygin was merely "on his way home" and that Chou En-lai met him at Peking airport.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. V. Secret. According to a handwritten notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on October 6. Sonnenfeldt forwarded an attached report to Kissinger on September 12. Kissinger then requested that a memorandum be prepared for Nixon. Attached but not printed is a 3-page "CIA Analysis of the Kosygin-Chou Meeting" that served as the basis for this memorandum.

US Interests

Until we learn more of the content of the Peking discussion, it is uncertain how our own interests might be affected;

—there is nothing thus far, however, that suggests a new Sino-Soviet diplomatic offensive on Vietnam;

—there is nothing to suggest a narrowing of Sino-Soviet differences on fundamental problems;

—it is at least possible, that the failure of a personal encounter may actually worsen relations;

—sudden moves of this sort do point, however, to the caution which the US should exercise in basing its own actions solely on expected developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute; much of this relationship is still shrouded from us.

34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China and Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command¹

Washington, September 23, 1969, 2117Z.

161648. Joint State/Defense Message. CINCPAC pass to POLAD. Subject: Modification of Taiwan Strait Patrol.² Refs: A. Deptel 111806;³ B. Deptel 120842.⁴

1. We regrettably have found it necessary to modify Taiwan Strait patrol. In future patrol will be manned on intermittent basis as Commander Seventh Fleet can make forces available for this purpose.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6–2 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Froebe (EA/ROC); cleared by Sloss (J/PM), Captain Hayward (Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy), Rear Admiral Behrens (CNO, Ops–61), Colonel Mayland (Joint Staff, J–5), Colonel Karrick (ISA/PP), Rear Admiral Shepard (ISA/EAPR), Dr. Doolin (DASD/EAPR), Green, U. Alexis Johnson, and Kissinger; and approved by Shoesmith (EA/ROC). Repeated to CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CHMAAG Taipei.

² In notes made during a September 11 telephone conversation between Johnson and Nutter concerning the Strait patrol, Nutter “said that there are various [budget] cuts which have political implications and that they have got to talk to individual countries in advance.” (Ibid., U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, September–October 1969) A September 15 memorandum from Laird to Nixon stated: “Following my directive to the Services to reduce Fiscal Year 1970 expenditures, the Navy proposed, and I have approved, a number of force reductions that will affect our world-wide naval posture.” He added that the Commander of the Seventh Fleet would make forces available on an intermittent basis in the Strait. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Top Secret Files: FRC 330 72 A 6308, China, Rep. of, 1969, 000.1) In a September 18 memorandum to Haig, NSC staff member Howe wrote that Holdridge had drafted a memorandum recommending approval of the telegram to Taipei. Howe opposed the change in the patrol’s deployment, writing that “its withdrawal will have important political significance. The cable does not satisfactorily cover the implications of this decision on our relations with Peking and naively assumes, in my view, that Chiang Kai-shek will accept such a reduction with little reaction.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III) Kissinger’s memoirs briefly mention the patrol, indicating that Kissinger and Richardson “worked out” this new policy in late September or early October. (*White House Years*, p. 186)

³ In telegram 111806 to Taipei, CINCPAC, and CINCPAC POLAD, July 7, the Department requested information concerning the ROC’s request to purchase nine U.S. warships that had been placed on the stricken list, including four destroyers, four radar picket escort ships, and one diesel submarine. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–8 US–CHINAT) The United States rejected the submarine request but agreed to sell the warships if the ROC decommissioned some of its old vessels. Armstrong suggested that the warship sale and the patrol be treated as separate issues. He wrote that “to suggest that the sale of warships in some way substitutes for present Taiwan Strait patrol could even tend to accentuate GRC concern that ‘modification’ of Taiwan Strait patrol is in fact indicative of US intentions to disengage from US 7th Fleet responsibilities related to our commitment.” He also pointed out that combining the patrol modifications, the refusal to sell submarines, and U.S. requests for ROC ship deactivations in order to purchase newer vessels “would not be a particularly attractive package to the GRC.” (Telegram 4063 from Taipei, October 14; *ibid.*) On October 16 the Departments of State and Defense sent a joint telegram to Taipei accepting this proposal.

(FYI: We cannot now be more precise as to frequency, and wish to avoid being drawn into speculation on this point. End FYI) Decision necessitated as part of over 100 ship reduction in world-wide US naval deployment, made pursuant to recent \$3.0 billion reduction in defense expenditures. Bulk of this reduction will fall primarily on CONUS-based naval forces. Outside of CONUS, majority of destroyer-type reductions will affect our commitment to NATO, while in Pacific area there will be some diminution in naval forces assigned to Southeast Asia along with modification of Taiwan Strait patrol.

2. We believe, however, that following offsetting factors should allay GRC concern for its security interests as a result of this change:

A) Modification carries no implication whatever of any change in US defense commitment or in ability of Seventh Fleet to perform mission contemplated for it under Mutual Defense Treaty.

B) Elements of Seventh Fleet will continue to call at Taiwan ports as in past, and thus will continue visibility of Seventh Fleet in Taiwan Strait.

C) We will in near future make forthcoming response to GRC request for surface ships (Refs A and B) as commented on by all addressees. FYI: Submarines will not be approved. End FYI. Real offset in above reductions is that they are largely responsible for availability of surface vessels now under consideration.

In presenting this decision to GRC, you also should try to keep modification of patrol in perspective for GRC by emphasizing that patrol has been only one aspect of presence of Seventh Fleet in Strait, that other aspects such as R&R visits and periodic calls by Commander Seventh Fleet will continue, and that whatever additional units of Seventh Fleet are necessary to fulfill our commitments under Mutual Defense Treaty are available for immediate deployment to Taiwan Strait area. FYI: This perspective of special importance in view of possibility that President Chiang may choose to interpret modification of Taiwan Strait patrol as contravening Secretary Rogers' statement to him during August visit (when Chiang asked whether US would make "fresh demands for (GRC) to abandon Quemoy and Matsu so that US Seventh Fleet could be withdrawn from Taiwan Strait," and Secretary responded that President Nixon did not "have any intention to move Seventh Fleet"). End FYI.

(Telegram 175922 to Taipei, October 16; *ibid.*) After notes were exchanged in Taipei on November 28 and December 8, the United States sold three destroyers to the ROC. See Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1970, p. 20. Armstrong handled these matters while McConaughy was away from post from late August through early December 1969.

⁴ In telegram 120842 to Taipei, July 22, the Department requested that the Country Team evaluate an ROC request made on July 8 for the loan of four submarines. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-CHINAT)

3. In giving comprehensive consideration to this decision, we recognize that it may reinforce type of concern recently expressed by GRC that major change in US China policy may be impending. It will be evident from foregoing that no change in our basic relationship with GRC is involved.

4. We request, therefore, that Chargé, accompanied by COMUSTDC, seek early appointment with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to inform GRC of decision. We suggest that detailed presentation, drawing on paras 1 and 2 above, be made by COMUSTDC in order to emphasize primarily military nature of decision. COMUSTDC should also ask Vice Premier's agreement that TDC brief MND on military aspects of decision.

5. Public announcement of that portion of force reduction involving Taiwan Strait patrol will be made at yet undecided date, and will avoid any direct reference to modification of patrol. Please inform Department as soon as notification given GRC inasmuch as public announcement must await this notification.⁵

Richardson

⁵ On November 1 a joint message from the Departments of State and Defense requested that Embassy officials in Taipei notify the ROC Government of U.S. intentions. (Telegram 185493 to Taipei; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III)

35. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

Renewal of US Passport Restrictions

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 337, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969. Confidential. Sent for information.

Secretary Rogers has set forth his reasons for continuing the present restrictions making US passports invalid for travel to Cuba, mainland China, North Korea and North Vietnam (Tab A).²

Secretary Rogers notes that the restrictions are ineffective because court decisions have eliminated any sanctions. He has decided to extend the rules for another six months because their elimination at this time could be misconstrued in view of the General Assembly meeting and of measures we may be taking on Vietnam. Removing the remaining restrictions at this time would also have undermined the effect of the limited easing of restrictions undertaken last July with respect to Communist China.

Secretary Rogers believes that "we should look toward the elimination of these restrictions at the earliest possible time." The question is one of timing, and he promises to recommend their removal when he thinks the moment is appropriate.

I agree with Secretary Rogers' decision to make this extension, and with his desire to eliminate the restrictions as soon as we appropriately can.³

² Attached at Tab A but not printed is a September 15 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon. Kissinger restates the contents of the Rogers memorandum. A record of a September 13 telephone conversation indicates that Richardson drafted the memorandum to the President for Rogers' signature. Richardson also noted that Barbara Watson, Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, forwarded a memorandum to Rogers calling for the immediate lifting of travel restrictions. Rogers and Richardson decided to delay any change for the time being. (Record of a telephone conversation between Richardson and Rogers, September 13; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Under Secretary of State, Telephone Conversations, September 1969)

³ Nixon drew a line bracketing the final paragraph and wrote below it: "*I agree. Soon—but not now but never to Cuba until I decide it.*"

36. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 25, 1969, 2:25–3:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Differences (NSSM 63)

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Richard F. Pedersen (came late)

William I. Cargo

Donald McHenry

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

CIA

R. Jack Smith

JCS

LTG F. T. Unger

OEP

Haakon Lindjord

USIA

Frank Shakespeare

NSC Staff

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

John Holdridge

William Hyland

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The Ad Hoc Committee paper² is to be revised to spell out the consequences of policy choices in three situations:

- a. Continued Sino-Soviet tension but no hostilities;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. NSC staff member Jeanne Davis forwarded the minutes to Kissinger on October 7, under a covering memorandum in which she noted that Sonnenfeldt had reviewed and approved them. A notation on the covering memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

² Reference is to the draft response to NSSM 63 prepared by the Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Group on September 3. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 63) The October 17 version is printed as Document 40. In an undated memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge criticized the draft response to NSSM 63: "it is inadequate in that it gives almost no proposals or options for US actions to implement the broad strategy it recommends." They added, "The one area where the NSSM did break new ground—the contingency of Sino-Soviet hostilities—is largely overtaken by the separate contingency paper." Both added that the leader of the ad hoc group that produced the paper, Elliot Richardson, "was highly favorable to taking some initiative

- b. Active U.S. effort to deter hostilities;
- c. Hostilities
 - 1. one-shot strike, or
 - 2. protracted conflict

The revised paper will be considered again at a Review Group meeting and then by the NSC.

Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting saying that this was a difficult paper to write on a conjectural issue of which we do not know the dimensions. There were, in fact, two papers: a basic paper and a summary. There was, however, no inevitable relationship between the two, since parts of the basic paper were not covered in the summary. He suggested, and it was agreed, that this meeting would deal with the summary paper plus certain points of the basic paper not covered in the summary.

He noted the summary's assumption that the President has already spoken in favor of Strategy D ("to assert an interest in improving relations with both contestants").³ He acknowledged this was true, but noted that usually the President's position was more complicated than what he said. He (Mr. Kissinger) did not wish to be in a position of announcing to the Review Group what the President's policy is, then structuring the meeting accordingly. The President is open to other suggestions if the judgment of this group indicates that another course would be more desirable. The President's position was contained in a public statement that we want to be friends with both sides. Mr. Kissinger interpreted that to mean that in a non-hostilities situation we would be more inclined to lean toward China while publicly pronouncing that we favor neither. He thought the President's view was not so firm that it could not be changed by reasoned

with the USSR to lay out our position." (Undated memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge to Kissinger; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting—Sino-Soviet Differences 11/20/69) A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. A short summary of this meeting, prepared by R.J. Smith, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01086A, Executive Registry, Richard Helms Files, Box 7, Folder 224. The Department of State version, prepared by Cargo, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 63.

³ The September 3 draft stated that "In theory, four broad strategies are open to the United States in the face of this classical falling-out between two states, both of which are also in opposition to U.S. interests. A. To support the Chinese position by collaborating with Peking in its efforts to avoid politico-economic isolation. B. To collaborate with the USSR in isolating China. C. To adopt a 'hands-off' attitude, refusing to have anything to do with either contestant that might be interpreted by the other as tilting the balance. D. To assert an interest in improving relations with both contestants, gaining leverage where we can from the dispute in pursuit of our own interests."

argument, and reiterated that there were no restrictions on this group's discussions.

He thought the situations could be stated more explicitly than in the paper, possibly as: (1) continued tension but not hostilities; (2) a U.S. policy to deter hostilities; (3) U.S. policy during hostilities. He could see the argument of leaning toward China on the grounds that in a non-war situation it was more logical to support the weaker against the stronger. During hostilities, neutrality would have the objective consequence of helping the USSR, and assistance to China would probably not make any difference to the outcome. Therefore, since policy in a pre-hostilities stage would not be applicable to a hostilities situation, it would be worth examining policy in both situations.

Mr. Cargo agreed, saying the deterrent policy was presumably a part of the contingency study underway in the WSAG.⁴ He thought the first and third situations (no hostilities and hostilities) were addressed in the paper before the meeting. He noted that Section V examines the implications area by area in both situations.

Mr. Shakespeare asked why there was not more emphasis on and more analysis of the role of Japan and U.S. relations with Japan. He pointed out that Japan now had the third largest GNP and it was predicted that by 1972 its GNP would exceed Germany and France combined. Herman Kahn predicted that by 2000 Japan could tie the U.S. It was the third major industrial power with an excellent physical location and an intense marketing strategy in Asia whose national interest led them to China. He thought that in accordance with the President's policy of regionalization the U.S. should pay more attention to Japan in its relation with China. If our policies could be coordinated, the industrial potential could be much greater.

Mr. Kissinger replied that the China paper looks at the relationship to Japan. He noted that one problem with the Sino-Soviet paper is that there are three studies now going on as pieces of the puzzle.⁵

Mr. Cargo agreed that Joe Neubert and Dick Davies (drafters of the paper) had a terrible time confining the study to the limits set down—they found it hard not to relate the study to the global problem. He knew they had considered Japan and other countries in connection with the paper.

Mr. Shakespeare agreed with the difficulty, but reiterated that Japan would be an enormous potential factor in 10 years.

⁴ Minutes of the WSAG meetings are printed as Documents 29 and 32.

⁵ Apparent reference to the response to NSSM 63, the WSAG Sino-Soviet Contingency paper, and NIE 11/13-69 concerning the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Defense Department supplement should be considered a dissent.⁶

Mr. Nutter replied that this was a difficult study to confine and still do what it is supposed to do. It started with the China study, which considered some of the longer-range aspects of the problem but did not address the problem of triangular relations. The more immediate triangular concerns were addressed in the contingency study. However, a number of important questions were falling between stools and the longer-range aspects were not being as fully considered as possible, which was one of the reasons for the Defense supplement. The differences between the USSR and China were both political and military. If the Soviets take military action, they would also look to a resolution of the political problems. The question was how to deal with the alternative internal political situations that might develop in China. We would face different problems depending on the political outcome. He saw similar implications in Section V of the paper—consideration of Soviet influence and our reaction in other areas of the world in the case of change with or without hostilities. Defense would like to see more emphasis on an analysis of what opportunities would be presented to us for furthering our national interests in different aspects of the triangular situation. The purpose of the supplement was to indicate that there should be more consideration of the implications of political developments.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt returned to Mr. Shakespeare's point on Japan, saying that if we examine the implications of leaning toward China we must also examine the U.S. attitude toward the economic policies of Japan and other countries. One of the best vehicles for "leaning toward China" would be to be more permissive and tolerant toward third countries dealing with China, and Japan would be an important country in this regard.

Mr. Smith commented that item 6 in the Key Judgments section of the Summary was less than evenhanded in describing the pros and cons—e.g., it omitted the "pro" that in the event of hostilities the present Chinese nuclear capability would be destroyed.

⁶ The Department of Defense submitted a short, undated "supplementary paper" and a summary of the supplementary paper for NSSM 63. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting—NSSM-63, Sino Soviet Differences, 9/25/69) The summary emphasized that "The DOD paper contends that the NSSM-63 Summary Statement (Tab A) and the Ad Hoc Group Report (Tab B) give inadequate consideration to two possible outcomes of major Sino-Soviet hostilities, viz the creation of Soviet-sponsored regimes in China and the downfall of the Mao-Lin government." The paper also posited that a Soviet "politico-military effort" might lead to the emergence of a non-Communist regime and complained that the NSSM-63 study did not give adequate consideration to this possibility. This paper is discussed further in Document 41.

Mr. Shakespeare commented that the paper makes the assumption that a Sino-Soviet conflict is to be avoided at all costs and questioned whether this is correct.

Mr. Smith commented that there was little we can do to deter such a conflict.

Mr. Shakespeare noted that we were talking about high-level statements, to which Mr. Kissinger replied that we would make such statements even if we were egging them on.

Mr. Smith said it was not certain that hostilities would create havoc, to which Mr. Nutter commented that it would depend on the real outcome.

General Unger explained that the supplement was designed to explore all the options. He thought the summary paper leads up to the possibility of hostilities and then drops it as undesirable. There could, in fact, be all sorts of outcomes. In line with Strategy D we should be aware of the possibility of the emergence of a non-Communist regime in China. The possible outcome could be in the U.S. interest.

Mr. Lindjord remarked that much of the paper is a contingency plan and asked if we wanted to introduce such a political question.

Mr. Kissinger commented that our stance depends on our idea of a desirable outcome; for example, if we lean toward China in a pre-hostilities period it would be on the assumption that China will be a functioning unit. If China breaks up, we are in a different universe and would no longer have the option of supporting China. We should get some assessment of the trends in a pre-hostilities phase but it would be more important in the event of hostilities. We should consider two possibilities: (1) a military situation where the Soviets have taken out China's nuclear capability and nothing else, and (2) a situation in which the Soviets have moved massively into a protracted ground war. In the first situation, we could make the best of a demonstration of impotence and in the second, we could enjoy the vicarious pleasures of someone else's Vietnam. It was not in our interest for the USSR and China to become a monolithic bloc. If China breaks up, it would not be so much of a problem. He asked if we should postulate a few assumptions.

Mr. Cargo said that perhaps the papers we have don't embrace the whole picture. The contingency plan covers approximately 60 days, while this paper considers the possibility of war further down the pike. Neither paper talks about major hostilities and the possible outcome, but the Defense Department supplement does. He noted that hostilities would provide an opportunity for the Soviets to establish a regime in China more favorable to their interests.

Mr. Nutter agreed that they might.

Mr. Cargo concluded that we need to project further down the road and to consider possible outcomes.

General Unger cited some discussion of this aspect on page 23 of the basic paper.

Mr. Kissinger said it would be helpful to bring the paper to a point where one gives the President some idea of what Strategy D means in practice—what operational policy goes with what types of decisions.

Mr. Holdridge noted that there was a strong Chinese nationalism to be contended with which was a common force in any scenario. The Soviets would have to be physically present in force to make the Chinese regime fly apart.

Mr. Nutter commented that they might be pulled apart.

Mr. Holdridge said the main force in China is to rectify the results of the various periods of imperialism and thought China would tend to hold together.

Mr. Nutter said he would not rule this out in a probabilistic sense, but noted that there were divisive elements in China.

Mr. Smith agreed with Mr. Holdridge. He thought the Defense supplement was speculative in terms of the present paper, but that it had a place if the scope of the present paper should be enlarged.

Mr. Kissinger said he could make no judgment on what will happen in China, but he thought we should make a judgment on the effect of a single Soviet strike on China vs. a massive ground war and that it would be worthwhile to look at the position the U.S. should take. He questioned whether it was worthwhile taking the time of senior people to consider possible political outcomes in China.

Mr. Cargo agreed, saying he thought the Defense Department supplement overstates the case. He asked if we think Soviet political action could produce a change in the Chinese regime.

Mr. Nutter asked what would happen on the death of Mao.

Mr. Smith replied we would probably have collective leadership. He said the Defense supplement ignores the fact of Chinese nationalism and the pervasive anti-Soviet and anti-foreign feeling. He could not see any group of Chinese who would be willing to identify with Soviet interests.

Mr. Nutter remarked that we can't make national policy on such definite statements.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were no possibility of indigenous change in China.

Mr. Smith thought this would require a major Soviet military effort—that it couldn't happen without it.

Mr. Nutter thought this was a matter of various experts rendering judgments.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were no possibility of a Chinese leadership that placed greater emphasis on the unity of communism worldwide and would make adjustments.

Mr. Smith thought not immediately following a war—maybe later.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt drew a distinction between a pre-war and a wartime situation. He thought there were elements that could be attracted to a pro-Soviet position in a non-war situation. In a wartime situation, he thought the Soviets could capture enough territory to set up a puppet regime but it would require great effort to maintain it.

Mr. Nutter noted that the population of Sinkiang is primarily non-Chinese, to which Mr. Sonnenfeldt added that they were not pro-Soviet, however.

Mr. Kissinger thought Sinkiang and Tibet were different—they could split off without affecting the Chinese power position. He drew a distinction between them and Chinese core territory.

Mr. Smith agreed that under conditions of great stress, fragmentation would be a serious possibility.

Mr. Nutter remarked that South China had also been shaken.

Mr. Holdridge acknowledged differences between Cantonese speakers and others, but noted that a unifying education policy had existed since 1919 which taught that they were Chinese first and Cantonese second.

Mr. Kissinger thought we might add some consideration of the contingencies beyond the 30-day period to the present 30-day contingency paper—possibly expand it to a consideration of U.S. policy in a period of tension. We should also consider U.S. options in a war situation. Even with the President's statement of Strategy D, should we give him an opportunity in this paper to refine his thinking by putting the key choices before him again. He thought the statement concerning leaning toward one side or the other was too simple; e.g. we could lean toward China but not at the price of getting concessions from the USSR. We need some operational definition of what is implied by the various options.

Mr. Cargo cited the top paragraph on page 2 of the Summary, saying one could spell out the kinds of things that could be done.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that many things were mentioned in germinal form, citing the helpful statements on pages 19–20 of the Basic Paper, but asked so what?

Mr. Shakespeare asked if hostilities would not result in an interdiction in land or sea routes to Vietnam, or, at least, a change in world attention to Vietnam. He thought the USSR would probably pull back from the Middle East and that there would be increasing ferment in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Kissinger commented that this was not the judgment of the paper.

Mr. Nutter noted, with regard to Eastern Europe, that the paper says we can't exploit the situation because it would lead to armed occupation. He asked whether this would necessarily be disadvantageous to the U.S. In the Middle East, we might break away from discussions with the USSR and begin to deal directly with the Arab countries. With regard to Cuba, the paper suggests there is nothing we can do. He questioned whether the paper ruled out possible moves in these areas because we think Soviet action would be to our disfavor.

Mr. Kissinger said that, to the extent our policy in the Middle East is influenced by a fear of becoming embroiled with the USSR, we would have to consider Soviet reluctance to become involved with us in the Middle East and with China in the Far East. This would depend on the different possible war outcomes. If the Soviets were involved in a protracted war in the Far East, they would be reluctant to get into another war. *But*, if they could make a clean nuclear strike, it would enhance their fearsomeness and the temptation to intervene in the Middle East would be greater.

Mr. Shakespeare replied that, even so, the Soviets would have earned the implacable hostility of China. And they might be in difficulty in Eastern Europe. Would the U.S. be worse off?

Mr. Kissinger asked what the effect would be if the USSR knocked off the Chinese nuclear capability, even on top of the Czech invasion. What could China do in 10 or 15 years?

Mr. Shakespeare asked if we gained or lost from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia?

Mr. Kissinger replied we lost.

Mr. Pedersen commented that we did not want a worldwide deterioration of the situation.

Mr. Kissinger thought the "implacable hostility" of China wouldn't hurt the Soviets for 10 years. He cited the Chinese attack on India in 1962 which resulted in India's loss of confidence in China. He thought hostilities might lead to an interesting situation in the Middle East. But, on the other hand, it might make the Soviets think they should clean up the situation in the West before they have to face the East again.

Mr. Shakespeare thought that we should consider whether the possibility of a protracted conflict between the USSR and China could have decided benefits.

Mr. Cargo thought we could analyze the possible types of conflicts which would be advantageous, although we would not have that kind of choice. He thought we must say 'no' to a Soviet-Chinese conflict. He

thought the nuclear problems—the question of fallout alone—would require this position.

General Unger noted the third-country problem, and Mr. Cargo commented that we would be letting the genie out of the bottle.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt commented that arguing the methodology of advantage or disadvantage isn't going to get far. We should isolate the consequences and what problems each would pose. In the Middle East, what would Israel calculate the Soviet reaction to be if they should march. What would be the effect on the India-Pakistan situation?

Mr. Shakespeare agreed. While the paper assumes that hostilities should be avoided at all costs, he thought there was another side.

Mr. Kissinger asked whether, even if we assume our interest is in avoiding conflict, should we not consider it. He thought it would be very useful to expand the contingency paper to 45 days plus. We could handle the Vietnam issue as a part of the contingency paper in view of its sensitivity.

Mr. Cargo agreed.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt noted with regard to SALT that the paper says the Soviets might be more reluctant to go into SALT in the event of major hostilities. He thought this would be true in the event of protracted war, but, on the other hand, the Soviets might want to use SALT as a safety valve and to manipulate the Chinese into a bad position.

Mr. Pedersen noted that the interesting thing in Gromyko's speech to the General Assembly was his statement that any radical disarmament must include all five powers. This was different from what he had said last year.⁷

Mr. Kissinger thought this was suspicious unless the Soviets were getting ready to disarm China.

Mr. Kissinger recommended that, in order to make the NSC discussion useful, we lay out the consequences of various choices in various situations. He thought we might get useful directives as a result.

Mr. Kissinger noted there were overlapping (or possibly conflicting) interests between us and the Soviets which might lend themselves to negotiations in the case of a period of tension or of hostilities.

⁷ In his speech at the September 19 plenary meeting of the 24th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Gromyko introduced a plan for "the strengthening of international security," which was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. (United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, *Official Records*, 1756th Plenary Meeting, September 19, 1969, pp. 7–14; *ibid.*, *Annexes*, Agenda Item 103, Document A/7654 and A/7903, pp. 1–6) International reaction to the Soviet proposal was lukewarm. (Richard Halloran, "Nations Show Little Interest in Pact on A-Arms," *The New York Times*, September 20, 1969, p. 10)

Except for Taiwan, we might have few similar situations with China. Which would be easier?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt noted the disagreement over whether “overlapping” means “converging” or “conflicting,” citing the experience in drafting the BNSP.

Mr. Kissinger thought we should explore what is really hidden by “overlapping,” get it explicitly analyzed and resolved.

Mr. Cargo thought we might highlight the principal choices and their operational consequences and attempt to project them further ahead.

Mr. Kissinger said we should separate hostilities from a period of tension and we should sub-divide the types of hostilities—a one-shot strike vs. protracted conflict. He thought we should bring the matter to the NSC as soon as possible.

Mr. Cargo noted that the “lean toward” option would be taken care of in such an approach.

Mr. Kissinger thought we would probably come out with a recommendation to keep open our options toward China in order to and to the extent that we could get concessions from the USSR. We should pose the question in terms of the three new basic options he had mentioned at the beginning of the meeting. He asked if we could get a revision of the paper in a week or two.

Mr. Cargo replied we could.

Mr. Kissinger said he foresaw a quick Review Group meeting on the revised paper, then to the NSC.

37. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

The US Role in Soviet Maneuvering Against China

In the last two months, the increase in Sino-Soviet tensions has led the Soviets to sound out numerous American contacts on their

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 337, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969. Secret. Sent for action.

attitude toward a possible Soviet air strike against China's nuclear/missile facilities or toward other Soviet military actions.² These probes have varied in character from point-blank questioning of our reaction to provocative musings by Soviets over what they might be forced to do against the Chinese, including the use of nuclear weapons. Some of these contacts have featured adamant denials that the Soviets were planning any military moves—thereby keeping the entire issue alive. (Secretary Rogers' Memorandum on this subject is at Tab A.)³

Our contingency planning for major Sino-Soviet hostilities is well along, and NSC consideration of a basic policy paper on the Sino-Soviet dispute is scheduled for October 8.⁴

Meanwhile, I am concerned about our response to these probes. The Soviets may be quite uncertain over their China policy, and our reactions

² The Department of State and the White House received hints from a Soviet official of possible joint action against the PRC as early as March 1969, when two Soviet journalists told U.S. Embassy officials in Moscow that "the situation might reach a point where a U.S.-Soviet 'understanding' on China would become necessary." (Telegram 1169 from Moscow, March 20, attached to the President's March 25 daily briefing memorandum; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 4, President's Daily Briefs) Also during March 1969, Kissinger's daily briefing memoranda to President Nixon contained cables and reports concerning Soviet sensitivity to improving ties between the United States and the PRC. For example, speeches by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) and former John F. Kennedy aide Theodore Sorensen, suggesting the need for better relations with the PRC, provoked immediate Soviet reactions. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Emory C. Swank, reported from Moscow: "During the past week I have been impressed by suspicion with which some ordinarily sophisticated Soviets have reacted to statements on China recently made by Kennedy and Sorensen." (Telegram 1325 from Moscow, March 29, attached to the President's Daily Brief for March 31; *ibid.*)

³ In the attached September 10 memorandum to the President, Rogers cited a conversation on August 18 between the Soviet Embassy's Second Secretary Boris N. Davydov and William L. Stearman, Special Assistant for North Vietnam, INR/REA. Rogers observed: "Davydov's conversation was unusual for the length of the argument that he presented for such a Soviet course of action [an attack on Chinese nuclear facilities]. None of the other occasional references to the idea in talks with the Soviets which have come to our attention have spelled out such a justification." Rogers concluded, "the Department's analysts judge that the chances of this particular course of action are still substantially less than fifty-fifty and that Sino-Soviet conflict, if it does occur, might more likely result from escalation of border clashes. That assessment seems reasonable to me." Robert Baraz (INR/RSE) drafted the memorandum for the President on August 29, and Green sent it to Rogers at the Secretary's request on August 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12 CHICOM) Kissinger wrote his comments on an earlier version of his September 29 memorandum to the President that Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge had drafted: "I disagree with State analysis. Soviets would not ask such questions lightly—though this does not mean that they intend to attack. Redo cover memo for President giving a little more flavor of communist probes. Remember he *never* reads back up material. But I want us to work with them and give specific guidance. Best would be to send directive to State about [unintelligible] of instructions we received." (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge to Kissinger, September 12; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 710, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. V)

⁴ See Documents 40 and 43.

could figure in their calculations. Second, the Soviets may be using us to generate an impression in China and the world that we are being consulted in secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions.

A related issue is the shifting Soviet attitude on Chinese representation in the UN. We have had two indications that the Soviets, in an effort to keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN through indirection, are dangling the prospect before us of cooperation on the representation issue. Gromyko, in his UN speech, of course failed to mention Peking's admission for the first time.⁵

I believe we should make clear that we are not playing along with these tactics, in pursuance of your policy of avoiding the appearance of siding with the Soviets.

The principal gain in making our position clear would be in our stance with respect to China. The benefits would be long rather than short-term, but they may be none the less real. Behavior of Chinese Communist diplomats in recent months strongly suggests the existence of a body of opinion, presently submerged by Mao's doctrinal views, which might wish to put US/Chinese relations on a more rational and less ideological basis than has been true for the past two decades.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to ask the Department of State to prepare instructions to the field setting forth guidance to be used with the USSR and others, deploring reports of a Soviet plan to make a preemptive military strike against Communist China.⁶

⁵ Kissinger first reported these "two indications" to the President. According to a second-hand account of a conversation with a Soviet diplomat in Canada, the diplomat accepted that the PRC should "eventually" join the UN and hold a seat on the Security Council, but that the ROC should remain in the General Assembly. (Telegram 1615 from Taipei, May 14; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 6, President's Daily Briefs) The other indication came from a meeting between U.S. Ambassador to the UN Charles Yost and a Soviet diplomat. The Soviet remarked that he hoped the United States would not change its policy toward Chinese representation in the UN. (Telegram 1292 from USUN, May 1; *ibid.*) Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's September 19 speech to the United Nations mentioned almost every Socialist country except the PRC and every issue except UN membership for the PRC. (United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, *Official Records*, 1756th Plenary Meeting, September 19, 1969, pp. 7-14)

⁶ The President initialed his approval and added a handwritten comment: "Base it on 'reports which have come here—etc.'" Apparently this was not the first time the issue had arisen. The President responded to such a report on Soviet concerns that the United States might exploit Sino-Soviet tensions in the President's September 17 daily briefing memorandum, writing: "K—we must be getting through. We must not be too obvious about it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 10, President's Daily Briefs) Attached to another copy of Kissinger's September 29 memorandum is an unsigned and undated memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers, laying out the President's request as described in this paragraph. (*Ibid.*, Country Files, USSR, Box 710, Vol. V)

38. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

Time for US Initiative Toward Peking?

An accumulation of indicators, especially the latest Chinese statement on the border negotiations with Moscow, suggests that the present may be an opportune moment for a move toward Peking. The Chinese statement contains an extremely interesting formulation worth quoting in full:

"The Chinese government has never covered up the fact that there exist irreconcilable differences of principle between China and the Soviet Union and that the struggle of principle between them will continue for a long period of time. But this should not prevent China and the Soviet Union from maintaining normal state relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence."²

Obviously this thesis of normal relations could apply to the US as well as to the USSR. Indeed, it is reminiscent of the Chinese statement last November agreeing to resume the Warsaw talks.³ In this respect it could be a signal of some importance.

It comes against a background of other indications that the so-called "pragmatists" in Peking seem to have increasingly reasserted their influence over the conduct of Chinese diplomacy. If this is so, then some probing by the United States would seem justified.

Moreover, the apprehensive tone of the statement on the border dispute, plus other signs that the Chinese have been impressed by the Soviet threats of recent weeks, suggest that concern over the Soviet problem may make them more receptive to US overtures than at any time in the past several years.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Hyland. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on October 10.

² The Five Principles were "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence." (*Beijing Review*, October 16, 1970, p. 13) These ideas were first articulated by Foreign Minister Chou En-lai at the 1955 Bandung Conference.

³ See Document 6.

Finally, there is some concrete evidence worth considering. The Norwegian Ambassador has reported on the rather even-handed Chinese discussion of relations with the US which he had with a Chinese foreign ministry official recently.⁴ And the new French Ambassador in talking with Chou En-lai gained the impression that Chou was generally more dispassionate in discussing the US.⁵ For example, he did not reject the idea of resuming talks, but commented that the "situation was complicated", apparently referring to the situation in Peking. On the Sino-Soviet border he charged that our attitude was "ambiguous," but went on to say that America thought nothing good would come from war between China and the USSR.

All of the above seems to suggest an exploratory American overture. Such an overture could be designed to accomplish two purposes:

1. To establish our interest in resuming a dialogue, in Warsaw or elsewhere.
2. to lay out for the Chinese our position on Asian policy as expressed by the President during his trip, with special emphasis on Vietnam.

There are several points which could be made to the Chinese:

- we could officially call their attention to the changes in our import control and passport regulations;⁶
- we could call to their attention the reduction or removal of the destroyer patrol in the Taiwan Straits;⁷
- we could call to their attention the statement by Elliot Richardson on the Sino-Soviet problem, and expand somewhat on the theme of our position of non-collaboration with the Soviets;⁸

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 123.

⁵ Telegram 14940 from Paris, September 30, reported on meetings between French Ambassador to the PRC Etienne Manac'h and Chou En-lai that took place on September 25. French Ambassador Charles Ernest Lucet met with Irwin to give further details on the talks, which were reported in telegram 169976 to Paris, October 7. (Both telegrams are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, China, Vol. III)

⁶ See Documents 14 and 35.

⁷ See Document 34.

⁸ In a September 5 speech before the American Political Science Association (APSA) in New York, Richardson remarked: "In the case of Communist China, long run improvement in our relations is in our own national interest. We do not seek to exploit for our own advantage the hostility between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic. Ideological differences between the two Communist giants are not our affair. We could not fail to be deeply concerned, however, with an escalation of this quarrel into a massive breach of international peace and security." He also emphasized that the United States would seek agreements with the Soviets and attempt "to bring Communist China out of its angry, alienated shell." The full text is in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 22, 1969, pp. 257-260.

—we could note the formulation quoted above, on “normal relations” despite differences of principle, and inquire whether this could apply in our relationship;

—finally we could expand on the strategic implications for Peking of the President’s Vietnam policy:⁹

a. we are not threatening China; indeed we are trying to end the war and are withdrawing troops from both Vietnam and Thailand;

b. we have not sought to take advantage of Chinese problems on the Soviet border;

c. that peace in Southeast Asia would open up new possibilities in our relations with Peking, along the lines of the President’s backgrounder in Guam, etc.¹⁰

We should not expect much of a response on the official level but the situation inside China has probably evolved to the extent that the message will be read and understood. It might lead to nothing at first. But it is the one avenue of diplomacy connected to Vietnam which has been blocked. It is certainly worth probing to see if that avenue is now opening up.

*Recommendation*¹¹

That you discuss this with Richardson at your next meeting and suggest State work up a proposal for your early consideration.

Approve

Disapprove

See Me

⁹ The President read his September 24 daily briefing memorandum, which contained a report on Lodge’s conversation with Frenchman Jean Sainteny, who had recently returned from Hanoi. Sainteny believed that the PRC was key to the Vietnam conflict, because it was using its economic aid to pressure Hanoi to continue fighting. Nixon added a handwritten note: “K—important? Peking may still be holding the Soviet’s feet to the fire.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, September 24; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 11, President’s Daily Briefs)

¹⁰ Reference is to the President’s July 25 remarks at Guam, during which he outlined what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 544–556. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. I, Document 29.

¹¹ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendations, but Kissinger did meet with Richardson on October 11 to discuss easing passport restrictions to China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In briefing Kissinger for that discussion, Haig also noted, “The President has authorized you to ask State to prepare instructions to the field setting forth guidance for deploring reports on a Soviet plan to make a preemptive military strike against Communist China.” (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, October 11; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969)

39. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 16, 1969.

SUBJECT

President Yahya and Communist China

I was visited at the end of the week by Ambassador Hilaly and by Sher Ali Khan, President Yahya's Minister of Information and National Affairs who was here at the head of Pakistan's UN delegation. Although Sher Ali may not quite be Yahya's number two as he claims, he is apparently close.

Sher Ali came to report follow-up on your suggestion that President Yahya tell Chou En-lai that the US would welcome accommodation with Communist China.²

Sher Ali reported that Pakistan's delegate to the Peking 20th Anniversary celebrations had been instructed to let the Chinese know that Yahya was prepared to discuss the subject of American intentions in Asia when Chou En-lai visits Pakistan, presumably early next year. Now Sher Ali felt that it would help President Yahya to have something specific to say to the Chinese, perhaps on US intentions on Vietnam. They could make a general pitch for the improvement of relations but that would be unlikely to provoke a specific response. President Yahya hoped that we might give him something to say.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. According to a handwritten and stamped notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on October 28.

² See Documents 20 and 26. The Pakistanis apparently were encouraged by the Department of State. Holdridge reported to Kissinger on September 16 that "The President's interest in using the Pakistanis as a line of communication to the Chinese Communists has become known to a number of people in State. The attached Secret/Limdis cable reports a conversation in which Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly described [to Sisco] the President's approach to President Yahya and reiterated Pakistan's willingness to communicate with Peking." Sisco raised the issue of Sino-American relations by suggesting that Pakistan could "find ways of persuading Chinese that U.S. wants to get along peacefully with them." Holdridge continued, "I assume that Hilaly took Assistant Secretary Sisco's remark as the approach for which he had been waiting." (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, September 16; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I) Telegram 154461 to Islamabad reporting the September 10 conversation between Sisco and Hilaly was attached. The full memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-USSR

I told him that I would have to consult with you so that we could pass on a more precise formulation than I was prepared to do at that moment. I did tell him however that, if President Yahya were communicating with the Communist Chinese Ambassador, he might say confidentially that the United States is removing two of its destroyers from the Formosa Straits.³ I told him that he should not allow any misunderstanding of this move—it did not affect our basic position on Taiwan but it was an effort to remove an irritant. I told Sher Ali that we would be in touch with Ambassador Hilaly when we had something more precise to say.⁴

³ See Document 34.

⁴ President Nixon wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “K—also open trade possibilities.”

40. Draft Response to National Security Study Memorandum 63¹

Washington, October 17, 1969.

[Omitted here is a Table of Contents.]

NSSM-63

U.S. POLICY ON CURRENT SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES

Summary

This paper considers the policy options posed for the United States by the Sino-Soviet dispute on the assumption that the dispute continues to be fought out in terms of an essentially political rivalry on the present pattern; analyzes the nature of the interrelationships between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, and examines in general terms the problems and opportunities for the United States which would result from major hostilities between the Soviet Union and China. (The immediate short-range options in the event of Sino-Soviet war are the subject of a separate contingency study.)²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting, Sino Soviet Differences, 11/20/69. Secret. For drafting information, see footnote 3, Document 15.

² See Document 43.

Options

Three broad strategies are considered.

Option A would have the effect of supporting Communist China, the weaker of the two contestants, and would probably take the form of making various unreciprocated gestures towards China, such as endorsing Peking's border claims, while, at the same time, displaying reluctance to engage in negotiations with the USSR, e.g., on SALT. Pursuit of this strategy might result in some long-term improvement in the U.S.-Chinese relationship and it might also help prolong the Sino-Soviet dispute, but the Soviet reaction would be strong and adverse. The Soviets would probably pursue an intensified policy of attempting to detach Western Europe from the U.S., win over Asian countries, particularly Japan, strengthen their hold over Eastern Europe, and step up their own military program.

Option B would have the effect of supporting the Soviet Union, the stronger contestant, and would take the form of maintaining our present posture towards China without change, while we adopted a generally softer line towards the USSR. It could result in a more accommodating Soviet attitude on some of the major issues between us and in the general Soviet posture, but it might have the effect of making the USSR more difficult to deal with and more ready to take preemptive action against the Chinese. It would damage the chances of an improvement in our relations with China.

Option C would be one of overt neutrality and could be applied in one of two ways.

Option C. 1. would involve our taking no action which might be construed as favoring one contestant or the other. Accordingly, we should make no effort to develop our relations with Communist China and, at the same time, avoid trying to arrive at understandings with the USSR. Such a policy would reduce to a minimum the dangers of U.S. involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute, but would hamper pursuit of our own interests, vis-à-vis both China and the USSR.

Option C. 2. would involve maintenance of a policy of neutrality, while we pursued our own long-term interests towards both China and the USSR, without undue regard to the interpretation either side might put on our actions. In implementing this policy, we should attempt to develop our relations with China, while continuing our basic support of the GRC on Taiwan, and simultaneously seek to negotiate with the USSR on the important issues between us. This option would have the advantage of leaving us free to try to work out a satisfactory relationship with each of the contestants, but it would be difficult to pursue, since it calls for constant awareness of how each of them reacted to it.

The Interrelation: The Soviet Union, China, and the U.S.

The Soviets almost certainly see their relationship with China as the most compelling problem in foreign affairs now confronting them. Short of a conceivable Soviet decision to strike militarily against China, it can be anticipated that Moscow will persist in efforts to strengthen its military position along the border with China, to develop improved relations with both Communist and non-Communist countries on the Chinese periphery, to shore up its overall security position (particularly in Eastern Europe), to diminish Chinese influence in other Communist countries, to protect its political gains in the Middle East, and to establish a generally less hostile relationship with the West.

The character of Soviet policy could change if Moscow comes to believe that the Chinese are on the way to breaking out of their largely self-inflicted isolation, and most especially if this seemed to be happening in a way that foreshadowed a real and far-reaching Chinese rapprochement with the U.S. In this event, the Soviets might well see a need to strengthen further their general military position; they might feel greater compulsion to strike militarily at China; and they might adopt a more hostile attitude toward the U.S. Alternatively, the Soviets might decide that a serious effort to improve relations with the U.S., even at the expense of concessions on specific issues, was more likely to serve their interests.

It seems probable that the Chinese, for their part, also now regard the USSR as their most immediate and threatening adversary. They seem determined to give no ground in the quarrel, in spite of their obvious military weakness vis-à-vis the USSR. Since many of the handicaps which encumber Chinese foreign policy are of their own making, the way to greater international maneuverability is open to them—if they choose to use it. It is possible, therefore, that Peking might at some point come to see that it would be better served in the struggle with the Soviets by a more flexible posture. This could, even in the near term, lead the Chinese to seek improved relations with third countries and a somewhat less hostile relationship with the U.S. Peking recognizes its own military weakness in facing the Soviet Union and it is most unlikely that the Chinese will launch a military attack against the USSR. Nevertheless, the Chinese can be expected to react violently against any Soviet attack on Chinese territory.

The triangular relationship between the U.S., the USSR, and China is, of course, an unequal one: U.S. and Soviet interests intersect in many parts of the world, whereas our problems with China lie mainly in Asia. For the foreseeable future, the views of Peking and Moscow as to how the world should be organized are likely to remain incompatible with ours. Thus, until a fundamental and far-reaching change takes place in China or in the USSR, the resolution of critical differences we have with either is unlikely. Nevertheless, there is today some convergence of

interest between us and the USSR in the various parts of the world where our interests interact, arising mainly from our mutual desire to avoid a nuclear war. There is less convergence between U.S. and Chinese interests. Broadly, however, each of the three powers wants to avoid collusion between the other two or any dramatic expansion of the power of either adversary at the expense of that of the other.

Growing dissidence between the USSR and China has limited both countries in the pursuit of policies basically antagonistic to U.S. interests; this is the most important benefit which accrues to the U.S. from Sino-Soviet rivalry. Beyond this, the dispute has, in a positive sense, heightened Soviet interest in developing a less abrasive relationship with the U.S. and it may at some point lead China in the same direction.

Problems and Opportunities for the U.S. Assuming Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities

A change in the degree of tension between the Soviets and Chinese is a more likely prospect than a change in kind. The latter is, however, now well within the realm of the possible. There are two ways in which major hostilities might develop:

- (1) through inadvertent escalation, and
- (2) by deliberate resort to military force on a large scale.

Given the calculus of military power only the USSR would be likely to see advantage in the second course.

The impact of major Sino-Soviet hostilities on U.S. interests could vary significantly depending upon the nature and duration of the hostilities, the general posture of the U.S. toward the two sides, and the outcome of the war. The course and outcome of such hostilities are highly unpredictable.

Major Sino-Soviet hostilities which did not directly involve third countries (other than Mongolia) and were fought only with conventional weapons would not necessarily be disadvantageous to us. During such a war, the U.S. could expect (1) a drastic reduction in the capability of the USSR and China to pursue policies inimical to U.S. interests elsewhere, (2) a drastic reduction in assistance to Hanoi thereby eventually enhancing the prospect for political settlement in Viet-Nam, and (3) improved relations with third countries anxious to strengthen their own security in an uncertain situation. However, if third countries in Asia or in Europe were to be drawn in on one side or the other, if wars of opportunity should break out as a result (e.g., between North and South Korea), or if nuclear weapons were used in the conflict, serious dangers and problems for the U.S. would arise.

The general posture of the U.S. toward the Soviet Union and China at the time major hostilities broke out between them—and during the conflict—could affect U.S. ability to maximize advantages and

minimize risks. If we clearly supported one side in the conflict, we would be unable to gain advantages in relations with the other and we would have difficulties with third countries not adopting the same partisan attitude. A U.S. posture of neutrality in the dispute would provide maximum flexibility in dealings with third countries and might encourage both Moscow and Peking to make concessions to ensure that the U.S. not become involved in their quarrel, since both would fear U.S. support of the other.

The outcome of a Sino-Soviet war could have important policy implications for the U.S. If the Mao-Lin regime survived in control of China as it now exists, its prestige would be enhanced and China would probably be a more formidable opponent of U.S. interests in Asia. If the Soviets succeeded in creating puppet regimes in the Chinese border provinces, Peking might become more interested in improving relations with the U.S., but a triumphant USSR would be more difficult to deal with and Soviet influence in Asia would be enhanced to a degree and in ways inimical to our interests. If the Mao-Lin regime should be ousted as a result of the war, China might be fragmented and civil war might follow. The U.S. would then face the question of whether it should not attempt to counter Soviet efforts to gain predominant influence over more than just the border areas.

The net balance of the advantages and disadvantages to the United States cannot be foreseen, but the possibilities that nuclear weapons might be used, that other countries might be drawn into the war, and that the outcome might shift the balance of power against us, are sufficiently great to make an escalation of hostilities something we should seek to avoid and to raise the question whether there are possible actions we could take to minimize the chances of a major Sino-Soviet military conflict.

We have little ability to influence directly either Moscow or Peking on the question of relations with the other, since neither regards this as a question in which we have a legitimate interest. Even so, the U.S. could make it clear that it would not welcome a major Sino-Soviet conflict and believed dangerous international complications would ensue. Even if such a position did not reinforce councils [*counsels?*] of caution in Moscow and Peking, it should serve U.S. purposes in relations with third countries.

In making contingency preparations if major Sino-Soviet hostilities seemed imminent, care should be taken to avoid creating the impression that we were preparing to take military advantage of either Peking or Moscow since this could contribute to the explosiveness of the situation.

[Omitted here are 23 pages of text divided into three major sections: 1. Options; 2. Analysis of the Interrelation: The Soviet Union, China, and the U.S.; and 3. Problems and Opportunities for the U.S. Assuming Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities.]

41. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Chairman of the Senior Review Group (Kissinger)¹

I-25593/69

Washington, October 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSSM-63—U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences

I am enclosing 25 copies of the "DOD Supplementary Paper on NSSM-63," as revised since the Review Group Meeting on September 25.² I request that this revised DOD paper be submitted to the Review Group concurrently with the NSSM-63 Report forwarded to you by Mr. Cargo on October 23.³

As you know, the Secretary of Defense has directed the various elements of the Department to make a special effort to ensure that DOD views are brought to the attention of the NSC whenever these views differ from those of other agencies, as is the case with the NSSM-63 Report. The Report forwarded by Mr. Cargo reflects none of those DOD views that diverge despite our repeated efforts to incorporate them for NSC consideration.

In addition, the NSSM-63 Report includes a summary statement that neither OSD nor the OJCS representatives were given a chance to read prior to dissemination of the Report to the NSC Staff. I should also note that a DOD footnote that has been incorporated in the final draft submitted for inter-agency consideration calling attention to the DOD Supplementary Paper was omitted from the final NSSM-63 Report without the knowledge or concurrence of the DOD representatives.

We believe that the revised version of the NSSM-63 Report is fully responsive neither to the original NSSM nor to the Review Group's request at the end of the September 25 Meeting that the original Report be revised to cover certain points relating to major and prolonged Sino-Soviet hostilities.⁴ In our view, there are additional issues that must be considered in connection with alternative outcomes to the current differences between the two governments and their ruling communist parties.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting, Sino Soviet Differences, 11/20/69. Secret.

² The 9-page report is attached but not printed. See also footnote 6, Document 36.

³ Document 40.

⁴ A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Not so."

We also regard as a main issue the possibility that dynamic political change could occur in China and that hostilities, or Sino-Soviet “reconciliation” under Soviet dominance, however improbable either event may appear at this moment, would seriously affect events in and outside China. We believe that the Soviets desire a political change in China and might be willing in certain circumstances to undertake military action to help promote such change.

We believe that such courses of events, whatever their apparent likelihood at the present time, deserve greater attention because of the significance of their possible impact on the world and on U.S. interests and policy, and that they should not be overlooked solely on the ground of seeming improbability. For this reason DOD is submitting the enclosed “DOD Supplementary Paper on NSSM–63,” dated 8 October 1969.

G. Warren Nutter⁵

⁵ Printed from a copy that indicates Nutter signed the original.

42. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–8/1–69

Washington, October 30, 1969.

[Omitted here are a Table of Contents and 1-page map entitled “Communist China: Advanced Weapon Facilities.”]

COMMUNIST CHINA’S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAM

The Problem

To assess China’s strategic weapons program and to estimate the nature, size, and progress of these programs through the mid-1970’s.

Conclusions

A. China’s nuclear test program continues to emphasize the development of high-yield thermonuclear weapons. The Chinese have

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 13–8/1–69. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a notation on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on October 30 except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678. See also the earlier version of this estimate, Document 7, and a related report, Document 168.

developed a device [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that could be weaponized for delivery by the TU-16 jet medium bomber, or possibly configured as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warhead. They are probably at least two years away from having a thermonuclear weapon in the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) weight class, but fission warheads for such missiles could be available now. For the next several years at least, the production of nuclear materials can probably keep pace with or exceed the requirements of testing and the number of strategic missiles and TU-16s the Chinese are likely to be able to deploy.

B. The Chinese have probably begun production of medium bombers (TU-16s). We estimate that production could reach a level of about four or five a month and that about 200 TU-16s might be available by mid-1975.

C. The evidence suggests strongly that the Chinese are moving toward MRBM deployment. We believe that any major deployment program will involve the construction of permanent complexes, but we have no evidence that such work has begun. Even if some complexes were started in early 1969, they would not be operational before about mid-1970. It is possible, however, that there are a few operational MRBM sites in China at this time. If so, they probably would be temporary-type installations intended to provide an interim capability against the USSR.

D. [*1 line of source text not declassified*] However, should a vehicle become available for testing within the next few months, IOC could be achieved by late 1972 or early 1973. It is more likely, however, that IOC will be later, perhaps by as much as two or three years. If the earliest possible IOC were achieved, the number of operational launchers might fall somewhere between 10 and 25 in 1975. In the more likely event that IOC is later, achievement of a force this size would slip accordingly.

E. The Chinese have a large solid propellant complex at Hu-ho-hao-t'e in Inner Mongolia. We lack any basis for judging how the Chinese will proceed with a solid-propellant program, but we presently doubt that the Chinese could have either an MRBM or ICBM with solid fuel motors in the field by 1975. Moreover, a concentrated effort in this field would probably force the Chinese to restrict severely the deployment of liquid-propellant missiles.

F. If the Chinese were to attempt to orbit an earth satellite in the next year or so, a modified MRBM would probably be used as the launch vehicle. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]

G. In general, it is clear that the Chinese continue to press ahead with high priority work on strategic weapon systems. Many uncertainties remain, however, which leave in great doubt the future pace,

size, and scope of the program. Unlike the Soviet case, where we have observed numerous programs progress through development to deployment, most of the Chinese effort is not far enough along to provide an adequate historical background for judging China's technical and industrial capabilities for developing, producing, and deploying weapon systems embodying advanced technologies. [5 lines of source text not declassified] China's disturbed political situation and the increased animosity in Sino-Soviet relations add further uncertainty about the course of Chinese weapon programs over the next few years.

Discussion

I. General Considerations

1. A number of developments over the past year attest to China's intent to become a major strategic power. These include continuing work on the development of liquid fuel strategic missiles, solid propellants, and nuclear weapons, and the initiation of jet medium bomber production. For the most part the Chinese program has continued along lines previously observed.

2. There are, however, many uncertainties in our understanding of the scope, pace, and direction of the Chinese advanced weapons program. [3½ lines of source text not declassified]

3. In the missile field, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Unlike the Soviet case, where we have observed numerous advanced weapon systems progress through development to deployment, most of the Chinese effort is not far enough along to provide an adequate historical background for judging China's technical and industrial capabilities for developing, producing and deploying weapon systems embodying advanced technologies. The Soviets also publish some information on such matters as scientific accomplishments and military strategy and doctrine. This is not the case in China. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] We thus are unable to ascertain important key performance characteristics of missiles being tested or to follow closely the status of the test program. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

4. The Chinese no doubt have found it difficult to cope with the many complexities involved in advanced weaponry, and they may well find it increasingly difficult to do so as they continue to move beyond the technical limits of help received from the Soviets during the late 1950's. Technical data and specialized materials and equipment available to them from Western and Japanese sources can only partially overcome the handicap of China's limited scientific and technical resources, which are spread out thinly over a considerable number of programs.

5. As time goes on and more weapons systems reach the testing and deployment stage, there will be demands on high quality, scarce resources which will force upon the Chinese some increasingly difficult

decisions. They will have to make some choices among various weapon systems; they will also have to consider whether to deploy early systems in large numbers or to wait for later systems that might appear more credible as a threat and as a deterrent. Other choices confronting the Chinese are the balances to be struck between conventional general purpose and strategic forces, and between intercontinental and regional strategic programs. It is quite possible that the Chinese have not faced up to these problems fully and have not yet defined clearly the composition and size of their force goals.

6. Certainly the political situation in China during the past several years has not been conducive to orderly planning. There is good evidence that the Cultural Revolution intruded into the highest levels of the defense scientific establishment and into the government ministries responsible for missile and nuclear development, but we have not been able to pinpoint where disruption has occurred or to assess how serious it might have been. Although the wildly frenetic aspects of the Cultural Revolution have subsided, the chances for further negative political impact on advanced weapons programs remain. Finally, any longer term forecast of developments in China should allow for the host of uncertainties that will arise about China's future once Mao departs from the scene.

7. There are good indications that the large-scale Soviet military buildup opposite China and the recent sharp clashes on the border have increased considerably Peking's concern that the Soviets might take some major military action against China. It is highly uncertain what effects, if any, this deepened hostility might have on China's advanced weapons program. Much would depend, of course, on how high the Chinese actually rate the chances of a Soviet attack and on the type of attack they judge most likely. At one extreme Chinese fears might spur them into an emergency effort to deploy whatever they could as quickly as possible. At the other extreme it is conceivable that they might postpone deployment, at least of the sort that would appear particularly provocative to the Soviets, for fear that such deployment would increase the likelihood of a Soviet pre-emptive blow. Or the Chinese might decide that their best course was to improve the mobility and firepower of China's ground forces in an effort to make as unattractive as possible to the Soviets the prospect of a conflict at the conventional level. But these possibilities are pure conjecture, and at this point we can make only the very general judgment that Sino-Soviet antagonism is likely to continue as an important factor in Chinese military planning and strategy.

[Omitted here are paragraphs 8-40, comprising the trends and prospects portion of the estimate. This includes sections headed Nuclear Program (Nuclear Testing and Development, and Nuclear Materials Production), and Delivery Systems (Medium Bomber Force, MRBM Program, Missile Submarines, ICBM Program, IRBMs, Solid Propellant Missile Program, and Space Program).]

43. Washington Special Actions Group Report¹

Washington, November 10, 1969.

[Omitted here is a Table of Contents.]

IMMEDIATE U.S. POLICY PROBLEMS IN EVENT OF MAJOR SINO-SOVIET HOSTILITIES

Preface

The actions proposed below in the event of a major Sino-Soviet conflict are postulated on the thesis that such a conflict would not be in our interest and therefore we should do all possible to avoid involvement while doing what we can to encourage termination of the hostilities, particularly before the Soviets emerge with a major victory. However, the proposed actions also involve our being alert to the possibilities of promptly exploiting whatever opportunities may be presented for expediting a favorable termination of the war in Vietnam.

IMMEDIATE US POLICY PROBLEMS IN EVENT OF MAJOR SINO-SOVIET HOSTILITIES

Summary of Recommendations²

1. The US would publicly emphasize its impartiality and noninvolvement, urge both sides not to use nuclear weapons, call for negotiations and the restoration of peace, and take steps to avoid any provocative actions or accidental contact by US forces with belligerent

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 411, National Security Council Contingency Plans. Top Secret. This is the final version of the report discussed in various WSAG and SRG meetings (Documents 29, 32, and 36). The Department of State's Policy Planning Staff served as coordinator of the report. Even as revisions were being made, Holdridge wrote: "At the time it was begun, the prospects of a clash between Moscow and Peking seemed greater than they are today—perhaps the Soviets were actively considering taking some form of action, but now have resolved not to do so, or to defer pending the outcome of the talks in Peking." Holdridge also noted that the paper discussed short-term actions and was compatible with NSSM 63, which focused on longer term issues. He suggested that the Department of State's Policy Planning Council keep the study current. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Colonel Behr of the NSC Staff, October 20; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-071, WSAG Meeting, 10/21/69, Middle East/Sino-Soviet/Berlin.) For more information about the organization and activities of the Policy Planning Staff during the first Nixon administration, see William I. Cargo and Margaret L. Cargo, *Wherever the Road Leads: A Memoir* (Published by William and Margaret Cargo, 1997), chapter 21, "Again Washington—Directing the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (1969–1972)."

² This report was discussed briefly at the October 21 Washington Special Actions Group meeting. U. Alexis Johnson suggested that, with the exception of a few minor changes, it was a "finished product." Cargo then detailed two changes from the previous draft. The first would be to make clear that a Soviet victory did not require control of Chinese territory but instead "an extension of Soviet influence over a compliant CPR

forces. If hostilities were set off by the Soviets, the US would express its strong concern, and if nuclear weapons were used, strongly condemn their employment. These points would be made privately as well to both the Soviets and Chinese. We would not take the initiative to change our bilateral negotiating posture toward the Soviets significantly in the event of a conventional conflict, but if the Soviets employed nuclear weapons, we would at least suspend arms limitation talks. (III A, pp. 8–16)

2. In the event of any conventional Sino-Soviet conflict, the US military readiness and reaction posture would be strengthened by selected command and alerting actions. Scheduled overseas military exercises would be reviewed for possible provocative risks and degradation of our military posture, and force demobilization and withdrawal programs would be selectively suspended pending further analysis of the impact of Sino-Soviet hostilities on the US global force posture. In the event nuclear weapons were employed, DEFCON status would be increased, NATO consultations initiated, advanced Civil Defense plans implemented, and selected Reserve and National Guard units recalled to active duty. (III B, pp 17–21)

3. Close-on peripheral air and sea reconnaissance and overflights would be suspended pending high-level review of risks and intelligence requirements. Available intelligence collection platforms including advanced planning for the fullest use of present overhead reconnaissance capabilities would be readied for use as was judged needed. Peripheral collection missions along the China coast would be given earliest favorable consideration, consistent with risk factors, and human source collection efforts would be maximized. (III C, pp 22–24)

4. In the UN, the US would support a Security Council resolution consistent with our public posture, including criticism of the Soviets if their responsibility for hostilities was clear. (III D, pp 25–28)

5. We would emphasize to our Asian allies our intention of remaining non-involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict and would reaffirm our treaty commitments, maintaining close consultation with our allies. We would take precautions to forestall any actions by the Republic of Korea or the Republic of China which might expand the area of hostilities. In NATO, we would consult with our allies, maintaining a moderate, non-provocative posture, and support the implementation of appropriate alert measures as required by Soviet and Warsaw Pact

government." Second, the United States would avoid the impression that a blockade of Haiphong was a retaliatory act in the event of a Soviet blockade of Hong Kong. The blockade issue was to be kept separate from Sino-Soviet hostilities. Kissinger also requested that a summary of recommended actions (which are printed here) be added to the first section of the paper. (Ibid.)

force dispositions. We would make clear to the Soviets that these measures were defensive and not meant to threaten the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Toward Third Countries, we would emphasize our concern over the hostilities and our wish to avoid becoming involved. (III E, pp 29–37)

6. We would convey to the East Europeans our overall position on a Sino-Soviet conflict, urging them to use their influence to prevent or end any use of nuclear weapons, indicate our intention of avoiding any provocative actions, and reiterate our desire for improved bilateral relations with all countries. (III F, pp 38–39)

7. We would assure the Japanese of US caution in all actions which might result in US involvement in Sino-Soviet hostilities, but emphasize the importance of the flexibility of US base use on Okinawa. (III G, p 40)

8. In Vietnam, the US would review programmed troop withdrawals and our military posture in the South with a view to maximizing the strain on Hanoi as a result of Sino-Soviet hostilities. We would also consider more far-ranging alternatives of increasing our military pressure on the North or of holding out a new attractive inducement to Hanoi. (III H, pp 41–43)

9. The US would strongly oppose any use of nuclear weapons in a Sino-Soviet conflict and, if intelligence suggested their use by either side was being contemplated, we would consider discreet disclosure of our information to diminish the degree of surprise and hopefully to forestall use of the weapons. If nuclear weapons were used, we would take the lead in condemning their use and increase our worldwide DEFCON status. (III I, pp 44–45)

10. The US would consult with the UK and Hong Kong Governments on possible developments in Hong Kong and possible assistance in emergencies to the Hong Kong authorities. US R&R travel and naval ship visits to Hong Kong would be discontinued if the British requested. (III J, pp 46–47)

11. In the event of a Soviet blockade of the China coast, we would decline to challenge Soviet attempts to interdict commerce to the mainland but seek through diplomatic means to protect the right of US ships to navigate freely without interference to neutral ports, including Hong Kong. (III K, pp 48–49)

12. If independence movements developed in Sinkiang or Tibet, possibly with Soviet encouragement and assistance, the US would indicate its general opposition to territorial changes by force, endorse the principle of Chinese territorial integrity, and support the principle of self-determination while awaiting a clarification of the situation. We would express private concern to the Soviets over any territorial dismemberment of China and warn the Indians that if any intervention on their part in Tibet resulted in Chinese retaliation, we would have to

review the applicability of the Indo-US Air Defense Agreement. (III L, pp 50–51)

13. In the event of an internal struggle for power in China triggered by a Sino-Soviet conflict, the US would remain impartial between all conflicting factions. (III M, p 52)

14. In order to deter a Sino-Soviet conflict, the US might publicly warn that the Sino-Soviet conflict would endanger world peace, encourage discussion of the situation in the UN as a means of building public pressures against the possible belligerents, emphasize bilaterally to the Soviets our concern over the dangers of a possible Sino-Soviet war and arrange for the same concerns to be made known to Peking, and encourage third countries to bring their influence to bear on the Soviets and Chinese to avoid escalatory actions. (V, pp 57–59)

[Omitted here are 60 pages of text divided into five sections: I. Purpose, Scope and Assumptions; II. General Posture Alternatives; III. Immediate Policy Problems and Options; IV. Impartiality Stance: Advantages in Negotiating with the Soviet Union; and V. Possible U.S. Actions to Deter Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities. The report concludes with three annexes: A. Adequacy of North Vietnam's Stockpiles of Military and War Related Supplies; B. U.S. Neutrality and Soviet Maritime Interdiction of Communist China; and C. U.S. Actions in the Event of Soviet Interference with Vessels of US Allies Trading with the Chinese Mainland or with US or Allied Vessels Trading with Hong Kong.]

44. Memorandum for the President—Evening Report¹

Washington, November 12, 1969.

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of a House of Representatives resolution concerning Vietnam.]

2. *GRC Representations on Okinawa and the Formosa Straits*—Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming called on me today to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 13, President's Daily Brief. Secret. An Evening Report memorandum was forwarded daily to the President under the signature of the Secretary or the Under Secretary. The reports discussed overseas developments as well as budget issues and congressional relations. The information was sometimes placed into the daily briefing memorandum for the President produced by NSC staff under Kissinger's signature, but the President rarely read the Department of State's Evening Report itself.

convey his government's views on Okinawan reversion and on our decision to modify, beginning next Saturday, the Taiwan Strait Patrol.²

On Okinawa,³ Wei reiterated his government's suggestion that a plebiscite be held to confirm the wishes of the Okinawan people. I pointed out that it would be most inadvisable to introduce such a proposal at this stage in our negotiations with Japan, particularly since it might be interpreted as a shift from our acknowledgment that Japan has residual sovereignty over Okinawa. I also pointed out that recent elections in Okinawa leave no doubt as to the wishes of the people.

With respect to modification of the Taiwan Strait Patrol, Wei stated that although our decision involved little change from a technical point of view, it could have serious repercussions in terms of possible Chinese Communist reaction and public opinion in the Republic of China. He urged reconsideration of that decision. I emphasized that the decision had been prompted solely by budgetary considerations and reassured him that it involved no change in policy or our defense commitment, and that the Seventh Fleet would be able to carry on the functions of the regular patrol. I held out no possibility that the decision would be changed, noting that it had been approved at the highest level.

[Omitted here is information on Nigeria, West Germany, and media relations.]

² Rogers met with Wei and his party at 12:35 p.m. (Private Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books) For background on the Taiwan Strait patrol, see Document 34. A record of this meeting was sent to Taipei in telegram 191895, November 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 RYUKYUS)

³ Chinese interest in Japanese-American negotiations over the disposition of Okinawa is discussed in more detail in Documents 45, 113, 115, 133, and 134, as well as in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIX.

45. **Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, November 13, 1969.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with GRC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai

You have a meeting with GRC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai at 5:30 p.m. November 14, in response to a request from Ambassador Chow. As you recall from previous contacts with Ambassador Chow, he is a good, professional diplomat who likes to work through channels and who would not have sought a meeting with you except under instructions from Taipei and for purposes regarded by his government as extraordinary.

Ambassador Chow's Position

There are two issues of major importance to the GRC which we believe lie behind his meeting with you. These are:

—Our decision to modify the Taiwan Strait Patrol.² The GRC has now been informed of this decision, and has resisted it. President Chiang Kai-shek was about to intervene personally with our Chargé to ask reconsideration, but thought better of it and instead made such a request through the GRC Foreign Minister. It seems likely that President Chiang wants to end-run the State Department and get his strong feelings against our decision directly to the President. The GRC opposition to our move is based on: (1) the belief it might cause the Chinese Communists to calculate that our degree of support for the GRC had declined, thus encouraging stepped-up pressure on Taiwan or the Off-shore Islands; and, (2) fear of an adverse effect on public morale in the Republic of China.

—The Okinawa reversion issue. The GRC has long maintained that it should have some say on the basis of the Japanese Peace Treaty regarding the disposition of Okinawa. Realizing that it cannot prevent Okinawan reversion, it wants to stall by calling for a plebiscite to be held to confirm the wishes of the Okinawan people.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence File, Republic of China, President Chiang Kai-shek. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. The document was date-stamped "Nov 17 1969." No record of this conversation has been found.

² See Document 34.

—In addition, the GRC may through Ambassador Chow express some concern about the general trend in Sino-US relations, fearing that our support for the GRC is eroding. Ambassador Chow may allude to comments by US officials (e.g. Secretary Rogers) on improving relations with Communist China.³

Your Position

I recommend that:

—You reiterate that the modification of the Taiwan Strait Patrol was made for budgetary considerations only.

—You point out that the totality of the US relationship with the GRC depends on far more than the mothballing of two aged destroyers, and that many important evidences of US support for the GRC will remain in effect. For example, the Seventh Fleet will continue to operate in and around the Taiwan Strait area. You may wish to remind Ambassador Chow that we have agreed to strengthen the GRC Navy by five destroyer and destroyer-escort type vessels, which would leave the power balance in the Taiwan Strait unimpaired.

—Regarding Okinawa, the US has had numerous expressions of opinion on the part of the Okinawans as to their desire to be reunited with Japan. A case in point was the election of the present Okinawan Chief Executive, Yara, on a platform favoring reversion. Resisting this trend might impair the utility of our bases, and adversely affect the security of both Japan and Taiwan. Our purpose is to see these security interests safeguarded.

—US support for the GRC has been exemplified by the US stance on the Chinese representation issue in the UNGA. The vote rejecting Communist Chinese seating, while some less than last year (48–56–21 to 44–58–23), still showed substantial agreement on this issue.⁴

—We will be looking forward to the visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo in February of next year, at which time the President will have the opportunity to reinforce what you have just said about Sino-US congruity of interests.

³ Apparent reference to Rogers' August 8 address before the National Press Club in Canberra, Australia. The Secretary commented that the United States had been "seeking to open channels of communication" and pointed to liberalization of passport and tourist regulations regarding the PRC. (Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1969, p. 180) He reiterated these comments in his August 20 news conference in Washington. (Ibid., September 8, 1969, pp. 201–208) Haig brought Rogers' comments to the attention of Kissinger on August 18 in his memorandum entitled "Items to discuss with the President," stating that "Rogers free wheeled on China without any prior White House clearance." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 8/13/69 to 12/30/69)

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 283.

46. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSSM 63, Sino-Soviet Rivalry—A Dissenting View

NSSM 63 seems to proceed from certain basic assumptions about the effect of the Sino-Soviet rivalry on US interests. I would argue those assumptions. In my view, the revised paper still: (a) overdraws the benefits of the dispute for the US, (b) omits significant side effects of Sino-Soviet hostility, (c) fails to probe the most likely form of a full-fledged Sino-Soviet war and (d) puts the fundamental policy choice to the President in the wrong terms. The following are specific points of this criticism (keyed to the sequence of discussion in your analytical summary):²

The Rivalry and US Interests

1. *The paper rests on a judgment that the dispute has kept the Russians and Chinese from concerting anti-US policies and thereby limited the freedom of each to hurt us.* I find this a questionable proposition from the history of the last eight years, particularly in the developing world where the Soviets and Chinese have had most targets of opportunity. One can argue, for example, that "concerted" Sino-Soviet policies on the Subcontinent in the '50s confined both to an equivocal posture which did little to undermine our position with either the Indians or the Paks. It was the *dispute* that freed the Soviets to follow through their own game with Nehru and Shastri, and thus emerge as the main arms supplier and a dominant influence in the area.

Similarly, it was a Peking already at odds with Moscow which (a) attacked the Indians in 1962 (creating, among other unfortunate results, Delhi's appetite for Soviet arms) and (b) moved to become a major arms supplier to the Paks in the following period. Our declining

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting, Sino-Soviet Differences, 11/20/69. Secret. Sent for information. Morris sent the memorandum to Kissinger through Robert Osgood of the NSC staff. A handwritten notation on the first page notes that copies were sent to Sonnenfeldt, Watts, Holdridge, and Kennedy. Attached was another copy of the first page of this memorandum, upon which Kissinger wrote: "But basically this is Option C-2, or is that wrong? HK."

² Reference is to the analytical summary prepared by the NSC staff for Kissinger as part of the NSSM 63 response. See Document 40.

position on the Subcontinent since 1963 (Tashkent, the loss of Peshawar, etc.) can be related directly to the *increased* freedom which the rivalry gave both the Soviets and the Chinese to pursue their own interests unfettered by their partner's sensitivities.

One can argue in the same vein about Soviet and Chinese moves at our expense in Africa, Latin America, or even in the Middle East. Ideologically cleansed of Peking's radicalism—and thus seeming less ambitious—the Soviets have been able to carry off a much more effective posture vis-à-vis nationalist clients. The Chinese, unencumbered by the Soviet restraints that surely would have been applied in a “concerted” policy, have been able to exploit LDC radicals—such as the Southern African guerrillas, the Fedayeen, etc.—as they might never have done with Moscow tugging at their sleeves. And in so doing, of course, they have sometimes pulled the Soviets along to compete.

NSSM 63 seems to bypass the origins of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Whatever else it may have been, this was also a deep-seated quarrel about the tactics of revolution in the poor countries. Having gone their own ways, each side has been able largely to pursue its own strategy in the LDCs. It doesn't matter if the failure of one is the success of the other. In either case, the results are scarcely to our advantage.

2. *The paper suggests that the Soviet readiness to deal on questions such as SALT or European security is a favorable by-product of the rivalry.* I think this too misses a point about the origins of the dispute. It was the prior Soviet recognition of its great power status, and thus of the necessity for dealing with the US on security issues, that was a major factor in alienating the Chinese in the first place. The motives that bring Moscow to the SALT talks are fundamental to Soviet foreign policy since 1949–50, and clearly pre-date the formal schism with Peking. We only have to ask ourselves if the Soviets would really back-track on SALT, etc. if only the dispute with the Chinese were healed. I have great difficulty believing that—and thus in agreeing that the rivalry per se makes the Soviets easier to live with.

3. *The paper also suggests, though much less explicitly, that the rivalry may have moved the Chinese to a less belligerent posture towards us.* There is no hard evidence of this so far. The paper argues that Chinese propaganda against the US has diminished while it has increased against the USSR. But this is more likely a matter of priority in resources, or an ideological gambit in Chinese domestic politics, than a subtle signal to us (even for the Chinese). To the contrary, it can be argued that the Chinese have stayed with Hanoi, despite the enormous strains of the Cultural Revolution, largely because they would not cede that game to the Soviets. Likewise, Soviet policy in Vietnam since 1965 (when it counted) has been heavily laden with the need to counter the Chinese. Yet again, in any case, the results are unwelcome for us.

The Chinese may still try, of course, to maneuver toward us, and there are recent hints of this (which the paper ignores). But for purposes of policy planning over 3–5 years, we cannot assume this will be anything more than shrewd short-run tactics.

In sum, there are serious doubts about the “advantages” of the rivalry. The feud is certainly one more headache for already throbbing brows in Moscow and Peking. And if one assumes (as I do not) that their pain is always in some way our gain, we can watch with pleasure. But it’s just as certain that we have no worthwhile way to exploit the present rivalry.

4. *NSSM 63 goes on to say that a war between the two would “drastically reduce” their capability to pursue policies against us elsewhere. At the same time, the paper judges that the danger of nuclear escalation would make actual hostilities “disadvantageous” to our interests.* These are not relevant criteria for judging the Sino-Soviet reaction to us in the event of hostilities. The question is not one of “capabilities” to hurt us, but rather how they would calculate their own interests (and our intentions) if they were engaged in a major conflict with each other.

Here the evidence of history argues that the sheer trauma of a war would quickly immerse both parties in their fundamental paranoia about the outside world. Neither would be disposed to rely on mere diplomatic protection of their flanks. The Soviets would: (a) almost certainly tighten the screws in Eastern Europe in a show of fearsomeness, (b) might well do some sabre-rattling and domestic tampering with the Japanese to protect that flank and (c) call in their credit with Hanoi. None of these steps would be in our interest. I find, incidentally, that one of the paper’s most salient omissions is an analysis of Soviet-instigated side-effects vis-à-vis Japan or North Vietnam. A war with China, for example, would certainly deprive Moscow of what little leverage they have on Hanoi regarding the war in South Vietnam.

As for the Chinese, they too would be impelled to secure their flanks by aggressive diversions in North Korea or North Vietnam, inevitably at our expense. There is just no evidence to suggest (and much to the contrary) that a China-confronted by war with the Soviet Union would pause for a moment to try to court the US.

5. *Moreover, the paper fails to explore one of the most likely scenarios in Sino-Soviet hostilities—namely, a Soviet surgical strike on Peking’s nuclear capacity.* That enterprise would undoubtedly add to Soviet prestige in Asia, might make the otherwise insular hacks in the Kremlin dangerously cocky, and would leave us generally on the defensive. The Chinese could respond with an irrational outburst toward Siberia or Soviet Central Asia, but it seems to me more likely that they would choose (as before) the less costly but face-saving course of lashing out anew in Southeast Asia. That brings us unpleasanties I need not describe.

Not that these prospects should lead us to try to broker a reconciliation of Moscow and Peking (though there is an interesting argument that together—squabbling over tactics and doomed to compromise—they may be less formidable opponents).

But I would repeat that NSSM 63 is misleading to the degree it gives the President reason to rub his hands over the Sino-Soviet clash. The bureaucracy seems to view our relationship to the Moscow-Peking rivalry as a classical three-power gambit—in which, as the textbooks tell us, it's smart to back the weaker against the stronger and play for the breaks. It seems to me this misjudges the perception of the world from Moscow and Peking. The only safe assumption on the basis of past history is that heightened rivalry or actual conflict would give free rein to the deepest fear and suspicion in both leaderships, and thus only enliven their common belligerence toward us.

The Policy Question

The real policy question seems to me to proceed precisely from where NSSM 63 leaves off. Our influence on the situation is minimal. Our advantages, even in rivalry short of battle, are dubious. The question for the President is: Can we find any opportunity or peril in the Sino-Soviet rivalry which should compel him to change his distinct policies towards each side—each formulated and conducted for its own reasons? I think the answer must be negative.

However, there are two important corollaries of this policy choice which the paper does not make clear:

—Whatever the scenario in a Sino-Soviet war, the Russians are going to win it. Thus, we should do nothing that jeopardizes our chances for dealing with the Soviets on questions of vital interest to the US in either Asia or Europe.

—And because the actions the President now contemplates vis-à-vis China remain peripheral to the development of the Sino-Soviet quarrel, nothing in that quarrel should deter us from following a sensible relaxation of our posture toward Peking. The Soviets are indeed nervous about these trivial gestures, but we should let them squirm. There is a threshold of Soviet tolerance in our China policy. But we should be clear that we are still far from it. We should continue to consult our own immediate and direct interests (Asian and Pacific) in trying to do business with Peking.

Conclusion

This much said, however, I feel very much the seminar-paper syndrome. These points are worth exploring at the planning level. And it is surely worth telling the President that (a) the rivalry is a mixed blessing, (b) we are trying to cover the contingencies (most of them perilous) of a Sino-Soviet war, and (c) the rivalry is no reason to change his basic policies toward either China or Russia. But beyond that, the exercise is largely academic.

The “options” in NSSM 63 are just unreal, and I have difficulty imagining a full-dress NSC discussion could illuminate the issues in a way practical enough to justify the President’s time.

I suggest the Review Group commission an Information Memo to the President (written here) giving the main conclusions of the study—and let it go at that.³

³ The “Information Memo” was apparently not written.

47. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, November 20, 1969, 3:05–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences (NSSM 63)

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

William I. Cargo

Donald McHenry

Miriam Camps

Defense

Richard A. Ware

Y. L. Wu

CIA

R. Jack Smith

JCS

Rear Adm. Frank W. Vannoy

OEP

Haakon Lindjord

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Davis forwarded the minutes to Kissinger on November 25 under a covering memorandum, in which she noted that Sonnenfeldt and Holdridge had reviewed them. (Ibid.) Cargo also prepared a short report on this meeting. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 63)

USIA
Henry Loomis
NSC Staff
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
John Holdridge
Richard T. Kennedy
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. the problem should be considered by the NSC even though there was no immediate operational decision to be made;
2. for purposes of the NSC discussion, we would distinguish between neutrality on the Sino-Soviet dispute and neutrality in our relations with China and the USSR;
3. the basic paper would be carefully reviewed by the NSC Staff and any proposed restatements would be discussed with the State representatives;
4. following this review, suggestions for handling the paper in the NSC would be discussed with the RG members early next week;
5. if desired, the oral presentation for the NSC will be discussed with the State representatives;
6. the considerations in the Defense Department supplementary paper² will be brought before the NSC in some form or other.

Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting saying that the group was considering a longer range version of the paper considered at the previous Review Group meeting.³ He posed the usual questions: (1) should the paper go before the NSC, and (2) does the paper adequately and properly define the issues—is it what we want to put before the President? He noted that he would return later to the DOD supplemental paper with a view to fitting it in in some way. With regard to an NSC meeting, while there was no immediate operational decision to be made, he thought it would be useful for senior officials to address the problem. His personal recommendation would be for an NSC meeting.

Mr. Cargo agreed that while we had no immediate operational decision, the general situation would not go away.

Mr. Kissinger asked if all agreed on an NSC meeting. All consented. He asked for the views of the group on the way in which the issues are posed.

² A summary of the Department of Defense dissent is printed as Document 41.

³ See Document 36.

Mr. Cargo said that the original paper was considered to be oriented too much on presumptions of U.S. policy although these presumptions were thought to be correct ones. The present redraft had been cast more in the options mold.

Mr. Kissinger asked for views on how the options are stated.

Admiral Vannoy said the JCS had no problem.

Mr. Smith questioned the wording of Option A.⁴ He asked what new opportunities might be open to the Soviets.

Mr. Cargo said that the wording was intended to reflect a Soviet response of displeasure. He thought there would not necessarily be *new* opportunities but that the general fallout of Option A would be Soviet hostility.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Soviets were not doing anything now that they could do if they became annoyed.

Mr. Cargo mentioned further penetration in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Smith added Berlin, but noted that it was not mentioned.

Mr. Kissinger asked if, leaving Berlin aside, we considered that the Soviets were operating at less than full capacity.

Mr. Smith thought they might intensify activities in Africa and Latin America.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that they could move more actively in other parts of the world.

Mrs. Camps thought, in general, they could agitate more noisily.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Soviets made more noise, would not the effect be to drive Western Europe more toward the U.S.

Mrs. Camps thought the Soviets would be even more nervous about the situation in Western Europe and would likely review their options in Western Europe with a view to intensifying their efforts. She thought the Soviets would undoubtedly be more concerned about a Western Europe allied with the U.S. in active support of the Chinese.

Mr. Kissinger commented "unless you assume they do not want a Western Europe allied with the U.S. at all." He thought the Soviets were at the maximum of what they can feasibly do. If we actively support the Chinese, the Soviets would undoubtedly be much angrier but he did not know what they could do operationally.

Mrs. Camps thought that they would be more concerned with regard to Western Europe and those countries bordering China.

⁴ Reference is to Option A of Document 40. In abbreviated form, the options were: A. Support China, B. Support the USSR, C.1. Passive neutrality, and C.2. Current policy with more movement toward China.

Mr. Cargo asked if it would help to change the phrase on page 3 of the paper from “increasing their efforts to detach Western Europe from the U.S.” to “increasing their efforts to weaken the U.S. position in Western Europe.” He personally doubted that the Soviets are moving at full intensity.

Mr. Smith agreed this was true worldwide.

Mr. Lindjord thought that the use of “detach” was a problem but said OEP had no other questions on the paper.

Mr. Ware had no comment on this issue.

Mr. Wu thought Soviet reaction would depend on the time and circumstances. He thought the Soviets under pressure, while annoyed, might react in the opposite direction from that indicated in the paper.

Mr. Loomis had no comment on the paper.

Mr. Cargo asked if the revision that he had suggested would meet the concerns expressed.

Mr. Smith thought it would help.

Mr. Kissinger said he had no major problem with this formulation. However, he questioned the posing of the options, commenting that the only realistic option seemed to be C.2. With regard to Option A, he thought the political issues stated were the extremes. To support Chinese border claims would be practically to declare war on the USSR. He thought even to support the moves with regard to the GRC without undertaking the anti-Soviet moves would be pretty extreme. He had no objection to including the Option if it were understood that these were extreme cases. He thought, however, we could have a more subtle policy short of overwhelming provocation of the USSR. If the principals saw Option A as the only version of support for China, it would be too easy for them to reject. The same was true of support for the Soviets. He thought we could find ways of leaning toward the Soviets without taking the view that China is the aggressor or without supporting the Soviets in Western Europe. He found the Soviet case less extreme, however. He thought we could state our support for either side within a framework of a policy that we have no interest in measures that would bring about war. All-out support for China might produce a Soviet preemptive move. If we undertake all-out support for the Soviets, they might take this as a signal for them to take care of China and might then make a preemptive move. He thought we should, for the principals, flag the conditions under which support for either side might produce preemptive action, without at the same time rejecting a policy of support for either side.

Mrs. Camps said that the summary of the options was not adequate and that any paper for NSC consideration must be expanded to reflect the full flavor of the options as stated in the full paper. Each option contains sub-options involving questions of degree. It was difficult to analyze every conceivable sub-option and very hard to define what the limiting factors would be.

Mr. Kissinger noted that the options as stated might always produce an attack on China; it would be very hard to produce an attack on the Soviet Union.

Mrs. Camps thought that Option C.2. leaves room for movement in our relations with China.

Mr. Kissinger recognized the problem and agreed that it would be a mistake to redo the paper to include every conceivable combination of measures.⁵ He thought it would be possible to add some material to define limited cases—that gradations were possible within the statement of consequences. He thought Option C.1. combined the disadvantages of every course and that it would be considered more threatening to the Soviets than to the Chinese. He thought we needed a subtler approach.

Mr. Kissinger moved to the question of the U.S. position in the event of hostilities. He thought it was hard to believe that the Soviets would want more from us than neutrality. Neutrality would, in fact, equal support for the Soviets. Support for China might achieve nothing and might find us backing a losing cause. There was also a question of the limited degree of support we would be willing to give. Anything more than that would require massive activity. He noted statements by the Secretary and Under Secretary of State to the effect that neutrality resulted in support of the Soviets. He admitted that while he understood the question, he did not know the answer.

Mr. Cargo agreed that we were imprisoned by this.

Mr. Kissinger asked what our attitude would be in the event of a Soviet preemptive strike. Would we say “a plague on both your houses”? Would we condemn the move? Would we do more than condemn?

Mr. Cargo thought we would suspend the SALT talks.

Mr. Kissinger surmised that if the Soviets should undertake a preemptive strike against China, they would claim in the SALT talks that they had done our work for us. Should we not resist the principle of such unilateral action even though it might be advantageous to us?

⁵ Following this meeting, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Cargo concerning the response to NSSM 63. He requested that the “Options” section be refined to reflect the discussions held during the November 20 meeting. Kissinger also asked for greater distinction between the United States’ position toward the immediate causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute and attitudes toward the underlying relationship. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Cargo, November 29; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, Review Group Meeting, Sino-Soviet Differences, 11/20/69) The revised version of the report is not in the NSC files. According to the “NSSM Status Reports Prepared by S/PC,” in December 1971, no due date was set for these revisions and “No further action on this study is now likely.” (Ibid., RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Under Secretaries Memoranda, 1971)

Mr. Sonnenfeldt commented that the WSAG had agreed this would set a bad precedent.

Mr. Cargo agreed that the analysis was correct. Since China is the weaker power, a stance of impartiality would be more favorable to the Soviet Union than to China. He thought there were still sensible alternatives. A minor injection of U.S. sympathy and support for China would be ineffective and would only irritate the Soviets. Massive U.S. support of China, with the implication of military support, was not thinkable as U.S. policy.

Mr. Kissinger agreed with Secretary Rogers' television statement that our essential position is and should be one of neutrality.⁶ He asked whether it was not possible within the spectrum of neutrality to carry out policies slightly leaning to one side or the other. He thought the President wished to indicate the existence of a Chinese option although our declaratory policy would be neutrality. He thought opening up certain exchange possibilities would not necessarily mean giving up neutrality.

Mrs. Camps thought this was adequately provided for in Option C.2. The concept is that since one starts with a different relationship with China than with the Soviet Union, actual neutrality would require doing some positive things with China. On the other hand, since we already have some relations with the USSR, it would involve primarily pursuing these relationships in Berlin, SALT talks, etc. We now have relations with the Soviets; we do not have relations with China.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt thought we should distinguish between the question of neutrality on the merits of the Sino-Soviet dispute itself and neutrality on our relationships with each country.

Mrs. Camps thought this had been done in Option C.2.

Mr. Kissinger thought C.2. would make this possible. He noted, however, that the NSC principals would be coming fresh to this discussion. He thought we might handle this concept in the oral presentation at the NSC meeting and offered to discuss this presentation with Mr. Cargo and Mrs. Camps. He thought the other options (A and B) might be stated as extremes without foreclosing the possibility that we could take measures leaning toward one side or the other without becoming involved in the dispute. He thought we could lean toward China but that it would be extremely unwise for us to get into the border dispute. He agreed with Mrs. Camps that there was a question of how one defines neutrality. He thought Option C.2. could be interpreted two ways: (1) stay out of the dispute but pursue U.S. interests with both countries, or (2) stay neutral across the board. Options A and B called either for taking a stand on the dispute or at least leaning ag-

⁶ Rogers appeared on the National Broadcasting Company's *Meet the Press* program on October 12. The transcript is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 27, 1969, pp. 345–350.

gressively toward one or the other side. We could take steps toward China which would annoy the USSR but could still stop short of the big issues. For example, we could promote maximum trade with China without getting involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute—still throwing our weight toward China.

Mrs. Camps thought it would be unrealistic to go very far toward China without some reciprocity.

Mr. Kissinger asked then what was the meaning of Option A.

Mrs. Camps commented that the steps described under Option A would have to be extreme if they were good enough to bring Chinese support.

Mr. Kissinger agreed on the question of reciprocity but thought leaning toward China with reciprocity would be Option C.2. He thought Option A had been stated as an extreme, but was impressed by Mrs. Camps' arguments on the question of reciprocity.

Mrs. Camps reiterated that the summary was not adequate and that the paper should be read carefully. She thought the nuances that Mr. Kissinger sought were present in the paper and that fiddling with the options would not make the issues any clearer. She suggested that the summary be dropped.

Mr. Kissinger said he had skimmed the full paper but had read the summary carefully.

Mr. Cargo thought they could not do much better with the paper if they presented options that are discernible. He thought there was a spectrum of steps toward China and Soviet reaction to them. The lower end of the spectrum of Option A is incorporated in Option C.2.—neutrality but pursuing our own interests. He thought the options were more easily seen at the upper end of the spectrum. For example, some policies under Option C.2. would constitute support for China. He considered the present division of the options not a bad one.

Mr. Kissinger agreed to read the paper carefully, saying he thought all now understood the problem.

Mrs. Camps assured him that the full paper would meet his preoccupations.

Mr. Kissinger agreed to read the full paper and, if he thought any restatements were required, to discuss them with Mr. Cargo and Mrs. Camps. For purposes of the NSC meeting he thought we should distinguish between neutrality on the dispute and neutrality in our relations with China and the USSR. Neutrality on the dispute would not necessarily preclude our leaning toward one or the other. He agreed we could not go far with Option A without reciprocity. If there were such reciprocity this would mean a diplomatic revolution. This might result in our foregoing our neutrality on the dispute—that is, of forcing us to take a position on the dispute itself. He thought this should be stated clearly for the President. On the other hand, support for the USSR would not

result in a revolution of the same magnitude. He agreed that any significant revisions of the paper would be discussed with all RG members.

He then turned to the Defense Department's supplementary paper. He thought this paper was based on a different set of assumptions and in a different time frame. He thought the views of a senior department must go before the NSC for consideration with equivalence to those of other departments. He thought the DOD paper saw certain cataclysmic events taking place beyond the options stated in the paper.

Mr. Ware said the DOD paper went a step beyond the basic paper. He referred to some of the questions on page 4 of the DOD paper which he considered not unrelated to some of Mr. Kissinger's comments. The DOD paper raised the question of how to get concessions from China, given the pressure they would be under. He thought we should not dismiss the possibility that a worse situation might be created on the mainland of China. The DOD paper attempted to explore what should be U.S. attitudes: (1) at the existing level of Soviet-Chinese relations; (2) in the event of a preemptive strike, and (3) in the event of protracted conflict. He said he did not know how these could be blended into the existing paper.

Mr. Kissinger noted the questions raised on page 4 of the DOD paper, commenting that these did not include the question of what unilateral policies we might pursue for our own objectives. What would we expect in return?

Mr. Wu thought we could ask for certain *quids pro quo*.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it would be in terms of "if we move into Option A, this is what we could expect to get for our position."

Mr. Ware noted, however, that even in a situation of U.S. neutrality the Chinese might fear that we could not remain neutral.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt thought this would depend on their judgment as to what U.S. neutrality means.

Mr. Wu noted that the various options stated would have to be applied within a certain environment of relations between the two countries: the present situation, increased pressures, hostilities, or preemptive strike. They would have to be considered in relation to whether the Soviets had succeeded or not.

Mr. Kissinger thought we could take care of some of the DOD points by expanding the present discussion in the paper.

Mr. Wu thought this would require extensive rewriting.

Mr. Kissinger said an alternative would be to make the DOD supplement an annex to the basic paper.

Mr. Ware suggested that two summary paragraphs be inserted in the summary of the basic paper to note the existence of a supplementary series of comments, then send the supplementary paper forward to the NSC.

Mr. Kissinger said that ideally the paper should have some inter-departmental sanction; however, he could not refuse to let the DOD paper go before the NSC, either as an annex or otherwise. He saw the major thrust of the DOD paper to be consideration of a major war or a possible cataclysmic breakup of China and of the sort of concessions we might get in this situation. He had no problem with a presentation of these considerations. He asked if the question of U.S. policies in the case of major war or cataclysmic changes inside China might not possibly be more useful as a contingency study?

Mr. Wu thought cataclysmic change might include support of a pro-Soviet China without actual war.

Mr. Cargo thought the question was how the DOD paper impinges on NSSM 63 or on the WSAG exercise. He could not say there was no possibility of the occurrence of the conditions described in the DOD paper. He did question whether they were possible enough to warrant the time required of senior people for lengthy analysis. If it was agreed to pursue these considerations, he thought the first step should be to get an intelligence estimate as to their likelihood.

Mr. Ware expressed the view that the Soviets might like to see internal change in China.

Mr. Kissinger asked why the U.S. should support a pro-Soviet government in China.

Mr. Ware asked what we would do under those conditions.

Mr. Kissinger asked what *could* we do?

Mr. Kissinger said that if the Secretary of Defense wishes the paper to go before the NSC it will, of course, go. He thought he owed it to the Defense Department to find a way to integrate the DOD paper as a possible approach.

Mr. Ware offered to sit down with State Department representatives in an attempt to work out means of incorporating or adding the DOD considerations to the basic paper.

Mr. Kissinger thought this would be difficult since the DOD paper operated on different assumptions in a different time frame.

Mr. Smith agreed with Mr. Kissinger that the DOD paper might be considered in the contingency context.

Mr. Ware thought the DOD paper was more than that since one alternative therein dealt with the existing situation between the USSR and China.

Mr. Kissinger agreed to study the basic paper carefully and to come back to the RG members early next week with suggestions for handling the paper in the NSC. He thought the discussion has been useful in clarifying the issues and assured Mr. Ware that the Defense considerations would be surfaced one way or another.

48. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Warsaw Talks and Taiwan Strait Patrol

State is thinking of using the elimination of the Taiwan Strait patrol as a lever to encourage the Chinese who wish to reopen the Warsaw talks. Prior to the formal pitch we will make at the Ambassadorial talks to the Chinese Communists in Warsaw on our modification of the Taiwan Strait patrol—and as a means of re-starting such talks—State wants to make the same pitch to a Chinese official in Hong Kong [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. A message for your clearance is at Tab A,² [*1 line of source text not declassified*].

State's purpose in this clandestine approach is to reinforce the formal approach, and make sure that Peking gets the message. They say that with the adjustments in ship movements through the Taiwan Strait made to satisfy the GRC about our continued presence there, it might otherwise take a while for Peking to learn of the modification (i.e. suspension) of the Taiwan Strait patrol. (In order to reassure President Chiang, we are routing some fifteen ships a month through the Strait to make up in part for the elimination of the destroyer patrol.)

I assume that, in the formal channel at Warsaw, State intends to make clear that we are not withdrawing from our commitments. (State's purpose is simply to make some political capital out of a decision taken on budgetary grounds; we would not want the ploy to be misinterpreted as a signal of diminished US interest, which could conceivably encourage Chinese Communist pressure against the offshore islands or elsewhere. I shall be sure that you clear any instruction to Warsaw.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I, Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. According to another copy of the memorandum, it was drafted by Grant on November 21. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Chronological File, Box CL 3, Folder: November 17–30, 1969)

² Attached at Tab A but not printed is a memorandum from Coerr (INR/DOC) to Nelson (CIA), drafted by Thayer (EA/ACA). The message read in part: "the Department requests that you take steps as soon as possible to draw this modification [of the Strait patrol] to Peking's attention. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] a 'rumor' that the U.S. Navy's regularly scheduled patrol of the Taiwan Strait, which previously operated from Taiwan ports, is being discontinued, although U.S. Navy vessels will continue to transit the Strait. The rumor would not include any knowledge of the reason for the modification but would express the view that the move was interesting." Also attached was a draft telegram to Warsaw, Taipei, and Hong Kong, [*text not declassified*].

Although as a general rule I believe we should steer away from gimmickry such as this, I consider that under the confusing circumstances which are developing in the Taiwan Strait it would be advisable to move ahead. The draft telegram has already been cleared all over the place, but unless Under Secretary Johnson discussed it with you directly, the matter was not put to us until the draft actually arrived.

Recommendation

That you clear the draft message at Tab A.³

³ Kissinger initialed the approval option on November 26. An attached handwritten note reads: "Return to Holdridge for action. State not yet informed." Holdridge wrote on the note: "State informed 11/26 2:50 p.m." [*text not declassified*] (Memorandum from Nelson to Coerr, December 3; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, Far East, China, 1969–1970)

49. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Next Moves in China Policy

I believe the time has come to proceed with the remaining measures relaxing economic controls against Communist China, which you approved in principle in June (NSDM–17),² as well as to consider other steps we might take toward China.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL CHICOM–US. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Kreisberg drafted the memorandum on October 6 and sent it under Green's signature to Richardson. On October 23 Winthrop Brown and Morton Abramowitz asked for a shorter, "punchier" version. (Ibid.) In a November 22 memorandum to Rogers, Richardson wrote: "it is very important to move on the attached package right away." He hoped that the measures could be carried out by the end of the year. Richardson emphasized that "Sino-Soviet border talks are still going on. It might prove difficult to move ahead with these measures if the talks break down." He also wanted the measures implemented prior to Chiang Ching-kuo's visit in 1970 and pointed out that "Congress will be moving out for its Christmas recess and our consultation problems will be much reduced." (Ibid.) Green revised the memorandum and forwarded it to Rogers on December 1. He attached a covering memorandum, in which he noted that the memorandum to Nixon had been changed to reflect Rogers' request to delineate more clearly between actions that could be taken immediately and actions that would wait for the resumption of Sino-American talks in Warsaw. (Ibid.)

² Document 14.

—Talks between the Soviet Union and Communist China begin in Peking on October 20. We do not believe that these will result in a fundamental change in the Sino-Soviet relationship. The roots of the ideological dispute will remain, together with a certain level of tension. Although the Sino-Soviet discussions have apparently not gone well thus far, we cannot exclude the possibility of at least a partial rapprochement between the Soviets and the Chinese, which might take the form of some restoration of normalcy in state-to-state relations.

—Our moves may introduce an additional complicating factor into the Soviet leadership's assessment of our intentions towards China—and towards the USSR, as well. Such an effect would also serve our long-term interest of forestalling an eventual more fundamental rapprochement between the USSR and China.

—At the same time, this conjunction of Soviet agreement to negotiations both with China and with us, on SALT, enables us to maintain our posture of non-involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Moves by us at this time in the direction of opening the door towards China a little more can hardly be the object of plausible objections by the Soviet Government when it itself is talking with the Chinese.

—Notwithstanding the ups and downs in Chinese propaganda stridency in recent months, there have been signs of moderation in Peking's foreign policy stance including—in private encounters—toward the U.S. We cannot predict that such steps as I propose would evoke a favorable response from Peking, but the chance that they might now appears to be greater than it has been for some time. Additionally, when the Chinese leadership appears to be in some disarray, we may contribute to a strengthening of those who advocate moderation and thereby continue to move towards a position where we may be able eventually to exert some influence on the Chinese Government in a direction more favorable to our own interests.

—Finally, the steps I propose would serve specific U.S. interests. They would also be useful preliminaries to an attempt by us in the near future to revive bilateral discussions with the Chinese and as further signals that we are interested in continuing to move towards more normal relations.

The Republic of China will object to such moves, but I do not believe this should deter us. These actions would not affect any vital security interest of Taiwan or diminish in any way our existing treaty commitments. They would be consistent with what I have told ROC leaders about our general approach towards Communist China.

If you agree that we should move forward, I would contemplate undertaking the requisite Congressional consultation, preparatory to announcement of changes in regulations.

Treasury concurs that all the actions described below can be taken by executive action and approves of the recommendations.

*Specific Recommendations*³

I have considered the whole range of measures we might take—economic, travel, raising the level of the Warsaw talks, etc.—but at this time recommend the following moves to be implemented in two stages.

a. For implementation immediately:

1. Remove Foreign Asset Control (FAC) restraints on foreign subsidiaries of United States firms on transactions with China regarded as non-strategic by COCOM (approved by you in principle in NSDM-17, June 26, 1969);

2. Eliminate the present restrictions on U.S. business participation in third-country trade in presumptive Chinese goods;

3. Modify slightly your approval in June allowing the noncommercial purchase of Chinese Communist goods by Americans traveling or resident abroad by removing the \$100 ceiling and the requirements that non-commercial imports from China enter the United States as accompanied baggage.

In addition to their political effects on the Chinese and Russians, implementation of these measures would:

—remove a substantial licensing burden on Foreign Assets Control and the general public;

—relieve a number of difficult problems which our Allies have raised pertaining to United States extraterritorial controls on the activities of American subsidiaries abroad;

—not make any commodities available which the Chinese cannot already purchase abroad;

³ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendations, but the NSC staff summarized this document in a 1-page memorandum, which Kissinger initialed and sent to Nixon on December 11. The President initialed his approval of all recommendations and added a handwritten note: "Depending on Warsaw meeting analysis." An unknown person added the notation "12-15/69." A handwritten notation beside Kissinger's signature reads: "Al—Let's move on this. I'll call Richardson." (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, December 11; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III) On December 15 Kissinger called Richardson at 11:50 a.m. to tell him that the President had approved "that proposal on China policy: foreign assistance control; restrictions on US participation in trade and modification of non-commercial purchases. Now how do we implement it?" Richardson answered that it would be done by an announcement in the *Federal Register*. Kissinger asked if could be done by early next week. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) On December 16 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Richardson entitled: "Next Move in China Policy." It reads in full: "The President has approved the 'recommendations for immediate implementation' contained on page 3 of the Secretary of State's memorandum of December 2, 1969, subject: Next Moves in Our China Policy. Implementation of these three steps should be initiated in a low-key manner so as to minimize public speculation on the implication of these moves." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHICOM-US) On December 18 Kissinger and Richardson met to discuss the implementation and public announcement of this policy. In particular Kissinger wanted to review how other nations and members of Congress would be notified. (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, December 18; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 337, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969-December 1969)

—contribute to the competitive strength of American business concerns overseas and respond to strong pressures from foreign branches of U.S. business concerns in several Asian countries to be allowed to compete for third-country business in goods administratively assumed to be of Chinese origin; and

—satisfy the desire of tourists, collectors, museums, and universities to import Chinese products for their own account and rid us of administrative headaches.

b. For implementation following the resumption of our bilateral Ambassadorial talks with the Chinese:

1. Modify the Department of Commerce export control regulations through a general license for the export of food, agricultural equipment, fertilizers and pharmaceuticals (approved by you in principle in NSDM-17, June 26, 1969). This would

—provide an initial opening in the area of non-strategic direct U.S. trade with Peking;

—would not enable Peking to obtain commodities they are not already able to purchase elsewhere;

—would represent only a modest extension beyond the offers to sell grain and pharmaceuticals on an ad hoc basis to the Chinese made during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations; and

—would open up a potential outlet for American farm products (for example, the Chinese Communists have recently expressed interest in purchasing U.S.-produced oilseeds from a large West Coast vegetable oil company through a Hong Kong intermediary).⁴

WPR

⁴ Relevant diplomatic posts were informed of the new regulations in telegram 209491 to Taipei, Ottawa, Tokyo, Seoul, Saigon, Canberra, London, Wellington, and Hong Kong, December 18. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, STR 9–1 CHICOM) A Department of State spokesman announced the changes on December 19. (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 12, 1970, p. 31) The actual modifications to the Foreign Assets Control Regulations are in 34 *Federal Register* 20189.

50. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 9, 1969.

SUBJECT

Letter to President Chiang on Taiwan Strait Patrol

Secretary Rogers has recommended (Tab B)² that you send a brief response to President Chiang's telegraphic expression of concern at our proposal to de-activate the two destroyers which constituted the Taiwan Strait patrol.³

Under Secretary Packard and Admiral McCain reassured President Chiang that the Seventh Fleet will continue to maintain an effective surveillance of the Strait. He withdrew his objections to the removal of the two destroyers.⁴

Subsequent to that exchange, President Chiang has followed up his telegraphic message with a longer letter (Tab C)⁵ which makes clear that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence File, Republic of China, President Chiang Kai-shek. Secret; Limdis. Sent for action. Kissinger's handwritten comment on the memorandum reads: "Send out." A November 24 covering memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger contains a short, handwritten comment by Kissinger: "Can't we go a little farther on the F-4's—Laird has indicated a willingness to proceed." (Ibid.)

² Attached at Tab B is a November 19 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, in which Rogers concludes: "I believe a personal acknowledgment of his message would bring this matter to an appropriate close."

³ Chiang sent a short message to Nixon on November 14 asking that the decision be delayed. (Telegram 4608 from Taipei, November 14; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III)

⁴ A transcript of a November 14 telephone conversation between Laird and Kissinger, reads: "K indicated that the Chinese Ambassador [Chow Shu-kai] came in to see him with a personal letter to President Nixon about the two destroyers which are going off station soon. They understand the problems but they wonder whether we could delay it for 2 or 3 weeks. Laird indicated that this is part of the State Department move toward China. They came in to talk to Laird also. They equate this to a new policy toward the mainland. They are trying to get us to go along with a few F4s for them. They only want to buy 8 or 9 of them. K asked what Laird thought about that. Laird said it was o.k. with him but they want us to make credit arrangements for them. Kissinger added that he has not discussed the issue with the President but agrees with Laird's plan to allow a three-week extension of the patrol." (Ibid.; see also Document 45) Even as Kissinger and Laird discussed delaying the policy change, Packard and McCain were meeting with Chiang (November 15 in Taipei) to explain the plan to de-activate the regular patrol in the Strait. They emphasized that U.S. naval vessels would continue to transit the Strait on a regular basis, and that the de-activation was designed to retire two older destroyers. Packard reported that Chiang accepted their logic on the issue, and the Department of Defense issued orders on November 16 to follow through on the original plan to end the patrol. (Letter from Laird to Kissinger, November 29; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III)

⁵ Attached at Tab C but not printed is the November 19 letter.

he was by no means pleased with the withdrawal. He assumes that “gaps” will be created which will tempt the Communists to attack his sea lines of communications to the Pescadores and the offshore islands.

—On these grounds, he calls for an immediate review of the contingency plan “Rochester.” (This is a plan for the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores within the terms of our Mutual Security Treaty with the GRC.)

He goes on to endorse “Vietnamization” and the concept that the threatened nations should do more to assure their own defense.

—Using this justification, he reiterates the Chinese request for submarines and late-model jets (by implication, F-4s).

We have repeatedly declined Chinese requests for submarines because we do not believe that they would represent an effective use of resources for the defense of Taiwan and they would provide the GRC with a capability for mainland operations which we might not endorse.

We have not programmed F-4s in our MAP program for Taiwan because of the cost. (The issue has been made a current one, however, by a House amendment to the FY71 MAP bill to provide a squadron of F-4s to the GRC; we do not know exactly how the GRC managed to get this one into the hopper.) We *are* proceeding with the upgrading of the GRC air force, and we are presently in the process of offering the Chinese additional F-104s, which will enable them to phase out their remaining F-86s and will give them a fighter force built around F-104s and F-5s.⁶

I think that your reply to the Generalissimo should be friendly, courteous and noncommittal. We should not offer him any hope that by escalating the negotiations to your level he can get the submarines or airplanes he wants, and—given Senatorial interest in contingency plans—we do not want to seem to give too much attention or status to plan “Rochester.”

I believe that, together with your expression of concern about Mme. Chiang’s health which you have relayed through Ambassador McConaughy, President Chiang will get the message: that you remain friendly and concerned about his welfare but disinclined to embark upon a shift of policy to accommodate his desires for more sophisticated arms.

⁶ In a December 3 telephone conversation, Packard and Kissinger discussed the ROC Air Force’s needs and specifically the need for F-104s. Packard stated that “they [the ROC] don’t need them from a military standpoint—they are in good shape there. On the other hand, if we are going to follow the President’s policy of supporting our Allies (they are one of our strongest friends) and it would be a move in the President’s long-range proposals . . . Packard advised that we recommend that we go ahead with it.” (Notes of a telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

The proposed letter has been coordinated with James Keogh.⁷

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to President Chiang at Tab A.⁸

⁷ James Keogh was a journalist with *Time Magazine* before joining the President's staff in 1969.

⁸ Nixon's response, sent in telegram 208044 to Taipei, December 16, reads in part: "I am confident that any questions concerning the details of these new procedures will be resolved satisfactorily through consultations between the Commander, United States Taiwan Defense Command, and your defense authorities. If your defense authorities believe that some modifications of plan 'Rochester' are required by the present situation, the officers of the Taiwan Defense Command will be interested in hearing their views." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6-2 US)

51. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Informing the Soviets of our Talks with the Chinese

I notice that Gerard Smith and Ambassador Thompson proposed that Dobrynin be informed of the resumption of US-Chinese talks before it becomes public knowledge.²

In the last Administration it was standard practice for the State Department to provide Dobrynin with detailed records of the Warsaw talks. This was done at the Thompson and Bohlen level. The idea was to calm possible Soviet suspicions. It was also assumed that the Russians probably had some knowledge of the content of the talks from

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information.

² Thompson voiced this concern as early as February 7 in a memorandum to Rogers, in which he reported on his meeting with Kissinger and the President: "I told the President I thought we should be careful not to feed Soviet suspicions about the possibility of our ganging up with Communist China against them. In reply to his question, I said I was not referring to his public statements on this matter as the Soviets would understand that we would pursue our national interests. Rather I was thinking of any hints or actions that indicated something was going on under the table." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12)

Polish monitoring operations and that, therefore, there was no harm in providing them with the full record.

I believe that as a matter of style, and consistent with our general approach to the Soviets and the Chinese Communists, this practice of the last Administration should not be resumed in this one. I assume that you will want to call this to the attention of the Secretary of State.³

³ Haig wrote “Absolutely” and his initials after this paragraph, along with the following comment: “Hal [Sonnenfeldt]—Rogers called HAK, agreed completely with your psn [position] and he’s even volunteered this psn—HAK ran by Pres—and confirmed in writing. Copy attached.” Attached was a December 12 memorandum from Kissinger, informing Rogers “that under no circumstances should we inform Dobrynin of the talks or their content. If Dobrynin questions, we should respond with nonchalance that they concern matters of mutual interest but not go beyond that. The President is concerned that lower-level offices not go beyond this in informal conversations.” (Ibid., POL CHICOM–US) On December 13 the President told Kissinger that the Warsaw talks, as well as any talks with the Soviet Union, “ought to be handled on a confidential basis.” Kissinger later observed: “I don’t care about these talks [Warsaw talks]; we don’t have anything to talk about anyway.” The President replied: “we all know that, but the Russians aren’t going to believe we didn’t have [*say?*] anything, and the Chinese will believe we are playing them off against the Russians.” (Notes of a telephone conversation, December 13, 12:59 p.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

52. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Taipei, December 17, 1969, 4:30–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECTS

1. Exposition of U.S. China Policy
2. Changes in Seventh Fleet Patrol of Taiwan Strait
3. Miscellaneous Matters

PARTICIPANTS

President Chiang Kai-shek
Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis. The meeting was held at Chiang’s residence in Shih Lin. Drafted by McConaughy on December 30, passed to Green, who then forwarded it to Kissinger, who in turn sent it to the President. Kissinger wrote, “it would appear that McConaughy faithfully reproduced your ideas to President Chiang.” Kissinger added that he had authorized Green to “make limited dissemination of the MemCon in State, on a need-to-know basis, in the belief that the document will have a useful educational effect in acquainting the appropriate officers in State as to the tone and thrust of your China policy.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, February 17; *ibid.*)

PRESENT BUT NOT PARTICIPATING

Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming
 Mr. Fredrick F. Ch'ien, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, North American Bureau
 (Interpreter)

This was my first call on President Chiang, made at my request, following my return to Taiwan on December 8 after an absence of three and a half months.

I conveyed the warm greetings of President Nixon to President and Madame Chiang, together with his cordial expression of good will and sympathetic interest. I recalled President Nixon's active concern at the injury which Madame Chiang sustained in the auto accident of mid-September, and described the particulars of President Nixon's offer of U.S. medical assistance in the person of the noted American neurologist, Dr. Riland.² President Chiang expressed cordial appreciation for President Nixon's manifestations of interest and goodwill and voiced particular thanks for the kind offer of assistance in the medical treatment of Madame Chiang. He thought it would be unnecessary to accept the kind offer in view of Madame Chiang's favorable current rate of recovery, but he said he would like to consider the offer as still open in case of later need to accept it. I assured him it was a standing offer.

My principal purpose in arranging the call was to set forth for President Chiang the substance of an oral message from President Nixon in regard to U.S. China policy, which the President outlined to me in the course of my call on him at the White House on November 15, 1969.³ President Nixon instructed me to set forth this general U.S. position to President Chiang on an appropriate occasion after my return.

1. U.S. China Policy.

I told President Chiang that President Nixon had summarized to me his views on certain policy matters related to China, and had instructed me to convey the substance of what he had said to President Chiang upon my return.

I then set forth for President Chiang in summary form, and in conversational manner, a paraphrase of President Nixon's observations, along the following lines:

Mainland China. The U.S. Government remained thoroughly aware of the threat to the entire East Asian region posed by the Chinese

² During their November 15 meeting in Washington, Nixon asked McConaughy to make Chiang and his wife aware of the availability of Dr. R. Kenneth Riland, an osteopathic physician. McConaughy subsequently relayed this offer to Taipei. (Telegram 195779 to Taipei, November 21; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 CHINAT)

³ No substantive record of the November 15 meeting between Nixon and McConaughy has been found. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the meeting lasted from 12:30 to 12:51 p.m., with the last few minutes devoted to photographs taken by members of the press corps. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

Communist regime, and did not intend to pursue any policy which would enhance its capability for making trouble for its neighbors or for the rest of the world. The U.S. was not changing its attitude of vigilance or its posture of readiness to carry out its commitments in the area. At the same time, the USG believed that it had an obligation to take every practicable and prudent step to lower tensions in the area, and to implement in this part of the world the announced general Administration policy of endeavoring to substitute negotiation for confrontation. We wanted peaceful relations with all parts of the world and we wanted to avoid unnecessary provocation. In this era effective contacts with all great areas and peoples of the world aimed at creating a larger measure of understanding are an imperative necessity. In this spirit, we are making earnest efforts to establish a worthwhile dialogue with the Peiping regime. If the efforts should bear any fruit, it might take the form of a resumption of the Ambassadorial-level talks at Warsaw or elsewhere. In an effort to improve the atmosphere, we have made certain modest relaxations in the restrictions on trade and travel of American citizens in relation to Mainland China, and certain additional relaxations can be expected to follow. It is by no means certain that the Chinese Communists will react in any affirmative way to these limited gestures. In fact, it is only realistic to anticipate continued rebuffs from the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless, our efforts to improve the climate and to bring about a better and safer relationship with the Mainland will continue. We will carry forward this effort within the limits of prudence and national self-respect.

We are explaining this policy to the GRC with full candor, recognizing that President Chiang and his Government have a major interest therein which entitles them to a full exposition of our objectives. We believe that he will understand our motivation, recognizing as he does the greatness and the inescapable influence on the whole world of the vast Chinese population on the Mainland, and the need for effective communication between it and the outside world. We cannot be confident that any type of dialogue we may be able to establish with the Peiping regime will have any moderating effect on it, or be of any direct benefit to the mass of the Chinese people on the Mainland, but the possibility of some eventual influence of a beneficial nature cannot be entirely ruled out. In any event, we are determined to continue the search for serviceable contacts, and we feel it is right and appropriate for President Chiang as a friend and ally to be fully aware of the nature and the purposes of this policy.

Republic of China on Taiwan. The other facet of our China policy has to do with the Republic of China on Taiwan. President Nixon wants President Chiang to be assured in the most positive and explicit terms that the United States stands by its mutual defense commitment to the Republic of China and that nothing related to the search for better Mainland China relations will dilute that commitment. The U.S. Gov-

ernment is steadfast in its policy of strong support for and close association with the Republic of China and wants those close ties maintained and reinforced, not only in the defense area, but also in the political, economic, and cultural fields. He has expressly charged his Ambassador to the Republic of China with the responsibility for preserving and nurturing this close relationship in all its aspects. Furthermore, President Nixon has instructed the Ambassador to state on his behalf to President Chiang that in his view no aspect of our Mainland China policy impinges upon or is prejudicial to any essential interest of the Republic of China. President Nixon entertains the hope that President Chiang can accept this policy exposition with the confidence that in no respect is it inimical to the Republic of China and that it will not interfere with constructive and collaborative development efforts by our two governments in an atmosphere which we hope will be less shadowed by threats of aggression from the Mainland.

By way of further reassurance to President Chiang, I spelled out what our Mainland posture does *not* signify: (1) It does not mean that we are extending diplomatic recognition to the Chicom regime or facilitating its international acceptance; (2) It does not mean that we are lowering our defensive guard in any sector where we have a defense responsibility; (3) It does not mean that we believe there is evidence of a real change in the nature of the Chinese Communist regime, or that the Chinese Communist regime can be trusted; (4) It does not mean that we are abandoning any of our basic principles in our search for means of lessening the dangerous tensions in the East Asia region.

The President listened to the presentation intently, with apparent deep concentration and without interruption. At its conclusion, he reflected for a few moments and then simply said that he was reassured to have the confirmation that there would be no change in the U.S. policy of strong support for the Republic of China.

2. *Modification of Seventh Fleet Patrol of Taiwan Strait.*⁴

After the foregoing discussion of China policy, the President made mention, with some satisfaction, of the visit to Taipei of Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard on November 15.⁵ In that connection, reference was made to the suspension of the regular patrol of the Taiwan Strait by two destroyer escorts attached to the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The President noted that he had felt a considerable degree of concern at the U.S. decision, especially in view of the dangerous misinterpretation of the withdrawal which might be drawn by the Chinese Communists. He indicated his concerns had been partially, but not entirely, allayed

⁴ See Documents 34 and 50.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 50.

by the explanations and assurances given him by Deputy Secretary Packard and CINCPAC Admiral McCain.

I told the President that my meeting with President Nixon in Washington had taken place on the same day as his talk with Deputy Secretary Packard and Admiral McCain. The matter of the modification of the Seventh Fleet patrol of the Taiwan Strait had come up at that White House meeting, and President Nixon had asked me for a summary of the reasons for the Republic of China's objections to the change, as I understood them. I said I had given President Nixon a summation of the GRC position as I understood it, based on my general knowledge and on my conversation of a day or so before at the State Department with visiting Admiral Feng, CinC of the Chinese Navy.⁶ I said I had stressed the GRC view that the Chinese Communists would be likely to get the wrong signal from the modification, probably misconstruing it to mean a lessening of U.S. interest in the defense of the area. The consequence of such a misconstrual, in the GRC view, might be an unwitting encouragement to the Chicoms to take new and bolder steps of an aggressive nature in the Taiwan Strait area, including attacks on GRC vessels plying between Taiwan and the offshore islands. I told President Chiang that President Nixon had thereupon authorized me, upon my return, to assure the ROC Government that the slight alteration in the orders to individual ships of the Seventh Fleet were dictated purely by reasons of economy. There was no change in the role, mission or responsibilities of the Seventh Fleet and, of course, no change in our defense commitments. Nor would there be any change in our capability to carry out our commitment. President Nixon had further stated that there was naturally no U.S. intention to afford any cause for misunderstanding by the Chinese Communists. The U.S. was interested in lowering tensions and risks to peace, not in heightening them. President Nixon had told me that I could inform the representatives of the GRC that if the Chinese Communists took advantage of this U.S. administrative modification of patrol arrangements and resorted to attacks on Republic of China shipping in the Taiwan Strait area, the U.S. Government would certainly take cognizance of such an unjustified act. President Nixon indicated that he would not let any unwarranted and unprovoked Chicom attack on the Republic of China shipping in the Taiwan Strait go unnoticed. (N.B. I carefully refrained from specifying or indicating in any way what sort of reaction or cognizance President Nixon might have in mind.)

⁶ McConaughy met with Admiral Feng Chi-chung, Commander-in-Chief of the ROC Navy, on November 14 to discuss the Taiwan Strait patrol and the ROC's request to purchase submarines. (Memorandum of conversation, November 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6-2 US)

I further noted the arrangements that had been made for a material increase in the aggregate number of transits of the Strait per month by ships of the Seventh Fleet. Most of the vessels of the Fleet moving in a north/south direction would transit the Strait rather than travel along the East Coast of Taiwan. As a result, there would probably be more actual transits of the Strait by Seventh Fleet vessels, and a more thorough naval observation of the Strait under the new procedure than when the two DE's were on regular patrol. President Chiang indicated his appreciation at the receipt of this information. He seemed more relaxed about the patrol situation than he had been at the beginning of the discussion.

3. *Miscellaneous Matters.*

Brief exchanges took place on the following topics, as mentioned in Taipei telegram 5098 of December 18:⁷ Request for F-4 aircraft, forthcoming visit of Vice President Agnew to Taiwan,⁸ and USG invitation to Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to visit the U.S.⁹

⁷ Not printed. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 CHINAT-US.)

⁸ Vice President Agnew visited Taiwan in early January 1970. Records of Agnew's conversations with ROC leaders are *ibid.*, Conference Files, 1966-1972, CF-421, Vice President Agnew's Trip, December 1969-January 1970.

⁹ In telegram 2144 from Taipei, June 13, McConaughy had proposed a visit by Chiang Ching-kuo in the late summer or early fall of 1969. The response from the Department of State, with the concurrence of DOD and CIA, telegram 103272 to Taipei, June 24, noted that it would be difficult to schedule a visit in 1969. (Both cables are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 913, VIP Visits, Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of China, April 21-23, 1970, Vol. I) In September the Department of State proposed to Kissinger that Chiang Ching-kuo come to the United States in February 1970. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, September 15; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 CHINAT) Kissinger approved the trip in October. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, October 17; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 913, VIP Visits, Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of China, April 21-23, 1970, Vol. I) However, in late 1969 Department of State and White House officials confronted the problem of finding a date for Chiang Ching-kuo's visit that did not come too close to U.S.-PRC talks in Warsaw. In late February 1970 McConaughy was asked to extend a formal invitation for Chiang to visit on April 20-23. (Telegram 26985 to Taipei, February 23 and telegram 29573 to Taipei, February 27; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 CHINAT) Chiang Ching-kuo accepted in early March. (Telegram 971 from Taipei, March 5; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 913, VIP Visits, Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of China, April 21-23, 1970, Vol. I)

53. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

Memorandum from Secretary Rogers on Handling of Warsaw Talks²

Secretary Rogers has sent you the memorandum attached at Tab A, reporting that he looked into the question of the wide dissemination given to our Warsaw contact with the Communist Chinese.³ He reports that our Embassies in Tokyo, Taipei, and Moscow, and our Consulate General in Hong Kong were kept informed because of their special interest in the matter, but under the same injunctions about public comment as were placed on the Department's spokesman in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² In early December, based on instructions he had received at his September 9 meeting with the President and Kissinger (see Document 31), Stoessel approached the interpreter for the Chinese Chargé at a diplomatic reception organized by the Yugoslav Government and commented that President Nixon wished to open "serious, concrete talks with Chinese." (Telegram 3706 from Warsaw, December 3; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 US) On December 10 the Chinese Embassy telephoned the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw to suggest a meeting be held the next day. (Telegram 3744 from Warsaw, December 10; *ibid.*, POL CHICOM–US) On December 11 Stoessel went to the Chargé's residence (the Chinese Ambassador to Poland was not in the country), where he told Chargé Lei Yang that the meeting "provides an opportunity to begin exploring whether some improvement in our bilateral relationship may be possible." He suggested a formal meeting for the week of January 12–16, that Chinese and English be the languages used for the talks, and that they alternate between embassies rather than meeting in a "neutral" Polish venue. He also made clear that the United States was open to moving the talks to another city. (Telegram 3760 from Warsaw, December 11; *ibid.*) The President was informed of each step by Kissinger through the daily briefing memoranda. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Boxes 15 and 16, President's Daily Briefs)

³ Attached at Tab A was a December 18 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, responding to Nixon's concerns about "wide dissemination of the Warsaw contact." (*Ibid.*, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70) Kissinger had relayed the President's concerns to the Department of State and ordered that all telegrams on the Warsaw talks and "all public statements, press releases or references" to the talks or relations between the United States and PRC be cleared by the White House, and that "there should be no explanation to the Soviets with respect to our talks with the Chicomors nor should there be any speculation as to their reaction to these talks." (Memorandum from Kissinger to Eliot, undated; *ibid.*) In a December 15 telephone conversation, Kissinger told Richardson that "I thought, and so did the President more so, that the Warsaw talk was handled very poorly from that point of view. We spent months setting it up and it gets buck-slipped to half the embassies in the whole world. The less we say the better off we are." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Under Secretary of State, Telephone Conversations, December 1969)

Washington. (This was to limit comments on the substance of the meeting to the statement that “matters of mutual interest” were discussed.)

State informed the Governments of the Republic of China and Japan in advance of the meeting in general terms. The Secretary says that President Chiang was informed as a matter of necessary courtesy, and Prime Minister Sato was notified in order to work out with him the best means of handling public comment after the meeting became public knowledge. In fact, the Secretary says, there was no leak in either capital.

In addition, the Governments of Australia and the U.K. were briefed in confidence along the same lines very shortly before the announcement. Canada, France, Italy, and New Zealand were similarly briefed after the meeting.

The Chairman of the SALT delegation was notified on an eyes only basis that the meeting would take place. The State Department disagreed with his suggestion that the Soviets be informed in advance.

VOA and the Voice of the United Nations Command were instructed not to relay speculative comment appearing in the press, but to stick only to official statements on the subject.

The Secretary argues that despite these instructions, it has been impossible to stop public speculation and public conclusions as to the probable content of the talks. The report of Reuters that the Department spokesman said that resumption of talks had been discussed is simply untrue and is being taken up with Reuters. The Secretary notes that he will continue to clear all cables on the subject with the White House.

54. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Word from China through Pakistan

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK Trip to China—December 1969–July 1971. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

The Pakistani Ambassador came in with a report on a recent exchange between President Yahya and the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Pakistan.²

President Yahya early in November had called in the Chinese Ambassador to tell him the impressions he had gained in his talk with you in August and also to report our intentions to withdraw two destroyers from the Taiwan Straits.³ Basically, his message was that the U.S. is interested in normalizing relations with Communist China.

Early this month, the Chinese Ambassador returned to President Yahya after having heard from Peking. He told President Yahya that the Chinese appreciate the Pakistani role and efforts. He added that, as a result, the Chinese had released two Americans a few days before. [This apparently refers to the two yachtsmen released by the Chinese.]⁴

Ambassador Hilaly asked whether there was anything of more precise substance that I could give him to be discussed when Chou En-lai visits Pakistan. He said that no date for this visit had been set yet.

I made these two points:

1. When a date is settled for the visit, I would pass on to him something more specific which President Yahya might say.

2. The Pakistanis could, however, pass along the following word to the Chinese: We appreciate this communication which Ambassador Hilaly had brought. We are serious in our desire to have conversations with the Chinese. If they want to have these conversations in a more secure manner than Warsaw makes possible or in channels less widely disseminated within the bureaucracy, you would be prepared to do this.

Ambassador Hilaly indicated that he would send this message back to President Yahya.

I will consult with you in greater detail when we learn that a date has been set for Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan.

² The conversation between Hilaly and Kissinger was held in Kissinger's office on December 19. The memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*

³ See Document 20.

⁴ Brackets in the source text. Two Americans were detained by local Chinese authorities after straying into PRC territorial waters off the coast of Kwangtung Province near Macao on February 16, 1969. They were released on December 7. PRC representatives informed the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw on December 7. (Telegram 3724 from Warsaw; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–4 CHICOM) In his December 8 daily briefing memorandum for the President, Kissinger remarked that their release “culminates a series of low-key Chinese moves clearly intended to signal us—and probably the Soviets—that they are interested in greater communication with us.” (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 14, President's Daily Briefs) Chinese sources had claimed that the release was in response to the relaxation of trade restrictions, ending the Taiwan Strait patrol, and U.S. opposition to Soviet suggestions for joint action against the PRC. (Jin Zhongji, ed., *Zhou Enlai zhuan (A Biography of Zhou Enlai)* (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushe, 1998), p. 2046)

55. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Another Meeting with the Pakistani Ambassador on China

Last week Ambassador Hilaly came in to report an exchange which President Yahya had had with the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Rawalpindi.² President Yahya had conveyed his impression, based on his talks with you in August, that the US is prepared to normalize relations with Communist China.

After reporting that to Peking, the Chinese Ambassador returned to President Yahya and told him that the Chinese appreciated Pakistan's role and efforts in conveying that message. It was reported to Ambassador Hilaly that, "as a result," the Chinese had released two Americans. This apparently referred to the two yachtsmen released recently.

This week,³ the Ambassador said that he had received a more recent personal letter from President Yahya asking the Ambassador to convey to you the two following sentences:

1. "It is our assessment that the Chinese appear willing for the resumption of talks at Warsaw at the Ambassador level without insisting on preconditions."
2. "Quite apart from the public renunciation of the recent agreement between the US and Japan, the Chinese are greatly concerned over it and see in it the revival of Japanese militarism which will threaten not only China but the whole of Southeast Asia."

I told the Ambassador that we appreciated these communications and would be in touch with him when the date for Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan had been set in order to pass on something more specific for President Yahya to say.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China—December 1969–July 1971. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Saunders forwarded this memorandum to Kissinger on December 24 for transmittal to the President.

² See Document 54.

³ Kissinger met with Hilaly on December 23. The memorandum of conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China—December 1969–July 1971. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 2.

At the same time, Ambassador Hilaly delivered to me a very brief note from President Yahya to you conveying his government's "thanks for your prompt response to meet the food situation in East Pakistan."⁴ He said that "this timely action will help us in improving the food situation and bringing down food prices in East Pakistan." He closed saying that he valued "your keen interest in Pakistan's development effort." You will recall in mid-October approving shipment of grain to help bring down food prices in East Pakistan.

⁴ Attached but not printed is Yahya's December 4 note.

56. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 27, 1969.

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Relations

Attached are extracts from a perceptive CIA analysis of current Sino-Soviet relations.² The report indicates, inter alia:

—Peking admits being forced into border talks and believes Soviet efforts to improve relations with the West are part of preparations for "dealing" with China.

—Peking's campaign of civilian "war preparations" is designed to deter a Soviet attack as well as promote national unity and unpopular domestic programs.

—Moscow will continue military pressure along the frontier and pursue diplomatic efforts to isolate China.

—Peking will remain the vulnerable and defensive party and seek to improve its international diplomatic position.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1006, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File, Sino-Soviet Relations. Secret; Sensitive. Notations on the memorandum indicate that it was to be taken to San Clemente and that the President saw it.

² Attached but not printed are extracts prepared in the White House. Although there exist a variety of reports from the CIA concerning Sino-Soviet relations, none was found in the files that corresponded to the following extracts.

China, 1970

57. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. and Lindsey Grant of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 2, 1970.

SUBJECT

Gestures to General Chiang

You requested that an action memorandum be prepared on the upgrading of the GRC air defense system as a gesture to General Chiang. Dave Packard has written you explaining that this proposal, first made by State, needs to be further studied by DOD before any commitment is made to the GRC (Tab A).²

The Proposed Gestures

On December 11, State proposed that we make two gestures to the GRC as assurances of U.S. support (Tab B).³

—A new PL-480 agreement in support of the GRC's program (Vanguard) of technical assistance to other developing countries.⁴

—A promise to contribute substantially (\$31–\$36 million) to the upgrading of the GRC's air defense capability through provision of a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. Lynn initialed the memorandum but not Grant. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw and initialed it.

² Attached at Tab A is a December 31 memorandum from Packard to Kissinger, in which Packard wrote: "While there is general agreement that a high priority requirement exists for the proposals made by Ambassador Johnson and that they would substantially contribute to the GRC air defense system, the estimate of cost and funding provided to you appears to be optimistic." This conclusion was taken verbatim from a December 17 memorandum from Nutter to the Secretaries of the Army, Resor, and the Air Force, Seamans. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA General Files: FRC 330 72 A 6309, China, Rep. of, 1969, 333–388.3)

³ Attached at Tab B is a December 11 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Kissinger. Another copy is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, AID (US) 8 CHINAT.

⁴ Public Law 480, The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, (later commonly known as the "Food for Peace Act") was designed to "increase the consumption of United States agricultural commodities in foreign countries, to improve the foreign relations of the United States, and for other purposes." (PL-480, 68 Stat. 454, as amended) The Vanguard program was the ROC's foreign agricultural assistance program, primarily for African nations.

F-104 squadron, an additional Nike–Hercules battalion, an additional Hawk battalion, and upgrading of the GRC Aircraft Control and Warning System.

On the first gesture, PL-480 for Program Vanguard, you have signed off on the proposal.⁵ On the second, action has been delayed for DOD to develop a specific course of action based on State's general proposal.

The reasons given by Dave Packard for reconsideration of State's proposal to improve the GRC's air defense system are:

—The possibility of providing the proposed air defense systems cannot be determined now. State's judgement about the availability and cost of the air defense equipment "appears to be optimistic."

—The U.S. has recently promised to provide the GRC with both an additional squadron of F-104 interceptors and 5 destroyers. Dave Packard states that these systems will augment the GRC's air defense capability.

For these reasons, Dave Packard feels that the air defense proposal needs further study, which DOD has now undertaken and will be completed "in early January."

In preparation for his visit to the GRC, Vice President Agnew was briefed to make no specific commitment to the GRC beyond mentioning the F-104 squadron already promised and the U.S. desire to help the GRC improve its air defense capabilities.⁶ If more specific guidance has not been sent to the Vice President, he will not have committed the U.S. to provision of more air defense capability than Dave Packard feels DOD can offer at this time.

⁵ On December 22, 1969, Rogers recommended to Nixon that he ask Agnew, who was then traveling in East Asia, to inform the ROC Government of the continuation of PL-480 support for the Vanguard Program "subject to working out appropriate terms and conditions this spring." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, China, Vol. III) In a December 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge and Bergsten noted: "We see no need to bring this matter to the President." They recommended informing the Vice President of the Vanguard Program's renewal. Kissinger initialed his approval on December 27. (Ibid.) The Vice President was informed in telegram 213872 to Manila, December 31. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/AGNEW)

⁶ In a December 17, 1969, memorandum to Agnew, Kissinger wrote: "Although we do not wish to take a public position against F-4s, State and Defense have long considered F-4s too expensive, and submarines irrelevant to Taiwan's defense requirements. We are, however, discussing the continuing provision of more modern weapons (including F-104s) to the GRC." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 450, President's Trip Files, VP Trip East Asia Jan 70)

Summary

Dave Packard finds that the air defense system proposed by State as a gesture to General Chiang needs further study. Vice President Agnew's position prepared for his meeting with Chiang was consistent with this DOD reservation.⁷

⁷ Even prior to the Packard memorandum, Agnew's party had been informed that "DOD is currently working on plan that would hopefully enable GRC to obtain better aircraft than they now have with more manageable costs." (Telegram from Haig to Robert Houdek aboard Air Force II, December 27; *ibid.*) Memoranda of conversation from the Vice President's trip are *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Conference Files: Lot 70 D 387, Vice President's Trips, December 1969–January 1970, CF-421.

58. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 10, 1970.

INFORMATION ITEMS

[Omitted here are two paragraphs on the situation in Laos.]

—*Vice President on F-4s*: During his meeting in Taipei, the Vice President was twice approached obliquely concerning the GRC's desire for F-4s. Without mentioning F-4s specifically, he responded by:

- recognizing the high priority of GRC air defense requirements,
- indicating the US disposition to assist in up-grading GRC air defense, and
- stressing the difficult political problems surrounding the pending Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill.

He urged the GRC to take account of our problems, and reminded them that "the recipient country was not in a position to make a decision as to precisely what type of matériel the US would provide."

Subsequently, Ambassador McConaughy has discussed the F-4 question with Chiang Ching-kuo. He mentioned our current planning

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 16, President's Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. There is no indication that the President saw it.

on improved GRC air defense capabilities, and he elaborated on the technical reasons which make us doubt that the F-4 is suitable. He made a strong case of our desire for GRC consultation and cooperation in coping with a trying issue which was undoubtedly having consequences harmful to the GRC.

Chiang Ching-kuo said flatly that the request still stands. At the Ambassador's insistence, he agreed that his response would not be considered definitive until he had checked it with President Chiang, but neither he nor Ambassador McConaughy believe that President Chiang is likely to change his mind. (Tab B)²

—*Continuing Trend Away From Militancy in Communist China*: A recent article in the theoretical journal *Red Flag* underscores the determination of the Chinese leadership to rebuild the Communist Party through the rehabilitation of members who were under suspicion during the Cultural Revolution. The Party's primacy over other political organizations was strongly asserted, and Cultural Revolutionaries were bluntly warned that having won "merit" or office in the Cultural Revolution did not in itself entitle them to Party membership.

Whatever this may mean as to the power relationships at the top—and this is thoroughly unclear—the new article is a strengthening of the pragmatic and cautious line of the past nine months. It is another sign that the radicals who came forward in the Cultural Revolution are being further frozen out of the reconstituted power elite. Almost certainly, this both reflects and will further reduce the radicals' waning influence in Peking.

[Omitted here are items on the Soviet Union and other topics.]

² Attached at Tab B but not printed is telegram 127 from Taipei, January 8, reporting on a January 3 meeting between Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and Agnew; and telegram 149 from Taipei, January 9, reporting on a meeting between McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo.

59. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Warsaw Talks

You are aware of the success of the meeting with the Chinese Chargé on January 8.² Both sides carefully avoided polemics, and the Chinese accepted the administrative arrangements for future meetings with alacrity. The next meeting (and the first formal discussion of substance in two years) will occur in the Chinese Embassy on January 20. We will revert to the use of Chinese and English, which minimizes the possibility of translation error. Secretary Rogers has a proposed guidance telegram, which should be coming over very shortly.³

The Chinese tone of reasonableness is underlined by the ease which they accepted the principle of meeting alternately in the two Embassies. (Chinese usually like others to come to them, a remnant of the old imperial attitude.) Meeting inside the Embassies has the advantage, as they well know, of making it much harder for the Poles and the Russians to eavesdrop.

Three different elements of the Chinese attitude came out very clearly:

—They now *want* publicity. The Chargé arrived flamboyantly in his limousine. It was he who proposed the announcement of the meeting.

—They want to *sound reasonable*. The Chargé referred to the “five principles of peaceful co-existence,” a Chinese theme of the 50’s which was anathema during the Cultural Revolution.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. According to a handwritten notation, it was returned from the President on January 14. An attached covering memorandum indicates that Holdridge forwarded it to Kissinger at the latter’s request on January 9.

² See footnote 2, Document 53 for background on restarting the Warsaw talks. On January 7, 1970, the Chinese telephoned to suggest that Chargé Lei Yang and others come to the U.S. Embassy the next day. (Telegram 31 from Warsaw, January 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) At this meeting Lei Yang, accompanied by two aides, asked for a formal meeting on January 20. (Telegram 52 from Warsaw, January 8; *ibid.*)

³ Document 61.

—They want to maintain their *ideological “purity”* despite these talks. The Chinese press has continued to tell the Chinese public of the “iniquities” of your Administration.

The immediate Chinese purpose is to show the *appearance* of the ability to deal with us—primarily for Soviet consumption. They are probably unready to talk much substance. This phase is necessary, however.

Having convinced themselves of the desirability of appearing to be able to make deals with us, they may find it easier to justify seeking the *substance* of understandings. Already, they are showing some interest in trade with us, and considerable curiosity as to your new policy lines.

The more pragmatic style of diplomacy which the Chinese are showing around the world can pose some immediate problems for us (e.g. the Chinese representation issue in the UN), but it is a danger which we must run if they are to move into a more responsible and normal member of the world society.

There is a continuing trend within Communist China away from militancy, and a weakening of the radicals. (Recent evidence on this point is being separately briefed.)⁴ There is a good chance that the leadership may hold to its present pragmatic course, and that we shall have a chance to explore our relations with it at some leisure.

⁴ See Documents 58 and 64.

60. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Kabul, January 13, 1970, 1542Z.

112. 1. In view of encouragement which President, you and Secretary Rogers gave to me November 24 in Washington to look into pos-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Top Secret. Haig forwarded the cable to Kissinger under a January 15 covering memorandum entitled “Items to Discuss with the President During Telephone Call Tonight.” This item was checkmarked; however, the same item appeared on the “Items” memorandum for January 23. (Ibid.) A note attached to another copy reads: “No further dis. per AMH.” (Ibid., Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 1/5/70 to 4/30/70)

sibilities of some Sino-US contacts in Kabul, I have taken a first tentative step.²

2. On December 22 before resumption Warsaw talks announced I had conversation with Yugoslav Ambassador (Vojo Sobajic) in which I carefully reviewed key points our current policy toward China and indicated as my personal view that Kabul might not be bad place for informal or formal contacts. I said that I would leave to his judgment whether and in what manner he might make use of these views should occasion arise in his periodic contacts with Chinese Ambassador in Kabul.

3. At his request I called on Yugoslav Ambassador January 14 who had meeting with Chinese Ambassador (Hsieh Pang-chih) and his interpreter January 11. Following Yugoslav Ambassador's comments on US policy as reflected in my talk with him, Chinese Ambassador said that as far as formal talks between US and PRC were concerned it is immaterial to PRC where they are located. Talks first took place Switzerland, moved to Warsaw, but might well lead elsewhere. In order for these talks to produce any positive results, however, Chinese insist and will insist to the very end on two conditions: (1) Retreat of all US forces from Taiwan ("our territory of Taiwan") and (2) Withdrawal of US 7th Fleet from Straits of Taiwan. (No other condition was mentioned.)

4. Yugoslav Ambassador raised question of Viet Nam, to which Chinese Ambassador replied that Viet Nam should not be raised in context US-Chinese relations. Chinese position re Viet Nam was well known, namely that US forces ought withdraw as soon as possible. But, he repeated that "this has no bearing on US-Chinese relations and should not be raised in Warsaw either".³

² Rogers, Kissinger, and Neumann met with Nixon from 2:54 to 3:03 p.m. on November 24, 1969. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.

³ During a January 15 telephone call, beginning at 6:10 p.m., Nixon and Kissinger discussed Neumann's meeting with the Yugoslav Ambassador and Sino-American relations. The transcript of the telephone conversation reads: "K[Kissinger]: The Ambassador in Kabul had an interesting contact with the Chinese Ambassador through the Yugoslav Ambassador. He suggested that talks begin in Warsaw and then talk could begin about talking elsewhere. One interesting thing he said—Vietnam has no bearing on Chinese-U.S. relations. President: Whole new attitude on that. K: Have to withdraw from Taiwan. In Vietnam have to withdraw eventually. That was in your Nov. 3 speech. President: We would have no trouble getting out of Taiwan. K: We would have to withdraw our 7th fleet from the Straits but would not have to hand Taiwan over [to] them. President: Very interesting point. K: Everyone was opposed to those drones over Southern China but they haven't hurt anything. Chinese push is withdraw from VN as soon as possible and should not raise in Warsaw. Has no bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations. Very interesting. President: Yes." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

5. Responding to question of Yugoslav Ambassador regarding Sino-Soviet relations, Chinese Ambassador moved into heavy attack on USSR and said border talks had broken down and in fact were non-starter from outset. Failure was attributed to refusal Soviets agree move forces back from border to avoid friction. He added that it would be better if no direct contact existed between Chinese and Soviet troops in this sensitive area and in view Soviet refusal "incidents were again possible".

6. Yugoslav Ambassador said that in entire conversation only direct and personal attacks by Chinese Ambassador were against Soviets. He made no comment about me personally or our Mission. Only comment re US was stereotype characterization of general US moves, including VP Agnew tour, as "designed to deceive the people".

7. I expressed our appreciation to Yugoslav Ambassador, both of us agreeing that his contacts be held very closely and in order to be perfectly clear reiterated my earlier statement that among available options two track discussions, formal at one place, information at another, might possibly also be considered.

8. I should add one note of caution concerning report of Chinese and Yugoslav Ambassadors' talk. Chinese interpreter speaks English in which Yugoslav is not fully proficient. We speak in French so possibly some nuances might be lost.

9. I am of course informing Secretary Rogers of these conversations by same channel and look forward to any guidance which the President, you, or the Secretary may wish to offer, especially now that Warsaw talks have resumed.⁴

10. The visit of VP Agnew went exceedingly well and Afghan officials were delighted with the visit and the conversations. I hope you will come and see us one of these days.

⁴ This potential avenue of communication with the Chinese did not develop further. No response from Kissinger was found. Neumann relayed his report to the Department of State in telegram 111. Green passed the report to Rogers through Eliot on January 16. Rogers followed the advice of Green, as detailed in his covering memorandum, and approved telegram 10412 to Kabul, January 22, which read in part: "In view of the current resumption of Warsaw contacts, we are not at this point actively planning shift in venue of talks but it is helpful to have indication from Chinese Ambassador in Kabul that Chinese are not bound to Warsaw site." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 CHICOM-AFG)

61. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Guidance for Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Meeting, January 20, 1970

I attach for your approval guidance we have prepared for Ambassador Stoessel's use at the 135th Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw, January 20, 1970.² The message contains the text of Ambassador Stoessel's opening presentation as well as general guidance for responses to issues we believe the Chinese are likely to raise. The emphasis is on a new beginning in Sino-U.S. relations and this Administration's new approach to Asian policy.

Among the points not previously raised with the Chinese are:

1. *Guam Doctrine*. Although this has been amply spelled out in public statements, we think it important to convey it privately to the Chinese along with its implications for improvement in our bilateral relations.

2. *U.S. assumption that the People's Republic of China does not intend to undertake overt aggression against other Asian states*. We think this useful to dispel earlier characterizations of China as a potential aggressor and threat to its Asian neighbors.

3. *Our intention to reduce U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia and hence in the neighborhood of China's southern border*. This is intended to make clear to the Chinese that we do not seek a permanent military

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Anderson (EA/ACA) on January 13, and cleared by Swank, Green, and U. Alexis Johnson. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Cable cleared and sent WH—Mr. Kissinger cleared. Changes made in cable per Green/Kissinger telcon 1/17/70. (RLBrown to FHess)" According to a January 17, 11:40 a.m. telephone conversation between Green and Kissinger, Kissinger's major problem with the draft instruction—and the President endorsed Kissinger's view—was with the "tone." Kissinger told Green, "It seems we are trying a little too hard to prove our good intentions." Green replied, "You mean we are defensive?" Kissinger agreed, "that is a better word—we are protesting too hard. I think we will be more impressive to them if we give the feeling of moderation produced by strength." Kissinger then went on to suggest a number of specific language changes. Kissinger also told Green that he had checked "this idea of eventually reducing our presence on Taiwan with the President, and he thought that was fine." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

² Not printed. Sent as telegram 8061 to Warsaw, January 17. The telegram was drafted by Anderson on January 14; cleared by Kreisberg, Brown, Green, Swank, Farley (ACDA), Johnson, and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers.

presence on the Asian mainland and that China can best ease her own security worries over U.S. “encirclement” through cooperating in a reduction in tension in the area around her southern border.

4. *Offer to discuss both our goals in the area and their limits.* Although, in a sense, the Warsaw talks have centered around mutual discussion and accusation concerning each other’s goals in Asia, we have never proposed that we undertake a genuine dialogue on this subject, particularly concerning the limits of our objectives.

5. *Offer to discuss the whole range of trade questions including the settlement of outstanding obligations.* It is unlikely the Chinese will want to enter into concrete trade discussions at this meeting. Nevertheless, we know that they are curious about our unilateral actions and may be interested in any expression of U.S. willingness to open this entire issue to discussion.

6. *Three new formulations on Taiwan:*

(a) The U.S. does not seek to impose its views concerning Taiwan on either side and does not intend to interfere in whatever settlement may be reached.

(b) A strengthened commitment not to support a GRC offensive action against the mainland.

(c) Expression of hope that we can reduce U.S. military presence on Taiwan as peace and stability in Asia grows.

The issue of Taiwan is the key to any improvement of relations with the PRC and the Chinese will be most interested in our statements on this subject. These three formulations are as far as we should be prepared to go at this time, but they are most important as a signal that we genuinely seek an improvement of relations.

7. *Offer to enter bilateral discussions on disarmament.* This offer has the double advantage of enabling us to refute Chinese charges of U.S.-Soviet “collusion” on nuclear disarmament matters while indicating that we believe the Chinese to be a major power and an essential element in the disarmament picture.

8. *Offer to send a special representative to Peking or have a Chinese representative come to Washington to discuss any of the subjects mentioned in the statement.* Should the Chinese wish to signal their willingness to improve relations, they could accept this offer without compromising any of their principles. Acceptance of such an offer at present is unlikely, but they will find it interesting as evidence of U.S. interest in further development of relations.

62. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, January 20, 1970, 1645Z.

143. Subj: Sino-US Talks: 135th Meeting. Ref: (A) State 8061;² (B) Warsaw 141.³

1. In relatively brief (one hour) meeting, I opened with text provided ref (A). Chinese statement which followed started with assertion that basis of ChiCom foreign policy was peaceful coexistence on basis of five principles. From this Lei Yang moved to note that these principles were not consistent with interference by one country in internal affairs of another or forcible occupation by one country of territory of another. He observed that my statement to him on January 8 had spoken of widening communication and political dialogue with PRC but had omitted any mention of Taiwan.⁴ He then devoted bulk of his remaining opening statement to Taiwan issue.

2. He emphasized Taiwan was crux of long-standing Sino-US disputes. Reviewing history of issue beginning with Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, US interposition of 7th Fleet in Taiwan Strait at beginning of Korean War, and US-GRC Treaty following conclusion of Korean War, he said US had attempted to legalize forcible occupation of Taiwan, to plan to bring about "Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan" situation, and to separate Taiwan from China. He said US had carried out war threats and provocations against Mainland from Taiwan and has provided military aircraft to the GRC in the name of our treaty responsibilities. All this was intervention and aggression against the PRC.

3. He emphasized that the PRC would certainly liberate Taiwan and would never allow another country to occupy China's territory.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 2 p.m. Kissinger forwarded the cable to the President on January 21 in his daily briefing memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 16, President's Daily Briefs) The Embassy sent the full record of the meeting to the Department of State on January 24 in Airgram A-25 from Warsaw. (Ibid.) See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-13, Document 3. Stoessel, Kreisberg (Advisor), Donald M. Anderson (Interpreter), Thomas W. Simons (Scribe), Lei Yang (Chargé d'Affaires), Li Ch-ching (Advisor), Ch'ien Yung-nien (Interpreter), and Yeh Wei-lan (Scribe) attended both the January 20 and February 20 meetings.

² See footnote 2, Document 61.

³ Telegram 141 from Warsaw, January 20, relayed the contents of Stoessel's public statement following the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 59.

Any expectation that Peking's position on this would change was fruitless. He emphasized that it had been the fault of the US that no progress had been made in the Sino-US talks thus far because the US continued to talk about subsidiary issues, rather than the key issue of Taiwan. It was up to the US, he said, to consider how to deal with this basic issue if it wished to improve relations with the PRC.

4. China, Lei said, was consistently in favor of the use of negotiations and peaceful means to resolve disputes between the US and the PRC and were prepared on this basis to explore and consider how to resolve the basic problems existing between the two countries. PRC was willing to consider and discuss any thoughts and proposals consistent with the principles of peaceful coexistence which the US wished to put forward.

5. Concluding, Lei said that such proposals could be put forward either through the Ambassadorial-level talks or through higher-level discussions or any other channel which both sides might agree upon.⁵

6. The general flavor of Lei's remarks was non-polemical. His restatement of the PRC's Taiwan position did not explicitly call for any specific action by the US. He did not refer to any specific incidents, to the 7th Fleet (except in the context of his recitation of the history of the Taiwan issue), to "US-Soviet collusion", to Viet-Nam, or to any other multilateral or ideological issues. Likewise, Lei did not comment on US trade or travel moves. His sole focus was on Taiwan as a bilateral, political, non-ideological issue between us, and upon Peking's willingness to resolve disputes with the US through peaceful negotiations.

7. I replied only briefly to Lei Yang's remarks, reiterating in accordance with Department's guidance that the US position relating to Taiwan was clear, that it was without prejudice to any peaceful settlement which might be arrived at between Peking and Taipei, and observed that it was my feeling that there was much similarity between the positions he and I had set forth so far as our desire to resolve any disputes in the area, including Taiwan, by peaceful means. I then asked whether he could elaborate on the meaning of "other channels" as a means of continuing our discussions.

8. Lei on his part repeated that Peking's position on Taiwan was clear, the US-GRC treaty was not recognized by the people of China,

⁵ The full record of the meeting (see footnote 1 above) shows that, following the instructions from the Department of State, Stoessel offered that "If as these talks progress it would seem to be useful and your Government would so desire, my Government would be prepared to consider sending a representative to Peking for direct discussions with your officials or receiving a representative of your Government in Washington for more thorough exploration of any of the subjects I have mentioned in my remarks today or other matters on which we might agree."

and that Taiwan was not a state but a part of China. Lei specifically noted that he would refer to Peking our proposal on sending a representative to Peking or having a Chinese representative visit Washington. He declined to elaborate on the meaning of meetings at "higher level" or through "other channels," and suggested PRC would consider US specific proposal on this subject or could work out proposal at ambassadorial meeting. He then suggested that rather than setting a specific date for the next meeting, liaison officers of our two Embassies be in touch soon.

9. Our over-all impression of the meeting was that the Chinese wished it to be considered as a serious opening negotiating session in which direct bilateral issues could be set forth and general ideological issues set aside. The atmosphere was straightforward and businesslike with the Chinese moving the actual meeting from a large formal hall (where newsmen were allowed to take photographs) to a small, informal conference room. (We assume this was for security reasons as well as for greater ease of dialogue and strongly recommend that no public mention be made of fact talks did not actually take place where newsmen were admitted.) It is somewhat ambiguous at this point who will take the initiative in proposing the next meeting. I suspect the Chinese intentionally left it so.

10. In briefing friendly governments on meeting, I recommend that Chinese statement be characterized as generally dealing with problem of Taiwan, restating essence of ChiCom position on historical character of this dispute. General non-polemical, non-ideological character of ChiCom presentation might also be noted. Recommend, however, that ChiCom proposal on higher-level meetings and willingness discuss peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes with US might be held to ourselves for present. Chinese we believe have gone to considerable efforts to maintain security of present meeting and any leak of relatively relaxed Chinese comments or optimistic characterization of atmosphere of meeting could embarrass our future contacts with Chinese and force defensive hardening of their posture.

Stoessel

63. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Warsaw Talks

I described and commented briefly on the Warsaw talks in this morning's intelligence briefing.² Given the importance of the topic, I would like to expand somewhat on that report.

The meeting was brief (one hour). Stoessel opened; the Chinese replied, devoting almost his entire time to the Taiwan issue. From that, he moved directly to say that China "favored the use of negotiation and peaceful means to resolve disputes between the US and the PRC, and were prepared on this basis to explore and consider how to resolve the basic problems existing between the two countries." The Taiwan issue, he said, was not an ideological one. He offered to discuss any US proposals "consistent with the principles of peaceful coexistence." He suggested that we proceed either with ambassadorial level talks, higher-level discussions or any other mutually agreeable channel. He specifically mentioned that he would pass to Peking our proposal to send a representative to Peking or accept a Chinese representative in Washington. Beyond that, he would not elaborate. Rather than setting a date for the next meeting, he suggested that our Embassies' liaison officers "be in touch soon."

Ambassador Stoessel observes that:

- Lei's remarks were not polemical.
- He restated the PRC's Taiwan position without explicitly calling for specific US actions.
- He avoided reference to the 7th Fleet, "US-Soviet collusion," Vietnam, or any ideological issues.

Stoessel regards the Chinese presentation as a serious opening of negotiating sessions to discuss direct bilateral issues and avoid ideology.

Stoessel recommends that in briefing friendly governments we not go beyond characterizing the Chinese statement as "generally dealing

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. I Warsaw Talks up to 1/31/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. According to a handwritten notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on January 26. A covering memorandum, attached but not printed, indicates that Holdridge drafted it at Kissinger's request.

² See footnote 1, Document 62.

with the problem of Taiwan, restating the essence of the Chinese Communist position on the historical character of this dispute. The general non-polemical, non-ideological character of the Chinese Communist presentation might also be noted."

Comments: The Chinese Chargé's language is unquestionably the most forthcoming of any we have heard in the history of the Warsaw talks, except for one brief period in 1955. They want to keep on talking. Whether they want to arrive at an understanding even at the expense of compromising on Taiwan is much less certain. They certainly have not given anything away. It should be remembered that they are focusing on Taiwan, an area in which *they* want something from *us*. They are of course aware of the potential for disrupting US/GRC relations to their own advantage if they can get us to seem to make concessions concerning Taiwan.

Having said all this, it was still a most interesting and inviting presentation. Once in 1955 they seemed to hover on the point of willingness to declare that the "Bandung principles" ruled out the use of force in the Taiwan Strait; also in 1955, they suggested carrying on the talks at a higher level. They have now returned close to that style of diplomacy, and the question will arise: what use do we wish to make of the change?

We clearly have considerable thinking to do as to what we want from them, and what we would give in return. This question has been addressed before, in theoretical terms. One quickly discovers, of course, that they are not actually *doing* much that we want them to stop doing.

—we would like them to desist from material support to insurgencies in Southeast Asia, but by their lights we are providing far more support to our friends in Southeast Asia than they are to theirs.

—we have one collision point—the Chinese road in Laos—which could wreck our movement toward a *détente*.

There are some things which we would like them to *start doing*, but these involve our hopes for a fundamental reordering of their priorities and outlook, and are far beyond the scope of non-ideological, bilateral negotiation, i.e.:

—we would like for them to participate responsibly in supranational endeavors, such as disarmament, and to take a less hostile view of non-Communist governments.

Consequently, the areas in which we can hope to accomplish anything tend to be *transitional issues*, in which our purpose is not to arrive at important practical agreements, but rather to continue to shape a climate in which they will evolve in a desirable direction, e.g.:

—a *détente* in the Taiwan Strait, without sacrificing the GRC.

—a mutual phasedown of the hostility with which we regard each other's actions in Asia.

—an improvement in communication, such as arrangements for travel in both directions, for trade, for the better exchange of books and written materials, for Chinese participation in international groups, for telegraphic clearing agreements, etc.

These are issues about which we have talked before, but encountered no Chinese response. They have insisted on settling the Taiwan issue first; they still insist on it, but they may be more flexible as to what constitutes an interim settlement. We shall probably have to accommodate them and talk about Taiwan, but we will need to move most carefully to avoid giving them a windfall by upsetting the present stability on Taiwan.

Beyond that, trade may be the most fruitful area for probing, since the Chinese may develop an interest in the American market.

As to more immediate issues, I agree with Stoessel's concerns that we not say too much to our friends, and have asked that any proposed briefing on the talks be cleared here. We may need to be somewhat franker with the GRC about the Taiwan issue in this and subsequent meetings, however, to avoid allowing the Communists to whipsaw us by leaking distorted accounts to the GRC.

Stoessel is probably right that the Chinese are being deliberately unclear as to who should ask for the next meeting. They may hope to induce us to make the bid, for the psychological advantage of putting us in the position of supplicant.

64. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, January 26, 1970.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

65. **Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, January 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

US Treatment of Peng Ming-min

The Situation:

You are aware that Peng Ming-min has escaped from Taiwan. The Department of State thinks he is probably in Sweden, and that he will soon approach us for a visa to take up one of the university positions offered to him in the United States. His family is still in Taiwan.

Peng was evidently a student of yours, and several individuals and organizations solicited your help last spring to press the GRC to allow him to come to the United States. At your guidance, we answered one of these letters (to an acquaintance of yours) with the briefest of acknowledgments, and filed the rest unanswered.²

Our Embassy in Taipei thinks that Peng will become the leader of the Taiwan independence movement, and that he may revitalize that movement. There is, however, no evidence that he will be able to raise the movement from the almost complete impotence which has heretofore characterized it. (Thomas Liao, the erstwhile leader, lived for years in Japan, but made his peace with the GRC some time ago and returned docilely to Taiwan—thereby, incidentally, removing a very sore point in GRC/Japanese relations.)

Ambassador Chow has requested an appointment with Marshall Green on Thursday morning. State has told our Embassies in Taipei and Stockholm that we will inform Chow that we plan to issue a visa if it is requested. (Tab A)³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an unsigned copy.

² An associate of Peng in Japan, Yoichi Yokoboki, wrote a letter to Kissinger dated May 1, 1969. A reply signed by Grant on May 9 reads in full: "Dr. Kissinger has asked me to reply to your letter of May 1. As I am sure you appreciate, the pressures on his time make it simply impossible for him to write directly. Thank you for calling our attention to Professor Peng's problem." (Ibid., Vol. II) Another letter regarding Peng from Yoichi Yokobori was dated May 24. In it, Yoichi had requested help in obtaining an exit visa for Peng. Kissinger's handwritten comment on a note forwarding this letter to him reads: "No answer, 6/4/69."

³ Telegram 12608 to Taipei and Stockholm, January 28, not printed.

The Issues:

This is a very hot potato. Peng has many friends in university circles here, and any move to qualify or prevent his entry will probably elicit quite an outcry that we are attempting to muzzle opinion in the United States to accommodate Chiang Kai-shek. (This will not help Chiang among liberals here—but it is questionable whether his stock with them could sink any lower.)

On the other hand, President Chiang will take it as a personal affront if we decide to issue a visa. He will see it in the context of the removal of the permanent Strait patrol, the Warsaw meetings, and our statements and actions concerning relations with Communist China. He will probably become highly suspicious of a US plot to sell him out and work toward a “one China, one Taiwan” solution based on the Taiwanese.

At State, the working-level people argue: “What can Chiang do?” The answer is that he is dependent upon us and cannot do much. This is not to say, however, that we should look with equanimity on a decision which will deepen US/GRC suspicions and which will probably make it more difficult to cooperate, for instance, in strategy on Chinese representation in the United Nations. An accumulation of suspicions could conceivably lead Chiang to take ill-considered action.

Insofar as they take note of this matter, the Chinese Communists would probably regard a visa for Peng as a “one-China, one-Taiwan” maneuver, and dislike it as such.⁴

The Visa Regulations:

The ideal solution would be to grant Peng asylum, on condition that he not engage in political activities intended to overthrow the GRC. Unfortunately, our visa laws do not make provision for asylum. We are on thin legal grounds in attempting to exact a pledge from Peng as a condition for entry (though at our urging, State did get U Nu to sign such a pledge voluntarily in a somewhat similar situation last year—which he largely ignored.) We have little legal recourse if Peng violates such a pledge.

Proposed Action:

I think that this one should go to you or the President.⁵ Marshall Green has agreed *not* to take a definitive position Thursday when Am-

⁴ The PRC's adverse public reaction to Peng's activities is summarized in “U.S.–Japanese Reactionaries Step Up ‘Taiwan Independence Movement’ Plot,” *Beijing Review*, March 6, 1970, pp. 21–22.

⁵ There is no record of this matter being brought to the attention of the President.

bassador Chow calls. (After all, we are not formally notified that Chow will raise the subject, and we have not yet received the visa application.) Marshall will recite the disadvantages of refusing a visa, by way of educating the Chinese and preparing them for the worst, but at the same time he can refrain from stating a position, on the grounds that no visa has been received and no policy yet decided.⁶

State will staff out the alternatives legally open to it, and will present these with their recommendations to the White House, after they have heard from our Embassy in Taipei as to likely reactions there.

Meanwhile, Stockholm is being forewarned to submit any visa application from Peng for clearance to Washington.

The Best Possible Resolution:

Without prejudging the results of further inquiry, Marshall thinks that the best course will be to allow Peng in, but only if he will sign a pledge not to engage in political activity intended to bring about the overthrow of the GRC. (We would be unwise to ask him to refrain from *criticizing* the GRC.) Given the fact that his family is in Taiwan, and that he probably wants very much to come to the United States, he will probably sign such a document. The pledge could then be shown to the GRC to demonstrate our responsiveness to their concerns, and it would probably have a certain effect in dissuading Peng from engaging in flamboyant activity against the GRC, such as attempting to revive the nearly defunct Taiwan nationalist underground newspaper.

If he should refuse a conditional visa, we would have another and tougher problem, but we could at least have a defensible explanation for delay in issuing a visa.

⁶ Green followed this course in his conversation with Chow on January 29, as reported in telegram 14335 to Taipei and Stockholm, January 29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. III)

66. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

Henry Cabot Lodge's Discussion with Mr. J. J. Derksen, Netherlands' Minister Accredited to Communist China

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum prepared by Cabot Lodge describing his discussion with Mr. J. J. Derksen, the Netherlands' Chargé accredited to Communist China, who visited him in Boston on January 30.² The discussion which Lodge had with Mr. Derksen was highly significant and is described in detail in his memorandum to me. Inter alia, Derksen made the following points to Lodge:

—Offered to act as a channel between the U.S. and Peking Governments.

—Promised to preserve absolute secrecy and if we decide to use him to send nothing in writing to his own government. He would only report orally to the Prime Minister's Office when he is in the Hague, after first consulting with us on what he should say. Derksen would not tell anything to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

—Confirmed that Chou En-lai is in complete command in Peking and controls and directs through five Vice Foreign Ministers with whom Derksen has easy access.

—During a January 13 departure call on the Acting Director of the Chinese Communists' Office of Western European Affairs, Derksen was told about the resumption of the Warsaw talks and was assured that if the U.S. wants better relations then "everything becomes easy." He also was impressed with the importance of Taiwan to Peking in its visualization of improving relations with the U.S.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 430, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, Derksen, J.J.—Backchannel (Lodge Initiative) 1970–1972. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis; Eyes Only. The date on the memorandum is handwritten. Derksen's given name was Jacobus Jerome.

² Not attached. A February 3 memorandum from Lodge to Kissinger is *ibid.*, Box 823, Name Files, Henry Cabot Lodge, Vol. I through 20 Apr. 70. This 5-page document describes Derksen's background and his offer to assist the United States in negotiating with both the PRC and North Vietnam. According to Lodge, "I believe he came [to Boston] at his own expense and that his trip may well not have been known to the Dutch Government." Also attached is a January 23 message from Lodge informing Kissinger of Derksen's January 30 visit.

—Derksen has concluded that Chou En-lai wants better relations with the U.S. and prefers the Americans to the Russians.

—Derksen believes that it would be extremely useful to assign him the job of getting talks started between Chou En-lai and a senior representative designated by you. Derksen believes that these talks should be thoroughly prepared ahead of time and could lead to some real improvement in relations. He also believes that meetings between Chou En-lai and your representative could be arranged at some location outside of China.

Derksen's proposals offer some distinct advantages:

1. It would give a sense of security to the Chinese Communists with respect to the Soviets which is not provided in the Warsaw forum.

2. I suspect that the pro-Soviet factions in State go to the limits of the possible and at times even beyond in informing Dobrynin of the contents of our discussions in Warsaw, thereby affording the Soviets an opportunity to sabotage these talks by intimidating the Chinese Communists in their dealings with them.

For these reasons, I recommend that we send the memorandum at Tab B to the Chinese Communists through Mr. Derksen.³ If Chou En-lai is definitely interested, as Mr. Derksen believes, we could establish a dialogue which might lead to direct secret talks at a mutually agreed upon location outside of Communist China between him or other senior officials. In the proposed communication, I have offered either Mr. Derksen or Major General Vernon Walters, our Defense Attaché in Paris, as channels.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached message to the Chinese Communist Government which would be delivered to Mr. Derksen in the

³ The attachment reads in full:

"The U.S. Government wishes to continue the exchanges we have begun again through the Ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw. However, the location of these talks makes it difficult to maintain complete secrecy due to the amount of public interest which they have generated, the level at which they are conducted, and the numbers of officials involved. If the Government of the People's Republic of China desires talks not known by other countries, the President is ready to establish an alternate channel for matters of the most extreme sensitivity. We are prepared to activate such alternate channels through either Mr. Derksen, the bearer of this communication, or through Major General Vernon C. Walters, the U.S. Defense Attaché accredited to the French Government in Paris. General Walters can be contacted in Paris at his residence, telephone number 637-4374, or at his office in the Embassy, telephone number ANJ 7460. He is in direct contact with the White House. Knowledge of such talks would be kept to a very small circle of the President's closest advisors."

strictest confidence (probably by Cabot Lodge) prior to Derksen's departure from the Hague.⁴ Knowledge of the message would be restricted to yourself, Cabot Lodge, Mr. Derksen and me.⁵

⁴ The original message, initialed by the President, is attached. According to a February 11 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, Kissinger was to pass along the message in a meeting with Derksen and Lodge that day. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Material Concerning Preparations for the First China Trip by HAK, July 1971)

⁵ The President initialed his approval. This effort to make contact with the Chinese failed. In an overview of communications with the Chinese, Lord wrote that in April 1971 "There followed a series of messages to Haig for HAK passed through the Dutch Embassy here which are even more incomprehensible once translated than they were in code. Derksen keeps saying he is getting ready to pass [the] message and Haig keeps acknowledging Derksen's notes." (Memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, April 17; *ibid.*) In December 1970 Kissinger informed the Dutch that he had no objections to their recalling Derksen from Beijing "where he has been a disappointment to his government." The Dutch Ambassador to the United States, Van Lynden, asked Kissinger in July 1971 if Derksen had "helped to establish contact which led to Kissinger's trip to Peking." In a July 17 message relayed through Haig to Van Lynden, Kissinger declared that Derksen "had no role in matters leading to the trip to Peking, that no messages were ever received through him, and that we have not used his services for some time." Copies of these messages are *ibid.*, Box 430, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, Derksen, J.J.—Backchannel (Lodge Initiative) 1970–1972.

67. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Sino-US Negotiations in Warsaw

Secretary Rogers has sent you a memorandum forwarding State's proposed guidance for the February 20 Sino-US meeting in Warsaw and a memorandum on US strategy (Tabs A, B and C).²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70–6/30/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. An attached February 10 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger contained a lengthy analysis of the recent Warsaw meeting by Holdridge and indicated that he was the drafter of the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed. These documents were drafted by Kreisberg, cleared by Swank, then forwarded by Green to Rogers on February 6. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) The documents were prepared in part to respond to

The guidance instructs Ambassador Stoessel to:

—State that we are prepared to discuss with the Chinese a joint declaration incorporating the position that we would not interfere in any peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question reached between the PRC and the GRC and affirming our adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence;

—Indicate our intention to reduce those military facilities which we have on Taiwan as tensions in the area diminish;

—State our intention of dropping our remaining travel restrictions applicable to Mainland China (these restrictions come up for renewal on March 15);

—Offer specifically to discuss and settle blocked accounts and arrangements for an expansion of trade relations;

—Authorize our Ambassador on rebuttal, if the subject arises, to refer to a possible amnesty for Richard Fecteau, an American whose prison sentence expires in two years.

The strategy memorandum assumes that the Chinese as well as ourselves will want to reduce the chances of a Sino-US conflict, and would be interested in bilateral talks on issues such as trade if the stumbling block of Taiwan can be overcome. For this purpose, the memorandum says that Peking will want some acknowledgment that we regard the Taiwan question as an internal Chinese matter, that we do not support “two Chinas,” and that we will reduce our military presence on Taiwan; for our part we will want assurances that Taiwan will not come under attack and that we can maintain our commitments to the GRC. The recommended initial negotiating position on Taiwan is therefore to blur the issue of Taiwan’s status by reiterating the position (taken at the last meeting) that the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland should be settled by those directly involved.

You should have no problem with the general direction of the immediate strategy and guidance (including the removal of the remaining travel restrictions). You may wish, however, to consider Secretary Rogers’ suggestion that we pull slightly back from our proposal in January to send representatives to Peking or receive Chinese representatives here.³ (The new guidance would have Ambassador Stoessel refer the question without showing interest.) Shortly after the talks began in 1955 the Chinese proposed raising the level, to which we responded by insisting that there had to be progress at the Ambassadorial level before we could agree. Our negative reaction to Peking’s bid was probably one

Kissinger’s February 3 memorandum to Rogers, in which Kissinger wrote: “The President has requested that a game plan be developed for the evolution of the Warsaw talks.” Kissinger continued, “The plan should spell out our objectives in the talks, and should address itself to the tactics which the Department of State plans to use.” (Ibid.)

³ See Document 61.

reason why the talks slipped into sterility, and we might now want to avoid going over the same ground again. If the talks should move to Peking or Washington and go to a higher level, Peking might in fact consider it had more to lose by not discussing bilateral issues than would otherwise be the case. I suggest that if you agree on these reservations, I pass them along to State.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to inform State that you have reservations concerning its recommendations on responding to a Chinese proposal on talks in Peking or Washington and that it adopt a more positive approach to such a proposal.⁴

⁴ Nixon initialed his approval. Instructions to Stoessel in Warsaw were sent in telegram 24493, February 18, and telegram 25648, February 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) Stoessel was also informed of the White House’s stance in a February 19 letter from Hillenbrand, which reads in part: “The White House believes that it would be preferable to take a more positive approach to a favorable Chinese response on the question of higher level meeting.” Hillenbrand suggested, “Evidently, the view is that holding out too stringently for progress at the Ambassadorial level before agreeing to have representatives meet in Peking or Washington might invite a repetition of the deadlock which developed in earlier stages of the talks.” (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Files of Walter J. Stoessel, China Talks (Warsaw))

68. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, February 20, 1970, 1645Z.

376. Subj: Sino-US Talks: February 20 Meeting. Ref: A. State 24453 [24493]; B. State 25648.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A full record of the meeting is in Airgram A–84 from Warsaw, February 20. (Ibid.) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 4. The Chinese suggested the February 20 date during a February 2 visit to the Embassy in Warsaw. (Telegram 215 from Warsaw, February 2; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70–6/30/70)

² See footnote 4, Document 67.

1. In his twenty-minute opening statement, Lei Yang focused on only two subjects: primacy of Taiwan issue and Chinese interest in higher level meeting. He started by welcoming US comments at January 20 meeting on US wish to improve Sino-US relations, relax tensions, and resolve differences and said PRC had always stood for conducting relations between states with different social systems on basis of principles of peaceful coexistence and for the peaceful settlement through negotiations of Sino-US differences. He said that the Chinese in 1955 had said the Chinese people wishes friendly relations with the American people and did not want war with the US. PRC was willing enter into negotiations now to discuss relaxation of tensions in Far East and especially in the Taiwan area.

2. Lei expressed satisfaction that at January 20 meeting US did not evade Taiwan issue and dealt with question of agreement on Five Principles and Taiwan in detail. At same time, he said, US had raised other questions in way which confused the primary Taiwan issue with secondary matters. Taiwan and the directly related matter of Five Principles must be settled first. Only when this done could fundamental improvement in Sino-US relations be achieved and other matters discussed. He then noted, without elaboration, that the PRC was aware that the settlement of the Taiwan issue required that an effort be made to create appropriate conditions for its resolution.

3. Recalling that ambassadorial talks had been suspended for two years, Lei noted they were now resumed and said PRC shared US hope they represented new beginning. He said in this context that the Chinese continued to note inconsistency in US position: (a) US wanted to improve relations with PRC but continued relations with "Chiang clique" which had been overthrown by Chinese people; (b) US was willing discuss Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence but said it would continue honor commitment to "Chiang clique;" (c) US considered PRC had right (*sic*) settle Taiwan question as an internal affair but continued follow policy aimed at "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" which Chinese people could never accept.

4. Lei said that all this showed that more thorough exploration of this question was indeed necessary. There were, however, "certain difficulties" in undertaking this exploration through the ambassadorial talks. Lei noted that both sides appeared to have foreseen this situation when they separately suggested at the January 20 meeting that higher level talks were possible. If the US wished to send a representative of ministerial rank or a special Presidential envoy to Peking for further exploration of the fundamental principles of relations between the US and PRC, the Chinese would be prepared to receive him. Lei again emphasized that fundamental principle revolved around Taiwan. Once this question was settled, resolution of other issues would not be difficult. For example, the practice in the past of allowing "US criminals

in China” to exchange letters and packages, and receive visits by family members could be continued in future.

5. After I made prepared statement provided ref (a) (as amended by ref (b)), Lei responded that he had nothing to add on Taiwan question, would report US position to Peking, and was not prepared to make further comment on trade, prisoners, or other issues.

6. I then observed that while we would welcome continuation of past Chinese practice on letters, packages, and visits for prisoners on mainland, this did not represent any forward movement. I noted Fecteau and Dunn cases (ref A). I then asked for further clarification of PRC proposal on higher-level meeting, specifically asking whether Chinese envisaged this as substitute for Ambassadorial meetings, whether arrangements for such a possible meeting would be made through Ambassadorial discussions here, and whether Chinese were thinking in terms of publicized meeting or one held in secret.

7. Lei said he would report my comments on prisoners to Peking as well as questions on higher-level meeting. He said he was not prepared at present time to say any more.

8. As experiment, I asked Lei if he would like to join me in my office for informal tea and sandwiches. He declined at this time on grounds of appointment elsewhere but said Embassy liaison personnel might discuss arrangements for similar informal encounter at some future time.

9. *Comment:* Chinese statement was even blander and less polemical than at January 20 meeting. No accusations were made of US military involvement on Taiwan, drone incident was avoided, and past history of Sino-US relations was not rehearsed again (I consequently omitted portion of first para of Dept guidance (ref a) dealing with past history). At same time, Chinese gave little away and avoided any hints or signal on bilateral issues we have raised. Lei Yang’s comment, almost a “throw away,” that Peking recognized need to create conditions for resolution of Taiwan question extremely interesting if, as I suspect, it was intended as hint that the Chinese may be prepared to consider more compromise solution on Taiwan or to make some gesture of substantive move on other issues. At same time, in focusing explicitly on three key aspects of Taiwan issue (para 3 (a)–(c) above), Lei gave no hint of any concession or shift in Chinese posture.

10. As I gather Department anticipated, Chinese appear anxious have higher-level meeting and are setting their target high in aiming at “ministerial” or “Presidential envoy” level. I did not press Lei as to what precisely were “certain difficulties” which made such a meeting more appropriate for discussion of Sino-US relations than lower-level talks. Sensitivity in Peking of talks with US gives Chinese representative little if any leeway in give and take at our ambassadorial meetings. Meeting in Peking would make possible continuing internal

“factional” discussions on Chinese side, provide the Chinese with invaluable counterpoint to their simultaneous negotiations with the Soviets, and have obvious effects on the GRC. I suspect it is less a question of “certain difficulties” for Peking than of “considerable advantages.”

11. At the same time I suspect the Chinese are going to be very reluctant to back away from such a high-level meeting and that we may be hard pressed to persuade them to return here in Warsaw to substantive discussion of hint of future flexibility they provided in today’s meeting. Chinese are obviously prepared to meet again here to discuss the higher-level meeting itself but I suspect not much else. Question will be whether they want it enough to be willing to put something down “on account” beforehand.

Stoessel

69. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Chinese at Warsaw Talks Suggest US Send High-Level Representative to Peking

At today’s session of the Warsaw talks² the Chinese said that if we wished to send a representative of “ministerial rank or a special Presidential envoy to Peking for the further exploration of fundamental principles of relations” between the US and China, they would be prepared to receive him. They made it plain that the “fundamental principle” with which they were concerned was the Taiwan question, and that once this question was settled other issues could be resolved. They also made it plain that the resolution of the Taiwan issue could not be in the context of a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” procedure.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Poland, Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70–6/30/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. The date is handwritten. Haig signed for Kissinger. The “I” is apparently Haig. According to a handwritten notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on February 26.

² See Document 68.

The Chinese have now picked up that element in our negotiating position which would be the most dramatic development in terms of the effects on the outside world. The Soviets could be expected to be taken aback by the appearance of a US envoy in Peking; the GRC undoubtedly would react adversely; and opinion in other countries which have fears and suspicions of Communist China might question our motives and the direction of our policy. The Chinese probably had all of these effects in mind in responding to our proposal. At the same time, however, the Chinese will also face problems in terms of the effects on their own public opinion if a US "imperialist" shows up in Peking after years of propaganda against us; moreover, they must be prepared to consider making some adjustment in their own stand against the US and the US role in Taiwan to avoid a dramatic collapse of this high-level contact. Such a collapse might encourage the Soviets to believe that Chinese explorations of the US option had failed and that the Chinese now had to face the Soviets on their own.

I consider that the advantages lie on the side of a positive response to the Chinese. While we should exercise great care in selecting our representative and laying out the line he should take with the Chinese, his presence in Peking could be very helpful in moving our relationship with the Chinese in the direction which you set in your foreign policy review. This step is fully in consonance with the policy toward Communist China laid down in the foreign policy review, and can be explained as such to all comers, including the GRC. From our standpoint, we may wish to prolong the presence of our representative in Peking and thereby gain, if nothing else, some degree of representation there.

We need not move immediately in naming a representative, since Ambassador Stoessel raised a number of questions concerning the Chinese thoughts as to the arrangements and, in any case, the ball is in our court in proposing the time of the next meeting. However, we should not delay over long so as to avoid creating a negative impression, and I will very shortly have recommendations for you concerning nominees for the job of representative, the level of the position, and the guidance he will be given. I will consult with State on this. There may need to be one or two meetings before arrangements can be fully worked out.

As an interesting side-light on the Warsaw meeting, the Chinese referred to remarks they had made in 1955 on wishing friendly relations with the American people and not desiring war with us. You will recall that our negative reaction to their call for higher-level meetings in 1955 was one of the factors which led to the sterile nature of the talks. We now appear to be back in the 1955 atmosphere, and indeed the Chinese at this meeting avoided polemics and references to any

other issue such as our military position on Taiwan which could have impaired the atmospherics of the session.

I have discussed the broad outlines of the foregoing with Dr. Kissinger and he agrees that we will probably have to respond positively to the Chinese initiative. He will be prepared to cover this with you in greater detail on Sunday.³

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, the President and Kissinger met from noon until 3:15 p.m. on February 22 at Camp David. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No other record of their conversation has been found.

70. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

Message from President Yahya on China

Ambassador Hilaly came to me yesterday with the contents of a letter he had received from President Yahya containing his assessment of the current state of Communist China's thinking about U.S.-Chinese relations.² The Ambassador said President Yahya's letter contained no explanation of what further contacts with the Chinese, if any, this assessment might be based on.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. The handwritten date on this copy, February 27, 1970, is apparently incorrect, as Kissinger noted in his memoirs that he met with Hilaly on February 22 (see footnote 2 below). Another copy of this memorandum, without Nixon's handwritten comments but dated February 23, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Cookies II, [Chronology of Exchanges with the PRC, February 1969–April 1971]. "Cookies II" was a collection of materials documenting contact with the PRC up to the time of Kissinger's trip in July 1971. This copy also bears the notation "Handcarried to Gen. Haig. No cover memo."

² No record of this meeting was found. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs: "On February 22, we received a communication from Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly that his President, Yahya Khan, believed our initiatives had encouraged the Chinese." (*White House Years*, p. 689)

If this is a message from the Chinese—and I assume it is—its significance seems to be:

1. that they are telling us they no longer see the Vietnam war as a problem between us and
2. that they are no longer concerned about the U.S. and USSR seeking a condominium in Asia.

Specifically, President Yahya's statement as read by Ambassador Hilaly ran as follows:

"The initiatives taken by the U.S. have encouraged the Chinese. It also seems to be their assessment now that there is no U.S.-Soviet collusion on matters of concern to China. They would, however, be very sensitive if the U.S. were to show its belief that their willingness to conduct a meaningful dialogue with the U.S. is a sign of Chinese weakness or of fear of U.S.-Soviet collaboration against China. For the U.S. to proceed from such a basis might jeopardize future negotiations.³

"In any case, the Chinese response to U.S. initiatives is likely to be in very measured and cautious steps. But China does seem inclined toward a meaningful dialogue concerning all issues which divide the two countries.

"It should be anticipated that negotiations will be hard and difficult. A lot will be said for the purpose of the record but given trust, the problems between the two could be solved by peaceful negotiations.

"The possibility of expansion of the Vietnam war is seen as having lessened. A war between China and the U.S. is seen now as a very remote possibility."

I told Ambassador Hilaly that we would appreciate it if President Yahya would explain two things to the Chinese:

1. We do not control the press. Any attempt by us to control press speculation on this subject would create even more speculation. The White House will scrupulously avoid any reflections along the lines of those described in President Yahya's communication.

2. When matters are in formal diplomatic channels, it is not so easy for us to maintain total discretion because too many people see what is happening. We would therefore be prepared to open a direct White House channel to Peking which would not be known outside the White House and on which we could guarantee total security.⁴

At the conclusion of our conversation I told Ambassador Hilaly that the communication from President Yahya was consistent with what had happened in the Warsaw Talks so far. I also asked him to tell President Yahya that you very much appreciate his role in this matter.

³ Nixon wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: "Very important to have in mind."

⁴ Nixon bracketed these numbered paragraphs and wrote in the margin: "good."

71. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Personal Letter to You from President Chiang Kai-shek Protesting Warsaw Talks²

At Tab A is a personal letter to you from President Chiang Kai-shek expressing his "shock" at the position which Ambassador Stoessel allegedly took with the Chinese Communist representative at the February 20 Warsaw meeting and in effect protesting the course which the talks are taking.³ The specific issue which concerns President Chiang is the possibility that we might consider "accepting the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence first publicized by the Chinese Communists at the Bandung Conference 15 years ago and discuss with them how to settle the so-called Taiwan problem." He states that this would be infringing upon the sovereign rights of the Republic of China.

In making these points President Chiang reviews the record of US involvement with the Chinese Communists during World War II and subsequently; submits that their objectives in Asia have not changed (he takes the Vietnam war, the fall of the Plain of Jars and Muong Soui and the Chinese road building activity in Laos, and infiltration of the Philippines and Thailand by Communist elements as cases in point) and warns you to be on your guard. He declares that he supports the Nixon Doctrine, but adds that this should mean strengthening the free nations against aggression, and by inference, not giving in to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Holdridge and forwarded to Kissinger on March 5. According to a handwritten notation on the first page, the memorandum was "OBE'd."

² In the letter attached at Tab A, Chiang wrote that he did not object to the talks per se, but added, "I hope you will carefully consider the consequences and take timely measures to prevent any distortion of your well-meaning policy during its implementation."

³ Guidance for informing the ROC Government of the Warsaw talks is in telegram 27045 to Taipei, February 24, and telegram 28259 to Taipei, February 26. These telgrams, approved by Green and Brown respectively, stated that the first briefings were to be held for ROC Embassy personnel in Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US)

the Chinese Communists. He concludes by saying that his letter backs up a Ministry of Foreign Affairs *démarche* on the same subject.⁴

President Chiang's letter is not unexpected. It illustrates the deep concern which he and others like him in Taiwan undoubtedly feel with respect to the possible implications of the Warsaw talks. I believe that we will need to be very careful in replying to President Chiang so that our continued commitment to the Republic of China is re-emphasized to him and that due deference is given to his sensitivities. While we of course do not hold to his analysis of developments in East Asia and rejection of the changes which have taken place during the last generation, we must accept that his views are characteristic of many in that part of the world.

A draft reply to President Chiang's letter will be ready for you next week.⁵

⁴ On March 2 (Taipei time), Foreign Minister Wei presented a note to McConaughy which reads in part: "During the said meeting [February 20 meeting in Warsaw], the so-called 'Taiwan problem' was brought up for discussion. As this is a matter which directly involves the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of China, the Chinese Government cannot possibly tolerate its discussion and it must therefore register its most vehement objection." (Telegram 916 from Taipei, March 2; *ibid.*, POL CHINAT-US) Ambassador Chow presented a note to Green on March 2. (Telegram 30838 to Taipei, March 3; *ibid.*) In his March 3 daily briefing memorandum to the President, Kissinger discussed a "stiff note concerning the Warsaw talks." (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 19, President's Daily Briefs)

⁵ Document 74.

72. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 10, 1970.

SUBJECT

A Higher-Level Meeting with the Chinese

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Kreisberg on March 4, approved by Green, and forwarded with a covering letter and attachments to Holdridge on March 5. Holdridge then forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger on March 11.

At the February 20, 1970 meeting in Warsaw with the Chinese, they offered to receive a US representative in Peking. This was in response to our offer at the January 20 meeting to consider such a "higher-level" meeting after our talks progressed in Warsaw and was consistent with their independent suggestion at the January meeting that our talks might be conducted at a higher level or elsewhere than in Warsaw.

In the Strategy Memorandum enclosed with my February 7, 1970 memorandum to you on the Sino-US talks,² I suggested that since Peking might wish a higher-level meeting only in order to serve its own purposes vis-à-vis the Soviets, to damage our relations with the GRC and others, and to weaken support for the GRC in the UN, we should agree to such a meeting only after there were signs in the Ambassadorial-level talks that a higher-level meeting would be productive. I enclose two additional memoranda: on the general advantages and disadvantages of a higher-level meeting, and on tactical considerations in handling the question of our response to the Chinese at the next Warsaw meeting.³

A higher-level meeting with the Chinese, either in Peking or here, would be a major international event, receiving the widest public attention and with widespread and substantial international and domestic political effects. It is one of the few things that the Chinese want from us just now. I do not think that we yet have a sufficiently clear idea of what to expect from the Chinese at such a meeting to justify our playing our major card by immediate acceptance of their proposal. At the same time, if there is any chance that such a meeting might help unfreeze our relationships with Peking, we do not want to lose the opportunity which might be offered.

I believe, therefore, that at the next meeting, which I suggest we propose for March 19, we should reaffirm that we are prepared to consider a higher-level meeting but emphasize that in order to ensure a proper basis for such a meeting, the possible areas of mutual understanding, or at least those areas where both sides are clearly going to have to "agree to disagree," should be further developed at the Ambassadorial level.

In doing this we would review the positions we set forth relating to Taiwan at the last two meetings and the positions set forth by the Chinese. We would indicate our view that a plausible basis for discussion could be found in our mutual acceptance of the following

² Reference is to an attachment to the memorandum accompanying the instructions to Ambassador Stoessel prior to the February 20 Warsaw meeting. See footnote 2, Document 67.

³ Both attached but not printed.

principles: (1) Disputes relating to Taiwan should be resolved peacefully between those parties on the mainland and on Taiwan which are directly concerned; (2) The US will not interfere in such a settlement; (3) As tensions relating to the area diminish, the US military presence in the Taiwan area will be gradually reduced; (4) The US and the PRC will resolve disputes which arise between them through peaceful negotiations; (5) It is desirable from the standpoint of both sides to expand mutual contacts and trade; and (6) The principles of peaceful co-existence are consistent with the foregoing positions. We would then attempt to see whether the Chinese would be prepared to take these elements as the basis for further discussions and, if not, at what critical points our differences will focus.

At the same time, we can see whether the Chinese may be willing: (a) to make some gesture of “good will” in terms of action on prisoners, travel, or some analogous issue in order to set the stage for a higher-level meeting; or (b) to indicate that they will make such a gesture at the time of such a meeting.

The Chinese may well refuse to discuss substantive matters in terms going beyond those they have already used at the last two meetings and insist that a higher-level meeting is the only place to advance our conversations. It may take several meetings before it becomes clear whether this Chinese position is subject to change. If they remain adamant, we would then have to decide whether to continue to insist on prior progress in Warsaw, or to agree to go to Peking, or invite the Chinese to come here. Our initial approach, however, will have given us an opportunity to test Chinese intentions further, to see how strongly they want a higher-level meeting, and to find out whether they may be prepared to pay some price for it.

Since we anticipate that the Chinese now are preparing only to hear our response to their February 20 proposal, in order to elicit some reaction from them at the next meeting I believe it is necessary to provide them with advance warning of the general approach we plan to take. This, at least, will ensure that their response at that time will have been made in the foreknowledge of our own attitude and will give us a faster read-back on Chinese attitudes.⁴

⁴ Holdridge drafted a memorandum from Kissinger to the President, suggesting a policy designed to “meet some of State’s reservations, but which would respond positively to the Chinese on sending a representative to Peking.” Kissinger did not sign the draft memorandum but did note on the first page: “Why do we have to raise Taiwan issue? Holdridge, see me.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV) Kissinger, Green, William Sullivan, Holdridge, Smyser also met on March 17 in the White House Situation Room. Green reiterated his concerns over sending a high-level representative to China and wanted to make higher-level contacts “conditional to progress at Warsaw.” (Memorandum of conversation pre-

I am, therefore, also enclosing for your approval a letter from Ambassador Stoessel to the Chinese Chargé, proposing March 19 for the next meeting and indicating our wish to discuss further in Warsaw the basis for mutually acceptable discussions at a higher level.⁵

William P. Rogers⁶

pared by Holdridge and Smyser, March 17; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memoranda of Conversation, 1969–1970) Green followed up on March 17 with a 3-page letter to Kissinger stating that “Ambassador Brown agrees with me that we should first attempt to obtain some clearer idea what the prospects would be for substantive progress at a higher-level meeting before definitely committing ourselves.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70–6/30/70)

⁵ Attached but not printed.

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. A notation on the memorandum indicates that it is a “true copy” from the Secretary of State’s office. The signed original is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV.

73. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, March 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Higher-Level Meeting with the Chinese Communists

The President has carefully reviewed your memorandum to him of March 10, 1970² on the considerations which you proposed relative to a higher-level meeting with the Chinese Communists in Peking. He agrees with you that it would be desirable to establish the existence of common ground between our respective positions before going from the Ambassadorial level to a higher level in our talks with the Chinese. At the same time, however, he believes that it is important for us to preserve the positive approach to the question of raising the level of the talks, and to avoid suggesting to the Chinese that we are drawing back from the proposal for the meeting at a higher level which we ourselves offered at the January 20 Ambassadorial-level meeting in Warsaw.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US. Secret; Nodis.

² Document 72.

Accordingly, the President has directed that Ambassador Stoessel, at the next meeting in Warsaw, present our position on seeking common ground in positive terms so that our intention to proceed at the higher level is fully affirmed.³ In addition, to underscore the positive nature of our approach, the President directs that at the next Warsaw meeting we propose opening discussions on the modalities which would apply for a higher-level meeting in Peking, e.g. diplomatic immunities, secure communications, etc.

Finally, the President has directed that in our next Warsaw presentation we pick up the reference made by the Chinese Chargé at the last meeting to his country's willingness to sit down with the U.S. to discuss the question of relaxing tensions in the Far East, and indicate that we would be interested in hearing the Chinese views on this matter.

In view of the time factor raised by the visit of GRC Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to Washington on April 21–23, the next Ambassadorial-level meeting should be set for the week of March 23–27, or as soon thereafter as possible depending on the Chinese response to the date which we propose.⁴

Henry A. Kissinger

³ In a March 13 telephone conversation with Kissinger, Nixon stated: "I was thinking about the Chinese thing. Did they offer to conduct talks in Warsaw? I want talks in Peking. I do not agree with idea that it is just a question of timing. I suggest they tell them in essence we agree. Who is in charge of that? Tell them that the President has decided that and that we do it. I want to be sure they don't screw it up." Kissinger replied, "We have to clear every speech they make." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

⁴ Instructions for subsequent Warsaw talks were held up until May 17 due to uncertainty over the date of the next meeting. See Document 80. Various iterations of instructions to Warsaw during February–June 1970 are in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US, and *ibid.*, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, Winston Lord Chronology.

74. Letter From President Nixon to the President of the Republic of China Chiang Kai-shek¹

Washington, March 27, 1970.

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of March 1 was most welcome.² I greatly appreciated your frankness and your sincere concern for the success of my efforts to bring a lasting peace to East Asia.

From the conversations which we had together before I became President and from the previous correspondence which we have exchanged, I know of your deep distrust of Communist China's motives. In my own evaluation of Communist China, I do not ignore the legacy of the past, nor do I ignore the threat which the Chinese Communist regime may pose in the future. In my report to the Congress of February 18, 1970 on United States Foreign Policy, I stated that in dealing with the Communist countries we would not underestimate the depth of ideological disagreement or the disparity between their interests and ours.³ You may recall, too, that in my press conference of January 30 I cited the potential danger to the United States posed by the growth of Communist China's nuclear weapons capability.⁴

At the same time, Mr. President, I believe that I would be remiss in my duty to the American people if I did not attempt to discover whether a basis may not exist for reducing the risk of a conflict between the United States and Communist China, and whether certain of the issues which lie between us may not be settled by negotiation. The alternative of maintaining a hostile relationship indefinitely while weapons of mass destruction increase in numbers and power is a terrible one, and demands that every reasonable effort be made to promote understandings which will contribute to peace and stability in Asia.

In undertaking this effort, I of course have in mind not only the essential interests of the American people, but of our allies as well.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence File, Republic of China, President Chiang Kai-shek. Sent in telegram 45340 to Taipei, March 27. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US) In an April 11 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger indicated that he sent the response to the ROC while Nixon was in Key Biscayne, Florida. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70-6/30/70) The response was drafted in EA, then forwarded by Green to Rogers for approval on March 16. Kissinger modified this response after receiving it under a covering memorandum from Eliot on March 21.

² See Document 71.

³ The report was published as a separate document but is also printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 116-190. Pages 181-182 address Sino-American relations.

⁴ Ibid., p. 44.

In your letter you have expressed concern for certain aspects of our talks with the Chinese Communists at Warsaw. Secretary Rogers has received from your Ambassador in Washington a detailed statement of your Government's views on these matters and is replying to them.⁵

I wish, however, to assure you personally and in the strongest terms of my determination that there shall be no change in the firmness of our commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores and of my earnest desire that these talks will not affect the friendship and close cooperation which has existed between our Governments for so many years. I deeply value our long personal relationship as candid friends and am confident that this will serve us well in the future.

Mrs. Nixon joins me in extending our best wishes and warmest regards to you and Madame Chiang. We trust that Madame Chiang's health has improved.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon⁶

⁵ These notes were in response to ROC messages from early March. See footnote 4, Document 71. Rogers' note to the ROC Ambassador was sent to Taipei in telegram 45069, March 27, to be delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) McConaughy delivered the letter to Chiang on March 28. (Telegram 1404 from Taipei, March 28; *ibid.*) On March 27 an identical message was given to Ambassador Chow in Washington. (Telegram 45437 to Taipei, March 27; *ibid.*)

⁶ Printed from a copy that indicates Nixon signed the original.

75. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Relations

You have expressed concern over a news report of April 4² to the effect that the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union may have

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memoranda of Conversations, Feb. 1969–Sept. 1971, Box CL 278. Secret. Sent for information.

² Not found.

accomplished a mutual pull-back of their troops from each side of the disputed border, and you have asked me to comment on the implications of this report with respect to Sino-Soviet relations, the effects on Hanoi and the possible effects on our current strategy with respect to Communist China.

Sino-Soviet Relations

Several sources have confirmed that there has been an agreement to pull back some forces from disputed border areas. The withdrawals have been only a few kilometers and not all along the border. It is also confirmed that the Soviets will send a new Ambassador to Peking, and the Chinese will name their Ambassador later.

Both sides seem to have made some concessions. The Soviets originally proposed last year to exchange Ambassadors as part of a general improvement in relations, which they linked to a general settlement of the border. The Chinese initially refused to accept this approach and insisted as a precondition that the Soviets withdraw from disputed areas.

It may be that each saw some advantage in demonstrating that the talks in Peking were not hopelessly bogged down or about to break off.

The appearance of a slight improvement in relations with Peking would be tactically helpful to the Soviets as they continue their negotiations with Brandt, at a time when the SALT talks resume, and as negotiations continue over the Middle East and they are involving themselves more in the defense of the UAR. Some easing of their Eastern border problems would be designed to confound many in the West who have counted heavily on this problem as either a limiting factor on Soviet freedom of action or as inducing the Soviets to make concessions for the sake of détente with the West.

The Chinese themselves would probably welcome a respite to enable them to devote more of their attention to recovering from the Cultural Revolution. But neither side will be prepared to give up any fundamental positions, and the mutual antipathies will continue. We know from sensitive intelligence sources that the Soviets are extremely suspicious of the Chinese policies and intentions, and the Chinese have made it very evident that they have no use for the "new Tsars", as they now call the Soviets. The Chinese, too, will realize that a pull back of Soviet troops from the border areas still leaves very substantial Soviet forces near enough to China to strike on short notice. The Chinese remain on guard, and in point of fact are still continuing their anti-Soviet propaganda.

Effects on Hanoi

Hanoi, which we know from intelligence reports was greatly worried by the Sino-Soviet confrontation, will be relieved by these latest

developments.³ Their fears that the Sino-Soviet conflict would lead to a loss of Soviet overland supplies may be eased somewhat. And Hanoi may be less concerned over possible opportunities to exploit the Sino-Soviet competition. Hanoi might therefore judge that its strategy of “protracted struggle” can be continued without undue interruption, and the pressures on it to negotiate may diminish as a result.

This does not mean, though, that Hanoi will be operating without constraints. For example, one of the major limiting factors on its ability to sustain the war is military manpower, and neither the Soviets nor the Chinese are in a position to fill Hanoi’s needs. (The Chinese could, of course, return their logistic support units to North Vietnam, but this would help only peripherally. And, too, Hanoi presumably will need to pay for at least some of the aid which it is receiving from the USSR and China. Basically Hanoi’s decision on whether or not to follow a “protracted struggle” strategy will depend more on the situation in the South, as well as on Hanoi’s manpower losses, than on a guarantee of Soviet aid through China.

Effects on US Strategy Toward China

I doubt that these latest developments portend any fundamental relief in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus no significant change in our strategy toward Communist China is likely to be required. The Chinese will probably still wish to continue to develop the contact with us as a counterweight to the Soviets. There also seems to be some interest on their part in opening up trade with us. They may, however, believe that there is less urgency in moving ahead with higher level talks in Peking,⁴ and we may find that the fairly rapid pace which developed in our contacts with the Chinese at Warsaw since December 1969 will slow down. In this respect, we are still awaiting a reply from Peking on the date of the next Warsaw meeting. They responded to our bid for talks on April 1–3 by proposing April 15, and we have counter-proposed April 30 or any date thereafter.⁵

³ Nixon underlined this sentence and wrote in the margin: “the most significant by product.”

⁴ Nixon circled the words “with higher level talks in Peking” and wrote: “Let us see that State does not drag its feet on this.”

⁵ See Document 80.

76. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

United States Relations with the Republic of China

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy

Donald M. Anderson, Department of State

Republic of China

Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo

Shen Chien-hung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Chow Shu-kai

The President greeted the Vice Premier and noted that this was the first meeting that they had had since the Vice Premier was in Washington for the funeral of President Eisenhower. The Vice Premier expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to discuss mutual problems between the United States and the Republic of China. He presented a letter to the President from President Chiang Kai-shek and said that President Chiang had asked him to convey his thoughts on several matters of mutual interest.² He then presented President Chiang's views, using prepared notes. This presentation is summarized under the next five headings.

International Situation and the Nixon Doctrine

The Vice Premier stated that President Chiang feels the present international situation is in a state of change and that the way in which

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held from 7:05 to 8:05 p.m. prior to a White House State Dinner. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The memorandum of conversation was drafted by Anderson, who also served as an interpreter for the Warsaw talks. Kissinger approved it on May 14. The Vice Premier was in the United States April 18–28, and in Washington April 20–24. Chiang Ching-kuo's schedule is *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 913, VIP Visits, Vol. II Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo of China, April 21–23, 1970. He met with Rogers, Green, McConaughy, and other Department of State officials on April 21. Records of these meetings are *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US. According to an April 16 memorandum from Rogers to the President, Chiang was scheduled to meet on April 22 with Laird, McCracken, and Schlesinger, Acting Director of BOB. A memorandum of conversation of Chiang's meeting with McCracken and Schlesinger is *ibid.*, POL 7 CHINAT. For his meeting with Laird, see Document 78.

² The 1-page April 17 letter from Chiang Kai-shek to Nixon is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence File, President Chiang Kai-shek.

we handle the complicated situation at present will be very important in determining the shape of future developments. President Chiang, the Vice Premier said, is well aware of the President's domestic difficulties and the problems he faces with U.S. public opinion, and he sympathizes with the President's heavy burden. President Chiang fully supports the President's new Asia policy and the Nixon Doctrine. The important question concerning the new Asia policy is one of implementation. This will be particularly important in shaping the Asian peoples' reaction to it and will largely determine its success. The Republic of China is prepared to cooperate closely with the United States in the implementation of this policy, and as part of this cooperation, the Vice Premier assured the President that the Republic of China will not use armed force against the mainland, even on a small scale, but instead will use political means to attain its goals.

Security of Taiwan

The Vice Premier noted that, with the problems of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos, there is relatively little attention currently being given to Taiwan. This, he said, is largely because the situation on Taiwan is stable. Nevertheless, Taiwan remains the center of the problems in Asia, and the security of Taiwan is closely connected with the security of the United States. The Vice Premier noted that, while in other countries, the Chinese Communists rely primarily on political infiltration, providing arms and assistance to dissident elements, in the case of Taiwan the Chinese Communists will use military force, most likely a surprise attack. The Republic of China recently acquired a publication limited to Chinese Communist cadres which spelled out Chinese Communist strategic thinking. It clearly indicated that they are planning an attack similar to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the main difference being that it will be followed up with a landing of troops. The Vice Premier stated that the United States and the Republic of China should make a joint effort to determine effective means of coping with this threat. A second very important factor, he said, was the impact of U.S. foreign policy on the situation and the effect that it would have on the morale of governments in the Far East.

Mainland Situation

Turning to the situation on the mainland, the Vice Premier noted that the Chinese Communists face difficult problems. They are confronted with the problem of Sino-Soviet relations, divisive forces internally and a crisis in their economy. Their main concern at present, then, is how to surmount these difficulties. A standard Communist tactic when they are cornered is to make use of others, so they have agreed to resume the talks with the United States in Warsaw. They have adopted this tactic for a number of reasons. It helps them in their conflict with Moscow; it is a psychological warfare device to alienate the United States and the Republic of China; and it is useful in lowering

the prestige of the United States in Asia. The Vice Premier noted that if the Chinese Communists are given an inch they will ask for a foot. As an example, he noted that the Republic of China had recently acquired intelligence in Hong Kong indicating that the Chinese Communists may propose a change in venue for the Warsaw talks, perhaps even seeking to move them to Peking.³ Finally, the Vice Premier noted that President Chiang is concerned that the Warsaw talks might arouse the Soviet Union to take action against China.

Sino-Soviet Relations

The Vice Premier discussed Sino-Soviet relations, saying that President Chiang is convinced there can be no rapprochement between the two. He does not feel, however, that the Soviets are planning the use of regular military forces against the Chinese Communists. The Vice Premier noted that Kuznetsov's protracted stay in Peking has two implications: 1) as a symbol of Soviet presence and a potential rallying point for pro-Soviet elements in the Chinese Communist hierarchy; and 2) as a means of collecting intelligence and information as part of Moscow's efforts to bring about a pro-Soviet regime in China. President Chiang believes that Moscow is currently thinking of new means to control any future leadership of Communist China. The methods they used with Mao were a failure.

The United States should be thinking about the adverse implications of a Soviet controlled mainland. President Chiang believes that the Mao regime will eventually collapse either as a result of an internal split or due to pressure from the Soviet Union. This will create a new situation, and if the Soviets regain their dominant position, this will be a major problem for the United States in the 1970's. If the seven hundred million Chinese people are friendly toward the United States there will be peace in Asia. If they are Soviet dominated there will be problems. It is uncertain under what circumstances or how soon the Republic of China will be able to return to the mainland. However, President Chiang, as a friend and ally of the United States, feels that it is of utmost importance that there be a candid exchange of views on what can be done to improve the chances of success. The seven hundred million Chinese people will be friends of the United States only when they have a peace-loving government.

³ In a May 1 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge suggested that Chiang "is trying to tip us off that the GRC has intelligence contacts with the Chinese Communists. This is probably intended to remind us that we should not take the GRC for granted. From the Communists' standpoint, this intelligence by-play is a useful reminder that the Communists' immediate tactical objective in the present talks is probably to see if they can slip a blade in between us and the GRC. (The broader purpose of course is probably related to the Sino-Soviet relationship.)" (Ibid., Box 913, VIP Visits, Vol. II Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of China, April 21-23, 1970)

Collective Security in Asia

The Vice Premier raised the subject of collective security in Asia, noting that the Republic of China, South Viet-Nam, South Korea and Thailand are like-minded countries and all face a Communist threat. He said that he felt it was important that these governments should coordinate their efforts and that the United States had a major role to play. President Chiang, however, feels that the time is not right for a formal arrangement between these states and that it would be preferable to take other practical measures currently to improve the security of the area.

U.S. Policy and the Warsaw Talks

The President responded that he was glad to have the views of President Chiang and the Vice Premier. Concerning the Nixon Doctrine, the President said that its purpose is not the withdrawal of the United States from Asia. The U.S. will continue to play a role there. A second aspect of the Nixon Doctrine, and one which is sometimes too little emphasized, is that the United States wants to help others help themselves. He recognized that the application of the Doctrine might call for more, not less, military assistance to our allies, although the attitude of the Congress might make it difficult to do all that we would like to do. The Republic of China is an outstanding example of success in Asia, the President said, with a self-sustaining economy and a strong military. The other aspect of U.S. policy is that we will stand firmly by our allies, particularly the Republic of China. Under no circumstances will we abandon this commitment. The President described the Warsaw talks as only exploratory in nature and said they in no way compromise our loyalty to the Republic of China. The Warsaw talks, he said, do not encompass our relations with the Republic of China. What will come out of these talks, if anything, we do not know, but the President assured the Vice Premier that it is not U.S. policy to let down its friends. He said that we will continue to oppose admission of Communist China to the United Nations.⁴

The President expressed his appreciation for President Chiang's understanding of the domestic problems involved in such questions as military assistance. We have difficulties in getting sufficient funds from Congress for some purposes, he said, but we will continue to the extent we can to meet those requests which are in our mutual interest.

⁴ In his May 1 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge wrote: "This is a natural formula to use in a meeting such as this, but it is somewhat different from the usual position that we will continue to oppose the eviction of the GRC." (Ibid.) A Chinese record of this conversation, as well as of Chiang's meeting with Kissinger on April 22, is in James C. H. Shen, *The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally* (Washington D.C.: Acropolis Books Ltd., 1983), pp. 47–52. Shen served as a translator on Chiang's visit and became Ambassador to the United States in May 1971.

Turning to the question of the Chinese Communist threat to Taiwan, the President noted that we have faced this problem before, as in 1958 especially, and that our position has not changed. We will continue to stand by our commitments. The President expressed his appreciation for President Chiang's assurances of support for United States policies and for his far-sighted views on the vital importance of the seven hundred million Chinese people to the future of Asia. He agreed that for the Chinese people to be dominated by the Soviet Union would be undesirable and that our forthcoming policies will have a profound effect in the area over the next twenty-five years and longer. What we want to do, the President said, is use our influence to shape those developments.

The President concluded by noting that the Vice Premier would be discussing many of these problems in detail with Secretaries Rogers and Laird, and that the most important thing required from him as President was a reaffirmation of our friendship and support. He noted that he has been a friend of the Republic of China for the past twenty-three years, ever since he first entered Congress, and that he had visited the Republic of China on six occasions. The strength and vitality on Taiwan is a credit to the Chinese people. Finally, the President noted that although this is a difficult period in Southeast Asia, we are keenly aware of the importance of a strong, free Republic of China.

Military Assistance

The Vice Premier replied that the Chinese people look on the President as a staunch friend and that other free Asian peoples feel the same. He noted that on his departure from Taiwan he had been asked if he would seek more modern weapons. He did not intend to ask for more weapons, he said, but he did want to stress the importance of mutual security and the necessity for joint efforts in this regard. The Vice Premier noted that he did have one new thought on this subject that he would like to mention. It is time, he said, for a serious study of the efficacy of the present defense system on Taiwan. He said he hoped that a joint high level study of this problem could be arranged at an early date. After mentioning the recent force reductions in the army on Taiwan, both the President and the Vice Premier agreed that it is quality and not the size of the army that is important.

Concluding Remarks

In response to the President's question concerning the possibility of a Sino-Soviet détente, the Vice Premier reiterated his belief that it is impossible. Neither side is willing to make concessions, he said. The Soviet leadership could not survive an abandonment of their position, and for Mao to yield to the Soviets would be disastrous for him. There are anti-Mao elements in China, but all find it necessary to oppose the

Soviet Union to some degree. Finally, the Vice Premier noted that Mao is finding it difficult to maintain his control, particularly of the military. He referred to a current slogan on the mainland opposing “mountain-topism” which, he said clearly refers to the old problem of warlordism. The problem of control will become more serious when Mao dies, he said, because Communism is alien to the people of China.

The President and the Vice Premier were joined at about 7:35 by Dr. Kissinger, and at about 7:50 by the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The President’s assurances to the Vice Premier as to the steadfastness of U.S. policy toward the Republic of China were reiterated after the arrival of these officials.

At 8:00 the meeting was adjourned to go down to dinner.

77. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 22, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member
William Codrus, Office of Protocol, Department of State
Chiang Ching-kuo, Vice Premier, Republic of China
James Shen, Vice Foreign Minister, Republic of China
Ambassador Chow Shu-kai

SUBJECT

GRC Vice Premier’s Conversation with Dr. Kissinger

The Vice Premier said he was glad to be received by Dr. Kissinger at a time when he, Dr. Kissinger, was so busy. Dr. Kissinger said he had been looking forward to seeing the Vice Premier. An NSC meeting on Cambodia was being held, so he had been obliged to cancel all of his afternoon appointments. Nevertheless, he didn’t want to miss the opportunity to see the Vice Premier briefly. Dr. Kissinger mentioned that he knew Ambassador Chow very well, and regarded him as a very effective representative.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 913, VIP Visits, Vol. I Visit of Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of China, April 21–23, 1970. Secret; Sensitive. According to a covering memorandum drafted by Holdridge, Kissinger approved this memorandum of conversation on June 2. It was to have “in-house distribution only.”

The Vice Premier declared that he wanted to express his sincere appreciation for what Dr. Kissinger was doing in providing an important link between our two countries. He had been very pleased to be able to meet with US leaders from the President on down, and found his discussions with them most rewarding. Dr. Kissinger commented that the President had been most impressed by his meeting with the Vice Premier and had said that there was no substitute for face-to-face contacts of this nature. The Vice Premier agreed that there was no better way to get ideas across than to have views exchanged. He liked to think that the relations between our two countries were not of an ordinary sort, since they had been in existence for a long time. It was in this light that he approached the opportunity to have a few days here and engage in face-to-face discussions.

Dr. Kissinger declared that we believe very strongly in standing by our friends. Sometimes we engaged in tactical moves which looked confusing, but we knew how to separate strategy and tactics. A newsman had said to him the other day that he had finally worked out the President's approach—the President was always four moves ahead of the game. His reply had been that the newsman was half right, and that the first thing to figure out was what game the President was playing.

The Vice Premier said that his President had known the President for more than twenty years, and liked to think that he understood him and knew what he thought. Dr. Kissinger remarked that he had worked with the President since he had assumed office, had seen him make big decisions, and had always seen him make the big choice. He had always supported his friends, and had never yielded to the Communists on any issue. Speaking frankly, we would go through lots of maneuvering before we acted because there was no sense in tipping our hand. In this respect, the North Vietnamese offensive on Laos hadn't stopped because we were using kind words. Dr. Kissinger added that the President is not good for the nerves of some of his subordinates in the bureaucracy, who are of a more cautious frame of mind.

The Vice Premier said he would like to know the consensus in the Administration on Cambodia—is this part of the whole Communist strategy (which would include Laos), or an issue by itself? Dr. Kissinger said, first, that our Administration policy with respect to the bureaucracy was to “let 100 flowers bloom” but that our friends should watch what we do and not what they in the bureaucracy say. Continuing, he explained that we looked at Cambodia as part of the entire Indo-China problem and of the total Communist movement there. He added that if they thought they could move in Cambodia for nothing, they would know better soon.

The Vice Premier said that the Chinese hoped that the new government in Phnom Penh could hold out, but were apprehensive that

the North Vietnamese would not stop where they were and would try to put Sihanouk back in power. Dr. Kissinger agreed that they would try, and remarked that we couldn't be too optimistic. The Cambodian army did not have² the same quality as the Laotian army, and had not yet distinguished itself in combat. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had once said that the only people who could fight in Asia were the Chinese or the people under Chinese cultural influence. The Cambodians were definitely not the latter. We couldn't guarantee the outcome but would do what we could. The Communists would not have a free ride. They had had more problems with us than with our predecessors. We didn't talk so much and would not ignore events in Cambodia, which we did not consider a separate war. He hoped that the Cambodians could hold out for a few more weeks. He asked what the Vice Premier thought.

The Vice Premier agreed that Cambodia was not an isolated case but part of the whole Indo-China question. The Chinese felt the same with respect to Laos. Their intelligence indicated that the Chinese Communists were intensifying a training program for Cambodian and Lao cadres in Kunming, which is right on the border. Dr. Kissinger noted that the Chinese Communists had also given strong support to Sihanouk. The Vice Premier went on to say that he doubted they would use their own forces in the situation.

Dr. Kissinger asked the Vice Premier for his estimate of the quality of the Chinese Communist army. In response, the Vice Premier said that there had not been much change in the combat quality of the ground forces, but there had been noteworthy improvements in the capability of the air force and the navy. Army morale accounted for 50% of the Communist capability under fire in the past, but he knew for a fact that this morale was now not what it had been. Nevertheless, we should not ignore the fact that they were stronger in the air and on the sea. He surmised that the emphasis in the training being given Cambodians and Lao in Kunming was on guerrilla warfare.

The Vice President then asked Dr. Kissinger for his estimate of the significance of Chou En-lai's visit to Pyongyang. Dr. Kissinger replied that he didn't have a clear opinion on this. The Chinese Communists were trying to mend relations with many neighbors, and to prevent excessive Soviet influence, but he felt that the Vice Premier's views would be more interesting than his own.

The Vice Premier said that there was one theory to the effect that North Korea had come to resent the tight control which the Soviets had exercised in restraining North Korean adventures against South Korea

² Kissinger corrected this sentence, changing "did not have" to "had."

which might involve the Soviets themselves. This resentment had reached such proportions as to make it desirable for North Korea to break away a bit and to establish closer relations with Peking instead. Dr. Kissinger observed that the North Koreans would be in tough shape if they attacked—they could not count on making a move against the US again and getting away with it.

The Vice Premier wondered if the Chinese Communists' purpose was to keep the US busy on more than one front at a time by keeping up the pressures on Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger thought that this might be true. There was something odd, he said, about a situation where the greatest country in the world had to worry about what a whole lot of fifth rate countries were doing to us. It would be unwise, though, for the Communists to hit us again. This President had a great advantage over his predecessors in that there were 13 million votes on the right which he had not yet tapped, and it would be dangerous to push us too hard. We engaged in a lot of tactics because we didn't believe in taking part in needless domestic battles which might involve our political capital, but we would spend this capital when necessary. This President didn't get where he is today by yielding. There were many members of the bureaucracy who didn't realize this point.

The Vice Premier said that he appreciated the fact that Dr. Kissinger was very busy, and would not take up any more of his time. He simply wanted to make one last remark—people often tended to apply normal standards in assessing Mao Tse-tung and Mao's thoughts and actions. This was a mistake. Mao was not a normal man, and his reflexes didn't operate in ways in which they might be expected to operate. Dr. Kissinger agreed that it would be a mistake to analyze other countries on the basis of our standards.

78. Memorandum of Conversation¹

I-21969/70

Washington, April 22, 1970, 1-2:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

SECDEF Working Luncheon for Vice Premier of Republic of China

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 330 73 A 1975, China, Rep. of, 1970, 333 January. Secret. Prepared by Doolin and approved by Nutter on April 29 and Laird's office on May 25. The meeting was held in Laird's dining room at the Pentagon.

PARTICIPANTS

Republic of China Side

Vice Premier—Chiang Ching-kuo
ROC Ambassador to U.S.—Chow Shu-kai
Secretary General of Executive Yuan—Tsiang Yen-shih
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs—Shen Chien-hung
Special Assistant to Vice Premier—MGEN Wen Ha-hsiung
Advisor to Executive Yuan—Captain Chung Hu-ping

United States Side

Secretary of Defense—Melvin R. Laird
Deputy Secretary of Defense—David Packard
Secretary of the Air Force—Robert C. Seamans
American Ambassador to ROC—Walter P. McCaughy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—G. Warren Nutter
Assistant Secretary of Defense (SA)—Gardiner L. Tucker
Deputy ASD (ISA/MA&S)—LGEN Robert H. Warren
Deputy ASD (ISA/EAPA)—Dennis J. Doolin
Military Assistant—BGEN Robert E. Pursley

1. *Military Assistance*

The Secretary opened by observing that this was a working lunch and requested that General Warren provide a general review of our aid program to the ROC. Among items mentioned by General Warren were replacement aircraft for the F-86s, the Nike-Hercules Battalion, long-supply and excess items, as well as the hope for more matériel to the ROC as our SEA involvement draws down. The Secretary then mentioned the air defense radar stating that he hoped that it had been upgraded. Secretary Seamans informed the Secretary that he had briefly discussed this matter with the Vice Premier immediately before lunch.

2. *International Fighter*

The Secretary then briefed the Vice Premier with regard to the proposed international fighter. The Deputy Secretary followed, elaborating on lower O&M costs for the aircraft. Mr. Packard noted that the proposal is out to contractors at the present time and hopes to have it firmed up within 4 to 6 weeks.

3. *Vice Premier's Views*

The Vice Premier then thanked the Secretary for his hospitality as well as the opportunity to discuss matters of mutual concern. He continued by stating that the defense of Taiwan is in the mutual security interest of both our countries and hoped that matters related to military assistance could be studied jointly. The Vice Premier elaborated on this matter at some length. He stated that he had discussed the matter of fundamental improvement and modernization of ROC armed forces with President Nixon, noting that he meant improvement and modernization with regard to organization, structure, weapons, and equipment. He stated that this review should be joint, exhaustive,

and lengthy, and that, if the Secretary concurs, he will bring the matter up with President Chiang. He noted on more than one occasion (although it was not translated each time) that his hope was for a ROC armed force—Army, Navy, and Air Force—with increased fire power but with less personnel. He then requested that consideration be given to providing surplus weapons from SVN *apart from MAP*. He referred to President Chiang Kai-shek's mentioning to Secretary Rogers that the ROC needs air and sea supremacy, and, in a low-key renewed his request for F-4 aircraft *and* submarines in this context. (*Note*: This is the first time that the ROC has raised the submarine issue in a context other than anti-submarine warfare training.) The Vice Premier then reiterated again that his government desired overall, not piecemeal, improvement and modernization of its armed forces. The Secretary responded that this was a worthwhile suggestion that should be outlined in some detail and staffed-out with the Ambassador and our working group in Taiwan.²

4. *Plan Rochester*

The Vice Premier then turned to the question of Plan Rochester (the joint U.S./ROC defense plan), noting that the plan was revised last year jointly by the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command and the ROC's Ministry of National Defense. He stated that, although agreement had been reached at that level concerning the plan, the U.S. Government has not yet signed and expressed his hope that an early date could be set for the formal signing. The Secretary replied in a noncommittal manner.

5. *Secretary's Views*

Secretary Laird then stated the desire of the U.S. to promote increased close cooperation between our two governments, noting that under the Nixon Doctrine, we are well aware of the need to improve Nationalist China's naval and air defenses. He stated that, within the limits imposed by the Congress, we would try to provide as much military assistance as we can. He stated that we will have additional surplus matériel available in the 1971-72 time frame, and expressed his hope that we will be able to retain our flexibility concerning the allocation of this surplus. He then noted the President's reaffirmation of our Security Treaty commitments to the ROC and stated that the ROC can look forward to continued cooperation from the DOD as the Secretary is "prepared to go the extra step for the Republic of China."

² Prior to the meeting, Nutter informed Laird that Chiang Ching-kuo would probably raise force reorganization in tandem with the need for F-4 aircraft and submarines for the ROC. (Memorandum from Nutter to Laird, April 22; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Secret Files: FRC 330 76 0067, China (Nats), 1970)

6. *Toast & Conclusion*

The Secretary then proposed a toast to the continued deep friendship between our two peoples as well as to the continued good health of our distinguished visitor. The toast was reciprocated by the Prime Minister, who expressed appreciation for all past assistance and our continued close relations. The luncheon concluded with an amiable discussion.

79. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, May 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Communication with the Communist Chinese

As I mentioned to you at the time on the phone, Professor Ernst Winters, a naturalized American working with UNESCO in Paris, and an old acquaintance, called me on May 3 to relay the reaction of personnel in the Communist Chinese Embassy in Paris to your decision on the Cambodian sanctuaries.² This reaction was obtained on April 30, i.e., *before* your speech.³ Thus, the Chinese were aware of only South Vietnamese ground operations in Cambodia, not our own.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Material Concerning Preparations for First China Trip by HAK, July 1971. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Sent for information. An unsigned May 3 version of this memorandum is *ibid.*, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, Winston Lord Chronology, May 1970.

² On May 3 Kissinger informed the President of his conversation with Winters. Kissinger told Nixon that "they [the Chinese] wanted to know if it [the Cambodian invasion] is a highly tactical move or intense campaign. They wanted to know who they should talk to here. What I think we should do is tell them that they can talk to us here and that if they want to they should call General Walters. It has two advantages. One, we can surface it if we want to and two, we can establish a channel which the Dutchman has never brought off. This man said he has never seen them in such a state of agitation. He said they called him in which is unheard of." The President replied: "That is very interesting and should be explored to the hilt." (Transcript of a telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, May 3, 1:50 p.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) The transcript of Winters' telephone conversation with Kissinger, May 3, 1:40 p.m., is *ibid.*

³ "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia," April 30, 1970, in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 405–410.

On hearing the gist of his information, I asked Professor Winters to come to my office right away. We met at 2:00 p.m. that afternoon for about fifteen minutes.

I asked Professor Winters what had transpired in Paris. He said that on Thursday, April 30, at 11:30 a.m. (i.e., *before* your speech) one of his contact people with the Chinese, a Frenchman who arranges exchanges between Chinese and French students, called to say that the Chinese wanted to see Professor Winters. He went to the Embassy for a two-hour lunch.

He met with several young low-echelon personnel, such as the chauffeur and a switchboard operator, who are imbued with the cultural revolution and in a sense run the Embassy. The Ambassador and a young man from the Foreign Service were also there but, as usual, were not very articulate. The Chinese immediately asked Professor Winters what he thought of the President's decisions on Cambodia.

Professor Winters replied that he supposed that the United States thought that its natural interest was at stake and was acting accordingly. The Chinese immediately began to harangue him with invective, a marked departure from their previous polite dealings, and lumped him together with all other Americans. They claimed that the U.S. wished to conquer China, that we were considering preventive war, that we were in collusion with the Soviets in a pincer movement on China, and that our Vietnam withdrawals were a ruse.

Professor Winters was struck by the enormous, un-Chinese intensity of their reaction. Clearly, a nerve had been touched. He took the Chinese reaction in stride and asked how the United States was to know how the Chinese felt without any contact. The Chinese did not allow American visitors and the Warsaw meetings were not really productive.

The Chinese asked Professor Winters who in America they could talk to and trust, the significant groups. In his only intervention, the Foreign Service officer said, "Don't say the student movement." Professor Winters replied that the President and his Cabinet were the policy makers and the ones to talk to.

He left the Chinese Embassy very depressed, with a feeling of hopelessness after seven years of cultivating the Chinese. Since he was going to New York that afternoon anyway for a meeting, he thought it would be useful to go to Washington and give me his information in case it fit into our overall strategic mosaic.

I asked Professor Winters whether they would see him, and he replied that they never refused to do so. They did not know that he had been in New York or that he knew me.

I then asked Professor Winters to see the Chinese the next day on May 4 and to tell them that he had seen me, and had put their

questions to me. I asked Professor Winters to pass a message to the Chinese along the lines of the attachment at Tab A.⁴ I told him to contact General Walters as soon as he had seen the Chinese and give him any message from them.

Professor Winters added that he had observed during the past few weeks that the Soviets in UNESCO circles were moving away from the U.S. and that there was a growing Soviet-U.S. tension.

Our meeting closed with Professor Winters assuring me that he would act on this the next day and my observing that if the Chinese refused to receive him, this would be an interesting development also.

We have not heard back from Winters or Walters on this subject.⁵

⁴ The attached message reads in its entirety: "The United States has no aggressive intentions concerning Communist China. On the contrary, we would like to establish regular relations with her, recognizing our differences in ideology. We have no interest in establishing military bases in Vietnam, and we believe that a peace that takes into account everyone's interests in that area can be achieved. Dr. Kissinger is prepared to talk to a person of stature on the Communist Chinese side if this can be done secretly. The Chinese can reply by getting in touch with Major General Vernon Walters, Senior U.S. Military Attaché, American Embassy, Paris. No one but the President is aware of this message and the Chinese reply should be through General Walters and nobody else."

⁵ Kissinger did not hear again from Winters until late September. Lord relayed Winters' message to Kissinger, stating: "Assuming you would consider this the least promising of the various Chinese tracks, I have drafted a friendly, nonsubstantive acknowledgment for your signature." (Memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, October 21; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1033, Files for the President—China Material, Miscellaneous Memoranda Relating to HAK's Trip to the PRC, July 1971) Winters visited the White House in mid-December but did not see Kissinger. Winters reported that his Chinese contacts in Paris requested the names of "influential" or "establishment" Americans who could be invited to China. Kissinger's reply, January 6, 1971, was noncommittal. (Memorandum from Jon Howe to Kissinger, December 16, 1970; *ibid.*)

80. Editorial Note

Scheduling problems, conflict over the war in Vietnam, as well as growing interest in other avenues of communication between the United States and the People's Republic of China brought the Warsaw talks to an end in 1970. After internal discussion of the timing and goals of Sino-American talks (see Documents 72 and 73), the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, requested that the next Warsaw meeting be held between March 23 and 27. The Department of State asked for more time to prepare and suggested April 1–3 as the next meeting date. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, March 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM-US)

Executive Secretary of the Department of State Theodore Eliot reported on March 28 that the PRC had not responded to the suggestion of the April 1–3 dates. He added: “The first Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry statement on Laos in a year was issued on March 26 and appeared to convey sharply increased Chinese concern over the developing situation, particularly the involvement of Thai troops and U.S. bombing.” Eliot suggested that the meetings be delayed until after the April 18–28 visit of ROC Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to the United States. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger; *ibid.*) Chiang Ching-kuo made his irritation over the Warsaw talks known to U.S. officials, even hinting that he might cancel his visit. (Telegrams 1590 and 1591 from Taipei, April 9; *ibid.*, POL 7 CHINAT)

On March 31 PRC diplomats in Warsaw suggested meeting on April 15, a date closer to Chiang’s scheduled U.S. visit. (Telegram 726 from Warsaw; *ibid.*, POL CHICOM–US) The United States responded on April 1 by proposing an April 30 or later date. The Chinese accepted May 20 for the next meeting. Eliot noted the “apparent ‘hardening’ of Peking’s propaganda stance on a range of international issues since the beginning of April—possibly following a Politburo meeting.” (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger; April 28; *ibid.*)

Within the Department of State, there existed varying degrees of eagerness to arrange a meeting with the Chinese. For example, Paul Kreisberg of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs sent a 3-page memorandum through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winthrop Brown, to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green, on April 22, outlining options for the next Warsaw meeting. Kreisberg suggested that the United States “indicate that we wish to continue our dialogue, that we do not believe that developments in Southeast Asia should affect the Warsaw meetings.” He included a draft telegram to Warsaw in order to have this message relayed to the Chinese. Brown and Green cleared the draft. Secretary of State William Rogers wrote on the cable: “Disapprove. Why should we seem to be so anxious.” (*Ibid.*)

On May 18 the Chinese cancelled the May 20 meeting but did offer to meet on June 20 to discuss future talks. In a May 18 memorandum to Rogers, subsequently re-written as a May 19 memorandum from Rogers to President Nixon, Green pointed out that this cancellation was different from the situation in 1969. (See Document 6) He noted the relatively moderate terms used to criticize U.S. policies in Southeast Asia and commented that the cancellation “serves to meet the needs of its relations with Moscow and Hanoi by pointedly avoiding talking with the U.S. at this stage.” (*Ibid.*) [*text not declassified*] The PRC’s public stance is printed as “137th Meeting of Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks Postponed,” *Beijing Review*, May 29, 1970, pages 38–39.

On June 18 the United States accepted the PRC offer to meet on June 20. (Telegram 95760 to Warsaw; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) On June 20, however, a PRC diplomat in Warsaw made the following announcement to U.S. diplomats visiting the Chinese Embassy: “I am instructed to notify you of the following. In view of the current situation, of which both sides are well aware, the Chinese Government deems it unsuitable to discuss and decide upon a date for the next meeting of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks at present. As to when it will be suitable for the meeting to be held in the future, it can be discussed by the liaison personnel of the two sides at an appropriate time. Our side will release news about this.” (Telegram 1687 from Warsaw, June 20; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 700, Country Files, Europe, Poland Vol. II Warsaw Talks 2/1/70–6/30/70) No further Ambassadorial talks were held in Warsaw.

John H. Holdridge of the NSC staff prepared a June 7, 1971, summary memorandum and forwarded an 8-page report to Kissinger detailing the history of PRC negotiating tactics at the Warsaw talks. Holdridge concluded, “nothing of real substance was accomplished between 1955 and 1970.” (*Ibid.*, Box 524, Country Files, Far East, Peoples’ Republic of China, Vol. I)

81. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

Mao Tse-tung Statement on U.S. Action in Cambodia

Mao on May 20 issued a statement concerning U.S. actions in Cambodia (Tab A).² These statements appear occasionally, and usually concern the U.S. The last one concerned the negro struggle in America, in 1968.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A May 20 covering memorandum indicates that Holdridge prepared the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is the 2-page translation of a May 20 New China News Agency report.

The statement is full of sounding phrases such as "U.S. Imperialism, which looks like a huge monster, is in essence a paper tiger, now in the throes of its death-bed struggle." In substance, however, it is remarkably bland. It offers only "warm support" to the three peoples of Indo-China, without even the usual phrases about China being a "rear area" for the struggle. It hammers home the thesis that a small nation can defeat a large one, which must seem cold comfort in Hanoi. It makes no threats, offers no commitments, is not personally abusive toward you, and avoids positions on contentious bilateral issues.

Tactically, Mao's statement serves several purposes:

- It makes propaganda capital of your action in Cambodia.
- It adds Mao's personal prestige to Chinese support for Sihanouk.
- It embarrasses the Soviets by noting pointedly that twenty (other) countries have recognized Sihanouk.

One may wonder why Mao put his prestige on the line for such a vapid undertaking. No answer to this question is completely satisfactory, but it would seem that the Mao mystique is somehow involved. I think (though some analysts would disagree) that Mao really does write these. He is an old man, and obsessed with his place in history. In this, and in earlier such pronouncements, he is highlighting what he sees as salient developments in the death throes of the American system—and he wants history to see that he correctly diagnosed the process. He predicts in the article that the "American people" will eventually rise against "fascist rule." He probably does see the Cambodian exercise as a paroxysm of a dying imperialism, as he sees the negro struggle as a sign of internal decay.

In addition, Mao may have had a particular tactical issue in mind. The top Hanoi leadership is presently engaged in deliberations over policy, and by identifying his personal prestige with maintenance of a "protracted people's war," Mao may calculate that he can help to check any inclinations among the Hanoi leaders to seek a political settlement. A related matter would, of course, be that Mao senses such an inclination actually exists. A hint of this is contained in Mao's assertion that: "Strengthening their unity, supporting each other and persevering in a protracted people's war, the three Indo-Chinese peoples will certainly overcome all difficulties and win complete victory." This sounds like an argument directed against elements who might wish to take another course.

CIA and State analysts have come to similar preliminary readings of the Mao statement, without touching on the surmise sketched out as to Mao's personal vision or on the implications regarding a political settlement. A CIA analysis is at Tab B.³

³ Attached but not printed is an undated 1-page CIA analysis of Mao's statement.

82. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 13–9–70

Washington, May 28, 1970.

[Omitted here are the cover page and a 1-page map of Indochina.]

SUBJECT

SNIE 13–9–70: Chinese Reactions to Possible Developments in Indochina

NOTE

Cambodia's involvement has given a new shape to the struggle in Indochina. This paper considers how China² might view future hypothetical developments, particularly in the military field, which might compel it³ to consider a significant change in its⁴ strategy, and estimates what its⁵ reactions might be if such developments do take place. Insofar as these involve military or other moves by the US and its allies, they are to be regarded as actions which the Communists might possibly anticipate, not as courses of action being entertained by the Allied side.

THE ESTIMATE

I. Peking's View of The Struggle in Indochina

1. Peking has viewed events in Southeast Asia during the course of the war in Vietnam mainly in the light of its aspirations for political dominance in the area. Its perspective is long term, involves no fixed time schedule, and is an aspect of its pretensions to lead a world-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIC Files. Top Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem; Limdis. According to a note on the cover page, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate except for representatives from the FBI and AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdictions. For the full text of this SNIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678. In a March 25 memorandum to Helms, Kissinger wrote: "In order to obtain a sound basis for U.S. policies in Southeast Asia and China over the next five years, we need to obtain an analysis of Chinese attitudes and behavior toward Southeast Asian insurgencies." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 207, CIA—Vol. II 1 Jan 70–30 June 70) This report covered much of the same ground as the June 11 SNIE 13–10–70, Chinese Reactions to Certain Courses of Action in Indochina, which noted that "In particular, this paper assesses the likelihood of the Chinese using 'volunteers' in response to successful guerilla operations to interdict communist lines of communication in this area." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIC Files)

² A handwritten correction removed the words "and North Vietnam."

³ A handwritten correction changed "them" to "it."

⁴ A handwritten correction changed "their" to "its."

⁵ A handwritten correction changed "their" to "its."

wide revolutionary movement. More immediately, Peking sees the war in Indochina as a continuation of a lengthy liberation struggle; first against the French, and now against the US. Peking's advice to the Communists in Indochina has been repetitious and consistent. They are to persist in self-reliant and protracted struggle until they can destroy the enemy or his will to fight. That this may involve occasional defeats and considerable losses is a foregone conclusion. Only by a prolonged and costly struggle can they hope to achieve eventual victory, and they must carry on this struggle themselves, without reliance on outside forces.

2. On one hand, the Chinese view the fighting as a test of Mao's theory of "people's war." They believe a victory would enhance China's political prestige in Asia and would support their claims for ideological pre-eminence over the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Peking has had to consider the possibility that an adverse turn in the war might lead to a security threat on China's southern border and therefore a possible direct confrontation with the US. In practice, this has meant militant advocacy of "people's war" for others, but careful maneuvering to ensure that China stays safely out of the line of fire.

3. In defining its role in this struggle, Peking has been both cautious and prudent. Thus far the policy has been to rule out any direct use of Chinese troops in the ground fighting and to reduce the risks of even an accidental confrontation with the US. There is evidence that the Peking leadership reaffirmed these basic ground rules after a long and bitter debate during 1965. This conflict, which pitted Minister of Defense Lin Piao against his Chief of Staff, was concerned with the assessment of, and possible responses to, the large-scale US intervention in Vietnam then under way. Lin Piao ended the debate with an authoritative endorsement of Mao's theories on "people's war," emphasizing defense in depth rather than moving across China's borders to meet the threat.

4. This decision not to intervene overtly in the Vietnam War was consistent with Peking's policy, at least since the Korean War, of not risking major hostilities with either the US or the USSR. There is as yet no indication that the acquisition of nuclear weapons has changed this basic stance. Indeed, it may have had a sobering effect. When hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 threatened to escalate into a nuclear conflict, the Chinese moved to calm the situation. We judge that China's troubled internal situation and its unresolved problems with the USSR incline its leaders to continue making the same cautious calculations of risk that have marked their conduct of recent years. This means that China's aims in Southeast Asia should be pursued by subversion, revolutionary activity, and diplomacy rather than by the open use of its own military forces.

5. *Recent Developments.* Recent events in Indochina are not likely to change this basic approach. As long as the US/GVN move into Cambodia does not critically affect Hanoi's ability to continue the war, Peking is likely to minimize the threat posed by the current Allied actions. Moreover, Peking probably sees immediate benefits from the political reaction aroused in the US against the Cambodian involvement. And if the US should not withdraw from Cambodia, Peking would assess the situation as one in which the US was getting more and more bogged down in an expanding war that would guarantee growing opposition both at home and abroad. In this sense, at least, it would make little difference to Peking whether the US kept to its schedule and withdrew or whether it continued its involvement in Cambodia.⁶

6. In Peking's view, the US is fighting a losing war in which Hanoi has only to be patient and persevere in order to outlast the US. In order to preserve that patience, China will continue to supply North Vietnam with economic and military aid. More important, Peking is probably now better prepared to furnish steady and dependable political support than it was during the Cultural Revolution. Relations with Hanoi have improved considerably since last fall, and recent events in Cambodia have brought Peking and Hanoi closer together. The remarkable turnout in Peking for Le Duan's recent visit, in which both Mao and Lin made one of their increasingly rare appearances, is evidence of Chinese concern to strengthen ties with Hanoi at Moscow's expense. Peking's careful campaign to exploit Sihanouk, recently emphasized in a major pronouncement by Mao himself, is also intended to diminish Soviet influence in Indochina.

7. In short, Peking has moved promptly to exploit the Cambodian developments for its own ends. The Chinese leadership has seized the opportunities presented to reduce Soviet influence on Hanoi and to increase its own capability to influence Hanoi without, for the present at least, exposing itself to greater risks or markedly higher costs.

⁶ In a June 18 memorandum to Helms, Kissinger asked several questions about the SNIE. He wrote: "In paragraph 5, it is argued that Peking is unlikely to change its basic approach, since it would find advantage in both a U.S. withdrawal and in the U.S.'s becoming bogged down in an expanding war. This seems to leave out the possibility that our policies could succeed and that Vietnamization would result in a GVN increasingly able to take care of itself. Is this so totally out of the question as to be left out of Peking's calculation entirely?" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 207, CIA—Vol. II 1 Jan 70–30 June 70) Abbot Smith, Director, National Estimates, CIA, responded to Kissinger's questions on June 24, noting: "The discussion in paragraph 5 was not intended to exclude possible concern on Peking's part that allied actions in Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos might, in time, result in a GVN increasingly able to take care of itself (or a Hanoi less willing and able to sustain a protracted struggle). We did not feel, however, that this concern would be overriding in the near term; indeed, Peking's sponsorship of the 'Indochina Peoples Conference' seemed to attest to Chinese Communist confidence that Hanoi was prepared to carry on with the struggle on a somewhat broader front." (Ibid.)

8. At the same time, Peking may have some concern that an intensified and enlarged scale of hostilities could weaken Hanoi's will and capacity to continue. Against this possibility Peking is probably prepared to render increased aid to Hanoi, increase the level of threat in its propaganda, perhaps stimulate insurgency and tensions elsewhere in Asia, or attempt to unsettle the US by moving troops about in southern China. Judging by its past actions, however, Peking is likely to calculate carefully the risks of these moves and to prefer gestures and actions that will worry but not provoke the US.

9. *The Soviet Factor.* Peking's reactions in Indochina are conditioned by the terms of its bitter rivalry with the USSR. At critical points during the course of the war, the Chinese have sought to project an image of militant devotion to "people's war," partly at least to outflank politically the Soviets; the latter are constrained in Southeast Asia by geography and by some concern to avoid complicating relations with the US or offending potentially friendly non-Communist Asian regimes. Peking calculates in these situations that Moscow's position is certain to be relatively "soft," providing ample room for Chinese posturing without a requirement for risky commitments. Nonetheless, this stance carries the risk that the Soviets might be able to expose the gap between Chinese rhetoric and performance.

10. Moreover, so long as large and hostile Soviet forces threaten China's northern and western borders, there is added reason for avoiding direct military involvements in Southeast Asia. In sum, the Soviet factor reinforces other considerations which make Peking want to avoid precipitate and risky action even though it continues to discourage compromise settlement of the war.⁷

[Omitted here are paragraphs 11–26, under the heading: II. Peking's Reactions to Possible Future Developments, which were divided into the following sub-headings: Continued Allied Military Activity in Cambodia, Allied Support of the Lon Nol Government, Thai Military Commitment to Cambodia, Renewed Bombing of North Vietnam, Ground Troops in Southern Laos, and Ground Troops in Northern Laos.]

⁷ An unsigned and undated memorandum to the President contained Kissinger's summary of this SNIE. (Ibid., Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV)

83. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–3–70

Washington, June 11, 1970.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

COMMUNIST CHINA'S GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

The Problem

To assess the strength, capabilities, and disposition of the Chinese Communist general purpose and air defense forces with particular reference to the impact of domestic political developments and Sino-Soviet tensions.

Conclusions

A. Twenty years have now been expended in Communist China's effort to strengthen and modernize its armed forces. Peking's persistent willingness to allocate a large share of its resources to military purposes has yielded some creditable results. At the same time, however, the effort has been beset by difficulties caused by disruptive economic and political policies and by the ambivalence between Maoist military doctrine and the requirements for building a modern, professional military force.

B. The upheavals of the Cultural Revolution interfered with military training and degraded the combat capabilities and readiness of the Chinese Armed Forces. But the extent of this degradation and the degree of its persistence up to the present time is in dispute. CIA and INR believe that the level of training is still well short of normal in the army because of continued heavy involvement in non-military activities and that progress in extricating the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from these tasks will be slow. DIA and NSA, on the other hand, believe that training in the army approached normal levels in 1968 and that any residual degradation in combat readiness and effectiveness is slight. A discussion of the evidence on these points at issue is contained in paragraphs 12 to 17.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 13–3–70. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Another copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIC Files. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on June 11 except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678.

C. The deteriorating course of Sino-Soviet relations, which first deprived China of extensive military assistance and then in recent years led to an ominous buildup of military forces and pressure against China, has added another dimension to China's defense problem. Although Peking's reaction has so far been cautious and limited in scope, the Soviet buildup is almost certainly having a major impact on Chinese military planning.

D. Despite its problems, the PLA has the capability for putting up a formidable defense of the mainland. Its principal strength lies in the size of the ground forces (about two and one-half million) and their fighting potential as an infantry force. Although China's military stance is basically defensive, its forces could overwhelm its neighbors in Southeast Asia or Korea if not opposed by a modern outside power; and, as it is demonstrating in Indochina, Peking can provide important assistance to insurgent groups across its southern borders.

E. In conventional combat against a modern opponent, however, each branch of the PLA would have critical weaknesses. Army units are believed to be seriously deficient in motorized transport and heavy armament; the air defense system probably lacks an adequate communications and data processing capability and could not withstand a large-scale, sophisticated air attack; and China's navy, while growing, is still little more than a coastal defense force.

F. As estimated, current and projected production programs will not, for many years, provide sufficient quantities of the various types of weapons and equipment needed to remedy matériel deficiencies and to raise the PLA to modern combat standards. But the Chinese are persevering—and almost certainly will continue to do so under any foreseeable leadership—with a fairly broad range of modernization programs along the following lines:

1. *Ground Forces.* Although the army is deficient in firepower and mobility and seems to have made less progress in modernization than might have been expected, the firepower of Chinese combat units is increasing. Already well supplied with small arms, ground units are receiving more tanks and artillery.

2. *Air Forces.* All elements of China's air defense apparently have been improved. Command and control capabilities have probably increased, more and better radars have been deployed at an increasing rate, and Mig-19 production probably has recovered from the Cultural Revolution. SAM deployment, however, has been proceeding slowly and we are increasingly uncertain about Chinese plans for producing the Mig-21. There is some evidence that an aircraft of native design based on the Mig-19 has been produced in China.

3. *Naval Forces.* With few exceptions, naval shipbuilding programs appear to have recovered fully during 1969 from the Cultural

Revolution, and current expansion of shipyards indicates that new programs could be planned. Greater emphasis is being placed on production of larger, longer range ships capable of extended patrols. Construction of R-class submarines now averages about two units a year, and China has begun to build destroyers. Old destroyers are being converted to carry cruise missiles.

[Omitted here is the 24-page Discussion section of the NIE, which includes the following chapters: I. The People's Liberation Army and the Cultural Revolution, II. The People's Liberation Army Today, and III. Outlook; and an Annex: Status of Forces and Trends.]

84. Message to Be Delivered by Major General Vernon A. Walters to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, undated.

The United States Government wishes to continue the exchanges that are taking place through the Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. However, it is difficult to maintain complete secrecy in these talks due to their formal nature, the large number of officials involved and the great public interest that they have generated.

If the Government of the People's Republic of China desires talks that are strictly confidential and not known by other countries, the President is ready to establish an alternative channel directly to him for

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis; Eyes Only. A typed note attached to the message reads: "June 16, 1970. Typed version—exactly like this—but without signature—was hand carried by Jim Fazio to General Walters this date w/cover memo which is also in this file." A copy of the message in the file is signed by the President. Attached but not printed is a June 15 memorandum from Haig to Walters, which reads in full: "Pursuant to your discussions with my friend [apparently Kissinger], attached is the text you should use in your discussions in Paris. As I understand it, you will not hand over this text to the other side but will follow it literally in your discussions. Jim Fazio, who is carrying this memorandum and its enclosure, will also provide you with an additional supply of one time pads." Fazio, assistant director of the White House Situation Room, delivered this message and Haig's memorandum to Walters in Paris on June 17. His account of meeting Walters was included in two memoranda from Fazio to Haig, both June 22. (Ibid., Box 1327, Unfiled Material, 1971, 5 of 12) "One-time pads" are sheets of random numbers used for encryption purposes. An account of Sino-American contact in Paris is in Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1978). Walters' account of the timing of these initiatives varies from the documentation printed here.

matters of the most extreme sensitivity. Its purpose would be to bring about an improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations fully recognizing differences in ideology.

We are prepared to activate such a channel through the bearer of this communication, Major General Vernon A. Walters, the U.S. Defense Attaché accredited to the French Government in Paris. We are also ready to send a high-level personal representative of the President to Paris, or some other mutually convenient location, for direct talks on U.S.-Chinese relations.

Knowledge of these talks would be confined to the President, his personal advisors, and his personal representative unless otherwise agreed.

85. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 9, 1970.

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Chinese Communist Attempt Against U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft

You have seen the report that the Chinese Communists sent out two MIG 19s with protective cover, in an apparently premeditated effort to intercept and presumably to shoot down a C-130 which was flying [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] collection mission some 100 miles off the China coast on July 2. The MIGs could not locate the C-130, which aborted its mission and returned safely.

These intelligence missions are routine. They sometimes elicit defensive Chinese patrols, but not since 1965 have the Chinese shown evidence of hostile intent.

There are certain aspects of this situation which are puzzling and even disturbing. First, the aircraft was operating well off the China mainland, and was following a flight pattern which has been repeated many times. Customarily the Chinese could be expected to react only when the path carries the aircraft close to the mainland, and they have

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Umbra. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

allowed the many previous flights along the same general line to go unchallenged. Second, the attempt against the aircraft comes at a time when the Chinese have been cautiously opening communications with us, in a process which has not been entirely disrupted by Cambodia. It is true that the Chinese have displayed particular military sensitivity about the Shantung region, and may have wanted to raise the cost and decrease the effectiveness of our intelligence collection activities in this region by driving us farther offshore and perhaps resorting to fighter cover. There may be also some new military developments in or around Shantung regarding which they are particularly sensitive.

However, this may not in itself be sufficient explanation for an effort to shoot down an American aircraft far at sea. Had they succeeded, they would have finished off the slight movement toward a Sino-U.S. thaw. In doing so, they would have nullified the "U.S. option" which they have been developing since their confrontation with the U.S.S.R. began.

The tone of Chinese treatment of us—particularly their diplomatic language—has not changed so markedly as to suggest a major reversal of Chinese policy. Witness the courteous and low-keyed manner in which they deferred future Warsaw meetings.

Perhaps the most plausible hypothesis is that somebody in the power structure *did* want to wreck Sino-U.S. relations. Discounting the usual stridency of their propaganda language, the Chinese for some two years have been cautiously and tentatively feeling us out to see what we might be willing to do to improve relations. This policy is usually associated with Chou En-lai and the moderate grouping which has dominated internal policy in the same period. In the past couple of weeks, there has been evidence of an upsurge of the zealots, and signs that they are fighting their relative exclusion from the reconstituted Party. The Air Force during the Cultural Revolution was the most radical of the armed services. The attempted shutdown may have been related to a policy/power struggle and been intended to stop the moderate drift of foreign policy. The perpetrators may also have hoped that by provoking us into reactions or angry statements they could discredit any proponents of limited accommodation with the U.S.

From the Chinese standpoint, a shutdown would have had two useful byproducts, which may have been used by the proponents to persuade the Standing Committee (i.e. Mao) that the effort should be undertaken:

—It would have raised estimates in the U.S. as to the danger of deeper Chinese involvement in Southeast Asia, and increased pressures for U.S. withdrawal.

—It would have shown solidarity with North Korea, which the Chinese have been courting.

From our standpoint, whatever the truth as to the above hypothesis, the prudent course would seem to be to examine our intelligence operations and make sure that aircraft are not unnecessarily exposed, or their missions unusually provocative. If my guess is correct, we have the additional incentive to avoid playing into the radicals' hands.

We should be sure that adequate cover is given to missions which are thought necessary. The loss of a MIG 19 would not particularly serve the radicals' purpose. We cannot simply abandon the entire C-130 collection operation under these circumstances, without proving to the Chinese that a hard line works best with us.

I have asked that proposals for forthcoming intelligence missions against China be framed with the increased danger in mind.

86. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Taipei, July 17, 1970, 0945Z.

3080. Subj: GRC Force Reorganization and Modernization. Ref: A) Taipei 2589;² B) State 99216;³ C) Taipei 2925;⁴ D) Taipei 2939.⁵

1. We believe Ambassador's and General Taylor's conversations with CCK (refs c, d) have provided about as much clarification as we can expect re CCK and GRC thinking on proposed review. We recognize that we and GRC may still have some differences in relative

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 1 CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority. Copies were sent to CINCPAC, COMUSTDC, CHMAAG Taiwan, and 327th Air Division, part of the 13th Air Force.

² In telegram 2589 from Taipei, June 12, McConaughy reported on a May 21 meeting between General Taylor of MAAG and Chiang Ching-kuo to discuss force reorganization. The Ambassador emphasized that "We will of course give consideration to objectives outlined in telegram 19013 to Taipei (see footnote 4, Document 1) as modified by subsequent exchanges between Washington and Country Team." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 1 CHINAT-US)

³ Telegram 99216 to Taipei, June 23, contained a series of questions about the force reorganization plan. (Ibid.)

⁴ In telegram 2925 from Taipei, July 7, the Embassy reported on McConaughy's July 3 meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo to discuss the questions raised by telegram 99216 to Taipei. (Ibid.)

⁵ In telegram 2939 from Taipei, July 8, the Embassy reported on a July 7 meeting among General Taylor, McConaughy, and Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang discussed the weapons he felt should accompany the reorganization effort: F-4 fighter aircraft, 3 submarines, and M-14 and M-16 rifles. (Ibid.)

importance assigned to certain objectives. In particular, GRC almost certainly hopes the review will improve its prospects for future US assistance. This is only natural, but we should be able to prevent this from becoming major problem by US input during review as well as constant reminders that study implies no USG commitment on either general level of future assistance or on specific items. Moreover, in some respects this is not basically inconsistent with US belief expressed last spring that more carefully considered ROC procurement proposals reflecting sound rationale and systematic evaluation of requirements and their costs (including O&M) probably would enhance receptivity in Washington. This and other potential problems also eased by CCK's full acceptance of idea that study itself, and its end products, will be GRC's and not joint.

2. We also believe that GRC has genuine interest in developing more rational approach to defense planning, and this review can provide further stimulus. For example, growing MND interest and activity in area of systems analysis should gain momentum from this exercise as will trend toward more careful consideration of O&M costs. Sharper focus on relationship of threat to priority requirements and an integrated look at service priorities also a plus. We realize there are limitations on the pace and extent to which these and other US objectives can be achieved, but we are confident that progress in this direction can be made.

3. In any event, GRC may move ahead with some form of review even if we back away. (In fact, Chinese have already begun some preparatory work and informally have been requesting MAAG advice.) There is risk that if they proceed unilaterally, objectives we seek to achieve may suffer.

4. With foregoing in mind, we propose that we develop informal working relationship with MND at two levels—one involving the Chinese service elements, and another higher level arrangement involving representatives of Chinese GCHQ. We would expect the latter group to discuss general approach along lines of ref a and ref c, with some fleshing out of this guidance for the benefit of the Chinese personnel actually doing the work and as guidance for the US officers principally responsible for providing consultation. US personnel will be instructed to: propose basic questions which will stimulate GRC to formulate concepts and plans, as suggested ref b; to respond to requests for advice; and to critique GRC oral presentations and drafts.

5. Defense assistance "nucleus" within the Country Team will be kept fully apprised of developments and "nucleus" will meet as required to provide whatever guidance appears necessary based on its own deliberations and on instructions from Washington. "Nucleus" will keep Washington advised of progress of study.

6. Country Team would appreciate indication as to when systems analysts requested ref a might be expected to arrive.⁶

7. As noted above, Chinese have already undertaken some preparatory work and have informally requested advice of MAAG officers. It will be awkward to continue holding them off and we would appreciate a reply to foregoing ASAP.

8. TDC, MAAG and 327th concur.

9. Re request (ref b) for copy of MemCon covering earlier CHMAAG conversation with CCK and copy of ROC statements to CINCPAC regarding modernization requirements of individual services, we are forwarding material Monday by pouch.⁷

10. *For EA/ROC*: Please bring this message to the attention of Ambassador McConaughy.

Armstrong

⁶ In telegram 2589, McConaughy also suggested that the two systems analysts assigned to MAAG participate in the ROC force reorganization effort.

⁷ Not found.

87. Memorandum From Lindsey Grant of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 31, 1970.

SUBJECT

Communist Chinese Foreign Policy and Strains Within the Leadership

You may find the attached brief research study of interest (Tab A).² It pulls together recent evidence of renewed jockeying for power. It

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. The memorandum was date-stamped "August 11 1970."

² Attached at Tab A but not printed is "Communist China: Maneuvering Among the Top Leadership," Research Study REAS-19 prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, July 23.

describes the evident slippage in power of the old guard leadership and the “administrators”, many of whom had been associated with Chou En-lai. It documents the reappearance of the more radical “cultural revolutionaries.” The study notes that there are continuing signs of the subtle, opportunistic type of foreign policy which we usually associate with Chou, and which has been resurgent for the past two years. It warns, however, that there may be erratic or contradictory behavior, some of it attributable to tensions within a delicately balanced leadership coalition.

The leader of the Air Force, who has been closely associated with the radicals, is again on the ascendant. This adds one small shred of evidence to my personal hypothesis that the apparent attempt in June to shoot down the American C-130 over the high seas may have been a deliberate effort by the radicals to sabotage Chou’s efforts to maintain a dialogue with the U.S.³

To compound the mysteries, the French Parliamentary mission reports that, during its interview with Mao, Chou En-lai appeared to be very much at ease and was in constant conversation with Mao. Lin Piao, supposedly the heir apparent, was unshaven and unkempt; seemed to be in poor health, and said not a word.⁴

The impression which the French Parliamentary mission got from its visit was all sweetness and light, by Chinese standards, but most of its contact was with the administrators rather than the radicals. The conversation with Mao was very general. He disclaimed a big power role for China, objected to “some powers’ ” efforts to interfere in the domestic affairs of others, and complained that the USSR and the U.S. are trying to impose decisions in the nuclear field. Chou En-lai was very complimentary to the French. He reiterated the theme that China would not be pushed around by the big powers but said that China would have normal relations with powers favoring peaceful coexistence. He refused to concede that the U.S. is interested in peace in Vietnam or elsewhere. He bore down heavily on Taiwan, and insisted that

³ Grant is presumably referring to the July 2 incident. See Document 85.

⁴ French Minister for Planning and Territorial Management, André Bettencourt, led a delegation during a July 7–21 visit to the PRC. Telegram 10048 from Paris, July 28, and telegram 121713 to Hong Kong, Paris, Tokyo, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Taipei, Moscow, London, and Bonn, July 29, contain reports of the visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 FR) Another version of the talks between Mao and Bettencourt, obtained “on most confidential basis,” is in telegram 12787 from Paris, September 22. (Ibid., CHICOM-FR)

China would never accept "two Chinas." The PRC could, however, "live with the factual situation." He described German and Japanese militarism as "two new dangers."

Other Chinese echoed the line on Taiwan. None of the Chinese would be drawn into substantive conversation concerning solutions for the Indochina problem.

The French felt that the Chinese are not in an aggressive mood, that they are genuinely worried about Japan, and that they may have played down the Sino-Soviet problem in order to worry the U.S. about possible improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.

88. Assessment Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, September 2, 1970.

TAIWAN SITUATION ASSESSMENT

Summary. The GRC is rapidly approaching the end of an era, and it seems almost certain that the next few years will be marked by sweeping changes in the domestic situation and in Taipei's international position. The groundwork for these changes is already prepared. What is perhaps the most significant GRC achievement—rapid economic development of the island—has set the stage for potential shifts in the internal political balance. Changes in the U.S. political priorities and the gradual resumption of Peking's long march toward regional dominance in East Asia point toward the necessity for acceptance of a new international role by the GRC.

Society on Taiwan is being rapidly urbanized. The many stresses which result—including a growth of political consciousness among the underdog Taiwanese majority—will be harder to cope with because of the split between the politically dominant Mainlanders and the generally alienated Taiwanese, who outnumber them 8 to 1. Internationally, the GRC faces an increasingly precarious situation with steadily diminishing options as U.S. power is gradually shifted in the Pacific.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 73 D 38, Pol. Assessment-US/GRC. Secret. An attached but not printed covering memorandum from Nelson to Green states that this report was prepared by the CIA.

Eventually, the leaders in Taipei must confront the unpleasant prospect—probably sooner rather than later—of acknowledging the “two Chinas” situation and openly accepting the galling status of a small power existing behind the shield of U.S. and/or regional security guarantees. Against this backdrop of trouble, the GRC leadership must cope with the succession question—probably no later than 1972—and a host of lesser problems.

Despite the uncertainties in the near-term future, I feel quite confident that the GRC will weather its problems successfully during the next several years.² The economic growth, which is at the root of many political and social difficulties, also produces a steady rise in the standard of living which serves as a balancing factor in an otherwise unstable situation. This, in conjunction with the pervasive security apparatus and the fact that “Taiwanese independence” is still basically a state of mind, makes it seem likely that the period just ahead will be comparatively tranquil internally. This judgment would require immediate review if some sudden stroke of fate removed the President’s able son, Chiang Ching-kuo, from the line of succession to *de facto control as Premier*—which I confidently expect within the next twelve months.

This does not mean, however, that either the U.S. Government or [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will have easy times ahead in working with the GRC. I believe the Chinese are going to become more touchy, more demanding and more inclined to be assertive where there is any question concerning GRC sovereignty. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

[Omitted here is an 11-page analysis of the Taiwan situation.]

² Shoemith prepared a memorandum for Green on September 11, in which he took issue with the CIA report. Shoemith posited that “the GRC is not merely facing the ‘end of an era’ but a basic challenge to the political structure which has been maintained on Taiwan since 1949.” He also observed that the passing of Chiang and the declining international position of the ROC created a “potentially explosive” situation that could impair domestic economic growth and, in turn, exacerbate political conflicts between mainlanders and the Taiwanese. Green wrote on the first page of this memorandum: “Many thanks. The two analyses [names not declassified] made useful contrasts. MG.” (Ibid.)

89. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Contact with the Chinese

In response to an item on Communist Chinese activity in the September 9 Daily Brief, you asked whether we should not try again through our channel in Paris to contact the Chinese.²

As suggested in your note, we do have an offer outstanding to the Chinese. Attached is a copy of a message that we gave General Walters on June 16, but which he has not yet delivered.³ (You, of course, approved this message but we left it purposely unsigned. Walters would not hand over the text, but rather would read from it literally.) Several weeks ago he found an opportunity to tell his Chinese contact that he had an important message from our government to their government. The man said that he would inform his government that we had a message, but Walters received no response. This past Monday, September 7, Walters again told his contact, at a Pakistani reception, that he had a message. The man again said that he would tell his government.⁴

We have also been trying since the beginning of the year to open a channel through the Dutch,⁵ but I believe if we are to have any success it will be through Paris.

I agree that it would be useful to establish contact with the Chinese at this time. However, we have made clear signals, and I think we have no choice but to wait and see if they are willing to respond.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information.

² In his September 9 daily briefing memorandum, Kissinger mentioned the Hong Kong Consulate's reports on a "new mobility in Peking's conduct of foreign relations which may present opportunities for improving relations." Nixon commented in the margin: "K—should you not try again on your Walters contact with the Chicom in Paris? Or do we have an offer outstanding?" (Ibid., Box 26, President's Daily Briefs)

³ Document 84.

⁴ Information on this attempt to contact the Chinese was not found.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 66.

90. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, September 27, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger
Mr. Sainteny

[Omitted here is discussion concerning Vietnam and Cambodia.]

Communist China

Mr. Sainteny said that he frequently saw the Communist Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen. Dr. Kissinger said that we had tried to have conversations with the Chinese but that they seemed to get nowhere, even though we have no basic problems with the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger asked if Mr. Sainteny could set up a channel with Huang Chen. Our other channels were not satisfactory, and the one in Warsaw was much too much in the public (and the Soviet) view.

Mr. Sainteny said that he would try to arrange something. He was a little concerned because he did not speak Chinese, and whenever he talked with Huang Chen it was through an interpreter. The latter, of course, was an intelligence officer. However, Mr. Sainteny thought he might be able to arrange a channel through an associate who spoke Chinese and who, he thought, could speak to Chen privately. Mr. Sainteny said he would write to Mr. Smyser to let Dr. Kissinger know what happened.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Jean Sainteny's Paris apartment. Sainteny was a French banker and political figure. He served as a source of information and contacts with the Vietnamese. He had served in French Indochina as Commissioner, 1945–1947; Governor of the Colonies, 1946; and Delegate General to North Vietnam, 1954–1958.

² A November 7 memorandum from Smyser to Kissinger passed along a translation of a November 3 letter from Sainteny. Smyser observed: "I note that he appears to have taken a long time to obtain rather basic information [on PRC diplomats in France] and that he does not refer to the interpreter problem he cited in our conversation. So I do not really know what to make of it. Maybe Jean first checked with his government. In any case, I stand ready to transmit a reply on my personal stationery." An attached note from Haig ordered Smyser to prepare a letter for Kissinger's signature; see Document 119. Copies of the Smyser memorandum, Sainteny letter, and Haig's note are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971.

91. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

U.S. Visa for Taiwan Independence Movement Leader Peng

Attached at Tab A is a recent FBI report on the ChiNat Independence Leader Peng, whose group is allegedly responsible for the attempt on the life of Vice Premier Chiang last April.² You will recall the Vice President spoke to you about the need to have State not issue a visa to Peng who plans to come to the U.S. for the purpose of accepting a research position at the University of Michigan.³

Attached at Tab B is a copy of our staff work on the Peng visa. U. Alexis Johnson informed you of State's decision on September 3 to approve issuance of a non-immigrant visa, valid for one year.⁴ Although realizing that the decision would be painful for the Nationalists, State reasoned that it had no other choice since Peng satisfied all the criteria normally required for a non-immigrant visa application. State also felt that discrimination against Peng would generate congressional and public criticism which would prove harmful to U.S. policy toward the GRC. The visa was issued on September 17, and Peng gave his

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V. Secret. Kissinger wrote "OK, HK" and "Peng is former student of mine" on the memorandum.

² In an October 2 memorandum to Kissinger, Hoover declared that Peng was a leader of the independence movement, whose members had attempted to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo in New York on April 24, 1970. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V)

³ No record of this conversation has been found. However, an October 6 memorandum from Haig to Kent Crane of the Vice President's staff mentioned that Agnew found it "undesirable" for Peng come to the United States. Haig's memorandum explained the reasoning behind the visa decision and promised that Kissinger would contact the Vice President personally to discuss this matter. (Ibid.) A September 21 letter from Ambassador Chow to Agnew included a personal plea from Chiang to prevent Peng from entering the United States (Ibid.) Documentation on the debate concerning Peng's admission to the United States is also *ibid.*, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, POL 29 Peng Ming-min.

⁴ On September 3 Acting Secretary of State Richardson approved an August 28 memorandum from Green, which granted a non-immigrant visa to Peng. Johnson forwarded the memorandum to the NSC on September 3. The memoranda from Green and Johnson are *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 30 CHINAT. In a September 5 summary memorandum by Holdridge, Kissinger indicated his approval by writing: "OK, HK." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Department of State—Sept 70–Nov 70, Vol. IX)

personal assurances that he would not engage in organized Taiwan independence activities while in the United States.

Recommendation

That you call the Vice President and explain to him that:

—the problems associated with granting Peng a non-immigrant visa were well recognized at the time.

—there were considered to be no valid legal grounds to bar his entry.

—Peng has given assurances that he will not engage in organized Taiwan independence activities.

—on balance, you believe that under the circumstances the best choice was made among unhappy alternatives.⁵

⁵ No record of a conversation between Kissinger and Agnew has been found.

92. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, October 22, 1970, 1145Z.

4603. Dept pass White House and Vice President's Office. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Subject: Ambassador's Conversation with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo on US/GRC Relations. Reference: Taipei 4580.²

1. I paid my first call following recent home leave on Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo October 21. Personal rapport as strong as ever, and amenities and personal exchanges consumed ten minutes of one-hour meeting.

2. I then told CCK that I would not press for discussion of official matters on this initial occasion. But at some time convenient to him, I wanted to have completely candid discussion of any elements in US/GRC relationship which might be troubling him. Our close friendship did not permit any unrealistic pretenses and I was of course aware of GRC preoccupation with certain recent developments, especially

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, COMUSTDC, and CHMAAG.

² In telegram 4580, October 21, the Embassy relayed the contents of McConaughy's discussions with Acting Foreign Minister Shen on October 20. Their talks focused on MAP funds and Peng Ming-min. (Ibid.)

those related to MAP and Peng Ming-min case. I was ready at any time to give him full exposition of US rationale for decisions taken and I wanted to have a full and uninhibited exchange of views with him. The preservation of the traditional close and trustful relationship between our two governments was too important to permit any disagreement to fester beneath the surface.

3. The Vice Premier heartily reciprocated my preference for friendly candor and said he would like to set forth at once the essential GRC position on MAP cut and admission of Peng to US.

4. As to MAP cut, CCK said that although they had noted warning of possible substantial cut conveyed by Vice President Agnew end of August, they had not anticipated that the new level would go below \$15 million. It was inconceivable to GRC that all investment items would be eliminated and fund for operations and maintenance cut out completely, leaving nothing but a sum of less than \$7 million for overhead type expenses. He said his government had not yet recovered from shock and still found US action incredible. He said that there had to be some continuity in any important major program and some reasonable relationship between present levels and levels of immediately preceding years. Changes need to be gradual and there needs to be opportunity for advance planning and adjustment to necessary changes. The total withdrawal of the entire substantive program without notice and contrary to the advance joint planning could not be justified in GRC view. He said confidence in US consistency and dependability had been seriously diluted in all sectors of his government, adding that the US action would also work against the morale of the GRC armed forces. He said that the GRC officials could not see how the US action, particularly as to the manner in which it was carried out, could be reconciled with the requirements of alliance and friendship. He said the consensus in meetings held by various organs of government was that the US action was "outrageous." GRC officials had said that they did not see how any American associated with the matter could avoid a feeling of embarrassment. He said that while the most serious tangible effect was on the GRC armed forces, the budgetary consequences were also worrisome. The GRC budget was already over-strained and it would not be easy to finance the shortfall, particularly since there had been no opportunity for advance budgetary preparation. But he thought that the intangible consequences were even worse than the concrete results. The GRC officials felt that there had to be policy implications in such a drastic unilateral move, and the implications which the GRC was bound to read into the action were disturbing.

5. I explained our MAP action along the same lines I used October 20 with Acting FonMin Shen (reftel). I assured him categorically that there were no anti-GRC policy implications in the move whatever. I noted the limited total of the expected appropriation and the top

priority unexpected emergency requirements for Cambodia and Korea which had to be met. I frankly pointed out that the absence of any apparent immediate aggressive intent against Taiwan by the ChiComs and the impressive economic progress of the GRC were necessarily taken into account in Washington when the painful decisions had to be made as to how the unavoidable cuts would be applied. I told him that while we could make no commitment as to MAP levels for following years, it was a fact that the current cut applies only to FY 1971. I recalled our ongoing efforts in association with GRC representatives to find ways of buffering the shock of the cut through a readjustment of purchases under military credit and otherwise.

6. CCK said he recognized US budgetary difficulties and the emergency situations in Cambodia and Korea. He did not deny that some cuts might have been necessary but he thought that the matter could have been handled in a different way with some consultation, some advance notice, and at least a partial preservation of the O&M program.

7. CCK then turned to Peng Ming-min case. He termed the US action in opening its gates to Peng the most abrasive event in Sino-US relations in the last 20 years.³ He called the action a direct blow at the political and social stability and security of Taiwan. He recalled that the prestige of President Chiang himself had been engaged in the GRC effort to convince the USG that Peng's admittance to the US would be contrary to essential GRC interests and would be deeply upsetting to GRC. He noted strong appeal which FonMin Wei had made to me on August 28 (Taipei 3737), and urgent representations made by Ambassador Chow in Washington.⁴ USG had acted in complete disregard of these most insistent pleas of a friendly government. The results were a widespread assumption that US was sympathetic to TIM movement, a considerable encouragement to TIM sentiment, and a compounding of the problems of GRC at a difficult juncture.

³ On September 16, Washington local time, Green informed Ambassador Chow in Washington, and Armstrong informed Shen in Taipei, of the decision to grant a visa to Peng. (Telegram 151025 to Taipei, September 15, and telegram 152198 to Taipei, September 16; both *ibid.*, POL 30 CHINAT) ROC officials immediately protested. The Embassy reported a September 21 conversation with Chou Chung-feng, Director of the National Security Bureau, similar to the talk between McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo: "Chou predicted that issuance of a visa to Peng will create misunderstanding and protest on the part of the people of Taiwan." Chou asked that Peng be prevented from coming to the United States or at least be dissuaded from engaging in political activity. The U.S. Government declined to do so. (Memorandum from William E. Nelson to Shoesmith, September 25; *ibid.*, EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, POL 29, Peng Ming-min)

⁴ In telegram 3737, August 29, McConaughy reported on his meeting with Wei. (*Ibid.*, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 CHINAT) Chow met with Green on September 22 and called McConaughy, then in Atlanta on home leave, on September 24 to complain about the military assistance program and Peng's visa. (Telegram 155267 to Taipei, September 21; *ibid.*, and Shoesmith's memorandum for the file, September 24; *ibid.*, EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, POL 29, Peng Ming-min)

8. I set forth basis for our reluctant decision in Peng case and precautionary steps we had taken in recognition of GRC concerns, along lines used with Acting FonMin. I stressed great difficulty of denying entry to a visa applicant qualified under the law and regulations when he cannot be termed a subversive by any US definition of the term. I also dwelt emphatically on extensive harm to the GRC reservoir of goodwill in US if academic, congressional and journalistic communities had been alienated by exclusion of Peng.

9. CCK's response was to effect that GRC had documented number of cases where USG had excluded by administration action aliens whom it wanted to exclude. He said flatly that US could easily have kept Peng out of the country if it had wished to do so. He dismissed goodwill argument, saying that GRC was accustomed to unfriendly attitude from substantial sectors of American public and it could, if necessary, withstand some further hostility from American public. He said the holding of a firm internal security line was far more important to his government than the goodwill of the American elements I had mentioned.

10. CCK summed up by saying that the local standing of the US unfortunately had been severely damaged by these actions. Consequences could be serious. The Chinese view was that the basic requirement of governmental as well as personal friendship was a sympathetic understanding of the needs of the friend and a willingness to go to some trouble to accommodate those needs. It was felt that the USG had not met this friendship test in these two cases. He said that these two decisions were history now, but "they had left scars." The two decisions between them had struck at both the external and the internal security of the GRC. He believed that both types of GRC security had some importance for the US.

11. CCK then mentioned Canadian recognition of ChiComs.⁵ He called this a highly unfortunate development which aggravated the international problems of GRC. He noted that the GRC is facing reverses from several directions but they refused to be discouraged and setbacks would only cause them to redouble their efforts. He said "we will stand up and fight to the end in any event."

12. I told CCK that it was our established policy and confirmed intention to uphold the international position of the GRC and to carry out all of our commitments. I told him his government was mistaken in reading sweeping policy implications into the two actions we had discussed. We do not support or encourage any TIM effort to overthrow the GRC. I told him I and my colleagues would work unremittingly to set right any misunderstandings and to preserve the

⁵ See Document 2 and footnote 2, Document 93.

traditional close US–GRC relationship. I said that I earnestly hoped that no lesions would be left from the two events we had talked about. If there had to be any scars, I hoped they would be completely healed and hardly noticeable.

13. CCK said that he wanted to work with me on the remedial action which he felt was needed. He said he thought the GRC had always lived up to its commitments. It had tried to be forthright, frank, and accommodating in all its dealings with the US. It had not complained or threatened when the AID program was terminated in 1965, when the initial MAP cuts began in 1968, or when other programs had been cut back. He hoped that the US would be able to take account of the needs and the special circumstances of its Chinese ally.

14. I told CCK that the best assurance of the steadfastness of this administration to its commitments lay in the character, the convictions, and the wisdom of its leaders, President Nixon and Vice President Agnew. The leaders of the GRC knew them both well as sympathetic and understanding friends of the GRC.

15. CCK told me that his government did indeed find much comfort and reassurance in President Nixon's and Vice President Agnew's positions of leadership.

16. At the end of the meeting CCK told me that regardless of circumstances the GRC position of close alignment with the United States and support for the US position will not change.

17. CCK insisted on escorting me from his third-floor office to my car.

18. See septel for brief CCK representations to me about alleged involvement of some private American nationals on Taiwan with members of Taiwan Independence Movement.⁶

McConaughy

⁶ In telegram 4613 from Taipei, October 23, McConaughy reported that on October 21, "Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo said the security authorities here have definite evidence that certain private American citizens are giving encouragement and assistance to members of the Taiwan independence movement." McConaughy said that the Embassy would, at most, consider "passing some sort of cautionary word to the persons involved." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US).

93. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 25, 1970, 3:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Richard Nixon
C.K. Yen, Vice President of the Republic of China
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President opened the conversation by saying that the Canadian recognition of Communist China had disturbed some people, and was interpreted by some as a harbinger of what the United States would do.² The President said that the U.S. position remained the same and we would continue to oppose the Red Chinese admission. He thought that the Canadian move was strictly political. In response to the President's question, Dr. Kissinger commented that he thought the wheat deal played a significant role in the Canadian decision.

Vice President Yen said that even from the point of view of wheat it was a mistake. The Republic of China trades more with Canada than Red China does, apart from the wheat deal. The President said he wanted to make clear that we would maintain our vote in the U.N. on the traditional pattern. Yen said that perhaps the U.S. could help by getting Cambodia to vote against the Red Chinese admission. Cambodia had told Taiwan that it would consult its friends; they must have meant the United States.

The President asked Dr. Kissinger to look into this and see what could be done.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. A November 10 memorandum by Lord transmitting a copy of this memorandum to Kissinger reads: "You [Kissinger] were the only other person at these meetings and I have boiled down and sanitized your personal notes. Your full records will go into your personal files." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V) No other record of this conversation has been found. According to the President's Daily Diary, Yen and the President met from 3:21 to 3:59 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

² After over a year of negotiations, the Canadian Government and the People's Republic of China announced the establishment of formal diplomatic relations on October 13, 1970. The U.S. response was detailed in telegram 171377 to all diplomatic posts, October 16; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 CHICOM.

Vice President Yen then said that the reduction of the military aid program was too drastic.³ He believed that military aid for Taiwan was now in much the same position as economic aid had been previously. It should be phased out over a period of years, but if it is phased out too dramatically it will lead to an erosion of confidence and undermine the eventual capability of the Chinese to take care of their own defense.

The President explained that there was a particular problem caused by the fact that military assistance program funds had to be found for Cambodia and had to be scratched together from a variety of sources. He gave Vice President Yen the personal information that on November 15, or as soon thereafter as possible, he would submit a supplemental to Congress which would attempt to restore a great deal of the military aid.

Dr. Kissinger explained that this had not yet been announced and therefore should be kept secret.

Vice President Yen pointed out that the President had always been very farsighted. For example, when the President had visited Taiwan for the first time in 1953 he had urged that Taiwan spend a great deal of its energy training overseas Chinese; some 30,000 have been trained and have returned to their countries. This was an example of the Nixon Doctrine in action.

Vice President Yen then turned to the Peng case.⁴ Dr. Kissinger pointed out that we had no legal basis for denying the visa and that actually Peng was attracting less attention in the country than he would have were he kept outside the country. The President added that the U.S. would take Taiwan's views seriously into account in the future.

Vice President Yen then turned to the textile issue and maintained Hong Kong was getting more favorable treatment on the voluntary textile agreement than Taiwan. He also asked that the Central African Republic get a World Bank loan for a railway the Chinese were building.

³ Briefing materials for Nixon—prepared by the Department of State on October 22, then summarized by Kissinger—emphasized that the reduction in the FY 71 MAP funds did not indicate a change in the U.S. commitment to defend the ROC. Rather it resulted from the need to provide funds quickly for Cambodia's military. (Memorandum from Acting Secretary U. Alexis Johnson to Nixon, and memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V) Chiang Kai-shek personally complained to representatives from the Departments of Defense and State about the MAP reduction, stating that "\$13,000,000 was less than one-tenth of one percent of our [the U.S. Federal] budget. However, it was very critical to them." (Reported by Armstrong in telegram 4269 from Taipei, October 1; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19 US-CHINAT) Vice Chief of General Staff, General Louie Yen-chun, CAF, met with DOD/ISA officials on October 19 and Packard on October 23, in order to express concerns over military assistance. Both memoranda of conversation, October 30, are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Secret Files: FRC 330 73 A 1975, China, Rep. of, 1970, 333 Jan. Additional documentation on MAP funding is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 CHINAT.

⁴ See Document 91.

The President concluded the meeting by discussing the domestic situation. He said that the U.S. attitude toward Communist China had not really changed. We were keeping some lines of communication open but we will do so only at the Ambassadorial level and without any illusions.

94. Editorial Note

Pakistan and Romania continued to serve as important avenues for Sino-American rapprochement (see Document 20). President Richard Nixon met with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu in Washington on October 26 between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. At this meeting, Nixon reiterated his interest in moving the Sino-American talks out of Warsaw. He acknowledged that U.S. ties to the Nationalist government on Taiwan "was a problem of great difficulty" and observed that the United States sought "independent relations with each [the Soviet Union and China], not directed against the other. The President added that this seems to be President Ceausescu's viewpoint as well." Nixon concluded that he hoped Romania could serve as a "peace-maker" by talking to both parties. The memorandum of conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files, Europe, Romania, Vol. III and scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XXIX.

Kissinger reiterated these points in his October 27 meeting with Ceausescu, emphasizing that "We are prepared to set up channels to the People's Republic of China which are free from any outside pressures and free from any questions of prestige. If the leaders of the People's Republic of China want to tell us something through you and your Ambassador brings the communication to me, I can assure you that such communication will be confined to the White House." (Memorandum of conversation, October 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Presidential/HAK Memcons, HAK/President/Ceausescu [Oct. 27, 1970])

Gheorghe Macovescu, Romania's Deputy Foreign Minister, visited Washington in mid-December 1970. In a December 17 talk with Kissinger, he stated that the Chinese were interested in expanding their involvement in international affairs. Macovescu offered few specifics, stating only that the Chinese were willing to have relations and "make efforts." His information was based on a meeting between Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Romanian Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who stopped in Peking while returning to Romania after Ho

Chi Minh's funeral. (Ibid., Box 704, Country Files, Europe, Romania, Macovescu) In a telephone conversation with Nixon at 6:40 p.m. on December 17, Kissinger related that the Chinese were "interested in normal relations with the West and us but nothing specific." They also discussed the need for secrecy in these efforts: "P [The President] said my view is that I wouldn't tell them [the Soviets] anything. P said if I were the State Department I would just let them guess. P said we have to have our own private contacts on these—we can't count on State. P said anything we do important has to be done privately. K [Kissinger] agreed." (Extracts of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Nixon, December 17; *ibid.*) These extracts were prepared by Kissinger's staff.

Even more promising was contact through Pakistan. In an October 25 meeting among Nixon, Kissinger, and Pakistani President Yahya Khan at the White House, Nixon declared that "It is essential that we open negotiations with China. Whatever our relations with the USSR or what announcements are made I want you to know the following: 1) we will make no condominium against China and we want them to know it whatever may be put out; 2) we will be glad to send Murphy or Dewey to Peking and to establish links secretly." (Memorandum of conversation, October 25; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memcons, 1970 Presidential File) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-7, Document 90 for the full text. Two versions of this document exist. The slightly shorter version does not contain any of the specific proposals for sending envoys to China. This edited record of the Nixon–Yahya meeting was forwarded to the Department of State and Ambassador Farland. (National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, Winston Lord Chronology, November 1970) See Documents 98, 99, and 100 for further information on Sino-American contact through Pakistan.

95. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13-7-70

Washington, November 12, 1970.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE

Note

China's return to active diplomacy raises new questions about the direction of its foreign policy. After four years in which the internal preoccupations of the Cultural Revolution thoroughly overshadowed foreign relations, Peking is now moving to repair its international image and to exploit new opportunities. In attempting to estimate how China will play this new role in international politics over the next year or so, this paper will examine Peking's options in terms of those policy factors which are most likely to remain constant and those which are subject to greater variations in response to domestic or external events.

It must be acknowledged at the outset that we have remarkably little information on the decision-making processes in Peking. Thus, estimates of short-run tactical moves are susceptible to considerable error. As in the past, sudden twists and turns in Chinese policies will probably continue to surprise us. But in the broader perspective of long-range goals and basic capabilities, this paper attempts to set useful guidelines on the course that China is likely to follow in adapting to the outside world.

Conclusions

A. With the waning of the radical and frenetic phase of the Cultural Revolution, Peking has substantially recouped its earlier diplomatic position and is moving to compete for influence in new areas. Its successes to date—due in large part to the receptivity of other nations to a more normal relationship with the Chinese—have been impressive, especially in areas of secondary importance to Peking. In areas of prime concern, i.e., the Soviet Union, the US, Southeast Asia and Japan, progress has been marginal and Peking's policy less sure.

B. Many domestic and foreign obstacles stand in the way of achieving Peking's basic goals, whether these be China as a great power

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 13-7-70. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on November 12 except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, pp. 583-599.

and leader of the world revolution or as a more traditional but highly nationalistic country concerned primarily with Asian interests.

C. On the domestic side, stability and steady growth in basic elements of strength—economic, military, political—are far from assured. Even in the best of circumstances, China's marginal economy will serve to limit its maneuverability in foreign affairs. A great deal of work remains to be done to restore effective government administration, and to rebuild a Communist party. So long as Mao lives, the possibility of disruptive campaigns exist and his death could usher in a period of leadership uncertainty and intense preoccupation with internal affairs.

D. Externally, China's aspirations remain blocked directly or indirectly by the realities of the international scene including: the vastly superior power and hostility of the USSR, its most immediate threat as well as rival for ideological leadership in the Communist world; the US presence and US commitments around the periphery of China; and the growth in economic strength and self-confidence of another traditional rival, Japan.

E. Even should the Chinese regime wish to alter its basic foreign policy approach and use its growing military force aggressively in peripheral areas, its options would be limited by the risk of provoking one or another of the superpowers. From Peking's point of view, military adventures in Southeast Asia, against Taiwan, in Korea, or in the Soviet Far East would be needlessly risky and the potential prize not worth the game. Peking does, however, have room, even in present circumstances, for some maneuver directly between the two great powers as well as around their flanks or under their guard in Southeast Asia, the Near East, Africa, and even in Eastern Europe.

F. At present, the Chinese see the USSR as their major military threat. By accepting negotiations with the Soviets, cooling border tensions, and improving their diplomatic image, the Chinese apparently judge that they have reduced the risk of hostilities with the Soviets. There is little prospect, however, of a genuine rapprochement emerging from the present Sino-Soviet talks. But both sides are apparently concerned that their dispute not end in a military test. Thus, as long as they both continue to exercise the present degree of military caution, there is likely to be some improvement in diplomatic and trade relations but little movement in border talks. As long as Mao lives there is almost no chance of significant compromise on the ideological questions.

G. With the US, Peking has moved from its previous intransigence to a more flexible approach better designed to exploit the Sino-US relationship for Chinese purposes. The Chinese hope to unsettle the Soviets by playing on their fears of a Sino-American rapprochement as well as exploit the potential for changes in the balance of forces in East Asia resulting from the drawdown of the US military presence. In pur-

suing its new flexibility, however, Peking does not expect an early major improvement in Sino-US relations and any small improvements are likely to be limited to marginal issues.

H. Japan poses special problems to Peking because it too is an Asian power, is outstripping China in economic growth, and is strongly resistant to Maoist subversion or Chinese threats. And the Chinese, who remember Japanese imperialism in China during World War II, wonder what threat the Japanese may become to their security over the long term and fear Tokyo will one day take on the role of protector of Taiwan. The Chinese answer so far has been to continue with a rather rigid and vituperative propaganda attack on Japan's leaders, their policies, and their alleged ambitions in Asia. While this may impress the North Koreans and some people in Southeast Asia, it does little good for China's cause in Japan itself. Nonetheless, and despite the burgeoning growth in Sino-Japanese trade, any basic shift in China's approach to Japan seems unlikely in the present ideological climate in Peking.

I. In Southeast Asia, Peking's earlier fear that the Indochinese war might spill over into China seems to have lessened. Indeed, the Chinese seem to believe that the US is being forced gradually to withdraw its military presence from the region and that this process will eventually improve the prospects for Chinese influence. Rather than use overt military force to exploit possible developments in this area, Peking's more likely course will be to increase its support to subversive and insurgent activity. The Chinese will seek to maintain their role as revolutionary leaders without exposing themselves to undue cost or risk. In addition they will rely on conventional diplomacy when this suits their needs. There is abundant evidence that Peking feels no need to set deadlines and has no schedule to fulfill; it is clearly prepared for the long haul.

J. In the longer run, if Mao's successors follow a more steady and pragmatic course, they are likely to have greater success than Mao in expanding China's political influence and acceptance. We cannot be sure, of course, how future leaders will see their situation, and it is possible that they will be prepared to employ China's developing power in a more aggressive manner. We think it more likely, however, that they will continue to focus their foreign policy on diplomacy at the overt level and on subversion at the covert level. The open use of military force will probably be judged needlessly risky.

K. While we do not doubt that China would fight tenaciously if invaded, we see no compelling factors moving Peking toward a policy of expansionism, or even a higher level of risk-taking. For all its verbal hostility and latent aggressiveness, neither the present nor the probable future leadership is likely to see foreign adventures as a solution to China's problems.

[Omitted here is the 12-page Discussion section of NIE 13–7–70, which includes the following chapters: I. Foreign Policy: Some Principles and Priorities, and II. Prospects and Contingencies.]

96. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

China and Arms Control

Under Secretary Irwin has sent for your clearance a telegram to USUN and Embassy Bucharest on the above subject (Tab A).²

Also attached is an explanatory memorandum from ACDA Acting Director Farley (Tab B).³

The telegram would authorize, after the Chirep votes, hints to the Romanians in New York and Bucharest that Romania might wish to invite Communist China to participate in the 1971 Pugwash meetings, which will be held next year in Romania.

Farley comments that the Chinese response to the suggestion is likely to be negative but the approach would support our stated intention of seeking improvement in our relations with Peking. Should

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V. Secret; Limdis. Sent for action.

² Drafted in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by D. Linebaugh on November 5. Attached but not printed.

³ Undated. Attached but not printed.

the Chinese agree to attend next year's Pugwash meeting, the U.S. would have an opportunity on an unofficial level to explore arms control questions with them.⁴

Comment

This seems to me to be the sort of discreet pressing of the Chinese of which we should be doing more. I see no likelihood of any negative repercussions. Hal Sonnenfeldt concurs.⁵

Recommendation

That you authorize me to clear the attached telegram.⁶

⁴ This was not the first time arms control talks with the PRC were discussed. In July 1970 the Department of State and ACDA forwarded to the White House a 34-page report on arms control discussions with the PRC. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, July 8, and undated ACDA report; *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files Lot 73 D 288, General Files on NSC Matters, NSC Miscellaneous Memoranda, July 1970) No action was taken. A copy was also forwarded to the Department of Defense. Packard provided the Department's response, writing to Farley on October 24 that "My principal concern is that initiation of arms control discussions with the CPR for the sake of whatever political advantages might possibly be derived from such discussions could seriously damage our relationships with other Asian nations, the neutrals as well as our allies. A renunciation of force agreement, in the absence of any substantive change in the CPR's conduct toward its neighbors, could be interpreted as an indication that the United States is prepared to ignore Communist expansion which falls short of overt attack." He added, "Such [arms control] measures will, I believe, have to be worked out in the context of a general improvement in relations based on substantial change in the attitude and actions of the CPR toward us and toward her Asian neighbors." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 0067, China (Reds), 1970)

⁵ "Hal Sonnenfeldt concurs" was added in Holdridge's hand.

⁶ Kissinger initialed his approval. The issue of arms control and the PRC was revisited in 1971. See Document 109.

97. National Security Study Memorandum 106¹

Washington, November 19, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

China Policy

The President has directed the preparation of a study on China Policy to be carried out by the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. In addition to the regular members of the Group, the Chairman should invite representatives of other agencies, such as Treasury and Commerce, to participate as appropriate.

The study should include such subjects as:

- Long range (5–10 year) U.S. policy goals as regards China;
- Short range policy goals toward China;
- U.S. policy toward Taiwan including short-range goals of our relations with the GRC;
- Tactics to be pursued in carrying out the foregoing;
- Coordination of policy consideration and tactics with other countries which have a particular interest in China, e.g., Japan, Australia, New Zealand;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-176 and 177, NSSM Files, NSSM 106. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Stans and Kennedy. According to an October 19 memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, the impetus for the study came in part from an October 8 letter from Richard Moorsteen. Kissinger noted on this memorandum: "I agree with Moorsteen. Do it as NSSM of policy review for SRG." (Ibid., RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files, Winston Lord Chronology, November 1970. Moorsteen's letter was attached.) Moorsteen had served on Richardson's staff in 1969 as a Foreign Service Reserve officer. In a November 18 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge, Colonel Kennedy, Wright, and Sonnenfeldt noted that Kissinger transmitted his request for the draft NSSM through Lord and that the study would be under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V) The Department of State was also moving ahead with a re-evaluation of policy toward the PRC. In a November 18 memorandum to Nixon, Rogers announced that he had ordered the Department of State, under the coordination of EA, to initiate a "thorough study and review" of Sino-American relations and Chinese representation in the United Nations. This was undertaken at the suggestion of Brown, in his November 17 memorandum to Rogers. (Both *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM) Documentation on Chinese representation in the United Nations, including NSSM 107, November 17, is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume V.

- Effect of U.S.-China policy on U.S.-Soviet relations;
- Effect of U.S.-China policy on our interests in Southeast Asia.

This study should be submitted to the Senior Review Group by February 15, 1971.

Henry A. Kissinger

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, December 14, 1970, 0752Z.

9593. Eyes Only From Ambassador for Secretary and White House for Dr. Kissinger. Subj: President Yahya on U.S.-China Relations. Ref: Islamabad 9587.²

1. During a wide-ranging conversation with President Yahya on December 12, he made the following observations with reference to his recent trip to Peking.³

2. Yahya said that quite early in his conversation with Chou En-lai he specifically made mention of those matters which President Nixon had discussed with him during his visit to Washington.⁴ (He did not spell out the subject matter to me.) He said that Chou En-lai listened with unusual attention and interest and upon conclusion of this conversation observed that the comments made by President Yahya were extremely interesting and deserved full consideration. Chou En-lai added that he would convey the gist of the conversation with both Mao and Lin Piao.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Eyes Only. Kissinger relayed the contents of the telegram to the President in his December 15 daily briefing memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 29, President's Daily Briefs) A notation on another copy of this telegram reads: "HAK: This cat is out of the bag. You may get a call from Secy Rogers asking what the President's discussion was about. JHH. I called Eliot per your request and told him Pres. simply said we [were] interested in finding ways to improve relations. JHH." (Ibid., Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971)

² In telegram 9587 from Islamabad, December 12, Farland reported on his meeting with Yahya. They discussed bilateral relations and disaster relief for East Pakistan. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 PAK)

³ Yahya Khan was in Beijing November 11-15, 1970.

⁴ See Document 94.

3. Later during the state visit, Chou En-lai again alluded to this particular conversation and advised Yahya that he had pursued the subject with both Mao and Lin Piao; as a result he was prepared to state that while there were considerable difficulties between China and the U.S., particularly on the matter of Taiwan, his government was hopeful that a more amiable attitude could develop between the two countries.

Yahya told me that his personal observations during the course of these conversations indicated there was a much more relaxed disposition this time among the Chinese official hierarchy on the whole concept of China vis-à-vis United States than heretofore evidenced.

Farland

99. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Chinese Communist Initiative

At Tab B is the text of the exchange which President Yahya had with Prime Minister Chou En-lai and President Yahya's comments on the Chinese reply. Chou En-lai made the point that the Chinese reply represented the coordinated position of Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin Piao and himself.

At Tab A is a draft Note Verbale which would respond to the ChiCom communication and:

—states U.S. pleasure at Peking's offer proffered at the February 20 Warsaw meeting to receive a U.S. representative to discuss outstanding issues between our two Governments;

—welcomes high level discussions seeking the improvement of relations between our two countries; and

—proposes a meeting of our respective representatives at the earliest possible moment to discuss the modalities of a higher level meeting.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an unsigned copy.

Tab A²

The U.S. representative at the meeting between the two sides in Warsaw on January 20, 1970, suggested that direct discussions be held either in Peking or Washington on the broad range of issues which lie between the People's Republic of China and the U.S., including the issue of Taiwan. This proposal was an outgrowth of the consistent policy of the United States Government to seek opportunities for negotiating the settlement of outstanding issues between the two governments. The United States therefore welcomed the remarks of the representative of the People's Republic of China at the Warsaw meeting of February 20, 1970, in expressing the willingness of the Government of the People's Republic of China to receive in Peking a U.S. representative of Ministerial rank or a special Presidential envoy.

In the light of the remarks of Premier Chou En-lai to President Yahya, as well as the continuing United States interest in U.S.-China discussions at a higher level, the United States Government believes it would be useful to begin discussions with a view of bringing about a higher-level meeting in Peking. The meeting in Peking would not be limited only to the Taiwan question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions. With respect to the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, however, the policy of the United States Government is to reduce its military presence in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region diminish.

The United States therefore proposes that representatives of the two governments meet together at an early convenient moment in a location convenient to both sides to discuss the modalities of the higher-level meeting. These modalities would include the size of the delegations, the duration of the meeting, the agenda and a clear understanding on the status and amenities which the U.S. delegation would enjoy while in the People's Republic of China.

² Nixon made several minor changes to the draft at Tab A, including substituting "Peoples Republic of China" for "China" in the last sentence. According to a December 16 memorandum of record prepared by Kennedy (*ibid.*), the message was given to Hialy on December 16. See Document 100.

Tab B

Ambassador Hilaly dictated the following in Mr. Kissinger's office at 6:05 pm, December 9:

The message was duly conveyed and Prime Minister Chou En-lai's reply given after three days of deliberations was as follows:

"This (meaning the reply) is not from me alone but from Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao as well. We thank the President of Pakistan for conveying to us orally a message from President Nixon. China has always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful means. Taiwan and the Straits of Taiwan are an inalienable part of China which have now been occupied by foreign troops of the United States for the last fifteen years. Negotiations and talks have been going on with no results whatsoever. In order to discuss this subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking."

Chou En-lai said, in the course of the conversation:

"We have had messages from the United States from different sources in the past but this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head. The United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message."

President Yahya's comments:

"I think it is significant that Chou En-lai did not accept or reject the proposal as soon as it was made and that he consulted Mao and Lin Piao before giving the answer. This in itself reflects a trend which holds out some possibility. Further, at no stage during the discussion with the Chinese leaders did they indulge in vehement criticism of the United States. The banquet speech of Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu also made no reference to the United States by name. These are additional indications of modification of the Chinese approach in their relations with the United States."

100. Record of Discussion Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States (Hilaly)¹

Washington, December 16, 1970, 11:30–11:45 a.m.

I was summoned to the White House by Mr. Kissinger this morning at 11 a.m. He told me that in reply to the message sent by Premier Chou En-lai through our President which I conveyed to him on the 9th December, President Nixon would like to send a fresh message to President Yahya for passing it on to the Chinese Prime Minister (he presumed this would be through the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan). He then gave me an unsigned note in an envelope.² When I asked him what it contained he said that in response to Chou En-lai's suggestion that a special representative of President Nixon would be welcome in Peking to discuss the question of Taiwan, President Nixon wished to inform Premier Chou En-lai that the U.S. Government was prepared to attend a preliminary meeting at an early date in a location convenient to both sides to discuss what arrangements could or should be made for sending a U.S. delegation to Peking for high level discussions. In reply to questions from me, Mr. Kissinger said that the preliminary meeting could take place in Rawalpindi if General Yahya's government would not be embarrassed in any way by it. From the U.S. side the representatives could be, Ambassador Murphy or Mr. Dewey or Ambassador David Bruce. Or it could also be himself. (He could arrange to pay a visit to Vietnam and under that cover, arrange a halt in Pakistan for the purpose of meeting the Chinese representative. It would depend on what kind of official the Chinese would send to Pakistan for this purpose).

Mr. Kissinger added that if a U.S. delegation ultimately went to Peking, the discussions would not be confined to the question of Taiwan but all matters connected with improving relations with the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. No classification marking. Hilaly and Kissinger met from 11:30 to 11:45 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) Hilaly drafted the record of conversation. A handwritten notation indicates that Hilaly delivered it to Kissinger at 6:15 on April 27; see footnote 1, Document 118.

² The note to Chou En-lai is attached. See Document 99. A memorandum of record by Kennedy confirms that Kissinger gave a copy of this message to Hilaly on December 16. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Materials Concerning Preparations for the First China Trip by HAK, July 1971)

Chinese and reducing tensions would be discussed. Also that it would not be difficult to comply with the Chinese request for withdrawing American forces from Taiwan. There were no American military forces there except advisory and training missions.

101. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin)¹

Washington, December 26, 1970.

SUBJECT

Travel and Trade with Communist China

National Security Decision Memorandum 17 announced the President's decision to modify certain trade controls against Communist China.² The President's approval of certain additional modifications was conveyed by my memorandum of December 6, 1969, to the Under Secretary of State.³

The President has directed that, using these earlier decisions as a base, the Under Secretaries Committee prepare recommendations for additional steps which can be taken to relax restrictions on travel to and further broaden trade with Communist China. Each recommended step should be accompanied by:

- An analysis of the pros and cons and anticipated results.
- Preferred timing of the step.
- A proposed diplomatic scenario associated with the recommended step.
- A scenario for congressional consultation and press guidance.

The recommendations requested by this memorandum should reflect to the extent possible the short term aspects of the study of China

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive.

² Document 14.

³ Apparent reference to Kissinger's memorandum of December 16, 1969. See footnote 3, Document 49.

policy directed by NSSM 106.⁴ That study, however, should continue as earlier directed.

The Under Secretaries Committee Report should be submitted by January 20, 1971. The President has directed that the classification of this study and the report of the Under Secretaries Committee be strictly observed and that the study be limited on strict need-to-know basis.⁵

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ Document 97.

⁵ On December 29 Hartman sent a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Under Secretary of Commerce, and the Special Trade Representative explaining Kissinger's request. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, Under Secretaries' Memoranda, NSC-U/SM 91)

China, January–September 1971

102. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Ambassador Bogdan, Map Room, January 11, 1971

Ambassador Bogdan told me that after the conversation with the President, Ceausescu sent his Vice Premier to Peking and Hanoi.² In Peking he had extensive talks with Chou En-lai. Chou En-lai handed him the following message:

“The communication from the U.S. President is not new. There is only one outstanding issue between us—the U.S. occupation of Taiwan. The PRC has attempted to negotiate on this issue in good faith for 15 years. If the U.S. has a desire to settle the issue and a proposal for its solution, the PRC will be prepared to receive a U.S. special envoy in Peking. This message has been reviewed by Chairman Mao and by Lin Piao.”

Chou En-lai added the comment that since President Nixon had visited Bucharest and Belgrade, he would also be welcome in Peking. The Vice Premier found nothing new in Hanoi.

Comment: (a) The Chinese note indirectly refers to the Yahya communication. It also validates it because it is almost the same.

(b) It is free of invective.

(c) It strongly implies that the war in Vietnam is no obstacle to U.S.-Chinese rapprochement.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicated the President saw it. Nixon was in San Clemente, California, January 5–14. Kissinger and Bogdan met in Washington from 12:30 to 12:50 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² See Documents 20 and 94.

(d) It remains to be seen whether Peking will accept a proposal for a solution with a long time-fuse.

(e) If they answer our communication through Yahya, we may get a clue.³

³ The President noted at the bottom of this memorandum: "I believe we may appear too eager. Let's cool it. Wait for them to respond to our initiative." Kissinger and Bogdan met again on January 29. According to a memorandum of conversation drafted by Halperin, "Mr. Kissinger began by saying that we had found the communication from the Chinese very interesting and helpful; Mr. Kissinger then asked if he was correct in thinking that China will negotiate with us only if we agree in principle on Taiwan ahead of time. Ambassador Bogdan was noncommittal in responding to this. Mr. Kissinger then said that we are willing to talk about a whole range of Sino-American problems including the problem of Taiwan. We have always said that the degree of our military presence in Asia is related to the degree of tensions in that area—and we would reduce our military presence as the tensions diminish." Kissinger added that the United States was willing to hold talks outside of Warsaw, which he described as "a very public place." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971)

103. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Information Items

[Omitted here is one paragraph on fighting in Cambodia.]

Edgar Snow's Interview with Chou En-lai: Our Consulate General at Hong Kong has commented on the first part of a four-hour interview between Edgar Snow and Chou En-lai which appeared in an Italian magazine last month.² While the interview reveals no strikingly new departures in Chinese policy, it is a notable expression of the return of "peaceful coexistence" as the general line of China's foreign policy,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 30, President's Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² The magazine was *L'Epoca*. Much of this paragraph is taken verbatim from Airgram A-369 from Hong Kong, December 31, 1970. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 CHICOM) A version of this interview is also in Edgar Snow, "A Conversation with Mao Tse-tung," *Life*, April 30, 1971, pp. 46-48.

including its relations with the U.S. and the USSR. The rationalization for this policy springs from what Snow described as “cautious revolutionary optimism,” i.e., 90 percent of the people of the world will want revolution “sooner or later” but in the meantime flexible policies which serve China’s immediate interests are in order. Only passing reference is made in this first account to Vietnam and none to Cambodia. Instead, Chou stresses the importance in Sino-U.S. relations of the Taiwan problem and he indicates that a major goal of the PRC’s current diplomatic offensive is the strengthening of its position vis-à-vis the Taiwan issue.³

[Omitted here is information on Jordan, Berlin, USSR, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and Ethiopia.]

³ This analysis did not differ significantly from a January 4, 1971, INR Intelligence Note, which includes an annex of PRC statements on the Taiwan issue during the 1955–1970 period. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US)

104. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 10, 1971.

SUBJECT

Remarks by Chinese Communist Deputy Foreign Minister on U.S. Relations with Communist China

Our Ambassador in Oslo has reported a conversation on February 4 between the Norwegian Ambassador in Peking and Chinese Com-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Ohio. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. In an attached February 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge recommended that this memorandum be sent to the President. Norwegian diplomats also relayed information about the PRC to U.S. officials in Washington. The Norwegian Ambassador to the United States, Arne Gunneng, discussed Sino-American relations at least three times with U. Alexis Johnson during 1969. (Memoranda of conversation, February 27, September 18, and December 17, 1969; *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 96 D 695, U. Alexis Johnson Files, Memcons, 1969) During his visit to Washington in November 1970, Norwegian Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China Ole Aalgaard suggested to Johnson that he [Aalgaard] could serve as a conduit for messages between the United States and People’s Republic of China. (Memorandum of conversation, November 16, 1970; *ibid.*, Memcons, 1970)

munist Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan Hua in which Chiao noted that:²

—The Chinese are aware of a new trend in America's position vis-à-vis China and greater flexibility as regards the Taiwan question.

—However, because of Indochina it is impossible to resume the Warsaw meetings now, both out of respect for China's friends in Indochina and because U.S. escalation is bringing the war closer to China's doorstep.³

—The Chinese and the Americans nevertheless must sooner or later sit down and straighten out our relationships. Chiao implied interest in a meeting with me.

—Chiao requested that the above be brought to our attention and hoped that Norway could continue to be a channel of communication. (They probably chose Norway for this on the grounds of Norwegian friendship and reliability—others such as the Pakistanis might not fit as well.)

Comment:

The remarks by Chiao Kuan Hua can be considered authoritative and probably representative of current Peking thinking on U.S. relations with Communist China. Significant points of this conversation are as follows:

—This is a formal Chinese approach, as evidenced by the fact that Chiao specifically requested that his remarks be brought to the attention of the Americans.

—The Chinese are aware of our more forthcoming position on U.S. relations with China, e.g. Chiao's remarks on our flexibility on the Taiwan question. Our efforts to get this message across have therefore succeeded.

—The Chinese attitude was non-polemical. It of course comes as no surprise that Indochina is an obstacle to a resumption of contacts,

² In telegram 390 from Oslo, February 8, Ambassador to Norway Philip K. Crowe reported that Aalgaard transmitted the Chinese statement on February 6. The Norwegian Foreign Office gave it to Crowe on February 8. A notation by Kissinger on the telegram reads: "Summary for President, HK." (Ibid.) On March 24 Holdridge informed Kissinger of another conversation between PRC and Norwegian diplomats, during which the "Chinese bore down very heavily on the fact of a US military presence in Taiwan as the key issue between the US and Communist China. He [Deputy Foreign Minister Lo Kuei Po] did not mention our treaty with the GRC or political support for Chiang Kai-shek as stumbling blocks." (Telegram 846 from Oslo, March 19, attached to Holdridge's memorandum to Kissinger; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 520, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI)

³ The President underlined the word "Indochina" and the rest of the paragraph beginning with the word "respect."

but even on this point the Chinese position was a moderate one. Importantly, Chiao's dispassionate remarks were made on the same day Peking issued a strong Foreign Ministry denunciation of our actions in Laos, suggesting a Chinese disposition to play down the effects of Laos on long-term U.S.-Chinese relations.

—Chinese willingness to get together with us in due course was emphasized. Chiao's implied interest in meeting with me can probably be read not just as a mere gesture of politeness, but rather an expression of more serious intent to arrange a high-level meeting.

In short, the Chinese have let it be known authoritatively that they are indeed interested in dealing with us at an appropriate time and level, and recognize that our position has changed. Perhaps we might find flexibility on their side as well.

105. Draft Response to National Security Study Memorandum 106¹

Washington, February 16, 1971.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

NSSM 106—China Policy

I. THE SITUATION FACING US

A. *The Present Problem*

It is obviously undesirable, as well as potentially dangerous, for the world's most powerful country and the world's most populous

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-177, NSSM 106. Secret. Green was responsible for coordinating the Department of State's response to NSSM 106. (Memorandum from Cargo to Green, November 28, 1970; *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files; Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 106) Representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Treasury, and ACDA, USIA, and the CIA met on December 23 to discuss the draft response. Green noted: "With the exception of some differences on specific points, the other participating Agencies appeared to support the general thrust of State's draft." (Memorandum from Green to Rogers, January 8, 1971; *ibid.*) In an undated memorandum, Green wrote to the Under Secretary of State that the Interdepartmental Group had reviewed the response to NSSM 106 on February 11. According to Green, "However, some differences between DOD and State remain on specific points, notably in the sections dealing with the strategic importance of Taiwan and our military presence there and in the final section on possible arms control discussions with Peking." (*Ibid.*, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, NSC Files, SRG Meeting on NSSM 106) A March 6 briefing memorandum from Levin, Sonnenfeldt, and

country (itself growing in power) to remain as hostile toward each other as they have been for two decades, with virtually no peaceful international intercourse—diplomatic, economic, scientific or cultural. The historical reasons for this are well known. The question is whether this circumstance is now alterable, and if so, whether it is in the US interest to attempt to alter it.

This problem has been given added urgency in the light of recent developments in China, in Asia, and in the world's attitudes towards China. Much has been said concerning the drawing to a close of the "post-war era" in Europe. We may have reached a similar watershed in Asia, with the Nixon Doctrine both a harbinger of it and an accommodation to it.

For two decades the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been in control of nearly a quarter of mankind, yet has been outside the mainstream of international affairs. Its isolation has been partly self-imposed, a result of both its conscious policy and its abusive behavior, and partly imposed on it by the efforts of non-Communist countries under US leadership. Denied a seat in the United Nations and faced with Taipei's participation in international conferences, it has been loath to take part in any multilateral consideration of problems of global concern, such as arms control, law of the sea, offshore oil and seabed rights, airline hijacking, control of narcotics traffic, etc.—and it has generally not been invited to do so. It has also been generally unwilling to associate itself after the fact with international agreements reached without its participation.

In the mid-sixties the PRC had begun to improve its international standing—epitomized by French diplomatic recognition and a tie vote in the UN on Chinese representation—but the confused and extravagant conduct of the Cultural Revolution halted the trend toward increased international support. With the violent phase of the Cultural

Kennedy to Kissinger explained that NSSM 106 "in effect, poses the issue of how far we want to go to improve relations with the People's Republic of China, since attempts to achieve these improvements must come, if at all, at some cost in our relations with the GRC and will raise some questions in our relations with the Soviets." In a March 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge emphasized that NSSM 106 involved conventional, not nuclear forces, and suggested that these matters would be better discussed in the context of NSSM 69, U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia. (Ibid.) Materials prepared for Kissinger including this response to NSSM 106, the Department of State's Issues Paper, NSDM 17, and NSSM 106 are *ibid.* According to a March 25 memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, there was also an "Intelligence Annex" to the response to the NSSM, which had the concurrence of INR, DOD, and the CIA. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 84-B00513R, DCI/Executive Registry Files: NSSMs)

Revolution now over, the PRC is attempting to end its isolation. While there is reluctance in the world community to impair the standing of the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan (GRC), given the seemingly irreconcilable confrontation between the two Chinese regimes a growing number of governments elect to support the PRC at the expense of the GRC whenever the issue is forced in the UN or elsewhere.

As a result, the US is finding fewer allies in its support of the GRC's international position. If present indications materialize, within the next two or three years most of our European allies will have recognized Peking; and Japan, under heavy domestic pressure, is seriously examining its options, though a move toward recognition is not imminent. In the China context, diplomatic recognition and support in the United Nations tend to be mutually supportive acts. Accordingly, given the present trend in recognition, we can also expect increasing support for Peking in the UN which is likely to lead to PRC seating and GRC expulsion this year or in 1972. Our policy is being regarded more and more as unrealistic and out of date, both internationally and within the American body politic.

However, it is one thing for Canada, France, the UK or a host of other nations to recognize the PRC and support it in the UN; it is quite another thing for the US to do so. We are largely responsible for the very existence of the GRC; we have a defense treaty commitment to it (though we would not stand in the way of a peaceful resolution of the "Taiwan problem"), and we have a degree of responsibility for the people of Taiwan. We therefore have a moral obligation as well as political, economic and military interests arising from our long association with the GRC.

Thus important and valid but mutually incompatible interests of the United States in the China tangle have long presented us with dilemmas in our China policy. For most of the past two decades these dilemmas could be, and were, fairly successfully submerged, but developments of the past year have brought them into stark focus.

As a result, a number of insistent questions arise: Why does US-PRC hostility persist? Can anything be done about it? What future course would be most promising? Is any change in US policy likely to prompt a desired change in PRC policy? If improvement in US-PRC relations is to be further sought, how can our obligations to the GRC best be honored? What are the confines of US policy maneuverability? What are the likely costs and benefits from moves within those limits? This paper examines the issues raised by these questions and presents policy alternatives relative to them.

Before addressing these questions, however, certain strategic factors in the situation facing us should be noted.

B. Strategic Factors

1. *The Nixon Doctrine and the Asian reaction.*

For years the US has deployed strategic and conventional forces in forward positions throughout East Asia. These have been directed against the military potential of the USSR and China and the specific military threats from North Korea and North Viet-Nam.

The presence of these forces has brought important gains in exchange for certain costs. They have helped deter overt conventional military aggression by Asian Communist countries. They have added significantly to the confidence of allied governments in their ability to resist Communist domination and influence. At the same time the presence of foreign troops to some extent has engendered frictions with local populations within the host countries, as well as with governments sensitive about what the presence of those troops implies for their sovereignty. The presence of US troops, particularly in mainland Asia, has also projected a threatening image of the US in the eyes of the Chinese and other Asian Communists, constituting one of the barriers in the way of improvement in our relations with them.

In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine the US is now reducing its close-in military presence (which Peking has long cited as proof of US hostility and presumption) and is increasing military assistance to selected allies so that they can assume primary responsibility for their own non-nuclear defense. It should not be assumed that Peking will interpret these reductions as an effort toward *détente* on the part of the US. Indeed, reduction of US forces in other parts of East Asia without concomitant reductions on Taiwan could well be regarded by Peking as an indication of US interest in keeping Taiwan permanently separate from the mainland, as a US base directed against the PRC.

The reduction of US force levels thus presents the US with political, military and psychological problems as well as opportunities. It has raised questions among our allies as to US determination to maintain its commitments, led them to start thinking more actively about how they might shape future arrangements with Peking, and may provide the PRC with opportunities to expand its political influence in the area.

So far as we can determine, the reduction of US force levels as such has not produced any change in Chinese deployments directed against Korea, Taiwan or Southeast Asia, although the PRC apparently has begun to alter traditional deployment patterns in South China in order to strengthen conventional capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Chinese are and will continue to be deterred from overt massive aggression across their borders by US and Soviet nuclear and conventional power.

The PRC probably views the Nixon Doctrine with mixed feelings. While it welcomes the first significant US troop reductions in East Asia since the end of the Korean War, it is probably concerned that strengthened indigenous non-Communist governments left behind may be harder for “liberation” movements to handle. Furthermore, Peking has seen benefits in what it regards as the over-extension of American resources and in the US domestic political disruption connected with the Viet-Nam War, and would like to see these continued—though not at the expense of an enlarged threat to China.

Peking’s considerations related to the American presence are greatly magnified where Taiwan is concerned. Any favorable PRC reaction toward the over-all reduction of US military presence in East Asia would be more than offset if the net effect should be strengthening the US presence on Taiwan.

As for reactions elsewhere, while some Asian leaders appear to have been reassured about US intentions and agree with the Nixon Doctrine as a practical approach if it is carefully implemented, many opinion makers are skeptical. The media in Asia continue to reflect doubt and concern. Asian non-Communist nations in general continue to look upon the Chinese colossus with suspicion and fear. While they regard the threat of overt invasion as much less likely than was once believed, Chinese-abetted “people’s wars” are looked upon as a constant threat, and one difficult to counter. They fear the potential of Maoist-oriented Communist indigenous elements, particularly in view of the large Chinese minorities found in most Asian countries.

Conservative Japanese leaders are disturbed by the pace of US military force reductions and have hinted that we should slow down. Those who have questioned Japan’s alignment with the US see the reductions as evidence of the unreliability of our commitment and are more than ever inclined to urge that Japan should consider alternative options.

Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia and to a lesser extent South Viet-Nam often express the hope for even greater American material assistance in strengthening their defense capabilities.

In the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand there is growing interest in contact with Communist states as a means of reducing tensions and protecting the peace and security of Southeast Asia, whereas Korea and Taiwan continue to oppose such contacts, preferring to rely on some kind of regional military arrangement as effective deterrence. The latter may also be true in Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.

2. *Great power interrelationship in Asia.*

Although changes have been gradual, the interaction of the US, China, Japan and the USSR in East Asia has made each country more conscious of the complex balance of power and potential for manipulation inherent in an increasingly—but by no means fully—quadrangular power interrelationship. The shift from alliance to confrontation in Sino-Soviet relations and the rapid emergence of Japan have altered the nature of the game.

Sino-Soviet tensions, which in late 1969 built to the point where open hostilities seemed possible, have eased somewhat; but the Soviet threat is a more real and immediate worry for Peking than any danger from the US. Although some normalization in state relations has taken place between the two, re-establishment to any significant degree of the Sino-Soviet relationship of the 1950's is highly improbable for the foreseeable future. Most likely Sino-Soviet relations will remain in a state of controlled tension with both sides avoiding armed conflict but neither side willing to make major concessions. Nevertheless, given recent history the possibility of a significant deterioration of relations cannot be discounted.

The virulence of the hostility between the PRC and the Soviet Union has contributed to China's interest in maintaining some contact with the US—while other factors dictate that such contact be sporadic and tenuous. It is unlikely that the Chinese expect these contacts to lead to early and substantial results, but they apparently calculate that they not only serve to disturb the USSR but also may aggravate uncertainty about US intentions among the population and leaders of Taiwan.

The USSR and the PRC are highly sensitive to shifts in the US-Sino-Soviet relationship. In 1969 during the period of greatest Sino-Soviet tension, both were especially suspicious about US contact with the other. Although the Chinese remain nervous over possible US-Soviet collusion, the Soviets, noting Peking's cool response to US overtures, have for the time being relegated collusion by the other two to the realm of potential rather than imminent danger. Nevertheless, should there be a marked improvement in US-PRC relations, the Soviets would carefully assess the potential effect of such changes on their own interests. They are particularly concerned that the US might provide, or permit third countries to provide, the PRC with scientific information and technology which would directly or indirectly help PRC military potential vis-à-vis the USSR. Should the Soviet leaders judge that changes in our trade policies might facilitate the strengthening of PRC military potential to their detriment, US-Soviet relations in other areas could, as a result, noticeably chill.

China's power position has been challenged by the emergence of Japan. Although the latter's economic capacity has not been matched

by a commensurate political role, the Chinese as well as other Asians sense Japan's tremendous potential for influence in the region. Aside from jealousy over Japan's economic success as such, the Chinese are bothered by the prospect of a Japanese economic influence in Asia which will carry prestige and political weight as well. They fear a resurgence of Japanese military power and are disturbed about the protective role they suspect the Japanese have in mind for Korea and particularly Taiwan. They are acutely aware that some influential elements in Japan believe Japan's large and growing investments in Taiwan and its strategic interest in the Island should determine Japanese China policy, even at the expense of a permanent breach with the PRC.

At the same time certain countervailing factors inhibit the Chinese from indulging in all-out hostility toward Japan: China depends heavily on Sino-Japanese trade; it desires to weaken US-Japanese security relations; it does not wish to antagonize unnecessarily those already significant Japanese elements who favor a more accommodating policy toward Peking; and it wishes to avoid providing a concrete threat which Japanese rightists could seize as a rationale for rearmament.

So far, Japan's emergence has had a lesser impact on the positions of the US and the USSR. The relative weight of the US in the area will, nevertheless, diminish with the lower profile envisaged under the Nixon Doctrine. The importance of close coordination with Japan on our China policy is obvious.

II. US OBJECTIVES

The President said in 1970 that it is "certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking."² Given the inherent conflicts in US interests relating to the China question, we must decide how strongly we desire improved relations with the PRC, since presumably they must come—if they can come at all—at some cost in our relations with the GRC and perhaps in other interests as well.

In formulating long (4–8 year) and short (1–3 year) term goals, we have taken into account (1) the advanced ages of the two key leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek, (2) the fact that the GRC is approaching a crossroads in its international position and may later face the problem of greater Taiwanese political participation, and (3) the state of flux in PRC policy issues in the post-Cultural Revolution era.

² "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s, February 18, 1970," in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*: p. 182.

*Toward the PRC**A. Long Range (4–8 year) goals*

1. Avoid a direct US–PRC armed confrontation or conflict; work toward a relaxation of tensions in the area facilitating an acceptable settlement in Southeast Asia.
2. Deter PRC aggression against non-Communist neighbors.
3. Secure PRC recognition (albeit tacit) that the US has a legitimate role in Asia.
4. Encourage Peking to play a constructive, responsible role in the international community.
5. Achieve more normal political and economic relations with the PRC, including participation in the growing trade with it.
6. Encourage a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.
7. Prevent an offensive alliance between Peking and Moscow directed against the US or its Asian friends and allies.

B. Short Range (1–3 years) goals

1. Discourage the use of force by either side in the Strait area.
2. Achieve a relaxation of Sino-US tension through expansion of contacts including a resumption of the dialogue at Warsaw or elsewhere.
3. Allay Peking's fears of US-Soviet collusion against and encirclement of China.
4. Do what we can to make possible Peking's constructive participation in international conferences on world-wide problems, including measures for arms control and disarmament.³
5. Initiate controlled, direct economic relations.⁴

Toward the GRC and Taiwan

(The assumption is made that during the next eight years the PRC will be unable to bring Taiwan under its control.)

C. Long Range (4–8 years) goals

1. Encourage movement toward a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue between the governments in Peking and Taipei.
2. Insure the security of Taiwan from external attack, including achievement of a local defense force capable of contributing to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores and supportable by local resources with decreasing US assistance.⁵
3. Encourage other governments to maintain relations with the Government on Taiwan consistent with its de facto status.
4. Encourage the evolution of more representative political institutions which would provide the Taiwanese community a greater voice

³ See Document 109.

⁴ Specific steps involving trade and travel were covered by the Under Secretaries Committee report (see footnote 3, Document 111).

⁵ See Document 110.

in central government decisions.

D. *Short Range (1–3 years) goals*

1. Discourage the use of force by either side in the Taiwan Strait area.

2. Encourage restructuring and modernization of GRC forces to achieve adequate defense capabilities supportable by GRC resources without impeding continued economic growth.

3. Maintain access to Taiwan to the extent necessary to meet our commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores and our strategic requirements in East Asia.

4. Encourage the GRC to adopt more flexible policies concerning the Chirep issue and third country recognition so that we can more effectively support it internationally.

5. Encourage Taiwan's continued growth and its increasing contribution to regional development.

[Omitted here are 48 pages divided into sections: III. PRC Strategy; IV. US Strategy; V. Difficulties in Improving Relations; and VI. Policy Options—Room for Maneuver. Also omitted are a 6-page Top Secret annex written by the Department of Defense entitled "US Military Presence on Taiwan" and a 3-page document, "Extracts from Terms of Reference for CHMAAG, China."]

106. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 13–10–71

Washington, February 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

SNIE 13–10–71: Communist China's Reactions to Developments in Laos

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 14, Geopolitical File, China, Chronological File, Trips, July 1971, Background Materials, 1970–71. Top Secret; Umbra; Controlled Dissem. Another copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIE and SNIE Files. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate except for the representatives from the FBI and AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdictions. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678.

THE ESTIMATE

Chinese Response Thus Far

1. Peking trailed both Hanoi and Moscow in reacting to recent developments in southern Laos.² The Chinese did not speculate publicly on the possibility of cross-border operations into Laos until 2 February when they began to cite press commentary from Hanoi, which had begun some days earlier. Since then Peking has issued a number of authoritative commentaries as well as several Foreign Ministry statements. At first, these pronouncements dwelt on the same themes: the US is expanding the war in Indochina; the people of Indochina will certainly surmount the new challenge; and China will continue to provide “powerful backing and support.” More recently, Peking has strengthened its rhetoric, claiming that the allied move into Laos is “a menace to China” and that it “definitely poses a grave threat to China.” The latter statements are an escalation of the rhetoric that followed Cambodia last spring, and suggest that Peking now takes a more serious view of the situation in Indochina.

2. Large rallies have been held in Peking and Shanghai to condemn allied actions in Laos, a pattern that will no doubt be repeated throughout the country. Nevertheless, all authoritative comment on the situation in Indochina since the beginning of the month has placed Chinese assurances of assistance in terms of rear base support.

3. It is reasonable to assume that Peking and Hanoi have been consulting on the present situation, but there is no evidence of a high-level conference. Rumors of important Chinese—e.g., Chou En-lai and Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng—attending communist strategy sessions in Hanoi in late January and early February appear to be unfounded. A Vietnamese negotiator, however, has been in Peking recently to sign a supplemental agreement on military and economic aid to North Vietnam.

² Consul General Osborn submitted a report from Hong Kong on PRC intentions and capabilities in Indochina that was forwarded to Kissinger on January 18. Osborn noted: “Peking possesses limited leverage with which to force events in Indochina to conform to its desires, and the intentions and behavior of other will largely shape the eventual outcome of the struggle.” He continued: “If, as seems likely, the Chinese fear that total victory for Hanoi would perhaps be a mixed blessing, they should be further encouraged in their flexibility and restraint.” Osborn predicted that the PRC would send combat troops only in response to a “fundamental shift in the balance of forces in the area” that Beijing saw as threatening its security interests. Osborn concluded that “the longer a negotiated political settlement in Indochina is delayed, the greater will be Chinese influence in the area, and the less likely China itself will be to favor accommodating but neutralist governments in the area.” (Airgram A-2 from Hong Kong, January 7, and Summary Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, January 18; both in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 11 Chronological Files, 2 Jan.–16 Feb. 1971)

4. No unusual military movements—either on the ground or in the air—have been detected in South China.³ [4 lines of source text not declassified] It could, however, presage an expansion of the Chinese roadbuilding activity.⁴ The recent discovery of heavier anti-aircraft guns [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the area of the roadbuilding can not be related to developments in southern Laos [1½ lines of source text not declassified].

[Omitted here are paragraphs 5–15, under the subheadings of Chinese Options and Probable Courses of Action, and a 5-page annex, Chinese Communist Military Forces in Laos.]

³ This judgment is based primarily on information [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; no photography is available to confirm this. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ This roadbuilding activity is discussed in the Annex. [Footnote in the source text.]

107. Memorandum From Frank Chapin of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, March 5, 1971.

[Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, China. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

108. Memorandum for Record of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

I-35275/71

Washington, March 12, 1971

SUBJECT

Senior Review Group Meeting of 12 March 1971, on NSSM 69, US Nuclear Policy in Asia and NSSM 106, US China Policy²

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger—Chairman
 Mr. John Irwin, Under Secretary of State
 Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (present for consideration of NSSM 106 only)
 Mr. David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Mr. Armistead Selden, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
 General William Westmoreland, JCS
 Lt. General Cushman, Deputy Director, CIA
 Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA
 Mr. Frank Shakespeare, Director, USIA
 Various Deputies and Assistants

*NSSM 69—US Nuclear Power in Asia*³

Dr. Kissinger posed three levels of issues presented by the NSSM 69 study:

1. The degree of reliance to be placed on strategic forces⁴ to counter conventional threats in Asia, considering the growth of PRC nuclear capabilities and our choice of strategy.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Top Secret Files: FRC 330 76 0207, Asia, 471.61, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Limdis. Prepared by Colonel Paul Murray on March 18 and approved by Armistead Selden (ISA). According to Kissinger's record of schedule, the meeting took place from 3:07 to 4:40 p.m. A short, handwritten note appears at the bottom of the page: "Interesting—worth reviewing." A notation on the memorandum indicates that Laird saw it on March 22. Two other records of this meeting exist. One, written by Gathright of the Department of State's Executive Secretariat, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 69; and the other is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. According to the NSC record, the meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The NSC version is virtually a verbatim record of the meeting.

² NSSM 69 is Document 18 and NSSM 106 is Document 97.

³ In a March 9 briefing memorandum to Kissinger, K. Wayne Smith noted: "This study has a long and tortured history. It was initiated in July 1969—almost 20 months ago—and responsibility for it was given entirely to OSD (ISA)." He added that the "basic study" was completed in July 1970, and agency comments were received by September. After discussing some of the disputes in drafting the report, both inside DOD and among other agencies, Smith wrote: "DOD after being given complete responsibility for the study almost two years ago, has again failed to come up with a document that is substantively and bureaucratically ready for Presidential consideration." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-053, SRG Meeting, Nuclear Policy for Asia, (NSSM 69) 3/12/71)

⁴ A handwritten note, apparently by Laird, describes "strategic forces" as "nuclear."

2. The degree of reliance on tactical nuclear weapons to counter conventional threats, with consideration given to location and quantity of deployment.

3. The posture and employment of General Purpose Forces.

Mr. Packard agreed that this was a fair statement of the issues and made the point that the situation with regard to the PRC was different in that we have nuclear superiority. Further, we are not likely to be in a position to counter PRC aggression with conventional forces. Thus, in the Asian situation, there is greater reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence, for countering the threat of nuclear attack, and against conventional attacks. Deterrence in Asia implies the use of strategic forces different from other areas. Tactical weapons can also be used in a strategic role, i.e., bombers, fighter bombers, and the like.

There followed a discussion of PRC nuclear capabilities and the potential of the PRC nuclear arsenal to present problems to our use of nuclear weapons. Dr. Kissinger asked if we could employ “battlefield” nuclear weapons without attacking PRC strategic weapons, since the disparity in nuclear strength might cause the PRC to consider any use of nuclear weapons by us as an attack on PRC strategic capabilities. Mr. Packard replied that for the present, we should combine any use of nuclear weapons with pre-emptive strikes against PRC nuclear capabilities.

Dr. Kissinger noted that there were several places in the study where the JCS warned that our nuclear capabilities against the PRC should not be at the expense of degrading SIOP capabilities, to which Mr. Packard replied that our capabilities should be increased so as to prevent such degradation.

The discussion then turned to the weapons deployment levels necessary in Asia. Mr. Packard reiterated that we must maintain the capability to use tactical nuclear weapons and to execute pre-emptive strikes. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Irwin stated that there was agreement that we must maintain a capability but the issue was at which level to maintain such capability. They advanced the thesis that as US conventional force levels in Asia were reduced, the level of deployed nuclear weapons should be similarly reduced. Mr. Packard observed that, in general, tactical nuclear weapon levels should conform to the presence of conventional forces, except for weapons delivered by aircraft.

General Westmoreland stated that we must maintain the capability to fight a war if necessary, and that war games show that the use of nuclear weapons would be necessary against major aggression in Asia.

This led to a discussion of the validity of the estimates of enemy attack capabilities used in the war games, the degree to which the use of tactical nuclear weapons would reduce the requirement for con-

ventional reinforcement, the use of nuclear weapons in Korea and elsewhere, the degree of warning we might expect of a major attack, and related issues.

Dr. Kissinger concluded this portion of the discussion with the statement that the necessity for a tactical nuclear capability was established, but the question was where it should be based.

Mr. Packard stressed the importance for deterrence of a visible, ready for employment capability. [*1 line of source text not declassified*]

In response to Dr. Kissinger's observation that the Department of State had a different opinion from a political point of view, Mr. Johnson said that State had no problem with the deployment of the F-4 squadrons, [*1 line of source text not declassified*] in Korea.

Mr. Packard said that he tended to agree but that the JCS had a different view which he was in the process of discussing with them and, in any case, [*2 lines of source text not declassified*].

[*2 paragraphs (6 lines of source text) not declassified*]

Dr. Kissinger then said that the NSSM 69 study was not complete enough to be forwarded to the NSC. An analysis was required, similar to that conducted regarding NATO, of the relationship between strategic, tactical nuclear, and general purpose forces, and how they should be employed in Asia. Another look should also be taken at the projected threat.⁵ He stated that a working group should be constituted to conduct the analysis and that he would be in touch with Mr. Packard on this matter in the next few days.

NSSM 106—US China Policy

Prior to addressing NSSM 106, Dr. Kissinger announced that the Secretary of State had requested an NSC meeting on NSSM 107, UN

⁵ On March 30 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Irwin, Packard, Helms, Moorer, McCracken, and Shultz requesting further work on the response to NSSM 69. Kissinger essentially repeated questions 1–3 in the record of this meeting. He asked for the information by May 25 and expected that the Defense Program Review Committee would review the reports in June. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, NSC Files, Senior Review Group, February–August 1971) The NSC did not review NSSM 69 in 1971. On December 14, 1971, Kissinger noted that the December 8 meeting of the DPRC had agreed that further work was required on the response to NSSM 69 before submission to the NSC. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Helms, Johnson, Packard, McCracken, and Shultz; National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 69) A 61-page executive summary of the October 1971 draft NSSM 69 report is *ibid.*

Membership and US China Policy. It was agreed that the meeting would be on Thursday, 25 March 1971.⁶

Dr. Kissinger then stated that the U/SM 91 study on trade and travel with Communist China was in the hands of the President.⁷ With regard to relaxation of travel restrictions, there were some problems raised by the Justice Department regarding validation of passports, but no other discernible problems. As for relaxation of trade controls, the President would probably want to take it in small steps.

Dr. Kissinger then asked about the status of the ACDA paper on Arms Control Talks with the PRC which was mentioned in the NSSM 106 study.⁸ Mr. Farley replied that it had already been forwarded to the Under Secretaries Committee. When Mr. Irwin indicated no knowledge of the matter, Dr. Kissinger said that he would inquire further.

Dr. Kissinger then opened the discussion of NSSM 106 by addressing the five options pertaining to US military presence on Taiwan.⁹ It was quickly agreed that Options 2 and 3 calling, respectively for the increase in US non-combat and combat military presence on Taiwan were not viable options in the current political climate.

Dr. Kissinger then addressed Option 5, which calls for the removal of US military presence from Taiwan, contingent upon a renunciation of force agreement in the Taiwan Strait Area between the US and the PRC, while retaining re-entry rights and maintaining our defense commitment to Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger asked if the Warsaw Talks were to resume, could we agree to remove our military presence from Taiwan if the Chinese Communists agreed to a renunciation of force?

Mr. Packard stated that the Department of Defense is concerned that the position of Taiwan in our total Asian posture has not been adequately addressed.

Dr. Kissinger asked if the Interagency Group had looked at what forces we have on Taiwan and how they got there. When the DOD Annex of the study was mentioned as containing information on person-

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 342.

⁷ See Document 111.

⁸ See Document 109.

⁹ The five options were set forth in Section IV of the draft response to NSSM 106 (Document 97), which is not printed. They are: "1. Maintain present levels and composition of US military presence now on Taiwan. 2. Increase US non-combat military presence on and use of Taiwan. 3. Increase deployment of combat forces to Taiwan. 4. Decrease US military presence on and military use of Taiwan, while preserving reentry rights and retaining the contingency command and current advisory presence. 5. Contingent upon PRC willingness to agree to a mutual renunciation of force in the Strait area, remove all US military presence from Taiwan and the Strait area, except for a small liaison group on Taiwan, while retaining reentry rights and maintaining our defense commitments to Taiwan and the Pescadores."

nel strengths and functions,¹⁰ Dr. Kissinger stated that it did not give the right kind of information. What was needed was a grouping of forces into those required for the defense of Taiwan, those associated with Vietnam, and those performing other functions which could be relocated or phased out.

Mr. Green pointed to the necessity of reducing our strength on Taiwan along with our reduction elsewhere in Asia in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. He pointed to an apparent tendency to shift more military presence to Taiwan as we phase down elsewhere in Asia.

Dr. Kissinger again returned to the question of removing US forces if the Warsaw Talks are resumed. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*].

Mr. Packard made the point that our dispositions in Asia were predicated upon existing policies and strategy. If there were a major change in policy, adjustments would have to be made.

Dr. Kissinger once more asked if it is a tenable position to remove forces from Taiwan if a renunciation of force agreement could be achieved.

In response to a query by Mr. Irwin as to how much our capabilities would be degraded if our military presence on Taiwan were removed, General Westmoreland replied that as long as the PRC was a threat, Taiwan would be an important piece of real estate.

Mr. Green stated that removal of our military presence from the Taiwan Strait Area was the only meaningful thing we can do to bring about any kind of a relationship with Peking.

Dr. Kissinger then asked if State could produce an examination of just what a renunciation of force agreement would entail. He then asked if DOD would produce a study showing the impact on our capabilities in Asia of the removal of US military presence from Taiwan.¹¹

General Westmoreland asked if the retention of MAAG was visualized, to which Dr. Kissinger replied that this was part of the question.

¹⁰ See footnote 1, Document 110.

¹¹ Kissinger sent a memorandum on March 17 to Irwin, Packard, Moorer, and Helms, requesting information on force levels in Taiwan and a possible renunciation of force agreement with the PRC. He requested that he receive these reports by March 22. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 106) Document 110 details the Department of Defense response. Eliot forwarded a 6-page paper entitled "Renunciation of Force Agreement with PRC" to Kissinger on March 24. (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) The NSC staff distributed the paper to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Emergency Preparedness on the same day. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 106)

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

General Westmoreland cautioned that reduction in or removal of our military presence on Taiwan may require backtracking in our phasedown in Japan and Okinawa.

Note: A study directive will be forthcoming on the above mentioned DOD and State supplementary studies.

After a brief and inconclusive discussion of options concerning the GRC legal position and the future status of Taiwan,¹² the meeting was adjourned.

¹² Reference is to options set forth in Section IV of the draft response to NSSM 106 (Document 105), which is not printed. The four options are: 1. "Continue our present policy of maintaining diplomatic relations only with the GRC, keeping silent about its claim to be the government of all of China, but making clear that we deal with the PRC on matters of mutual interest." 2. "State publicly that the question of which government is the legitimate government of China is not one which the US can decide and that we regard this issue to be a matter for peaceful resolution by the parties directly involved." 3. "Make public statements to the effect that we do not support the GRC claim to be the government of all China, but recognize it as the de facto government of Taiwan." 4. "Publicly support GRC claim to be the legitimate government of all China." NSSM 106 was discussed briefly during the National Security Council meeting of March 25; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 342.

109. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

China and Arms Control

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for action.

ACDA Acting Director Farley has sent you the ACDA issues paper on “U.S.-China Arms Control Talks” which you asked about at the Senior Review Group Meeting on Friday, March 12 (Tab B).² In the paper it is proposed that the U.S. initiate with the Chinese an exchange of views on one or more of the following control measures:

- A renunciation of force declaration.
- A Washington-Peking hot line.
- Information exchange on nuclear weapons safeguards.
- Agreement not to possess biological weapons.
- Pugwash-type unofficial arms control talks.
- A conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss accidental war, command and control, and arrangements for emergency communication.

Regarding unofficial arms control talks, Mr. Farley notes that we have already suggested to the Romanians that they invite Chinese participation in the Pugwash Talks to be held in Bucharest this year. (The telegram was cleared with us.)³

In response to your request to Under Secretary Irwin, ACDA is now engaged in developing with State a renunciation of force declaration for negotiation with the Chinese.⁴

Mr. Farley states that other suggested recommendations in the paper need interagency review. These are summarized at Tab A. In order for you to have interested agency comments for consideration before the next SRG or NSC meeting on this subject, it would be advisable to have this paper circulated as soon as possible.

Recommendation

That you authorize Jeanne Davis to circulate the ACDA paper to State, Defense and CIA with a request for comments by March 24.⁵

² Attached but not printed. The 12-page issue paper, undated, was forwarded to Kissinger under a covering memorandum by Farley on March 16. (Ibid.) Farley and Green also sent a copy of the paper and a covering memorandum to Irwin on February 25. They hoped it would be considered in parallel with the SRG’s discussion of NSSM 106. (Ibid., RG 59, Lot Files: 74 D 164, Summaries of the Under Secretary’s Meetings with Kissinger, October 1970–March 1972) Handwritten notes on an agenda for a meeting between Irwin and Kissinger on March 16 read: “Briefly discussed. HK merely spoke of receiving it.” The meeting agenda is *ibid.* For the March 12 SRG meeting, see Document 108.

³ See Document 96.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 108.

⁵ There is no indication whether or not Kissinger approved this recommendation, but according to a note on the NSC Correspondence Profile attached to these documents, this effort was deferred. A short May 26 note from Holdridge to the NSC Secretariat observed that the document was being held because “more modest proposals on subject [are] being incorporated in NSSM [124] due June 4.” An attached anonymous note, September 7, reads: “HAK has deferred action on NSSM 124.” NSSM 124 is printed as Document 117.

Tab A

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

**SUMMARY OF US-CHINA ARMS CONTROL TALKS
ISSUES PAPER**

Propose that the US and the PRC issue the following declaration, based on language and principles of the UN Charter:

The Government of the United States and the Government of the People's Republic of China hereby declare their determination to settle all disputes which may arise between the two nations without resort to force or the threat of force, including nuclear force. As part of this declaration, both governments declare and resolve to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force, including nuclear force, against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

—Such a declaration would be a first step toward improving relations between the US and the PRC without any additional commitment on the part of the US since the language of the declaration would simply extend basic provisions of the UN Charter to the US-PRC relationship. Taipei would oppose such a US agreement with the PRC and would press us hard for reassurances that this would in no way alter the US agreement under the security treaty.

Propose that the United States and the PRC establish a direct secure communications link between Washington and Peking—a hot line.

—The advantage of a hot line would be its use during a crisis. The Chinese could easily accept this proposal without encumbering it with extraneous political conditions. The Soviets might take a gloomy view since it would provide an obvious means of secure communication between the Chinese and ourselves.

As a first step in discussing with Peking the problem of accidental nuclear war, we could provide the Chinese with the considerable amount of unclassified material available on US nuclear weapon safety program. We would invite an exchange of views and information on this subject.

—Whether or not reciprocated, this would benefit the US by focusing Chinese attention on the dangers of nuclear deployment. If the PRC responds we would gain valuable information on the Chinese weapons safety program, about which we now know nothing. The only cautionary involved is that this would have to be broached to the Chinese with very great care to avoid raising Peking's sensibilities that we were patronizing them.

After we ratify the Geneva Protocol, we could propose to the Chinese a joint statement renouncing the development, production and stockpiling of biological warfare agents.

—A proposal of this nature to the Chinese would be consistent with the President's public position and with our desire to encourage other states to renounce biological warfare. The principal disadvantage is that the Chinese might reject the approach due to our reservations regarding the use of tear gas under the Protocol or because of Chinese unwillingness to separate discussion of biological warfare from chemical warfare agents, a position taken by a number of other states including the USSR.

The United States, Britain and the USSR, the nuclear powers now active in arms control negotiations, could invite the other two nuclear powers, the PRC and France, to meet with them to exchange information and discuss accidental nuclear explosions or launchers, accidental war, command and control, and arrangements for emergency communications.

—All the nuclear powers have a real interest in this subject and the Soviets might not object because it would involve France as well as China and might meet some Soviet concerns as expressed in SALT. However, the Soviets might be suspicious of our motives in trying to include the Chinese in such talks. If the Chinese come they might use this forum to exploit differences among the nuclear powers.

110. Department of Defense Position Paper¹

Washington, undated.

DOD POSITION PAPER ON OPTION A-5 OF THE NSSM 106 STUDY

1. *Option A-5*: Contingent upon PRC willingness to agree to a mutual renunciation of force in the Strait area, remove all US military presence from Taiwan and the Strait area except for a small liaison group on Taiwan, while retaining re-entry rights and maintaining our defense commitment to Taiwan and the Pescadores.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-031, NSC Meeting, UN Representation and China, 3/25/71. Secret. See Documents 105 and 108. The Department of Defense also submitted a paper for the March 25 NSC meeting entitled "U.S. Military Elements on Taiwan." Davis distributed the DOD papers on March 24 under a covering memorandum. Both papers and the covering memorandum are *ibid.* Copies are also in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 107. The March 25 NSC meeting focused upon Chinese representation in the United Nations and NSSM 107. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. V, Document 342.

2. *Key Military Factors Requiring Consideration:*

a. A review of historical military problems in the Pacific have emphasized need for improved (1) reaction time as in the case of the *Pueblo* and EC-121 shootdown incident, (2) basing and logistical flexibility as in the early phases in Korea and Vietnam, and (3) timely and adequate intelligence in all cases. The current reductions of US force levels and increasing restrictions of basing arrangements in WESTPAC require that careful consideration be given to these factors. While the Nixon Doctrine reaffirms our current treaty arrangements, it emphasizes the development of the military capabilities of selected Asian nations. The improvement of the military capabilities of these countries will require constant, patient, and persistent US effort.

b. The rate of qualitative improvements in the PRC Armed Forces is such that it is predictable that this trend will continue to exceed improvements in GRC defensive capabilities. Thus, as this gap continues to increase, timely and effective support by US forces under the Mutual Defense Treaty will become more important.

c. Emphasis must therefore be continuously placed on the following key military factors:

—improvement of command and control capabilities, especially in emergency situations;

—development of a survivable intelligence system which will provide essential intelligence under all conditions and prevent critical intelligence gaps from occurring;

—dependence upon effective and survivable key communications systems to provide near real-time delivery of essential traffic such as command and control and intelligence traffic referred to above;

—adequate basing posture to support contingency plans with emphasis on maintenance of essential facilities to insure capability to conduct operations therefrom with minimal delay; and,

—development of designated friendly country military forces as rapidly as military assistance levels and country capabilities with US advice allow, which, in turn, would enable reductions of US force levels without significant reduction in overall US/Allied capabilities in East Asia.

3. *Analysis of Option as Stated:*

a. *Renunciation of Force Agreement:*

Although the type of agreement envisioned by the paper prepared by the Department of State decouples the troop reduction-withdrawal issue from the renunciation of force agreement,² certain assumptions are implicit in Option A-5 with regard to such an agreement:

(1) It would be unrealistic to attempt to decouple a US-PRC agreement from the Taiwan issue. The agreement must be acceptable to and adhered to by the GRC. Such an agreement would be, at least tacitly,

² Regarding the Department of State paper, see footnote 11, Document 108.

between the PRC and the GRC as well as between the US and the PRC. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that the GRC would agree, especially in regard to the removal of US military presence and its political implications.

(2) It would not invalidate the Mutual Defense Agreement. While this agreement is considered essential by the US and the GRC, it is not evident that the PRC would agree to renunciation of force so long as the Mutual Defense Treaty remained in effect.

(3) The option as written assumes that the PRC would agree to a renunciation of force under terms which, from its viewpoint, would continue to remain essentially favorable to US interests, i.e., maintenance of Mutual Defense Commitment, re-entry rights, and small military liaison group. This appears to be an unrealistic assumption.

(4) If removal of US military presence is not linked to renunciation of force agreement and is accomplished prior to such agreement as an inducement to Peking, we will have degraded our own and the GRC capabilities as a political gesture. By tacitly ignoring the Taiwan issue in any US–PRC renunciation of force agreement, the removal of US military presence from Taiwan would be in the nature of a gamble, and not a response to reasonable assurances which should be implicit in any agreement consistent with our security interests. Ambiguity with regard to a PRC–GRC confrontation when both sides consider the matter a domestic issue of “one state” could serve as a stimulus to one or both sides to resort to force.

b. *Other Implications:*

(1) Removal of US military presence except for a small liaison group involves the removal of MAAG and TDC which would affect the key military factors cited in paragraph 2; elimination of other units and functions (e.g., communications and intelligence) would further compound this loss. The function and composition of “a small liaison group” should be clearly established. Such a group may not be acceptable to the PRC since they have announced that the removal of all US forces from Taiwan is a prerequisite to any US–PRC discourse. Moreover, despite a renunciation of force agreement, a nearly complete elimination of US military presence on Taiwan could be viewed by the PRC as a weakening of US resolve to honor commitments to the Mutual Defense Treaty, thereby lessening the restraints on PRC aggression against the GRC.

(2) The effect of the removal of US military presence on US ability to monitor GRC actions and react to PRC moves implies risk to US security interests in the absence of some means of effective and timely monitoring of possible PRC/GRC violations of a renunciation of force agreement.

(3) There is a requirement for comprehension of and careful definition of “US military presence” as used in the option. Military personnel are involved in such activities as MAP, FMS, loan, lease, co-production, mobile training teams, and similar activities. While they may not be based on Taiwan, frequent visits are made in connection with these activities, which are necessary to the maintenance of GRC military capabilities. To the PRC, such transient personnel may constitute “military presence,” as might routine and frequent calls at Taiwan of US military air and surface craft of various descriptions. A “military quarantine” could be an objective of the PRC, which would be unacceptable within the context of the option as stated.

c. Option A-5 vs Nixon Doctrine:

Inasmuch as Option A-5 would result in the removal of most US military presence from Taiwan, the impact on the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine would include the following:

(1) The removal of US military presence would severely impair or eliminate the ability of the US to either respond in emergencies in the Taiwan area or continue the advisory, technical, and logistic support necessary for the maintenance of the military capabilities of the GRC armed forces. Yet, it is an essential tenet of the Nixon Doctrine that indigenous armed forces are a part of the fabric of US security policy, and that those forces will be supplemented as necessary in the event of aggression, in accordance with our treaty commitments. It should be noted that the Military Assistance Act of 1961 as amended requires some form of US military presence in those countries receiving military assistance.

(2) The removal of our military presence from Taiwan would impact on other areas in East Asia where we are in the process of phasing down our military presence in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. The requirement to relocate various units and functions from Taiwan may cause some reversal in the process of phasing down elsewhere. Yet, there are political constraints on our ability to relocate to the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan. The combination of political sensitivities, fiscal constraints, and our overall policy of reducing our military presence in conformity with the Nixon Doctrine increasingly narrows the options available for maintaining our strategic posture in Asia.

(3) The impact on regional defensive capabilities of a US withdrawal from Taiwan would be counter to the thrust of the Nixon Doctrine which emphasizes that the defense and progress of other countries is primarily an individual responsibility, and secondarily a regional responsibility, to which US assistance and assurances are added. Japan has specifically expressed her concern over the continued security of Taiwan. The Philippines are also directly affected. Other nations throughout Asia could view a change in US policy regarding Taiwan with concern.

In his report to the Congress in February, 1971 on US Foreign Policy for the 1970's³, the President stated:

"In applying the Nixon Doctrine, we cannot move too fast without sapping the Asian sense of confidence and security which it is our purpose to sustain and nurture. And we cannot cut our own contributions to Asian security without providing for their assumption by our Asian friends. Thus, there is built into the decision to reduce our own presence the obligation to help our allies create the capacity to carry the responsibilities we are transferring. To do otherwise is to undercut our fundamental goal of creating a stable structure in Asia."

d. *Summary Comment:*

Although the option as stated may appear to be a credible course of action, analysis of the implications of the option render it largely academic. If the PRC were to agree to a renunciation of force agreement vis-à-vis Taiwan, they would be compromising their basic tenet that the Taiwan problem is a domestic affair, wholly within their own right and purview to settle in any manner they may see fit, and without outside interference. Although it is conceivable that the PRC might reverse their position on this matter as a tactic, it is scarcely credible that they would do so under terms largely favorable to US interests, as set forth in the option as stated. A more credible course of action by the PRC would be agreement on the renunciation of force issue only in return for a complete and unconditional US military evacuation of the area, to include renunciation of the US–GRC Mutual Defense Treaty. The PRC could conceivably enter a bilateral renunciation of force agreement with the US without reference to the present US–GRC Mutual Defense Treaty; however, any US commitment of force in support of the Taiwan Defense Treaty could be viewed by the PRC and other nations as a unilateral, US abrogation of the renunciation of force agreement.

The advantages and disadvantages of Option A–5 set out on pages 35–36 of the NSSM–106 response require careful consideration in conjunction with the more detailed US force compositions and mission statements furnished with this paper. The principal advantage of Option A–5 is stated as follows: "The PRC might be persuaded on this basis to set aside the Taiwan issue as the main obstacle to an improvement in US–PRC relations." This is at best a possibility not a probability since US military presence on Taiwan is but one facet of US–PRC disagreement over Taiwan as the NSSM response itself delineates. Most of the disadvantages of the option, however, involve neither possibilities

³ "Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy, February 25, 1971," in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 219–345.

nor probabilities but foregone conclusions and real costs in military capabilities. Therefore, as the option suggests, its adoption would result in a tenuous possibility vis-à-vis the PRC in exchange for high costs in military capabilities and at least a probable negative political impact on our Asian Allies.⁴

⁴ Defense officials continued to voice concerns on the issue of military presence on Taiwan. In JCSM-388-71, August 30, Moorer wrote to Laird that "A severe impact on US security interest would be caused by removal of US military presence from Taiwan." Moorer added: "Relocation can be accomplished but not without considerable difficulty and cost. The impact would be substantial in terms of politico/military considerations, reduced tactical and strategic military posture, and major increases in fiscal/budgetary requirements, including new construction at the relocation sites." (Washington National Records Center, RG 350, OSD Top Secret Files: FRC 330 76 0207, China (Nats) 323.3)

111. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 25, 1971.

SUBJECT

Steps Toward Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People's Republic of China and the United States

As you requested, I have asked the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to produce some suggested changes in the U.S. trade and travel regulations with respect to Communist China with a view toward implementing additional relaxations in our present controls.² These steps would be intended to further your policy of broadening communications between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China by removing obstacles to personal and commercial contacts.

The Under Secretaries Committee went all out and developed a large package of proposals which sets a workable course in the direc-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² See Document 101.

tion which you desire.³ The Committee did so, not in the expectation of any substantial immediate increases in trade or travel, but because the adoption of these proposals would show the genuineness of our desire to improve relations and possibly eventually develop significant trade. No new legislation or negotiations with the Chinese would be required.

At the same time, however, the Committee's proposals would, if fully implemented, put a severe strain on our relations with the GRC and perhaps cause a crisis in U.S.–GRC relations. There would also be implications for our relations with the USSR. It therefore appears that a balance will need to be struck between furthering your objectives with respect to Communist China on the one hand, and the desirability of minimizing U.S.–GRC strains, and keeping a watch on Soviet reactions on the other. The questions of timing and the extent to which we should go in our approaches to Peking will clearly need to be carefully considered.

Accordingly, I have broken down the large package from the Under Secretaries Committee into three segments which we could carry out sequentially after an assessment of the results attained (including the Chinese Communist, GRC and Soviet responses) following each of the preceding segments. After assessing these results, we could then consider whether to go on to the next segment.

(Actually, in effect there were originally four segments, of which the first was the non-extension of U.S. passport restrictions on travel to the People's Republic of China after these restrictions expired on March 15. You have already approved this step on the basis of the position put forward by State, Defense, and other agencies—over the opposition of the Department of Justice—that the fabric of American society was strong enough to resist the additional strains which removal of the passport restrictions might put upon it via increased contacts between U.S. radicals and PRC intelligence agents.)

Group I—For Implementation Within the Near Future

Our purpose in this Group would be to show significant movement in the direction of easing travel and trade restrictions with Communist China while not going so far as to antagonize or alarm the GRC unduly nor complicate our relations with the USSR.

³ NSC-U/SM-91, Travel and Trade with Communist China, February 22, 1971, was forwarded by the Under Secretaries Committee to the White House on February 23. The report and covering memorandum are *ibid.* Information on the various drafts of this report is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, Under Secretaries Memoranda, NSC-U/SM 91.

—*Entry of Chinese.* Following the expiration of the restrictions against using U.S. passports to travel to Communist China, in order to establish our willingness to facilitate on a reciprocal basis a flow of people between the two countries, the Committee recommends a public statement by the U.S. Government offering to expedite visas for groups of visitors from the People's Republic of China to the U.S.⁴ This would implement your references to removing needless obstacles to broader opportunities for contacts in your Foreign Policy Report. Justice opposes this because it would afford the PRC better opportunities for intelligence acquisition, permit close clandestine contacts between American Maoists, advocates of domestic violence and the PRC, and make it easier for the PRC to recruit intelligence agents.⁵ Commerce favored increased travel as necessary to exploit commercial opportunities. State, Defense and the other agencies felt that the American people were sufficiently resilient to resist any added subversive burdens which the presence of Chinese Communist travelers might introduce. Very few Chinese are likely to apply in the foreseeable future.

—*Currency Controls.* Relaxation of our currency controls to permit Chinese use of dollars would be essential in conjunction with a decision to permit direct trade with China (discussed below), but could also be put into effect independently.

—*Bunkering.* The Committee recommends the ending of restrictions on American oil companies providing bunkers except on Chinese owned or chartered carriers bound to or from North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba. This relaxation covers ships as well as planes, but would not affect our existing controls on entry of PRC carriers into U.S. ports.

—*Shipping.* The Committee recommends granting permission to U.S. vessels to carry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports, and U.S.-owned foreign flag vessels to call at Chinese ports.

All of the foregoing moves involve relatively minor adjustments on our part and would inspire little or no reaction from the GRC and the USSR. The main GRC objection would be regarding the admission

⁴ On March 12 Kissinger indicated that the President had approved the end of passport restrictions, as suggested by the Under Secretaries Committee. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Department of State, 1 Dec 70–15 Apr 71, Vol. X) Kissinger also approved a Department of State telegram informing diplomatic posts of the new policy. (Telegram 42808 to posts in East and Southeast Asia and Hong Kong, March 13; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM-US) The Department of State announced the new travel policy on March 15. (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 12, 1971, p. 510)

⁵ Kleindienst relayed these concerns, primarily from the FBI, to Hartman in a February 21 letter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI)

of Chinese Communists into the U.S., and we could anticipate receiving an official GRC expression of concern at the Ambassadorial level. The totality of our moves would of course bother the GRC, but probably not to a point where real trouble would ensue. The Soviets would be suspicious of our intent and also suspect some behind-the-scenes U.S.-Chinese contacts, but are not likely to make much of an issue out of the individual moves.

There is, however, a more complex proposal in Group I which deserves special attention:

—*Trade*. The Committee recommends that we should now commence relaxation of our controls on direct trade between the United States and China. With Defense and Commerce dissenting, it observes that, “The closer our treatment of trade with the PRC approaches that applied to the Soviet Union, the more seriously our assertions of willingness to improve relations with the PRC will be believed, and the more likely it becomes that Peking will eventually respond favorably to our initiatives.” Defense and Commerce take the position that we should not set in advance a policy of bringing our trade controls with China into line with those affecting the USSR.⁶ In fact, a public policy of placing China trade on a par with Soviet trade would be galling to both the GRC and the Soviets. The Soviets would take the equal treatment of China with them as an intentional slight, and would profess to believe that this signified U.S. intentions to go further in the political field. Even though many of the trade measures would obviously be in the U.S. commercial interest, the Soviets would not accept such explanations. The GRC’s view would be that a stated policy of putting China trade on the same basis as that with the USSR, when added to the totality of the other moves in Group I, indicated a definite U.S. intention of downgrading GRC interests in favor of improving relations with Communist China. In the formal sense, the GRC’s response would probably be to lodge a diplomatic protest, but we might in addition expect GRC non-cooperation in other matters of joint concern such as Chirep tactics.

Nevertheless, the recommendation for commencing relaxation of our controls on direct trade was unanimous, and the upshot was to leave as an accepted course the approach favored by Defense and Commerce: to place individual items under general license for direct export to the PRC only after interagency review to determine if they are of

⁶ The views of Packard and McLellan, representing the Departments of Defense and Commerce respectively, are spelled out in their March 1 and 5 letters to Kissinger. (Ibid.)

strategic significance. No material adverse reaction would be anticipated from either the USSR or the GRC, although a pro forma protest from the latter could be expected.

Once direct trade of a limited nature is on the books, the Committee would then favor direct imports from China of a similar and correlated limited nature.

Group II

A reasonable period after implementation of Group I, and following an evaluation of the results and the PRC, GRC, and Soviet reactions, the Under Secretaries Committee would report to you the effect of these moves on our relations with Moscow, Taipei, and Peking, and request approval to implement additional moves, as set forth below. In making these moves, we would be going beyond steps of a limited and still quasi-symbolic nature and working toward the development of substantial two-way trade. With the Group I steps already on the books, we would be making it plain that the relationship we seek with the Chinese is one of substance and not just show.

—*Exports.* Approve export to the PRC of all commodities currently under general license to the USSR except those deemed to be of strategic significance to the PRC.⁷

—*Imports.* Authorize direct commercial imports into the U.S. from the PRC on essentially the same basis as the Soviet Union in a manner correlated with allowing direct exports.

—*Aircraft Sales.* End the restriction against the sale by American and foreign airlines of older American civil aircraft not under COCOM restrictions, on a case-by-case basis, after strategic equipment is removed. This would provide the airlines with the capital to buy new American aircraft—which would be much welcomed by our industry.

With the Group II moves we would be coming close to placing trade with China and the USSR on much the same basis, and both the

⁷ Nixon wrote to Kissinger on April 27: "I note that the present line with regard to our China initiative is that trade with China should be on the same basis as trade with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. I realize this is our final objective. The question is whether we should consider now the timing of such announcements and whether this might not be a good move to make at an earlier time than we have anticipated for reasons that are obvious." (Ibid., Box 341, Subject Files, HAK/President Memoranda, 1971) On April 28 Haig wrote to Kissinger: "Henry: We got a barrage of these [Presidential directives] today—all of which I have initialed action on. This one leaves me wondering whether the President reads his mail. I suppose the best bet is to review for him again, in more general and brief terms, the menu of Phase II and III actions that we have on the docket and your belief that they must be carefully orchestrated and the temperature tested every step along the way as we proceed towards the ultimate goal of comparability [sic] in our trade with China and the Soviet Union." Kissinger initialed the option marked "Proceed this way" at the bottom of this memorandum. According to an attached May 12 note from the NSC Secretariat staff, the "requirements" for reviewing the issue with Nixon "had sort of gone away." (Ibid.)

Soviets and the GRC would, for the reasons outlined above, be disturbed. They on balance would both probably live with the situation, however, though we could anticipate a strong protest from the GRC coupled with the difficulty already noted in obtaining its cooperation in matters such as Chirep. If we did succeed in getting its cooperation, the price would almost surely be considerably higher than would have been the case otherwise.

I might note that the question of the sale of older American civil aircraft to China could become an active issue, since Pakistan International Airlines is attempting to dispose of some Boeing 720s to the Chinese. This issue, if it actually arises (there has been no firm Chinese offer), could be handled as a separate item from the other steps with fewer repercussions and problems.

Group III

A reasonable period after implementation of Group II, the Under Secretaries Committee would report to you the effect of these moves on our relations with Moscow, Taipei, and Peking, and request approval to implement a final group of steps. These would make it very evident that we would be willing to go a considerable distance in improving relations with the Chinese Communists, and to this end would be prepared to accept a large measure of Soviet and GRC displeasure.

—*Trade Delegations.* The Committee recommends authorization of a proposal to the PRC to exchange trade delegations if circumstances warrant. Justice opposes for the same reasons cited under the travel option (Group I). The Chinese delegation would, by the very nature of the regime, be an official one, and ours would probably assume something of an official character in the public eye.

—*Grain Sales.* The Committee notes that a decision in the export field to permit grain sales to the PRC—a major importer of grain—would raise the question of whether to allow more favorable treatment of the PRC than the USSR by not requiring that 50 percent be shipped in American bottoms. If we do extend the 50 percent requirement to apply to the PRC, we might defeat the purpose of permitting sales of grain to the PRC because of high shipping costs. Moreover, regulations would have to be amended to permit U.S. ships to call at Chinese ports.

Waiving the 50 percent shipping requirement would constitute more favorable treatment for China than for the USSR in a historically sensitive area, and might be misunderstood politically abroad. In addition, the longshoremen and other unions have vehemently opposed any relaxation of the shipping requirement for the USSR; they would presumably be at least equally vociferous against Communist China, for both commercial and ideological reasons. The unions would maintain their opposition against the USSR if we were to relax on both to avoid a discrimination in favor of China.

If we were to take this step, you would be taking on a major domestic political battle. Since previous relaxations would have placed our trade with China and the USSR under approximately the same level of restrictions, I see no need to allow the PRC more favorable treatment by exempting grain exports from the 50 percent American bottom shipping requirement. However, Agriculture vigorously favors this move.

If you disapproved waiving the 50 percent shipping requirement, you would wish to consider amending regulations to permit U.S. ships to call at PRC ports, which is necessary in view of the 50 percent shipping requirement to make grain sales a credible possibility and thereby to avoid legitimate PRC claims that our moves are a sham.

A strong adverse reaction could be anticipated from both the USSR and the GRC to the steps in Group III. From the Soviet standpoint, a more favorable treatment for China than the USSR is the question of requirements for using American ships would indicate that the U.S. attached a higher value to good relations with China than with the USSR. Selling grain on the same terms would not cause as much of a reaction, but even in this case the Soviets would be suspicious that our motives were political rather than economic. Even if an attempt to sell grain came to nothing, the Soviets would mark it down as a sign of a change in the U.S. attitude.

The GRC would focus first upon the official quality of the proposed trade delegations, seeing in them a U.S. desire to move toward diplomatic relations with Peking. Grain sales and shipments to China on terms more favorable than those granted the USSR would signify the same thing to the GRC. (Grain sales alone would not be regarded differently from any other non-strategic trade item, however.) Since the GRC would assume as a corollary a U.S. disposition to bargain away its interests, we would need to take into our calculus the possibility of a severe crisis in U.S.–GRC relations. Management of such a crisis could prove very difficult, and we might not be able to count on the GRC's past practice of backing away from extreme positions which it threatens to take.

*Recommendation:*⁸

That you approve the implementation of the steps outlined in Group I.

That you authorize me to inform the Under Secretaries Committee that the further steps proposed by it will be considered only after due consideration of the results gained from the Group I steps, including an assessment of the reactions of the PRC, the GRC, and the USSR.

⁸ Nixon initialed his approval of both recommendations.

112. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

Possible Significance of PRC Invitation to U.S. Table Tennis Team to Visit China

At Tab A is a memorandum to you from State discussing the possible significance of the recent Chinese invitation to a U.S. Table Tennis Team to visit China.² Its main points are as follows:

—The invitation to the U.S. Table Tennis Team to visit China is the first such extension of hospitality to any U.S. sports group since the Communists came to power in 1949.

—The invitation comes at a time when Peking is allowing increasing numbers of foreign visitors to enter China. It follows closely on our March 15 termination of the restriction on U.S. passports for travel to China. The Chinese invitation may be intended as a gesture in response to this and other U.S. initiatives.

—The primary significance of the invitation is its reflection of Peking's openness and self-confidence in handling its foreign relations. This is part of Peking's effort to present an agreeable face to the world in its drive to gain entry into the UN this autumn.

—The possibility of Peking allowing Senators Javits and Mansfield to visit China may also be seen as part of Peking's "smiles" diplomacy.

Comment. The Chinese may also anticipate that these visits may result in further criticism of Administration policy (Mansfield, for example, would be calling on Sihanouk).

Senator Javits has been keeping State informed of his efforts through the Norwegian Ambassador in Peking to gain entry to China.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for information. The attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that the memorandum was "Noted by HAK."

² Attached but not printed is an April 7 1-page memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. Kissinger's April 8 daily briefing memorandum informed the President of the April 7 invitation. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 32, President's Daily Briefs) More information on White House involvement in the ping-pong team's visit to the PRC is *ibid.*, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, John A. Scali, Subject Files, Box 3.

The Chinese reacted positively to the Norwegian Ambassador's approach on behalf of Javits but have not yet replied.³

³ In telegram 869 from Oslo, March 24, the Embassy reported on a discussion between the Norwegian Ambassador to the PRC, Aalgaard, and Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua. "Aalgaard mentioned Senator Javits' wish to visit China. This aroused great interest. Chiao will himself take up this matter." After receiving further information from the Department of State, Ambassador Crowe passed Javits' itinerary to the Norwegians, who sent it to Aalgaard in Beijing. The plans for Javits' visit went no further than the planning stage. (Telegram 869 and telegram 1385 from Oslo, May 13; are both *ibid.*, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Norway Vol. I) More information on Javits' attempts to visit the PRC is *ibid.*, Box 819, Name Files, Senator Javits.

113. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 12, 1971, 11:31 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between the President, Ambassador Chow and Henry A. Kissinger

Ambassador Chow who is leaving his position to return to Taipei as Foreign Minister came in at what was originally a courtesy call but, because of the visit of the Ping Pong Team to China, has taken on added significance.² Ambassador Chow began the meeting by thanking the President for his many courtesies and saying he wanted the President to know that he always understood that the President and I were the best friends of China in this Administration.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, President/HAK Memcons, Memcon—the President, Kissinger, and Amb. Chow Apr. 12, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The President's Daily Diary indicates that Chow met with the President from 11:31 a.m. to 12:05 p.m. and that Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol for the Department of State, was also present. (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files) The conversation was recorded by the White House taping system. The statements in quotations marks are actually paraphrases. (*Ibid.*, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, 11:28 a.m.–12:41 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 477–3)

² Shortly before Chow entered the room, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the visit of the U.S. ping-pong team to the PRC. Noted Nixon, "One interesting thing that we're saying goodbye to him on the day that the ping-pong team, waited, you know, ping-pong team makes the front page of *The New York Times*." Responded Kissinger, "They are very subtle though, these Chinese." Nixon replied, "You think it means something." Kissinger stated, "No question." (*Ibid.*)

The President said, "I want you to convey my warmest greetings to Generalissimo and Madam Chiang. We will stick by our treaty commitments to Taiwan; we will honor them. I said so in my State of the World Report.³ We will do nothing in the trade and travel field which is in derogation of friendship to your President and to Madam Chiang. On the other hand, we will take some steps in the next few days that are primarily to be seen as part of our world perspective, particularly vis-à-vis the Soviet Union." [Note: The President said this because he thought it would be an unbearable loss of face for the Ambassador to begin his career as foreign minister having seen the President and not being warned of impending relaxations.]⁴

The President continued, "On the UN membership issue, some of our friends have deserted us. We are prepared to fight for you but we want to do it in an effective way. I have many proposals on various schemes such as dual representation. I will make this decision, not the State Department. Some people say, let's find a clever way of doing it, but there is no clever way of being defeated. There is no change in our basic position, but there may have to be some adaptation of our strategy. We, however, before we make a decision want to talk to you. I am sending Ambassador Murphy to Taiwan; he is going there on business anyway, and the Generalissimo should talk to him as he talks to me. Taiwan and the UN is a fact of life for us and we will do nothing to give it up, but we have to be intelligent and we want to hear your views."

Chow said, "We appreciate your special attention; above all, don't spread the impression that all is lost." The President then asked me to explain the choices on China representation, and I summed up the memorandum that I had written to him on the subject (copy attached).⁵ The President asked Chow for his analysis.

Chow said, "We could stick them out for Universality plus the Important Question." I said, "Will the IQ carry and Universality lose?"

³ Apparent reference to the "Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Relations," February 25, 1971, in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 219–345.

⁴ Brackets in the source text. Shortly before Chow arrived, Kissinger reminded Nixon: "Mr. President, one more thing I want to mention, about the Chinese Ambassador. He's going to be the Chinese foreign minister, and we're going to announce the relaxation of our trade restrictions [with the PRC]. He's going straight back to Taipei. I wonder whether you could just mention that to him, so that he doesn't arrive there with a severe loss of face after seeing you and not having been told about it. Now this first group, there are actually three groups of relaxations. The first one is minor, the entry of Chinese, currency controls, bunkering, some shipping restrictions." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 477–3)

⁵ Probable reference to an April 9 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 344. See also Document 167 in this volume.

Chow said, “No, this depends on how it is formulated.” He then raised this issue of the Senkaku Islands.⁶ It has to do with the protection of the Chinese Nationalist interests. If Taiwan can do that, then intellectuals and overseas Chinese will feel they must go to the other side. The State Department statement insisting that this is part of Okinawa has had violent repercussions. This will get a movement of overseas Chinese.⁷ The President said, “I want you to know that the relaxation of trade that we are planning is mostly symbolic; the important issue is the UN. We will be very much influenced by what the Generalissimo will think. As long as I am here, you have a friend in the White House and you should do nothing to embarrass him. The Chinese should look at the subtleties. You help us and we will help you. I want Murphy to bring his report personally to me. We will stand firm as long as we can, but we must have an army behind us.”⁸

After an exchange of pleasantries, the meeting ended.⁹

⁶ Japanese-American negotiations over Okinawa sparked renewed Chinese interest in the Senkaku Islands (Taiyoutai or Daiyoutai in Chinese). Chow gave a 4-page aide-mémoire to Green on September 16, 1970, outlining the ROC’s objections to Japanese sovereignty over these islands. (National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 61, Subject Files, Petroleum–Senkakus, January–September 1970) Shoemith summarized reports of student demonstrations in Taipei against Japanese control of the Senkaku Islands and noted: “The Embassy believes that the initiative for the demonstrations has come from the students rather than the government. But the latter probably has given tacit approval out of reluctance to oppose the fruits of youthful patriotism and its own dissatisfaction over our China policy and oil exploration moratorium.” (Memorandum from Shoemith to Green, April 17; *ibid.*, Lot 75 D 76, Petroleum–Senkakus, January–March 1971) There were also student protests in the United States and Hong Kong. The White House tape of the April 12 meeting indicates that Chow emphasized that the final disposition of the Senkakus should be kept open, and that this issue was a measure of the ROC’s ability to protect itself. He emphasized the symbolic importance of the islands. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 477–3)

⁷ After Chow left the Oval Office, the President remarked that Chow was correct on the need to consider the political views of overseas Chinese. (*Ibid.*)

⁸ Nixon remarked that he would not raise the issue of the U.S. position in public, but, if asked, would say that it had not changed. He also emphasized that Murphy’s visit would be private, with no press coverage, and that Murphy would report to the White House, not the Department of State. Finally he urged Chow to be “mum” about the United Nations issue until after Murphy visited Taiwan. (*Ibid.*) The White House also wanted to limit speculation by U.S. officials concerning policy toward China. An April 14 memorandum from Kissinger to the Acting Secretary of State reads in its entirety: “In the wake of recent developments, the President has asked that all substantive comments by U.S. officials, including responses to formal press inquiries, background statements on and off-the-record remarks and guidance to Posts abroad, concerning U.S. relations with the Peoples Republic of China be cleared with him through my office.” (*Ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI)

⁹ At the end of this sentence is a comment in brackets: “End of tape.” In fact the White House taping system continued, as Nixon and Kissinger discussed Chow’s visit, then welcomed Anna Chennault into the Oval Office for a short talk.

114. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 12, 1971, 3:31–3:47 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Chow Shu-kai, Departing Ambassador of the Republic of China
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with the Republic of China

Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to see Ambassador Chow briefly to express his personal sentiments on how much he had enjoyed having Ambassador Chow in Washington. He wanted, too, to repeat the sentiments which had been expressed earlier by the President on this same score. Dr. Kissinger then referred to what the President had said concerning moves which the U.S. might possibly make toward Communist China, indicating that some steps might be taken this week. However, this had nothing to do with U.S. relations with the GRC, and quite frankly, were undertaken in order to prevent Russia from being the dominant country in dealing with Communist China. Ambassador Chow noted that he could understand this.²

Continuing, Dr. Kissinger said that we had picked a few steps which might be taken now, such as travel. While we could let a few Chinese Communists in, it was doubtful they would be breaking down our doors asking for visas. Ambassador Chow again noted that he could see our point—the new steps might make the Russians more amenable. Nevertheless, he didn't know if the Russians would respond to this approach, and Peking would be put in the middle between both

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted on April 14. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office. In an April 14 covering memorandum, Holdridge suggested that no further distribution be made. Kissinger initialed his approval. (Ibid.) Kissinger and Chow met from 3:31 to 3:47 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 480, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² During April 1971 there were signs that the Republic of China had accepted the U.S. position. Kearns reported that he spoke privately with Chiang Ching-kuo after a dinner at McConaughy's home in Taipei. He paraphrased Chiang as follows: "It is necessary for us to publicly oppose actions taken by the United States Government that favor the Chinese Communists. However, we wish the President to know that we understand the necessity of taking such actions at this time." Chiang asked that his message be relayed to the President, and Peterson forwarded it on April 17. (Memorandum from Kearns to Peterson, April 15, and memorandum from Peterson to Nixon, April 17; both in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 443 and William P. Rogers' Official and Personal Papers, White House Correspondence)

the U.S. and Moscow. Dr. Kissinger agreed that there were limits to what the Russians could do. This was a very complicated game. Ambassador Chow described the U.S. approach as a highly sophisticated one, which couldn't be explained very easily to the people on Taiwan. He would need to report to his President on this matter in generalized terms. Dr. Kissinger pointed out that no one in Washington outside of a very few knew what was to be undertaken. In fact, a long list had been presented, of which we were taking but a few items.

Ambassador Chow said that in the measures the U.S. was taking which affected his country, the understanding if not the support of the Chinese people was needed. He described the strong sentiments which various Chinese groups had with regard to a number of issues, particularly the question of the status of Senkaku Islets. The demonstration which had taken place in Washington on April 10 was a case in point—those demonstrating had been scientists, engineers, and professional people and not just students. The demonstration had come on all of a sudden because these people had become excited, and was symbolic of what they and the country would stand for. Ambassador Chow declared that he had been asked by President Chiang to take up the Senkaku question with the President and Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger stated that he was looking into the Senkaku matter, and asked Mr. Holdridge to forward a report to him on the issues involved by April 13.³

Ambassador Chow, in commenting further on the Senkakus, remarked that even when the Japanese had occupied Taiwan and the Ryukyus, legal matters involving the Senkakus had been handled by courts on Taiwan, and the fishing boats which went to the Senkakus had been from Taiwan. From the Japanese point of view, they didn't care how the Senkakus were administered. For the Chinese though, the issue of nationalism was deeply involved.

Ambassador Chow referred to the fact that there would be some decisions required with respect to the General Assembly next year and he hoped that the "other side" (i.e., the Chinese Communists) could be kept out. Whatever formula was advocated, the Chinese position had to be made tenable in the eyes of the people. Moreover, regardless of what was proposed, it would be hard to sell.

Ambassador Chow went on to discuss the desirability of like-minded nations in East Asia working more closely together. He described ASPAC as something of a social club of the foreign ministers, who put forward differing views on various subjects. The Koreans and the Japanese, for example, were quite far apart on many issues. His

³ See Document 115.

idea was for countries such as the ROC, Korea, Thailand and Vietnam to have more and closer consultations. This would not be like a "minor club," but would have a real purpose in such things as military matters. Such a grouping, having more or less of a joint stand, would make it easier for the U.S. to make military moves. The group could come to the U.S. and say that it would back the U.S. up. If the four governments could be gotten together, more planning could be undertaken on issues such as the UN, and a parallel approach maintained instead of each government going its separate way. The U.S. would be expected to be a benevolent friend. It wouldn't necessarily be expected to act, and the other nations would have to do things for themselves, but the tacit backing of the U.S. was needed. Rivalries had to be avoided, since there were already enough adversaries in the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that in these days, anyone who stands up to the Communists comes under attack; this was not from the Communists but from fellow citizens. Ambassador Chow referred to the existence of rumors that the U.S. was giving up, and of the need to arrest the trend of assuming that such was the case. Dr. Kissinger said that he agreed. We did not believe that we had to demonstrate our wisdom and political sagacity by destroying our friends. This was very much in the President's mind. On the UN issue, we would send someone to the ROC to explain our position, and would need some support from the ROC side. Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Chow to explain to his President that our President was a true friend, and that there had to be understanding between the two.

Ambassador Chow stated that he would look upon his role in Taiwan as Foreign Minister as being one of support for the U.S. position. He considered himself very proud to have known Dr. Kissinger, whom he regarded as a friend. He asked that Dr. Kissinger allow him the privilege of communicating directly with him. Dr. Kissinger replied that he definitely wanted Ambassador Chow to do so. If Ambassador Chow should write and let Dr. Kissinger know his private reactions, this would be a tremendous help. He wanted Ambassador Chow to know that in his opinion, he, Ambassador Chow, had always conducted his affairs here with dignity, and when in Taiwan should feel he had two friends in the White House. If we were obliged to do things which caused them pain, this would be to the minimum extent possible. He assured Ambassador Chow that we would do nothing without checking with the ROC. As far as our moves toward the Chinese Communists were concerned, they were mainly of significance with respect to the USSR and in response to our own domestic situation. Ambassador Chow said that he could see the U.S. point of view in both cases, although there were of course questions raised with respect to mainland China.

115. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Chinese Claim to the Senkaku Islets

You asked for information on the Chinese claim to the Senkaku Islets. The most recent summary of this was contained in a Note Verbale sent the State Department by the Chinese Embassy on March 15 (Tab A).² Its main points are as follows:

—As early as the 15th century Chinese historical records considered the Senkakus as the boundary separating Taiwan from the independent kingdom of the Ryukyus.

—The geological structure of the Senkaku Islets is similar to that of other islets associated with Taiwan. The Senkakus are closer to Taiwan than to the Ryukyus and are separated from the Ryukyus by the Okinawa Trough at the end of the Continental Shelf, which is 2,000 meters in depth.

—Taiwanese fisherman have traditionally fished in the area of the Senkakus and called at these islets.

—The Japanese Government did not include the Senkakus in Okinawa Prefecture until after China's cession of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895.

—For regional security considerations the GRC has hitherto not challenged the U.S. military occupation of the Senkakus under Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, according to international law temporary military occupation of an area does not affect the ultimate determination of its sovereignty.

—In view of the expected termination of the U.S. occupation of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, the U.S. is requested to respect the GRC's sovereign rights over the Senkaku Islets and restore them to the GRC when this termination takes place.

Comment. As you can imagine, the Japanese Government has a comparable list of apparently offsetting arguments and maintains sim-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on April 23.

² Attached but not printed.

ply that the Senkakus remain Japanese. State's position is that in occupying the Ryukyus and the Senkakus in 1945, and in proposing to return them to Japan in 1972, the U.S. passes no judgement as to conflicting claims over any portion of them, which should be settled directly by the parties concerned.³

³ Kissinger's handwritten comment in the margin reads: "But that is nonsense since it gives islands to Japan. How can we get a more neutral position?"

116. National Security Decision Memorandum 105¹

Washington, April 13, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Attorney General

SUBJECT

Steps Towards Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People's Republic of China and the United States

The President has reviewed the recommendations forwarded by the Under Secretaries Committee on steps to increase personal and commercial contacts between the People's Republic of China and the United States,² and has directed that the following moves be undertaken:

- Issuance of a public statement offering to expedite visas for groups of visitors from the People's Republic of China to the U.S.
- Relaxation of currency control to permit Chinese use of dollars.
- Ending restrictions on American oil companies providing bunkers except on Chinese-owned or chartered carriers bound to or from North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba. This relaxation covers ships as well as planes, but would not affect our existing controls on entry to PRC carriers into U.S. ports.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-223, NSDM Files, NSDM 105. Secret. Copies were sent to Connally, Stans, Moorer, and Shakespeare.

² See Document 111.

—Granting permission to U.S. vessels to carry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports, and for U.S.-owned foreign flag vessels to call at Chinese ports.

—Commencement of a relaxation of controls on direct trade between the U.S. and China by placing individual items under general license for direct export to the PRC after item-by-item interagency review to determine if they are of strategic significance. The Under Secretaries Committee is to be charged with the responsibility of determining which items should be placed on general license, and should forward a report within 30 days requesting approval of these determinations. Upon the commencement of these limited direct exports, direct imports from China of a similar and correlated nature will be allowed.³

The President has also directed that the Under Secretaries Committee review and report to him after a period of four months the results of the steps taken. The report should include an assessment of the reactions to these steps by the PRC and the GRC.⁴ The President will then determine whether implementation of additional steps recommended by the Under Secretaries Committee may be warranted.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ The President announced these changes on April 14. See Department of State *Bulletin*, May 3, 1971, pp. 567–577. The changes were forwarded to all diplomatic posts in circular telegram 63580, April 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 CHICOM–US) The Departments of State, Commerce, Transportation, and Treasury announced the regulations designed to implement the President’s decision on May 7. (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 31, 1971, pp. 702–704) The White House announced the list of products that could be sold under general export licenses (without the need for Department of Commerce permission for each transaction) on June 10. (*Ibid.*, June 28, 1971, pp. 815–817)

⁴ The Department of State kept the White House informed on the largely positive reactions to this decision. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, April 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT CHICOM–US) The Department, relying upon a CIA report, also informed Kissinger that the People’s Republic of China was waiting to see whether it would enjoy the same trading privileges as the Soviet Union. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, April 27, with attached CIA Intelligence Information Cable; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI)

117. National Security Study Memorandum 124¹

Washington, April 19, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Next Steps Toward the People's Republic of China

The President has directed a study of possible diplomatic initiatives which the United States might take toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the objective of furthering the improvement of relations. These initiatives should explore the degree to which it is possible to build on recent progress. They should be put into the context of our relations towards other countries, especially the USSR and Japan.

The analysis of each possible diplomatic initiative should include:

- the objectives of the initiative;
- anticipated reaction or response by the PRC;
- the advantages and disadvantages of the initiative;
- an assessment of the possible effects on our relations with and the anticipated reactions of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), the USSR, Japan and other nations as appropriate;
- an illustrative scenario by which the initiative could be pursued.

The initiatives should be placed into various groups of increasing scope and also include consideration of appropriate arms control measures included in the ongoing studies provided for by NSSMs 69 and 106 on this subject.²

The study should assume that there will be no change in our policy of recognition of or support for the Government of the Republic of China.

The President has directed that this study be prepared on a priority basis by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 124. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer.

² See Documents 18, 97, 105, and 108.

submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by May 15, 1971, for consideration by the Senior Review Group.³

Henry A. Kissinger

³ Joseph Walter Neubert, Acting Deputy Director for Policy, Planning and Coordination Staff, forwarded NSSM 124 to Green on April 23. According to Neubert, Irwin requested that the Green coordinate the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia's work with other areas of the Department, then discuss the draft report with Rogers and himself. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 124) U.S. officials in Taipei, Tokyo, and Hong Kong were asked to provide their views on further initiatives to improve relations with the People's Republic of China in telegram 71891, April 27. (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US) Hong Kong Consul General Osborn suggested five initiatives: organize a U.S.–PRC foreign ministers' conference, announce publicly the end of the Taiwan Strait patrol, reduce U.S. military forces on Taiwan, establish de facto trade representation in the PRC, and have private groups invite PRC diplomats to the United States. (Telegram 2763 from Hong Kong, May 3; *ibid.*, POL CHICOM–US) In Taipei McConaughy discussed the reactions by ROC officials to U.S. policy changes, noting that "So far this cost [in relations with the ROC] has been moderate, but to some extent it is cumulative." (Telegram 2156 from Taipei, May 6; *ibid.*) On May 14 R.T. Curran, Deputy Executive Secretary, sent a memorandum to Davis to request that the report be delayed because Irwin, Green, and Trezise were traveling in Asia. (Ibid.) The final report was dated May 27; it is printed as Document 129.

118. Message From the Premier of the People's Republic of China Chou En-lai to President Nixon¹

Beijing, April 21, 1971.

Premier Chou En-lai thanked President Yahya for conveying the message of President Nixon on 5 January 1971.² Premier Chou En-lai is very grateful to President Yahya and he will be grateful if President Yahya conveys the following verbatim to President Nixon:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. No classification marking. According to a covering memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, Hilaly called at 3:45 p.m. on April 27 and requested a 5-minute meeting as soon as possible: "He says he has an urgent message from his President having to do with Communist China." Hilaly and Kissinger met from 6:12 to 6:30 p.m., then Kissinger met with Nixon from 7 to 7:37 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) A handwritten copy of this statement, apparently prepared by Hilaly, is attached to the typed version. The versions are identical. Hilaly also handed over a record of his December 16, 1970, meeting with Kissinger, Document 100.

² See Documents 99 and 100.

“Owing to the situation of the time it has not been possible to reply earlier to the message from the President of the U.S.A. to the Premier of People’s Republic of China.

“At present contacts between the peoples of China and the United States are being renewed. However, as the relations between China and the U.S.A. are to be restored fundamentally, a solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions between high-level responsible persons of the two countries. Therefore, the Chinese Government reaffirms its willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions. Of course, if the U.S. President considers that the time is not yet right the matter may be deferred to a later date. As for the modalities, procedure and other details of the high-level meeting and discussions in Peking, as they are of no substantive significance, it is believed that it is entirely possible for public arrangements to be made through the good offices of President Yahya Khan.”

119. Letter From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Defense Attaché in France (Walters)¹

Washington, April 27, 1971.

Dear Vernon:

Mr. David McManis of Dr. Kissinger’s staff will deliver to you, together with this letter, two documents. The first (at Tab A) is a letter from Dr. Kissinger to Mr. Jean Sainteny² and asks him to assist us in a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK’s Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret.

² The undated letter to Sainteny reads in its entirety:

“Dear Jean: Once again, the President and I would like to impose on your invaluable good offices to assist us in a matter of the greatest sensitivity. The bearer of this message, Major General Vernon Walters (our Defense Attaché in Paris), will explain to you our specific need for your intercession. The project is one requiring the kind of skill and delicacy which have characterized your earlier efforts in our behalf and no one, other than the President, myself and General Walters is aware of it. Therefore, it is important that after talking to General Walters you inform no one of the nature of your conversation with him, with the exception of President Pompidou. Both the President and I hope you will find it possible to help. It would increase our already large debt of gratitude to you. Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger.”

sensitive matter which you will, in turn, explain to him when you deliver the letter. You should, therefore, contact Sainteny, show Henry's letter to him and ask him to arrange a private meeting between you and the Ambassador to France of the People's Republic of China or with some other appropriate Senior Chinese Communist representative in Paris. In the meantime, Dr. Kissinger will alert Sainteny by telephone. It is important that Mr. Sainteny merely read Henry's letter to him and that you reclaim it after he has read its contents. Hopefully, Sainteny will then arrange a private meeting between you and a designated representative of the Chinese.

The second document (at Tab B) is a note which you should subsequently deliver to the designated representative of the People's Republic.³ The contents of this note should, under no circumstances, be divulged to Mr. Sainteny and you should merely tell Sainteny that you have been instructed to deliver a note, without further explanation of its nature or content.

In sum, we visualize the scenario as follows:

—You are to contact Mr. Sainteny who will have been alerted by Henry.

—Allow him to read Henry's letter to him, being sure to reclaim the letter at the end of the meeting and being sure not to divulge the content of the second note which is destined for the Chinese representative. At this meeting, flesh out Henry's letter by telling Sainteny that we hope he can arrange a private and secure meeting alone between you and an appropriate representative of the People's Republic assigned to France.

—Mr. Sainteny, in turn, will arrange an appropriate secure rendezvous between you and the Chinese representative. At this private meeting, you would then deliver the note at Tab B.

Please keep us posted on the scenario as it unfolds.

Best regards,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

³ The undated message reads in its entirety:

"In light of recent events, it seems important to have a reliable channel for communication between our two Governments. If the Government of the People's Republic of China desires talks that are strictly confidential, the President is ready to establish such a channel directly to him for matters of the most extreme sensitivity. Its purpose would be to bring about an improvement in US-Chinese relations fully recognizing the differences in ideology. On the United States side, such a channel would be known only to the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and would not be revealed to any other foreign country. If you are interested in pursuing this proposal, initial contact should be made with the bearer of this communication, Major General Vernon A. Walters, the U.S. Defense Attaché in Paris. Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, would be prepared to come to Paris for direct talks on US-Chinese relations with whomever might be designated by the People's Republic of China to explore the subject further."

120. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 27, 1971, 8:18 p.m.

P: I had a couple of thoughts on this. One with regard to the Bruce² thing which seems to me may pose to them a difficult problem because of him being directly involved in the Vietnam negotiations. Secondly, let me think of whether there is something else—how about Nelson?³

K: No.

P: Can't do it, huh?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. This transcript was prepared by Kissinger's staff. There is also a tape of this conversation. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 27, 8:16–8:36 p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 2–52) There are no substantive differences between the two versions.

² Reference is to David K.E. Bruce, former Ambassador to Great Britain and personal representative of the President with rank of Ambassador at the Paris talks with the Vietnamese. The President and Kissinger were discussing who might represent the United States in high-level meetings with officials from the PRC. Discussions between the President and Kissinger concerning contacts with the PRC continued on April 28. The two men, with H. R. Haldeman, re-hashed the previous day's list of potential envoys. John Connally and Kenneth Rush were also considered. The April 28 tape of this conversation, which took place in the President's office in the Executive Office Building, is of poor quality and much of it is unintelligible. Nixon and Kissinger were under the assumption that the first high-level meeting would be in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, although they discussed the possibility of meeting with PRC representatives in Paris. This secret meeting was to prepare for a subsequent trip by Nixon to Peking. While the first meeting would be private, it would be followed by a public envoy if the Chinese requested one. Kissinger suggested that he serve as the secret envoy, stating, "actually I don't want to toot my own horn, but I happen to be the only one who knows all the negotiations." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, April 28, 1971, 4:51–6:08 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 252–20)

³ Reference is to Nelson Rockefeller, businessman, philanthropist, and Governor of New York, 1958–1973. In his April 28 conversation with Kissinger, the President commented:

"Well my point is that he [Rockefeller] does not have the subtlety of moving around. He is the kind of a guy that wants to make a quick shot, dramatic, you know, bold. Now goddamn it, we're going to do things bold, but we don't want to fall down doing it. You can do it. The best thing, the best thing to do is this: Set up a secret negotiation. But the way I would start the telegram, I would say the President has considered, and he would like to arrange a visit to Peking. He believes, he would like to come to Peking. He thinks, however, that the best way to arrange that is for his, must be arranged at the highest level, the agenda, the modalities, et cetera should be arranged by Dr. Kissinger and whatever." (Ibid.)

K: Mr. President, he wouldn't be disciplined enough, although he is a possibility.

P: It would engulf him in a big deal and he is outside of the Government, you see.

K: Let me think about it, I might be able to hold him in check.

P: It is intriguing, don't you think?

K: It is intriguing.

P: How about Bush?

K: Absolutely not, he is too soft and not sophisticated enough.

P: I thought of that myself.

K: I thought about Richardson but he wouldn't be the right thing.

P: He is still too close to us and [I don't think it would set well with Rogers].⁴ Nelson—the Chinese would consider him important and he would be—could do a lot for us in terms of the domestic situation. No, Nelson is a wild [*hare?*] running around.

K: I think for one operation I could keep him under control. To them a Rockefeller is a tremendous thing.

P: Sure. Well, keep it in the back of your head.

K: Bush would be too weak.

P: I thought so too but I was trying to think of somebody with a title.

K: Nelson has possibilities.

P: A possibility, yeah. Of course, that would drive State up the wall.

K: He would take someone from State along but he despises them so much he will take our direction and I would send someone from our staff to go along.

P: Send Haig. Really, he's really tough.

K: And he knows Haig.

P: Henry, it wouldn't have happened if you hadn't stuck to your guns. We played a game and we got a little break. It was done skillfully and now we will wait a couple of weeks.

K: We have done it now, we have got it all hooked together; Berlin is hooked to SALT. Nelson might be able to do it, particularly if I sent Haig.

P: Oh, we would have to have Haig; and a State guy but not that Green guy.

⁴ Brackets in the source text.

K: Oh, Green could go. On foreign policy, Nelson would take my advice.

P: He would be a special envoy in a sense.

K: Actually, Mr. President, that's a very original idea and he's tough.

P: Particularly if you get him in right at the mountain top and say look, it will make or break you, boy.

K: Oh, he would do it and I could tell him on this one. On the long operation he would be hard to control but on this one he would be good.

P: If Dewey were alive, he could do it.

K: Nelson would be better.

P: But Dewey isn't alive.

K: If you can hold on a minute, I can get you—I have the oral note that the Pakistans sent me. Here it is—the Pakistan note to Yahya which Yahya passed on to the Chinese that asked him (read portion of note⁵—In reply to questions from me, Mr. Kissinger said . . .)

P: They opened that up on Taiwan.

K: On this ambiguous formulations could make that clear in the exchange and announcements.

P: Their reply is can not come over and talk about Taiwan. There is no limit to that because there is no meeting.

K: The difference between them and the Russians is that if you drop some loose change, when you go to pick it up the Russians will step on your fingers and the Chinese won't. I have reviewed all the communications with them and it has been on a high level.

P: Yeah, they have.

K: The Russians squeeze us on every bloody move and it has just been stupid. They cannot trick us out of Taiwan, they have to have a fundamental understanding.

P: Put Nelson in the back of your head. What did Haig think about this?

K: He thinks it is a great diplomatic move and if we play it coolly and toughly as we have until now, we can settle everything.

P: He said that.

⁵ All ellipses are in the source text. See Document 118.

K: Mr. President, I have not said this before but I think if we get this thing working, we will end Vietnam this year.⁶ The mere fact of these contacts makes that.

P: Another thing, of course, our little problem of time. In terms of wanting to announce—

K: We ought to be able to announce it by the first week in June anyway.

P: We would have to if we are going to be there in June. Is SALT going to turn them off?⁷

K: No, no.

P: Particularly, if we are going to drag our feet with the Russians on the Summit. They are fiddling around with it; well, let them fiddle.

K: They won't move fast because of the protests in this country. A more sophisticated analysis of the report was made by Chou En-lai.

P: His analysis in effect realized what we were doing.

K: A very subtle analysis of the international situation.

P: Well, anyway, there is another player we can keep. Bruce is another possibility too. It would be quite dramatic to pull Bruce out of Paris and send him to Peking.

K: For that reason, they might not take him.

P: In terms of Bruce, he is our senior Ambassador and we feel he is the best qualified man.

K: They would jump at Rockefeller, a high visibility one.

P: Visibility and it would be enormous. Can't you just see what that would do to the Libs in this country, oh, God. Rockefeller over there, Jesus Christ.

⁶ Vietnam figured prominently in their discussions. On April 28 the President told Kissinger: "What we are playing for basically is the Chinese summit, that's my plan. That is the big play. Now, that's only half of it, the other part of the play is to do something about this war. That's the other half of it." Kissinger responded: "With that, I think, those guys in '54 they needed peace, and they settled Vietnam then. They need peace now, it's got to have effect on Hanoi. That's one advantage of a public emissary." After a brief discussion Nixon allowed that they could send a public emissary later "for cosmetics." Nixon later added: "Well, let me say, before I get there, the war has to be pretty well settled. I'd just simply say, we can't come there until we have some idea. The fact must be known in the United States that the war is settled. I can't come to China before that." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, April 28, 1971, 4:51–6:08 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 252–20)

⁷ During the April 28 discussion, Kissinger observed: "They're [the Chinese] so scared of the Russians that they're better off having your visit next May or April and keeping it hanging and keep daring the Russians to attack them with the Presidential visit. That's what I think they want. I do not believe they want you now. That would be too quick a turn-around time for them." (Ibid.)

K: That has great possibilities.

P: Here is Rockefeller—he is lined up with us all the way; he has lined up with us on foreign policy all the way. Anyway, that is something to think about.

K: That's a good problem to have.

P: It is a good luxury to have.

K: Once this gets going—everything is beginning to fit together.

P: I hope so.

K: You will have to hold hard on Vietnam on Thursday.

P: I intend to hold it hard. What's happening on the prisoners?

K: I have three proposals which I am putting in writing—they will release 1,000, they are opening their camps and calling on the North Vietnamese to do the same, and proposing that all prisoners be held in a neutral country. This should be announced by Bruce in the morning—

P: Good.

K: And you can hit it in the evening.

P: They might hit that play if we build it up a bit. They will all think it is about bugging out but it will be on prisoners.

K: We are beginning to hold the cards.

P: That's true but we are going to hold it. The demonstrators may overplay their hand.

K: John Chancellor, whom I had lunch with today, thinks the tide has turned.

P: What turned it?

K: He thinks what happened this week has ruined them.

P: John Chancellor . . .

K: Absolutely. He doesn't exactly know what you have up your sleeve but—

P: I am not saying anything about China except that the proposals are at a very sensitive stage and I don't intend to comment on the future and next question, gentlemen.

K: Right.

P: I don't want to get into the proposal of a two-China policy, UN membership, Taiwan and so forth. I am going to finesse all questions by saying that developments here are significant and I don't think the interests of the nation will be served by commenting on it further.

K: I think that would be the best position to take, Mr. President.

P: Haig was pretty pleased.

K: If anyone had predicted that two months ago, we would have thought it was inconceivable.

P: Yeah, yeah. After Laos—

K: After Cambodia, the same thing—

P: Yeah. But look at after Laos, the people over two to one thought it had failed and yet here comes the Chinese move, the Ping Pong team and something more significant that pales that into nothing. It can have an enormous significance. Well, look, Nelson's tongue made that statement to Snow. How can we get the Mansfield thing turned off. I don't know how we can do it but one way we could do it is to invite him to go along.

K: No. Why give this to him?

P: He could go along with me.

K: He can go along with you when you go.

P: We could invite Mansfield and Scott.

K: If you want to share it with the Democrats.

P: Share it; the Chinese will treat them very well but they will know where the power is.

K: But they actually haven't invited anyone yet.

P: Could you get a message to him?

K: Think I can get some oral message to him.

P: Two weeks away and I wonder if they will move on Mansfield before then.

K: No, but they may.

P: As a temporary action, can you say that the President will be in California and—

K: I have already told them and that a constructive reply will be coming.

P: If you could add to that, that any other visits should be held in abeyance until we give our reply.

K: I will get that across.

P: There will be many requests and we feel that political requests . . .

K: Right.

P: Good idea. Okay, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

121. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Taipei, May 3, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Ambassador David Kennedy

Mr. Anthony Jurich

Republic of China

President Chiang Kai-shek

Mr. Fredrick Chien, Interpreter

Both Kennedy and President Chiang expressed warm and cordial greetings. The President indicated that he had not been fortunate to have met Ambassador Kennedy previously but was fully aware of his fine reputation and friendship for the Chinese people.

Ambassador Kennedy expressed to the President the warm regards from President Nixon and his hopes for continued strong and friendly relations between our two countries.

Ambassador Kennedy then explained to the President that the principal purpose of this mission was to arrange for a solution to the textile problem. He developed for the President both the political and economic problems that are resulting from the upsurge of the textile imports into the United States. Ambassador Kennedy strongly stressed the need for a prompt and favorable solution to this problem.

He advised the President that he would be present during the course of these negotiations but not participate directly at the negotiating

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/KENNEDY. Secret. Prepared by Jurich, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Secretary of the Treasury. Telegrams relaying the contents of Kennedy's discussions with Vice President C.K. Yen on May 1 and Finance Minister K. T. Li on April 30 are *ibid.* The memorandum of Kennedy's conversation with Chiang and his May 12 memorandum to the President are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 820, Name Files, Ambassador David M. Kennedy. Kennedy's May 13 summary report of his meetings, forwarded to Rogers, then the President, stated that the Chinese assured him negotiations would take 3 to 5 days. He also mentioned that the Chinese hoped to obtain a steel mill and greater investment in "oil resource development" to offset voluntary limitations on the growth of their textile industry. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/KENNEDY) Ambassador Kennedy also visited Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, where he sought to obtain commitments to negotiate limits on textile imports into the United States. Memoranda of conversations he held were forwarded to Rogers on May 13. (*Ibid.*)

level.² He would be readily available to reconcile any disputes and make final decisions. President Chiang was then asked to designate one individual who would have the authority and responsibility to perform a similar function. We cannot afford to get bogged down in petty details and bureaucratic machinations on these crucial issues Kennedy explained.

President Chiang promptly agreed to start negotiations as rapidly as possible with the assurances that we would reach reasonable agreement. He particularly appreciated the approach which Ambassador Kennedy has used and proposes to use during the next stage of negotiations.

Note: Subsequent to this meeting, word was received from both the President and Vice Premier's offices that they would be ready to start negotiations by the first of June.

Up to this point, the Generalissimo had complete composure. He looks particularly well and acts like he is in control of himself and the situation. Mentally he seems particularly alert. He then started to discuss the recent State Department statements of Mr. Bray.³ The President went on at great length without interruption becoming increasingly agitated. Toward the end of this colloquy, he was visibly shaking.

The President explained that he considered questioning the sovereignty of Taiwan and the Pescadores as the most serious affront to the ROC. He called it a "slap in the face" to both himself and to his nation.

It was particularly emphasized that Bray in response to a question reflected the impression that there had been a change in the U.S. position, and compounded the situation by subsequently reading a prepared statement, which seemed to further endorse the impression of change relative to the question of sovereignty.

President Chiang then cited the wartime meetings at Cairo and Yalta plus various wartime documents which clearly established the sovereignty of Taiwan and the Pescadores as belonging to the ROC. In

² Nixon's May 13 memorandum to Cabinet officers involved with economic policy noted that talks would begin on June 1 and that Jurich would chair the negotiating team, which would include representatives from the Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor. (Ibid.)

³ Reference is to Charles W. Bray, III, Department of State press spokesman. Apparent reference to an April 28 statement issued by the Department of State suggesting Taiwan's ultimate status awaited final determination. The ROC Chargé, Martin Wang, brought this matter to Green's attention on April 30. (Telegram 75570 to Taipei, May 2; *ibid.*, POL CHINAT-US) The PRC also complained publicly about this statement. Nixon commented on a brief report about this issue in his May 5 daily briefing memorandum: "K—Why doesn't State just follow my line?" (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, May 5; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 33, President's Daily Briefs) The statement was not printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*.

addition, he cited the mutual defense treaty between the ROC and the U.S. Are all these treaties and understandings being questioned, he asked.

Ambassador Kennedy, at this point, injected the comment that President Nixon subsequently at his press conference⁴ clarified the U.S. position by stating that it had not changed. President Chiang acknowledged that he knew of and understood President Nixon's statement. Subsequently, however, he asked categorically that Ambassador Kennedy express personally to President Nixon the extreme concern which he has expressed and asked that at some appropriate time, President Nixon reaffirm the U.S. position so that there may be no doubts in anyone's mind as to the status of Taiwan and the Pescadores and the relationship between the ROC and the U.S.

Ambassador Kennedy expressed his apologies over this most unfortunate statement and reaffirmed President Nixon's and the United States Government's position that the U.S. policy has not changed. He also assured President Chiang that his views would be personally, fully and completely conveyed to President Nixon upon his return. Ambassador Kennedy then expressed his appreciation for the frank and candid statement by the President.

President Chiang at this point apologized for taking so much time in his frank and emotional statement but he felt so strongly that he was not able to help himself. He believes he is expressing not only his personal view but the view of the government of the ROC and the people.

At this point Ambassador Kennedy expressed his sincere appreciation for President Nixon, for his country and for himself personally for this opportunity to discuss these important matters as candidly with the President.

The President did not acknowledge this offer to culminate the meeting but immediately started discussing the U.S. policy concerning mainland China.

The Generalissimo reflected upon the mission of General Marshall in 1947–48. He then compared the motive and the goodwill of the United States as reflected by the Marshall mission with what is happening today. Again, he stated, the U.S. is trying to reconcile the differences between the Chinese Communists, the ROC, and the world. He recognizes that our motive is to reduce tension and seek peace. Again, however, he believes we do not fully understand the Chinese Communists, their views, and their methods. As we were deceived in 1947–48, which resulted in the fall of the ROC, he is concerned that the U.S. will again make the same mistake.

⁴ Apparent reference to a news conference held on April 29. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, p. 593.

He then spent some time further explaining what the Chinese Communists are trying to do and the tactics they are using. Particularly, he cautioned the U.S. about both subversion and ideological warfare. In brief, he is seriously concerned that the United States and the West are exposing themselves to a Chinese Communists' offensive which will weaken us and the free world.

Ambassador Kennedy assured the President that the U.S. is seeking these small steps relative to the mainland in order to reduce tensions in the interest of peace. The United States will do its utmost to insure that in the process there will be no harm done to the ROC. We will keep alert and appreciate the notes of caution by the President which have been expressed so honestly and so candidly. We also recognize that they are based upon personal experiences which are invaluable in assessing such a complex situation.

Ambassador Kennedy then again thanked President Chiang for the opportunity to frankly and honestly exchange views which he believes will be helpful to both governments.

The meeting lasted approximately an hour and twenty minutes.

President Chiang thanked Ambassador Kennedy and expressed his hopes that he would be returning soon. He specifically requested Ambassador Kennedy to convey his personal and his country's thanks to President Nixon and to assure Nixon of his continuing friendship.

122. Extract of Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 5, 1971.

Ambassador Hilaly called today asking that the following information be passed to the President:

The message which Dr. Kissinger gave him on April 28 was transmitted directly to President Yahya that same evening.² President Yahya

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. A full memorandum of conversation has not been found. This extract was apparently prepared by the NSC staff.

² Kissinger met with Hilaly in the early evening of April 27. See footnote 1, Document 118. Neither a copy of the message from Kissinger to the PRC nor a record of the April 28 meeting with Hilaly has been found. Kissinger's record of schedule does not contain entries for April 28–May 9, 1971.

has cabled Hilaly confirming that Yahya personally conveyed the message to the Ambassador of Communist China on Saturday morning, May 1. It most probably reached Chou En-lai the same day or the following day.

Ambassador Hilaly said that what he had told President Yahya on behalf of President Nixon on the basis of Dr. Kissinger's talk with him was as follows:

The President asked that the following message be passed to President Yahya:

My warm thanks for the helpful role you have played. I particularly appreciate the delicacy and tact with which you have handled these important exchanges. Please thank Chou En-lai for his message which I think is positive, constructive and forthcoming. I will soon be replying to it in the same spirit.

Ambassador Hilaly noted further that Dr. Kissinger asked him to convey the following to Chou En-lai stated as President Yahya's personal views:

I feel that President Nixon is very anxious to handle these negotiations entirely by himself and not to let any politician come into the picture until a government-to-government channel is established. My Ambassador in Washington thinks this is because President Nixon will find it more difficult to move quickly in the matter if American politicians come into it. Therefore, it would be best until President Nixon's reply is received and an American envoy is designated for these discussions if the Chinese government would not discuss the matter with any American politician. This does not mean that there is any objection to continuation of the People-to-People program. In fact, Ambassador Hilaly thinks that President Nixon would be very happy if every other kind of American visitor is encouraged to visit China—students, reporters, scholars, etc.—so this is a temporary thing until the official link is established.

Ambassador Hilaly said that he received a telegram from President Yahya saying that the above was conveyed as suggested.³

³ Haig used this document as a basis for a May 5 memorandum to Nixon. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 5.

123. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Message from Norwegian Ambassador in Peking²

Ambassador Crowe in Oslo has forwarded the text of two telegrams to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (received on April 19 and 23) from Norwegian Ambassador Aalgaard in Peking covering his conversation with the Acting Chinese Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei.³ I thought that you would be interested in the main points, which should be viewed in the context of events known only to you.

—Chi Peng-fei stressed the political importance of the American Table Tennis Team's visit to China and maintained that this was only the beginning of extensive contacts with the American people. It was clear to Aalgaard from Chi's remarks that the invitation to the American team was a response to the U.S. lifting of travel restrictions.

—Mao told Edgar Snow that contact with the Russians was now impossible. The Russian people had allowed themselves to be led by the current leadership. The situation is completely different in the U.S. where the American people have demonstrated a great capacity to behave independently. China must therefore seek to establish better contacts with the Americans.

—Chinese sports teams will travel to the U.S. in the near future and the Chinese have a long list of American politicians, journalists and others who have expressed a desire to visit China. James Reston will come at the end of April.⁴

—China is now prepared to start a wide range of contact activity with the U.S. The U.S. rejected the Chinese proposal for such contacts

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Norway, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. According to an attached covering memorandum, Holdridge drafted the memorandum for Haig on April 29.

² See also Document 104 and footnote 3, Document 112.

³ Crowe combined the two Norwegian telegrams detailing Aalgaard's conversations in Beijing in telegram 1185 from Oslo, April 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Norway, Vol. I. The actual conversation between Aalgaard and Chi took place on April 14.

⁴ The President underlined this sentence and added "?!" at the end of it.

made at the beginning of the Warsaw Talks.⁵ Now the conditions exist in both countries for the realization of the original Chinese idea.

—Aalgaard felt that while the new Chinese line may be seen primarily as a face-saving device, for example with Hanoi, it is first and foremost a response to the American softer line.

—Aalgaard also felt that in addition to the immediate utility in advancing Chinese political goals, the most recent Chinese moves should also be seen as part of a longer range policy of greater flexibility in relation to the U.S. to counter China's greater danger, namely, increased Soviet influence in Southeast Asia and the possibility that the Soviets will fill the military vacuum which the American disengagement policy in Asia can create. Another factor is fear of an eventual Japanese nuclear capability.⁶

—The Norwegian Embassy in Peking believes that the Chinese will not immediately propose resumption of the Warsaw Talks though it is not impossible that this will occur in the last half of 1971. It is therefore assumed that the people-to-people formula will be maintained between China and the U.S. in the foreseeable future.⁷

⁵ The President underlined this sentence.

⁶ The President began underlining at the word "counter."

⁷ In a March 16 memorandum to Kissinger, which reported on Norwegian views of the PRC's policy toward peace in Vietnam, Holdridge wrote: "Past experience makes us leery of Aalgaard's reporting, which, we fear, is probably colored by his desire to play an intermediary role in the negotiations." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Norway, Vol. I) Crowe had also suggested to the Department of State that Oslo might be "a suitable locale for Chicom-US contact," but apparently no action was taken toward this end. (Telgram 205 from Oslo, January 21; *ibid.*)

124. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 15, 1971.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ambassador Farland, May 7, 1971

On Friday, May 7, I met for three hours with Ambassador Farland in Palm Springs.² At that time, I outlined the exchange of messages between the U.S. and China that has taken place through the Pakistanis; I read portions of the most recent message delivered by Ambassador Hilaly on April 21³ and told Ambassador Farland that you intended to respond by proposing that I meet with Chou En-lai, or a suitable Chinese representative, either in Pakistan or at a location in southern China easily accessible from Pakistan. We considered a number of details associated with the trip and reached some tentative decisions.

—After reviewing several alternative communication channels, we agreed to place a special Navy communicator in Karachi to provide a communications channel similar to the one I have set up with Bahr and Rush. This should be operational this week.

—I discussed with Ambassador Farland my proposed trip itinerary which would provide for an arrival in Islamabad on a Friday, at which point he or Yahya could arrange to host me for the weekend. This would provide the cover for my meeting with the Chinese, and on Monday I would continue on to Tehran. I indicated that I would probably require about 24 hours with the Chinese and would plan on meeting in three separate sessions.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret, Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² According to the attached memorandum of conversation prepared by David Halperin of the NSC staff, this meeting took place at the home of Theodore Cummings in Palm Springs, California, on May 7 between 2:50 and 5:45 p.m. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 6. In a backchannel message to Farland, May 3, Kissinger wrote: "For the most sensitive reasons known only to the President and myself, the President wishes you to find some personal repeat personal pretext for undertaking an immediate trip to the United States in order that you may be able to confer with me." (Ibid.) Farland responded on May 4 that he had informed the Department of State that he was returning to the United States to conduct an urgent business transaction. (Ibid.)

³ See Document 118.

—Ambassador Farland felt that it would be better to be taped by the Chinese than the Pakistanis, and for this reason the meeting should be conducted in southern China rather than Pakistan.

—We discussed the relative merits of my traveling to China by Pakistani, Chinese or U.S. aircraft and tentatively decided that the optimum arrangement would be to pre-position a smaller White House aircraft in Pakistan equipped with a Pakistani navigator. This would permit the larger aircraft in which I arrive to remain parked at Rawalpindi over the weekend in public view.

—I instructed Ambassador Farland to discuss our meeting and my proposed trip with Yahya and made him responsible for all the technical details of the trip. He will submit for my review several possible scenarios for the China meeting as soon as the special communications channel is activated.

Ambassador Farland made several more general points:

—He was sharply critical of Ambassador Keating who, in his view, is attempting to make a partisan issue of the Pakistani situation and discredit the Administration in the process. Ambassador Keating apparently called in a *New York Times* correspondent and divulged the contents of the Blood cables,⁴ and Ambassador Farland feels that Ambassador Keating will use his trip back to Washington to lobby against your Pakistan policies.

—Ambassador Farland stressed his conviction that it will take a substantial (i.e., \$250 million) loan to sustain Pakistan for another six months and he requested support in obtaining a commitment from the World Bank or IMF. As a related matter, Ambassador Farland asked that Hannah be told in a forceful way that you want him to adopt a positive attitude toward Pakistan for at least the next six months.

—Ambassador Farland also felt that Germany, Great Britain and possibly also Japan should be apprised of our determination to save Pakistan and asked to adjust their policies to support our position.

A full record of the meeting is attached at Tab A.⁵

⁴ Archer K. Blood was the U.S. Consul General in Dacca, East Pakistan (Bangladesh). The "Blood cables," written by Blood and the staff at the Consulate in Dacca, criticized U.S. policy toward South Asia and called for strong condemnation of Pakistani military repression in East Pakistan. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XI, Document 19.

⁵ Attached but not printed. See footnote 2 above.

125. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, May 10, 1971.

President Nixon has carefully studied the message of April 21, 1971, from Premier Chou En-lai conveyed through the courtesy of President Yahya Khan. President Nixon agrees that direct high-level negotiations are necessary to resolve the issues dividing the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Because of the importance he attaches to normalizing relations between our two countries, President Nixon is prepared to accept the suggestion of Premier Chou En-lai that he visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. At such a meeting each side would be free to raise the issue of principal concern to it.

In order to prepare the visit by President Nixon and to establish reliable contact with the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic, President Nixon proposes a preliminary *secret* meeting between his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, and Premier Chou En-lai or another appropriate high-level Chinese official. Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to attend such a meeting on Chinese soil preferably at some location within convenient flying distance from Pakistan to be suggested by the People's Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger would be authorized to discuss the circumstances which would make a visit by President Nixon most useful, the agenda of such a meeting, the time of such a visit and to begin a preliminary exchange of views on all subjects of mutual interest. If it should be thought desirable that a special emissary come to Peking publicly between the secret visit to the People's Republic of China of Dr. Kissinger and the arrival of President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to arrange it. It is anticipated that the visit of President Nixon to Peking could be announced within a short time of the secret meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-lai. Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to come from June 15 onward.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the first page reads: "Handed by Mr. Kissinger to Amb. Hilaly, 12:00, 5/10/71." Kissinger met with Hilaly on May 10 from 12:10 to 12:55 p.m. and from 3:05 to 3:29 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) Kissinger informed Farland via a May 14 backchannel message that "Message passed to Yahya through Hilaly along lines of our conversation. You were designated as point of contact for travel arrangements." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 426, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages—1971—Amb Farland—Pakistan) Farland informed Kissinger on May 22 that this message was received by Yahya in Lahore on May 17 and was given to the PRC Ambassador on May 19. (Ibid.)

It is proposed that the precise details of Dr. Kissinger's trip including location, duration of stay, communication and similar matters be discussed through the good offices of President Yahya Khan. *For secrecy, it is essential that no other channel be used. It is also understood that this first meeting between Dr. Kissinger and high officials of the People's Republic of China be strictly secret.*²

² Nixon did, however, hint to Rogers that a meeting was possible. At a May 21 meeting with Rogers, Nixon remarked: "Now, it's something that we should keep very much, now one thing I've done that you should know, Maurice Stans wants to take a commercial mission, Ted Kennedy suggested he could drop over from there [the PRC] on his trips and so forth. And I said none of you even approach it, don't even suggest it, we're not going to get into [unintelligible]. Any visits must be at the highest level. It would have to be you or me or both. And it might come, it might come. I just have a hunch here, a feeling that there's something going on there. I think that this Russian thing has a helluva lot more to do with China than anything else. They're scared of them." Rogers replied: "Yeah, no doubt about it. I think we want to be careful, that's why I want to mention today in my speech, on not appearing that we've turned them off. I think we've got to soften, to downplay a little bit so we don't get too eager." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Rogers, May 21, 1971, 11:29–11:41 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 503–9) Rogers' May 21 speech before the 1970 Medal of Honor recipients is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 14, 1971, pp. 766–768.

126. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, May 20, 1971.

In case the People's Republic of China has not been apprised, the United States Government wishes to inform it of the following statement made by the President of the United States on May 20, 1971:

"The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. This message was sent via special channels from Kissinger to Farland on May 20. Kissinger's instructions read: "Please deliver the attached message to Yahya personally for immediate transmittal by him to PRC Ambassador. Best regards." (Ibid.) A copy of the message contains the handwritten notation: "Handed to Hilaly 12:00 May 20, 1971 (without classification)." Kissinger and Hilaly met from 12:10 to 12:15 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM's). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

"The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued."

President Nixon wishes to emphasize that it is his policy to conclude no agreement which would be directed against the People's Republic of China. Mr. Kissinger is prepared to include this issue and related questions on the agenda of the proposed meeting with the designated representative of the People's Republic of China.²

² The first draft of this May 19 message reads in its entirety: "The United States Government wishes to inform the Government of the People's Republic of China of the President's May 20, 1971 statement on the strategic arms limitation talks. The United States Government wishes to reaffirm that any agreement that it might conclude will not be directed against the People's Republic of China. Mr. Kissinger is prepared to discuss this issue and related questions with the designated representative of the People's Republic of China." A longer second draft, May 19, contains Kissinger's revisions. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971)

127. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 24, 1971.

SUBJECT

China Trade

As you know, I am fully behind the President's policy to open up our trade and travel restrictions with the People's Republic of China. Not only are there economic advantages for us but I am convinced that the President has already and will continue to make domestic political gains from the process. This is particularly true, if the domestic political aspects are handled with care. My views on how to win extra domestic political points in the key border and agricultural states are set

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Secret.

forth in the attached copy of a memorandum I sent the President on May 17.²

On substance, I'm with you and will support proposals as far-reaching as you think advisable.

Clearly, the key disagreed substantive issue for Presidential decision is the proposal to add grains on general license for export both to China and the Soviet Union. There is a real trade potential here; there is an opportunity with Bob Dole³ and the farmers to win domestic political kudos; and the situation is set up to eliminate some very short-sighted shipping restrictions. While labor and George Meany⁴ may oppose this latter aspect, I have reason to believe that the west coast unions are prepared to load grains both for China and the Soviet Union.

On balance, it is better from the President's standpoint, for Joe Curran⁵ to be unhappy than for the American farmers to be unhappy. Particularly since grain exports do have the promise of improving the balance of payments, which is so important.

² The attached May 17 memorandum to the President essentially restated the points raised by Peterson in this memorandum.

³ Senator Robert Dole (R-Kansas) was Chairman of the Republic National Committee.

⁴ George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO.

⁵ Joseph Edwin Curran, President of the National Maritime Union (AFL-CIO).

128. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 25, 1971, 1:10–2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
M. and Mme. John Paul Sainteny
Brig. General Alexander M. Haig
W. Richard Smyser, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office. Sainteny, Kissinger, Lord, and Smyser also met from 2:40 to 3:15 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

Substantive portions of the luncheon conversation centered on Vietnam and China. Following are the highlights of M. Sainteny's observations.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

China

Mr. Sainteny said the following:

—The US moves concerning China were good, and we were now on a good path.

—With the Chinese, if you knock on one door they will open another one. Thus, while the Chinese Ambassador in Paris had merely transmitted Dr. Kissinger's note without comment, M. Sainteny believed the approach through him had been very efficacious with respect to recent events.²

—Chou En-lai has been clearly in charge since the Cultural Revolution, with Mao now being old.

—The Chinese will blow hot and cold in their dealings with us. We should multiply our gestures toward them to show our good will; he cited as an example that his company wished to sell helicopters to the Chinese, but were prevented by COCOM restrictions because an American license was needed for certain parts.

Dr. Kissinger said that M. Sainteny could tell the Chinese that the US will look positively at these trade questions. We will be freeing some trade items, although we cannot guarantee to free them all and will not release any with military significance.

After Lunch

After lunch, M. Sainteny remained for further private conversation with Dr. Kissinger. During that conversation he asked Dr. Kissinger whether he could tell Ambassador Bruce and Xuan Thuy that he had occasional contact with Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger said that he could tell those people.

² Sainteny wrote a letter to Kissinger on January 12, which was translated by Smyser for Kissinger on January 18: "Acting on your letter of November 9, I had a conversation with my friend on December 23 during which I was able to set forth our project. Although he received the idea with a certain reserve, my interlocutor transmitted it to his board of directors. This board has so far apparently not made its response known. I shall not fail of course to keep you informed." Kissinger's response, drafted by Smyser, reads: "It was a great pleasure to hear that you are making progress. We wish you and your family a very Happy New Year, and we look forward to hearing from you again." Sainteny's letter, Smyser's translation, and the response to Sainteny are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1033, Files for the President, Miscellaneous memoranda relating to HAK's trip to PRC, July 1971.

Dr. Kissinger asked M. Sainteny whether we could use him to get a message to the Chinese very fast if we needed to. M. Sainteny said he thought he could get to the Chinese quickly enough to deliver any urgent message, and that he would be pleased to do it.

129. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 124¹

Washington, May 27, 1971.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

NEXT STEPS TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA— NSSM 124

Preface

On April 19, 1971, the President directed:

“a study of possible diplomatic initiatives which the United States might take toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the objective of furthering the improvement of relations.” NSSM 124 further directed that “The study should assume that there will be no change in our policy of recognition of or support for the Government of the Republic of China.”

The introduction of this response to the President is an analysis of the principal factors in US–PRC relations which have bearing on the selection and timing of the next initiatives.

This is followed by three groups of initiatives which the President might wish to approve ranging from some which could be unilaterally

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 124. Top Secret. Brown, Acting Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific, submitted this report to the SRG on May 28. (Memorandum from Brown to Kissinger; *ibid.*) According to an August 24 memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, the CIA prepared an Intelligence Annex to NSSM 124 that assessed reconnaissance operations involving China with an eye toward their reduction or elimination. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 84–B00513R, DCI/Executive Registry Files, NSSMs) According to a “NSSM Status Reports Prepared by S/PC,” from December 1971, NSSM 124 was “completed” after it was submitted to the Senior Review Group, and no NSC meeting was planned. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 73 D 288, General Files on NSC Matters, NSC Under Secretaries Memoranda, 1971) NSSM 124 is printed as Document 117.

undertaken at any time with minimal preparation to those which require the concurrence of the PRC for implementation.²

NEXT STEPS TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA—
NSSM 124

Introduction

I. The Present Situation

For over a decade we have tried to get the People's Republic of China to defer the central problem between us—Taiwan—and to discuss at Warsaw what Peking called "minor questions," various means of contact between our two peoples. We have sought these contacts in the hope that better understanding might gradually move us toward resolution of more fundamental problems between us. Only in the past two years, however, have we made significant unilateral moves in an effort to bring this about. Peking has now acted too—and, perhaps significantly, in the one area wherein we so far have permitted an "equal and comparable" arrangement, that of travel.

Both sides have doubtless recognized the danger inherent in nearly two decades of deeply inimical confrontation. In the present changed context, both sides seem at last to view the rigidities long associated with that confrontation as being unnecessarily self-limiting.

The events of April in Sino-US relations are significant. But they do not yet touch on fundamentals. This paper presents steps to stimulate further normal contacts between China and the United States in order to test whether we can now move on toward a more fundamental regularization of our relations.

II. PRC Motives and Tactics

Peking's "people's diplomacy" towards the US is a dramatic departure. But it does not necessarily mean that the Chinese leaders have changed their hostile view of the US or revised their major foreign policy goals—recognition as the dominant power in Asia, accommodation of other Asian states to PRC policies, elimination of the Nationalist Government, and the withdrawal of US military presence from Taiwan and the Asian mainland.

² Options in Group I included the following: Cultural, Scientific, and Industrial Exchange; Transportation: Sea and Air; Trade Initiatives; Trade Promotion; Arms Control; and U.S. Military Presence on Taiwan. Group II included Cultural and Scientific Exchange; Trade Promotion, U.S. Presence in the PRC; Status of the GRC; Arms Control; and U.S. Military Presence on Taiwan. Group III included Official Trade Missions; Status of the GRC; Status of Taiwan; Blocked Chinese Assets and U.S. Claims; U.S. Presence in the PRC, Arms Control; and U.S. Military Presence in the Taiwan Area. Each option included a brief discussion of principal advantages, principal disadvantages, and implementation.

The new approach to the US forcefully underlines another policy goal—recognition of China as a world power.

Probable Motives

Peking wishes both to raise the prospect of a dialogue with the United States as a warning and lever against the Soviet Union and to erode the GRC's international and domestic position. Peking's "reasonableness" toward the United States is certainly designed to induce other countries to recognize the PRC and to garner support for entry into the UN on its own terms—GRC expulsion. Additional considerations are to move the Japanese Government towards accommodation, and to increase domestic US pressure for changes in US China policy.

International Chinese Developments. Most of the Chinese leadership appears to have backed the post-Cultural Revolution drive for a more normal international status. But there have been enough disruptions in the pattern of Chinese behavior, particularly in the domestic area, to suggest serious policy debates. The moderate line appears firmly in control, but the radicals undoubtedly continue to exercise a restraining influence on friendly approaches to the United States, especially in areas where this might involve substantive Chinese concessions. Conceivably, visible failures in the current international initiatives could contribute to a reversal of line.

The American Factor. If satisfied by the degree of success they see from their initial step, the Chinese may take bolder actions, including a resumption of the Warsaw Talks or some other form of official contact with the United States, though this is by no means certain. We should not expect Peking's interest in building the momentum of its American policy to lead it to accept any major undercutting of its bargaining position on the Taiwan issue.

Some US actions could cause Peking to hesitate in its new approach or even turn "people's diplomacy" into an activity intended mainly to embarrass the United States Government. Examples include:

- A major US escalation in Southeast Asia.
- The transfer of US military facilities and functions from Okinawa to Taiwan.
- Formal US adoption of a "two Chinas" position.
- Vigorous US leadership of a campaign clearly intended to block PRC admission to the United Nations.

The Chinese will be acutely sensitive to questions of equality of treatment, especially as compared with the USSR. To avoid appearing in the supplicant's role by rapid response to US initiatives, they may not publicize trade activities and may be embarrassed by public or semi-public discussions of scenarios for improving relations that

appeared to emanate from official US sources. To gain maximum impact on US public opinion, Chinese moves may be correlated with US Congressional hearings and the 1972 election campaign, and be directed toward individuals seeking more rapid changes in US policy.

The International Context. Peking will attempt to secure maximum international support on Chirep and minimize US opposition. If they fail to obtain their seat, the Chinese would be likely to increase their pressures again the following spring. If they win, they would be better positioned to make additional moves to capitalize on their new prestige and on Taipei's discomfiture.

Other developments which could quicken their pace would include a dramatic increase in Sino-Soviet tensions, a buildup of pressure in Japan to change its China policy, and a breakdown of morale on Taiwan. The new Chinese course risks displeasure in Hanoi and Pyongyang. Over time, unhappiness in these quarters could cause Peking to hesitate, especially if its initiative does not appear to be bearing fruit.

III. US Objectives and Strategy

A. *Objectives.* Some US and PRC objectives overlap—examples are allowing US–Chinese relations to develop as a way of offsetting Soviet pressures on each of us and avoiding armed conflict between the United States and China. That renewal of contact between us may permit us to work from these common interests toward mutual accommodation in areas of disagreement is the premise underlying our basic policy of encouraging PRC entry into the world community and improving our bilateral relations.

On the other hand, we intend to continue our policy of recognition of, and support for, the GRC, and we will have to assure ourselves at each turn that US–GRC relations do not suffer to the point of jeopardizing our most fundamental objectives toward Taiwan—insuring its security from external attack and maintaining necessary military access for ourselves. Much will have to happen between the PRC and us before this minimum is in danger, but it is within those limitations that our next steps toward the PRC must take place.

Not all of the US objectives that might be sought via better US–PRC relations (or even unrequited US initiatives toward Peking) relate strictly to the GRC and PRC. And some may be even more important than those already mentioned:

—Preserving the present US–Japanese relationship. Judging from reactions so far (see below), reducing US–PRC tensions can serve this objective, though that depends greatly on how well we handle the process.

—Maintaining public support for our foreign policy. Even the first, uncertain indication of a thaw between Washington and Peking has

produced strongly favorable public reactions, both internationally and at home. This strengthens the credibility of our expressed desire to deal peacefully with all nations, offsetting antipathies toward the Indochina war. Thereby, it increases our ability to deal with the whole spectrum of other international issues.

B. *Strategy.* Our handling of the Table Tennis episode has shown that the United States Government welcomes—and does not fear—Peking's new flexibility. Additional relatively innocuous steps by us and an amiable attitude toward further moves by Peking can serve the same purpose.

The Mix of "People's" and Governmental Diplomacy. Peking is faced with certain conflicts in its objectives:

—It wants to recover Taiwan, which pits it against US policy.

—It wants improved relations with the USG, if for no other reason than for leverage to use on the Soviets (and perhaps the Japanese).

The conflict is reflected in Peking's current resort to popular, as opposed to governmental, diplomacy vis-à-vis the US.

Popular diplomacy serves both objectives—to some extent. By appealing to US and world opinion on a people-to-people basis, Peking improves its prospects for getting the GRC expelled from the UN. Whether this succeeds or not, however, Peking will still confront the US defense commitment to Taiwan. Peking expects its popular diplomacy to help here too, because public pressure will force the US Government to make further concessions. This in turn could ultimately lead to better US-PRC governmental relations—which Peking surely requires if China's position with respect to the Soviets is to be enhanced in any substantial and enduring way.

Peking may hope for this strategy to work. But in the short-run it cannot expect much on the government-to-government front if it requires first that the United States sever its ties with Taiwan. And it has problems with the Soviet Union now. To pursue both its current objectives, therefore, it cannot give absolute priority to the Taiwan issue. While it may show relative toughness toward us on Taiwan between now and the UN vote next fall, it will hardly wish to foreclose all its options on the governmental side.

Our tactical dilemma is similar to Peking's. We would like to improve relations—without making crucial concessions on the Taiwan issue. Peking's popular diplomacy offers an opening for us, but it is more advantageous for us to be able to deal also on a government-to-government basis.

—The latter would show Peking that any improvement in relations was a deliberate act of USG policy, not something caused by popular pressure on the Administration.

—It would erode Peking's policy of focusing on a "solution of the Taiwan issue" to the preemption of all other business in its governmental dealings with us.

—It would move us more quickly toward a relationship in which our most serious objectives can be pursued, since these are matters that must be dealt with between governments.

It should, therefore, be US policy to try to move our contacts more into a governmental plane or to involve the government in some appropriate way in people-to-people contacts. This has been done, for example, in the handling so far of the Table Tennis visits (through the President's reception of Steenhoven, official facilitation of visas and invitations, etc.).

Conciliatory governmental gestures by us, even if not taken up by Peking, would offset attempted PRC pressures on the US Government through purely people-to-people contacts. More importantly, approaching Peking on a governmental basis will probe the relative priority it actually accords the Taiwan issue as an obstacle to better US-PRC relations.

This does not mean that we should take no steps on the Taiwan issue until the returns from other moves are in. If only for reasons of consistency Peking must press seriously for something on the Taiwan issue. But we can start modestly with additional steps in store should developments merit our taking them.

We should thus be careful not to convey to Peking by words, acts or even nuance, that our objective is to obtain PRC agreement to "put the Taiwan issue aside." On the contrary we are neither unwilling nor afraid to discuss it. (This position would be conveyed, when and if appropriate, privately and to the PRC only.)

The Options Available—Moving by Graded Steps. The options presented in this paper are divided into three groups. Each group represents an increase in seriousness of impact along several fronts:

—The groups would be progressively more difficult to accept for the GRC and the Soviet Union, each of whom opposes reduced US-PRC tensions.

—Congress and public opinion in the United States and elsewhere will probably also react differently to the moves in the successive groups. Some of the later moves, for example, would be substantial departures from long existing patterns. Reactions will be easier to judge as the earlier, more innocuous moves are made.

—The effect of these moves will be to press the PRC increasingly to deal with us on a government-to-government basis. The range of moves included in each group is intended to permit selection of a mix with enough interest to Peking to bring it along. Actual choice of what, if any, mix to implement will, of course, depend on the overall circumstances of the time.

—The moves in the first group are innocuous in their effect on US security interests, the likelihood of adverse domestic or international

reactions and the like. Some moves in the second and especially the third group, however, become increasingly steps we should take only as merited by other developments, especially (but not exclusively) PRC reactions to our earlier moves. This is particularly important in the military field, and steps challenging the GRC's legitimacy.

The impact of these moves will vary with their quantity and timing. Many steps taken simultaneously will have more impact—for a while at least—than would the same steps spaced out. Bunching them may also leave the problem of what to do for an encore. If many innocuous steps are taken together, the first impact may be great, but the later impact of more consequential steps may be reduced. The public and other governments will have grown more accustomed to movement between the United States and the PRC. Accordingly, this might increase our room for maneuver later on.

Chinese Responses. Peking is more apt to take small steps to improve atmospherics and maintain a sense of momentum than to propose or undertake major new departures affecting Sino-US relations.

It will probably want to move cautiously, assessing the effect of each step it takes before moving to the next. Among the steps open to the Chinese are the following:

—Favorable comments on US attitudes and initiatives by such leaders as Chou En-lai.

—Private remarks by Chinese officials designed to reach US officials which assess the possibility of further improvement in bilateral relations in a realistic and generally favorable light.

—Increased contact by Chinese diplomatic officials stationed abroad with Americans in official and unofficial positions.

—An alteration in the tone and content of Chinese domestic and foreign propaganda resulting in a marked diminution of anti-American themes. Personal attacks on President Nixon have already largely ceased in Peking's external media; further steps in this direction are possible.

—Admission to China of US public figures, for example, US Congressmen, with whom Chinese officials could hold responsible if unofficial discussions.

—Admission of relatives of the US citizens still held in Chinese jails for visits.

—Relaxation of PRC restrictions on trade and resumption of Sino-US talks in Warsaw or elsewhere. Trade moves are likely to be initially rather small and may depend in large part on Peking's reading as to whether or not the US continues to discriminate against China in relation to the USSR. Chinese interest in resuming the Warsaw dialogue would probably depend on Peking's reading of the desirable mix between "people's diplomacy" and government-to-government contacts, as discussed above.

One obviously desirable Chinese response would be the release of some or all of the four US prisoners still held in Chinese jails. Peking would probably react negatively if it came to feel that the United States

was making further improvement in relations dependent on the release of the prisoners. On the other hand, they have in the past released foreign nationals held in Chinese jails as an indication that relations with the country in question were already improving and could improve further. This approach was employed most recently in the case of Great Britain. But even if Peking were to decide to release some or all of the prisoners, they are likely to do so later rather than sooner, as progress is made in bilateral relations.

Chinese responses, however, are only one element in assessing the usefulness of US initiatives. The options set forth in the first group and most of those listed in the second group are really not dependent on specific moves by Peking. Favorable domestic and world impact or problems relating to Soviet-US relations might make some or all of these options desirable, even in the absence of a clear and favorable Chinese move. The options in the third group, however, generally require some specific and favorable movement on the part of Peking. These responses are listed under the individual options themselves.

Constraints. In taking additional steps toward improved relations with the PRC we must avoid their being misinterpreted by Peking and our allies as indicating US weakness. If so construed, they might stimulate the PRC to step up pressures rather than improve relations. This is especially so in the military sphere. An excessive unilateral reduction of our close-in military presence, for example, could be misunderstood by Peking as meaning we would not resist Communist aggression. It could leave us less prepared to counter such aggression should it occur. And it could undermine the confidence of our allies. Given these uncertainties about Chinese motivation, initiatives which might be considered in the military area should be confined to those which do not detract from essential US and allied military capabilities. Significant changes in the size and nature of our military presence in Asia have already been taken over the past several years. Reductions in the US troop strength in Korea and Southeast Asia, the reduction of base facilities in Japan, the reversion of Okinawa, discontinuance of the Taiwan Strait Patrol, reduction in MAAG China strength, withdrawal of KC-135 tankers from Taiwan, and contemplated reductions in the Philippines present a pattern which, together with the lowered profile called for by the Nixon Doctrine, constitute a major shift in the thrust of our military policy in Asia. Given US specific bilateral commitments to various nations on the periphery of the PRC, as well as the more general commitments expressed in the Nixon Doctrine, further dramatic initiatives in the field of military reductions should not be considered except with all due caution. For example, a sudden drop in the US military presence on Taiwan that exceeded reductions consonant with our withdrawals

from Viet-Nam should probably not be taken in the absence of other justifying circumstances.

An additional constraint exists by virtue of the lack of governmental contact between the US and the PRC. In the case of the USSR, because of the existence of diplomatic relations and the various post-World War II multinational military groups and committees on which both the US and the USSR have been represented, it has been possible to negotiate reciprocal arrangements to dampen risks to vital interests. In the absence of formal US–PRC contacts, initiatives must be unilateral and intentions made apparent by gestures and pronouncements. Such a situation is extremely fragile and is easily subject to misinterpretation. This danger may be reduced to the extent that we are successful in drawing the PRC into government-to-government contacts. US initiatives on the military side which facilitate such contacts, without endangering our essential military capabilities, would therefore be helpful.

The military options in the first and second groups, if taken under the circumstances specified for each, are not expected to produce the various undesirable consequences discussed in this Introduction. Those in the third group should probably not be taken without further review, as is more fully explained below.

[Omitted here are the last two sections of the Introduction (Chirep Implications, and Third Country Reactions), Group I Options, Group II Options, Group III Options, and Annex to Option on Blocked Chinese Assets and U.S. Claims.]

**130. Message From the Premier of the People's Republic of China
Chou En-lai to President Nixon¹**

Beijing, May 29, 1971.

“Premier Chou En-lai sincerely thanks His Excellency President Yahya Khan for most rapidly transmitting the three messages from President Nixon.

“Premier Chou En-lai has seriously studied President Nixon’s messages of April 29, May 17th and May 22nd, 1971,² and has reported with much pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse-tung that President Nixon is prepared to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People’s Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has indicated that he welcomes President Nixon’s visit and looks forward to that occasion when he may have direct conversations with His Excellency the President, in which each side would be free to raise the principal issue of concern to it. It goes without saying that the first question to be settled is the crucial issue between China and the United States which is the question of the concrete way of the withdrawal of all the U.S. Armed Forces from Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area.

“Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the U.S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with high level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary arrangements for President Nixon’s visit to Peking.

“Premier Chou En-lai suggests that it would be preferable for Dr. Kissinger to set a date between June 15 and 20th for his arrival in China, that Peking may be the location and that he may fly direct from Islamabad to a Peking airport not open to the public. As for the flight, he may take a Pakistan Boeing aircraft or a Chinese special plane can be sent to fly him to and from China, if needed. The talks plus the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK’s Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. No classification marking. An identical handwritten copy of this message is attached. It was probably prepared by Hilaly. Kissinger met with Hilaly from 9:06 to 9:24 a.m. on May 31. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) At that time, he apparently made Kissinger aware of the incoming message but did not yet have the actual text. The two men met again on June 2 from 8:10 to 8:30 p.m. (Ibid.) According to a notation on another copy of the message, it was “transcribed from handwritten document handed to HAK by Hilaly, 6–2–71, 8:10 p.m. Taken to Pres.” This version did not include the comments from Yahya at the end of the message. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Material Concerning Preparations for First China Trip by HAK, July 1971)

² See Documents 122, 125, and 126.

flights on both ways will probably take three or four days. If there is the desire to use his own telecommunication equipment on a temporary basis during his stay in Peking he may do so.

“As it is difficult to keep Dr. Kissinger’s trip strictly secret, he may well consider coming for the meeting in an open capacity. If secrecy is still desired the Government of the People’s Republic of China will on its part guarantee the strict maintenance of secrecy. When the talks have yielded results, the two sides may agree to a public announcement to be made after the meeting, if it is so desired.

“As for other details, they may be discussed and arranged through President Yahya Khan directly with the Chinese Ambassador.

“Premier Chou En-lai warmly looks forward to the meeting with Dr. Kissinger in Peking in the near future.”

I³ notice from the above message that the Premier has given an alternative for an open meeting between himself and Dr. Kissinger. Knowing Dr. Kissinger’s desire to maintain strict secrecy which fact I have been impressing upon Premier Chou En-lai, the above message is indicative of the Premier’s acceptance of the secret meeting for which he has given guarantee. The rest will depend upon U.S. and Pakistan maintaining secrecy.

As regards arrangements on our part, I have discussed with the Chinese Ambassador and propose as follows:

- (a) Dr. Kissinger arrives on a D Day
- (b) After a 24 hour stop in Islamabad and a meal with me, he will ostensibly make a trip to a place not open to public in the Northern region. In actual fact, a Pakistan Boeing will carry him along the Northern route direct to Peking up from Islamabad. The time of flight will be approximately seven hours. On completion of the mission, Dr. Kissinger will return to Islamabad to resume his onward journey.

If Dr. Kissinger would find it helpful, I am considering sending a high level Pakistani with him to Peking.

³ “I” refers to Yahya.

131. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

China Trade

The Under Secretaries' Committee (USC) has forwarded at Tab A² its recommendations on direct trade between the United States and the PRC, as you directed in your April 14 decision.³ The agencies have already put into effect the other elements of your decision: visas, shipping, cargoes, bunkering, and foreign assets controls.

U.S. Exports

You will recall that your decision in opening trade with the PRC was to proceed in three stages: Stage I, to establish a trade level below that of U.S. trade with the USSR; Stage II, to place trade with the PRC on a par with the USSR; and Stage III, to go beyond the level of trade with the USSR. (This last would have been via authorizing direct grain shipments to the PRC without requiring that they be shipped on U.S. vessels, as is now necessary for shipments to the USSR and Eastern Europe.) Your purpose was to provide us with an opportunity to assess the reactions of the PRC, the Republic of China, and the Soviets before proceeding to the next stage. The USC list (Tab A1)⁴ is intended to implement Stage I of your decision.

I believe that the list of items USC has recommended for direct U.S.–PRC trade meets your conditions. Its level of trade would be at a level lower than that with the Soviet Union, and there would be a number of significant items which could be added to the China list later. (The excluded items are at Tab A2.) The main differentiation is that the proposed China list leaves out several items which Defense, Commerce

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for action. According to a covering memorandum to Kissinger from Holdridge and Ernest Johnson, with the concurrence of Kennedy, Holdridge and Johnson wrote and then revised this memorandum for the President. (Ibid.)

² Attached but not printed is a 4-page May 13 memorandum signed by Irwin. The full report detailing trade options and a list of non-strategic items are *ibid.*, RG 59, Office of International Policy and Planning, 1969–1971: Lot 72 D 504, NSSM 124.

³ See footnote 3, Document 116.

⁴ The tabs are attached but not printed.

and AEC believed needed further review because of possible military use or of their greater strategic benefit to China's low technological and industrial level. Examples are automatic welding machines for pipe over 19 inches, propellers, agricultural machinery with automatic transmission, cars with four-wheel drive, steam boilers, engines, gas containers, some chemicals, radar, cameras and lenses.

In addition, the USC list would appear to meet another issue which has arisen in connection with direct U.S.–PRC trade: the strong indications we have received that the Chinese will not be interested in such trade if we restrict our exports to them significantly more than exports to the USSR. The USC list contains 95 percent of the items allowed to go freely to the Soviet Union, and this is probably sufficient to make the Chinese feel that they are not being given second class status. If they should get a contrary impression, they would probably state publicly that this was the reason for their not sanctioning trade with the U.S., thereby causing American business interests to criticize you and not the Chinese for the failure of trade to develop.

On the other hand, by accepting the USC list, we should be able to avoid Chinese resentment by making it clear in the first announcements that we are still continuing to consider further additions to the China list, and that we will consider applications for special licenses for items not included on the general license list. Continuation of some differential in favor of the USSR will also help avoid problems with the USSR and Taiwan.

You should know, however, that Secretary Laird does not wish to release the USC list all at once but proposes instead to release it in segments over a period of months contingent on PRC reactions.⁵ In addition, Defense objects to the inclusion of two items, earth moving equipment and railway equipment, on the USC list. I have no particular brief on these items other than to keep the China list close enough to the Soviet list to obviate the difficulties I outlined above. A piecemeal release of the items on the USC list, though, would almost certainly result in a cold reaction from the Chinese. It would also cause delays and throw the question of what to release at any given time back to the inter-agency process.

If you should wish to make even more dramatic your implementation decisions, you could of course decide to go immediately to Stage II of our decontrol program and make the original Chinese general

⁵ Laird's comments on the May 13 draft Under Secretaries memorandum stemmed in large part from recommendations made to him on May 12 by Nutter, Moorer, and John W. Vogt, Director of the Joint Staff. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 76 0197, China (Reds) 092, May)

license list equal to the Soviet general license list without serious security problems, i.e., by adding the items at Tab A2. The Chinese could probably get these goods from other sources in any case. I do not believe it necessary, however, to move at once to the Russian list in view of the ample nature of the Under Secretaries' recommendations with the State additions, provided we release all the items on our list simultaneously.

Grains

The Under Secretaries' Committee, except Defense and Labor, strongly urges that you approve a proposal to add wheat and feed grains to the open general list not only for China, but for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well. Maintenance of this restriction enables Commerce to demand that 50 percent of all shipments be in American bottoms. This eliminates the grain trade with Eastern Europe and will appear absurd with China until we allow U.S. ships to call at Chinese ports. (NSSM 124, Next China Steps,⁶ as it now stands in draft does, however, offer the option of U.S. carriers calling at Mainland China ports, and it is due shortly.) The China trade changes offer a good occasion to eliminate the 50 percent shipping requirement across the board, and it would be a gesture to the USSR.⁷

Grain is one of the principal potential exports from the Free World to China, and it is difficult to explain to U.S. farming interests why we refuse to allow that trade. Liberalization on this point may result in further pressure to relax Eastern European restrictions, and it will certainly increase pressure to allow U.S. ships to call at Chinese ports. The

⁶ See Documents 117 and 129.

⁷ The AFL-CIO and the International Longshoremen's Association opposed any modification of the requirement that at least 50 percent of all grain shipments to Communist countries be carried in U.S.-registered vessels. The President and Kissinger discussed this requirement on June 4. Nixon complained, "It's an archaic provision of law, the 50 percent of American bottoms. The American merchant marine, however, is a relatively, is a very patriotic union in support of other activities and it would be rough as hell." Kissinger replied, "That's true. I think then perhaps individual licenses would be better. Except that then every time we do it, we have hell to pay." Nixon said, "Well, the point is, we just tell them we got it because of the enormous surplus of grain and so forth, we've got to do it for grain, we're going to fight like hell to keep the 50 percent American bottoms for everything else." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, June 4, 1971, 9:42–10:22 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–4) Kissinger, Lord, Jay Lovestone, Director of the Department of International Affairs, AFL-CIO, and Thomas Gleason, President of the International Longshoremen's Association met on June 9. Gleason informed Kissinger that he would instruct the longshoremen not to load any ships involved in grain trade with Communist countries. He added, however, that he did not want to embarrass the President. (Memorandum of conversation, June 9; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 269, Memoranda of Conversation, June 1971)

Labor Department is opposed to relaxation of these controls without first getting union agreement, since the move would antagonize the unions, particularly George Meany, and may result in a refusal by the longshoremen to load grain destined for the Communist countries. Pete Peterson strongly urges a positive grains decision, since it would have very favorable political results in border and agricultural states, and specifically with Senator Dole. Peterson believes the agricultural political aspects outweigh the costs with the unions and that the west coast unions are prepared to load grain.

The Under Secretaries' Committee considered a fallback recommendation—that you include grain on the open list for China even if you do not do so for Eastern Europe, or that you authorize individual licenses for China without the 50–50 requirement. I cannot, however, recommend these fallback positions for they would reinforce suspicions that improvement in China relations is principally aimed against the USSR and would take us right to Stage III in our China control program—better treatment for China than for Russia.

U.S. Imports

The Under Secretaries' Committee has considered three means of controlling U.S. imports from China. The Trading with the Enemy Act, by which we will control these imports, does not allow product differentiation.

Imports from China will face high Smoot–Hawley tariff rates. Cotton textiles will be held down by the long-term textile agreement. Before the U.S. embargo on trade with China, 80 percent of our imports consisted of items such as hog bristles, tung oil, wool, tungsten, feathers, eggs, and menthol. The USC believes that even without controls, our imports from China would take a few years to reach \$100 million though they might eventually reach \$200 million. In view of the nature of China's exports to the Free World—mainly foodstuffs, crude materials, and semi-finished manufactures—the pattern of her shipments to the United States and the potential volume of imports, the Under Secretaries' Committee recommends that you approve the issuance of a general license authorizing all imports from the PRC with an announcement that we may impose a global import restriction in the future should it become necessary.

Other options considered and rejected were that (a) all potential imports be licensed individually by the Treasury Department; and (b) a \$50 million quota be now announced limiting such imports. The Committee rejected these recommendations as unnecessary until we have a better view of developing trade relations and because of the bad precedent that would be established by initiating such a cumbersome bureaucratic procedure.

Further Review and Coordination

The Committee will review the results of your decisions in August and report to you on possible future steps. Meanwhile, the agencies will continue to make additions to the China list in the context of reviews for the Eastern European list and send to you only those items on which there is interagency disagreement. (I believe we can trust Defense to be sufficiently vigilant in this respect.) The agencies will also consider on their merits individual applications for export of items not yet included on the general open license list.

Announcing Your Decision

To obtain maximum domestic and international impact from your decision, we should issue a White House press release along the lines of the one at Tab B. Pete Peterson, however, has written to suggest that we would gain more domestic plaudits by first conferring with interest groups (Tab C). This, however, would open the strong possibility of press leaks.⁸

Recommendations

1. That you accept the Under Secretaries' recommendation on items for the U.S. export list including earth moving and railroad equipment. Pete Peterson concurs.⁹

Approve

Disapprove, prefer the USG list without earth moving and railroad equipment

⁸ Peterson's memorandum is Document 127. Nixon wrote a handwritten comment beside this sentence: "OK—Don't worry about the leaks, they will only help build the story." On June 4 Nixon told Kissinger that he wanted Peterson to confer with interest groups and that a leak would be "useful" in this case in order to build the story over time. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, June 4, 1971, 9:42–10:22 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–4)

⁹ The President initialed his approval. However, in a conversation with Nixon on June 4, Kissinger suggested delaying the approval on earth moving equipment and some other items: "You see, the advantage of not going immediately to the Soviet level is it gives you another story whenever you need it." (Ibid.) Nixon apparently accepted this suggestion, as Holdridge wrote to Kissinger on June 4: "In accordance with your instructions, Ernest Johnson and I went to State this afternoon for a meeting of the Working Group on China Trade List in order to reduce the number of items on the China list significantly below the number on the Soviet list." He added that items cut from the list included earth moving equipment, locomotives, petroleum products, copper products, and railroad signal equipment. He concluded: "We have stressed the need for keeping the reductions in the China list extremely closely held." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII)

Disapprove, prefer to accept USG recommendations but phase the announcements over several months as suggested by Defense

Disapprove, prefer to go immediately to the Soviet level in our Chinese export controls

2. That you approve the addition of grains for open general license export to China and the Soviet Union. Pete Peterson strongly concurs.¹⁰

Approve

Disapprove

Disapprove, open general license to China only _____, or, individual licensing for China without the 50% shipping requirement_____. (I strongly recommend against these last alternatives.)

3. That we announce the licensing of all imports from the PRC under a general license subject to possible future import restrictions should these prove necessary. Pete Peterson concurs.¹¹

Approve

Disapprove, prefer individual licenses, without dollar quota

Disapprove, prefer a global \$50 million limit

4. That we announce the decision via a public release from the White House.¹²

Approve

Disapprove

¹⁰ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of any of the options, but the President wrote: "Pete [Peterson], [George] Shultz—earliest." When discussing this issue on June 4, Nixon and Kissinger felt it unlikely that the Russians or the Chinese would buy significant amounts of grain from the United States. Nixon, however, emphasized that even a small shipment of grain to the PRC would have a major impact among farmers. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, June 4, 1971, 9:42–10:22 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–4)

¹¹ The President initialed his approval.

¹² The President initialed his approval. Kissinger relayed these decisions to Irwin in a June 9 memorandum. (Ibid., RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/U-Sec Memoranda, January 1971) The White House announced the trade policy on June 10. (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 28, 1971, pp. 815–817) Details on the new trade rules are in 36 *Federal Register* 11808. All diplomatic posts were informed in telegram 103604, June 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT 1 CHICOM–US) The Republic of China expressed its dissatisfaction with these measures on June 11, when Ambassador Shen met with Green. (Telegram 104798 to Taipei; *ibid.*)

132. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, June 4, 1971.

President Nixon has carefully reviewed the May 29, 1971, message from Premier Chou En-lai which President Yahya Khan so kindly conveyed. President Nixon looks forward to the opportunity of a personal exchange with the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The President appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou En-lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because of the shortness of time available and the need to arrange a suitable pretext for his travel, Dr. Kissinger now finds it impossible to leave Washington before the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China early on July 9 and leave on July 11, flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft directly to and from an airport to be designated by the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of concern to both countries preliminary to President Nixon's visit to China. Dr. Kissinger will not require his own telecommunication equipment. It is envisaged that four members of his personal staff will accompany him.

President Nixon appreciates the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China is prepared to maintain strict secrecy with respect to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers this essential. Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss a possible communiqué to be issued sometime after his return to the United States.²

President Nixon reciprocates Premier Chou En-lai's anticipation of the meeting between the Premier and Dr. Kissinger. He considers it a hopeful first step in improving relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. No classification marking. Nixon initialed the message, which bears the notation: "5th Draft—handed to Hilaly 5:30, 6/4/71." Kissinger and Hilaly met from 5:50 to 6:47 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² Kissinger wrote the word "joint" in front of the word "communiqué" in this sentence.

**133. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for
International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to
President Nixon¹**

Washington, June 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Textile Negotiations in Taiwan

1. Ambassador Kennedy has reported that U.S. and Taiwan have reached some preliminary understanding on several major portions of a five-year voluntary restraint program for textiles, including a nine percent average growth rate for man-mades and one percent for wool.² However, several very serious points of contention remain (base year figure and trigger mechanism for imports in categories not specifically covered in the agreement). Until they are resolved, the negotiations are at an impasse.

2. Ambassador Kennedy believes there is no give whatsoever in the U.S. industry's position on these issues and there is some strong pressure for the industry representatives to come home. The Chinese also have compelling reasons to be adamant. They see no reason why they should not hold out for something at least as good as Japan is now giving us unilaterally. They are also concerned about being the first of the three Asian countries to voluntarily settle with us unless the terms are advantageous. The Taiwan Government feels it has taken a heavy beating from the U.S. in recent months (oil moratorium, Two-China developments) and that it would lose a great deal more international face if they were to settle for a disadvantageous bargain.

3. Ambassador Kennedy believes we have three alternatives:

(a) Go to Hong Kong and Korea with the agreement as it now stands and with an understanding with Taiwan (which they have agreed to) that they will accept a base year figure and consultation mechanism that those two countries are willing to accept. Ambassador Kennedy rejects this approach since Hong Kong and Korea will know

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 12, President's Handwriting Files. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. This trip was arranged in early May. See Document 121. Overall trade policy toward the nations of East Asia is documented in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV.

² Attached but not printed is a message sent via backchannel by Kennedy to Peterson on June 7. A relatively complete record of the Sino-American textile negotiations is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, Textile Negotiations (cables).

the problem we face with Taiwan and be in a good position to exert leverage on us to give in other areas to get what we need on the base year and the consultation mechanism.

(b) Return home now and admit failure. Ambassador Kennedy believes your prestige is on the line in the textile and footwear issues and that to fail could have very serious domestic and foreign ramifications (he believes the footwear negotiations would collapse if the textile negotiations were called off). While the industry indicates it would rather go home than give any further, he doubts that would be their feeling a few months down the road in the face of totally unrestrained textile imports.

(c) Offer certain concessions to Taiwan. Ambassador Kennedy feels the impasse can be broken without causing disastrous side effects for either our industry or the Taiwan Government. While the Chinese have stressed the importance of certain military items (F-4's for example) Ambassador Kennedy is convinced that the "only" way to resolve the issues is to withhold turning the Senkaku Islands over to Japanese administrative control under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.³

4. Ambassador Kennedy's argument on the Senkaku follows:

"This is a major issue in Taiwan with both domestic and international implications. If the U.S. were to maintain administrative control, it would give the GRC a tremendous public boost since they have expressed themselves so forcefully on the issues. Further, it would be a very direct indication of our continued interest in and support for the GRC—and it would be done at Japan's expense, a point that is vital to our ability to proceed effectively with textile negotiations in Hong Kong and Korea and subsequently in Japan. Announcement of such a decision allows the GRC to save face both at home (it takes the Vice Premier off the hook) and abroad. Taiwan could accept the current textile package in face of Hong Kong and Korean pressure.

"In addition, such an act would, in my opinion, provide a very badly needed shock effect on the Japanese. It would indicate that U.S. acquiescence in all matters requested by the Japanese could no longer be taken for granted.

"I can fully appreciate the opposition which such a proposal will generate in certain quarters of our government. But I feel that this can and must be done. We accepted stewardship of these Islands after World War II. Neither historically nor geographically are they a part of the Ryukyus Chain containing Okinawa. Consequently, the GRC suffers a great loss of face if we allow Japan to gain administrative control of them. Since possession of the Islands is still in dispute, there is every reason for the United States to maintain administrative control until such time as the dispute is settled. Taiwan feels very strongly that

³ See Documents 113, 114, and 115.

once Japan had administrative control there is absolutely no possibility of their ever relinquishing that control. By no means am I suggesting that we hand the islands over to Taiwan. Rather, I am strongly recommending the wisdom of preserving the status quo rather than allowing Japan to assume administrative control with the great loss of face this entails for Taiwan.

"I know of no other action sufficiently important or sufficiently dramatic to resolve our textile problems specifically as well as to pave the way for resolution of several general international trade difficulties. The stakes involved are very high which I fully realize. I realize, too, that only the President can make such a decision. Therefore, I urge you in the strongest possible terms to present to him all the potential benefits and ramifications of my recommendations."

5. Henry Kissinger is looking into the background of the Senkaku Islands dispute and will be able to report to you at our meeting this afternoon on what would be involved in not turning over the Senkaku Islands to Japan at this point.

6. I've just heard from Harry Dent that Roger Milliken called to say the industry is getting very discouraged, and I am trying to get that input prior to our three o'clock meeting.⁴

⁴ Harry Dent was Special Counsel to the President, 1969–1972. Roger Milliken was a textile executive at Deering Milliken, Inc. and a member of the Republican National Finance Committee.

134. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to Ambassador Kennedy, in Taipei¹

Washington, June 8, 1971, 1229Z.

Eyes Only for Amb Kennedy, Taipei from Peter Peterson. After lengthy discussion, the President's decision on the Islands is that the deal has gone too far and too many commitments made to back off

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Secret; Eyes Only.

now.² I showed your wire on this and even reread portion dealing with its importance.³ The President was deeply regretful that he could not help on this, but he felt that the decision was simply not possible. The President has instructed me to tell you that he will send a senior military representative in August to review with GRC in “a favorable and forthcoming way” important defense possibilities.⁴ I’ve explained that this makes final negotiations now very difficult but decision is August visit because of need to do this while Congress is out in August. Not to complicate your life further but I just talked with Roger Milliken who says that industry here was about to decide to ask everyone to come back because deal now being talked about comes up to 2.7 billion over the term, which is half billion up from 2.2 billion or 7-1/2 percent increase worked out here on the 1970 base that Milliken says was the ceiling. Also, Milliken reports Mills will say that he can get deal from other countries similar to Japanese which will work out considerably better than deal you have offered.⁵ Harry Dent and I suspect that Mills may have suggested he will support quota bill as part of his own political objectives. Bryce Harlow confirms from high sources that Mills has made some kind of commitment to support quota bill next spring.

Apparently, the 2.7 billion that industry representatives there agreed to strikes them as too much here in this country and that 2.2 billion was the ceiling.

I have just called Milliken to say that the President would certainly appreciate their staying with us in this effort and if it breaks up now

² Nixon, Kissinger, and Peterson met at Camp David from 3:25 to 4:10 p.m. on June 7. (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to a draft telegram to Rogers by U. Alexis Johnson: “Henry Kissinger stepped into the breach with material that I supplied him, and last night [June 7] obtained the President’s decision that we would not change our position on the Senkakus. However, this points up the heat that GRC is bringing to bear on us and in turn in some degree probably reflects the heat that GRC is feeling on a subject which it neglected for so long.” (*Ibid.*, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Nodis Chrono 1971) Kissinger and Johnson discussed the Senkaku Island issue by telephone on the morning of June 7. Johnson stated: “The principle that we are applying is that we receive the islands from Japan for administration and are returning them to Japan without prejudice to the rights—no position between the two governments on it.” (Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Johnson, June 7, 10:35 a.m.; *ibid.*, Telcons, May–June 1971)

³ See Document 133 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁴ In an October 5 memorandum to Haig, Holdridge wrote that Peterson’s office had contacted him to note that no military assistance mission had been dispatched to Taiwan. He noted, “Given Ambassador Kennedy’s promise to the GRC, and given the doubts likely to be raised in their mind by any considerable postponement of the survey mission, we should move ahead reasonably soon to send a suitable officer to Taiwan.” Haig’s handwritten comment on the bottom of the memorandum reads: “Cripes John—this is dynamite. In any event we should wait till we see how textiles come out.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX)

⁵ Representative Wilbur D. Mills (D–Arkansas) was the ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee.

it would be hard to reconstitute the effort. He said they felt that likelihood is good enough for quota legislation that they would probably take their chances and come home now.

My recommendation is that you tell GRC that deal must be at a volume level that you can get industry to really accept and that this is important enough to us that we will have to review defense and other carrots and sticks in order to achieve it.

Then I would go on and start in other two countries and let GRC stew about potential U.S. actions. If industry says they want to come back to U.S., I'd be inclined to go on anyway and see what it takes in other two countries to get deal industry would accept. I think it would be better if industry would stay but it's not essential. My reasoning is that if you can get deal that sounds reasonable not only to some of the industry but also the public, then I think we are far better off than having appeared to have failed and only Presidential alternative would be to support what could be a disastrous, wide-ranging quota bill on many categories or veto and still lose textile support. If we don't make any deal, it certainly would seem to hurt the President a lot and help political opponents equally. I've explored this with top advisers and all agree that the best deal we can make is a lot better than none at all. Do your best on this basis.⁶ The President deeply appreciates what you are doing.⁷

⁶ On June 7 Kennedy told Chiang Ching-kuo of the decision on the Senkaku Islands. Chiang asked that the U.S. Government categorically state at the time of the signing of the Okinawa reversion agreement that the final status of the islands had not been determined and should be settled by all parties involved. (Backchannel message from Kennedy to Peterson, June 9; *ibid.*, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, Textile Negotiations (cables)) In a June 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Johnson noted that Rogers had raised this issue with Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi at their meeting in Paris on June 9. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Kissinger, Henry, 1971) On June 12 Peterson informed Kennedy, who was in Seoul, that Rogers had approached Aichi, "strongly urging GOJ to discuss issue with GRC prior to signature of Okinawa Agreement on June 17." He also noted that a Department of State spokesman would announce on June 17 that a return of "administrative rights" to Japan of the Senkaku Islands "can in no way prejudice the underlying claims of the Republic of China." (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, Textile Negotiations (cables)) On June 15 Peterson cabled Kennedy, in Seoul, stating that Aichi had met with the ROC Ambassador in Tokyo to discuss the Senkaku issue. (*Ibid.*) On July 12 Chiang Ching-kuo complained to McConaughy that "the Japanese so far have refused to talk in any meaningful way on the subject." (Telegram 3388 from Taipei, July 12; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT)

⁷ An exchange of notes between Rogers and Ambassador Shen on June 29 extended and amended the October 12, 1967, agreement on trade in cotton textiles. See TIAS 6361 (the 1967 agreement), TIAS 7011 (an exchange of notes for an interim agreement signed in late December 1970), and TIAS 7135 (the June 1971 notes). The agreement was further extended and amended in August 1971 (TIAS 7177). A new agreement was reached in December 1971 (TIAS 7249, corrected in TIAS 7469). The United States and the Republic of China were also parties to a multilateral accord on trade in wool and man-made fiber textile products in December 1971 (TIAS 7493 and 7498).

135. Editorial Note

The United States and the People's Republic of China finalized arrangements for the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger's trip with a series of message relayed through the Pakistani Government. Kissinger, Winston Lord, and Ambassador Agha Hilaly met at the White House on June 21 from 6:07 to 6:45 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) At this meeting, Hilaly handed over two notes. First was a June 19 note from Islamabad, written on stationery from the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington:

"My dear Henry: Enclosed is the slip of paper sent to me by President Yahya Khan. The rest of the slip had the following message from him *to me*. 'The above message from Peking seems to clinch the issue finally. Please assure our friend that absolute fool proof arrangements will be made by us and he need have no anxiety on this count. I will be expecting him in Islamabad on July 8—mid-day. Please deliver the above message to him & send me his confirmation & reaction if any.' With my best regards, Yours sincerely, Agha [Khan, President of Pakistan]."

Attached to this note was Premier Chou En-lai's June 11 message to President Nixon:

"President Nixon's message transmitted by President Yahya Khan on June 9, 1971 has been received. Premier Chou En-lai agrees to change the time of Dr. Kissinger's visit to Peking to July 9th to 11th, 1971. The govt of People's Republic of China will make all the necessary arrangements accordingly."

Chou's message was written on plain paper. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK's Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) Kissinger relayed his travel plans to the Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph S. Farland, on June 22. The draft telegram signed by Kissinger reads as follows:

"1. This will bring you up to date on my plans for Pakistan visit which have now firmed up. 2. We plan to surface Asian trip in bureaucracy late this week, and publicly first of next week, building it around three-day stop to Saigon, followed by low-key orientation visit to Bangkok, New Delhi, and Islamabad, plus stopover in Paris to see Bruce on way home. 3. My side trip is now confirmed for July 9–11. 4. My official itinerary as sent to posts will show me arriving in Islamabad mid-day July 8 and departing July 10 afternoon. In response to State cable, you should work with Pakistani Government to arrange official schedule in Islamabad during this period. We will adjust schedule while I am traveling. 5. Other members of my staff with me for

Pakistani stop will be Hal Saunders, John Holdridge, Winston Lord, Dick Smyser, David Halperin and a Secret Service agent. 6. The only other people aware of the side trip are Helms' deputy Karamessines [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. 7. I have told Ambassador Hilaly that because of need for fast communications, further planning for side trip will be through you. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] I will keep Hilaly informed. You should deal only with President Yahya or whomever he personally designates as liaison. 8. You should, of course, remain in Islamabad from now through my visit. I look forward to seeing you. Warm regards." (Ibid.)

An undated telegram in this special series provided more detail on arrangements for Kissinger's trip. The telegram reads in part:

"He [Kissinger] will be accompanied on side trip only by Lord, Holdridge, Smyser and two Secret Service reps. Saunders will stay in Pindi for business there. Halperin will go to Hill Station with Farland and third Secret Service rep, while Saunders stays at Guest House. Two girls in the party, Diane Matthews and Florence Gwyer will be billeted separately. By the time of arrival in Islamabad, all members of the party, with the possible exception of three additional Secret Service men who will presumably be at Embassy, will be witting. Another exception as matters now stand will be Yeoman First Class Charles Radford who will also not be witting."

The telegram also detailed how Kissinger's staff would prevent a doctor from the U.S. Embassy from traveling to the Hill Station during Kissinger's "illness." (Ibid.)

According to a draft telegram prepared by Kissinger's deputy Alexander Haig, on June 28 Kissinger sent another special channel message to Farland:

"When you see Yahya tomorrow to discuss draft itinerary for visit to Pakistan, please ask him to transmit the substance of the following message to the Chinese as soon as possible: 1. U.S. Government wishes the Government of the People's Republic of China to know that it will not answer the Soviet Government with respect to the question of the five power nuclear disarmament conference until Dr. Kissinger has discussed the matter during his forthcoming visit. 2. The U.S. Government will maintain the strictest secrecy with respect to Dr. Kissinger's forthcoming trip regardless of whatever speculation may occur in the U.S. press or elsewhere. 3. During his visit, Dr. Kissinger will be empowered to work out with the Government of the People's Republic of China the substance and form of a possible subsequent announcement of his trip. Warm regards." (Ibid.)

136. Conversation Between President Nixon and the Ambassador to the Republic of China (McConaughy)¹

Washington, June 30, 1971, 12:18–12:35 p.m.

[Omitted here is an exchange of pleasantries and a brief discussion of American relations with Africa, Chile, Turkey, and Iran.]

McConaughy: Am I authorized, Mr. President, to continue telling them that we do not intend our efforts to lower tensions with the Chinese Communists—

Nixon: Our intentions—

McConaughy: And to get some contacts. I mean, we do not intend for those efforts to prejudice the vital interests of the Republic of China. You authorized me to say that about 12 months ago.²

Nixon: I think that's fair enough. Just say that we, that our—as far as the Republic of China is concerned that we have—we know who our friends are. And we are continuing to continue our close, friendly relations with them. As for their vital interests, what you really mean by vital interests, what you mean is, are we going to turn them over to the ChiComs, is that it?

McConaughy: Well—

Nixon: Is that what they're afraid of?

McConaughy: I think they, they'd find—of course that they know we wouldn't do that. I believe they think of that as just general support for their membership in the UN—general international backing of them.

Nixon: We will—we will certainly in the UN. We're not going to support any proposition that would throw them out.

McConaughy: Yeah. Exactly.

Nixon: Now, whether or not we can do what they want to do, which is of course to support the proposition that they stay in the Security Council, that's really—I think we can support them, but it isn't really going to work.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: I mean, if they get in—if they should—and when they—that's why the whole two China thing is so really rather ridiculous,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 532-17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

² McConaughy accompanied Chiang Ching-kuo on his April 1970 visit to the United States. He also returned to Washington during the fall of 1970. No record of a private meeting between him and President Nixon has been found.

even if we eventually have to come to that. But our position will basically be that we support the Republic of China and especially in the UN. We will continue to. We will not support any resolution—our China position will not support any propositions that have the Republic of China put out of the UN.

McConaughy: Yes.

Nixon: We will be strong, steadfast on that point, so that's one. Now when you get into the other areas, we, after all, have a treaty commitment. We won't manage to break our treaties. We are working with them economically, too.

McConaughy: And they're—

Nixon: But we must have in mind, and they must be prepared for the fact, that there will continue to be a step-by-step, a more normal relationship with the other—the Chinese mainland. Because our interests require it. Not because we love them, but because they're there.

McConaughy: Yeah. Precisely.

Nixon: And because the world situation has so drastically changed. This has not been a derogation of Taiwan.

McConaughy: Exactly.

Nixon: And it's done because, as I say, because of very great considerations in other areas.

McConaughy: Yes. Yeah.

Nixon: It's a hard thing to sell.

McConaughy: Yes it's a—

Nixon: I know it's terribly difficult.

McConaughy: Yes. It's tough.

Nixon: They're going to see it in black and white. And they—my personal friendship goes back many years.

McConaughy: It does indeed.

Nixon: They sent the most beautiful gifts to our daughter's [unclear] wedding and so forth. We just—that's the way we're gonna deal with it. The personal considerations here are—we'll put it this way, we're not about to engage in what the Kennedy administration did with Diem. Because they might think that way. Either physically or philosophically, we don't do that to our friends.

McConaughy: Yeah, exactly.

Nixon: You remember that?

McConaughy: Yes. Of course they—

Nixon: The Kennedy administration has Diem's blood upon its hands, unfortunately. That was a bad deal.

McConaughy: Yeah. The President [Chiang Kai-shek] says repeatedly that you are the President, and your administration is the

administration that understands the China issue and really sympathizes with his government, understands its ideals and its aspirations and its role in the world better than any other American president, any preceding administration, and he's unshaken in that view.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. That's why, of course, it causes me great concern that we have to move in this other direction. When I say we have to move, we have to because our failure to move would be—would prejudice our interests in other areas that are overwhelming.

McConaughy: Yes. Exactly.

Nixon: Let us suppose, for example, we require some cooperation in Vietnam. Let's suppose that we could affect other relations—see many, there are different guesses on that—all these things are there.

McConaughy: Yeah. The real crunch on the UN issue is the Security Council seat.

Nixon: Of course it is.

McConaughy: I'm convinced we can keep them in if there's no tender of the Security Council seat to the Chinese Communists. If there is—as of now it looks like they would withdraw.

Nixon: Yeah.

McConaughy: That would mean they're giving up on the thing. They've pretty well convinced themselves they could make a go of it without UN membership.

Nixon: Oh, hell yes. To be perfectly frank with you—

McConaughy: And that would be—

Nixon: To be perfectly frank with you, if I were to be, if I were in their position, and the UN, as I say, the UN moves in that direction, I would just say the hell with the UN. What is it anyway? It's a damn debating society. What good does it do?

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: Very little. [unclear] They talk about hijacking, drugs, the challenges of modern society, and the rest just give hell to the United States. That's all they do.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: No, my views about the UN, I must say, despite publicly I have to go through the usual facade, the act of praising the UN, but it's had it.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: Every sophisticate knows it.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: I mean, it does not serve our interests to put anything up to the UN. As you know, none of our vital interests have ever been submitted to the UN and will never be while I'm here.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: So as far as they're concerned, I think they ought to not give much of a damn what happens in the UN. I don't think it hurts them one bit, but that's for them to decide.

McConaughy: They recognize that it's got a certain psychological importance, I think. They don't want to be isolated—

Nixon: They don't want to be isolated. They don't want to be outside the community of nations.

McConaughy: A sort of a pariah. And they—they're afraid that other countries might use their absence from the UN as sort of a pretext for discriminatory actions against them, even in the trade sector. And there might be some danger of this. For instance, the European Economic Community is rather inclined to exclude Taiwan from the list of preferential countries, the less developed countries that get preferential treatment on import duties. And they're afraid that there'd be an extra argument for the EEC to cut them out if they're not members of the UN. They might say, "Well then, who are they? They don't even have UN status. Why should they go on any sort of a preferential list for concessions?"

Nixon: Uh-huh. Oh, I see.

McConaughy: That sort of thing. They're just afraid that their efforts to keep up their exports might suffer.

Nixon: No, I—

McConaughy: And they've got to export to live, of course.

Nixon: Oh, yes.

McConaughy: And they've been phenomenally successful, as you well know. And that remarkable rate of growth is continuing. Their foreign—total foreign trade last year was greater than that of entire England and China.

Nixon: Yeah. Sure.

McConaughy: Just over \$3 billion, which slightly exceeded the total import and export trade of the Chinese Communists.

Nixon: Just think of that.

McConaughy: Fourteen million [people on Taiwan] against 750 million [people on the mainland]—they had a little larger foreign trade.

Nixon: Well, you can just stop and think of what could happen if anybody with a decent system of government got control of that mainland. Good God.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: There'd be no power in the world that could even—I mean, you put 800 million Chinese to work under a decent system—

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: —and they will be the leaders of the world. The Indians—you could put 200 billion Indians to work, and they wouldn't amount to a goddamn.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: You know, basically they're different kinds of people.

McConaughy: That's right. Yeah.

Nixon: But the Chinese, they're all over Asia. I know. They've got what it takes.

McConaughy: Yeah, with an elected system of government. The one thing that—

Nixon: [unclear]

McConaughy: I'm just back from New York on some trade conference work for the Businessmen's Council for International Understanding, Mr. President. I've assured them that we are well disposed toward continued American investment there. You know—

Nixon: Absolutely.

McConaughy: This very loyal American investment. I've encouraged them to continue. I've told them so far as I know the political climate is going to remain favorable if they can make an independent business judgment, which they must make for themselves. It's good business risk. Then as far as we know, the political climate certainly would argue for their going in. We don't foresee any change there. We anticipate it will be, continue to be a good climate. We're continuing to give our export guarantees there, in concurrence the Ex-Im Bank program has done an awful lot there—wonderful job. Also, the AID guarantees on investments apply—the same as in other countries. So I encouraged them to continue their interest in investment.

Nixon: They should.

McConaughy: I got a very good response.

Nixon: I consider [unclear] a stable country and I certainly would not fault any course but that.

McConaughy: Yeah.

Nixon: But it's a delicate line.

McConaughy: It is.

Nixon: And you're going to have to—we're going to depend on you to be as, you know, as effective as you can be under difficult circumstances to keep them from, well, just throwing up their hands. There isn't anything they can do to us, of course. It isn't that so much. But the point is we take no comfort in seeming to hurt our friends.

McConaughy: Yes.

Nixon: No comfort at all.

McConaughy: Right.

Nixon: But the world is—their's is a very delicate problem.

McConaughy: It's something not to be talked about now, of course, Mr. President, but I conceive of Taiwan as gradually developing its own orbit, separate from that of the mainland.

Nixon: That's what—

McConaughy: And I think this is going to be in our national interest too. We don't need to talk about formal independence now or sovereignty questions. I think we're wise to leave this open.

Nixon: That's right.

McConaughy: In public.

Nixon: That's right. They should—they should go on. I think that's their whole—their whole line of their thinking should be along that line.

McConaughy: Of course, the Generalissimo couldn't come to that now. But someday I think they are going to accept a separate status, independent of the mainland, in a different orbit and a separate status. But Taiwan is a part of the general equilibrium in the Far East, and I think that'd be seriously disturbed, apart from every humanitarian consideration, if the Chinese Communists took it over. It'd be a disaster.

Nixon: If Chinese Communists took it over [unclear].

McConaughy: Yeah. Of course, it'd be a bloodbath, the same as Tibet. But from the geopolitical standpoint it would just change the sensitive equipoise in the area, I think. And I know the Japanese would be greatly disturbed, too.

Nixon: Yep.

McConaughy: The Filipinos would be. And of course with the reversion of Okinawa, the Japanese are all the more sensitive to any change there. I think we've got a real ally in the Japanese. [unclear], they're basically with us.

Nixon: They sign on?

McConaughy: The LDP is. I don't know how the Japanese Socialists would be, if they came into power. They never do. But the LDP is with us.

Nixon: Sure. Sure. Sure. Sure. The Socialists [unclear]. Well, you don't have—there isn't any more delicate assignment, or I must say, as events unfold here, any one that will be more difficult than yours. And I just wish you the best. It's just one of those things, as I say. I look around the world, and you have to deal sometimes with a bunch of damn bandits. We do. And we're dealing with bandits, thugs, international outlaws, and so forth. But sometimes you have to because our interests are so deeply involved. With the Soviet—they're really a despicable [unclear], but you've got to deal with them.

McConaughy: That's right.

Nixon: You've got to talk with them.

McConaughy: Yeah. And we've got a complex interplay here—the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. They've obviously got very mixed feelings about the prospective entry of ChiComs into the UN. They don't really want it, but they think they've got to give lip service.

Nixon: Sure.

McConaughy: I guess they'll vote for the—

Nixon: Oh sure.

McConaughy: —resolution, they don't really want it.

Nixon: Boy, they just love sitting there with them. That'd be the worst thing that [unclear].

McConaughy: Well, you know that I will use every resource in my power, Mr. President, to keep them confident and reassured. [Unclear exchange]. You've given me a lot to work with.

Nixon: Well, I can't say much more to be quite—just say as little as you can. Reassure them. But on the other hand, they have a friend, but we have to continue our other thing for other reasons that have nothing to do with our friendship with Taiwan.

[Omitted here are goodbyes and a gift presentation to McConaughy.]

137. Memorandum for the President's File¹

Washington, July 1, 1971.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between President, Dr. Kissinger and General Haig, Thursday, July 1, Oval Office

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Paris Peace Talks.]

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical Files, China, China Trips, July 1971 Briefing Notebook. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig met from 9:18 to 9:52 a.m. and from 9:54 to 10:26 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

The President next turned to Dr. Kissinger's proposals for discussion with representatives of the People's Republic of China during his forthcoming side visit to Peking.² The President stated that the communiqué resulting from the visit should not include names and that in his view the President noted that the position which Dr. Kissinger proposed to take was not strong enough, that it was far too forthcoming and that he wished him not to indicate a willingness to abandon much of our support for Taiwan until it was necessary to do so.

The President emphasized that the issue of "one China vs. two Chinas" should be mentioned only once in the conversation rather than threaded throughout it as in the present text. He stated that with respect to United Nations representation Dr. Kissinger should specifically ask for the Chinese viewpoint. Concerning the section on Vietnam the President suggested that it be reduced in length and tightened considerably.

The President stated that during the discussions he felt it was important for Dr. Kissinger to emphasize more clearly to the Chinese the threat of Japan's future orientation. He pointed out that Dr. Kissinger should state that the Chinese must recognize that a number of nations are concerned about Asia, particularly the role of Japan in the event the United States leaves. In the case of Japan it is obvious that they have both the ability, resources, and know-how to rebuild their military in a precipitous fashion and that a total disengagement of the United States or a misapplication of forces in the area could result in a resurgent Japanese bellicosity with considerable danger for all.

The President stated that he wanted a somewhat heavier emphasis on the Soviet threat. Dr. Kissinger replied that this issue would have to be handled gingerly and that the Chinese might report what was said to the Soviets. The President agreed but stated that the way to handle this was to refer to facts rather than U.S. interpretation of these facts. For example he should tell the Chinese that we note that there are more Soviet divisions on the Chinese border than those arrayed

² Reference is to a briefing book prepared for Kissinger's trip. Nixon's comments here closely match his handwritten notes on the cover of the briefing book: "Put in fear RN could turn hard on V. Nam. Play up our possible move toward Soviets. Not Ottawa. Leave out names on Communiqué (Agnew, Laird). Don't be so forthcoming on Taiwan—until necessary. Prior to summit: V. Nam, grain or other trade, POW in China. V. Nam too long. Put in more fears re Japan. Summit: Businesslike, Shanghai, limit entertainment. Press: Very small delegation. Limit press to TV + wires. We pick them. Limit political visitors." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Briefing Book for the President, July 1971)

against all of the NATO pact countries. He should refer to this as reports in the press.

The President summarized by stating that in his discussions with the Chinese Dr. Kissinger should build on three fears: (1) fears of what the President might do in the event of continued stalemate in the South Vietnam war; (2) the fear of a resurgent and militaristic Japan; and (3) the fear of the Soviet threat on their flank.

The President stated that prior to a summit certain accomplishments should be arrived at between the two governments. First, the release of all U.S. POWs held in China. Second, at least some token shipments of U.S. grain to Communist China. Third, some progress on the Vietnam war issue. Four, we might conclude, as the outcome of a summit, the establishment of a hotline between the two governments and some kind of agreement on the issue of accidental nuclear war.

Finally the President stated Dr. Kissinger should make it very clear to the Chinese that we expected them to institute a severe limit on political visitors prior to any summit with President Nixon. Following that summit visits of any kind would, of course, be authorized.

The President then returned to the subject of Taiwan and the treatment of it in the discussions with the Chinese. He told Dr. Kissinger to tone down any reference to the fact that Vice President Agnew and Secretary Laird had cancelled their trips. He emphasized that the discussions with the Chinese cannot look like a sellout of Taiwan. He instructed Dr. Kissinger not to open up with a discussion on what we've done and the fact that we will not need troops there forever, but rather to restructure that point by emphasizing that the Nixon Doctrine provides for help to those nations who help themselves and thus it will not be essential for our military presence to remain in some areas forever. The President stated that the overall statement with respect to Taiwan should be somewhat more enigmatic.

The President asked Dr. Kissinger not to mention the Truman 1950 statement with which he personally did not agree.³ In sum, the President asked him to review the entire discussion of the Taiwan issue so that we would not appear to be dumping on our friends and so that we would be somewhat more mysterious about our overall willingness to make concessions in this area.

³ President Truman made several major statements about Taiwan in 1950, including his January 5 news conference, a June 27 statement, and a September 1 speech. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, pp. 11–12, 492, and 613) In the first statement, Truman emphasized that Taiwan is part of China, while in the latter two (after the start of the Korean War) he suggested that its status had not yet been determined.

With respect to future meeting places between the two governments, President Nixon stated that he preferred London where communications would be secure and where the size of the city added to the kind of security that would be necessary. He instructed Dr. Kissinger to refer to London as our first choice. Warsaw would be best for diplomatic contacts, but above all, Ottawa would be unacceptable to the President.

Again concerning Taiwan the President made the point that six thousand of our troops in Taiwan were directly related to our conduct of the war in South Vietnam so that as that issue was solved the requirement for these troops would disappear.

The President stated that the section on Korea was exceptionally well done.

[Omitted here is a brief concluding discussion of the Paris Peace Talks.]

138. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brewster) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

Arms Control Discussions Between Non-Official U.S. and Chinese Experts

Last year the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency examined a variety of possible arms control initiatives which might be taken toward the People's Republic of China.² Many of these proposals were further studied and have been incorporated in NSSM 124,³ among them a suggestion that some neutral organization be approached with a view to encouraging meetings between unofficial American and Chinese

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, EA/PRCM Files: Lot 74 D 400, DEF 18, Arms Control, 1971. Secret. Drafted by Brown and Farley who forwarded the first draft of this memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State on June 9; revised by Veliotes; and cleared in substance by Rogers, Irwin, and Spiers.

² See footnote 4, Document 96.

³ See Document 129.

experts, similar to the early Pugwash sessions. Earlier this year we suggested that the Romanians urge China's attendance at a Pugwash session this summer.⁴ Although the reply was somewhat ambiguous, the Romanians have informed us that the PRC will probably not attend.

Dr. Jack Ruina of MIT, who is a member of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament and has broad knowledge of U.S. arms control policy, will be working with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute from now until early August. If we were to wish to implement the recommendation in NSSM 124, ACDA and the Department propose that we take this opportunity to have Dr. Ruina suggest that the Institute extend invitations to U.S. and Communist Chinese experts to meet in the summer of 1972 in Stockholm. We believe Dr. Ruina would be willing to make such a suggestion at our request. We would make the request by having a member of the SALT delegation in Helsinki who knows Dr. Ruina well travel to Stockholm to talk to him.

In order to increase the chances of acceptance by the PRC, we would authorize Dr. Ruina to indicate to the Swedes that there is official U.S. government sanction for such a conference, making clear, however, that at any such meeting attendance from our side would be restricted to non-governmental specialists. We would leave to the Swedes the question of what other nations, if any, were invited to participate.

We would appreciate receiving your early views on our proposal.⁵

Charles F. Dunbar⁶

⁴ See Documents 96 and 109.

⁵ Haig's July 27 response to Eliot is attached. It reads in its entirety: "We believe that the proposed action in your memorandum, dated July 3, 1971, is not appropriate at this time. The proposal may be appropriate at a later date after we have seen the trend of other related negotiations and after we have a more complete understanding of future United States policy in Asia." Nonetheless, on August 3 Farley followed up with a memorandum to Kissinger on China and arms control. He stated that ACDA was studying ways to include the PRC in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and other venues. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VIII)

⁶ Dunbar signed for Brewster over Brewster's typed signature.

139. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and Americas Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
One Other Chinese Official, and Deputy Chief of Protocol
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
Chinese Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

PM Chou: There is special news this afternoon—you are lost. (Premier Chou offers cigarettes to the American party.) No one wants one? I have found a party that doesn't smoke.

First of all, I would like to welcome you, especially as Dr. Kissinger is the special representative of the President.

Dr. Kissinger: It is a great pleasure to be here. I have looked forward a long time to this opportunity.

PM Chou: As Chairman Mao Tse-tung has already spoken about this to Edgar Snow, there is no need to elaborate. I believe you have first-hand knowledge of this article by now.²

Dr. Kissinger: I read it with great attention.

PM Chou: You do not know Mr. Edgar Snow?

Dr. Kissinger: I have never met him.

PM Chou: Thirty-five years ago he became a friend with us. Now he is an old friend. He is considered an old man in your country now, over 60, I believe 65.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK Visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the "Chinese Government Guest House." According to three memoranda from Lord to Kissinger (July 29, August 6, and August 12), these transcripts were prepared by Holdridge, Smyser, and Lord. Kissinger initialed Lord's memoranda to indicate approval of the transcripts. (Ibid., Box 1033, Files for the President—China Material, China Memcons & Memos—Originals July 1971)

² See Document 103.

Dr. Kissinger: I have read his books with great interest, and all his articles. I read the book in which he recounted his long conversation with the Premier.

PM Chou: I was the first to see him. The most important point is his conversation with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and we read those that had been published.

PM Chou: It seems to me that in 1936 when he left China and went back to the U.S. to write an article, his first article was published in *LIFE*. This time it is also in *LIFE*.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is in *LIFE* magazine. The article of him with Mao Tse-tung has been widely read, particularly by President Nixon, who read it with the greatest attention.

PM Chou: Of course not all his works were so accurate, because they were written in the manner of conversation. Certain points were not so accurate, and in individual places were wrong. It is basically correct.

Dr. Kissinger: President Nixon has asked me to convey his sincere greetings both to you and Chairman Mao. He looks forward warmly to visiting Peking personally in the not too distant future.

PM Chou: We thank His Excellency, the President, for his kind attention, and I believe that this desire will be able to be fulfilled eventually through exchanges of our opinions.

Dr. Kissinger: We expect that.

PM Chou: According to our custom, we first invite our guest to speak. Besides, you already have prepared a thick book.³ Of course, later on we will give our opinions also.

Dr. Kissinger: It is most unusual for me to have written notes. However, because of the importance of this occasion and because I wanted President Nixon to see what I would say, I have taken the liberty to write out certain of my comments.

PM Chou: Please.

Dr. Kissinger: As I have already pointed out to you, President Nixon has asked me to convey to you and Chairman Mao his high personal regards. He looks forward to meeting with the leaders of the People's Republic of China personally to exchange ideas.

PM Chou: We thank His Excellency, the President, for his regards. As Chairman Mao has already said, we welcome President Nixon to our country for a visit, no matter whether he comes as President or as a private person. Of course, he now is still in his capacity as President.

³ Apparent reference to the briefing books prepared by the NSC staff. See footnote 2, Document 137.

Dr. Kissinger: He expects to remain there for some time.

PM Chou: That's good.

Dr. Kissinger: The President asked that this mission be secret until after we meet, so we can meet unencumbered by bureaucracy, free of the past, and with the greatest possible latitude.

PM Chou: You don't like bureaucracy either.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and it's mutual; the bureaucracy doesn't like me.

PM Chou: Do you know that some people call me the dictator of bureaucracy and warlords?

Dr. Kissinger: But that has been strongly overcome. For us this meeting.

PM Chou: Perhaps you did not understand. Do you know who said that?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: You have not read the articles and documents printed by our northern neighbor?

Dr. Kissinger: They tell us so many things about you that we can't follow them all.

PM Chou: This is a very outstanding article, a recent title.

Dr. Kissinger: For us this is an historic occasion. Because this is the first time that American and Chinese leaders are talking to each other on a basis where each country recognizes each other as equals. In our earlier contacts we were a new and developing country in contrast to Chinese cultural superiority. For the past century you were victims of foreign oppression. Only today, after many difficulties and separate roads, have we come together again on a basis of equality and mutual respect. So we are both turning a new page in our histories.

We are here today, brought together by global trends. Reality has brought us together, and we believe that reality will shape our future.

Because this is the beginning of our discussions, let me generally state our general approach towards the People's Republic of China.

We consider that the People's Republic of China, because of its achievements, tradition, ideology, and strength, must participate on the basis of equality in all matters affecting the peace of Asia and the peace of the world. We consider it in our interest, and above all in the interest of the world, that you play your appropriate role in shaping international arrangements.

We realize, of course, that there are deep ideological differences between us. You are dedicated to the belief that your concepts will prevail. We have our own convictions about the future. The essential question for our relations is whether both countries are willing to let history judge who is correct, while in the interval we cooperate on matters

of mutual concern on a basis of mutual respect and equality and for the benefit of all mankind.

Mr. Premier, I see two principal purposes for our meetings today and tomorrow. First, as Chairman Mao and you have suggested, we should work out satisfactory understandings concerning a visit to China by President Nixon, a visit which he intends to make and to which he looks forward. I am authorized to settle all matters concerning such a visit, including its nature, time, and other details; the manner in which the meeting should be prepared; the subjects to be discussed; the possible outcome; and as well, a possible communiqué when I have returned to the U.S.

Secondly, to make President Nixon's visit the success we want it to be, we should lay the groundwork by discussing issues between us, our mutual concerns in Asia, and the peace of the world.

Among the topics I believe we should cover are the following:

—Taiwan, which, from the exchange of notes between us, we know to be your principal concern in relations between us.⁴ Mr. Premier, you have defined this as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. I am prepared to hear your views and to discuss the matter practically.

—Indochina, which is currently the major area of conflict and tension in Asia.

—Relations with other major countries, for example, the Soviet Union and Japan, which of course will certainly affect the future peace of the world.

—The situation in the South Asian subcontinent, which involves many outside countries.

—Establishment between us of a secure channel of communications which is not dependent on the goodwill or the upheavals in third countries, and which is entirely within the control of our two leaders.

—Issues of arms control, such as the recent proposal for a five power conference, on which we have delayed our reply until we could have the benefit of the views of the Premier.

—Any other topics which the Chinese side would care to raise.

In discussing these matters, Mr. Premier, I will be absolutely candid with you, because I want to make sure that if we disagree, it will be in full knowledge of each other's point of view, and because I hope with full candor we will come closer to an agreement.

As a close associate of President Nixon, I am authorized to explain to you fully what our interests are in major areas of the world and areas of policy, and I hope you will feel free to raise any issue with me.

⁴ See, for example, Document 130.

I need not add that any assurances made in this channel will be honored absolutely.

We will have an opportunity to discuss in detail all of these issues, but there's one issue which I know from the statement of the Premier is very much on your mind, which I would like to take the liberty of raising now.

I know you are concerned about collusion, or what you call collusion, of other countries against you. Let me say now that we will never collude with other countries against the People's Republic of China, either with our allies or with some of our opponents. Of course, you may believe that the objective consequences of our actions will bring about collusion, no matter what we say. But we will consciously strive to avoid this.

It is the conviction of President Nixon that a strong and developing People's Republic of China poses no threat to any essential U.S. interest. It is no accident that our two countries have had such a long history of friendship.

To make these thoughts concrete, President Nixon has authorized me to tell you that the U.S. will not take any major steps affecting your interests without discussing them with you and taking your views into account.

I hope while I am here to arrange for a channel which will enable us to communicate directly and secretly. We are prepared to set up communications comparable to those that link us to other major countries of decision, and other means of communication which will enable us to explain our views to each other better.

I am authorized to discuss with you negotiations in which we are engaged with some of your neighbors which you believe may affect your interests.

Both our countries face a difficult task as we move to formalize these contacts. I know that we must both be true to our basic principles, because neither of us can play a responsible world role or build a lasting peace if we abandon our principles.

My colleagues and I look forward to our conversations here with warm anticipation and a keen awareness of the responsibilities we share.

Many visitors have come to this beautiful, and to us, mysterious, land.

PM Chou: You will find it not mysterious. When you have become familiar with it, it will not be as mysterious as before.

Dr. Kissinger: All have departed with new perspectives, and a few have left some modest contributions behind.

We have come to the People's Republic of China with an open mind and an open heart. We hope that when we leave we may have contributed to sowing seeds from which will grow peace between our countries, peace in this region, and peace in this world.

Thank you.

PM Chou: I thank you for the statement you have made at the beginning and for your general explanations of U.S. policy. Before you came, we had already received a message from the NSC Chief of Gen. Yahya Khan, who told us you were coming here with a frank and sincere attitude and wanted to have serious discussions with us. We welcome this attitude. We come with the same attitude, and we are ready to explain our opinions frankly. It is very clear that the world outlook and stands of our two sides are different. As you just said, each side has its own convictions, and we both believe our ideas will become reality. But this shouldn't hinder our two countries on the two sides of the Pacific Ocean seeking what you mentioned—a channel for co-existence, equality, and friendship.

The first question is that of equality, or in other words, the principle of reciprocity. All things must be done in a reciprocal manner. I agree with what you just said—the Chinese and American peoples are friendly toward each other. This was true in the past and will be true in the future. Recently, we invited the U.S. table tennis delegation to China—perhaps you met some of them—and they can bear witness that the Chinese people welcomed this visit of the American people. We have also received many repeated invitations from the U.S. Table Tennis Association to send a delegation to the U.S. We feel this shows that the U.S. people want to welcome the Chinese people.

Dr. Kissinger: We have talked to Mr. Steenhoven.⁵

PM Chou: He recently sent us a cable.

But the question of friendship between the Chinese and American people began to be discussed very early after New China appeared. In 1955, at the Bandung Conference, I answered questions put to me by some American correspondents on relations with the U.S. But later, due to various factors, it was not possible to continue the exchanges which began from this time. Perhaps Your Excellency knows the reason why. Later on, beginning from August 1, 1955, representatives of our two governments sat down for negotiations.

⁵ On April 21 Graham D. Steenhoven, President of the United States Table Tennis Association, met with President Nixon in the Oval Office. Scali prepared a 2-page April 23 memorandum for the President's file that reported on this meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 84, Memoranda for the President)

Our meetings have gone on for almost 16 years now. We have met 136 times, but there's still no result.⁶ Just as you have now mentioned, it's not so easy to bring about results through official negotiations. This is not solely because the negotiations are official, because these today are official; it is whether there is an intention to solve problems. This is the crux.

You just now mentioned the objectives of your present mission. Your first objective is also linked to your second objective, because your second objective is to engage in a preparatory exchange of views in order to bring our basic stands closer together and make them favorable for resolution.

Just now you mentioned seven issues. Of course, we are not limited to seven because we can each put forward what we like. That was your seventh point. You said that you brought with you the desire of your President to make it possible for our views to a certain extent to come closer, and so be beneficial to a settlement. This is a different situation than that in which the Ambassadorial talks began first at Geneva and later in Warsaw. At that time the U.S. Ambassador always said he would like first to settle the small questions one at a time so that we could gradually come closer. We consistently said that only the settlement of fundamental questions first could lead to the settlement of other questions. Therefore, our stands were always different.

However, since President Nixon came into office he has expressed a willingness to settle fundamental questions with us. From the very beginning, he took the attitude that he was willing to come to Peking to meet us, either to send his special envoy or to come himself.

Of course, after he expressed this opinion there was a cessation of contacts for a period of time. As you know, one reason was last year's Cambodian incident, and this year there was the Route 9 battle. This could not but affect our contacts.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree. That is why I wanted the opportunity to express our views concerning peace in Indochina, so that these differences can be settled, both in Indochina and in our relationship.

PM Chou: That's your second item, that's true. I think that as we are beginning to exchange ideas today, we can put forward all kinds of questions. One item can be expanded to link up with other items in a wider field and we can express clearly the stands and views of each side.

The first question is Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger has put forward views very frankly and we will express our own ideas.

⁶ Reference is to the Warsaw talks.

Dr. Kissinger: I have quoted from a communication from Prime Minister Chou which may account for my uncharacteristic clarity.

PM Chou: You mentioned that the meeting today is an historic occasion. Of course a still greater historic occasion would be if President Nixon comes to China and meets Chairman Mao Tse-tung. That would be an historic occasion, if we could solve problems. Of course, we can begin today to create the atmosphere, because as you mentioned, our two separate roads meet each other. On the other hand, we would like to settle on the basis of equality.

Therefore, the question of Taiwan becomes one regarding which we cannot but blame your government. Of course, you are not responsible for this, and you may say that President Nixon wasn't responsible for it either.

As for the U.S. Government, however, I must say a few words. I will not mention the old meetings in China in which U.S. representatives participated, because this is too long ago. Dean Acheson's White Paper⁷ shows what happened more clearly than anything else, and shows that it was the Chinese people themselves who won their own liberation, who liberated our motherland, and drove away the reactionary rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. At that time, the U.S. Government considered this an internal affair of China. This was during the period of 1949 to the beginning of 1950. By then, Taiwan was already restored to the motherland, and China was that motherland. The U.S. stated then that it had no territorial ambitions regarding Taiwan or any other Chinese territories. And, therefore, the U.S. declared that it wouldn't interfere in China's internal affairs and would leave the Chinese people to settle internal questions.

This attitude was proclaimed in all your documents of that time, although some documents adopted an attitude hostile to us—you wouldn't agree that the Chinese Communist Party was leading a new China, but you couldn't do anything about it. Therefore, you made a statement that you would not interfere in China's internal affairs.

Within a short period afterwards, the Korean war broke out and you surrounded Taiwan and declared the status of Taiwan was still unsettled. Even up to the present day the spokesman of your State Department still says that this is your position.⁸ That is the crux.

Dr. Kissinger: He hasn't repeated it! (Considerable laughter from the Chinese side.)

⁷ *United States Relations With China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949* (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1949).

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 121.

PM Chou: If this crucial question is not solved, then the whole question will be difficult to resolve. We are two countries on two sides of the Pacific Ocean, yours with a history of 200 years, and ours with a history of only 22 years, dating from the founding of New China. Therefore, we are younger than you. As for our ancient culture, every country has it—the Indians in the U.S. and Mexico, the Inca Empire in South America, which was even more ancient than China. It's a pity that their scriptures were not preserved, but were lost. With respect to China's long history, there's one good point, the written language, which contains a heritage of 4,000 years based on historical relics. This is beneficial to the unification and development of our nation. But there's also a weak point. Our symbolic language of ideograms restricted our development. You might think that these are all idle words, but they are not. They show that we know our objective world and we can coolly appraise it.

History also proves that Taiwan has belonged to China for more than 1000 years—a longer period than Long Island has been a part of the U.S. In the middle (*sic*) of this period Taiwan was temporarily grabbed away by Japan when China was defeated in the war. It was returned to China in the Cairo and Tehran Declarations, and by the Japanese surrender. Both Acheson's White Paper and Truman's statement serve as evidence to that.

Therefore, in recognizing China the U.S. must do so unreservedly. It must recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and not make any exceptions. Just as we recognize the U.S. as the sole legitimate government without considering Hawaii, the last state, an exception to your sovereignty, or still less, Long Island. Taiwan is a Chinese province, is already restored to China, and is an inalienable part of Chinese territory.

This leads us to the second question: The U.S. must withdraw all its armed forces and dismantle all its military installations on Taiwan and in the Taiwan Straits within a limited period. This is the natural logic of the matter.

Of course, the treaty between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek which was signed by Dulles in 1954 is considered to be illegal by the PRC and Chinese people, and we do not recognize it. So speaking of the Taiwan question, this is crucial. I would like to know your opinion so we can exchange views.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to ask the Prime Minister how he proposes to proceed. We can do it in one of two ways—each stating the problems which concern us, reserving its answers until later, or proceeding with the issues one at a time. Which do you prefer?

PM Chou: What is your opinion?

Dr. Kissinger: I have no strong opinion. One possible way is that since Prime Minister Chou has stated his views on Taiwan, we could state our views on Indochina. Then I could tell him of my reaction to his statement on Taiwan, and he could tell me of his reaction to mine on Indochina. Or we could take each issue one at a time.

PM Chou: Either way, it's your decision. You can say whatever you like. You could speak first on the Taiwan question or Indochina, or together, because you may think they are linked.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe they are linked to some extent. But why don't I give a brief reply to your comments on Taiwan and then speak about Indochina, after which we can have an extended discussion of both.

PM Chou: That's agreeable.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me then make a few comments first about Taiwan, and then perhaps say a few things about Indochina.

I agree with a great deal of the historical analysis presented by Prime Minister Chou. There's no question that if the Korean war hadn't occurred, a war which we did not seek and you did not seek, Taiwan would probably be today a part of the PRC. For reasons which are now worthless to recapitulate, a previous Administration linked the future of Korea to the future of Taiwan, partly because of U.S. domestic opinion at the time. Whatever the reason, a certain history has now developed which involves some principles of foreign policy for us.

I have noticed that the Prime Minister in his remarks here went beyond some of the communications we have previously exchanged. Both in these communications and in our Warsaw meetings he has spoken of withdrawing military presence and installations from the area of Taiwan and the area of the Taiwan Strait. Today he has spoken also of certain official political declarations.

PM Chou: This was because in order to exchange opinions one must give the entire opinion on the matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. I am not saying this critically, but simply to divide the matter into two parts—first, the military situation in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, and second, the question of political evolution between Taiwan and the PRC.

PM Chou: This differs from our opinion. We hold that our relations with Taiwan is a question of China's internal affairs. We have consistently repeated this in the Warsaw talks and in all our open declarations we have also maintained this same consistent stand. What I was speaking of just now, that if relations are to be established between our two countries, China and the United States, the United States must recognize that the PRC is the sole legitimate government in China and

that Taiwan Province is an inalienable part of Chinese territory which must be restored to the motherland. Under these circumstances, the U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek Treaty would not exist.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand what you have said with respect to the problem of diplomatic relations. Let me talk about Taiwan in our relations in the immediate present in the absence of diplomatic relations.

First, let me say some things about our military presence and then let me say something, in the frankness that these talks permit, about how we see future relations between Taiwan and the PRC as we see objective reality. I am not talking about the formalities of diplomatic relations for the time being.

First, about our military presence, which was the first point the Prime Minister raised with us in his communications and also in the two Warsaw talks that took place in our Administration. We have demonstrated our general intentions with a number of symbolic steps. For example, we have ended the Taiwan Strait Patrol, removed a squadron of air tankers from Taiwan, and reduced the size of our military advisory group by 20 percent. I know this is not your principal point, and I only mention it to show the general direction of our intentions.

Our military presence in Taiwan at this moment is composed of two elements, the two-thirds of it which is related to activities in other parts of Asia, and the one-third of it which is related to the defense of Taiwan. We are prepared to remove that part related to activities other than to the defense of Taiwan, that's two-thirds of our force (I have the detailed numbers here in case you would like to hear them) within a specified brief period of time after the ending of the war in Indochina. We are prepared to begin reducing our other forces on Taiwan as our relations improve, so that the military questions need not be a principal obstacle between us. I may say, incidentally, that these are personal decisions of President Nixon which have not yet been discussed with our bureaucracy or with Congress, and so should be treated with great confidence.

As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a "two Chinas" solution or a "one China, one Taiwan" solution. As a student of history, one's prediction would have to be that the political evolution is likely to be in the direction which Prime Minister Chou En-lai indicated to me. But if we want to put the relations between our two countries on a genuine basis of understanding, we must recognize each other's necessities.

PM Chou: What necessities?

Dr. Kissinger: We should not be forced into formal declarations in a brief period of time which by themselves have no practical effect. However, we will not stand in the way of basic evolution, once you

and we have come to a basic understanding. That is all I want to say now in a general way, but I would be glad to answer questions.

PM Chou: It's quite clear that in the relations between our two countries that Taiwan is the crucial issue. We have said this more than once in the Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. And we have said that the matter is not only the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but also the basic relations between our two countries. Taiwan must be regarded as a part of China. The solution of the question must follow in order to find a way out. In our messages, we've also reiterated this, that Taiwan is a province of China.

With respect to what you have just now said, that is, your opinions on historical evolution and that you do not advocate a "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" solution, which you just now clearly expressed, this shows that the prospect for a solution and the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries is hopeful.

Dr. Kissinger: This depends, Mr. Prime Minister, on the situation of reality and in what time frame. The principles I mentioned are principles of our Administration and you can count on them. The timing of political steps will have to be discussed between us. The easier task will be the military steps than the other steps which will require a little more time.

PM Chou: There are two questions I would like to clarify. I see the necessity for a period of time, but the time that is left for President Nixon is limited. And as a close associate of him, you must be quite clear about this point.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the Prime Minister's estimate of the time left to President Nixon?

PM Chou: I see two stages. The first is one and a half years, and the second, if he is re-elected, five and a half years. This would take us to the 200th anniversary of your country.

Dr. Kissinger: Which time period is the Prime Minister talking about, five and a half years or one and a half years?

PM Chou: When your President comes to discuss matters with Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the conclusion could be drawn that when he comes he will answer that question. Because neither the U.S. nor the Chinese people would oppose the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of equality and reciprocity despite an estrangement of 22 years. But now a time to solve the question has come. Neither of the two questions are of the President's making, but if this issue is solved, it will be one of the factors relating to his re-election. Of course, there are many factors, and precisely because of this we welcome President Nixon and you to come.

Dr. Kissinger: Our policy with respect to the People's Republic of China has nothing to do with the President's re-election, but is related to

his lifetime conviction that there cannot be peace without the participation of the PRC. These decisions we make on the basis of the permanent interests of the U.S. and not the personal interest of President Nixon.

PM Chou: Of course, the President's policy should be established on the basis of equality, in which each treats the other as an equal, and just as you mentioned, we should promote matters in that direction.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to ask the Prime Minister a question, before making an observation. Is the Prime Minister linking a meeting between the President and Chairman Mao Tse-tung to the prior establishment of diplomatic relations, or can the two be separated?

PM Chou: This is not absolute. Of course it should be discussed. If time is needed, it may not necessarily be solved then. However, the general direction should be established.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

PM Chou: This should make their discussions easier. If you say that you need some time, we can understand.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me give the Prime Minister my personal estimate of what is possible. We can settle the major part of the military question within this term of the President if the war in Southeast Asia is ended. We can certainly settle the political question within the earlier part of the President's second term. Certainly we can begin evolution in that direction before.

PM Chou: Can't the matter of a military withdrawal from Indochina be settled at the most by next year? You just came from Saigon.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you mean from Vietnam or from Taiwan?

PM Chou: I was speaking of Indochina now. You just now mentioned that a settlement of the political part should be later.

I must clarify one point on another matter. What is the attitude of your government toward the so-called Taiwan Independence Movement?

Dr. Kissinger: The Taiwanese? We would not support this.

PM Chou: Was it supported by a part of the people of the U.S. Government, that is, by CIA or the Pentagon?

Dr. Kissinger: There is an exaggerated opinion in the minds of people in many parts of the world about the abilities of CIA. The only two countries where there have been revolutions in Asia in the last ten years were ones where we had no CIA—Indonesia and Cambodia. For your part, you might call these revolutions "counter-revolutions." There was no CIA, unbelievable as that may sound to you.

PM Chou: This was possibly so in Indochina, which I know is one of the places the President is most interested in, but I don't believe it can be said about Cambodia. We can talk about this later.

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps we can talk socially about it at dinner. I believe it might be to some advantage to us to maintain CIA's bad reputation (laughter from Chinese).

PM Chou: I attach great importance to what you have just now said: the U.S. government and the President do not support, and will not support, the so-called Independence Movement of Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: May I call you "Prime Minister," or is it offensive?

PM Chou: As you like.

Dr. Kissinger: This term is more natural in English.

Mr. Prime Minister, bureaucracies are large, and sometimes not perfectly manageable.

PM Chou: Don't you know that Chiang Kai-shek is complaining greatly that it was CIA which allowed Peng Meng-min to escape from Taiwan?⁹

Dr. Kissinger: You may know that Peng Meng-min was a student of mine fifteen years ago, but I don't want you to think that I had any relationship to this matter (laughter from the Chinese).

Let me be serious. First, to the best of my knowledge, CIA had nothing to do with Professor Peng Meng-min's coming to the USA. Second, if the President and Chairman Mao come to an understanding, then it's my job to enforce it in the bureaucracy, and I will assure you that it will be enforced. And there will be no support from the U.S.

I must be honest with the Prime Minister; there's no sense deluding ourselves. There's no possibility in the next one and a half years for us to recognize the PRC as the sole government of China in a formal way. It is possible to prevent new claims from being established, and that we will do. For example, the Taiwan Independence Movement, forces that disrupt the evolution which the Prime Minister and I have talked about and which could be confirmed between Chairman Mao Tse-tung and President Nixon.

PM Chou: You want to talk about Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: It's the only other point on which I have some notes.

I told your associates on the plane that whenever I talk from notes I talk for fifty minutes. It's a sign of my enormous respect that I don't do so today.

PM Chou: (laughs) You may act according to your own procedure and take longer. We have time.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to take the liberty of discussing Indochina with you. We know your principles and your friendships. We believe

⁹ See Documents 65 and 91.

that the time to make peace has come, for the sake of the people of Indochina, for the sake of peace in Asia, and for the sake of peace in the world.

I can assure you that we want to end the war in Vietnam through negotiations, and that we are prepared to set a date for the withdrawal of all our forces from Vietnam and Indochina as you suggested before.

But we want a settlement that is consistent with our honor and our self-respect, and if we cannot get this, then the war will continue, with the consequences which you yourself have described, and which may again, despite our interests, interrupt the improvement in our relations.

The actions in Cambodia and Laos and other actions that would happen if the war continues will never be directed against the People's Republic of China, but they will have unfortunate consequences for our relations which we would very much like to avoid.

One of the difficulties, in our judgment, which I want to mention frankly, is that we look at the problem from the perspective of world peace, but the North Vietnamese and the NLF have only one foreign policy problem, and that is Indochina.

I know Hanoi is very suspicious, and they are afraid to lose at the conference table what they have fought for on the battlefield. And sometimes I am frank to say that I have the impression that they are more afraid of being deceived than of being defeated. They think that they were deceived in 1954. But I want to say that we are realists. We know that after a peace is made we will be 10,000 miles away, and they will still be there.

So it is in our interest to make a peace that they will want to keep. We do not want the war to start again.

Let me tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, where I believe we stand in our negotiations.

As a specialist in secret trips, I took a secret trip to Paris on May 31 and made a proposal to the North Vietnamese with which you may be familiar.

PM Chou: I am not familiar with it.

Dr. Kissinger: I offered the following on behalf of President Nixon:—we would set a date for a withdrawal from Vietnam.

PM Chou: A date for complete withdrawal?

Dr. Kissinger: Right.

—Secondly, as part of the settlement, there should be a ceasefire in all of Indochina.

—Third, that there should be a release of all prisoners.

—Fourth, that there should be respect for the Geneva Accords.

There were some other provisions for international supervision and no infiltration, but I consider those subsidiary.

On June 26, at another secret meeting, Le Duc Tho replied with a nine point proposal which is different from the seven point proposal of Mme. Binh in some respects, but not in great detail.¹⁰

There are some positive, but two negative aspects to this Vietnamese reply.

There are some detailed military proposals which are unacceptable in their present form, but which I think we can negotiate and with which I shall not bother the Prime Minister unless he wants to discuss them.

PM Chou: If you like, you may speak of it.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, they give a shorter deadline than we. They want December 31, 1971, which is too short. But, we believe that within the next year what you mentioned can be settled; this is possible and I believe that we can find a compromise there. Within the next twelve months. The Prime Minister asked whether before the election this could be settled, and this is my answer.

Then there are demands, such as that we must pay reparations, which we cannot accept in that form as consistent with our honor. We are willing to give aid voluntarily once peace is made, but we cannot as a matter of honor pay reparations as a condition of peace.

But these are issues which we believe we can probably settle with North Vietnam, although I do not believe that they have survived 2000 years by being easy to deal with.

PM Chou: It is a heroic country.

Dr. Kissinger: They are heroic people, great people.

PM Chou: They are a great and heroic and admirable people. Two thousand years ago China committed aggression against them, and China was defeated. It was defeated by two ladies, two women generals.

And when I went to Vietnam as a representative of New China on a visit to North Vietnam, I went personally to the grave of these two women generals and left wreaths of flowers on the graves to pay my respects for these two heroines who had defeated our ancestors who were exploiters.

¹⁰ Copies of the seven and nine-point proposals are in Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam, eds., *American Foreign Relations, 1971: A Documentary Record* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1976), pp. 295–306 and Allan E. Goodman, *The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 111–114.

In France, Joan of Arc was also worthy of respect.

Dr. Kissinger: Women in politics can be ferocious. (Chinese laughter)

Even though they are now our enemies, we consider them an heroic and a great people whose independence we want to preserve.

There are two obstacles now to a rapid settlement, and not the ones I have mentioned. The two are the following:

—One, North Vietnam in effect demands that we overthrow the present government in Saigon as a condition of making peace.

—Secondly, they refuse to agree to a ceasefire throughout Indochina while we withdraw.

With respect to the political solution, they claim that the present government is a phantom government supported only by American forces. If this is true, then the removal of our forces should bring about the conditions which they are speaking of and which they desire.

Moreover, they are unrealistic. The longer the war goes on, the longer we will strengthen the Saigon Government; and the more we withdraw our forces, the less we can meet demands they make of us. They threaten us with the continuation of the war which will make it impossible to fulfill their demands even if we wanted to, and we don't want to.

As for the ceasefire, the reason we believe it is essential for all of Indochina is that if they attack our friends while we are withdrawing, we will be drawn into war again. And then the conflict will start again with incalculable consequences. They propose to make a ceasefire only with us and not with others. That is dishonorable, and we cannot do this.

I would like to tell the Prime Minister, on behalf of President Nixon, as solemnly as I can, that first of all, we are prepared to withdraw completely from Indochina and to give a fixed date, if there is a ceasefire and release of our prisoners. Secondly, we will permit the political solution of South Vietnam to evolve and to leave it to the Vietnamese alone.

We recognize that a solution must reflect the will of the South Vietnamese people and allow them to determine their future without interference. We will not re-enter Vietnam and will abide by the political process.

But what we need is what I told the Prime Minister with relation to Taiwan. The military settlement must be separated in time from the political issues. It is that which is holding up a solution.

On July 12, after I leave here, I shall see Mr. Le Duc Tho in Paris, and I shall make another proposal to him along the lines I have outlined to you.

If Hanoi is willing to accept a fixed date for our complete withdrawal, a ceasefire, a release of prisoners, and a guaranteed international status for South Vietnam, which can be guaranteed by any group of countries, including yourself, then we have a very good chance for a rapid peace.

If not, the war will continue, and it will be a misfortune for everybody.

We seek no military bases or military allies in Indochina, and we will pursue no policy in that area which could concern the People's Republic of China. We are willing to guarantee this either alone or together with you, whichever you prefer.

The President has asked me to tell you that we believe the time for peace has come. It is not up to us to tell you what, if anything, you can do. We believe that the end of the war in Indochina will accelerate the improvement in our relations. In any event, what we want is the people of Indochina to determine their own future without military conflict.

Let me say, Mr. Prime Minister, that regardless of what you do, we are prepared to withdraw that part of our forces on Taiwan which is related to this conflict within a specified time after the conflict is over.

I am not mentioning this as a condition, but for your information.

PM Chou: I thank you for telling us rather systematically about your position on the Indochina question. There is a common point between us in that both of us have respect for the greatness and the courage of the Vietnamese people.

I believe that, in my opinion, for the Vietnamese people to feel that they were deceived during the first Geneva Conference is not groundless, because on this point all signatories at that time, including the U.S., have the responsibility for this.

Dr. Kissinger: That is understood.

PM Chou: Since we have such a common understanding, it is easier to discuss. The secret documents, that were exposed in the *New York Times*,¹¹ show up the truth. A document which is no less significant is the White Paper produced by Dean Acheson.¹² Of course we knew of these events.

That a country should not sign an international agreement but would abide by it was a precedent which was set by Dulles, and never before seen in history.

¹¹ Commonly known as the Pentagon Papers.

¹² See footnote 7 above.

I think now that if at that time we had been more cool-headed, we could perhaps have forced him to sign the agreement, saying we would not sign unless the U.S. did.

Dr. Kissinger: It is hard to believe that the Prime Minister could be anything but cool-headed.

PM Chou: But on this I did not think enough. It was possible for us to be more cool-headed.

Chairman Mao has spoken of this many times with our Vietnamese friends. Our Vietnamese friends do not blame us for this. But we could have done more at that time.

The French were ready to withdraw and did not want to get involved in military adventures. Also at that time the British Government didn't want to be embroiled in adventures. President Truman had already had a role in the war in Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe it was Eisenhower.

PM Chou: But it began with Truman.

Dr. Kissinger: Right.

PM Chou: So did John Foster Dulles, indirectly, as advisor to the State Department—later he became Secretary of State.

So it was quite clear that the U.S. authorities at that time were preparing to step in the shoes of France.

Looking back from now, we can see that was the worst precedent set in international history.

It is not necessary to say any more on that, since you have now made public many portions of secret documents.

Dr. Kissinger: I hate to admit this, but they were made public by another student of mine.

PM Chou: I believe that and also thought that.

Dr. Kissinger: If I can make a comment about the difference between 1954 and 1971.

PM Chou: I agree there are differences.

Dr. Kissinger: There is a formal similarity, but an objective difference.

In 1954, Secretary Dulles believed that it was America's mission to fight communism all around the world and for the U.S. to be the principal force, to engage itself in every struggle at every point of the world at any point of time.

President Nixon operates on a different philosophy.

We do not deal with communism in the abstract, but with specific communist states on the basis of their specific actions toward us, and not as an abstract crusade.

We believe that if people want to defend themselves, they must do it on the basis of their own efforts and not on the basis of the efforts of a country 10,000 miles away.

So when we offer to withdraw from Vietnam, it is not in order to devise some trick to re-enter in some other manner but rather that we want to base our foreign policy on the realities of the present and not on the dreams of the past.

I can assure the Prime Minister that any agreement that he makes with us will be kept in the letter and in the spirit.

PM Chou: In this matter, I trust, I believe that Dr. Kissinger, as a special envoy of President Nixon, has sincerity.

And it is precisely because of this that I would like to explain to you the historical developments, which is why our Vietnamese friends are holding out so strongly.

Secretary Dulles' policy at the time, which you explained, was brinkmanship. We understand that. That policy was to isolate the socialist countries and to try to win control over the middle areas in between. Perhaps you have read Chairman Mao's works in which he mentioned this.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Such an assessment is not wrong.

Dr. Kissinger: It is correct.

PM Chou: Therefore, the Vietnamese people feel that they were greatly taken in and deceived at that time. It was stipulated very clearly that one year after the 1954 Geneva Agreement a plebiscite would be held in Vietnam and that the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese would come together to organize election committees which would draw up the election law. No matter what election law might have been drawn up, with international supervision, it was a certainty that President Ho Chi Minh would have been elected if an election had been held. That was where the hearts of the people lay. It was impossible to go against the trend, the evolution of history.

Toward this one must take an attitude of historical realism. There was a great love of the Vietnamese people for Ho Chi Minh. He gave them a sense of national dignity, and national pride. We were very old friends. I knew Ho Chi Minh myself in 1922.

Dr. Kissinger: He joined the Chinese Communist Party.

PM Chou: In Paris.

It was the activity of the U.S. which went against all that and forcibly fostered the Diem puppets in order to overthrow Bao Dai,¹³ the regime at that time, and disrupt the agreements. In this way the Geneva Agreements were completely violated.

¹³ Last emperor of Vietnam's Nguyen Dynasty, 1925–1945, and Vietnamese head of State, 1949–1955.

And the result was that the broad masses of the people of South Vietnam were unable to win liberation and were naturally disappointed. They were again submitted to oppression and massacre.

Hundreds of thousands of them in South Vietnam were thrown into jail and killed. Many went to the north under the Geneva Agreements. It was in such a way that the patriotic movement of the South Vietnamese people began. Even Ngo Dinh Diem was dissatisfied with this. You must know about that. President Kennedy did this. Before he was assassinated, he had Diem and his brother killed.

This cannot but give rise to the just resistance movement of the South Vietnamese people.

The Vietnamese people have continued their resistance movement up to this day. You know the Vietnamese have not asked the Chinese people to send troops. They have counted on themselves alone for the past ten years. This is quite a thing.

Of course, the biggest battles were from 1964–1968. The incident of the Tonkin Gulf was also in your documents. In this way the Geneva Agreements were completely violated.

When President Nixon came to office, he wanted to withdraw troops. That is true. We must say that the total number of U.S. troops now in Vietnam is quite less than the highest number under President Johnson's Administration.

Therefore our attitude toward the Vietnam question and toward a solution of the question of Indochina is composed of the following two points:

The first point is that all foreign troops of the United States and the troops of other countries which followed the United States into Indochina should be withdrawn.

The second point is that the peoples of the three countries of Indochina should be left alone to decide their own respective fates.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree with both points.

PM Chou: You must know that for all this time we have truly supported them, but we have not sent one single soldier to fight.

As to what political system the people choose for themselves, it is for them to decide. So long as no foreign force interferes in that area, then the issue is solved.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me give you the personal impression from the other side of the Pacific, from one who has seen Le Duc Tho five times and Xuan Thuy nine times.

I agree the Vietnamese are heroic people. The same qualities which make the Vietnamese such great fighters make it hard for them to make peace. The singlemindedness with which the Vietnamese people fight may deprive them of the perspective to make peace. If some of their

friends, and you may not want to reply to this, can help with their perspective so that they understand that some political evolution is necessary, then we could end the war rapidly. If the war continues it will not be in the interest of the people of Indochina, or peace, but only perhaps for outside peoples. It would only disturb our relationship.

The two principles you mentioned, we are prepared to accept them.

PM Chou: You have talked so many times with them. It is the first time that I have met you.

Dr. Kissinger: I regret that. We must catch up very quickly.

PM Chou: At the Paris talks there have been 122 sessions, about as much as the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks which have lasted sixteen years and 136 meetings.

Dr. Kissinger: My meetings are always private so they don't count.

PM Chou: Of course that's true.

As for the two principles that I have put forward, I would like to put forward some detailed questions:

Does the U.S. agree to withdraw *all* its military forces from Indochina including the army, the navy, the air force, and the marines, as well as its advisers and its military installations?

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to withdraw all organized military units and all installations within the time period I gave to the Prime Minister, and the advisers in a somewhat longer time period, but in a definite period. But we are willing to accept an upper limit on advisers.

PM Chou: Because that was the loophole in the Geneva Agreements. The war flared up from the matter of military advisers.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me make one other point. The advisers would not be combat advisers. They would be logistic and technical advisers, like some of those you have had in North Vietnam.

PM Chou: We have had no military advisers. They were only to build roads.

Dr. Kissinger: Whatever the situation, we need the advisers for somewhat longer. Every organized military unit, the army, the navy, the marines, and the air force and all their installations would be removed. Some technical advisers, up to an agreed limit, would remain longer up to a time limit, and then they too would be withdrawn.

PM Chou: What about the forces of the other countries which followed the U.S.? (He named the countries.)

Dr. Kissinger: They would withdraw also. All would be withdrawn within the same time period as the organized U.S. military units.

PM Chou: On this point, I must state that the Vietnamese people are not shortsighted. It is precisely they who have made a great con-

tribution to world peace. You must know that your newspapers and your people and even some of your demobilized army men and active army men all declared and expressed your cruelties in Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: But you have to understand two things. This is the tragedy of the war. President Nixon has two objectives:

First of all, he is dedicated to ending the war, and he has already withdrawn over 300,000 troops.

Secondly, he is also dedicated not to sign a peace which will undermine our basic principles in the world. I frankly believe that this would not be in your interest. If we are to have a permanent relationship, it is in your interest that we are a reliable country.

We must look at it from the point of view of a great country, not in terms of a local problem. Therefore, we may need to continue if we do not get reasonable terms, such as I have mentioned, which I have presented and will propose again Monday to the North Vietnamese. The war may have to continue, no matter what the newspapers say. But to continue is not in the interests of the peace of the world. There's no sense in continuing the war.

PM Chou: I have not finished.

If all these conditions were met, there's still another question which you must think about.

That is that even during Ho Chi Minh's lifetime, he said that if U.S. military forces were to withdraw, he would send them off on a red carpet, in order to show respect for the American people and not harm their national dignity. The American people, of course except for those who violated the Geneva Agreements, are not held responsible.

Wouldn't it be a good thing if the American troops could peacefully go home?

It would be another thing if after the U.S. armed forces should be withdrawn, if the roots of evil were still left and the Vietnamese people once again were thrown into the miserable abyss and submitted to slaughter. Then the civil war would still continue.

You should answer that question. Since the U.S. has sent troops for ten years, you must answer that question.

Dr. Kissinger: I would answer on two levels.

First, we should have a ceasefire for all of Indochina in good faith. Secondly, there should then be a reasonable effort by all the forces in Indochina which exist to settle their differences among each other.

Thirdly, we are not children, and history will not stop on the day a peace agreement is signed. If local forces develop again, and are not helped from forces outside, we are not likely to again come 10,000 miles. We are not proposing a treaty to stop history.

PM Chou: This question involves an even greater sphere.

For instance, in Cambodia, the Lon Nol/Sirik Matak clique staged a coup to overthrow Prince Sihanouk, Head of State in Cambodia. The broad masses of the people of Cambodia are supporting Sihanouk and wish to overthrow the Lon Nol regime. So even if foreign military forces were to withdraw, the civil war would still continue, until the people of Cambodia had driven out Lon Nol and the Government of National Union had returned to its rightful place.

How can you answer that?

Dr. Kissinger: I once said at one of the Vietnamese negotiations that a curious thing about Laos is that most of the Laotian freedom fighters whom we find speak Vietnamese.

If North Vietnam withdraws genuinely its forces from Cambodia and then the civil war is fought only by Cambodians, it's not an international problem. However, if the North Vietnamese troops are there, then it is an international problem. If the North Vietnamese return to their country, we would consider it an internal matter of Cambodia for them to decide and not an international problem.

Secondly, if the People's Republic of China and the U.S. in a demonstration of goodwill, together with other nations, would guarantee a settlement, it would be different from 1954. Because we would be thinking of each other not from the point of view of hostility but of cooperation.

PM Chou: The U.S. should be held mainly responsible for the enlargement of the war in Indochina, and there is no way to shirk that responsibility.

Dr. Kissinger: That is history, and our problem now is how to end it.

PM Chou: But as you just now mentioned, you would like to make an honorable retreat. We think that the best way to do this is forthrightly withdraw and completely withdraw all forces and leave the problems of Indochina to be determined by the people of the three countries of Indochina, no matter which way they would like to solve them. This is the most honorable and glorious way to withdraw from Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: I have stated our views and don't believe I need repeat them. I have stated the conditions which we have offered, which include complete withdrawal of U.S. forces and leaving the future to the people of Indochina, if there is a ceasefire and the release of POWs. I have explained our position, and that is the position which we will be forced to maintain.

PM Chou: Anyway, the cause of the war in Indochina and the responsibility for the beginning of the war in Indochina should be borne by the U.S. Government. Even though President Nixon's Administration wishes to change previous policy and carry out its present poli-

cies, it still must take the primary responsibility and must take it upon itself to end the war. Because the Nixon Administration enlarged and expanded the war to all three Indochina countries and spread it to cover the whole area.

The war was expanded with the invasion into Cambodia last year and the battle of Route Nine in Laos this year.

Therefore, if you want the Vietnamese people to continue fighting, they are prepared to do so. They have only two prospects. The first is for the U.S. to withdraw all its military forces. The second is to continue fighting on.

Since you have admitted that withdrawal of your forces is a good thing and beneficial for world peace and peace in the Far East, you should be able to make up your mind and withdraw from Indochina. This would be an honorable withdrawal and a glorious withdrawal. And you, Excellency, as adviser to the President, should be the first to make up your mind.

At least you should want peace in the Far East. If you speak of the Far East this also involves other questions we can speak of. Because if you don't end the war in Indochina, we must think of other areas. That means Japan, where you are rearming the Japanese militarists. You know of the present Fourth Defense Plan, which was drawn up according to the Joint Communiqué of President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato of Japan. You must know that the Sato Cabinet has been reorganized, and the plan is to be fulfilled ahead of schedule. The Japanese are bent on expanding; their economy has expanded to such an extent. Economic expansion will of necessity lead to military expansion. And once they expand, the Far East will be the first to feel the effects. They have openly decreed that Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam are linked up with their security.

What attitude toward peace is that? Isn't that a threat? We are not afraid of that.

Therefore this is a question on which we must frankly state our views in a clear way.

Dr. Kissinger: Regarding Indochina, I, of course, know your principles. I did not expect that I would convince you on our point of view or that you would tell me if I had convinced you.

I think perhaps after studying what I have said, you can decide what is appropriate, if anything, and needs to be done.

I will say nothing more except that we are sincerely interested in ending the war. It is a danger to peace in Asia. It obscures fundamental problems, one of which you have mentioned, which is the relationship with Japan and maybe with the other great powers. If the war continues, it will menace Asian peace. If you wish, I am prepared to discuss those with you.

PM Chou: Let us have a break and prepare for dinner. We can continue later on.

(At this point, 7:55 p.m., there was a break for dinner. During dinner, in addition to light conversation, there was a substantive discussion on Indochina, the highlights of which follow:

PM Chou: The U.S. should withdraw from Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: I said that the U.S. was prepared to do so.

PM Chou: One cannot blame the Indochinese people for struggling.

Dr. Kissinger: I do not blame them, but the withdrawal of outside forces would meet the aspirations of the Indochinese people and strengthen world peace.

PM Chou: There should be a ceasefire with the U.S. because the U.S. is withdrawing. This does not solve other problems [in Indochina]¹⁴ and therefore there can be no ceasefire with those people. One must remove those who are in power, either through democratic elections or by overthrowing them.

Dr. Kissinger: We are in favor of democratic elections and support them.

PM Chou: We don't believe in the elections in South Vietnam. It is a different situation. There are August elections and October elections and you help Thieu. Have you discussed this situation with Mr. Minh?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, on this trip.

PM Chou: They want you to get rid of the government.

Dr. Kissinger: They can't ask us both to withdraw and get rid of the government of Vietnam. To do both of these is impossible.

PM Chou: We have not exchanged views at this point. We have always thought on this matter that we cannot interfere in these affairs. If you withdraw and they want to continue the civil war, none of us should interfere. The situation has been created over a long time.

How can you make the Cambodian people recognize Lon Nol?

Dr. Kissinger: First, concerning Cambodia, there were 50,000 North Vietnamese troops there before any Americans crossed the border. Secondly, I can assure the Prime Minister that we were as surprised by the coup in Phnom Penh as the Prime Minister was. I thought it was a Sihanouk trick to show hostility against the North Vietnamese, because he was going to Moscow and Peking to try to get them to use their influence against the North Vietnamese forces.

PM Chou: The result was the standing together of the Indochinese people.

¹⁴ All brackets in the source text.

Dr. Kissinger: It was not our doing; it was unfortunate. We did not want Sihanouk overthrown. Why should we lie? What difference does it make now? We were negotiating with North Vietnam at that moment. The coup ruined negotiations that we were conducting and that we wanted to succeed.

PM Chou: The result was that Sihanouk stood together with the Indochinese people.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with the result [the coup]. We did not produce, cause, or encourage it.

PM Chou: Was it possibly done by the French?

Dr. Kissinger: That is conceivable, but it certainly was not done by us.

PM Chou: How about the shipload of American weapons taken by Lon Nol?

Dr. Kissinger: I know the incident. It had nothing to do with the coup. It was a historical accident. For two days I believed that Sihanouk had staged the coup as his own maneuver, so that he could come to Peking to impress you with the fact that he had a lot of domestic opposition. I'm not proud of my analysis, but that's what I thought.

PM Chou: Perhaps you were deceived by others.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm too vain to admit that.

PM Chou: You have said that the bureaucracy was not manageable?

Dr. Kissinger: A revolution could not be started by the bureaucratic apparatus. Perhaps an isolated incident like Peng Meng-min could, but it could not happen that a revolution would start without my knowing it. I knew Peng as a student. I don't believe CIA was involved. I can assure the Prime Minister that we will not support the independence movement.

You can rely on my word.

PM Chou: We have noted your statement.

(The formal meeting then resumed after dinner at 9:40 p.m.)

PM Chou: We can go to 11:00 p.m. tonight and if we don't finish, we can continue tomorrow. The main thing is that our guests do not get tired.

Just before dinner and at the table, Dr. Kissinger said that we should look at things from a global point of view. This was also mentioned by President Nixon on his way to San Clemente on July 6 when he said that the U.S. should not concentrate its energies on the Indochina question.¹⁵ The U.S. had been tied down for ten years and had suffered a lot.

¹⁵ Reference is to the President's remarks to news executives in Kansas City, Missouri. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 803–813.

He said that world problems are very large. Indeed, former administrations had driven the U.S. into a dead alley and it couldn't get out.

Since both the President and Your Excellency look at things in broad perspective, it should be easier for the U.S. to extricate itself. Of course, Your Excellency said that the U.S. must look after its honor, and an honorable peace. I think the greatest honor would be a glorious withdrawal. Because that is the call of the overwhelming majority of the people throughout the world, inside or outside the U.S. One can say in all frankness that if it were not for the help given the South Vietnamese puppets, the Saigon regime would have collapsed long ago.

Why must you want to leave a tail on this matter and be unwilling to give it up? As your President has said, you are tied down the last eight to ten years. Why do you not extricate yourselves? This is said by public opinion in the U.S. as well as the world.

So I cannot quite understand what you mean by wanting to leave a tail there, although you reaffirmed moments ago your complete withdrawal.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you mean by a tail?

PM Chou: One would be Thieu. In our view, you should just simply withdraw completely and never mind how. They might fight. We will not interfere. We believe they will solve their problems by themselves.

If you remain there, the fighting will continue and world opinion will not tolerate what you do.

Dr. Kissinger: I do not believe that I have explained our position clearly to the Prime Minister.

If there are no negotiations, we will eventually withdraw, unilaterally. But it will take longer, the government in Saigon will be strengthened with more equipment, and the outcome will still be decided in the long run by the Vietnamese. What we are now proposing is that we have rapid negotiations. We will set a deadline for withdrawals, and during withdrawals there should be a ceasefire, and some attempt at negotiations. If the agreement breaks down, then it is quite possible that the people in Vietnam will fight it out.

PM Chou: If you, while planning to withdraw, want the Vietnamese to undertake obligations tantamount to recognizing that Thieu will remain or be in a coalition government, then that is a conditional withdrawal on your part.

At the same time, you are maintaining the rule of Lon Nol/Sirik Matak in Cambodia. How can they accept that? They cannot accept that.

If that came to be the case, with Thieu and Sirik Matak continuing to oppress and slaughter their people, then the Vietnamese and Cambodian people would rather fight on.

Particularly after the summit conference on the three Indochinese peoples held last year, they in effect became allies.¹⁶ After the war, they will have different social systems, but at the present they are as one in fighting against aggression. I do not quite understand what good it is for the U.S. to maintain such unpopular rule.

Dr. Kissinger: Our position is not to maintain any particular government in South Vietnam. We are prepared to undertake specific obligations restricting the support we can give to the government after a peace settlement and defining the relationship we can maintain with it after a peace settlement.

What we cannot do is to participate in the overthrow of people with whom we have been allied, whatever the origin of the alliance.

If the government is as unpopular as you seem to think, then the quicker our forces are withdrawn the quicker it will be overthrown. And if it is overthrown after we withdraw, we will not intervene.

PM Chou: Then the following question arises: while withdrawing, will you look upon such a government as the legitimate government, as an ally; or will you pay no attention to it?

Dr. Kissinger: I understand the question, but I don't understand the significance of the question.

PM Chou: That means, would you still continue to support this regime, such as with military aid? You would not have troops, but if there is military aid you would still be giving support.

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to accept an agreed international status for South Vietnam, i.e., precisely stipulated limitations on the amount of military aid the kind of military aid we would maintain.

For example, we are prepared to look at point 5 of Mme. Binh's seven point proposal. Some aspects of it we are prepared to negotiate on.

Then if after some time, the government changes, these limitations would remain in effect.

The same restrictions would apply with respect to Cambodia. It is the most practical way, we believe, of dealing with the problem, which still leaves open the evolution of the political forces.

¹⁶ Representatives of North Vietnam, the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, the National United Front of Kampuchea, Prince Norodom Sihanouk (deposed Cambodian head of state), and Laotian Communists met on April 24–25. They pledged to forge a unified anti-American struggle in the region. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969–1970* (Bristol: Keesing's Publications, Ltd., 1970), pp. 24030–24031.

PM Chou: But you have a prerequisite with that, that is, a cease-fire throughout Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: For some period of time. We can put on a time limit, say 18 months or some period.

PM Chou: We cannot consider these specific matters. We are not Vietnamese. If you discuss the Taiwan question, then the details are more familiar with us. On Vietnam we only give them assistance.

Your information on military advisers is entirely inaccurate. We only have technical advisers to re-build roads, railroads, and bridges, and when this was done they went back. Because we must protect our engineering personnel, we had anti-aircraft batteries. As soon as we complete the construction work, we will all go. So the situation is entirely different from what we did in Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister is fortunate not to be involved in the details of the Vietnamese negotiations. This reminds me of a complicated situation in Europe in the Nineteenth Century, a negotiation which only three people ever understood. One of these was dead, the second was in an insane asylum, and a third was himself but he had forgotten everything.¹⁷ (Laughter from the Chinese.) I recognize that your possible direct concern over the details of the negotiations is limited. I appreciate your giving me the opportunity of presenting the problem, which as you correctly point out is ours and brought about by our actions. But since it affects the peace of Asia, and our relationship, I wanted to present our point of view, and I appreciate the courtesy with which you have listened to me.

PM Chou: I would like to go into some explanation. Since you mention peace in the Far East, not only Indochina, should I limit it to Indochina or discuss other areas?

Dr. Kissinger: No, let me hear about all the problems we have discussed.

PM Chou: I will do so, including South Asia and the subcontinent.

First, East Asia. You have troops in South Korea and know about the situation there. You have troops in South Korea and then the South Koreans sent troops to South Vietnam. Therefore, in your withdrawal, all South Korean troops in Vietnam should be withdrawn too.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

¹⁷ "Lord Palmerston, with characteristic levity had once said that only three men in Europe had ever understood [the Schleswig-Holstein question], and of these the Prince Consort was dead, a Danish statesman [unnamed] was in an asylum, and he himself had forgotten it." See R. W. Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe, 1789–1914* (1937) cited in Angela Partington, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, Fourth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 505.

PM Chou: Your troops in South Korea should also withdraw. We withdrew our people voluntarily from Korea back in 1958, but you said that the Chinese troops were only just behind the Yalu and could easily come back. However, there must be a reason; they cannot just cross over. That would be interference in internal affairs. There must be a guarantee in international relations, and we have given that guarantee. There are two points expressed in this agreement, which are: all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the territories of other countries, and let the people of those countries settle their affairs in the way they see fit without outside interference.

Dr. Kissinger: I was talking about this.

PM Chou: If we were to expand these to other points, would we agree?

Dr. Kissinger: If you agree to these principles, we are willing to sign an agreement with you on the basis of the Five Points of Peaceful Coexistence.

PM Chou: We put those forward many times.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: We believe that the peoples of any country should be capable of solving their own affairs without outside interference by others. There is the fact that twenty-five years after the Second World War, your hands are stretched out too far and people suffer from it in another country. Now if you do not withdraw, there will be a sticky situation. The President was right in Kansas City when he said that 25 years ago nobody would believe the U.S. could be in such a difficult position today. But Chairman Mao foresaw this at the time. He wrote an article shortly after World War II on the international situation. The word had spread that an attack was imminent against the USSR. Chairman Mao disagreed, and said that this was only a slogan whose purpose was to gain control over the intermediate areas of the world between the USSR and the U.S.

Chairman Mao pointed out the existence of two intermediate zones: First, the intermediate zone of what is generally known as the third world of Asia and Africa, Latin America, the developing countries, where there was a question of the struggle for control of these areas. The second intermediate zone, was the more developed countries. What was the result of this struggle for control? The result was as the President said. Now in Western Europe, a new collective strength has appeared. The problem in the President's thinking is that West Germany is out ahead of this, although England, France and others are also included. In the Common Market there were six, and there are now ten countries. In East Asia, there is Japan.

Your President also looks upon China as a country with potential strength. Although our country is large in size and has a large

population, yet comparatively it is not developed. So at the present time we only have a voice. But Chairman Mao on many occasions has said that we would absolutely not become a superpower. What we strive for is that all countries, big or small, be equal. It is not just a question of equality for two countries. Of course, it's a good thing for our two countries to negotiate on the basis of equality to exchange views, and to seek to find common points as well as putting on the table our differences. In order to really gain a relaxation in the international arena over a comparatively long period of time, one must deal with one another on the basis of equality. That is not easy to achieve.

After 25 years it's no longer possible for the U.S. to exercise a position of hegemony. Japan has become strengthened, and if you will now withdraw all foreign troops from the Far East, it's your purpose to strengthen Japan so it can serve as your vanguard in the Far East in controlling Asian countries. When we blame you for this, you say that it isn't the case.

Dr. Kissinger: Blame us for Japan?

PM Chou: Yes. You have troops in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Indochina, and also Thailand. As for Taiwan, we discussed that. That is the situation in the Far East. So, if we don't discuss these matters, how would it be possible to live in equality?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, we should discuss these matters. I had them in my opening remarks but decided it would be better first to discuss concrete matters before proceeding to philosophical problems.

PM Chou: These are not only philosophical matters, they are also concrete.

Dr. Kissinger: Partly philosophical, partly concrete. Philosophical because it's what each thinks of its place in the world. Concrete in the conclusions we draw from our philosophy.

Let me begin with a concrete example that you mentioned, namely Korea, then make general observations on how we see the U.S. role in the world, and then proceed to Japan and other problems. Is this all right?

PM Chou: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: On the narrow issue of U.S. troops in Korea, a great deal depends on the general relationships in this area and on the wisdom with which both of us handle the transition from one phase of international relations to another phase of international relations. Sometimes even correct things must be done gradually, because if done too quickly they have a shocking impact and create an opposite effect from what one intends. For example, if the relationships between our countries develop as they might, after the Indochina war ends and the ROK troops return to Korea, I would think it quite conceivable that before the end of the next term of President Nixon, most, if not all, American troops will be withdrawn from Korea.

PM Chou: Next term, not this term?

Dr. Kissinger: We have already reduced U.S. troops in Korea by 20,000 men.

PM Chou: There are still 40,000 or more.

Dr. Kissinger: We still have about 40,000 there. This process of reductions can continue as political relations in the Far East improve, until by a gradual process after a few years there will be either very few or no U.S. troops left there.

PM Chou: I would like to make an observation on this matter. You have such heavy burdens and military expenditures, but what are the results? For instance, precisely because you have been protecting Japan, Japan spent very little on military expenditures before 1971, and is able to expand its economic strength very rapidly. The President mentioned the last ten years; I looked at the figures which you have published on your military expenditures which were \$700 billion.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right.

PM Chou: While Japan has had practically no expenditures, with the result that Japan developed rapidly. Now the President says they are very powerful. Of course, your businessmen have a great investment in Japan. So what purpose is there for you to keep 40,000 troops in South Korea—just honor? You already have a treaty with the Koreans, Park Chong-hee recently was re-elected, and your Vice President went to congratulate him. You have tied yourself down.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, if there were Japanese troops in Korea, without making any judgments about your policy, I imagine that you would be more disquieted by these Japanese troops than by American troops.

PM Chou: We would oppose foreign troops in Korea, no matter whose.

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, I don't think that the Korean problem need detain us very long. I am certain that a political evolution is occurring in which this will take care of itself. Our military presence in South Korea is not a permanent feature of our foreign policy. A precise timetable for withdrawal is perhaps something which President Nixon can discuss, or else the matter will take care of itself in the very foreseeable future.

But if I may make a general observation about the problem of super powers and of the American involvement in world affairs. The U.S. is a complex nation for outsiders to understand because at one and the same time it's extremely materialistic and extremely idealistic—and by Marxist standards, naively idealistic. I believe it's quite possible, Mr. Prime Minister, that at the end of World War II Chairman Mao could have understood the tendencies in American policy better than American leaders themselves. I refer to the essay you described.

PM Chou: You are right. There's a saying in China that those on the sidelines often are more clear about issues than those directly involved.

Dr. Kissinger: The U.S. attitude until the end of World War II was that it really believed it need not participate in world affairs at all. It was protected by two oceans, and if there were international troubles, they were due to the short-sighted attitudes of other countries.

At the end of World War II, we confronted an objective reality for which nothing had prepared us and which we had in part generated by our own actions during the war. Every European country had been occupied at one time or another except England, which had been economically destroyed. So there was a vacuum in Europe. And there was also a vacuum in Asia produced by the complete defeat of Japan, and for a while by the Chinese civil war.

So the U.S., against its inclinations, found itself engaged all over the world, in every part of the world, simultaneously. (Chou nods.) It had two different policy doctrines carried out by two different groups dealing with this. First a military doctrine which drew a lesson from World War II to the effect that every aggressor had the same character and that therefore Communism was like Fascism, and had to be dealt with like Fascism. The other tendency was a social welfare tendency which dealt with the world's developing nations, accepting the principles inherited from the New Deal.

These said that if you ease economic conditions a little, without political organization and without economic doctrine, a political organization would emerge automatically. This was a mistake which I must say you never made.

At any rate, Americans spread across the world engaged in two unrelated enterprises, with the social welfare group not understanding that in a developing country before economic progress you must have political organization, and the military-oriented people like Dulles not understanding that to have a true defense there must be a consciousness of a common threat, and that an outside country cannot supply the will to resist even if it supplies the weapons.

So a curious thing occurred, Mr. Prime Minister. We didn't look for hegemony as we spread across the world; this was an undesirable consequence and led us into many enormous difficulties. In fact, our liberal element, very often because of missionary tendencies, got itself even more involved, for example, as in the Kennedy Administration, than the more conservative element. (Chou nods.) So here we are. When President Nixon came into office, we found ourselves, as you say, extended around the world without a clear doctrine under enormously changed circumstances. Europe had recovered, and was forming itself into an economic unit.

PM Chou: How much money did you spend on the Marshall Plan?

Dr. Kissinger: I think about \$30 billion.

PM Chou: Was it paid back?

Dr. Kissinger: By nobody.

PM Chou: Was it the same for Lend Lease?

Dr. Kissinger: Essentially.

PM Chou: How much did you spend on Lend Lease?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know.

PM Chou: It's too far back.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Lord was not born yet.

PM Chou: He can study.

Dr. Kissinger: My staff will catch hell over this when we get back because they're supposed to prepare me for every question.

PM Chou: It was an accidental question.

Dr. Kissinger: I will get the figures for you, and once we have established communications, will get this to you.

PM Chou: It doesn't really matter.

Dr. Kissinger: I will place a telephone call.

PM Chou: Ambassador Huang Hua will help me get the figures.

Dr. Kissinger: There's no need. We will get the figures for him.

At any rate, this Administration has had a very difficult task of adjusting American foreign policy to new realities at the same time we also have to conclude a very painful and difficult war. (Chou nods.) We have established the principle that the defense of far away countries cannot be primarily an American responsibility. That responsibility must in the first instance be their own, and in the second instance must be the responsibility of other countries of the region. And the U.S. should intervene primarily when a super-power threatens to establish hegemony over countries which can never be strong enough to resist on their own. This has been our philosophy since we came into office.

PM Chou: On this point, there is a difference in our respective views.

Dr. Kissinger: Indeed, this philosophy has brought me here.

PM Chou: I understand. There is another super-power.

Dr. Kissinger: Here? To the North?

PM Chou: Yes. We don't believe that super-power will be able to control the world. It will also be defeated as it stretches out its hand so far. You are feeling difficulties now, and they too will also feel difficulties. They are just following after you.

Dr. Kissinger: With all respect, I think they triggered us, they caused our actions. Even today their constant probing makes it very hard to have a real settlement with them.

With this as our philosophy, we have, for example, reduced our military forces in parts of the world other than Vietnam by over 100,000 men, and civilians by about 50,000 since we came into office. But as we move into a new period, certain contradictions become apparent. The Prime Minister has on a few occasions mentioned Japan. Let me say two things: first, as between a strong Japan and a strong China, we believe a strong China is not expansionist because this is your tradition.

PM Chou: This is not only because of our traditions but because of our new system. In the past, we had an expansionist tradition, and committed aggression against Vietnam, Burma, and Korea. But New China will not commit such aggression, because that is decided by our system and ideals.

You overestimate us when you say we will develop our economy after five to ten years. We don't go so fast, but we don't want to move along at a snail's pace. But you are correct that the new China will not practice expansionism. It's not the same for Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: A strong Japan has potentially some of the tendencies which the Prime Minister mentioned. A strong Japan has the economic and social infrastructure which permits it to create a strong military machine and use this for expansionist purposes if it so desires. The American forces on Japan are in this respect totally insignificant. They play no role compared to the potential power Japan represents. In fact, they create a paradox because it is our belief, and this is one of the occasions where we may be right, our defense relationship with Japan keeps Japan from pursuing aggressive policies. If Japan builds its own military machine, which it will do if it feels forsaken by us, and if it builds nuclear weapons, as it could easily do, then I feel the fears which you have expressed could become real indeed.

In fact, Mr. Prime Minister, from the point of view of the sort of theory which I used to teach in universities, it would make good sense for us to withdraw from Japan, allow Japan to re-arm, and then let Japan and China balance each other off in the Pacific. This is *not* our policy. A heavily rearmed Japan could easily repeat the policies of the 1930's.

So I really believe, Mr. Prime Minister, that with respect to Japan, your interests and ours are very similar. Neither of us wants to see Japan heavily re-armed. The few bases we have there are purely defensive and enable them to postpone their own rearmament. But if they nevertheless rearm heavily, I doubt that we will maintain our bases there. So we are not using Japan against you; this would be much to dangerous for both of us.

With respect to South Asia and your northern neighbor, perhaps we can discuss them separately. I have talked too long already.

PM Chou: It doesn't matter. With respect to Japan, there are some points we have in common, whereas some others we can further discuss.

I would like to ask one question—in Secretary Laird's recent visit to Japan and South Korea, I believe one of the questions discussed was military cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. I think he is still there, for ten days. He goes to Korea on the 13th.

Dr. Kissinger: If I can tell the Prime Minister something in the frank manner we are discussing, one reason Secretary Laird is so long in Japan was that he was going to Taiwan, and I kept him from going there while I am here. Mr. Prime Minister, if you believe this was easy, you don't know our bureaucracy.

PM Chou: I understand.

Dr. Kissinger: Two things. I believe that our Cabinet members this time of year discover important reasons to take them round the world and these visits very often assume local significance. For example, Secretary Laird was invited to Japan by Nakasone, but had the misfortune the day he arrived that his host was no longer in office. (Chou laughs.)

PM Chou: This was not expected, I believe.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree that it was not planned. In what Secretary Laird said, you should be in no doubt that he was not expressing the President's national concepts, but was exploring how to make it technically easier for us to cooperate. I will have to look into this matter. He may simply be looking at U.S. bases.

But it is absolutely against President Nixon's policy to project Japan's military power outside its home islands into other areas for possible offensive uses. This would be uncontrollable, short-sighted, and extremely dangerous, all of which does not exclude some bureaucrats from making technical arrangements. But they would not be of great significance.

PM Chou: One question I would like to ask which I did not ask. It's a very strange phenomenon. On the question of the reversion of Okinawa itself, the Japanese people are saying three things: first, that this arrangement still contains no guarantee for Okinawa's non-nuclear status; secondly, that this reversion cannot be said to be unconditional, that there are still conditions; and thirdly, it is not a complete reversion and some rights are to be retained by the U.S. Why do you insist on maintaining the Voice of America two years more on Okinawa, something which gives rise more easily to resentment?

Dr. Kissinger: On the first point, with respect to Okinawa's non-nuclear status, I don't understand the criticism because I was somewhat involved in the negotiations myself and I know that it will have exactly the same status as Japan, that is, a non-nuclear status. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]

Second, with respect to a conditional or unconditional reversion, of course there were certain financial provisions associated with it with which I am prepared to deal if the Prime Minister wishes to raise any issues.

As to VOA, there is still some time before I leave here. If the Prime Minister is patient for another ten minutes' discussion, I want to explain how our government works. It will be important for him when we set up direct communications to understand who communicates with whom on what subject, what subjects should go in what channels, and what roles the various bureaucracies play. For example, it is very fortunate for our presence here that the Prime Minister has corresponded through President Yahya rather than through our Ambassador in Warsaw, which would have produced a quite different result. We will discuss this separately.

On continuing the VOA in Japan for two years, it didn't seem worth the bureaucratic fight to overrule what the bureaucracy had decided and agreed upon. That was the easiest thing to do. It didn't seem that important an issue. Had these conversations taken place between the Prime Minister and myself, or between Chairman Mao and the President, before the negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa, the result would have been different because we would have attached a different importance to the issue.

PM Chou: I did not intend to go into this matter today. It came to me just on the spur of the moment. However, it is not only an irritant to the Chinese people, but also to the people of the Far East and the Japanese people themselves.

Dr. Kissinger: I asked the Prime Minister to put questions to me which puzzle him, and I believe that this is one of the good results of this meeting.

PM Chou: That's right. I have come to understand not only your philosophy but also your actual policies. Because these actual policies represent the thinking of the President who has put them into effect; they have helped to explain the position of the U.S. at the present time. In this respect, I have paid particular attention to the talk given by your President at Kansas City on his way to San Clemente. It was long, especially that part on international affairs.

Dr. Kissinger: I haven't read it yet; I have been travelling.

PM Chou: We'll get you a copy.

Dr. Kissinger: When Ambassador Huang Hua comes to Canada, we will send him the latest Chinese statements.

PM Chou: So this concludes our discussion for tonight.

Tomorrow, depending on the weather, if we kept you in this house for talks without letting you take a look, as hosts we would feel uneasy. I suppose you will get up about 8:00 a.m., Peking time.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: So if the weather is good, we will ask you to take a look at China's former Imperial Place.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be most grateful.

PM Chou: It can be kept closed to the public for a short time in the morning. You can see two parts, the exhibition of various historical relics, and the Imperial Palace itself. Among the relics are antiques unearthed during the great proletarian cultural revolution in ten different provinces.

Dr. Kissinger: That sounds very interesting.

PM Chou: The relics are from 2000, 1000 years ago. The two parts should take two hours.

Dr. Kissinger: We are very grateful.

PM Chou: We can then continue our discussions. I invite you to a roast duck dinner at the People's Hall at noon.

If there is rain the tour is troublesome. An alternative would be to go together to the Summer Palace for boating in the evening after the people have left. So the alternative depends on the weather.

Dr. Kissinger: Then we will continue our discussions tomorrow.

PM Chou: Yes.

140. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China

Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada

Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Hsu-Chung-ching, Secretary to the Prime Minister, PRC

Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol, PRC

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.

Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
Chinese Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

(At the opening of this session, Prime Minister Chou and Dr. Kissinger informally discussed the tour of the Imperial Palace grounds that the American party had taken that morning. Dr. Kissinger said that it was a very moving and interesting experience. When Prime Minister Chou noted that it involved a lot of walking, Dr. Kissinger replied that with all the eating the Americans were doing, this was the minimum they could do. Prime Minister Chou explained that the first Great Hall that the Americans had seen was built about 600 years ago and the second one was built during the reign of the Third Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, during which the capital was moved from Nanking to Peking. Dr. Kissinger said that the buildings were very impressive, as were the symmetry of the courtyards and the relationship between the roofs and the courtyards which formed an ensemble. Prime Minister Chou noted that they had also seen antiques which had been unearthed, and Dr. Kissinger commented that the Director of Archeological Museums had been a very excellent guide. Dr. Kissinger confirmed that they had had a short break during their tour and were in good shape.)

PM Chou: Yesterday, although we were not able to go into all the seven issues raised and there was some that we did not touch, yet generally we went over the subjects. I should now like to give our opinion of the issues you raised yesterday in the same manner as you did when you began yesterday, that is, to give a brief general opinion, after which you can give your opinion. We will then still be free to exchange views. Then later on this afternoon, as you have agreed, we can give a summary of our views and have it recorded.

Dr. Kissinger: On the taping question, we should first agree on everything else and then see about the taping.² That presents a special problem for me.

PM Chou: Our suggestion was that we could record the opinions of each side in a concise way at the end, and summarize them and have them recorded for you to use to report to President Nixon. This would also be a rather concentrated report which I could deliver to our leader Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin Piao, and the Chinese Communist Party.

² Not further identified.

Dr. Kissinger: If there is agreement that this would be the only use and there would be no public use, that would be one thing. The difficulty with respect to public use is that between the two of us it is possible to do more privately than we can say publicly.

PM Chou: This would not be for public use. I have no such intention whatsoever.

Dr. Kissinger: I also would have a personal problem. As I told you, you will be so much more precise and better organized than I, that I would be shown up at a disadvantage. It is a point of vanity.

PM Chou: This may not be the truth, then, because you are younger and have more energy than I. Of course, we can talk about this later. First we can have free exchanges.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's have a discussion and agree on everything else. Then let us broach this in a constructive way. We can find a solution.

PM Chou: I would now like to answer the issues which you brought up at the beginning session and some of the issues you touched upon later.

From beginning to end yesterday, you constantly said that you wished the question of Indochina to be seen not only as an Indochinese question but also as an instance having a relationship to the general world situation.

Yesterday, you said that we should find a way to implement any overall agreements we had reached in a way beneficial to peace between our two countries in Asia and in the world.

This truly is the overall question. When we entered into the latter part of our discussion yesterday, I mentioned that the situation of the world after the Second World War was not one of relaxation; on the contrary, after the Second World War wars had never stopped. Although there was no world war, local wars existed including wars of resistance, wars of aggression, and civil wars. In your government documents, for example Lodge's Report (The Report of the President's Commission on the UN) this fact is also recognized.³ In reality, this is so. The report said that it can be said that such wars have almost never stopped since World War II. Can we say we can get rid of the present situation? Under present circumstances, this may not be quite so possible.

In his talks with the press en route to the West Coast, your President also admitted that in the past 25 years the situation has been tense. Have you received a copy of his remarks?

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you. I have had an opportunity to read it.

³ Submitted to President Nixon on April 26, 1971, and published in part in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 2, 1971, pp. 128–136. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume V.

PM Chou: Yesterday I also mentioned that Chairman Mao analyzed the situation since World War II, describing it as one in which two super powers are contending with each other to win over the first and second intermediate regions. This situation is becoming more active, and not relaxing. The desire which your President expressed was that the five forces which have emerged cease their military competition, and embark upon economic competition.

The first part of our answer will be that we do not consider ourselves a power. Although we are developing our economy, in comparison to others we are comparatively backward. Of course, your President also mentioned that in the next five to ten years, China will speedily develop. We think it will not be so soon, although we will try to go all out, aim high, and develop our socialist construction in a better, faster, and more economical way.

The second part of our answer is that when our economy is developed, we will still not consider ourselves a superpower and will not join in the ranks of the superpowers.

Can the situation now make a turn toward easing tensions? Yesterday I also answered this question, saying that our two sides should make an effort to ease tension in our relations. But may I say with respect to the timetable which you described yesterday, this does not seem to be possible. That is, the steps which you are taking in your withdrawal from Indochina and the relationship of this withdrawal to the normalization of relations between our two countries, as mentioned in the first message which your President sent to us through President Yahya Khan.

Dr. Kissinger: I am afraid I don't understand what the Prime Minister has in mind on the last point.

PM Chou: This was the President's oral message of November 1970,⁴ saying that he wished to move toward friendship with China. If you are going to move towards friendship, this should mean normalization of relations between our two countries. According to the opinion which you gave to us yesterday, you would withdraw all armed forces from the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits gradually within a fixed period, and only after that would you consider solving political questions. These would be left to your President's second term to be solved.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think I made myself clear. Political evolution can start concurrently with our military withdrawal. It will take a somewhat longer period of time, but it can start at the same time.

⁴ Apparent reference to the efforts of Sainteny and Walters to deliver messages to PRC representatives in Paris. No record of Walters' contact with the Chinese in 1970 has been found. See Documents 89 and 90 and footnote 2 thereto.

PM Chou: But when you mentioned political evolution, and moving toward friendship with us, the following must be included:

—It must be recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people.

—It must be recognized that Taiwan belongs to China; that it is an inalienable part of China which was returned to China after World War II.

—That, as you mentioned yesterday, the U.S. does not support a two Chinas or a one China, one Taiwan policy and does not support the so-called Taiwan Independence Movement.

—Also, as you pointed out explicitly yesterday, the spokesman of the Department of State no longer reiterates what he said, that the status of Taiwan is undetermined.

If all these questions should be left to a later period to be solved, however, wouldn't the intermediate period be one of tension? And if none of these issues were resolved during your President's visit, then what would be the result of his visit? Not only the people in our country but the people of the world would ask us this question and ask you that question. If the President's visit is decided and confirmed, there should be efforts to move in this direction. Of course, we do not set that as a precondition for the President's visit, but we believe that there must be a certain direction of efforts as a result of the visit, because we have always viewed the question of Taiwan as our internal affair which we must solve ourselves. And if these questions are just hung up, then the tension that has existed between our two sides will continue to remain.

In other words, tension is also chaos. In our view, in the twenty-five years since World War II, the world all along has been in turmoil, the present has not settled down and is still in turmoil. In the example which you mentioned yesterday, the possibility that India will attack Pakistan in South Asia, from news which we received today it seems that the tense atmosphere has been stepped up.

Dr. Kissinger: Has something new happened?

PM Chou: There has been more propaganda from the Indian side. I also said yesterday that we always believed that such a possibility existed. The question of India is a question in which you two big powers, the U.S. and the USSR, are taking a hand in.

Dr. Kissinger: We (the U.S.) are taking a hand?

PM Chou: You are taking an interest in this affair because, as you said yesterday, you warned India when you went there. Of course, the Soviet Union has also declared that it hopes the two sides (India and Pakistan) will reach conciliation. Didn't they (the Soviets) issue the so-called Tashkent Declaration before? But these are only superficial things. With India able to get such a large amount of military equipment, it will take expansionist turns.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, India doesn't get military equipment from us.

PM Chou: That's what I have heard, but you are giving Pakistan some equipment.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but so are you.

PM Chou: We do so because India is committing aggression against Pakistan. They have also committed aggression against us, too, as you said yesterday . . .⁵

Dr. Kissinger: No, you mentioned that.

PM Chou: . . . in accordance with Nehru's traditional thinking as expressed in the book, *The Discovery of India*. So with respect to the issue of the South Asian subcontinent, this region continues to be in turmoil and is not settling down. The turmoil in East Pakistan in a very great way is due to India. The so-called Government of Bangla Desh set up its headquarters in India. Isn't that subversion of the Pakistani Government?

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister doesn't think that we are cooperating with this, does he?

PM Chou: I would not like to draw a conclusion on that at present, but simply want to point out the phenomenon—we cannot but pay attention to this. Perhaps our attention will be even greater than yours. This issue is before our eyes.

When we talk about the tensions in South Asia, this is to say nothing about the Middle East, Europe, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea or the Atlantic. And what about this side of the Pacific, aren't there many military maneuvers in the Sea of Japan? On this very day joint U.S.–Japan maneuvers have taken place. Of course the Soviet Union is very tense about all this; there is mutual tension.

With respect to Indochina, according to the withdrawal plan which you described yesterday, you cannot accept the proposal put forward by Mme. Binh in its entirety?

Dr. Kissinger: Not entirely, but we can accept a substantial part.

PM Chou: According to what we discussed yesterday, there is the possibility that, through your strengthening the Saigon Government and the Lon Nol/Sirik Matak regime by military equipment, and because you left that "tail" behind, the civil war will expand.

Dr. Kissinger: Not increase, decrease.

PM Chou: But yesterday you also said that if the Vietnamese people did not accept your plan and allow you to withdraw according to

⁵ All ellipses in the source text.

your plan, then the war will certainly continue and the result would be incalculable consequences.

Dr. Kissinger: I will let the Prime Minister speak first and make my comments afterward.

PM Chou: The Taiwan question is the same.

When I mentioned the Japanese question yesterday, and talked about the ambitions of the Japanese militarists, I was not only thinking of Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam but also of Northeast China, Indochina and the Philippines and areas way up to the Straits of Malacca which the Japanese regard as their lifeline. Thus there is a great possibility that before the U.S. forces have withdrawn from these areas and from Taiwan, armed forces of Japan shall enter. Entry into Taiwan would be possible because Japan and Taiwan still have a treaty, concluded with Chiang Kai-shek—the so-called Peace Treaty, and they are now stressing that fact.

All this is to say, that due to the development of history in the past 25 years, powder kegs have been set up everywhere. According to our philosophy, wherever there is oppression, there will be resistance. You have referred to Chairman Mao's theories of people's war in this connection, but such resistance is stimulated by your oppression, your subversion, and your intervention. Another aspect to be mentioned is the contention between the two superpowers. As a result, according to the objective facts the world is not moving toward relaxation of tensions, but on the contrary it continues in turmoil. This is precisely why we are digging air raid shelters here. I was using more diplomatic language yesterday.

Dr. Kissinger: You wouldn't tell me whom they are against.

PM Chou: I would like to tell you today in a more forthright manner, because if we are going to dig air raid shelters, we must think about the consequences. You like to talk about philosophy. The worst would be that China would be carved up once again. You could unite, with the USSR occupying all areas north of the Yellow River, and you occupying all the areas south of the Yangtse River, and the eastern section between these two rivers could be left to Japan. In the past Japan has been interested in Shantung and Chingtao; it also has been interested in Shanghai. It had been to all these places before when Japan committed aggression against China. You are familiar with that.

If such a large maneuver should occur, what would the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao be prepared to do? We would be prepared to resist for a protracted period by people's warfare, engaging in a long-term struggle until final victory. This would take time and, of course, we would have to sacrifice lives, but this is something which we would have to contemplate.

Of course, you can say that such things will never happen. Friends from Europe say that the Soviets will not attack. We say that we will never provoke an attack, but once they enter our borders, we must be prepared. We have to be prepared for attacks from all sides including from India as in 1962 or even on a greater scale. We shall use this to educate our peoples with the result that all issues will be solved. We will also educate the next generation, and guarantee that after victory a socialist country will emerge which is able to be truly developed without outside assistance.

Perhaps you have read some of Chairman Mao's poetry. Perhaps not. When he returned to his native town in 1959 after having been away 32 years, he wrote a poem in which there are these two lines: "It is the bitter sacrifices that strengthen our firm resolve, and which give us the courage to dare to change heavens and skies, to change the sun, and to make a new world." That is, we must be prepared to make even greater sacrifices to consolidate our new China.

I believe that this is the same case with the Vietnamese people and Indochinese people—they think in similar terms. As I mentioned yesterday, the Vietnamese people have made up their minds that if they are not allowed to live in peace they would be willing to sacrifice another million men and fight on to the end. Ho Chi Minh himself said before he died that he would not allow a single foreign soldier, that is, American soldier, to remain on Vietnamese soil and would fight on to victory. Therefore, this situation of great turmoil in the world exists, and no matter what you think, the objective situation develops in this way.

American friends always like to stress the dignity, the honor, and the face of the U.S. As I mentioned yesterday, the best thing for you would be to withdraw all your armed forces lock, stock, and barrel and withdraw all other foreign forces and do so on your own initiative. That would be the greatest honor. If you continue to want to leave a "tail" behind, then the Vietnamese people and the other Indochinese peoples will be able to say that you have something up your sleeve and will not be able to accept such a proposition. Also, as I mentioned yesterday, there have been 25 years since the Vietnamese people began their resistance against the French. In their relations with you, your aggression and oppression in South Vietnam has been going on for ten years now. If you proceed from the standpoint of equality with all countries, no matter big or small, you should also have respect for the dignity, honor and glory of the Vietnamese people. When we discuss what you call philosophy, we should view the objective world of developments in a cool manner.

Because of this, I have first touched upon the seventh issue which you mentioned yesterday, the general world situation first. In the messages which we exchanged between our two sides it was said that the

two sides could discuss any subjects they desired to raise. There are also many other detailed questions, but most are included within the major issues. We believe that at present there is chaos under heaven, and believe that in the past 25 years there has been a process of great upheaval, great division, and great reorganization. Your President also said (in Kansas City) that 25 years ago you could not imagine that the present situation could emerge. He also said that in the remaining third of the century that efforts should be made to cease military competition and to embark upon economic competition. However, economic competition in itself involves economic expansion, and then will necessarily lead to military expansion. Japan is the most telling case in point, but the danger may not be less in the case of West Germany in relation to Europe.

Yesterday I also mentioned the USSR. The Soviet Union is following your suit, in stretching its hands all over the world. You said that you were triggered by the Soviet Union's probing throughout the world. No matter whether there is a case of contention or a case of being triggered, anyway there is a situation of tension, of turmoil. This is the objective situation. If we look at the development of the objective world in a cool-headed manner, then we are called upon through our subjective efforts to attempt to undo some of the knots.

As you mentioned, there are links between the Taiwan question and the Indochina question. But the alternative that you put forward yesterday means dragging the situation on—going one step and waiting to see before embarking on the next. The result would be, before solving a question that you complicate it to such a degree that you would reach a certain point at which you would be unable to halt the course of events. For example on Taiwan. If you cannot determine your policy of moving toward a policy of friendship with the People's Republic of China, and put forward a very clear plan, but take one step and look before taking the next step, then the consequence would be that Japan would go into Taiwan and have a hand. This would be because if you withdrew part of your troops and wait to see what would happen next, Chiang Kai-shek would know what you were doing and would seek another way out even though he says himself that he is opposed to a policy of two Chinas, a one China, one Taiwan solution, or Taiwan independence, and opposes the fallacy that the status of Taiwan is unsettled. If he feels that the U.S. is⁶ unreliable, he could go to Japan, and Japan itself wants to be drawn into Taiwan and already considers Taiwan within its security sphere. Chiang Kai-shek is not only a single person but has others below him, and they could come up with various different proposals.

⁶ A handwritten correction changes "in" to "is."

Once your policy becomes fuzzy, and his policy is not able to be in accordance with yours, he will try to find a loophole and seek another way out.

Therefore, the Taiwan question is a very small matter to you. As you said, it was created by President Truman, and what use is Taiwan to you at the present moment? Taiwan is not an isolated issue, but is related to recognition of the People's Republic of China, and it is also related to the relations of all other countries to China. If your President were to come to the PRC without a clearcut attitude on this issue, then what impression would this give to the world? In my view, it would be inconceivable.

The second question is Indochina. As I have said we support and have formally stated our support for Mme. Binh's seven point proposal. Yesterday we discussed the crucial question of your leaving Indochina and also recalling all troops of other countries that went into Indochina with you. As for your two puppets, there is no need to pay any attention to them, and there is no sense giving any assistance to them because this can only do you discredit and not add anything to your honor, but on the contrary do dishonor to you. Only by leaving Indochina can you win honor. Of course, if you are able to change the puppets, and promote the establishment of a coalition government, that would be even better. If they will not agree, then if you just pay no attention to them they will collapse of their own accord. This can be said with certainty. This will be the case for Thieu and would be the same for the Lon Nol–Sirik Matak regime. By doing this you would be making an effort to change the turmoil of the objective world and let it settle down. If you do otherwise, and let things drag on messily, the only result would be ever greater turmoil for the world and the war would flare up again in the area even though you had withdrawn. If you still leave a "tail" there of experts and advisers, you will still have to protect them and history will repeat itself. Of course, history never repeats itself, though, and if the war flares up again in that area, the consequences will be even worse and you will be even more unpopular. You mentioned "incalculable consequences." These consequences are not incalculable for the Indochinese people, but only for the U.S. people.

The third question we discussed yesterday was Japan. In our opinion, Japanese militarism is being revived at present. This revival of Japanese militarism is being encouraged and supported by the 1969 statement issued between your two countries.⁷ The total sum to be spent in Japan's fourth defense plan is equal to more than half of the total sum of the previous three plans. It is one and a half times all the

⁷ Apparent reference to the joint statement made by Nixon and Sato, November 21, 1969. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 953–957.

three previous plans. The fourth plan is more than \$16 billion, while the whole total amount of the previous three plans was a little more than \$10 billion. According to findings by two U.S. Congressmen who went to Japan to attend the U.S.–Japanese Parliamentary discussions, the strength that Japan wants to build up during the fourth defense plan greatly exceeds Japan's own needs. The findings also revealed that according to Japan's present economic strength, Japan would not need five years to fulfill the fourth defense plan, but only two to three years to rearm itself. Sato himself has acknowledged this. With respect to the question of Japan, yesterday both we and you mentioned some dangers of a revival of militarism there.

You say yesterday that the withdrawal of troops from South Korea could only be realized during the latter part of the President's second term.

Dr. Kissinger: I said *during* the President's second term, and that it would begin fairly soon.

PM Chou: If you put it that way, you can say it has already begun because you have pulled out 20,000 troops already.

Dr. Kissinger: I said it would continue. I am not trying to win legalistic arguments with the Prime Minister.

PM Chou: Of course, that's not the main point.

The fourth issue was the South Asian subcontinent. In our opinion, if India continues on its present course in disregard of world opinion, it will continue to go on recklessly. We, however, support the stand of Pakistan. This is known to the world. If they (the Indians) are bent on provoking such a situation, then we cannot sit idly by. On May Day 1970 Chairman Mao met the Indian Chargé on the Tien An Men, and he suggested that we exchange ambassadors speedily. Actually, that could have been done, and we are prepared to do it now. They asked us to send our ambassador first, which was no great problem, but they have been spreading rumors throughout the world that they are going to seek out the Chinese for negotiations and there haven't been any. They are just spreading rumors. We also learned something about that during the latter part of the rule of Nehru.

Of course, when one speaks of the South Asian subcontinent, this means mainly India and Pakistan. However, China also has a part there. You said you were pressing India not to provoke a disturbance, and we also believe that you would like to improve your relations with Pakistan. I believe that you probably did say to India what you told us. We also support your opinion, that is advise India not to provoke such a disturbance, because President Yahya Khan is most concerned about the situation. For its part, Pakistan would never provoke a disturbance against India because in all military fields Pakistan is in a weaker position than India. There is still one special characteristic in

this situation: the morale and fighting capacity of Pakistan is greater than India. We can bear witness to that because we have had contacts in such a sense with India, and if India is going to go ahead and provoke disturbances in the subcontinent, then India itself will be the victim. India, I believe, is one of the countries most heavily in debt, and it is also well known that the life of the Indian people is not easy—if such a disturbance is created, they will be the victims. Those who will suffer will also be the rulers of India. That is the fourth issue.

On the fifth issue, communications between us, I would like to speak later on.

The sixth issue is arms control. You cited as an example of this question the proposal for a five-nation nuclear conference. I can answer Your Excellency now officially. The Chinese Government completely disapproves of the proposition of the Soviet government to hold a five-power nuclear conference. They are trying to lasso us. We didn't take part in the tripartite treaty on partial nuclear test bans in 1963 and we didn't take part in any later treaties or agreements on outer space, etc., because we do not believe that this is in accordance with the basic problem, which is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons which we advocate. Some people have asked us, since we have taken such a stand, why we are testing nuclear weapons. We must say very frankly that we do so to break the nuclear monopoly and to fight against the nuclear blackmail of certain great powers. All our nuclear tests have been held under the condition that they are necessary, and are limited. We do not engage in indiscriminate nuclear testing and every time we test, we make a statement that we will never be the first to use them. What we say counts. What we propose is that all nations of the world, whether large or small, should come together to discuss this problem and reach agreement on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and as a first step, should reach agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. It won't do to try to lasso us. The Soviet Union has such a scheme. That is our answer to the sixth question.

I would like to say a few words about the disarmament conference.

Dr. Kissinger: Which one?

PM Chou: The Geneva Conference, which, of course, includes the SALT talks. We don't know the content in your SALT talks, and the only thing we know is that your defense budget rises every year and the result is that the more you talk about disarmament, the more armaments expand and that adds to the disquiet, the turmoil of the world. I am not prepared, I do not intend, to go into any more detail on that.

I would like to go back to the fifth issue, further communication. Since Your Excellency has come to China in the capacity of the President's special envoy to have a free exchange of views, we would be

willing to continue in such a manner of a free exchange of views. But to have these communications in the capital of a third country, no matter how much care is taken, secrecy is hard to maintain.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree completely.

PM Chou: Therefore, we would welcome Your Excellency coming again, and we will do our best to accommodate you. If you yourself or the President picks another representative in whom you also have confidence, we would be willing to welcome him as your representative, to stay maybe not only two days but to remain a longer period of time. He could discuss things for a period and then go back. Or if he would like to stay here for a period and investigate things in China, we would welcome this too. Aren't there Soviet representatives in China talking over the border question? However, I feel it would perhaps be easier for us to talk, because we have told you everything. And I believe you will also tell us your opinion. The question between us is particularly that of Taiwan, the only question between us two, although of course there are other issues. We are raising what the President said in his first message about our moving toward friendship. Because we are moving towards friendship we believe we should normalize our relations and should be able to continue our discussions in accordance with such relations.

The final issue you mentioned yesterday is how to draw up an announcement which could be made public after you go back to the U.S. on a date which both sides could release simultaneously and with the same wording. I would like to hear your opinion on that.

What I have just now said is the answer I would like to give to what was said yesterday.

There are two ways we can now proceed, if you would like to consider them. We could first have lunch and then continue discussions after that. Or we could continue immediately. Or you could say one half of what you want and then take a break for lunch. I don't want it to be a one-sided talk. That would be unequal, and therefore we could hear some of your words first before we have our meal.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I appreciate the frankness with which you have spoken and the completeness of your presentation. Perhaps, if you agree, I will give my answers to you now. Given the scope of your presentation, it is conceivable that something will occur to me during lunch, and I hope you will permit me to speak also later. One of my personal tragedies is that ideas occur to me after the occasion to use them has past.

PM Chou: It doesn't matter—you can say what you want later on.

Dr. Kissinger: But I would like to reply now. You, Mr. Prime Minister, followed very faithfully the presentation which I made yesterday, and dealt with both topics, that is the visit of the President, and each

of the other topics I put down to narrow our differences on substantive matters.

As for the visit of President Nixon to Peking, you will remember that this idea resulted first from your initiative which we are happy to accept, and therefore, of course, you must decide when the time is opportune and when it is not opportune. If you judge that the time is opportune now, then this is a better opportunity to agree on it than through whatever other channels which we will need to rely upon after my departure and which would be more complicated, bureaucratic and less related to the general direction of our policies. But since this is your invitation, I will say no more about it and we will have to decide at the end of our discussion whether this is an item we would wish to include in our announcement if there is an announcement.

With respect to the specific issues we have discussed, there are several categories—some issues where we disagree in principle, and some issues we agree upon in principle but disagree on the timing of events. There are issues where I believe we agree in substance but where you seem to blame us for an evolution of events which we are not directing, for instance the possibility of Japanese expansionism. And there are also issues of the general philosophy of where the world finds itself, which you, Mr. Prime Minister, have put in every eloquent and very moving terms.

It is obvious that two countries which have been isolated from each other as we have for such a long period of time face a major problem in re-establishing first, normalcy, and then friendship. In this, it is necessary to be both patient and understanding with each other. We should not destroy what is possible by forcing events beyond what the circumstances will allow.

With this as background, let me turn to your points with respect to Taiwan. First, I would like to remind you, Mr. Prime Minister, that during this Administration both in your communications to the President and in the two Ambassadorial meetings at Warsaw, you mentioned only our military presence on Taiwan and in the area of the Taiwan Straits, and I have come with what we believe is a forthcoming answer to the demands which you made on this issue.

PM Chou: But does that mean you are only prepared to withdraw your military presence, and are not prepared to move toward friendship between two countries, that is diplomatic relations? It seems to me that this is a contradiction, because a normal consequence of improving relations is diplomatic relations. This was also mentioned in the Ambassadorial meetings. Recently you have in fact been referring to us as the People's Republic of China, and we refer to you as the United States of America. Doesn't that imply normal relations? Your President refers to us publicly in these terms.

Dr. Kissinger: I haven't finished what I have to say, and the Prime Minister is criticizing me for incompleteness, and not for the substance of my views. To answer your question, we deliberately referred to you as the People's Republic of China for the first time in a public document of the United States as a symbol of the direction we want to go, and therefore you understand us correctly, that is we want normalization and we want friendship.

While I have been here, the Prime Minister has mentioned four other points:

- Recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China;
- Recognition of Taiwan as belonging to China;
- Accepting the proposition that we do not support two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan;
- Not supporting the Taiwan Independence Movement.

PM Chou: In your words yesterday, you said that you did not support two Chinas or the policy of one China, one Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: That's correct.

PM Chou: And when I mentioned yesterday that when the State Department spokesman referred to Taiwan as territory whose status was not settled, you said he had not repeated that.

Dr. Kissinger: This was not by accident.

PM Chou: Precisely.

Dr. Kissinger: Is this your fifth point?

PM Chou: It is also your answer to what I mentioned, and you can count it as a fifth point. If you are going to move toward friendship and normal relations, the logical outcome is that we must recognize each other; otherwise how would we be able to have exchanges? But when you asked me yesterday whether we considered recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government as a precondition to the President's visit, I said this was not absolute.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me state my view.

PM Chou: What must be determined is whether you are willing to move toward the establishment of normal relations.

Dr. Kissinger: Therefore, let me state our views. I will say something on each of the five points, but let me say something more fundamental first; we'll never be able to escape the morass of all the issues we have mentioned unless we separate fundamentals from details. If you, Mr. Prime Minister, and I, or even more importantly, Chairman Mao and the President, agree on a fundamental course, then we will know what will happen and then the only issue remaining is "when." A visit by President Nixon to Chairman Mao has, of course, a considerable substantive significance, but it also has a tremendous symbolic significance because

it would make clear that normal relations were inevitable; otherwise there would be no point of such a visit. It would be our understanding that they would agree on the timing, with some steps to be taken in this term and the remaining steps in the first half of the next term.

Of the five points which the Prime Minister mentioned, four can be accomplished within the near future. I am sure that the President would be prepared to repeat to Chairman Mao, as I have told you, that we will not support the Taiwan Independence Movement. I am sure that he will repeat that we will not support one China, one Taiwan.

PM Chou: Nor a policy of two Chinas.

Dr. Kissinger: I was coming to that—the Prime Minister is always one step ahead of me.

PM Chou: Because it is a serious issue for us, an outstanding issue for 25 years.

Dr. Kissinger: I am sure that the President will repeat he will not support a two Chinas solution. And therefore with respect to the Prime Minister's second point, that Taiwan belongs to China, this will take care of itself as a result of the other three points.

Therefore, the only issue that we will have to leave until after the elections is the formal acceptance of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China. Nevertheless, the direction is obvious.

PM Chou: But there will be a contradiction in this, which I don't know how you will solve. There will be people among you who will want to recognize the People's Republic of China, while in the world arena the number of countries which have recognized New China or wish to recognize it is increasing. Even a greater number of people in various countries wish to do so. Such a situation will also appear in international organizations. What are you going to do?

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to raise this point as a practical matter with the Prime Minister, as a matter of fact. First, let me say—

PM Chou: But I was just going to say that this is a substantive matter.

Dr. Kissinger: It means the same thing. Obviously, if our two heads of government determine to move toward normal relations and friendship, they will do so without trickery because on this matter of great import and on all other matters we must deal on a basis of good faith because so much else depends on it.

What has occurred to us with respect to the international organizations issue is the following formula: we would be willing to agree that the admission of the People's Republic of China can be by a majority vote, and we would withdraw our view that it should be an important question. We would say that the expulsion of other countries

now in the UN, with seats now in the UN, should be by a two-thirds vote.

In this manner, you would be able to take the Security Council's seat allocated to China, and as soon as you can get the two-thirds vote for expulsion, you would be the only representative of China in the UN. Indeed, you would get the China seat now.

In other words, we would solve the contradiction before our public by withdrawing our opposition to entry of the People's Republic of China. But we have not yet announced this because as a sign of our good will, the President wanted me to discuss this matter with you before we adopted a position.

PM Chou: Your Excellency must know that we do not consider the matter of reclaiming our seat in the UN as such an urgent matter. We have gone through this for 21 years, and we have lived through it. Even if war should break out again, we should be able to live through it. Therefore, we do not attach any importance to the UN question, and I didn't mention it yesterday. But as you analysed it just now, we find that you will be in a contradiction if it is not solved.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no question that the course I have outlined will present us with a dilemma and a surface contradiction. The important point is that if both countries know where we are going, it will only be a question of time until the end result is acknowledged.

PM Chou: There is also the question of world public opinion. It's easier for us here, because we don't have to hold a press conference every week and can wait maybe a half year before giving our answer. Although perhaps now the situation may change.

Dr. Kissinger: If our decision is to adopt the course which you and I have discussed, whatever formal public position we would take, would be free of the hostility toward the PRC which has prevailed over the past because we would be working toward cooperation and friendship and not isolation. That we can guarantee.

PM Chou: But the following question will come up. If you adopt such a formula, we won't pay much attention to it, but to people who ask for our attitude we will of course say that all of China's legitimate rights in the UN must be restored. Even in your country many correspondents and politicians will agree with our attitude, and the result is that you will call for a two-thirds majority in order to expel a regime which represents no one. You will be criticized by public opinion for that. We will not be able to agree to such a formula. How could we agree?

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't think that you could agree. This is simply a stage on the way.

PM Chou: But when people come to ask for our attitude, we will have to proclaim to the world that we are against it, and then where

will you be? First of all, when the proposal of countries which support us is put forward, there will naturally be debate. Yesterday I didn't want to raise this question, but since today you are willing to confirm these points, that you are willing to let relations between our two countries move toward normalization, therefore we will have to face the objective facts which will occur later in the latter half of this year. For example, if your well-known friend Mr. Reston asks me about this, of course I will have to say to him what I have said to you. He isn't coming now. He's on the way.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that his journey to Peking will take him just as long as my presence here.

PM Chou: He's coming by rail.

Dr. Kissinger: He will probably complain about the slow train service.

PM Chou: No matter. We can say that we are more backward.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me tell you first my assessment of American public opinion. Under this formula, we would vote for the admission of the People's Republic of China, but against the expulsion of Taiwan. We could also stick to the present formula, just changing nothing. On this, frankly, I can tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, what a diplomat couldn't tell you, if he were here.

PM Chou: We are not engaged in a diplomatic dialogue.

Dr. Kissinger: Right. For us there is a practical problem of how to reach normalization of relations which cannot be done this year or next year, but which can be done in the first two years of the President's next term. As I have pointed out, the readiness of the President to accept your suggestion is itself symbolic of where we want to go. If Mr. Reston asks you about this matter, you will of course express your opinion; that's all right with us. (Chou nods.) That is, as long as you don't use too many adjectives to describe the President (laughter on the Chinese side). Have I made myself clear on the issue of Taiwan, or is there anything more I should say?

PM Chou: You were just now mentioning one thing—that Taiwan began to be put under the protection of the U.S. under President Truman. In other words, that is how the occupation occurred. Now, however, when you withdraw military forces, you need to do so in steps, and you will also have to establish normal diplomatic relations with us in steps. Then you will have the responsibility of not letting Taiwan loose, not letting Japan have a hand in meddling in the affairs of Taiwan, and not letting an independence movement break out in Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me answer with a number of views. I was going to come to the question of Japan's relations with Taiwan anyway. We will strongly oppose any Japanese military presence on Taiwan.

With respect to the Taiwan Independence Movement, we will give no support, either direct or indirect. If you have any reliable information to the contrary, get it to me and I will see that whatever is going on is stopped. (Chou nods.) We cannot be responsible for things which may happen without American encouragement, without American support, without American participation. But we will give it no support in any form whatsoever. I repeat, if you have information to the contrary, get it to me and we will stop whatever is going on.

I would like to make one other U.S. domestic political point. The only President who could conceivably do what I am discussing with you is President Nixon. Other political leaders might use more honey-eyed words, but would be destroyed by what is called the China lobby in the U.S. if they ever tried to move even partially in the direction which I have described to you. President Nixon, precisely because his political support comes from the center and right of center, cannot be attacked from that direction, and won't be attacked by the left in a policy of moving toward friendship with the People's Republic of China. You can see that I am speaking to you with great frankness. If you repeat this to Mr. Reston, I will have to ask for a job as an adviser in your Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Considerable laughter from the Chinese.)

PM Chou: Would you imagine that I would say such a thing to him?

Dr. Kissinger: I have complete confidence in you.

PM Chou: And you will also understand why it was when President Nixon expressed willingness to come to China for a visit, we expressed willingness to invite him. You have read Edgar Snow's article and from this will know that we believe the President does have the desire to resolve issues of relations between China and the U.S. Of course, he must rely on his advisers, such as you, to work out the ways to do so. Therefore, you can see a lot of politicians we have not invited to come here. I have a great pile of letters from them on my desk asking for invitations, which I have not answered.

Dr. Kissinger: What you have done is greatly appreciated by President Nixon.

PM Chou: This is done under the instructions and wisdom of Chairman Mao.

Dr. Kissinger: I think to get this new course firmly established, this is a wise policy. We think, in fact, that the new direction toward cooperation and friendship should be inaugurated personally by President Nixon, after which all other contacts could take a normal pattern. This will prevent this issue from becoming a political football. (Chou nods.)

PM Chou: And there are many such things like that in your country.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: After Chairman Mao heard of the directions set by your President, he particularly wanted to meet with him because he could be able to talk about anything with him.

Dr. Kissinger: This is exactly our view. This is also why President Nixon believes that fundamental changes in our relationship should be inaugurated at the highest level. Then there will be full confidence on both sides that the things talked about will be carried out.

PM Chou: So I believe the second item which you wanted to go into is Indochina, which is also very long. I suggest rest now and relaxation. Otherwise, you will be under tension and the duck will be cold.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be the most calamitous. Tension we can take.

(The two sides then broke for lunch at 2:35 p.m.)

During the roast duck luncheon Prime Minister Chou wanted to know if Dr. Kissinger had heard about China's Cultural Revolution. When Dr. Kissinger remarked that this was the internal affair of the People's Republic of China, Chou said that, no, he wanted to tell about it.

He called attention to Edgar Snow's interview with Mao Tse-tung in *LIFE* as being generally accurate concerning the purposes and results of the Cultural Revolution, even though Snow had not been correct on some other points in this article. As Snow had said, Chairman Mao and others had not foreseen the extent of the disturbances, and in fact some members of the People's Liberation Army had sacrificed their lives. The struggle between the two lines had indeed been very serious. However, the opponents of the Cultural Revolution had ultimately been struck down, including Liu Shao-chi who was the leader of the oppositionists, with the result that China was now firmly guided by the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

In conveying this message Chou was deadly serious. He appeared to be genuinely anguished when talking about the difficulties which had cropped up during the Cultural Revolution, and sincere in his belief that whatever had occurred, it had been all to the good, in terms of keeping alive the revolutionary spirit and striking at bureaucratization.

The formal meeting then resumed at 4:10 p.m.)

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, let me continue with the points you raised, which actually followed the ones I mentioned first yesterday.

With respect to the problem of Indochina, I believe I have already explained to the Prime Minister what our essential position is. But I would like to add that this is one of the cases where other nations, particularly those with whom we are beginning to cooperate, might look at our problem with understanding and patience.

We realize your experience in 1954 leads you to the belief that if there is any of what the Prime Minister calls a tail left behind, it will leave us with an opportunity to re-enter the situation. But in view of the experiences we have since made, and in view of the changed philosophy which I explained to the Prime Minister last evening, this is not, and cannot be, our purpose.

What we require is a transition period between the military withdrawal and the political evolution. Not so that we can re-enter, but so that we can let the people of Vietnam and of other parts of Indochina determine their own fate.

Even in that interim period, we are prepared to accept restrictions on the types of assistance that can be given to the countries of Indochina. And if no country of Indochina is prepared to accept outside military aid, then we are even prepared to consider eliminating all military aid.

I have told the Prime Minister yesterday, and I am willing to repeat this, that if after complete American withdrawal, the Indochinese people change their governments, the U.S. will not interfere.

The United States will abide by the determination of the will of the people.

The Prime Minister spoke of the million people that the Vietnamese will be prepared to lose. What I am trying to tell the Prime Minister is that there need not be another million people lost.

We are prepared to make peace quickly if it can be done within the framework I have mentioned. But if the Prime Minister has another proposal regarding the transition period, or if Hanoi has another proposal, we are prepared to consider it.

PM Chou: I discussed this matter just a moment ago, and also yesterday. That is we support the seven point proposal put forward by Madame Binh of the PRG of South Vietnam. And Your Excellency mentioned yesterday that you are willing to set a fixed time limit for the withdrawal of forces and the dismantling of all military bases. I would just like to say that how you fix this time, that is for you to negotiate with the people of Vietnam and not for us to speak on their behalf.⁸

Our hope, however, in this problem is that you will leave completely and not leave behind any tail, including any technical advisers. And, secondly, the demand of the Vietnamese that the regime fostered

⁸ Nixon drew parallel lines beside this paragraph.

by you be removed, as to how to remove it, this also is for you to discuss with the Vietnamese, and we won't interfere.⁹

Yesterday, you expressed appreciation for point 5 of Madame Binh's seven point proposal. That of course is a matter for you to solve in talks with them. As for us we support their proposal.

We support them. So long as the war does not cease, we will continue our support. This support is not only for the people of Vietnam, but also the people of Cambodia and Laos. Of course, you are aware of comments they have made that they fight together on the same battlefield.

But, as for what system they adopt, and what final solution they achieve after they overthrow reactionary regimes, that is a matter for them to decide themselves and we will not intervene.

We advocate that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from those countries where they are stationed and that the people of those nations be allowed to solve their problems any way they choose, whether there is a revolution or not. That is the right of these people and not outsiders. This is our basic position whether you like it or not. On this point there is a difference of principle between us. You said that if a regime should be subverted by an outside force, then you would intervene.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: Then there must be a mistake in the record.

(At this point there was some confusion on the Chinese side and some discussion of what the U.S. had said the day before.)

You mean that this was your position in the past? You mentioned yesterday that when a country could not stand up to a super-power, then you would intervene. What is the scope of this statement?

If we follow this principle that you put forward yesterday, then you are engaged in a war in Vietnam now which we consider aggression, and it could spread to Cambodia and Laos. Then, accepting your same principle, we could send in troops; and then we would be face to face. That is the problem.

Our way is to ask you to go and to let them choose by themselves their own system through negotiations.

If there is no possibility of negotiations, we are opposed to any aggression, for example, as did the Soviets against Czechoslovakia. Or, as you say, if in circumstances where the victim is weak and unable to resist, you should send troops to another country, we would also express opposition to this.

⁹ Nixon underlined the final clause in this sentence.

For example, now, Soviet troops are in the Mongolian People's Republic. We are opposed. They pose a threat to us. We are opposed to that, but we do not adopt the practice of also sending troops to fight. But if these troops pass through the territory of the MPR to invade even one inch of our territory, then we would immediately resist and fight back.¹⁰

Korea is somewhat different. Up to now there is only an armistice agreement. So now China is meeting every week at the military demarcation line. There are still constant incidents and clashes along the DMZ.

On the side of South Korea are your representatives and also the representatives of Park. On the North Korean side there are the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and also China. So the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has a point in feeling that it is a rather tense truce. Your troops are still in South Korea. And other countries still have token forces, though probably not many.

Under these circumstances, of course, the Democratic Republic of Korea would find it rather tense. Originally, a peace treaty was to be concluded in 1954 at the Geneva Conference but it was opposed by Dulles and then by his deputy, General Walter Bedell Smith.

And so the roots of discord are left there. So the Democratic Republic of Korea has grounds for feeling ill at ease. Because they don't know when the other side will attack them.

So the situation is such as I said before lunch, that the world is still in upheaval, and that is why we emphasize again and again why it is not possible to relax in Indochina.

But at the same time we made clear that if the situation does not relax in Indochina, we must continue to give aid to Indochina and first of all Vietnam. Because they indeed have suffered very serious losses the past ten years and are very heroic people.

Indeed, we hope very much you can come to some real understanding in your Paris discussions. But we cannot say that it will be possible for you to reach resolution very quickly.

Although you are occupying Taiwan, yet there is not war there. So we can go on discussing with you for over 15 years. Of course, such a state of affairs should not continue.

But in Vietnam there is still a war there, and people die and are wounded every day. So you must consider both possibilities: One is success in negotiation and the other is failure.

¹⁰ Nixon drew parallel lines beside this paragraph.

And we believe that through putting forward the seven point proposal by Mme. Binh the positions of the two sides should get closer together.

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask the Prime Minister a question? Does the Prime Minister also consider North Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia as foreign troops that should also be withdrawn?

PM Chou: That is their matter. You made them fight together.

Dr. Kissinger: But under conditions of peace?

PM Chou: That will be solved by them. It is stipulated in the Communiqué of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese People, which said that after the war questions of peace will be settled by the people of those countries themselves and territorial limits restored to what they were beforehand. This can be decided only after the civil war stops in those countries.

Why are the Indochinese people so interested in your getting rid of Thieu and Lon Nol-Sirik Matak? Because they are archcriminals with regard to the people of their own country. In a general sense, it is you who are responsible for them. As for the Indochina Accords, they were long ago torn up by the U.S., and there is no possibility of any discussion of that.

So we can only discuss our two principles which I mentioned and it is impossible to return to the Geneva Agreements. From the very beginning the U.S. sabotaged them. It would be ludicrous to want us to guarantee something you had already torn up. So we can only guarantee formally that all foreign forces should withdraw from Indochina and the three Indochinese people should solve their own questions by themselves.¹¹

Dr. Kissinger: It is probably not very fruitful to pursue this discussion because we have stated our points of view. There are two things the Prime Minister should keep in mind. One is a technical issue. There are two proposals from the other side. One is the seven point proposal of Madame Binh, and the other is the secret nine point proposal which Hanoi has recently made. They are not exactly identical. I will not bother the Prime Minister with that difference because they are substantially the same.

The second point is this: I will talk to the nine points when I see the North Vietnamese because this is what they presented to me. We believe that either the nine or the seven points, if interpreted in a flexible spirit, can offer many bases for negotiations.

¹¹ Nixon drew parallel lines beside this paragraph.

So we will not reject the whole program. We believe that if the other side approaches the negotiation in good spirit, good will, and some understanding of common purposes, negotiations can succeed.

We are not asking the People's Republic of China to stop giving aid to its friends, nor am I asking the Prime Minister what he may discuss privately with his Allies.

I do want you to understand that the two principles he mentioned to us, or that the seven or nine points given to us, could offer a basis for negotiation, if there is some flexibility and some willingness to look at the needs of the other side.

We are in complete accord with the Prime Minister that a rapid end to the war in Indochina would ease all the other problems we are now discussing. We will approach negotiations in that spirit.

Does the Prime Minister want to say something, or should I go to the other issues he raised?

PM Chou: There are still some different points of view on our two sides on Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: That is quite correct.

PM Chou: We have expressed our views.

As for the seven point proposal of Madame Binh, our newspapers expressed our country's support. We believe that it is possible to bring about a rapprochement on the basis of this seven point program.

It is because, as Your Excellency said, that there would be incalculable consequences if the war is not stopped, that I discussed the possible turmoil that could continue.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand, Mr. Prime Minister.

PM Chou: As for guarantees, we only express our political attitude toward the two points. We consider the Geneva Agreements a thing of the past. As for the other matters, it is best that you settle with the other party. We'll continue our support to them so long as agreement is not reached.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand and you understand our position. That is all we can do. (Chou nods.) I hope this will become a moot issue in a period of time, because it will be solved.

PM Chou: Yes, because the Indochina question is indeed a crucial problem, both for the Indochina people and for the world. For example, the American people have a very strong reaction, even stronger than ours to this issue.

So if you are able to solve this question, of course, we will be happy. If not, we can only continue to give them support.

What is more, we must be ready to meet the consequences of possible expansion.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your position. There's no misunderstanding. As I said in my opening remarks, we understand you are a man of principle. (Chou nods.)

Mr. Prime Minister, you discussed the issue of great power relations, specifically Japan and the Soviet Union, and you used the very striking phrase that there is chaos under the sky.

With respect to Japan, we are of the view that Japan must have the ability to defend itself. We will not encourage, and indeed we would oppose, any military expansion by the Japanese. Indeed, I believe that in the area of relations between large countries, our interests and yours are very parallel. If Japanese military expansion takes place, we would oppose it.

With respect to Soviet intentions, contrary to some of my American friends, I do not exclude the possibility of Soviet military adventurism. In fact, speaking personally and frankly, this is one of the new lessons I have learned in my present position. I had not believed it previously.¹²

But that is a problem essentially between you and the USSR. As far as the U.S. is concerned, I can tell you flatly that there is no possibility, certainly in this Administration, nor probably in any other, of any cooperation such as you have described between the U.S., the Soviet Union and Japan to divide up China.¹³

We are facing many potentially aggressive countries. How could it conceivably be in our interests, even for the most selfish motives, to encourage one superpower to destroy another country and even to cooperate with it? Particularly one with which, as the Prime Minister has himself pointed out, after the solution of the Taiwan issue, which will be in the relatively near future, we have no conflicting interests at all.

While I do not want to presume to tell the Prime Minister how to dispose his troops in his own country, I want to tell him that such forces as are prepared to defend the area you think the U.S. would occupy, he could employ more usefully elsewhere.

PM Chou: But to deal with Taiwan, we must still have them there.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand but I consider this problem will be solved.

PM Chou: Do you know anything about Taiwan?

Dr. Kissinger: I have never been in Taiwan. Only Mr. Holdridge of my staff. I only know what I read in diplomatic and other reports.

¹² Nixon drew a line beside this paragraph.

¹³ Nixon drew parallel lines beside this paragraph.

If we are looking at the future in an historical context, and if we want to reduce some of the chaos in the world, then I believe that in relations among large countries the United States will be your supporter and not your opponent.

As I pointed out yesterday, we will not participate in efforts to lasso you. Now, as long as I am talking about Japan, I might as well comment on news reports I got this morning about remarks which Secretary Laird is supposed to have made in Japan.¹⁴

If he was accurately reported to have said that Japan should look to its own nuclear weapons for protection, then he was acting contrary to White House policy and you will find that these phrases will never be repeated or implemented, as in the case of the State Department spokesman.

So I repeat the offer I have made to you—that we attempt to discuss with you, if we can find the means, any proposal made by any other large country which could affect your interests, and that we would take your views very seriously. Specifically, I am prepared to give you any information you may wish to know regarding any bilateral negotiations we are having with the Soviet Union on such issues as SALT, so as to alleviate any concerns you might have in this regard. So while these negotiations will continue, we will attempt to conduct them in such a way that they do not increase the opportunity for military pressures against you.

I think that is all I want to say on great power relations.

Should I turn to South Asia or has the Prime Minister any questions?

PM Chou: You may go on to South Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, with respect to South Asia, I think our analysis is not too different from yours. We have, of course, friendly relations with India, and we have given, in conjunction with other countries, substantial economic assistance. We have not given any military assistance of any kind since 1965. In connection with East Pakistan, we have given some humanitarian aid to help the refugees.

You know from President Yahya Khan the strong friendship we feel for him and his country. We strongly oppose any military action to solve the problems of East Pakistan. And if India takes military action in East Pakistan, we would strongly and publicly disapprove of it. Furthermore, we would under no circumstances encourage Indian military adventures against the People's Republic of China. Nor would we permit the indirect use of our aid for such purposes.

¹⁴ Apparent reference to statements made by Laird during and after his trip to Japan and Korea. See Takashi Oka, "Laird Advises Japanese to Spur Defense," *The New York Times*, July 8, 1971, p. A-3.

We want the people of India to develop their own future, but we also want them to leave their neighbors alone.

With respect to arms control, I have understood the Prime Minister's views. We understand that the People's Republic of China will not participate in the five power conference. Our own intention is to respond very slowly. Because of the pressure of other countries we may accept it in principle, but we will spend a lot of time on preparations, and we will conduct it in such a way that it offers no framework for pressures against the People's Republic of China.¹⁵

In nuclear matters, we will put principal emphasis on negotiations which concern us and the USSR primarily, mainly the limitation of nuclear strategic arms. And on these, as I have pointed out, we are prepared to keep you informed, as we have attempted through the rather inadequate means of communication we now have.

Now let me say a word about the communications between our two countries, unless the Prime Minister wants to raise questions about what I just said.

PM Chou: Please go ahead.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, the problem of communications has several aspects.

One, with which, of course, you are familiar, is just physically how do we get in touch with each other. The other, which is bureaucratic, is with whom in our government should you deal. If the Prime Minister can be patient with me for a few minutes, I would like to give him a little explanation of our bureaucratic processes.

We have not had the benefits of the Cultural Revolution which the Prime Minister described at lunch time. So we have a large, somewhat undisciplined, and with respect to publicity, not always reliable bureaucracy. A bureaucracy which, as you found out in Warsaw, operates in a very formalistic manner. Therefore, anything which goes through regular diplomatic channels goes through a very cumbersome bureaucratic process and we cannot guarantee that it will be fully protected from publicity.

Each President deals with this problem in his own way. President Nixon deals with it by handling the most sensitive matters directly in the White House, attempting, in matters of extreme importance, to reach agreements in principle with the senior leaders of other governments and then using the bureaucracy essentially for implementation. Until there is such an agreement in principle, it is his policy not to attempt to control every last thing that every official does. On the other

¹⁵ Nixon drew a line beside this paragraph.

hand, once there is agreement in principle, he makes very certain that it is implemented.

Therefore, if we are to move to an era of cooperation and friendship, it is important to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and Chairman Mao and others to understand with whom you should deal on what issue. It is easy to get a lot of activity started in regular diplomatic channels, but if you want results, the procedures we have now adopted are the best.

As a practical matter, it simply is not possible for me to come to Peking often enough, and impossible to come secretly this way again, to make this our only channel for communication.

Also, although we hope not, it is conceivable that there may be an emergency at some time in which either of us may wish to contact the other immediately, reliably and secretly.

On the other hand, it is not satisfactory—I agree with the Prime Minister—to use a third party, no matter how friendly, for these detailed exchanges.

I was, therefore, wondering whether the Prime Minister could designate some official of the People's Republic of China in some acceptable capital, such as Paris, or London, or Ottawa, whom we should contact to pass communications for the Prime Minister, and in some rare cases, for Chairman Mao, and who in turn could pass some communications to us directly.

In our government, these communications would be known only to President Nixon and myself, and perhaps to one or two staff members, but in any case to nobody outside the White House.

This does not exclude sending an emissary here on some occasion, although the problem of finding one in whom the President has full confidence and who will respect those channels of communication is not easy.

The best man we have for this purpose is Ambassador Bruce, who is now in Paris for the Vietnam negotiations. But he will retire from there soon, and after that he might be available for some mission such as this. That can also only be occasional.

For other normal matters, we can use any embassy convenient to you, Warsaw or anywhere else. But we consider that a subsidiary problem.

That is all I have on the subject of communications, but I would be grateful for the Prime Minister's reaction.

PM Chou: I would like to ask Your Excellency what you meant when you said you might send Ambassador Bruce on some rare occasion to Peking. Would you make it public?

Dr. Kissinger: We could make it public. We have no specific proposal, but the Prime Minister said if I could not come, we could send

somebody we could trust. That would be Ambassador Bruce, and he could come perfectly openly.

But openness introduces an element of bureaucracy and he would not have quite as much latitude with you as I have enjoyed. But he is still a very good man.

PM Chou: He would have to report to the bureaucratic apparatus.

Dr. Kissinger: He could separate his reporting but have to do some for the bureaucracy. He would also have to bring interpreters, etc. It is thus more difficult to control than the other means I have suggested.

PM Chou: Is the Civil Service System in the United States as strict as that in Britain? It seems to be more liberal in the U.S. than in Britain.

Dr. Kissinger: It is much more liberal and less disciplined.

I have spoken with great frankness to the Prime Minister.

PM Chou: So I told you of our transformation during lunch. We do not cover up the facts of our transformation.

When your President comes and talks to Chairman Mao he will speak much more. We sometimes wonder whether we can talk about such things. But Chairman Mao speaks completely at his will.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a sign of great inward strength.

PM Chou: That is true and that is something we are not up to.

Maybe you have not had time to read the editorial on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. I will send you the English or French copy and you can look it over while you are resting. It is the summary of the struggle between the two lines in our party over the past 50 years. It is most instructional. Our party has gone through many trials and tribulations. Our party has gone through many victories and defeats, twistings and turnings, and more victories and defeats to final victory. The correct line of the party was replaced by a mistaken line which was surmounted. Then another mistaken, then another correct, line. Then even after we won one great victory, we were defeated again. Finally, the bogus reactionary line was defeated, and we won the final victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

An individual is bound to experience success and failure. So it is with the party. Only then can we surmount our experiences and continue to advance.

Our country was fortunate to have found such a great leader with tremendous strength to carry us through so many great struggles. The Chairman has been leading us since the founding of the party. Fifty years have passed. But in this process there were several occasions when persons in the party excluded Chairman Mao from the top leadership and carried out a mistaken line, but they were defeated.

So we don't care if the leadership makes mistakes, so long as the cadres want revolution. Leaders will surely come who will follow the correct line.

If the masses do not want a revolution, it is not possible for a revolutionary leader to arise. Man is influenced by his time and his environment. There have been times in the history of the Chinese Communist Party when the leadership was very bad. But the revolutionary momentum did not fail to advance because of that.

The first leader was Chen Tu-hsin, who went with the Trotskyites and is now dead. Then, sometime later, there was Wang Ming, who first had leftist tendencies, then rightist deviation, and now has become the biggest traitor and renegade. He is now in Moscow. He was trained by the Russians and has returned to Moscow.

The third was a man who caused a split in our armed forces. He was known as Chang Kuo-tao. Your CIA knows him.¹⁶

Mr. Holdridge: I have met him.

PM Chou: He served as a living dictionary for a time. I am sorry to say that it was only after 17 years in the party that he went against it and went to Chiang Kai-shek. During the Long March he commanded quite large sections of the Red Army, but when he ran off he could not bring even one soldier. He could only write about his 17 years in the party. He made various distortions and sowed discord. You gave him royalties on his book. Once he used them up he had no more to do. He left Hong Kong. Now he is in Canada.

The next one is Liu Shao-chi. You know something about him.

So in every party, where bourgeois or revolutionary, there are bound to appear some renegades against that party.

We are fortunate that out of our great people has risen the great leader Chairman Mao. So in this sense we agree to have President Nixon come to China and to have conversations with Chairman Mao.

After President Nixon expressed a desire to come, this was put forward by Chairman Mao himself. At that time the President said he might come in his capacity as President, or maybe after he had retired. In fact, President Nixon even said that his daughter might spend her

¹⁶ Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Chen Duxi), founding member of the CCP, purged from major posts in 1927 and expelled from the party in 1929; Wang Ming (Wang Ming), pseudonym of Ch'en Shaoyu (Chen Shaoyu), CCP representative to the Comintern from 1931 to 1937, generally powerless after his return to China, returned to the USSR in the mid-1950s; and Chang Kuo-t'ao (Zhang Guotao), founding member of the CCP who defected to the Chinese Nationalists in 1938, then fled to Hong Kong after the establishment of the PRC in 1949.

honeymoon here. Shortly after your President said that, our message was sent to you.

That is all I have to say to you.

Dr. Kissinger: On the issue of communications, I am not clear. I will turn to the Summit later. On communications, what is your pleasure? Is there any place where it is possible for the White House to leave messages with you other than through the courtesy of President Yahya Khan?

PM Chou: We will study this matter and tell you either tonight or tomorrow morning. Anyway, we will certainly establish some means of contact.

Dr. Kissinger: If the President is to come here, we must agree beforehand on procedures, an agenda and other things. We would prefer to do this through private channels rather than publicly.

PM Chou: That's right.

Dr. Kissinger: Would you like to say something on the matter first?

PM Chou: Communications?

Dr. Kissinger: No, on the visit of the President and the communiqué.

PM Chou: The communiqué will be covered tonight or tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: It sounds like one of my staff meetings. On my staff only the masochists are left.

PM Chou: Would you like to say something about the President's visit?

Dr. Kissinger: On the question of the visit, I would like to say, as I pointed out in my discussion, that to move toward a relationship of cooperation and ultimately friendship between the PRC and the U.S. is an historic opportunity.

Therefore, President Nixon welcomes this invitation and is in principle prepared to accept the invitation.

On the basis of the discussions we have had, I am prepared to proceed with discussions concerning details. But since you are the host, I think the specific suggestion of when it would be convenient should come from you.

PM Chou: We first knew that President Nixon wanted to visit China when he announced it publicly in an interview to the press. That is, he expressed his wish. However, for the Chinese Government to issue an invitation, it would be a formal invitation. That, of course, as we have made clear, is a serious matter. As Your Excellency said in his analysis of developing events, we estimate the timing might be a bit later. That is after a number of matters have been thrashed out, and various things have occurred.

This raises the following questions.

For example, has your President ever considered the possibility of visiting the Soviet Union, or having leaders of the Soviet Union come

to the United States, or to have the President and the leaders of the Soviet Union meet somewhere else?

If there is such a possibility, it would be best for President Nixon and the Soviet Union to meet before President Nixon visits China.

We are not afraid of a big turmoil. With the objective development of events, this might be possible. But we would not want to deliberately create tensions.

You saw, just throwing a ping-pong ball has thrown the Soviet Union into such consternation. So many Americans going to the Soviet Union, and Russians to America, did not create such a stir. We paid no special attention to that.

Dr. Kissinger: I will be candid. This subject has been discussed. The President has received an invitation to visit Moscow.

As you know from your own dealings with the Soviet Union, there is a tendency on the part of Soviet leaders to attempt to squeeze every advantage out of any situation. (Chou laughs.)

Therefore, after extending the invitation, certain conditions were attached which we can meet as a matter of fact, but as a question of principle it is now held in abeyance.

It is not a question that we cannot meet them, but that we believe that if the President talks to the Head of State of another government it must be on its own merits. The same is true in your case.

But the principle of a meeting between the President and the Soviet leaders has been accepted. The visit [*invitation?*] has been extended by the Soviet leaders and a visit may still take place within the next 6 months.

PM Chou: In that case, we might set the date of the President's visit sometime in the summer of next year, say after May 1. That might be a more appropriate time for your President.

Dr. Kissinger: One difficulty with this is that after May the political campaign begins in America. While it would be advantageous from a political point of view to have the visit during that season, I think, frankly, for our mutual interest, that we would not start our relationship under the suspicion that it has this short-term motivation.

So it should be somewhat earlier; a few months earlier would be better than in the summer. March or April.

PM Chou: Fine. I will report this to Chairman Mao and then give you a reply. But you do agree to the principle that it would be good for the President first to visit Moscow and then China? Would this be better for you?

Dr. Kissinger: The problem in our relations with the Soviet Union is different from the problem of our relations with the People's Republic of China.

I understand your hesitation to begin with. In our relations with the Soviet Union we have a number of concrete issues but no overwhelming political issues.

PM Chou: Much more concrete issues.

Dr. Kissinger: But no overwhelming philosophic issues. You have had your own experience in negotiations with the Soviet Union, so I need not describe it. They lend themselves less well to meetings at a very high level because they always get lost in a great amount of detail. And some very petty detail.

Our relations with the People's Republic of China are at an historic turning point which requires the intervention of top leaders who can set a basic direction and then let the details be worked out later.

So the problem is that with the Soviet Union we can do a lot of business in regular ways, while with the People's Republic of China we can do the most important business really only between Chairman Mao and the President. That is the difference. (Chou nods.)

But in principle, I repeat, there is a formal agreement that makes clear we are prepared to meet with the Soviet leaders, and they have expressed their willingness.

In all honesty, I cannot promise you it will happen no matter when we set a date. We shall try, but we will not meet prior conditions either with Moscow or with Peking; but you haven't made any prior conditions.

PM Chou: That's right. We agree.

What is your thinking on an announcement of the visit?

Dr. Kissinger: What visit?

PM Chou: Would it cover only your visit or also President Nixon's visit?

Dr. Kissinger: We could announce my visit and say that Chairman Mao has extended an invitation to President Nixon and he has accepted, either in principle or at a fixed time, next spring.

What is your pleasure? I think there are advantages in doing both together.

PM Chou: Then would it be possible for the two sides to designate some of our men to draft an announcement?

Dr. Kissinger: We should draft in the context we have been discussing.

PM Chou: Both visits.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be all right.

PM Chou: We shall try it. For our side, it can be Ambassador Huang Hua and the Marshal.

Dr. Kissinger: Could I say myself? This is undemocratic centralism. (Laughter from the Chinese.) The Prime Minister has given me an idea at lunch and now I have to see how I can reduce my staff to two.

PM Chou: I have an appointment at six o'clock that will last until ten o'clock. My office is free to you. Or you can go to your residence for discussions. You can have supper and rest and a film.

Dr. Kissinger: We will meet at 10:00.

PM Chou: Yes, I will come to your residence. We will work deep into the night.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister keeps hours which make me look like a softie. But I want to work as long as is necessary.

PM Chou: Yes, I understand.

141. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, July 10, 1971, 11:20–11:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hsu Chung-ching, Secretary to the Prime Minister, PRC
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol, PRC
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
Chinese Notetakers
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

PM Chou: I'm sorry to be so late.

Dr. Kissinger: That's all right. We had a good walk.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK trip to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Chinese Government Guest House.

PM Chou: I would like to discuss two specific matters. The first is the announcement. Ambassador Huang Hua will come very shortly and show you our draft. You also have a draft.

Dr. Kissinger: I am sure that his calligraphy is better than mine. We also have prepared a draft, which is very brief.

PM Chou: We can check the two drafts.² If yours is very brief, ours is also brief. The second thing which I wanted to discuss is your time for departure tomorrow. Is it noon or one o'clock?

Dr. Kissinger: That depends on our discussions. I can stay until 1:00, but if our discussions are concluded in time I would prefer to leave at 12:00.

PM Chou: I think that two hours tomorrow morning would be sufficient, and then the time of departure can be decided. I think that this should be between 12:00 and 1:00.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's say 1:00, and then we will have flexibility.

PM Chou: You will take off then at 1:00.

Dr. Kissinger: If that's agreeable.

PM Chou: That doesn't mean you will leave here at that time.

Dr. Kissinger: About 12:30 p.m.

PM Chou: 12:20 would be safer.

Dr. Kissinger: You are our host, and you should decide.

PM Chou: Then there is a third question, that of the tape-recording. We discussed this before, but there is now no need for a tape-recording since we fully exchanged our views today and will tomorrow, and there is no need. I'm very sorry to keep you up.

Dr. Kissinger: Not at all. I enjoyed the opportunity to take a walk outside. I was resting until 10:00 p.m. anyway.

PM Chou: I had to make you gentlemen get up from bed.

Dr. Kissinger: It's good for the members of my staff to see someone who works even longer hours than I do.

PM Chou: That's all the more reason to ask them to work harder when you get back to the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger: While we are talking—if you have no other points—I thought I might elaborate on two or three things if you are interested.

Mr. Prime Minister, as my first point, you mentioned the necessity of keeping troops to protect yourselves against an invasion from Taiwan.

PM Chou: That's right.

² Attached but not printed.

Dr. Kissinger: It is the policy of this Administration to give no support whatsoever to any nationalist attempt to invade the People's Republic of China from Taiwan, and without our support they are technically unable to invade the mainland.

PM Chou: That's right. It's not possible for them to send troops en masse. Generally speaking, Chiang Kai-shek is able to control his armed forces, but there are those among his troops who deliberately want to make adventures—deliberately to create trouble for him, and for you. That's why we maintain defenses along our coast—to let people know that we are fully prepared and they cannot succeed. Some years ago Chiang sent spies against us by means of landing-craft, but all of these were wiped out. During recent years there has been less provocation. But once we make our announcement public, there will be a small number of such people who will want to launch adventures and deliberately cause trouble. That is why I tell you in all frankness that we keep on alert.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, we don't want to keep you from stationing troops for your defense: we only want to clarify our policy.

PM Chou: That's right, you have already made this clear. As you requested, if we gain any information to the effect that U.S. or KMT elements want to create trouble, we will tell you; you will do the same for us.

Dr. Kissinger: What I said about the Taiwan Independence Movement can be applied to this matter as well.

The second point which I wanted to raise concerns a possible meeting between the Soviet leaders and our President which you asked me about. Our position is this. I didn't want you to misunderstand our position. If there should be an agreement in the negotiations with respect to Berlin, or on strategic arms control, it is very possible that our respective leaders would meet to sign it. But we will not arrange a meeting in the abstract unless there is a specific occasion for one. This could happen within the next six months. I say this only so that you will not be surprised, but there is no fixed plan now.

PM Chou: I understand.

Dr. Kissinger: And on these agreements, as I promised you, when we have established communications, we will inform you of any provisions that could affect you. We have so far refused any proposal that could be applied to nuclear countries other than the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

PM Chou: Does this apply to the SALT talks?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: May I ask what is your thinking on the Berlin question? If you haven't gotten into any specific stages yet, I won't ask.

Dr. Kissinger: I will tell the Prime Minister that I am notoriously indiscreet. Therefore, I'll be glad to tell you about this.

On Berlin, there are three major issues and one minor issue. The first major issue is access from the Federal Republic of Germany to Berlin across the territory of the Democratic Republic of Germany. The second is the presence of organs of the Federal Republic of Germany in West Berlin. The third is the Soviet political presence in West Berlin. Then there is the fourth issue, which is of interest primarily to the Germans, and concerns travel of people from Berlin in East Germany and East Berlin.

What we are trying to bring about is a situation in which Berlin becomes less of a source of tension and a source of conflict in Central Europe. And we are making some progress in our discussions.

PM Chou: Your Excellency is probably aware of the incident which occurred along the Ussuri River at Chenpao Island.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I am.

PM Chou: At that time there was high tension over the Berlin question because the Federal Republic of Germany wanted to have elections for its Parliament in West Berlin. The Soviet authorities created the Chenpao incident so that all the Parliamentarians from West Germany could go to West Berlin to have the elections there, and so undo the crisis.

Dr. Kissinger: You think so?

PM Chou: Of course, because Ulbricht found himself in a very difficult situation the Soviets made it appear that we created trouble. However, it was they who deliberately created the incident to escape their responsibilities over Berlin.

Dr. Kissinger: It was hard for us to judge because we didn't have all the information.

With respect to the incidents in Sinkiang, though, I can say the following. When I assumed my present position I thought that the Chinese were always the aggressors. (Chou laughs.) Then I looked at the map of that part of Sinkiang where the incidents took place—this was in the summer of 1969—and saw that it was three miles from the Soviet railhead and 200 miles from a Chinese railhead. It then occurred to me that the Chinese military leaders would not have picked such a spot to attack. Since then I have looked at the problem with a different perspective.

PM Chou: It is also possible to misunderstand the origins of the Sino-Indian conflict.

Dr. Kissinger: That's possible.

PM Chou: The Indians said that we created the Ladakh incident. It occurred on a peak of the Karakorums on the Aksai-chin Plateau of Sinkiang. At this point a ridge of the Karakorums falls off very sharply

downward on the Kashmir side. The elevation is very high and even the Soviet helicopters used by the Indians could only gradually work their way up the steep slope. Our people were on top of this ridge and could see down on the Soviet helicopters gradually coming up. The Aksai-chin Plateau is the route along which we have to travel when crossing from Sinkiang to the Ali district of Tibet. The height of the plateau is 5000 meters. We started to build this highway in 1951—

Dr. Kissinger: The Indians call this region Ladakh.

PM Chou: Actually, Ladakh is farther below, but the Indians call all of this region Ladakh. Even the British colonial maps do not show this as a part of India, and Nehru was only able to provide a claim on the basis of a map drawn by a British traveller. Even three years after the road was built, Nehru didn't know about it. It runs all the way from Western Sinkiang to the Ali district of Tibet.

In my discussions with Nehru on the Sino-Indian boundary in 1956 he suddenly raised the issue of the road. I said, "you didn't even know we were building a road the last three years, and now you suddenly say that it is your territory." I remarked upon how strange this was. Although the so-called McMahon Line was a line that no Chinese government ever recognized, at least it was a line drawn by a Britisher, even though in drawing it he included more than 90,000 square kilometers of our territory in India. However, in the western sector there was no such line.

There was no agreement with us either in 1956 or 1957. And so in 1959 the Indians sent small patrols crawling up the steep slopes to attack our post. Our guards were at the passes. This was in December and the weather was extremely cold—40 degrees below zero. Our post was in the form of a fort and we could see them climbing up. So when the Indians attacked they suffered more heavy losses than we. However, we did have some wounded, and we raised a protest with the Indian Government. TASS said of this incident that the Chinese committed aggression against India. Khrushchev, without inquiring, took the same position on the grounds that the Indians had suffered such heavy casualties. This was the first such anti-China statement from the USSR.

Khrushchev wanted to go to Camp David. Just before, in June 1959, he tore up the Soviet agreement on atomic cooperation with China, and he brought these two things (the Soviet support for India and the tearing up of the nuclear cooperation agreement with China) as gifts to Camp David.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we didn't know about this until much later.

PM Chou: Were you there?

Dr. Kissinger: I wasn't in the government then, but because I had been a part time advisor to several governments I knew a number of

our senior officials. They didn't believe that there was a split between Moscow and Peking until well into the 1960's. But whatever the Soviets do to you, they do for their reasons, not for our reasons.

PM Chou: I'm aware of that, but I wanted you to know what had taken place.

Dr. Kissinger: I wasn't present at Camp David, so I cannot tell what was happening.

PM Chou: You were not in the government at that time. When Khrushchev returned from Camp David he came to Peking for the Tenth Anniversary of the People's Republic of China. Here, in the same banquet hall which you saw this afternoon, he made a speech in which he openly declared that there were "roosters who like to fight."

Dr. Kissinger: Who were the roosters?

PM Chou: By this he meant the Chinese. We understood well what he meant, but he put it in abstract terms.

The next day we asked him why he said what he did in such an open forum. We also asked him first of all why it was that on the eve of his departure for the U.S. he had declared we had committed aggression against India—without even asking us about it. He said that he did not need any other information, and the mere fact that India had lost more men proved that we were the aggressors. This was strange logic, totally illogical.

On the border question, at the beginning he didn't understand it, but afterwards he understood very well what the actual situation was. This is a thing of the past.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Weren't you aware of the fact that in 1960 he withdrew all Soviet experts from China and tore up all Soviet contracts?

Dr. Kissinger: I personally became aware of this only in 1962.

PM Chou: That's right. It's not difficult to understand that. You entered political life only gradually.

Is there anything more that you wish to discuss tonight? If not, I will leave you to discuss the joint communiqué. I suggest you go into the big room for discussion. This one's too hot.

142. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, July 11, 1971, midnight–1:40 a.m. and 9:50–10:35 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC (Second Session Only)
 Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
 Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
 Chinese Notetakers
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
 Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
 W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

At the working session which began about 12:00 midnight on the night of July 10–11, both the U.S. and the PRC sides presented preliminary drafts of a joint statement announcing the visit of Dr. Kissinger and the summit meeting between President Nixon and the Chinese leaders.²

Present on the Chinese side were Ambassador Huang Hua, Chang Wen-chin, and the two interpreters, Mr. Chi and Miss Tang. On the U.S. side were Dr. Kissinger and Messrs. Holdridge, Lord and Smyser.

Both sides agreed that the announcement should be kept simple. Dr. Kissinger, finding the wording of the Chinese draft in certain respects to be in accordance with what the U.S. had in mind, soon took this language as the basis of the discussions (attached at Tab C).³

The first significant issue which emerged was the Chinese desire to make it appear that the President had asked for an invitation to visit China. Dr. Kissinger reminded the Chinese of the fact that it was the Chinese who had actually proposed such a visit in their communication to the U.S., although the President admittedly had commented on visiting China during a press conference. After some discussion, the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Chinese Government Guest House.

² The final version of the announcement is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 819–820. The President announced the contacts with the PRC in a television address the evening of July 15. The statement was forwarded to all diplomatic posts in telegram 128513, July 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 CHICOM–US)

³ Tabs A–C were attached but not printed.

Chinese agreed that there should be a mutually expressed desire for a summit.

A second issue which then arose was a proposal by Dr. Kissinger that the announcement not set the purpose of the summit meeting only as seeking the "normalization of relations" between the U.S. and the PRC. The Chinese, who had submitted this formulation, objected when Dr. Kissinger wanted to broaden the summit scope to state that the meeting would be beneficial to Asian and world peace. There was considerable discussion concerning this issue. The Chinese acknowledged that in the President's message of May 19, 1971, to Prime Minister Chou, the President had suggested that each side should be free to include topics of principal concern to it in the summit discussions. Thus, something in addition to the normalization of relations was in order.

At 1:40 a.m. the Chinese asked for a thirty minute recess to permit them to consider wording which would be responsive to these two issues. They did not, however, return that night—at 2:55 a.m. the U.S. side was informed that they would not return until about 9:00 a.m. the next morning.

On Sunday morning, the Chinese returned at 9:50 a.m., accompanied this time by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying. (Prime Minister Chou remained outside pending approval of the draft announcement.) From the U.S. standpoint, the wording of the new Chinese draft (attached at Tab B) was a great improvement over that of the preceding day. The Chinese, on their own initiative, then changed the date for the summit from "in the spring of 1972" to "before May 1972." Dr. Kissinger said this was a better formulation. With respect to the initiative for the invitation, the Chinese draft said "in view of" President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the PRC. However, after a certain amount of give-and-take the Chinese agreed to a formulation in which Prime Minister Chou, "knowing of" the President's desire, had extended the invitation. As to the purpose of the visit, they had included in addition to seeking a normalization of relations, the phrase "and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides." Dr. Kissinger said the U.S. preferred the phrase "peace in the world" but accepted the Chinese formulation since it met the principal U.S. concern of broadening the scope of the summit.

After further brief discussion the two sides agreed on an announcement in English and Chinese (attached at Tab A). In working during the night on a new draft to meet the U.S. concerns, and in the verbal exchanges at these sessions, the Chinese clearly made an effort to find mutually acceptable compromises. This attitude was reciprocated by the U.S. side.

There was a brief exchange on when the joint announcement should be made. Dr. Kissinger suggested the evening of July 15, U.S.

time, while the Chinese preferred July 19. Dr. Kissinger explained that a Thursday evening announcement would allow for more intelligent coverage of the event in the American Sunday newspapers and weekly news magazines. Prime Minister Chou then entered the room to continue the discussion at 10:35 a.m.

143. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, July 11, 1971, 10:35–11:55 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, Chinese Communist Party, PRC
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to Canada
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hsu Chung-ching, Secretary to the Prime Minister, PRC
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol, PRC
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters
Chinese Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
W. Richard Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC

PM Chou: Our talks have become compressed and rushed toward the end. However, at the end each side is respecting the views of the other side.

We will need to address the question of the time for the announcement. We must pick an appropriate time, because the 15th appears to be a bit too early for our side. You are going to mention in your announcement that the President has accepted our invitation, and therefore you need time to report to him.

Dr. Kissinger: I will be back in California on the morning of July 13.

PM Chou: So quick?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Chinese Government Guest House.

Dr. Kissinger: We have proposed to make the announcement on the evening of the 15th for us, which would be the morning of the 16th for you.

PM Chou: Do you think we can postpone the announcement until Friday, or two days more? Today is Sunday. Is it that you don't make announcements on Saturday?

Dr. Kissinger: We don't generally do so because the Sunday newspapers are essentially printed on Friday and on Saturday morning.

PM Chou: Perhaps you don't like the Friday date—

Dr. Kissinger: We could possibly do it on Friday night. A problem which I wanted to explain to the Prime Minister—one which is not decisive—is that the weekly news magazines such as *TIME* and *Newsweek* are printed on Friday and Saturday. Therefore, if the announcement is made on Thursday night, they can do a better job of reporting it than if it were on Friday night, which would give them only a half day to write about it. But this is not a decisive matter.

PM Chou: That means it would be more appropriate to make the announcement on the evening of the 16th your time, and the morning of the 17th our time.

Dr. Kissinger: The evening of the 16th gives the news magazines only a half a day to do anything, while the evening of the 15th gives them almost two days. I represent our view to the Prime Minister, but this is not a matter of principle. The evening of the 15th, though, does mean that the news magazines could give fuller treatment and above all the Sunday newspapers, which in America are very big. They are printed on Friday and Saturday, and therefore if the announcement is Friday evening they wouldn't be able to give any analysis on Sunday.

PM Chou: The morning of the 16th is all right, but we must do some work before that.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have to do some work too.

PM Chou: "Before May" in the announcement could also mean this winter. Chairman Mao just called us to expressly speak on this issue. He said he would like to put forward this date formulation for your President.

Dr. Kissinger: We are very grateful for his courtesy.

PM Chou: So if your President finds it necessary he can come in anytime during this period, including this winter. There is another question to consider. We would welcome very much a public visit by either yourself or by Ambassador Bruce during the interval between your departure and President Nixon's visit. This is because you mentioned it is difficult to find another representative. You could make a short visit when necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: For very selfish reasons I would like to come myself.

PM Chou: I believe your colleagues would agree to that.

Dr. Kissinger: Since it may be difficult for me to get away, we may send Ambassador Bruce. However, it will be either he or I.

PM Chou: That is agreeable.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't have to put this into the communiqué. You have been very agreeable and very helpful in this matter.

PM Chou: There is also the matter of our direct communications. The best thing would be to do this in Paris, because Canada would give rise to too much speculation.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

PM Chou: In Paris we have wider scope and you yourself or your Ambassador could send an oral or written message to Ambassador Huang Chen.

Dr. Kissinger: The only man who will be authorized to contact your Ambassador on the President's behalf is General Vernon A. Walters. He is our military attaché in Paris and has direct communications to the White House. He used to be the personal interpreter for the President, and we have used him for contacts with the North Vietnamese. He's completely our man. It is easier for me to come to Paris secretly than to Ottawa, strangely enough.

PM Chou: We understand—that's why we suggested Paris.

Dr. Kissinger: We will communicate through unsigned letters to your Ambassador which General Walters will hand to him. On matters of great importance I will come personally to talk to him.

PM Chou: That's all right. Or if you have some confidential letters to hand to us, you can seal them, leaving them unsigned or signed as you prefer, and give them to us. You can talk directly with Ambassador Huang or hand over unsigned messages.

Dr. Kissinger: Which do you prefer?

PM Chou: It's up to you. A third course would be to hand over data or material which you would like to hand to us in confidence *sealed*, and give it to our Ambassador. We fully trust him. He is one of the members of our Central Committee.

Dr. Kissinger: If we have information we believe of national interest to you we will put it in a sealed envelope and give it to him. Similarly, we would prefer you to do the same to us.

PM Chou: Approach the U.S. Military Attaché in your Paris Embassy?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: At another site or at our Embassy?

Dr. Kissinger: Why don't we ask Walters to work that out? He has no authority to discuss matters of substance, just to transmit messages. But he's reliable.

PM Chou: You can discuss with Walters which method of communications you would prefer, instruct him, and he can talk to us.

Dr. Kissinger: We'll ask him to call your Ambassador. When can he call?

PM Chou: Perhaps Wednesday, the 14th.

Dr. Kissinger: He will call your Ambassador after the announcement.

PM Chou: Maybe next Monday, July 18.

Dr. Kissinger: The 18th then. On the meeting with the President when he comes to the People's Republic of China, how many days do you think it should take?

PM Chou: I don't think it should take too long because you are very busy, but five days at least.

Dr. Kissinger: For the President that's very long.

PM Chou: Of course, the time could be shortened.

Dr. Kissinger: We could say "up to" five days. Maybe it would be a little shorter. Should he visit only Peking?

PM Chou: Any other place would be satisfactory. It is possible that Chairman Mao might not be in Peking, and they therefore could go to some other quiet place.

Dr. Kissinger: You have had many barbarian invasions, but I am not sure that you are prepared for this one. (Laughter on the Chinese side.)

PM Chou: This is not necessarily the case—when Khrushchev came he was most ferocious.

Dr. Kissinger: The President will be very gentle, but his security officers are in a special category. That doesn't matter. We will bring the minimum number necessary.

PM Chou: If you find that necessary. In reality, if you want to guarantee the safety of a guest, the host must be held responsible first. This time you placed great trust in us, and nothing happened.

Dr. Kissinger: We still have two hours. (Chinese laugh) The President may want to go to one other place, but won't want to visit too many.

PM Chou: There won't be too many.

Dr. Kissinger: As for the press, he would prefer a small press delegation, not a large delegation, and we would be very grateful if you could help us by limiting the number whom you admit.

PM Chou: The number shouldn't exceed ten.

Dr. Kissinger: Something like that. If we change our view, we will let you know. As for the size of our delegation, we propose that it be rather small, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State, myself, and maybe one aide for the Secretary and one for me. Is that agreeable?

PM Chou: There is no question about that. It's up to the President's decision.

Dr. Kissinger: On the agenda, Ambassador Bruce or I can come and discuss this before the President's visit. (Chou nods.) However, we could cover roughly the same subjects you and I have discussed. (Chou nods.)

PM Chou: Please tell President Yahya Khan that when necessary we'll still use his channel. We have a saying in China that one shouldn't break the bridge after crossing it.

Dr. Kissinger: We might exchange some communications through him for politeness.

PM Chou: This is because you have confidence in him, and we also respect him.

Dr. Kissinger: There are just some things which we don't want to say through friends, no matter how trustworthy.

PM Chou: We'll send nothing substantive. Please convey my regards to him, and those of Chairman Mao also.

I would also like to take the opportunity to say we express thanks for the gifts which the President and you have sent to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, and myself. You may say that Chairman Mao and I both send our regards to President Nixon. Since we are short of time now, we won't return gifts but we will prepare for the next time. This time, hearing you like Chinese tea, we just have some Chinese tea—this is not a gift but a little token.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand, and I thank you very much.

Concerning the matter which we discussed yesterday: we think that to enable us to carry out most easily the relationships we have made, and to assure that the issues we have discussed won't become a political football in the United States, I think it would be best if the President could become the first political leader to initiate our new departure.

PM Chou: You were saying that we were advancing in this direction, and the course will not be too slow. It will accelerate as it goes on.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be best if it did not become an issue, if the President was first and started the process. This is better than a whole group of politicians coming before his visit, each making statements which have to be answered and defended. The China lobby might start up again, etc. (Chou nods.) This doesn't apply, of course, to the visits of newsmen and to cultural exchanges.

PM Chou: With respect to newsmen, we always reiterate the principles we have discussed here. After the announcement is made public, I'll be in more trouble than I am at present, but I'll still be better off than you because I don't see too many newspapermen.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to raise the issue of how to handle the press after our announcement. I would like to listen to your views.

PM Chou: Couldn't you mention only what is in the announcement and nothing else?

Dr. Kissinger: In America it is impossible not to meet the press at all, because this will cause unbelievable speculation and many unauthorized people will speak. Accordingly, I propose to meet on a background basis with a group of newsmen on Friday the 16th on the trip and without discussing any substance, just give them a little flavor of who took part in our conversations and where they took place. I say nothing in a half an hour very effectively, but this gives them a feeling they have heard something. But I will not make substantive comments and will not list the topics we discussed.

PM Chou: You are going to announce on the evening of the 15th? Will this be in the name of your press secretary, Ziegler, who will read it out?

Dr. Kissinger: Either he will read it out, or the President will release it. It is possible that the President will want to read it.

PM Chou: Is the title to be a communiqué or an announcement?

Dr. Kissinger: Probably there should be no title at all.

PM Chou: We use the term "announcement."

Dr. Kissinger: All right, we'll use the term "announcement."

PM Chou: We'll probably do it through the New China News Agency as a news announcement.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you use the same English text and not make a new translation?

PM Chou: Both the Chinese and English texts will remain as agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: I say this only because when we made the SALT announcement, the Russians used a completely different text in English from our own, saying that this was their translation from the Russian. We had to make them correct it.

PM Chou: We Chinese don't do things that way. Should we sign a statement about using the same text?

Dr. Kissinger: No. You are men of honor.

PM Chou: We have a gentleman's agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to learn to trust each other.

PM Chou: That's very important in international relations.

Dr. Kissinger: We have much more important things to do together.

For your consideration, and you don't need to settle this now, we are prepared, when the President visits, to discuss and sign an agreement for the mutual renouncing of force between our two countries such as you proposed in 1955.

PM Chou: You know that this question must be linked to the Taiwan question and the question of China's internal affairs. Once these questions are brought into shape, then this question (of renunciation of force) will be easier to deal with.

I hope that your trip to Paris will see some development, and we will tell our Vietnamese friends about this part of our discussions after the announcement is made.

Dr. Kissinger: That is of course proper. What I now propose will not be a request, but we will let your Ambassador in Paris know what part of the SALT agreement might be appropriate for negotiating bilaterally between us, for example, preventing accidental war, and if you want to discuss that with us, we will be prepared to do so, but we are not asking. If you want to discuss, we are prepared. But this is not a formal request. It is entirely up to you. We won't embarrass you by a formal request.

PM Chou: Of course, when you feel that the time is appropriate, you can approach us.

Dr. Kissinger: We will inform you of what the content is, and if it is of interest to you, we can discuss it separately.

PM Chou: This is mainly, as you told me yesterday, an agreement between your two countries (the U.S. and the USSR.)

Dr. Kissinger: The SALT talks, yes, but there is one section in the agreement now being negotiated on preventing accidental war through technical accidents. The general agreement would be discriminatory to you if you were to join SALT now when you are at the beginning of your nuclear program. But the accidental war part might be of interest to you.

PM Chou: You can tell us when you feel it is necessary.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to tell you, as I did yesterday, that sometimes there are clauses proposed to us that can be interpreted as applying to other countries, and which until rejected are still on the agenda. I want to tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we will not accept such clauses and will always tell you first about them, regardless of what any other party tells you, rather than to have you learn about them through other channels.

PM Chou: Thank you. We believe you will first tell us.

Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure.

PM Chou: Although, as we said, we now have no interest.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

I have one or two final points. One point—I suppose you see no need to resume the Warsaw talks under these conditions? (Chou nods.) I agree.

PM Chou: We better relieve our people there of their burdens.

Dr. Kissinger: And relieve our bureaucracies from the responsibility of writing instructions.

PM Chou: It would be another matter if our representatives met at diplomatic functions.

Dr. Kissinger: Should we send instructions to our Ambassadors to speak to one another at diplomatic receptions? I was just joking.

PM Chou: I believe that they know each other.

Dr. Kissinger: One final point. The President asked me to raise this as a matter of personal kindness. We are aware of four Americans sentenced to prison in China. While we are not disputing the circumstances, we would consider it an act of mercy if the People's Republic of China could pardon all or some of them whenever, in its judgment, it felt that conditions were right. This is not a request. I'm asking it as a favor.

PM Chou: There is a point in our law that if they themselves have behaved well, we can shorten the period of their sentence. We shall continue to study this matter.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be very grateful. We recognize that this is entirely within the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, but it would be a voluntary act of mercy. That's all.

PM Chou: I have a few points, too.

First, is the Taiwan question. As you have said, it will need time and we agree. Of course, once the direction is decided upon we should gradually advance in that direction. We believe the President's visit will accelerate the pace. I believe that as we gradually come to understand each other, by the time we have established diplomatic relations the treaty between the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek should not have any effect. We don't recognize the treaty.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand that you don't recognize it, and maybe history can take care of events.

PM Chou: By that time, when all your armed forces have withdrawn from Taiwan and we ourselves have solved the matter, it should no longer be a problem.

Dr. Kissinger: We hope very much that the Taiwan issue will be solved peacefully.

PM Chou: We are doing our best to do so. You will also need to undertake not to let the Japanese armed forces into Taiwan before you have left. Because this would be a great danger not only to us but you and peace in Asia and the world.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: And the Taiwan Independence Movement should not be allowed to prepare activities in Taiwan. This would also set Chiang Kai-shek at ease.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister must understand that where both conditions are within the power of the U.S., we will not encourage the Taiwan Independence Movement and indeed have asked the Prime Minister to give us any information to the contrary; we will also oppose the establishment of a Japanese military force on Taiwan. But if the Taiwan Independence Movement develops without us, that is not in our control. However, we will do nothing to encourage, support, finance, or give any other encouragement.

PM Chou: That should include not agreeing to Japan's engaging in such activities.

Dr. Kissinger: We will oppose this to the extent that we can control Japan.

PM Chou: Your attitude should be as it has just been. We have heard that Secretary Laird's words (about Japanese rearmament)² have been denied in Washington, and also that he himself has denied them under instructions from Washington. As you mentioned yesterday, he was prohibited from departing from White House policy.

We have also heard that Agnew was indignant over Park Chong-hee's discourtesies to him. Recently, the attitude of small men such as these has been such—there is an old Chinese saying that if you are close to someone like this, he will become mischievous and act in a spoiled way, but if you are far away from him, he will complain about you. Rhee was such a person, Diem was such a person, Park is such a person, and so are Thieu and Sirik Matak.

But if friends are equals, they will respect one another. For example, today it suddenly occurred to Chairman Mao that it might be convenient to your needs if maybe the President's visit was earlier and not necessarily in the spring. And so we came up with "before May." Once the announcement is made it will shake the world, which won't be able to sleep.

Dr. Kissinger: It will first of all shake our bureaucracy.

PM Chou: And Chiang Kai-shek, according to his temperament, might collude with Japan or the Soviets, and you must beware. He will demonstrate against your President. I am most familiar with him—I believe that you know my history. I was Political Commissar under him in the Whampoa Military Academy when he was Director of Training.

However, even though in the past he has massacred and slaughtered innumerable amounts of our people, if he could restore Taiwan to the embrace of the motherland, that will be a good thing. And it

² See footnote 14, Document 140.

would relieve you of a burden. That place is no great use for you, but a great wound for us.

Dr. Kissinger: How should we establish the date for the meeting?

PM Chou: Haven't you just mentioned a special channel?

Dr. Kissinger: We should make suggestions to you. I understand anytime winter–spring, from December to April.

PM Chou: November would also be all right. According to your needs, you can put forward a date, and we will answer.

Dr. Kissinger: But you would in any case want Ambassador Bruce or me to come openly before?

PM Chou: Yes. We expect that if you have anything especially urgent, and would like to tell us personally, it would of course be best if you come here to discuss the matter, because we can do things in better detail.

I must raise this point to your attention. You should know that if you put forward a formula in the U.N. such as you describe, it will raise great difficulties for you, and not for us.³ We will oppose because that means two Chinas. Taiwan will also oppose.

Dr. Kissinger: This is temporarily one China, one Taiwan.

PM Chou: I understand that this is only a temporary phenomenon. The President's visit will also manifest the phenomenon. On the one hand you recognize Taiwan and on the other you come here. You could say that this phenomenon began on the 9th. I must tell you that.

Dr. Kissinger: I recognize this. We may not propose this resolution ourselves, but might support it if someone else puts it forward. We recognize that you will oppose it, but if we can moderate our rhetoric about each other that will be progress.

PM Chou: Taiwan will also oppose that (the resolution) and there will be opposition from all quarters.

Dr. Kissinger: That may be a good way to end the issue.

PM Chou: It should be ended.

The second question I have concerns Indochina. I believe that you are quite clear as to our stand. We support Madam Binh's seven point proposal.⁴ We hope that your withdrawal will be most complete, thorough, and also honorable. Sentiments there will change. I know you say that you still have internal difficulties, but also you say that the President is the only one who can solve these issues. Therefore, I hope that your negotiations in Paris will be good for you.

³ See Document 167.

⁴ See footnote 10, Document 139.

Dr. Kissinger: Thanks.

PM Chou: And that you won't leave a tail behind.

Dr. Kissinger: There's no danger of misunderstanding the Prime Minister.

PM Chou: My third question concerns Korea. You now have mixed army units with the South Korean forces, which also include a Thai unit.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: This was reported in the news, which said that an American commands the army, with a South Korean as a vice commander.

Dr. Kissinger: In Korea or Thailand?

PM Chou: Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: I know of no Thai units but I will check on this. The joint command is not a new policy; its purpose is to make our withdrawal easier, and not to increase our commitment.

PM Chou: However, North Korean opposition will increase, and we will also oppose that. The second point is that the Japanese defense forces every month send personnel in civilian clothes to South Korea to look into the South Korean military situation; and Japanese military men will never forget Korea or Taiwan, though these territories did not belong to them. You should pay attention to that. You oppose revived Japanese militarism going abroad and now it's beginning?

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, I was not aware of these things. I am not disputing them, and will look into them. I repeat, it is not our policy to support Japanese military expansion outside their home islands.

PM Chou: But I must bring to your attention the fact that Japan has now grown big. Even your President has also said that either this year or next Japan's steel production will meet or exceed that of the U.S. Japan is already so big that it cannot contain itself. We are rather familiar with Japan, and you also have a history of relations with Japan dating back 100 years. The Japanese people are industrious and intelligent, and should have their independence and rightful status. However, recently the minority of the ambitious militarists in Japan have been expanding also, and their war-lord mentality has been expanding as well. I am mentioning this to you so that you can also bring it to the attention of your President. The Emperor of Japan is the basis of this system that maintains the militarism of Japan. This year or the next he will go to your country. He is in a different situation than the British Queen who travels all over the world.

Dr. Kissinger: One point about Korea: we oppose military aggression by South Korea against North Korea. But I also must tell you that sometimes North Korea has been very harsh in its military measures both against South Korea and against the U.S. We believe that it would

help maintain Asian peace if you could use your influence with North Korea to not use force against the U.S. and against South Korea.

PM Chou: The Military Demarcation Line still exists, and every week we meet there with you and South Korea on one side, and ourselves and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the other. This is a powder-keg left over from Dulles. At that time I suggested that you at least allow the Geneva Conference to apply to Korea. Many Foreign Ministers of other countries were persuaded by me, especially Spaak of Belgium. At the time of the Geneva Conference, Eden, who was in the chair at the time, almost agreed. My only request was to let the meeting continue. However, the U.S. representative, Smith,⁵ who was not very fierce, all he could do was wave his hands in opposition toward Mr. Eden, after which he changed and dropped the whole thing.

As for John Foster Dulles not wanting to shake hands with me, I wouldn't want to shake hands with him, either. This was the first time we engaged in such international activities.

Another point I mentioned for the cause of peace in the Far East, is that it would be best for you to withdraw all foreign troops from the Far East, including South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indochina. There is no need to discuss Taiwan anymore. I put this forward as a principle; this would be a popular move.

You know that Japan wants to recover certain islands to the north . . .⁶

Dr. Kissinger: From the Soviet Union.

PM Chou: . . . and members of the opposition party asked us what they should do. I said that they must prove that Japan will not restore militarism, and because the Japanese people oppose the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, they must do away with it. If they acted in this way, the Soviets would be forced to talk to them. However, if they told the Soviets that I said this, they would run up against a stone wall.

This shows that it is not easy to arrange peace in the Far East, and if things continue there could be even greater violence in the Far East. I must point this out to you.

Dr. Kissinger: As I have said, the danger from Japan of which you speak does not come from us, and withdrawal of our forces from Japan may increase the danger that worries you.

⁵ Paul Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister from April 22, 1954 to May 11, 1957, Head of the Belgian Delegation to the Geneva Talks and Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State from February 9, 1953 to October 1, 1954, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Geneva Talks.

⁶ All ellipses in the source text.

PM Chou: You know we are not afraid of that, as I told you yesterday. No matter how large Japan grows it has had experience with us. If they want to create great trouble, let them come. Changes have also occurred among the Japanese people over the last 25 years since the war. You have an expert on Japan—I believe his name is Reischauer⁷—isn't he rather clear about this?

Dr. Kissinger: He is a friend of mine.

PM Chou: How much knowledge does he have of Japan?

Dr. Kissinger: Quite a lot of knowledge.

PM Chou: Does he believe that the evil roots of Japanese militarism still exist?

Dr. Kissinger: I believe that he sees some tendencies.

PM Chou: More than that, their present defense means exceed their necessities.

There are two pieces of news that I would like to tell you. On July 9, the day you came, Indian and Pakistan artillery shelling occurred for the first time in an area near the borders of East Pakistan, India, Bhutan, and Sikkim. The Indian side sent more than 300 shells and the Pakistani forces in that area returned more than 300 rounds themselves. In the evening, the firing ceased.

Dr. Kissinger: On the 9th?

PM Chou: Yes. You will learn about this when you get to Pakistan.

The second item is that on the 10th, a coup d'état was attempted in Morocco staged by some people in the military, who broke into the Palace, killed the Air Commander and the Defense Minister, and also the Belgian Ambassador who was in the palace to see the King. Hassan the Second was not killed because that day he was celebrating his birthday.

Dr. Kissinger: He was not overthrown?

PM Chou: I don't know the results—perhaps he escaped.

Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate this information very much.

PM Chou: This shows that the turmoil is continuing. The world is in a great upheaval.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I think we have done some historic work here. I hope that we have laid the basis for a new relationship of cooperation and friendship between the American people and the Chinese people.

PM Chou: We have gone the first step.

⁷ Edwin O. Reischauer, Ambassador to Japan from March 1961 to August 1966, and well-known Japan scholar.

Dr. Kissinger: And we hope this will help reduce the turmoil under the heavens about which you spoke yesterday.

PM Chou: Our subjective efforts are in this direction, but the objective trend of affairs may not develop along the lines of our subjective ways.

Dr. Kissinger: We must try to do it. I came aware of the achievements of the People's Republic of China and its people, so I was not surprised by that. I have been especially moved though by the idealism and spiritual qualities of yourself and your colleagues.

PM Chou: I suggest that we have a quick lunch.

Even though our achievements are still small, we have a large population and country. It is not an easy task to organize a large country of 700 million people and still maintain and elevate the revolutionary vitality of these people and build up a socialist country. Perhaps the world expects too much from us, and I hope that you are not disappointed. We don't want to spread our hands all over the world. You and the Soviet Union have learned that lesson, and we don't want to follow in your paths.

Dr. Kissinger: My colleagues and I want to thank you for your grace and courtesy with which you have received us. In my subjective, and personal view, I came with hope and leave in friendship.

PM Chou: I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: I have also gotten to know new friends.

PM Chou: Shall we end here?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Please tell President Yahya Khan that if India commits aggression, we will support Pakistan. You are also against that.

Dr. Kissinger: We will oppose that, but we cannot take military measures.

PM Chou: You are too far away. But you have strength to persuade India. You can speak to both sides.

Dr. Kissinger: We will do our best.

144. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

San Clemente, California, July 14, 1971.

[Omitted here is a 23-page narrative review of the July meetings under the following headings: What Happened, The Chinese, Summit, Taiwan, Indochina, Japan, Korea, South Asia, Communications, Great Power Relations, Arms Control, and Americans Detained in China.]

SUBJECT

My Talks with Chou En-lai

Introduction

My two-day visit to Peking resulted in the most searching, sweeping and significant discussions I have ever had in government.² I spent seventeen hours in meetings and informal conversation with Chou En-lai, flanked by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, member of the Politburo and of the Military Commission; Huang Hua, the new Chinese Ambassador

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971 HAK trip to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Printed from an unsigned copy, which is 27 pages long. Nixon and Haig were in San Clemente, California, from July 6 through July 18. A 21-page version of this memorandum, July 17, contains less information on commitments made by the Kissinger or Chou on behalf of their respective nations, for example, information on U.S. officers to inform the PRC leaders of any agreements reached with the Soviet Union is absent from the shorter version. (Ibid., RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers, Entry 5439, China) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 9.

² An undated message from Haig "for Henry A. Kissinger very first opportunity on his return from destination" reads in full: "Leader has requested that you flash me via this channel, as first priority of business and regardless of hour, cryptic assessment of outcome. He is particularly interested in status of July 15 announcement." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, HAK, Very Sensitive Trip Cables) In response Kissinger cabled a short report on his talks while in the People's Republic of China, which was forwarded by Haig to the President. (Ibid., Box 1031, Files for the President—China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK Trip to China—December 1969–July 1971) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 7. Nixon's July 11 response to Kissinger's initial reports on talks in the PRC began: "Your reported conversations were the most intensive, important and far-reaching of your White House experience. If we play the game up to the hilt from now on out, history will record your visit as the most significant foreign policy achievement of this century. When you return, I plan to give you a day off in compensation for your superb service to the nation—far beyond the call of duty. Please extend my appreciation to the dedicated members of your staff whose superb efforts have contributed to this achievement." Copies of Nixon's message, sent through Haig, are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, HAK, Very Sensitive Trip Cables. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 8.

in Ottawa; and Chang Wen-chin, head of the West European and American Department in the Foreign Ministry. Another four hours was spent with Huang and Chang, mostly on drafting a communiqué. These meetings brought about a summit meeting between you and Mao Tse-tung, covered all major issues between our two countries at considerable length and with great candor, and may well have marked a major new departure in international relations.

It is extremely difficult to capture in a memorandum the essence of this experience. Simply giving you a straightforward account of the highlights of our talks, potentially momentous as they were, would do violence to an event so shaped by the atmosphere and the ebb and flow of our encounter, or to the Chinese behavior, so dependent on nuances and style. Thus, this memorandum will sketch the overall sequence of events and philosophic framework, as well as the substance of our exchanges. For the intangibles are crucial and we must understand them if we are to take advantage of the opportunities we now have, deal effectively with these tough, idealistic, fanatical, single-minded and remarkable people, and thus transform the very framework of global relationships.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the talks between Kissinger and Chou En-lai.]

Conclusion

I am frank to say that this visit was a very moving experience. The historic aspects of the occasion; the warmth and dignity of the Chinese; the splendor of the Forbidden City, Chinese history and culture; the heroic stature of Chou En-lai; and the intensity and sweep of our talks combined to make an indelible impression on me and my colleagues.

These forty-eight hours, and my extensive discussions with Chou in particular, had all the flavor, texture, variety and delicacy of a Chinese banquet. Prepared from the long sweep of tradition and culture, meticulously cooked by hands of experience, and served in splendidly simple surroundings, our feast consisted of many courses, some sweet and some sour, all interrelated and forming a coherent whole. It was a total experience, and one went away, as after all good Chinese meals, very satisfied but not at all satiated.

We have laid the groundwork for you and Mao to turn a page in history. But we should have no illusions about the future. Profound differences and years of isolation yawn between us and the Chinese. They will be tough before and during the summit on the question of Taiwan and other major issues. And they will prove implacable foes if our relations turn sour. My assessment of these people is that they are deeply ideological, close to fanatic in the intensity of their beliefs. At the same time they display an inward security that allows them, within

the framework of their principles, to be meticulous and reliable in dealing with others.

Furthermore, the process we have now started will send enormous shock waves around the world. It may panic the Soviet Union into sharp hostility. It could shake Japan loose from its heavily American moorings. It will cause a violent upheaval in Taiwan. It will have major impact on our other Asian allies, such as Korea and Thailand. It will increase the already substantial hostility in India. Some quarters may seek to sabotage the summit over the coming months.

However, we were well aware of these risks when we embarked on this course. We were aware too that the alternative was unacceptable—continued isolation from one-quarter of the world's most talented people and a country rich in past achievements and future potential.

And even the risks can be managed and turned to our advantage if we maintain steady nerves and pursue our policies responsibly. With the Soviet Union we will have to make clear the continued priorities we attach to our concrete negotiations with them. Just as we will not collude with them against China, so we have no intention of colluding with China against them. If carefully managed, our new China policy could have a longer term beneficial impact on Moscow.

With Japan our task will be to make clear that we are not shifting our allegiance in Asia from her to China. On Taiwan we can hope for little more than damage limitation by reaffirming our diplomatic relations and mutual defense treaty even while it becomes evident that we foresee a political evolution over the coming years. With our other Asian allies we will need to stress both our continued bonds and our hope that reconciliation between us and the Chinese will serve the cause of regional peace. And in India, after the initial shock, our China moves might produce a more healthy relationship.

For Asia and for the world we need to demonstrate that we are enlarging the scope of our diplomacy in a way that, far from harming the interests of other countries, should instead prove helpful to them.

Our dealings, both with the Chinese and others, will require reliability, precision, finesse. If we can master this process, we will have made a revolution.

145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, July 16, 1971.

128839/Tosec 156. White House—Please Pass San Clemente for Secretary Rogers. Subject: President's Announcement: ROC Reaction.² Refs: A. Taipei 3470; B. Taipei 3491.³

1. ROC Ambassador Shen, acting under instructions, called on Assistant Secretary Green in action parallel to that taken by Acting Foreign Minister Yang with Ambassador McConaughy (Ref tels). As instructed, Shen lodged strong protest and expressed profound regret at act that should "hardly be described as a friendly act." He said it would have consequences not only for both our countries, but for whole free world. He said ROC wants to know what transpired in Peking between Kissinger and Chou En-lai. Expressing concern about where we go from here, Shen asked whether the announcement was the decision referred to when the President on June 1 said that a decision regarding UN representation would be made in about six weeks.

2. Green responded that this announcement could not reasonably be called an unfriendly act. The President had said that it would "not be at the expense of our old friends," which meant the ROC. Green said the visit was motivated by a desire to find some way to ease the tensions which had so long existed in East Asia without letting down our guard or undercutting our friends.

3. As for other points raised by Shen, Green suggested that they might be discussed with Secretary Rogers who would be glad to see Shen at 11:00 a.m. Monday, July 19. Shen accepted with thanks. Green stated firmly that the President's announcement does not affect our friendship and relations with the ROC. He affirmed that our defense

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 CHICOM–US. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Tokyo, Hong Kong, USUN, the White House, and San Clemente. Drafted by L. R. Starbird (EA/ROC) and approved by Green.

² Initial ROC reaction to the President's announcement, including the first official statement, made by Vice President Yen, is in telegram 3493 from Taipei, July 16; *ibid.*, POL 1 CHICOM–US. A report on public demonstrations outside the U.S. Embassy is in telegram 3570 from Taipei, July 21; *ibid.*, POL 23–8 CHINAT, and media reactions are detailed in telegram 3571 from Taipei, July 21; *ibid.*, POL 1 CHICOM–US. McConaughy wrote: "Reaction to President's announcement indicates pattern of restraint on part of GRC and has involved numerous expressions of desire and necessity for maintaining good working relations with US." (Telegram 3572 from Taipei, July 21; *ibid.*) Rogers met with Shen on July 19, as reported in telegram 130330 to Taipei. (*Ibid.*, POL 17 CHINAT–US). They discussed Kissinger's trip and Chinese representation in the UN.

³ Telegrams 3470 and 3491 from Taipei, July 16 and 17, detail McConaughy's meeting with Yang. (*Ibid.*, POL 1 CHICOM–US)

commitment continues. He said he thought the Secretary might be able to throw some light on Chirep when he saw Shen.

4. Shen said Taipei was upset at this development. He had just learned of Premier Yen's statement from the ROC UN Mission. It too expressed profound surprise and regret. Shen said that the US had chosen a very unusual way to show its friendship for the ROC—by accepting an invitation from the leader of a rebel regime which usurps the mainland. He expressed appreciation for Green's reassurance that the US continues to stand by the ROC and intends to maintain its defense treaty commitment. He noted, however, that this had not stopped the US from having high-level dealings with what the ROC regards as a rebel regime. He pointed out that restoration of its control over the mainland remains an ROC objective.

5. Green said he could only emphasize that tensions and wars in East Asia had continued for a long time, that the people of the world were sick of it, and that we feel a real effort must be made to tackle the difficult international problems. This would be a long journey, it would require a great effort, and we do not know what the results will be. Certainly, we shall need to keep our guard up. But the ROC should realize that this move has met with great approval throughout the world and that this places great pressure on Peking to respond.

6. Shen expressed deep concern over the lack of prior consultations. He observed that the US did consult on the question of recognition of Outer Mongolia. He, therefore, found it difficult to understand why we had not consulted on this far more important development. He stressed the importance of this aspect by saying that if he himself found this hard to understand, how much more difficult will it be for the officials in Taipei. With some annoyance he asked whether the lack of prior consultations could be considered normal diplomatic practice and he again wondered aloud where we would go from here.

7. In response Green reiterated that this move was not an unfriendly act and that it was wrong to view it as such. He said we understood the problems and difficulties posed for the ROC, and we do not sacrifice our friends; in fact our record was second to none in the world in that regard. We have an obligation to the people of the United States and of the world to seek peace, but it would not be peace at any price. It will probably be a long journey and its outcome is not assured. It took great courage to accept the risks involved in starting it. But a start was necessary and it has been now made. We hope this effort succeeds because much is riding on it.

Irwin

146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, July 17, 1971, 0130Z.

129656. For Ambassador McConaughy. Subject: Letter to President Chiang From President Nixon.

1. You are authorized to deliver following personal message from President Nixon to President Chiang at earliest opportunity:²

Begin text: I deeply regret that I was not able to inform you at an earlier date of the substance of my announcement of July 15.

The steps which I have recommended were taken because I believe that it has become imperative in this age to attempt to break down barriers of hostility and suspicion that have grown over the years and could threaten the peace of the world. The people of free Asian nations should be the first to benefit from efforts to lower tensions in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

I recognize that these actions are disturbing to the Republic of China. In seeking to reduce tensions in the world, however, I wish to assure you that the United States will maintain its ties of friendship with your country and will continue to honor its defense treaty commitment to the Republic of China. I am proud of my long personal association with you and I know the American people will continue to cherish their friendship with the people of the Republic of China. *End text.*

2. We propose to keep contents of this message confidential, but we have no objection if GRC were to acknowledge publicly President Chiang had received a message from President Nixon regarding his desire to maintain continuing friendship with the GRC.

Irwin

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received on July 16 at 9:48 p.m. Drafted by Charles T. Sylvester (EA/ROC), cleared by Colonel Kennedy at the White House, and approved by Green.

² McConaughy reported that he personally handed the message to Acting Foreign Minister H. K. Yang at 1 p.m. on July 17. Yang said he would relay the message to Chiang. (Telegram 3495 from Taipei, July 17; *ibid.*, POL 15-1 CHINAT)

147. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 19, 1971.

One effective line you could use in your talks with the press is how RN is uniquely prepared for this meeting and how ironically in many ways he has similar character characteristics and background to Chou. I am just listing a few of the items that might be emphasized.²

- (1) Strong convictions.
- (2) Came up through adversity.
- (3) At his best in a crisis. Cool. Unflappable.
- (4) A tough bold strong leader. Willing to take chances where necessary.
- (5) A man who takes the long view, never being concerned about tomorrow's headlines but about how the policy will look years from now.
- (6) A man with a philosophical turn of mind.
- (7) A man who works without notes—in meetings with 73 heads of state and heads of government RN has had hours of conversation without any notes. When he met with Khrushchev in 1959 in the seven hour luncheon at the dacha, neither he nor Khrushchev had a note and yet discussed matters of the greatest consequences in covering many areas.
- (8) A man who knows Asia and has made a particular point of traveling in Asia and studying Asia.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, President/Kissinger Memos, HAK/President Memoranda, 1971. Confidential. Printed from an unsigned copy. A covering note, attached but not printed, from Haldeman to Kissinger reads: "P. suggests you cover these points with Scali also—but do not show him the memo." Haldeman reiterated many of these points in a similar memorandum to Kissinger, March 14, 1972. (Ibid., Box 817, Name Files, Haldeman, H.R.)

² In a conversation on July 22, Nixon and Kissinger again discussed the President's personality and views on relations with China. Nixon declared: "Let me say that on the China thing though, as I'm sure you realize Henry, there's no one who has less illusions about this initiative than I have. I know exactly that all this euphoria [about] Chinese-American relations, I know everyone in China. We're doing the China thing to screw the Russians and help us in Vietnam and to keep the Japanese in line, get another ball in play. And maybe way down the road to have some relations with China." Kissinger responded: "I told them [a group of conservative congressmen], Mr. President, this group this morning, that I sat through 73 meetings with foreign leaders with the President. Both in terms of style and general approach, it so happens you have been, he is the best resource we have for dealing with these people." He added: "I made the point, I said now, that tough, unemotional, precise, is precisely the President. I said most Americans come back from summit meetings with a sense of euphoria by social occasion. I said that can't happen because he doesn't have any social occasions, he works all the time." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, July 22, 1971, 3:49–5:05 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 543–1)

(9) A man who in terms of his personal style is very strong and very tough where necessary—steely but who is subtle and appears almost gentle. The tougher his position usually, the lower his voice.

You could point out that most of these attributes are ones that you also saw in Chou En-lai.

As a matter of fact, one of the ways that you could subtly get this across is to describe Chou En-lai and to go into how RN's personal characteristics are somewhat similar.

148. Minutes of the Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting¹

Washington, July 19, 1971, 8:47–9:52 a.m.

ATTENDEES

Mr. Laird	Dr. Nutter
Mr. Packard	BGen Hayes (pending Dr. Wilbur's arrival)
Mr. Froehlke	Mr. Shillito
Mr. Beal	Dr. Tucker
General Westmoreland	Mr. Buzhardt
Governor Chafee	Mr. Wallace
Admiral Zumwalt	Mr. Baroodly
Dr. Seamans	Mr. Johnson
General Ryan	Mr. Solomon
Admiral Moorer	Dr. Walske
General Chapman	Mr. Friedheim
Lt General Vogt	Dr. Heilmeyer
Dr. Rehtin (for Dr. Foster)	BGen Pursley
Mr. Cooke	RAdm Murphy
Mr. Henkin	Colonel Furlong
LGeneral Taber (for Mr. Kelley)	Colonel Boatner
Mr. Moot	

[Omitted here is discussion of Laird's recent trip to South Korea and Japan, manpower issues, and legislative affairs.]

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Office Files: FRC 330 76 0028, Chron, 16 June 1971. Top Secret. Prepared by Colonel James G. Boatner, USA. Laird also held his regular meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 19 at 2:30 p.m. Although the minutes of this meeting have not been found, the talking paper prepared for Laird cover many of the same points as the staff meeting minutes. The talking paper states that "The price which Peking may demand for normalizing U.S.-PRC relations is a return by the U.S. to essentially a pre-World War II posture in Asia, with minimum presence and influence." (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC 330 76 0197, 337 Staff Mtgs (JCS), 1971)

5. *China Initiative*

Mr. Laird felt that too many people were reading too much into the possibilities that would evolve from the President's proposed trip to China. Many of these implications will be of great concern to the Department of Defense, and Mr. Laird cautioned that there will be a tendency for many groups to assume that the war in Southeast Asia is over. Mr. Laird stressed that it is important to relate the China initiative to the principles of the Nixon Doctrine, ie, strength, partnership, and negotiation. Mr. Laird said that in his experience, many people would tend to put too much faith into the outcome of one meeting. He mentioned that the Chinese could make some last minute demands which would make it very difficult for us in Southeast Asia. Mr. Laird said that the theme, from the standpoint of the Department of Defense, should be first that this is just one move in our overall efforts to negotiate an era of peace and second, that we must remember it is important to maintain strength during this period of negotiation. Dr. Nutter gave an analysis of our possible new relationship with the People's Republic of China. He cautioned that it was very early to offer anything other than the very tentative analysis. He reminded the group that Peking has been conducting a diplomatic offense for over a year. Dr. Nutter also mentioned that a meaningful dialogue had developed on the subject of trade and travel after the President's foreign policy report of February 1971.² Dr. Nutter pointed out that Peking will seek a reduction of our military presence in the Western Pacific as a price for cooperation. Dr. Nutter cautioned that this may well have a very fundamental impact on the balance of power in that part of the world. He mentioned that various preliminary studies on the implications of this new situation had already been started by ISA, DIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East and Southeast Asia.]

² "Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy," February 25, 1971, in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 219–345.

149. Memorandum From the Defense Attaché in France (Walters) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Paris, July 19, 1971.

At 0830 on 19 July 1971 I called without prior announcement at the Residence of Ambassador Huang Chen in Neuilly, not far from my own home. I had left my car some distance away and arrived on foot. I was obviously expected and let in at once. I was initially received by the Ambassador's Secretary, Mr. Wei Tung. After tea and sweets, the Ambassador arrived accompanied by his First Secretary, Tsao Kuei Sheng.

The Ambassador said he had returned from Peking the previous evening. He complimented me on my discretion in coming early to residence rather than to chancellery where "police and newspapermen were watching." He said that he was glad to talk to a "colleague" as he, too, was a general.

The Ambassador said that Dr. Kissinger had done great work in Peking and he was a man who knew the value of discretion. I then handed him the message and the background briefing and requested that he transmit them to Prime Minister Chou En-lai with all possible speed and security.² He said that he would do so at once.

The Ambassador then said that when Dr. Kissinger had been in Peking he had indicated that he (HAK) might come to see the Ambassador in Paris. He asked that if this were to occur, he would appreciate being advised in advance through me and I could arrange the interview. If Dr. Kissinger had questions to ask, he would appreciate being advised two or three days in advance so he could transmit these questions to P.M. Chou En-lai and thus have the answers when he saw Dr. Kissinger.

He then said that the Chinese side had a message that they wanted to get to Dr. Kissinger at once. They read this slowly in English and I wrote it down and read it back to them. It is attached herewith.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

² See attachment below.

³ Attached but not printed. The message reads: "Over a period of time, a number of U.S. political figures have eagerly made requests for visits to China. Now that the announcement of July 16, 1971, has been issued, it will be difficult for the Chinese Government to further put off the consideration of these requests. In its contacts with them, the Chinese side will naturally expound its fundamental position on Sino-U.S. relations, the question of Indochina, the Far East question and the world situation, but will not mention the specific statements by Dr. Kissinger in the Peking talks." Nixon made the announcement on the evening of July 15 (U.S. time), which was July 16 in the PRC.

He said he knew I had translated for President Nixon on many occasions and knowing that my hobby was subways (this is correct), he hoped I would see the new Peking subway when I went to China.

After this demonstration of biographic expertise, more tea, extreme cordiality throughout, I was given telephone numbers 624–9002 and 624–9003 to reach them whenever I wanted. We agreed that we would each use the code name JEAN over the phone.

He again complimented me for coming to his residence rather than the chancery and said he was happy to have this direct channel of communications. He walked me to the door and reiterated that he would send what I had given him to Prime Minister Chou En-lai at once.

Faithfully

Dick

P.S. I made plain that no one in the U.S. Embassy in Paris was aware of the existence of this channel. They said they felt it was best that way. My stay at their Embassy lasted nearly an hour. Several times they made references to their industrial backwardness. This could indicate a future request for industrial know-how.

Attachment⁴

President Nixon expresses his warm appreciation for the courtesies that Premier Chou En-lai and the Government of the People's Republic of China extended to Dr. Kissinger during his visit to Peking.

The President has received Dr. Kissinger's reports of the visit and his talks with Premier Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials with great interest. He wishes to reaffirm all the understandings that were arrived at in these conversations and to assure the People's Republic of China that the United States Government will adhere to them scrupulously. The President hopes that the People's Republic of China will understand the bureaucratic complications that Dr. Kissinger outlined, and he reaffirms the procedures which Dr. Kissinger suggested for handling these problems.

The President has approved an interim visit to Peking prior to his own. He will send Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Bruce in order to work out the detailed arrangements for the President's subsequent visit to China. Within the next six weeks the United States Government will

⁴ No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the message reads: "Classified phone for hand carry by Fazio to Walters, 7/16/71."

propose, through this channel, possible dates for both the interim visit and the President's visit to Peking. The President warmly looks forward to his meetings with the Chinese leaders.

Dr. Kissinger wishes to add his own personal gratitude for the extremely gracious and hospitable manner in which he and his associates were received in Peking. He wishes to thank Premier Chou En-lai and all the other Chinese officials who made his journey so important and memorable.

Enclosed is a copy of Dr. Kissinger's July 16, 1971 background briefing of the press in California which he thought would be of interest to the Premier.⁵ This is the only official statement that will be made by the U.S. Government on Dr. Kissinger's visit to Peking.

⁵ Background briefing given by Kissinger and Ziegler on the morning of July 16 at San Clemente. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, Country Files—East Asia, U.S. China Policy, 1969–1972)

150. Message From the United States Government to the Premier of the People's Republic of China Chou En-lai¹

Washington, July 20, 1971.

In line with their understanding of keeping him informed of contacts affecting the People's Republic of China, Dr. Kissinger wants to call Premier Chou En-lai's attention to the following: (1) On July 19 the Soviet Ambassador called on Dr. Kissinger to inquire about the Peking talks. Dr. Kissinger told him that no matter concerning the Soviet Union was discussed. In reply to a question, Dr. Kissinger stated that the Chinese side expressed no concern over or interest in the possibility of Soviet military pressures against them. The Soviet Ambassador inquired whether the President would be prepared to visit Moscow before Peking. He was told that while the U.S. maintained its acceptance of a meeting with Soviet leaders, Presidential visits would take place in the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Haig forwarded the message under a separate covering letter to Walters on July 20. (Ibid.) Walters delivered this message to the PRC Ambassador to France on July 21. (Walters' letter to Haig, July 22; *ibid.*) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 10 and 11. In many of his reports, Walters uses the name "Kirschman" to refer to Kissinger.

order in which they were announced. (2) [1 line of source text not declassified] (3) With respect to the message transmitted by General Walters, the Premier must understand the need to insulate Sino-U.S. relations from U.S. domestic politics. To the degree that these relations or related subjects become subject to partisan statements, the President's freedom of action is inhibited. (4) Dr. Kissinger will be in Paris secretly on July 25/26 and will be prepared to meet the Chinese Ambassador on that occasion to receive Premier Chou En-lai's reaction to these messages or any other matter of mutual concern.²

² Another message, also attached to Haig's July 20 letter, "to be put orally by Walters" reads: "It may be useful to begin discussing the technical side of the public visit Dr. Kissinger is planning for Peking in late September/early October; for example, the Chinese ideas on where the plane might originate—is Okinawa acceptable, direct flight from Alaska, Chinese navigators, length of stay, participants at meeting, etc. The Ambassador might give answer when he sees Dr. Kissinger." Walters' July 22 letter to Haig indicated that he relayed this message. (Ibid.)

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, July 26, 1971, 4:35–5:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Chen, Chinese Ambassador to France
 Tsao Kuei Sheng, First Secretary of Chinese Embassy
 Wei Tung—Secretary to the Chinese Ambassador
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Major General Vernon Walters, Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Paris
 Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger apologized for being late for the meeting, but he had been delayed at another appointment.² Ambassador Huang welcomed Dr. Kissinger on Chinese soil and commented that he foresaw that Dr. Kissinger would be late. He noted that he had seen Dr. Kissinger at General DeGaulle's funeral and had almost said hello. Dr. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Chinese Embassy. Attached was a draft summary memorandum for Nixon and a July 30 short covering note by Lord. Kissinger indicated that he did not wish to forward the summary to Nixon. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 12.

² Kissinger was also meeting with DRV representatives in Paris. See *ibid.*, volume VII.

responded that he in turn had seen the Ambassador, but refrained from introducing himself because of the excitement it would have caused, particularly for the Soviet Ambassador. He said that he had pleasant memories of his trip to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that he had wanted to meet the Chinese Ambassador while in Paris so as to make arrangements for future contacts.

Ambassador Huang then presented a verbal message from his government which read as follows: "The Chinese Government agrees to an interim visit to China by Dr. Kissinger for the latter part of October. Owing to understandable reasons, it would not be appropriate for Mr. Bruce to come to China."

Ambassador Huang then said that he had another verbal message which stated that when Dr. Kissinger comes to China in the latter part of October, the special U.S. aircraft should take off directly from Alaska to land at the Shanghai airport. For further details, the Chinese would advise the U.S. concerning further contacts.

In response to Dr. Kissinger's query about why Shanghai was suggested Ambassador Huang replied that he could only transmit the message as he received it, and that this was what he had to say.

Dr. Kissinger said that he was sure that Prime Minister Chou En-lai remembered that it was his suggestion that there be an interim visit, and thus the United States had accepted *his* proposal. Dr. Kissinger had told the Prime Minister that Ambassador Bruce was the one man of our ambassadorial group in whom we had total confidence, and if Dr. Kissinger was not able to go to China, Ambassador Bruce would be able to speak for the President. He had explained to the Prime Minister at the time that Ambassador Bruce would have left the negotiations in Paris. In fact, he was leaving the next week. Dr. Kissinger understood the view of the Chinese government concerning this occasion, but it would be in the two countries' mutual interest if this were not a permanent view. For the United States hoped Ambassador Bruce could be used to maintain contact with the Chinese government on the occasions that Dr. Kissinger couldn't do so himself.

As for the technical side of the interim visit, General Walters would be in touch with Ambassador Huang, Dr. Kissinger continued. The U.S. would require specific information as to where the meetings would take place, who would participate, and the approximate size of the delegations on both sides, as well as the length of the visit. However, Dr. Kissinger added, there was plenty of time for these matters and they didn't have to be settled for several weeks. He did wish that Prime Minister Chou En-lai would read what he had told him about Ambassador Bruce, since it was important that the two sides keep contacts that don't become public.

Dr. Kissinger said that he had a couple of other matters to discuss. First, the U.S. was aware of the fact that the Chinese Nationalists were organizing and would intensify a campaign, together with other countries, against the meeting that has taken place in Peking and against the meeting that has been planned between the President and Chinese leaders. Part of this campaign was to describe Dr. Kissinger as a communist agent. Dr. Kissinger remarked that he could only say that the communists were not paying him very well. Ambassador Huang laughed and said that was ridiculous. Dr. Kissinger responded that it was of no concern to the Chinese and that it was his problem.

Dr. Kissinger stated that there was a second problem that could concern both countries. There was a systematic campaign to tell the press things that were allegedly discussed between Prime Minister Chou En-lai and himself in order to embarrass both sides. He wanted the Chinese to know that the only things which the U.S. had told the press were in his background, a copy of which he had given the Chinese, and anything else they read did not come from the United States Government.

Secondly, Dr. Kissinger said, the U.S. would continue to inform the Chinese of any conversations in which the PRC is mentioned that the U.S. might have with any other socialist country. And if anything should be said to the contrary, the Chinese could be sure that it was not true.

Finally, in any contact the U.S. Government would have with the press, it would reserve with the greatest restraint any commentary upon the PRC. The U.S. would consider it helpful, given the delicacy of the U.S.–Chinese relationship, if this were done on a reciprocal basis, but in any event the U.S. will do it. Ambassador Huang said this presented no problem on this side; it remained to be seen how the U.S. was able to do it. The Chinese would take care of their side.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that the American press was beside itself at this moment, particularly Mr. Joseph Alsop who was writing endless speculation on what happened in Peking. Ambassador Huang commented the Chinese had already read some of his articles. Dr. Kissinger said that none of the U.S. side had talked to Mr. Alsop, and that's what makes him angry, that and the fact that Dr. Kissinger had gone to Peking without his permission. It doesn't matter what the United States did, Mr. Alsop did not recognize the PRC. Ambassador Huang commented that other Americans have attitudes like him. Dr. Kissinger replied that this was a problem, that the U.S. had major opposition from right-wing groups. Ambassador Huang noted that this was one of the difficult problems for the U.S. Curiously enough, Dr. Kissinger said, it was best if the left wing were not encouraged to say too much by the Chinese. The best way to keep the right-wing groups under control was if the U.S. Government could assure them that its

policy was an independent one. Ambassador Huang responded that he was prepared to report to his government what Dr. Kissinger had told him. Dr. Kissinger said he was very grateful.

During some tea and pleasantries, Dr. Kissinger said that he would let Ambassador Huang know through General Walters when he was coming to town secretly. If Ambassador Huang had any messages for him, he could then let him know, and they could meet. Ambassador Huang agreed with this procedure, and the meeting then concluded.

152. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 27, 1971, 12:05–12:31 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

James C. H. Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT

Dr. Kissinger's Discussions with Ambassador Shen on the President's Visit to Peking

After a brief exchange with Ambassador Shen about the cuisine in Peking and the weight he had put on there, Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted Ambassador Shen to know that nothing in his tenure in the White House had been more painful to him than what had occurred (the secrecy over Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking and the announcement of the President's visit). He was saying this not as a diplomat but as a genuine friend. There were no people who had deserved what had happened less than the ROC, because they were our loyal friends. What had happened had been brought into play by general necessities, and had nothing to do with Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that we were under no illusions as to what we were up against on the PRC side. He had told the President that in Moscow we were up against thugs, and that in Peking we were deal-

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Memoranda of Conversations, September–December 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to Kissinger's record of schedule, the meeting lasted from 12:05 to 12:31 p.m. (Ibid., Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) A 2-page memorandum of talking points, prepared by Holdridge on July 26, is *ibid.*

ing with fanatical maniacs; of the two, it was hard to tell which was worse. Certainly we were not beginning an era of love, but we may have to go on a line which was not parallel to one followed by the ROC which would require some wisdom on the part of all of us. But we would not betray old friends, or turn anyone over to communism to ease our problems.

Dr. Kissinger noted that he was being attacked all over for being a hard liner, but if his record (and that of the President) were looked at closely, it could be seen that every effective military program with respect to Taiwan was done during this Administration. We would stand by our friends. With respect to recent developments, we simply had to respond to other problems not connected with Taiwan, and had to do what we did. This didn't ease Ambassador Shen's problems, but he, Dr. Kissinger, wanted the Ambassador to know his sentiments, and to feel some of the mood and feelings on our side. He hoped that Ambassador Shen would keep this in mind.

Ambassador Shen said that he appreciated what Dr. Kissinger had said. In addition, assurances from the President would be helpful. Dr. Kissinger declared that assurances were cheap and that he wanted to express his sentiments in terms which would be more valuable than formal assurances.

Ambassador Shen asked if Dr. Kissinger could speak about some of the things which he had discussed with the Chinese in Peking, for example the question of "two Chinas" and the U.S. position on China's Security Council seat. Dr. Kissinger informed Ambassador Shen that the PRC representatives had stated their full position on Taiwan's being a province of China, a position which Ambassador Shen must have known from the newspapers. We took the position which we had always taken, and had said that we would not oppose any peaceful solution which the ROC and the PRC worked out; we had also said that we had a Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC and hoped that they wouldn't use force against Taiwan.

Continuing, Dr. Kissinger said that with respect to the UN issue, we knew that they would oppose our position, and we had not gone into it because it was being handled separately. The question of the Security Council seat simply did not come up one way or another—they simply wanted the whole thing, which we had said was not possible. There was no separate discussion about their getting the Security Council seat, and of the ROC staying in the General Assembly. So contrary to what Ambassador Shen would have read in the newspapers, there were no deals made about Formosa, and also contrary to what the newspapers had said, we didn't go to them for the meetings, that is, take the initiative. This was not a case of our going to them and having them say that we had to give up Taiwan and the Security Council

seat. There were no conditions, and what Secretary Rogers had told Ambassador Shen about the talks in Peking was essentially what the situation had been.²

Ambassador Shen noted that he had just had a session the previous day with Secretary Rogers, together with his colleague on the ROC UN delegation in New York, Ambassador Liu.³ This had been a very useful discussion. Dr. Kissinger said his judgment was that if we were to take the position Secretary Rogers had discussed with Ambassador Shen, the PRC would be violently opposed. They would stick for nothing less than their getting the entire China seat. The present formula which the Secretary had discussed with Ambassador Shen was never discussed in Peking, much less accepted by them. He again expressed the guess that the PRC would oppose our position.

Ambassador Shen asked, did the discussions in Peking therefore focus on the President's trip? Dr. Kissinger replied affirmatively, adding that things were in a very preliminary state. We had not reached any substantive points, and rather were exploring technical details. Ambassador Shen wondered if the date and the month for the visit had been set, to which Dr. Kissinger replied "no." He had told them that we might make a suggestion sometime in September. Of course they could make one of their own at any time. The visit itself, though, would probably be considerably later. Dr. Kissinger said that off the top of his head, the very earliest date was December, but he considered that it probably could not be as early as that. We did not want to sit in Peking and have them hold us up with a whole series of propositions; we wanted to know what they would want before going there.

Ambassador Shen asked, would the ROC be kept informed about these arrangements, as was the case for the Warsaw talks? Dr. Kissinger replied that we would certainly try to do so—who would this information go to in the ROC? Ambassador Shen stated that only President Chiang and Chiang Ching-kuo would be informed. Dr. Kissinger declared that on that basis, we could do it. Ambassador Shen explained that he had a private channel to President Chiang and Chiang Ching-kuo via the Foreign Ministry: the Deputy Foreign Minister.

Ambassador Shen asked Dr. Kissinger for his impressions of how Chou En-lai had looked—was he in good shape? Dr. Kissinger said that Chou En-lai had seemed to be in very good shape, and had impressed him as being very intelligent.

² See footnote 2, Document 145.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 382. Rogers was attempting to obtain ROC support for the U.S. position that would oppose the expulsion of the ROC, while accepting the admittance of the PRC to the United Nations.

Ambassador Shen recalled that he had met Chou during the war years in Hankow and Chungking. He agreed that Chou was a very intelligent person. He went on to ask if Chou En-lai had appeared to be worried about the Soviets. Dr. Kissinger observed that he guessed relations with the Soviets had been on Chou's mind. Of course, the Chinese had not survived for three thousand years as an independent people by telling foreigners what they thought. This reminded Dr. Kissinger of a story concerning a Westerner who had been called to a police station for some reason in a provincial Chinese village. A Chinese bystander, seeing the Westerner, had wondered if he was a foreigner from the next province. Another villager had said, "no, he was a foreigner from the North." Finally, a third villager had said that the Westerner was a *foreign* foreigner. Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Shen where he was from. Ambassador Shen said that his home was Shanghai, on the coast.

Dr. Kissinger reverted to the subject of the Soviet Union, saying that Ambassador Shen must know that the question of the various great powers surrounding the PRC was no doubt of some concern to them. Ambassador Shen then wondered what, in Dr. Kissinger's opinion, Chou En-lai hoped to get out of the President's visit? Dr. Kissinger gave as his personal evaluation, since the Chinese hadn't told him this, that they basically believed the Taiwan problem was an historical one and not a military one which would settle itself over a period of years, and were more concerned over great power relationships, that is, over not being carved up. They were more interested in the US in this context than they were with respect to Taiwan and the US relationship with it. What did Ambassador Shen think?

Ambassador Shen remarked that he knew the people in the PRC were worried about the Soviets and Japanese, but not about the U.S. They saw that the U.S. was withdrawing from the Far East, although they didn't know if this was partial or total. Dr. Kissinger assured Ambassador Shen that it was not going to be total. Continuing, Ambassador Shen said that those in Peking knew that the U.S. had no designs against them. The U.S. message had gotten through, and they knew that they had more serious problems with the Soviet Union and Japan. Dr. Kissinger commented that this was his analysis, too. Ambassador Shen surmised that the people in Peking also hoped to improve their position with respect to the Soviet Union via the U.S. Dr. Kissinger remarked that he did not know what they wanted vis-à-vis the Russians, but he personally believed that we should keep cool on this and see where we were going.

Referring again to the recent events, Ambassador Shen stated that the initial shock in Taiwan had been terrific. Dr. Kissinger should understand, though, that the official reaction had been quite restrained. Dr.

Kissinger declared that this had been a tough thing for the ROC, but Ambassador Shen should believe that it had been tough for us, too. They hadn't had an American President before who liked Taiwan so much as our present President. As for himself, although he had never been to Taiwan, his friendships with senior officials there were very close.

Ambassador Shen expressed the view that the things discussed during the President's visit would raise more serious problems in Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger assumed that the President would restate the U.S. position on Taiwan again, but the Ambassador could be assured that there would be no concessions. Ambassador Shen wondered if this, then would spoil the visit, to which Dr. Kissinger replied that he doubted it. Ambassador Shen thought that the Chinese in Peking felt that time would take care of the issue.

Dr. Kissinger said that time was not on their side—we were not going to Peking to turn Taiwan over to them, and if they didn't understand this, then human language was not capable of containing it.

Ambassador Shen noted that Huang Hua, the new PRC Ambassador in Ottawa, had been four or five classes ahead of him in Yenching University in Peking. Was he the man with whom Dr. Kissinger would deal in arranging the visit? Dr. Kissinger replied that he didn't want to discuss this point. However, Ambassador Shen was Chinese enough to know that the most obvious place is not always the one picked.

Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Shen discussed briefly Chou En-lai's origin and educational background. Chou En-lai had been born in Anhui Province, but considered himself as being from Tientsin, where he has been educated. He was a graduate of Nankai University in Tientsin.

In conclusion, Dr. Kissinger observed that one thing had struck him while in Peking—even 25 years of communism had not been able to destroy the elegant Chinese mannerisms. Perhaps these had been better before, but they were still good.

153. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VIII. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

154. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

A New China Policy and the Search for Peace in Asia

The President's continuing efforts to improve relations with the People's Republic of China, most recently evinced by his dramatic announcement of July 15th, have won wide support at home and abroad. The Department of Defense is ready to assist in every possible way in these efforts of great significance to the peace and security of Asia and the world community.

To permit the Department of Defense to provide the most effective support of the President's efforts, we must be cognizant of, and participate in, the planning concerning politico-military matters of major concern to this Department.

Because of the continual emphasis in the various media of official expression in the People's Republic of China on United States military deployments in East Asia as a manifestation of hostility toward the PRC, it is anticipated that this subject will be of central concern in considerations affecting normalization of relations between the US and the PRC. Such matters as the size and nature of our future military presence on Taiwan, adjustments in our political and military relationships with other nations in Asia (particularly Japan), alternative means for accomplishing essential military functions which adjustments in our strategic posture may require, reassessment of certain aspects of the Military Assistance Program for Taiwan, and the requirement for training of additional China specialists in the Services are among the areas of potential concern. Timely and adequate consideration of these and related matters, not only by this Department but also by all agencies

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX. Top Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Colonel Paul Murray (ISA). An early draft was returned to ISA on July 23, as Laird wanted a more explicit and definitive memorandum. (Memorandum from Pursley to Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Armistead I. Selden, Jr.; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 330 74 0115, China, Rep. of, 1971, 000.1) The final draft was forwarded to Laird's office on August 3. (Memorandum from Selden to Laird; *ibid.*) According to a memorandum for the record prepared by the NSC staff, Kissinger, at a meeting on July 28, gave a brief overview of his meetings in the PRC to Laird, Pursley, and Admiral Murphy. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Kissinger, Sec. Laird, Gen. Pursley, Adm. Murphy and Gen. A. Haig, July 28, 1971)

and individuals involved in planning our future course in Asia, appears essential to the President's efforts to lessen tensions and normalize relations between ourselves and the People's Republic of China.

In anticipation of some of the major concerns which must be addressed, I have taken the following steps to survey Defense assets, analyze our current strategic posture, prepare for certain adjustments that may be required in this posture, and assure this Department's responsiveness to possible future requirements:

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been requested to provide their views concerning, first, the estimated impact on US security interests of the removal of the US military presence from Taiwan and second, the alternative means for providing for the essential functions relating to US and allied theater posture in the event such military presence was removed from Taiwan. I expect to receive and analyze the Chiefs' response shortly.

2. In view of the significance of certain intelligence functions performed on Taiwan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also been asked to include this dimension in their assessment.

3. The Defense Intelligence Agency has been directed to inventory language capabilities and China expertise in the Services in anticipation of expanded requirements for qualified personnel.

4. We are undertaking a reassessment of certain aspects of the Military Assistance Program for Taiwan, as well as addressing a possible requirement for SIOP-related adjustments.

In addition to such *anticipatory* concerns and others of a *reactive* nature in response to specific requirements which may be levied on the Department as planning proceeds, I feel strongly that the Department of Defense has major participatory interests in support of the President's undertaking. For instance, I believe that recent developments have added to the importance of securing a favorable resolution of the future status of the Micronesian Trust Territories and lend a new urgency to the next round of negotiations on this subject.

Most important in the near time-frame, of course, is the effect on Southeast Asia. We must look not only at the feasibility of some form of diplomatic breakthrough in Laos, but also at the possibility of significant progress in Paris or elsewhere regarding Indochina as a whole. We may also wish to consider urging Saigon to take new initiatives (trade, mail, etc.) to normalize contacts between the two Vietnams.

Finally, my just-concluded trip gave me the opportunity to see the concern of Japanese leaders that they will be left behind or by-passed by US-PRC negotiations. I remain convinced that maintenance of a relationship of trust and cooperation between our country and Japan is of the utmost importance, requiring full, frank, and timely discussions on a continuing basis. The possible removal of the US military presence from Taiwan makes our Japanese bases, especially on Okinawa, almost indispensable.

These are some of the concerns of the Department of Defense as the President addresses the challenge of normalizing our relationship with the People's Republic of China. I urge that the President call on the Department for the support we stand ready to provide in any manner most useful to him.²

Mel Laird

² Froebe forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger on August 28 under a covering memorandum. Kissinger's reply, drafted by Froebe on September 10, reads in full: "I have noted the Department of Defense's various points of interest described in your memorandum of August 13 regarding our planning of U.S. efforts to improve relations with the People's Republic of China. I appreciate very much your offer of the Department's support as we move forward toward normalizing relations with Peking. I assure you that the Department of Defense will be kept apprised of and consulted on these matters whenever appropriate." (Ibid., Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX)

155. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

My August 16 Meeting With the Chinese Ambassador in Paris

I saw the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen, before my meeting with the North Vietnamese, and we covered a good deal of ground in our session which lasted one and three-quarters hours.² Ambassador Huang was much more expansive than in our first encounter

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's Files—China Trip, China Exchanges, July–October 20, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² Attached but not printed is the 11-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting held in the PRC Embassy in Paris on August 16 from 9:05 to 10:45 a.m. It was attended by Ambassador Huang Chen, First Secretary Tsao Kuei Sheng, Secretary to the Ambassador Wei Tung, Kissinger, Lord, and Walters. The meeting was arranged through Walters during his August 9 meeting with the PRC Ambassador to France. Haig's August 8 instructions to Walters, and Walters' report on the meeting are *ibid.*, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 15, 16, and 17.

when he was rather stiff though friendly. His performance this time may have been due in part to our prior notification to the PRC of our cool reply to the Soviet Union's proposal for a five power nuclear conference, which the Chinese have also rejected. Following are the highlights of my meeting with the Ambassador.

Your Trip to China

—After we discussed several other subjects, I proposed February 21, 1972, or March 16, 1972 (with a slight preference for the former), as a starting date for your visit to China of up to seven days. I said that we would, of course, leave it up to the PRC to select a date.³

—As for my interim visit, Ambassador Huang led off our meeting with an oral message which specified that Chou En-lai would personally conduct the discussions during my visit to Peking; said that I would land in Shanghai so as to pick up a Chinese navigator to take us to Peking; and asked us for our views as to agenda and procedures.

—I replied that I envisaged a visit of up to four days and suggested that it begin October 18–20, because I had to be in Washington for Tito's October 28 visit. I said we would make a specific proposal about the agenda once the time was set, and asked for their views on when we should publicly announce this interim trip.

Our Relations with the Soviet Union

—I told the Ambassador that we had made good progress and were near agreement with the Soviet Union in the negotiations on accidental nuclear war and Berlin. I outlined the major provisions of the accidental war agreement, stressed that we had kept out all references to third countries, and said that we were prepared to sign a similar agreement with the PRC.

—As a result of this progress, and as I had foreshadowed to Prime Minister Chou, there was now a good possibility that you will meet with the Soviet leaders. I reaffirmed that this would take place *after*

³ The recommendations for the trip were the result of discussions among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman on August 11. The proposed dates and length of the trip were determined by Republican presidential primaries scheduled for early 1972, the Soviet summit, and the expectation that the time needed for translation would slow the talks. The trip to the USSR was an important consideration. Nixon agreed with Kissinger's statement that "so what I [Kissinger] think I ought to do is to tell their Ambassador in Paris on Monday that I don't know anything specific, but as negotiations develop and succeed, we will in be in no position then to refuse the invitation, but we can put [it] after Peking and we intend to put it after Peking." Kissinger continued: "So, the only part of the game plan it changes is that instead of holding the Peking date, we'll agree on that now, but not announce it until I come back." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, August 11, 1971, 9:10–11:40 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 561–4)

your Peking visit and said that we would give the PRC a week's advance notice of any public announcement.

—I suggested that the Soviet Union's strategy was to outmaneuver the Chinese, seeming to come closer to us because they could offer more than the Chinese. I said that we understood this strategy, and would not let it affect our new policy toward the PRC. I added that you would discuss our Soviet relations when you were in Peking and that we would be meticulous in keeping the Chinese informed of subjects which concerned them.⁴

South Asia

—I outlined our policy toward the South Asian continent and stressed that we were attempting to separate the problems of refugees and economic assistance where we wanted to help, from the political issues, specifically the question of East Pakistan.

—I emphasized that we face a very difficult domestic situation but that we would refuse to humiliate Pakistan and would strongly discourage others from attempting to do so. While we recognize that India had a problem with refugees, we would not be a party to its attempts to exploit this situation to settle Indian scores with Pakistan.

—I explained the up-coming Williams mission to coordinate relief and consult with Pakistan to develop a program which will allow a maximum number of refugees to return home and thus deprive India of any pretext for intervention.

—I said that we had told India that we would cut off economic aid if it started military action.

—Ambassador Huang, clearly acting on instructions, said that India in its efforts to create Bangla Desh "is obviously interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan and is carrying out subversive actions."

⁴ After receiving instructions from Haig on August 5, Walters met with Huang Chen on the morning of August 6 (Paris time) and presented the following message: "The President wishes to call the attention of the Government of the People's Republic of China to the following matters: The U.S. Government has not replied formally to the Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers. It is transmitting an oral communication to the Soviet Foreign Ministry through the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow along these lines. The subject of nuclear disarmament is worthy of serious consideration. A conference would require careful preparation and agreement among the five powers as to what subjects were feasible for discussion. The views of non-nuclear states should be considered. All five powers must be willing to attend. It is not anticipated that a formal reply will be made." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 13 and 14.) A New China News Agency (*Hsinhua*) release, August 7, contained a statement from the PRC Government rejecting the Soviet proposal. (Printed in *Beijing Review*, August 13, 1971, p. 5)

—I asked Huang to use China's influence with Pakistan to keep it from starting military action. I suggested to Peking that it encourage Pakistan to be more imaginative politically and psychologically so as to allow the return of the refugees.

—I told Huang that we would understand the furnishing of military equipment by the PRC to Pakistan (they are doing it anyway).

—I repeated that we would do nothing to embarrass Pakistan publicly and that we welcomed any views that the PRC might have on this situation.

Other Subjects

—I told Huang that you would see the Emperor of Japan during his re-fueling stop in Anchorage on September 26, and that this was pre-empting an official visit by him or by you to Japan. In addition, I said that Prime Minister Gandhi had accepted your invitation, extended in April, to visit the U.S. starting November 9, with her acceptance perhaps designed to balance off the effects of the Soviet/India Treaty of Friendship.

—Ambassador Huang said that the PRC stood by the agreement we reached in Peking that neither side had an interest in reopening the Warsaw talks. This channel, in Peking's view, would continue to exist in name only, being used perhaps for transmittal of bureaucratic documents. This Chinese position, which I said exactly matched our understanding, was in response to a message we had sent Peking last week. We had noted that Tad Szulc's interview of PRC Ambassador Huang Hua in Ottawa had suggested the re-opening of these Warsaw talks. (It appears that Huang Hua's position was inaccurately conveyed by Szulc.)⁵

—I gave to the Ambassador for his transmittal a courtesy note to Huang Hua which gives him my telephone numbers in case of emergency, while making clear that Paris remained the primary channel and that this was strictly a contingency in case we could not contact the Chinese in Paris quickly.⁶

⁵ Szulc met with Huang Hua in Ottawa on August 4. Green and Robert McCloskey met with Szulc the next day. Szulc reported to them that Huang Hua thought that the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw would continue. On August 6 Rogers forwarded Green's report on this conversation to Nixon and sent a copy to Kissinger. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 443, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers Unlabeled Folder) On August 9 Walters delivered a message to the PRC representatives in Paris that reads in part: "The difficulty of instructing Ambassadors and keeping the contacts secret and the danger of confusion of channels would make reopening of the Warsaw channel inadvisable prior to the President's trip." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges)

⁶ Attached but not printed. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 18.

Comment

This was a useful session. We are building a solid record of keeping the Chinese informed on all significant subjects of concern to them, which gives them an additional stake in nurturing our new relationship.⁷ We laid out our South Asia policy and made clear that we are not colluding against their ally. We have now foreshadowed the potentially unpleasant combination of a Moscow Summit and visits by the Emperor of Japan and Prime Minister Gandhi in a way that should make these events at the same time palatable and a reminder that we are not so eager with the Chinese that we will shy away from those countries which they dislike. The Chinese in turn were meticulous in their plans for my interim visit and their views on the Warsaw talks.

⁷ During his August 11 meeting with Kissinger and Haldeman, Nixon summed up his approach to developing relations with the PRC and other nations:

"They [the Department of State leaders] do not think big. Henry is, I mean, he's probably a little off the wall, and I know that in these NSC meetings, I am too at times. The earlier ones we've had. Henry and I would take, we both talk about long-range strategy and philosophy and so forth. And Bill gets very impatient with this philosophy. In all honesty, what are we going to do, he says. He doesn't understand that you must not talk about what you're going to do outside of a framework of philosophy. You've got to talk philosophy; you've got to be a great mosaic and you put in the pieces. And State is not thinking in mosaic terms. The Communists do. The Chinese do, the Russian do. We must. The British used to. They don't anymore, because they aren't a power any more. And the British are only thinking about how much they're going to get and whether or not whipped cream goes with their strawberries, going to be higher or less and that sort of thing. They're down to the piddling little goddamn things which are not worthy of a parliament. But that's all they've got to talk about. But we've got big things to talk about, and we're going to play it. But on Bill, we'll handle it well." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, August 11, 1971, 9:10–11:40 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 561–4)

156. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

September 13 meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris²

I met with Huang Chen, the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, for almost two hours on September 13 before my other session, primarily to lay the groundwork for your trip to Peking and my interim visit. This meeting, the third that we have had, was once again extremely cordial.

Announcement of Trips

The Ambassador read an oral note from Peking, the full text of which is attached at Tab A.³ In response to our messages of August 16 and September 1 the Chinese made the following points:⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² According to the memorandum of conversation, the meeting was held from 8:45–10:40 a.m. at the PRC Embassy in Paris. (Ibid.) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 19. Attendees were identical to the August 16 meeting in Paris; see Document 155.

³ Attached but not printed. The note's contents are essentially recounted in the following three paragraphs. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 20.

⁴ Apparent reference to the August 16 meeting in Paris. On September 1 Walters met with PRC Ambassador Huang Chen. Based on instructions received from Haig on August 31, Walters informed the Chinese that an Accidental War Agreement would be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on September 20 and that the United States hoped to announce Kissinger's and Nixon's upcoming trips to the PRC on September 20, 21, or 22. Walters also explained that the United States wanted to make these announcements prior to the visits of the Japanese Emperor who was scheduled to meet Nixon in Alaska on September 26 and other state visits in late September. On September 3 Walters and the Chinese met again, and Walters passed on a message concerning future negotiations with the Soviets regarding incidents at sea. Haig's instructions and Walters' reports on these meetings are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 19–21.

—They propose a four-day visit to Peking to make concrete arrangements for your trip. This should begin on October 20 (Peking time). I accepted this as it matched our proposals for length and timing.⁵

—The Chinese proposed announcing my visit on October 14. I made clear why we had suggested September 21 or 22: in addition to making the necessary arrangements for my travel, we preferred to announce my trip before Gromyko came to the U.S. on his annual visit to the UN. I explained that we did not want our announcement with the Chinese to look like a reaction to Gromyko's visit, during which the Soviets might well pin down your trip to Moscow, now that the conditions for it have been met in various negotiations. I said that I would have to check with you regarding the October 14 date for the announcement and asked them to let us know if they had any different views (i.e. moving it up) as a result of this discussion.

—The Chinese proposed that the date of your trip be fixed during my visit rather than being included in the October announcement. I did not dispute this, but pointed out that given the complexity of your schedule we would want to know if they had any date in mind other than the two we had given them (February 21 and March 16); that it would be very difficult to arrange another completely different date; and that we would hold open the two alternatives we had suggested pending my trip to Peking. The Ambassador thought that this problem could be easily solved during my visit.

—I said that we would respond to the Chinese proposals and suggested text for an announcement within the next few days.

—*Comment.* I believe the Chinese think that setting a date now for your trip would have overtones of collusion. They prefer to have a date fixed as a result of my trip so that they can say it was for that purpose. I see no problem in waiting until late October and giving the interim trip a concrete outcome. Thus I think we can accept the text of the proposed Chinese announcement.

⁵ On September 13 Haig instructed Walters to inform the PRC that the 4-day visit beginning October 20 and the Chinese version of the trip announcement were acceptable, but that the United States hoped the announcement would be made on September 23, 24, or October 4. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) The Chinese informed Walters on September 22 that the announcement would be made on October 5 because "the United States will, around September 23, put forward to the United Nations General Assembly its draft resolution designed to create 'Two Chinas' which the Chinese Government firmly opposes." (Attachment to Walters' memorandum for record, September 23; *ibid.*) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 24 and 25. On September 22 Bush submitted the U.S. draft resolution for consideration by the General Assembly. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 18, 1971, p. 425–427) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 412.

From their point of view a late date for the announcement puts it beyond their national day (October 1) and that of the Nationalists (October 10), and cuts down on the period of speculation. They are, of course, unaware of our October 12 announcement.⁶ We have complex scheduling problems, and I want to discuss personally with you our response to the proposed date of October 14.

Preparations for Peking Trips

In order to get the Chinese to do advance thinking, to pave the way for my trip, and to begin to shape a successful outcome for your trip, I gave the Chinese some technical questions and substantive suggestions.

—On the technical side, I explained and handed over lists of questions which I had gone over with Bob Haldeman and a few others on the White House Staff. I suggested that my party would number about 10 people, both substantive and technical. I explained the responsibilities of each of the latter (advance man, press, White House Communications Agency, Secret Service). I said we were prepared to begin the technical advance work later, but it was preferable to get going on this during my visit. I added that we believed that a minimum of 100 to 150 press were needed for your trip and asked for their views both as to minimum and maximum numbers. They seemed clearly taken aback even by the minimum number. For this reason I did not raise the issue of the ground station.⁷

—I outlined the topics that the Prime Minister and I should cover concerning your visit, including: the length (up to seven days); itinerary (Peking and perhaps two other stops); party composition (small working group); and agenda (subjects that Chou and I covered plus more technical issues like trade and exchange programs). I said that private meetings between Chou and me would be necessary for particularly sensitive subjects and that similarly you would want private sessions during your visit.

—Among the subjects Chou and I should discuss are the concrete results that could emerge from your trip. I gave as illustrations periodic special envoys between our two countries; a return visit by Chou to the U.S.; agreements we have already made with the Soviet Union such as accidental war and hot line communications; and various types of cultural, scientific, and other exchange programs.

—The Ambassador commented that we certainly had thought of everything concerning these trips, a specific indication of the fact that they seem genuinely impressed by our meticulousness.

⁶ At a press conference on October 12, the President announced plans for a Soviet-American summit in May 1972. (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1, 1971, p. 473)

⁷ Apparent reference to communications equipment required for Nixon's visit.

Other Topics

—*Romania*. I summarized our policy that I had outlined to the Romanian Ambassador and that you would reaffirm personally to him: that the U.S. has a major interest in the independence and autonomous policy of Romania, that we would not contribute to a collusion that would allow another great power to infringe on these principles, and that we would make clear that pressures for military action are not consistent with a relaxation of tensions.

—*Pakistan*. I briefly indicated the new assistance we were contemplating for Pakistan, i.e. arranging for debt relief of \$75 million and providing 75 percent of the \$250–300 million that would be needed for relief in East Pakistan.

—*Taiwan*. In view of intense press speculation (in particular concerning the UN question), I said that we stood by all that I had said on this issue to Chou when I was in Peking.

—*Kissinger Trip to Japan*. I noted that the Japanese press speculation of my visiting Japan was wrong and that I had no such plans.

157. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Indications of Possible Tense Situation in Communist China and Implications for your Visit

Within the last ten days we have received a number of indicators pointing to a possible tense situation in Communist China.² This situation could relate either to Chinese relations with the USSR, since there have been some unusual [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—General, July–October 1971. Top Secret; Umbra; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² See *ibid.*, Boxes 35 and 36, President's Daily Briefs, September 1971. The Department of State was also concerned and sent a telegram to all diplomatic posts requesting information on developments in the PRC. (Telegram 175874, September 24; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM)

on Soviet side of the border, or too some kind of a political problem in China affecting the top leadership. The key indicators are:

—Since September 12 there has been a suspension of almost all Chinese military aircraft flight activity. The only military flights have consisted of a few naval bomber missions, defensive fighter reactions in the Taiwan Strait area to Republic of China flights, and flights by two military transports, one carrying a Korean press delegation.

—Also since September 12, the members of the top Chinese military hierarchy have not appeared in public. (They could have been witnessing China's first ICBM test which took place on September 10, though; Government leaders such as Chou En-lai and Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei have been noted carrying out their usual activities.)

—Agence France Presse reported on September 21 in an item originating in Peking that the traditional October 1 National Day parade has been cancelled this year.

—The AFP report has been backed up [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*] saying that National Day observances all over China would not be held "because of a sudden change with respect to a certain situation had occurred" and "the whole country is now carrying out urgent war preparation."

These indicators occur against a backdrop of unusual [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] on the Soviet side of the border. The Soviets have had a nationwide military exercise underway since September 15 involving, among other things, [*4 lines of source text not declassified*]. This came at the time of our Cambodian operation, and could have related to advance Chinese notice to the public that an important announcement was to be made by Mao Tse-tung. Mao in fact did issue a statement at that time extolling the revolutionary situation in Indo-China, but the Soviets could have assumed that the Chinese were about to take some form of military action.

Alternative Explanation

There are a number of alternative explanations which can account for the indicators outlined above. These are:

—The Chinese genuinely fear that a war with the USSR may develop. Although the date of the Chinese air stand-down and the beginning of the Soviet military exercise do not coincide, the Chinese may have had some indications [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] involving units along the border that something was about to begin. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*] Fear of a Soviet attack could have caused the Chinese to take precautionary military moves and to call off the National Day parade.

—The situation is related in some way to domestic Chinese political considerations. Previous stand-downs of military flights were ordered during such periods in the Cultural Revolution as the fighting which occurred between two military factions in the city of Wuhan in July 1967. Presumably the Chinese wanted to be able to sort out the location and activities of their air units. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] there are some signs that the radical leadership faction within the

Party which has opposed the more moderate course of people such as Chou En-lai has not been completely defeated. The radicals could have used the news of your visit to mobilize a counterattack against the predominant leadership in Peking.

—Mao Tse-tung is dead or is seriously ill. Since he would be expected to be present at the October 1 National Day ceremonies, his death or incapacitation could account for the cancellation of the parade. On the other hand, except for a few reports that posters of Mao are being taken down (something which I believe has been going on anyway in Peking in order to return to a more normal atmosphere), there is nothing to suggest that anything has happened to Mao. He has not appeared publicly recently, but he has met such high-ranking visitors as Burma's Ne Win within the last month or so.

—Conceivably, Mao's chosen successor, Lin Piao, may be ill or dead. He, too, would be expected to appear at the National Day parade, and his inability to do so might cause the parade's cancellation. With Lin Piao out of the picture, there might be some problems among the military in choosing his successor as China's most senior military leader.³

—Another factor in the cancellation of the parade might be the regime's desire not to allow the thousands of people, or for that matter foreign visitors, to be in Peking during a crisis. If radical elements are attempting to stage a comeback, they might count on elements within the crowd to support them. Of, if a war situation is developing, the regime would not want foreign visitors in Peking.

Implications for Your Trip

The various interpretations which would be placed on events as we know them up to now and their implications for your planned trip are:

—*The PRC is really worried about a Soviet attack.* This would in part explain why they have wanted to keep the visit announcement so close to the event itself. This thesis also is supported by the fact that they gave so much advance notice of the stand-down of the October 1 events. If this turns out to be the real explanation, I do not believe that it will adversely affect your initiative; indeed it might help and make the trip more, not less, likely as a counter to Soviet pressure.

—*Mao has died.* In this event there are two possibilities. If Mao did not really run the PRC in recent months and Chou did and was able to consolidate his power, then the trip most certainly would be on. If

³ By early November, U.S. officials confirmed that Lin Biao had died in an airplane crash in Mongolia on September 12, as reported in Holdridge's November 6 memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 524, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. II, November–December 1971) Another report is telegram 7477 from the Consulate in Hong Kong, November 6. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POLCHICOM) On November 12 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, and Helms that reads as follows: "The President has directed that there should be no comments by U.S. Government officials, whether on a background basis or otherwise to the press or public concerning internal political developments in the People's Republic of China, notably the apparent purge of Lin Piao." (Ibid., Agency Files, Box 285, Department of State, Vol. XIII)

Chou did not hold the power or was unable to consolidate it, then the odds are strongly against the trip. If the problem is the demise of Lin Piao, but leaving Mao and Chou in power, your trip should not be affected.

—*A revolutionary group has taken power.* If this has happened, anti-Soviet hostility would not be mitigated but the coming to power of such a group would certainly be accompanied by a resurgence of isolationism and anti-Americanism. China would turn inward again and be set back immeasurably. In these circumstances the trip would certainly be off.

—*Mao could have been taking over power again after having been pushed out as he did once before.* This possibility seems less likely but if it turns out to be the situation, I believe they would want the trip to go forward as an evidence of strength and vindication of Mao's policy.

—*We could be seeing the completion of a purge of anti-Chou people* undertaken to hold the line within the power structure for your visit. If so, the visit would certainly go forward.

Note: A late AFP report from Paris dated September 22 quotes the PRC Embassy there as declaring that Mao Tse-tung is in excellent health. The Embassy added that the cancellation of the National Day parade "is a very normal thing and is due only to a decision to change the way of celebrating the national holiday." The planned visit of a PRC Government delegation to France will proceed as planned.⁴

⁴ On September 24 Kissinger and the President discussed the possibility that internal conflicts in the PRC might prevent the October visit. Kissinger said: "I don't exclude, I think there's a ten percent chance, but it isn't impossible, that the Chinese may want to get the visit, cancel the visit somehow or another, and that they'll want me there, you know, to have a pretext for doing it, saying we couldn't agree. I think there's a very, there's almost no chance of their doing that." After further discussion, Nixon decided: "We'd just be stoic about it. What the hell, if it happens, it happens. The Russians may screw us on theirs." Nixon also asked Kissinger about the parade's cancellation. Kissinger replied, "Mysterious. I have absolutely no way of knowing. But I think Chou En-lai is on top, whatever else is happening. And they have given a briefing, in Hong Kong, for example, at that Communist bank. They gave a briefing and one question was if Mao has died, would the President's visit still take place? The answer was Mao is alive, but even if he should die, the President's visit would take place, since it is in the interests of world peace, and the invitation was extended by the Chinese Government and not by any individual. So that's the party line that they've put out there. They may be purging Madame Mao. They are definitely attacking what they call the May 16th group, the extreme right wingers, left wingers, whatever you call them in that context." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, September 28, 1971, 5:51–6:42 p.m. Oval Office, Conversation No. 579–15) In a September 24 memorandum to Kissinger, Walters also expressed concern that the PRC might break off talks with the United States (Ibid., NSC Files, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 26.

158. Message From the United States Government to the People's Republic of China Government¹

Washington, undated.

1. As agreed by the Chinese side the U.S. will release the announcement of Dr. Kissinger's return visit at the White House on October 5, 1000 Washington time. There will be no press conference but a few technical background questions will have to be answered. It would be very desirable to have the Chinese views about the composition of the American group by then. The transcript of the background press briefing will be transmitted to the Chinese side immediately after the briefing is given.

2. While detailed arrangements and agenda can be left until Dr. Kissinger's arrival, it is important for the Chinese side to understand that the effectiveness of the discussions depends on their being conducted along the lines Dr. Kissinger explained to Ambassador Huang on September 13: restricted meetings conducted by Dr. Kissinger and one aide on the U.S. side; broader meetings for more general expositions and subsidiary political issues; and technical discussions. The composition of the Chinese group for each meeting is of course entirely up to the Chinese side.

3. As for the discussions during President Nixon's visit to China, the President fully stands behind the announcement of July 15 as well as the conversation between President Chou En-lai and Dr. Kissinger. This was reaffirmed in the U.S. oral note presented July 19; in President Nixon's press conference of August 4; and in President Nixon's answer to a question at the Economic Club of Detroit on September 23: "What I am trying to do is open a dialogue and move towards more

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. On September 28 Kissinger gave the message to Walters who was in Washington, along with instructions to inform the PRC on September 29 that he would have another message on October 1 detailing the results of the Kissinger–Gromyko talks. Walters delivered this message orally on October 2, then passed along the short overview of the talks with Gromyko and made further technical arrangements for Kissinger's trip to the PRC. (Instructions to Walters, September 28, and Walters' memoranda for record, September 30 and October 4; *ibid.*) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 27–29. Based on instructions that he received on October 9, Walters met with the Chinese on that date and relayed a joint Soviet-American statement slated for public release on October 12. Walters also informed the PRC representatives in Paris that they were the first country to be notified of the Soviet–American summit. (Instructions to Walters, October 9, and Walters' memorandum for record, October 10; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) Further meetings were held on October 13, 14, 15, and 16 to prepare for Kissinger's visit. (Walters' memoranda for record; *ibid.*) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 30–35.

normal relations.” Dr. Kissinger on September 13 indicated to Ambassador Huang that the agenda of his July meeting with Prime Minister Chou En-lai could serve as the basic agenda for President Nixon’s visit as well. Premier Minister Chou En-lai will remember that Dr. Kissinger was explicit about what was and what was not possible, and in what time frame. The President affirms these understandings once again. At the same time, certain subsidiary measures are desirable, not as a substitute for the main agenda but to contribute to a climate in which the principal objectives can be realized. This is not a diversion, but rather constitutes an attempt to facilitate the progress in Chinese-U.S. relations which many have an interest in preventing. For its part, the U.S. side stresses that the improvement of Chinese-U.S. relations is a cardinal element of President Nixon’s foreign policy which will be carried out energetically and in good faith. Progress requires a degree of mutual confidence.

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 15, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

James Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China
Henry Chen, Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of China
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC

SUBJECT

Questions from the Chinese Ambassador Concerning Mr. Kissinger’s Visit to Peking and the Situation in the UN

The conversation began with Mr. Kissinger explaining to Ambassador Shen the itinerary which Mr. Kissinger and his party would follow from Washington beginning October 16—Hawaii, for a little rest and a review with the technical staff of matters of interest to them, then Guam, followed by Shanghai and Peking. Ambassador Shen

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. According to an October 21 covering memorandum from Froebe, Kissinger did not want the memorandum of conversation distributed outside the NSC. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office from 4:33 to 5 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

commented that Shanghai was his home town, and that Mr. Kissinger should say, "hello."

Mr. Kissinger said he knew how painful an event this trip was for the Ambassador, though the Ambassador must have known that the second visit was an inevitable consequence of the first. When Ambassador Shen asked if Mr. Kissinger could say anything about the trip which had not been mentioned in the press, Mr. Kissinger assured him that there was much less in it than met the eye. This was an abnormal situation, otherwise Mr. Kissinger wouldn't have dreamed of going himself. The things which had to be settled were the agenda items, the technical arrangements, and the date for the President's visit. He would see Ambassador Shen after his return, and would tell the Ambassador about the trip then. He was quite sure, though, that there would be nothing much to tell. The Chinese Communists would probably raise the Taiwan question, in fact it would be incredible if they did not, but we would not change our position and there would be no concessions with respect to Taiwan. We could not prevent them from telling us their position and would hear them out, but whatever they said would not affect our position. Taiwan was not on the agenda.

Continuing, Mr. Kissinger said that he was certain that when the Chinese Communists talked about normalization, getting control of Taiwan was what was on their minds. However, Ambassador Shen could be sure that there was no change in our position, there would be no withdrawal, no recognition of the People's Republic of China, and so forth. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that he would be amazed if Taiwan were not raised by the Communists even though it was not on the agenda for this trip—he had never met a Chinese Communist official who didn't talk about Taiwan.

Ambassador Shen assumed that the subject would also come up when the President went to Peking. Mr. Kissinger remarked that he would know more about it after he had been to Peking, where he would have had an opportunity for a full exchange of views. Our Taiwan position was not negotiable as far as we were concerned. Mr. Kissinger added that he didn't know if they would raise the question, but psychologically, he felt strongly that they would. Ambassador Shen agreed, noting that that's what they always were talking about. What about the normalization of relations? Mr. Kissinger noted that we had never defined this term. What *we* meant by it was a more normal relationship. We had no intention of establishing diplomatic relations for the foreseeable future, though we might have a few people in Peking from time to time.

Ambassador Shen asked how long this situation could be expected to prevail—six months, or for the next year, or what? Mr. Kissinger assured Ambassador Shen that he was talking about the remainder of

this term of the President. He assumed that what he was saying here would be kept strictly confidential. Ambassador Shen said that he would report through “our man,” and not through the normal side.

Ambassador Shen referred to the President’s proposed visit to Moscow next May. Did Mr. Kissinger think this would reduce or increase the Chinese Communist interest in the President’s visit to Peking? Mr. Kissinger asked the Ambassador what he, as a Chinese, thought. According to Ambassador Shen, the result of the announcement of the President’s Moscow visit would be a reduction in Chinese Communist interest in the President’s visiting Peking. They wanted to get the greatest mileage out of the visit, and if the President was going to Moscow in May, this might follow fairly closely on his visit to Peking. When would the President, in fact, be going to Peking? Ambassador Shen remarked that the Chinese Communists would ask a lot of questions—he himself would do the same. Mr. Kissinger observed that it might be his fate to have both Chinas hating him.

Ambassador Shen asked, did Mr. Kissinger have any news from Peking about what was going on there? Mr. Kissinger replied that we had received three contradictory reports: one that Lin Piao was sick; one that Lin Piao was ill; and one that Lin Piao had been on the plane which went down in Mongolia. What did Ambassador Shen think? Ambassador Shen replied that he would choose the middle option—Lin Piao was ill. Mr. Kissinger said that he thought the same, although all our reports were fourth-hand, and we had no direct reports.

Ambassador Shen wondered how big an area would be covered in the agenda—would Asian questions of a broad nature be touched upon? Mr. Kissinger declared that we would try to confine the agenda to bilateral relations. We couldn’t negotiate about our friends; for example, we couldn’t discuss Korea. Ambassador Shen expressed some surprise at this, wondering if some indirect reference might not be made to Korea or Taiwan. What else would there be to talk about? Mr. Kissinger indicated that the general evolution of the world situation would certainly be talked about, and agreed to a suggestion from Ambassador Shen that the relaxation of tensions would also be a subject for discussion. There would, in addition, be the subject of cultural and other exchanges.

Ambassador Shen asked, would the subject of the off-shore islands come up? Mr. Kissinger termed this an interesting point, although it had never been mentioned by the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Shen surmised that this probably was because they thought that Taiwan was now within their reach, “so why bother about the off-shore islands?” What about the subject of the U.S. treaty relations with the ROC? Mr. Kissinger stressed that the Ambassador should have absolutely no doubt that we would reaffirm the treaty relationship.

Ambassador Shen queried Mr. Kissinger as to whether anything new had come up in Peking's relationship with Moscow. Mr. Kissinger declared that we couldn't notice anything. Something might be going on, but if there, was, we couldn't notice it. Ambassador Shen cited a report from Hong Kong to the effect that the Chinese Communists had moved troops from Kirin to the region of the Amur River, and also from Shensi in northwest China toward the border with Inner Mongolia. Mr. Kissinger observed that, so far as we could tell, the build-up of Soviet forces was continuing. He had not followed the movements of the Chinese Communist forces, but their weight obviously was toward the north, and not toward Fukien. Ambassador Shen expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists may have taken units out from this area—a regiment here, and a division there. Mr. Kissinger said he felt that the ROC didn't have anything to worry about in the form of a Chinese Communist attack within the next two or three years. He did not believe the Communists could manage an army outside their borders.

Reverting to the topic of the President's visit to Moscow, Mr. Kissinger observed that our judgment of the impact of the announcement of this visit was similar to that of Ambassador Shen's. It certainly had not been received with undiluted joy in Peking, but we had gone ahead anyway. It had the advantage of putting the President's visit to Peking into a better perspective.

Responding to a request from Ambassador Shen for an evaluation of the UN situation, Mr. Kissinger told the Ambassador that the President had personally talked to the Italian and British Foreign Ministers about the Chirep issue, so we were personally putting ourselves behind our resolutions.² What was Ambassador Shen's judgment? We had received conflicting reports about the way the vote stood. Ambassador Shen said that he had talked to his Foreign Minister that day, who had felt a little better following a talk with Secretary Rogers.³ However, quite a few UN delegations had noted that the President had not personally spoken out. Mr. Kissinger retorted that this was not true; the President had spoken to the Israelis, the Italians, the Irish, and the

² Nixon met with Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro in the White House on October 11. A record of the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI.

³ Rogers, De Palma, McCloskey, and Murphy met with Chow, Ambassador Liu, and Frederick Chien in New York on October 5. (Reported in Secto 71, October 6; National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 73 D 323, Secretary's Participation in UNGA, vol. II, memcons) Rogers, Pedersen, De Palma, and Murphy met with Chow, Liu, and Chien again on October 14 in New York. (Telegram 3549 from USUN, October 15; *ibid.*, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM) In the latter meeting, Rogers stated that he still expected the United States to prevail on the "Important Question" vote. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. V, Document 419.

UK. Moreover, the other day he had received a delegation of 350 Congressmen. According to Ambassador Shen, the President's remarks had been very brief, and left an impression that they were not positive enough.⁴ Ambassador Shen hoped something more could be done to make the U.S. stand more positive. The issue was coming up the following Monday, the debate might last for two or three weeks, and a positive word from the President would do the trick. It would dispell all lingering doubts about the sincerity of the U.S. in supporting the ROC position.

Mr. Kissinger declared that if Ambassador Shen would give us the name of a delegation whose support the ROC needed, he had no doubt that the President would speak to this delegation. We were working among all uncommitted delegations, such as the Israelis, the Irish, the British, and the Italians. As far as the British were concerned, we did not expect to get their vote, but were telling them to keep quiet in their contacts with other countries.

Ambassador Shen said that he still felt that a word from the President would be desirable. Many delegations were holding off in making their decision until the time came for them to cast their vote. The show was not over until these votes were really cast—the ROC had had some experience about this in previous years. Mr. Kissinger noted that he was leaving the next day, but would talk to the President before his departure. Continuing, Ambassador Shen again asked for a positive statement from the President, saying that no one could then ever suggest that the U.S. was simply just going through the motions.

Mr. Kissinger indicated that he had personally talked to five delegations, to which Ambassador Shen referred to the President's having used a quotation to the effect that a 5,000 mile journey began with the first step. He himself felt that a journey of this length had to be completed with the last step, and that no stone should be left unturned. Mr. Kissinger again said that he would speak to the President on this subject.

Ambassador Shen raised the question of whether, if we got through the UN issue this year, we would need to fight it all over again next year. Mr. Kissinger thought that we would have to go through a fight every year unless we came to an understanding with Peking. Ambassador Shen asked, did Mr. Kissinger feel that Peking would

⁴ On October 13 Nixon met with a delegation of House members who presented a petition to "Save the Republic of China's UN Seat." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) During his September 16 news conference, Nixon had announced that the United States would support the PRC's admission into the UN General Assembly and Security Council, while opposing any effort to expel the ROC. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 950–951)

enter the UN if the dual representation resolution passed? Mr. Kissinger said, “no.” This was his personal judgment, although the Chinese Communists had not discussed this with him. Ambassador Shen referred to a speech by the Australian Ambassador expressing a little more optimism about what Peking would do. What was Mr. Kissinger’s sense about this? Mr. Kissinger replied by asking the Ambassador if it would be bad for the ROC if Peking did, in fact, come in. Ambassador Shen’s response was that if Peking came in, the whole ROC approach to the UN would have to be changed—a change in tactics would be necessary. Mr. Kissinger expressed the belief that Peking wouldn’t come in unless it could get the ROC out, and was more interested in this goal than in taking its place in the UN. Ambassador Shen wondered if this, in Peking’s thinking, might be tied to getting Taiwan, and Mr. Kissinger declared that this was his judgment.

Ambassador Shen speculated that if the dual representation resolution passed, and the Chinese Communists didn’t come in and the ROC remained in the UN, this would provide the ROC with added assurance as to its UN position. Mr. Kissinger agreed that this would be a great gain. It would be a good development if we won and they didn’t come in. Ambassador Shen went on to note that if Peking had a seat in the General Assembly and a place in the Security Council and then didn’t come in, there would be an anomalous situation. Their position couldn’t be one-half valid and one-half invalid, and wouldn’t they be throwing themselves open to questions so far as their membership was concerned. Mr. Kissinger felt that this was an interesting point.

Ambassador Shen remarked that some of his people had said that the ROC should speak up first (on the question of whether the ROC would stay in the UN if Peking entered), while others said that they shouldn’t take the initiative in speaking up. Mr. Kissinger said he personally thought that the ROC should keep quiet, and let the Chinese Communists speak up. He saw nothing to gain by showing reasonableness. The ROC’s enemies didn’t care about this. James Reston wanted the ROC out of the UN no matter how reasonable it was. Being in or out of the UN was not important, what our enemies wanted was for us to give up our defense relationship. And although the ROC had been unhappy with us the last six months, it would find that it could count on us. Ambassador Shen observed that the real crunch was coming.

The discussion briefly turned to the weather in Peking this time of year (“beautiful” according to Ambassador Shen) and the circumstances under which Mr. Erlichman had shown up at a dinner in the Chinese Embassy by mistake which was being held for a group of “old China hands” who were not necessarily supporters of the Administration. According to Ambassador Shen, Mr. Erlichman had enjoyed the affair immensely.

Mr. Kissinger concluded by stressing to the Ambassador that no task was more painful for him than the things we were now doing. All his friends on Taiwan would tell the Ambassador that he, Mr. Kissinger, didn't want to be doing this, and would certainly do nothing to sacrifice our central interests. This was a painful period. Mr. Kissinger also explained briefly the necessity for his staying on in Peking for the length of time scheduled; this was to assure that none of the members of technical staff got into trouble. Or, if they did get into trouble, Mr. Kissinger would be there to take care of the situation. He assured Ambassador Shen that he would speak to him very soon after his return from Peking.

160. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) and the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Pursley)¹

Washington, October 21, 1971.

SUBJECT

Transfer of Major Items of U.S. Military Equipment to the Republic of China

In the future, White House approval should be obtained for any transfers of major items of U.S. military equipment to the Republic of China (such as F-5Es or M-48 tanks), whether through grant MAP, FMS credit or cash sales, commercial sales, as Excess Defense Articles, or through any other means. A memorandum giving a full description of the proposal should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in each case.

Alexander M. Haig Jr.
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX. Confidential. In an October 19 covering memorandum to Haig, Froebe wrote, "This we believe is necessary in order to judge the advisability and timing of the transfer [of weapons] in terms of its probable impact on the plans for the President's China trip and our efforts to improve relations with Peking."

China, October 1971–February 1972

161. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, discussed the February 1972 visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC) through a series of messages and conversations during and immediately after Kissinger's October 1971 trip to the PRC. On October 20 Alexander M. Haig sent a telegram to Kissinger:

"The President via Haldeman asked me to convey to you on an urgent basis the following message. He did not give any explanation although I sensed it is related to the imagery problem with which we are so well acquainted: He wishes you to insure that in discussing the agenda with your hosts a specific time is arranged for two private head-to-head meetings between, in one instance, the President and Mao with no one in attendance other than interpreters, and in the second instance, with Chou En-lai under identical circumstances. I was asked to convey this to you as soon as possible and would be grateful if you could confirm for the President if and when this has been accomplished." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK's October 1971 Visit)

Kissinger's response, received in the White House on October 21, reads:

"Please tell Haldeman to rest his fevered brain. Our hosts have one or two other things on their minds. Private meetings will be arranged, although I am bound to say anything except the most formal meeting along with Chou is a major mistake. Chou will know the whole negotiating history and the President cannot. Please leave the timing of raising it to me. I shall arrange it before I leave unless I hear to the contrary. Please remind Bush of our understanding with respect to the UN debate. Warm regards. To be delivered without disturbing Gen. Haig at home. No copies for distribution." (Ibid.)

Ambassador to the United Nations George Bush, Kissinger, and Nixon had met on September 30. At this meeting Kissinger said, "I was wondering, we were exploring all possibilities, but if the American speech [in the UN General Assembly] could be put after I've left there, since the debate will go on for 3 or 4 days after I've left there." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Bush, September 30, 1971, 9:22–9:54 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 581–2) The United Nations vote is discussed in Document 167.

Haig passed the information contained in Kissinger's telegram to Nixon on October 21. Nixon's handwritten comments on Haig's summary memorandum read: "Al. Wire Henry—OK for Chou and Mao together, but RN to be alone. Henry not to be present. Otherwise, we differ from RN's style on other trips and raise the Rogers problem." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK's October 1971 Visit)

Haig then wired Nixon's instructions to Kissinger on October 22, adding: "There may be more to this than that simple explanation and I suspect the Sherman story in Sunday's Post which touched upon the genesis of the Peking and Soviet initiatives was not helpful in any sense. You will recall that Sherman suggested that both trips had long been part of 'your' conceptual agenda." (Ibid.) George Sherman was a Washington Star reporter. Haig is apparently referring to Sherman's article entitled "Kissinger Mapped Nixon Shift," *Washington Star*, October 17, 1971, pages A-1, A-5.

On the same day, Haig sent a message to Kissinger that reads in part: "He [Haldeman] asked me to reiterate to you that the President's strong preference is for a five-day visit with only one additional stop which would involve an in-and-out on the same day. I assured him you were well aware of the President's wishes but that obviously you would have to consider Chinese attitude. He asked that I send this to you in any event. Best wishes." (Ibid. E-13, Documents 42, 45, and 47)

Also on October 22, Nixon, through Haig, requested that Kissinger delay his return to Washington from Monday, October 25 to Tuesday, October 26. Haig wrote: "The real reason is because Rogers insists that your arrival from Peking just before the Chirep vote [in the UN], now scheduled for Tuesday morning, would seriously jeopardize the outcome and in any event would be the subject of considerable criticism should the vote go against us." (Ibid.) On October 23 Kissinger responded that he could not delay his departure from China, and any delay in Hawaii or Alaska could only increase "speculation." He added: "As you know, I have never believed that my visit affects the Chirep vote. Whatever impact it has had is already accomplished, it will not be compounded by my return." After receiving another cable from Haig, October 23, explaining the situation on October 24 Kissinger indicated his willingness to delay for a day in Anchorage, Alaska. (Ibid.) Kissinger arrived in Washington on the afternoon of October 26 and had dinner with Nixon that evening. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-13, Documents 42, 45, 46, 47, 49, and 50.

On October 27 Kissinger and Nixon discussed the results of the trip. Kissinger affirmed: "It's [the China trip] the keystone of your for-

eign policy, Mr. President, you get a good reception in China, which I know you will, you come out with a decent communiqué, you're in business with the Russians. Then the Russian trip will be a great success." Nixon observed: "He's [Rogers] concerned with good reason about what does the communiqué say about Taiwan. But I think if we aren't smart enough to work out some fuzzy language there then we're, it's my understanding that the [unintelligible] won't be in any communiqué, it will be in the back room." Kissinger commented:

"Mr. President, you are going to be more sensitive to what you can say than he [Rogers]. You're not going to say anything that will hurt us. I believe actually on Taiwan they haven't met you yet, what you should, and we may even want to leave that door open until you get there. If you tell Mao, look, this is what I'm willing to do, but in order to do it we cannot say a great deal. And once they're seen you and seen that there's steel there, then I think it will go. They're not trying to screw you, that's not the way they operate, they're not like the Russians. The Russians get you by accumulating little things. The Chinese operate like you do, they go for the big play. They are not interested in, they do not want, when I left Chou said to me, I want you to understand that we have a big investment in President Nixon, everything we do is geared to him. They said, he said, a lot of people have promised us things, but we believe only he can actually perform. And you have to say, now Bill was making a fuss about how they were crowing [after victory in the UN vote]. That isn't true. Yesterday, Chou and their foreign minister, meeting a group of press, had absolutely no comment. They can't have any interest in humiliating you." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, October 27, 1971, 9:40 a.m.–12:22 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 603–1)

162. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, October 21, 1971, 10:30 a.m.–1:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People's Republic of China
Chi P'eng-fei, Acting PRC Foreign Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol, PRC
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters and Notetakers
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jonathan Howe, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC

[Omitted here is a 13-page section detailing plans for President Nixon's February 1972 trip to the People's Republic of China.]

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps we should then begin the substantive discussion, if the Prime Minister agrees.

PM Chou: Alright.

Dr. Kissinger: The first subject is the subject of the normalization of relations and Taiwan. I would like to sum up what is my recollection of what I told the Prime Minister when we met in July. I told the Prime Minister that we would withdraw the forces on Taiwan that are related to the war in Indochina within a short period after the war in Indochina. I said that we would reduce the other forces progressively over a somewhat longer period of time and faster if our relations improved.

PM Chou: At that time you didn't mention a final date.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1034, Files for the President—China Material, Polo II, HAK China Trip, Transcripts of Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People. Kissinger's topical briefing materials are *ibid.* Kissinger met with Chou En-lai on October 20 (Monday) from 4:40–7:10 p.m.; October 21 from 10:30–1:45 p.m. and again from 4:42–7:17 p.m.; October 22 from 4:15–8:28 p.m.; October 23 from 9:05–10:05 a.m.; October 24 from 10:28–1:55 p.m. and 9:23–11:20 p.m.; October 25 from 10:12–11 a.m. and 9:50–11:40 p.m.; and October 26 from 5:30–8:10 a.m. A short "informal memcon" of Chou En-lai's introduction to the Americans accompanying Kissinger on the afternoon of October 20 is also *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 36–41, 43–44, 48, 51–52, and 54–56. Kissinger's schedule is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Materials, HAK's October 1971 Visit. Memoranda of conversation of meetings held among Holdridge, Jenkins, and Hsiung Hsiang-huai, Secretary to the Prime Minister, are *ibid.* These meetings focused on preparations for the President's trip, trade, and exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 39 and 43.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. We understand the evolution we are aiming for. (Chou nods) I said that we are not advocating a two-China solution or a one China, one Taiwan solution.

PM Chou: Is it likely to realize a situation of one China and two governments as put forward by the State Department?² I have thought a lot about it. That is why we directed our spearhead of criticism to the State Department and Mr. Bush. But we didn't direct our criticism at Mr. Rogers after he put forward this proposition in the name of your government. Only in our press. Only after Mr. Bush put it forward did we put forward a foreign ministry statement on 20 August.³

Dr. Kissinger: We noted your statement and truly you used restraint, and I will say a word about it in a minute. You have showed great restraint in what is for both of us a very difficult situation. I will explain it in a minute.

I said that we wouldn't support or encourage the creation of an Independent Taiwan Movement. If you have any information that any American, official or unofficial, is encouraging such a movement, I understand that you will inform us and you have our promise that it will be stopped. We will oppose—

PM Chou: And the demonstration which took place in front of the UN Headquarters at the beginning of the UN General Assembly, was it premeditated by them or was it world-wide?⁴

Dr. Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge it had no encouragement from the US government, and I am not aware of the fact that it was a world-wide plan. However, I will look into it when I get back, and I will inform the Prime Minister of the results of my investigation through our channel.

PM Chou: These demonstrations for so-called Taiwan independence started with the convening of the UN in New York, and there was a series of demonstrations in other places in the US and Japan and even extending to Taiwan, and they are continuing. And I can send some of the material we obtained about this for you.

Dr. Kissinger: If you will send me the material, I will start an investigation when I get back from here and send you the result of our

² For documentation on Chinese representation in the United Nations, see Document 167 and *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume V.

³ "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, August 20, 1971," *Peking Review*, 35 (August 27, 1971), pp. 5–6.

⁴ In the late summer and early fall of 1971, supporters of the PRC, the ROC, and Taiwan Independence Movement all protested near the UN Headquarters in New York. See Frank Ching, "Chinese Groups in Confrontation Here," *The New York Times*, September 22, 1971, pp. 1, 6.

investigation, but I can assure you we are giving no encouragement whatsoever to such a movement.

PM Chou: The CIA had no hand in it?

Dr. Kissinger: As I told the Prime Minister the last time, he vastly overestimates the competence of the CIA.

PM Chou: They have become the topic of discussion throughout the world. Whenever something happens in the world they are always thought of.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true, and it flatters them, but they don't deserve it.

PM Chou: According to the US set-up, is the CIA under the NSC?

Dr. Kissinger: The CIA is technically under the White House. Technically. Before they engage in the sort of operation the Prime Minister refers to, they have to make a request to a committee of which I am chairman and on which other agencies usually have a voice, but not inevitably.⁵ No such operations have been authorized. Nor has such an operation been proposed. I am being candid—this is not information we generally tell other governments.

I cannot absolutely exclude, again speaking totally frankly, that some office does something unauthorized sometimes. It's extremely improbable and after a period of months we would certainly find out. It's possible it could happen, but not on a large scale.

PM Chou: The Pentagon is not responsible for them?

Dr. Kissinger: The Pentagon has also an intelligence organization, but it also doesn't have authority to do these things. Again I would like to propose the following to the Prime Minister. If you have any information of any American engaging in those activities and you give me his name, I can promise you in the name of the President he will be removed. It's impossible for him to do it without being discovered by you and us. We are talking about unauthorized actions now.

PM Chou: This is a question which we may raise—it's a little complicated question, because it's a matter of your internal affairs but also an international problem.

Dr. Kissinger: You can raise it, and we will not consider it an intervention in our domestic affairs.

PM Chou: They have activities throughout the world. That is one question that people throughout the world are most unhappy about,

⁵ Apparent reference to the 40 Committee, a group of high-level officials who reviewed intelligence gathering and covert activity. The 303 Committee became the 40 Committee after President Nixon signed NSDM 40 on February 17, 1970, thus updating NSC 5412/2.

and that's why they are not welcome. Because after the Second World War, the US is taking a hand in all kinds of affairs throughout the world and this organization had a role to play.

Dr. Kissinger: The CIA?

PM Chou: Yes. Because they have a role and have a payroll, they must feed their stomachs. So as your President said, and also as Your Excellency said, after the Second World War you appeared to be very powerful both militarily and in the matter of economic aid. So the CIA thought they had the right to look into everything. The result of this is causing disharmony in the world. Now it is less than the espionage activities of the Soviet Union. We are freely exchanging views.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

PM Chou: It is possible that activities in the China mainland are comparatively less but not perhaps nonexistent.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not sure it's in our interest to reassure you completely, but I will. First, you said, what will CIA agents do if they don't make revolution somewhere? Most write long, incomprehensible reports and don't make revolution.

PM Chou: You can preserve methods without this. We reserve our judgment on this.

Dr. Kissinger: They are mostly from Yale and they don't have the people.

PM Chou: He is from Yale [pointing to Winston Lord]⁶

Dr. Kissinger: Does he look like a revolutionary?

PM Chou: Those reports you referred to are intelligence. While you use the word revolution, we say subversion.

Dr. Kissinger: Or subversion. I understand. We are conscious of what is at stake in our relationship, and we will not let one organization carry out petty operations that could hinder this course, what you described yesterday evening in your toast.⁷ You must have noticed that since my visit in July a whole list of things which used to be routine, especially in the military, have been changed.

But we will review all those activities once again, and I want to repeat that we will not consider it an intervention in our affairs if you will point out those measures that affect you directly, either in respect to the Taiwan Independence Movement or other, and call them to our attention. It's not our policy to subvert the government of the People's Republic of China or its policy.

⁶ All brackets and ellipses are in the source text.

⁷ See Document 163 and footnote 2 thereto.

PM Chou: I just raised this question initially. When we discuss the question of Japan, I will raise it again. This is a matter which Taiwan also has complained of. Chiang Kai-shek and his son are very much worried about this.

Dr. Kissinger: Both the People's Republic and the Taiwan authorities have the same view on this matter.

PM Chou: That's right. For instance, we have set up the People's Republic for 22 years. We will not have some of our CIA people go to the US to indulge in activities. Even if a delegation went to the US, we would be very careful that there is no misunderstanding because what we are seeking is friendship between the two peoples. Because to change the system of any particular country, that is the responsibility of that particular country and cannot be done by any foreign countries, and we persist in this.

For instance, we are spending such a great effort to help in Vietnam, but we never entered into Vietnamese affairs. Also in Cambodia. The Government of Cambodia is in Peking, but some members are in Cambodia itself. There are often internal disputes within their government, and sometimes when they ask for our mediation, we say we will not stick our hands into it. But the amount of articles we carry in our press concerning publications and reports regarding the Royal Union of the government of Cambodia is unprecedented in our press and world history. Norodom Sihanouk has already published 21 proclamations to his people, and we have published them in our press and we have published them in full without changing a word. If you say there's no freedom in our country, that is the greatest freedom. We respect them and do not disrespect their sovereignty because the head of state is in our country.

You may have some experts study this and see if any government dares to do this. How did the British behave towards DeGaulle during the Second World War? The former American Government gave support to the Kerensky government in exile⁸ and also supported the government in exile of the three Baltic states. At the same time you are now supporting the so-called government in Taiwan, but you have never given them such privileges in your press. You can refute me in one way. Your press is owned privately while ours is not. That's the question because there's a question of profit. But we devote a great amount of space to their publications.

Nevertheless there are some people who say Sihanouk is not free in China and is a prisoner and even worse. I really can find no example

⁸ Reference is to the Russian provisional government, July–October 1917, led by Aleksandr Fyodorovich Kerensky.

of a head of state invited abroad who has such extensive freedom. Sihanouk wants to visit Europe, and we now have a possibility of sending him with our special plane because we have now an exit via the countries in central Asia; as you went last time, Pakistan and Tehran.

Dr. Kissinger: Spectacularly beautiful.

PM Chou: We have established relations with all these countries. He will go all the way to Romania and Yugoslavia. Only Greece we have not established relations with. One thing we cannot do. After our special plane sends Sihanouk to Europe, we cannot guarantee his safety. Saboteurs may come. They may come from the side of the Lon Nol/Matak clique. If it does come from that clique then it will involve you. That is a very natural logic followed in the world. So we are always considering how to guarantee his safety. We can guarantee his safety in China itself. But if he is to go abroad we can guarantee his security on our plane.

Dr. Kissinger: Wouldn't the French Government guarantee his safety?

PM Chou: He doesn't want to go there because France does not recognize him.

Dr. Kissinger: Where is he going?

PM Chou: Where I said. Romania, Yugoslavia, Algeria, and probably the United Arab Republic of Egypt. Because activities of saboteurs can be carried out easily. It can happen within the US. They may even put a plastic bomb outside the plane to destroy the plane. When I went to the Bandung Conference in 1955 I almost lost my life.

At that time we chartered an Indian plane, the "Kashmir Princess" from Hong Kong. Because Prime Minister U Nu wanted me to go with him, I went to Burma. He asked Nehru and Nasser to go with him and I changed my route at the last minute while the others went via Hong Kong. The saboteurs thought I was on the "Kashmir Princess" and set a time bomb on the plane. Just as the "Kashmir Princess" was about to reach Bandung, it exploded in mid-air and crashed into the sea.

India, together with authorities in Hong Kong, investigated the bombing. We have evidence that the bomb was placed by a Chinese who was brought over to Hong Kong, and I convinced the Indian Commissioner to go directly with our people to Hong Kong and demand from the Hong Kong authorities that they arrest that man. But such news leaks out, and the Indian told his Embassy, and just as we got to Hong Kong that man flew to Taiwan. So such things are sometimes not the responsibility of that government, and some individuals may do it on their own.

As for international hijacking, we do not approve those activities. It's too unreasonable. Such adventurous acts are not a good practice, regardless of the motives behind it, whether it is revolutionary or of a

saboteur nature. I say these not as superfluous words but to explain how people of the world think of the CIA. As for we ourselves, we are not very much excited by the CIA. Maybe indirectly. I didn't know Dr. Kissinger was the chairman of the committee.

Dr. Kissinger: Not for day-to-day things. Day-to-day things I don't know. I am only told of something that can have major foreign policy consequences. Not the sort of thing the Prime Minister described. I would not even hear about that.

PM Chou: They would seal you off. There are often some organizations that even though you are their chairman the more they seal you off. Chairman Mao has a thesis: those who hail you are not the ones who support you. He said it to Edgar Snow. There are three types of such persons. Those who support you and hail long life; they really support you; others support you maybe a little; and third, those who are double dealers and applaud you but under the table their feet kick you. Such people probably exist no matter the system.

Dr. Kissinger: I see many of those.

PM Chou: This will exist probably 10,000 years hence and even one million years hence, so long as human society exists. When humanity on earth disappears there may be people on other stars. This is a common phenomenon of society. One must be cool-headed and analyze things. And so you said that after the July 15 announcement, the majority supported it, and a minority were against it. I believe that. It's also true in China. There's no such thing as unanimous approval of agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Only for those not worth making. (laughter)

PM Chou: Not really unanimity, but a carefree manner. This may be outside our discussion but this is a heart-to-heart discussion.

Dr. Kissinger: For friendship we must be frank and know how each feels. I appreciate how the Prime Minister feels and he can be certain it will be taken absolutely seriously. We will not let officials subvert the trend we have started.

PM Chou: We must be prepared in our minds. There will be some who will want to subvert it. Only when we have such a preparation can we do our things well.

I think your colleagues have never heard someone on the other side saying such things. So it's only the second meeting, and I am saying what I want to you. You and Mr. Lord are familiar with this but not Miss Matthews and our new friend [referring to Jon Howe]. You probably thought the Chinese Communist Party has three heads and six arms. But, lo and behold, I am like you. Someone you can talk reason with and talk honestly. Back to Taiwan. I thought it was beneficial to say something about the CIA just then.

Dr. Kissinger: It's very important because in the relationship of our two countries much depends on confidence. There will be many ambiguous events and it is important to understand what we are really thinking.

A few more words about Taiwan. As I also said last time, we will not support, and indeed we will oppose, the establishment of Japanese military forces on Taiwan, military influence on Taiwan, and to the extent we have influence in Japan we will oppose an attempt by Japan to support the Taiwan Independence Movement.

We will support any peaceful resolution of the issues in the Taiwan Straits, and we will not be an obstacle to it.

We are prepared to move towards a normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, and we understand what you have in mind.

All of this the President will reaffirm in restricted meetings to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and to Chairman Mao.

I would like to add a few other observations if I may. With the same frankness with which the Prime Minister has spoken to me, I have to tell him that for us this is, of course, a somewhat painful process. We have worked with the Government of Taiwan for many years and whatever the course of the history that produced this, it is not easy for us to make the changes which we have outlined to you. Also there are many elements in the US who are violently opposed to the policy we are pursuing and who will be even more opposed to it as it begins to unwind.

We recognize that the People's Republic considers the subject of Taiwan an internal issue, and we will not challenge that. But to the degree that the People's Republic can on its own, in the exercise of its own sovereignty, declare its willingness to settle it by peaceful means, our actions will be easier. I am not speaking of undertaking to talk towards us as we asked in 1955, but something you do on your own. But whether you do or not, we will continue in the direction which I indicated.

Secondly, I want to say a few words about the discussion in the UN. There are many elements in our bureaucracy who are, of course, pursuing the traditional policies. And since we have not told them all the details of the discussions in July, it has not been possible to instill the discipline that will be the case as the years go on. We have carried out what I told the Prime Minister we would do when I was here in July. And we have tried to keep our rhetoric also at a lower level. I think the Prime Minister will have noticed that the President has not made a public statement on the subject.

Actually, if I can speak candidly to the Prime Minister, and this is not a matter in his control, it would be best for the policies which we

discussed if the Albanian Resolution did not pass this year. In the latest public opinion poll, there are still 62% of the American people who are opposed to the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN. And if the transition—the work of the July 15 announcement was very severe, and if there's another shock now, the elements opposed to what we are doing will have a rallying point, and they will launch a sharp attack prematurely. I am talking very candidly to you, Mr. Prime Minister. So paradoxically, if the position that has been advanced in the UN should prevail for this year, it will make it easier to carry out the policies we described, and it will make it easier next year to moderate our policies in the UN.

But I want to assure the Prime Minister that we are not looking for a clever way out of what I told him in July. With respect to Taiwan, I think we understand that it's possible to do more than we can say. And that some things can be left to an historical evolution as long as we both understand the way it's going. And that, of course, everything is easier for us if the resolution is peaceful. I am sure the President will reaffirm everything that I have said.

PM Chou: The question of the UN I will discuss at some point later. Our central question of concern is Taiwan. The question of Taiwan is a question that was already solved after the Second World War, but then became a question outstanding. Because after the Second World War it was a matter of certainty that in the instruments of surrender and in the signing in 1945 Japan gave up all claims on Taiwan just as it gave up all claims to Manchuria. The difference with Manchuria is that Soviet troops had already entered into Manchuria, and Chinese troops followed immediately after. So there was no question of China's restoring sovereignty over Manchuria. Although at the beginning the majority of it was occupied by Chiang Kai-shek's troops, then the whole of Manchuria was lost and became no international problem. The so-called State of Manchukuo existed for 14 years under the military occupation of the Japanese.

The difference about Taiwan is that because of China's defeat in 1894, China was forced to cede Taiwan to Japan. That is similar to Sakhalin Island that was conceded to Japan after the war of 1905. And it was also like the question after the Prussian War of 1870 when Alsace-Lorraine was conceded to Germany. The First World War was concluded in 1918, and the Germans lost, and Alsace-Lorraine was restored to France, and no questions asked. But during the Second World War Nazi Germany occupied even greater areas of France. After the Allies won victory, all of France was restored.

So when one says that Taiwan was under Japan for a long period of time, it was only fifty years and if you compare to Alsace-Lorraine, it was two years less. It's clear. I have never been to Taiwan, but I have

been to Salzburg in Alsace–Lorraine and it was clear that the inhabitants there spoke German. You noticed. So the vast majority of people on Taiwan spoke Fukien dialect. Some learned Japanese.

Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese claim is no problem for us.

PM Chou: But there does exist this adverse current in the world, and they say the status remains undetermined. That's entirely absurd.

Dr. Kissinger: That's not been said by any American spokesman since June.

PM Chou: That was trouble provoked by your State Department, and then you forbade them to say more. Britain now wants to raise the level of representation to Ambassador. I can tell you something here, but please don't make it public.

Dr. Kissinger: Nothing here will be made public and not outside the President. This goes only to the President.

PM Chou: I believe that. And I have even more confidence in the young. Old politicians sometimes have too many connections. The British Government says that the government of the United Kingdom acknowledges the position of the government of the People's Republic of China that Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China. That is clear and acknowledging the law. Not recognize but acknowledge. So for lawyers there might be a slight differentiation between acknowledge and recognize. That is a question of International Law.

What is more the British Government says as soon as it has declared this, the British Consulate in Taiwan will be withdrawn.

Third, the British Government said they will openly declare this and vote for the Albanian resolution. You know this. When your Deputy Secretary of State was visiting Europe, the British made its attitude very clear. So logically that should be sufficient.

Then there was a reservation that this was not to be made public. That is British diplomacy, that is the way the British Government said they themselves would not promote the theory that the status of Taiwan remains undetermined, but would not try to persuade any government. But when asked its position, the British Government says its position remains unchanged. So that is very interesting.

[At this point there is a short break.]

PM Chou: Sorry, I didn't think of everyone taking break.

Dr. Kissinger: We followed your lead.

PM Chou: So it's clear that if we are to proceed from expediency we can agree with this formula of the British Government, that they will not say unless asked. More people can support this, but we do not consider this acceptable. On this matter one should proceed with an earnest attitude on international problems.

Dr. Kissinger: What will you not accept?

PM Chou: That final reservation, which the British Government said, that its policy will not change. There will be a consequence to that. That state of affairs of being asked whether its position has changed may not occur. From the standpoint of the British Government it should not reserve that attitude, because the British Government is a signatory to the Cairo Declaration. At that time participating were the heads of government of the US, Britain, and China. Also the British were signatories to the Potsdam Declaration.

What about the historical facts? Afterwards the British Government sent someone to take over Taiwan and had a provincial governor established. At that time no difference of view was expressed by the allies. So after the Chinese people had overthrown the rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, President Truman declared that Taiwan had returned to the Chinese people, and the US had no interest in territory there. There are documents stressing that. The decision of President Truman at that time was of no concern to the existence or not of Chiang Kai-shek.

Just because of the Korean War he suddenly decided to send in the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan and advisors, and from that time he declared Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits under American protection. He mentioned nuclear devices, that there were devices there.

And so later on in the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan he uses a very strange formulation to declare this. In it it was said that Japan renounces all claim to all such and such territories, that is to say, Japan renounces claim to all such territories with the exception of the four principal islands of Japan—Honshu, Hokkaido, Shikoku, and Kyushu and that with the exception of these four principal islands, Japan would not claim any others. Japan renounces claim to the southern side of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, and the position of the Ryukyus, including Okinawa, remained open and also Taiwan and the Spratley islands. But it was not specified in the San Francisco Treaty to whom they belong. It was left to the countries. I don't know who drew that up.

Dr. Kissinger: Dulles, the Prime Minister's old acquaintance.

PM Chou: So afterwards individual treaties were made with Japan. At that time Chiang Kai-shek was only a small dynasty hanging on to Taiwan, with American protection, so what could he say? He could only act as he was told to do. He himself sits on Taiwan, but in the treaty with Japan it does not specify who Taiwan reverts to, only saying Japan gives up all claim. If I call him a traitor, I have every reason to do that.

Dr. Kissinger: He claims, too, that there's only one China but that is the Island of Taiwan.

PM Chou: I am talking about in the Peace Treaty of Japan. I tell the way that it is in the Peace Treaty with Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: When you made your agreement with Japan to revert Okinawa and the Ryukyus to the Japanese, Chiang Kai-shek asked why you were not returning them to China.

Taiwan is cursing us about the Ryukyus; not just about Okinawa. Because in history during the Ming and Ching dynasties the rulers of those islands and maybe even earlier. . . I will not go into the historical facts of that, but I am certain those islands sent gifts to the Chinese Emperor and were looked upon as tributary states. Maybe they were sent envoys to show concern for them. It merely shows relations between states. But in the factual empire days it was looked on as tributary states. Such things occurred in the Ottoman and Roman and Inca Empires in ancient days. All states that had relations with them were looked upon as belonging to them. If that's to be considered, then the world will be overturned and the world turned into chaos. The ownership of Taiwan and the Pescadores are not stated in the so-called Peace Treaty with Japan, and so it's null and void.

Chiang did not settle this problem. Later in order to seek protection from Dulles, he no longer mentioned that in his treaty. Particularly after the conclusion of the SEATO treaty and Dulles went to Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek, he didn't dare to raise this question.

It's a ludicrous state of affairs because the situation in Taiwan remained undetermined and the government itself is undetermined. He claims to represent the whole of China, but he was overthrown by the Chinese people. The place he is sitting in now, the status of that island, remains undetermined. From this point of view it can be said his government is hanging in mid-air.

This is a question that must be made clear. We ask the British Government why they insist on that reservation, and the British Government said that during the Conservative Government it was stated in Parliament. But that is not the only reason because a party is capable of changing its policy. For the new to replace the old it is a natural phenomenon. Why is it then that the British Government insists on maintaining what it said 20 years ago? That is because in their minds they think there will certainly be a day when the movement for so-called Taiwan independence will rise up in accordance with the theory that the status remains undetermined. Of course, first of all Japan advocates that point of view and secondly, they have in mind the United States.

So what I would like to clarify with Dr. Kissinger today is that is it the stated policy of the United States Government that it still wants to maintain the point of view that the status of Taiwan remains undetermined or is it the US Government policy that Taiwan is already returned to China and is a province of China? As to how the Chinese people will solve the question of the Taiwan regime, that is of secondary

importance. I have told you that last time. I replied to you already that we will try to bring about a peaceful settlement, the last morning before you left.

Dr. Kissinger: I remember.

PM Chou: So what is your point of view on the theory of the undetermined status of Taiwan? (Pauses) Maybe it's difficult for you.

Dr. Kissinger: It is. (laughter)

PM Chou: I have discovered this.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to formulate my answer with some precision and I don't have the same clarity of mind as the Prime Minister.

Let me separate what we can say and what our policy is. We do not challenge the fact that all Chinese maintain that there's only one China and that Taiwan is part of that China. And therefore we do not maintain that the status in that respect is undetermined. How this can be expressed is a difficult matter, but we would certainly be prepared in a communiqué that might be issued to take note of the fact that all Chinese maintain that there is only one China. So that is the policy of this government.

PM Chou: That is the first point. Any second point?

Dr. Kissinger: That is the point of our policy. The second point is what can be said, and I think I have answered that also. I can also assure the Prime Minister that the phrase "undetermined" will not be repeated.

PM Chou: If in the international arena certain countries, for instance Japan, or some other countries, were to raise this either in the UN or some other public forum in the world, what would your attitude be when they say the status is "undetermined"?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me tell the Prime Minister that I have not discussed this particular question in detail with the President. So I can only give my impression. If I am wrong, I will give him the answer through our channel. I will never deliberately mislead him. (Chou nods)

Let me say two things. First we are not encouraging any government to maintain the position that the status is undetermined. The British Government's position is an independent position and not at our encouragement.

Secondly, if a government raises this issue without our encouragement, we would certainly not support it. And I think the Prime Minister will have noticed that in our UN statements, no matter how distasteful they may have been to him, we took great care, and if the bureaucracy had been more pliable greater care, but we took great care not to mention the independent state of Taiwan. I think I can say to him with some confidence that we will do nothing that will encourage

the elaboration of a two-China or one-China, one-Taiwan policy, in whatever form it's presented. Our attempt will be to bring about a solution within a framework of one China and by peaceful means.

I will check this with the President and confirm it through our channel. The last sentence I can confirm now, i.e. I can confirm our policy of one China by peaceful means. But not the sentence on what tactical position we will take if another government raises whether the status of Taiwan is undetermined. I can confirm our position to bring about peaceful solution within the framework of one China. To "bring about" may be too active; "to encourage" is more correct. It's for the Chinese themselves to settle. It's not something we should actively push. We should try within the framework of one China. What tack we will take if another government raises the status as undetermined, I believe it will be that we will not support it, but I will check it with the President when I return.

PM Chou: Another question which is related to this question, that is when Taiwan, under the rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, is returned to the motherland—of course Taiwan was returned to the motherland, but because of the Chiang Kai-shek rule there is a problem—but should it be returned, then the US treaty, which we have never recognized, will it be possible to have it null and void at that time?

Dr. Kissinger: When Taiwan and China become one again by peaceful means then the treaty would lapse. It is not a permanent feature of our foreign policy to be maintained under such circumstances.

PM Chou: From our side our position is that although we have all along considered that treaty to be null and void and do not recognize it, but still our requirement at the time of your withdrawal of all military from Taiwan and as you remove all military installations from there, would be to declare the treaty null and void.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand your position and we hope that by that time the evolution will have reached a point where formal action may be unnecessary.

PM Chou: Only then can there be establishment of diplomatic relations.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand the Prime Minister's point of view.

PM Chou: That is the present situation of Taiwan no longer exists, and all US armed forces and military installations have been withdrawn from Taiwan, and the Taiwan Straits area. And the treaty which was to protect the Chiang Kai-shek clique will become abrogated. You say "lapsed." When that time comes there will be no longer difficulties between China and the United States, and only then it is possible for diplomatic relations between China and the United States.

Otherwise it's not possible for us to go to Washington, to have two Chinese Ambassadors there. Your President and you may come here

because there is only one United States here as far as we are concerned. But I cannot go to the United States because there's the so-called ambassador of Chiang Kai-shek there. The differences are clear. You would not allow the Chiang Kai-shek ping pong team to perform in front of the White House but it did perform there [Washington] and so while it is there our ping pong team could not go. There is this difference.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: But from our point of view what is even more urgent than the Taiwan question is your withdrawal from Indochina. We can discuss this this afternoon. I discussed other thing. For you too it's a most urgent matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Before we come to that I would like to answer one question.

PM Chou: That will be this afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister asked what our position would be once Taiwan has come back to the motherland. When Taiwan and China become one, we can abrogate that treaty. That's not a problem. Once there is formal unification, there's no reason for us to have a treaty with a province of China. We will present no obstacle in the way of such a political evolution. If the event that the Prime Minister mentioned in my last meeting should come about, either Chiang Kai-shek or his son should return to the mainland, we will not discourage it. To be very frank with the Prime Minister what we would like most and what we would encourage is a peaceful negotiation after which all the military relationships would be at an end.

PM Chou: Assistance or relationships?

Dr. Kissinger: After there is a political settlement between Taiwan and mainland China, yes. We will not insist on maintaining an American presence or military installations on Taiwan after unification of China by peaceful negotiations has been achieved. And in those conditions we will be prepared to abrogate formally. If there's no peaceful settlement, which is the second contingency, then it's easier for us to withdraw our military presence in stages, which I indicated to the Prime Minister than to abrogate the treaty.

PM Chou: I understand. But then Japan would go in.

Dr. Kissinger: We would not stand for that.

PM Chou: That is an important question.

Dr. Kissinger: We have a common interest there.

PM Chou: That is right. What they want to do is replace you.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, we have no interest in the military expansion of Japan.

PM Chou: That's right because they have threatened in the past not only China but all countries in the Pacific. We remember that clearly.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be a very shortsighted policy.

PM Chou: We think the Laird speech in that connection is not very appropriate.⁹

Dr. Kissinger: It has been denied that he made it, but never repeated.

PM Chou: He said something like that when he returned to Washington.

Dr. Kissinger: Some friends have asked what I would do after I left this job, and I said I would run a school for unruly boys.

PM Chou: That's not an easy thing to run such a school. I would not like such a job. Some people don't listen to you even if they are claiming to be of the same party or claim to listen to you. While there's humanity in the world there will be such people.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me be more honest with you than I have been with any other foreign leader. I have to select those issues on which to enforce discipline. I am—

PM Chou: It's not possible to go out in all four directions. Then you will be like Don Quixote.

Dr. Kissinger: Therefore, we choose to enforce discipline only on those statements that have practical consequences. We cannot keep Laird from making statements. But we can keep him from drawing practical consequences.

PM Chou: That's why we made a point of writing a commentary about Laird. And that was not a government statement. Only a press commentary. We only made two comments on Cabinet members of your government since you left.

Dr. Kissinger: We noticed that.

PM Chou: That is formal commentaries. In the UN those who support us—

Dr. Kissinger: We understand.

PM Chou: Our only formal commentary was that on August 20.

Dr. Kissinger: Some of your less formal are more vehement.

PM Chou: No matter, you know that is "firing empty guns." When we say "down with imperialism" it's for the people of the countries concerned. The same when we say "down with revisionism." If the people of the Soviet Union don't rise up to overthrow their leaders, it's empty cannon. We fire one empty cannon at them and they fire back 100 at us. We would not say they are doing it a 100 times. It's not worth it.

⁹ See footnote 14, Document 140.

So we must differentiate our comment. When it's actual policy we must be very prudent because in those matters what we say must count; it must be based on principle not just empty cannons. You cannot fire cannon at random, but if you were to then we would be happy no one would believe in those words. You understand this better than the Soviets.

What I ask now is that you affirm that you don't want Japanese armed forces to go into Taiwan and this must be affirmed only while your armed forces are in Taiwan. Isn't that so? You had already admitted in the time of President Truman that Taiwan was Chinese territory and you noted her ambitions toward it, and it was also President Truman who sent troops to Taiwan. The Republican Party is not responsible for that but since you are already there you must be responsible for the situation. Because after you went into Taiwan and with the conclusion of the treaty of 1954, this matter became not only a matter of internal Chinese affairs but of international affairs. We do not advocate using armed forces against you. These discussions began first in August 1955. Only now can we say that we are earnestly going into negotiations. When we say of the Japanese going into Taiwan, it includes the military aspects as well as the economic and political aspects. This is something not only we but Chiang Kai-shek is following closely too. Just some time ago the elder brother of Sato, Kishi, went to Taiwan where he was to attend the meeting of The Cooperating Committee of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Three pro-Japanese chieftains on Taiwan took part in this meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Chieftains?

PM Chou: Main people. On the civil side is Chang Ch'un, the Secretary General of the Chiang Kai-shek clique; on the military side is Huang Chieh, the Minister of Defense of the Chiang forces. He still has influence on Chiang Kai-shek's troops. Chiang Kai-shek is very ill at ease about him. He was my captain at the Whampoa Academy when Chiang Kai-shek was head and he was military commissioner and was director of teaching. In his middle age he was quite able to fight. Chiang Kai-shek is quite fearful of him. But is in quite good health and not dying so Chiang Kai-shek is worried about him. The third man called Ku Cheng-kang is a subordinate of Hui Ting, a member of the Central Committee and also the President of the Japanese-Chinese Friendship Association.¹⁰

¹⁰ Reference is to Chang Ch'un (Zheng Qun), Secretary-General to Chiang Kai-shek from 1954 to 1972, then Senior Advisor to Chiang Kai-shek; Huang Chieh (Huang Jie), Governor of Taiwan Province from 1962 to 1969, Minister of National Defense from 1969 to 1972, then Strategy Advisor to Chiang Kai-shek; and Ku Cheng-kang (Gu Zhenggang), Honorary Chairman of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) from 1968.

After you left in the latter part of July, both Chang Ch'un and Ku Cheng-kang visited Japan. At this time Japan made some suggestions to them, that is to find a formula to solve the problem of the UN. But the formula cannot be agreed to by Chiang Kai-shek, that is to say that those three pro-Japanese elements would be willing to turn Taiwan into a subsidiary state of Japan. Towards the latter part of the war of aggression, shortly before the Pacific war, there was a time when President Roosevelt was paying attention to what to do with Southeast Asia, and those three men I mentioned all wavered. If you meet Mr. Service,¹¹ he will tell you about these three men, and he will tell you the same thing. When I met some days ago more than 60 American friends, I did not mention these men but I saw that Mr. Service knew what I meant, this plot was being hatched by them. There were some young American friends who did not know about this.

So if such a state of affairs cropped up what would be your attitude?

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister always produces dialectic answers in me because I am in the People's Republic of China. Maybe he is engaging in subtle teaching. The relatively easy part is the projection of a Japanese military presence to Taiwan. It's out of the question while there are American forces there. And if it happened while there are American forces there, it will require us to reconsider the American presence. In other words, we would oppose it. If it happens at a later stage—

PM Chou: So long as Chiang Kai-shek is still around he will not permit Japanese military forces to go in, but as you know, Chiang Kai-shek is already 85.

Dr. Kissinger: If it happened afterwards the problem would be more difficult, but in any event the US would oppose Japanese forces on Taiwan. This I can say categorically.

PM Chou: Yes, this would not conform to the treaty.

Dr. Kissinger: It would not conform to the San Francisco Treaty and would raise a whole new spectre in the Pacific, but it would cause us to reconsider our whole policy in the Pacific if Japan started sending forces outside its territory.

Secondly, the problem of political and economic expansion of Japan, I have to be honest with the Prime Minister, is a more difficult problem because it's harder to measure. I can only say that it's not American policy to let Taiwan become a subsidiary state of Japan. (Chou nods)

¹¹ John Stewart Service, U.S. Foreign Service officer and China expert who was fired in 1951 due to "reasonable doubt" of his loyalty. In 1957 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal was improper. Service, who died in 1999, retired from the government in 1962 and became a scholar at the University of California at Berkeley.

PM Chou: It would be most disadvantageous to the attempts to relax tension in the Far East. In fact, it's impossible.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand that. But it's important we know that even before diplomatic relations we have a means of exchanging views and some visible signs of Sino–American relations, and we think that will affect the situation in Taiwan and also we believe in Japan.

PM Chou: Even now it's affecting to a certain degree Japan, for instance, the biggest Japanese steel manufacturer. It produces 30 million tons of steel in its own structure alone. Your President has said that in a year or two Japan may catch up with the US in steel production. That is the biggest Japanese steel company. That steel company originally took part in the commission of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Now it openly declared that it will not go to Taiwan and on the contrary, accepted our proposition, that is to say, it declared it would give up its deal to have Taiwan as a colony.

So we can see changes are taking place. There are the conditions to make common efforts to prevent the reemergence of Japanese militarism. Those of you who are experienced about Japan since the 30's after the Mukden incident. At that time Britain was allied to Japan. So Britain came to understand Japan later.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not discussing Japan now, but I will make one comment. I think if we treat each other with confidence there are certain things we can do together, but there is a danger that if the Chinese side acts too impetuously with respect to Japan this will bring about a forging of ties with Japan within the US and US and Japan. One attack on us is that we have sacrificed Japan for China. So some restraint on the Chinese side is necessary.

PM Chou: We are most restrained with regard to Japan because even now a state of war has not past between China and Japan in 26 years. Sato expressed a desire to see China even before President Nixon, but we pay no attention.

Dr. Kissinger: This could have the possibility of influencing the successor to Sato.

PM Chou: That is possible. Let's not go too far off the topic. Who do you think will succeed him?

Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese are very unpredictable. I think Fukuda.

PM Chou: He was reared by Sato himself.

Dr. Kissinger: As I told the Prime Minister yesterday, not all Japanese leaders who want good relations with China are easy to get along with. I always thought that Nakasone¹² was the most nationalistic.

¹² Nakasone Yasuhiro, Director of Japan's Defense Agency from January 1970 to July 1971, then Minister of Industry and Trade from July 1971 to December 1972.

PM Chou: He was your student, you must know about him.

Dr. Kissinger: I have known him since 1952.

PM Chou: In 1955 he came in the capacity as peace delegate to the conference. Years later he became the Director General of National Defense Ministry. After visiting the US and talking with Laird, he put out his Fourth Defense Plan. We have quite a long experience with Japan.

We have said so much about Taiwan. When we conclude our discussion we can formalize that. The most difficult topic is how we will put it down in the communiqué.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right. It will require restraint and wisdom. I have more of the latter than the former.

PM Chou: Not necessarily. And your assistants have the ability to do that. Let us meet in the afternoon. You will go back now for lunch. We will meet at 4:00 or 4:30.

Dr. Kissinger: You decide.

PM Chou: 4:30. Once we start talking the talks go on very long.

Dr. Kissinger: But very usefully.

PM Chou: We have exchanged views without reservation.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the same for us.

163. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

My October China Visit: The Atmospherics

A Cool Arrival

We began our stay in China under what superficially appeared to be chilly circumstances. When we landed in Shanghai on October 20 the weather was partially overcast, and only a handful of PRC officials were on hand to greet us—the same four who had met us last July in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK's October 1971 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

Rawalpindi plus two representatives of the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office. Their manner seemed correct, but restrained. And in Peking the reception committee was virtually the same as the one which greeted us in July when we arrived secretly, although this time the visit was publicly announced. As before, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying headed the official PRC party, joined this time by Acting Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei (whose presence did serve to up-grade the affair).

Our move from the airport to the Guest House (the same one which we stayed in before, incidentally) was similarly chilly. The motorcade skirted the city over roads which were closed to normal traffic and heavily guarded; the sky seemed grey and threatening. We discovered upon entering our rooms in the Guest House that each of them contained an English-language propaganda bulletin carrying an appeal on the cover for the people of the world to "overthrow the American imperialists and their running dogs." I had a member of my staff hand the one in my room back to a PRC protocol officer with the remark that it must have been put there by accident; subsequently, we collected all these bulletins and presented them to the Chinese, who received them in silence. The Chinese staff at the Guest House on the first day were very cool and impassive—a fact especially noted by our Chinese-speaking members of the party.

Growing Warmth

A thaw began to set in later that day, when Prime Minister Chou En-lai met my entire official party in the Great Hall of the People. Following a photographic session of his staff and mine at the entrance to the conference room, Chou seated us inside behind the inevitable cups of green tea and proceeded to say a few words of personal greetings to everyone in the party. He was extremely cordial during the general meeting which followed. Then at the formal banquet which he hosted for the entire party (including the crew of the aircraft) he shook hands with each one of us individually; he gave what I consider to be an extraordinarily warm welcoming toast (attached at Tab A);² and he went around the room after the toast to touch glasses with every American present. Chou had done his biographic homework well on those Americans at his table, and flattered them with references to their educational and professional history or past experience in China.

From this point on the character of the visit was firmly fixed by our Chinese hosts. It was in my judgment a careful, thoughtful, conscientious effort, *first*:

—to make me and my party feel like truly welcome guests; and *second*;

² Attached but not printed. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 38.

—to get the Chinese public accustomed to the idea that a senior U.S. official and the members of his party were in fact being received as honored guests by the top PRC leadership.

The way my visit was built up by the Chinese leaders, as well as the lengths to which they went to assure that the public and lower-ranking PRC officials got the message, became very apparent as the days went by.

Publicizing the Visit

The day after our arrival we learned from foreign press reports that the *People's Daily* (the official Chinese Communist Party newspaper) had on the preceding day carried an announcement of the arrival which reported the composition of the welcoming committee. Although to us the composition of this group was virtually the same as before, no politically-aware Chinese could have missed the point that I was met by very high-ranking PRC personalities indeed.

More significantly, on October 21, the *People's Daily* carried two photographs of Chou En-lai's meeting with us the day before. One was the group photograph of our two parties standing together outside the conference room, with Chou by my side. The other depicted us sitting down in the period prior to the general meeting during which Chou had extended his personal greetings to me and all the members of the party. These two photographs were very similar in format to those which have been taken when Chou has met innumerable other delegations, except for one thing—they showed Chou extending the same courtesies to me, as the representative of the President of the United States, which he had extended to personalities who were allies or at least neutrals. The average Chinese could not have failed to be greatly impressed, if not shaken, by this juxtaposition. This was the first time any American official had been pictured in the press with PRC officials. This was a clear signal to the populace.

Anti-American Propaganda

I should note here that I did not become aware of the *People's Daily* photographs until late on October 22, and in the meantime had raised with Chou the question of offensive anti-American signs in Peking. I had noticed a Reuters story covering my arrival which had said that the Chinese had had their little joke; my motorcade had driven past a series of Chinese characters at the airport which denounced "American Imperialism." At my meeting with Chou on the afternoon of October 22, I handed him this story and pointed out the problems that language of this nature would create for you. He responded along the lines of what he had said that morning about the PRC's anti-U.S. propaganda in general: this was "firing an empty cannon." However, he seemed to accept what I had said and to take it to heart. More about this later.

Informing Party and Government Officials

On the evening of October 22 an event occurred which I consider quite exceptional, and which must have had the same effect on the Chinese present. We were taken to the Great Hall of the People to see a “revolutionary” version of Peking Opera, and were met there by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, the Acting Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister’s Secretary, and other leading PRC personalities. These escorted us into the auditorium, where to (I am sure) our mutual surprise, approximately 500 cadres, or PRC and Chinese Communist Party officials, were in attendance. Immediately upon entering the hall, Marshal Yeh and the other top PRC leaders began to clap their hands loudly, inviting a response from the audience. I must in all candor admit that the American visitors did not exactly bring the house down, but the point was surely driven home: these Americans were honored guests who were distinctly personae gratae to the PRC. The Acting Foreign Minister told me during the intermission that the members of the audience were hand-picked from among personnel of the Foreign Ministry and other key PRC departments. These people were ones whom the senior leaders particularly wanted to read the handwriting on the wall.

(It later occurred to us that the applause might have been more prolonged if we had joined in! While this would be inappropriate in our customs—as well as in Chinese tradition—the PRC has emulated their despised Soviet revisionist fellow socialists in this regard: the honored guests are expected to join in, reciprocally—and simultaneously.)

Exposure to the Public

If the Peking Opera event could be taken as Chou En-lai’s means of enlightening the cadres as to the new turn in events, then my trip to the Great Wall and the Ming Tombs on October 23 was his way of bringing the public into the picture. When our motorcade departed at about 9:00 a.m., I found myself escorted not just by protocol representatives, as would have been perfectly proper (and acceptable), but by the Acting Foreign Minister, the Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Mayor of Peking. These ostentatiously led me up the steep inclines of the Great Wall before a scattering of curious onlookers, and later down into the tomb of one of the Ming Emperors before a much larger group of spectators. By this time, the *People’s Daily* arrival announcement of October 20 and photographs of October 21 had been widely noted; I could see that I was being recognized and that the level of my official escort was being taken in.

It was during the trip to the Great Wall that I believe some payoff from my remarks to Chou En-lai on signs could be noted. As we drove farther into the mountains and the pass narrowed it became more and more obvious that a large number of slogans painted on the rocks along the road had been blotted out. Of course, this could have been

a by-product of the general down-playing of sloganry since the end of the Cultural Revolution, but my staff assures me that at least some of the blotted-out slogans looked freshly done. Another point of interest about this trip concerns security: at literally every road junction along the entire right-of-way there was at least one uniformed member of the Public Security Forces. This in itself was no small enterprise.

The next day, October 23, brought a further and even more ostentatious appearance before the Chinese public. Our Chinese hosts had arranged a visit for me and the members of my party to the Summer Palace, about a half-hour's drive west of Peking, and once again I was escorted by senior PRC officials rather than by protocol functionaries. My host on this occasion was Marshal Yeh, who saw to it that he and I were properly displayed together before what the Chinese call "the masses." The Acting Foreign Minister and the Secretary to the Prime Minister were also present. The high point of this episode was our taking tea aboard a boat poled out onto the Summer Palace lake in plain view of literally hundreds of Chinese spectators. The fact that a strong, cold wind was blowing (on an otherwise perfect day) did not deter our hosts; they clearly wanted this boatripe to take place and only a hurricane could have prevented it. When I waved to the crowds of people on the shore, they clapped loudly. Word was sinking in, but I should add, too, that there appeared to be no coaching and that the applause seemed genuinely enthusiastic.

Apropos of our visit to the Summer Palace, Prime Minister Chou told me later in one of our restricted sessions that a North Vietnamese newsman had been there and had taken many photographs. The Chinese, Chou said, had assumed from his appearance that he was one of "them;" they had not recognized him as being a North Vietnamese and were more than a little disturbed to discover his true identity.

Visits to Points of Interest Around Peking

Over the next two and a half days I became involved with the Prime Minister in serious substantive discussions, and found that my movements as a result became rather restricted. Others of the party, however, continued to move about the city and its environs, looking at centers of interest which you yourself might wish to visit. Significant impressions were:

—Along the route to an oil refinery and chemical complex, some 40 km. west of Peking, the people appeared to be forewarned of the motorcade, and showed much interest in it. Sizeable crowds gathered to watch the group pass in villages and major road junctions. There were *no* evidences of hostility; quite the contrary—the bystanders seemed pleased to see Americans.

—Near the oil refinery, an obvious job of painting over signs had taken place. The road bent between two large brick and plaster billboard-size signs, one of which still contained an innocuous

propaganda exhortation, and the other of which had been splashed over, obviously hastily, with red paint.

—At the oil refinery itself, the authorities were correct but friendly. Certainly our people were treated no differently from other foreigners who have visited the complex.

—In Peking, when several members of the party went shopping at the Friendship Store (the special store for foreigners), a large crowd of Chinese gathered quickly to watch, but with evident goodwill. The sales personnel were extremely friendly and helpful, despite the fact that as a courtesy to us the store had been kept open past the normal closing time.

—Another stop which a number of the group made in Peking was at a hospital where the ancient Chinese practice of acupuncture (treatment of ailments by needles) was being put to modern use. What nobody expected was that this turned out to be a display of acupuncture techniques used as anesthesia for three major surgical operations: an appendectomy, the removal of an ovarian cyst, and the removal of a portion of a diseased lung. Although none of our people had any medical background whatsoever, they were led as “American friends” through every stage of these operations. (I am pleased to report that all operations were a success.) This strikes me as being somewhat beyond the ordinary in the reception of foreigners who are not M.D.’s.

The morning prior to the acupuncture episode a free moment occurred for me while Prime Minister Chou and his colleagues discussed some of the substantive points which I had raised. A suggestion was made that I should visit the Temple of Heaven, south of the main city of Peking, which I accepted. The Chinese were able to arrange this on 30 minutes notice, and also saw to it that the Mayor of Peking was present to accommodate our party to the temple area—the site where the Emperors of China prayed annually for a good year. Once again we were on public display before the people of Peking in company with leading PRC officials.

Additional Impressions

A few other vignettes may help to characterize the spirit with which the Chinese received us:

—On the evening of October 24 a farewell banquet at the Great Hall of the People, which was originally to be hosted by the Acting Foreign Minister, was preempted by Chou En-lai. Chou did not have to do this, but made the extra effort. As before, he was a most gracious host. He did not, though, repeat the round of toasts—once the dinner was over, he and I went into a nearby conference room for a further discussion of substantive issues.

—As I have previously indicated, the aircraft crew was given the most hospitable treatment. Sightseeing tours were arranged for the crewmen, special quarters were constructed for them at the airport, gifts were provided, and indeed they were accorded the same kind of meticulous courtesy with which those of us in the Guest House in Peking became so familiar.

—Repeatedly during my conversations with Chou En-lai a deep and abiding Chinese hatred of the Russians came through. The Chinese are concerned about Soviet power, but utterly contemptuous of the motivations of the leaders who exercise this power.

—Also at frequent intervals during my conversations with Chou, he brought in the fact that Chairman Mao Tse-tung was fully behind the US–PRC contact. This line of Chou’s must surely be seeping through to the members of the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy.

—The (to me) remarkable display of courtesy and warmth which has been accorded us. This ranged from the detailed and meticulous way we were housed, fed, and transported, to the cordiality of our social conversations and tours, to the beautiful gifts and collections of photographs with which each of us were plied upon departure. I realize that the Chinese are traditionally capable of being good hosts under strained circumstances, but the treatment we have received appears to transcend what might have been expected. For us, a rapprochement is a matter of tactics, but for them it involves a profound moral adjustment. This is not easy for them, but they are making it and more.

My final observation once again concerns signs. I have mentioned the offensive sign at the airport noted in the news reports upon our arrival which the interpreter in my car indeed translated for me as we sped past it on our way into Peking as something having to do with “American Imperialism.” When on October 26 we returned to the airport prior to our departure, the offensive characters were gone. The sign was still there, but had been completely repainted; the message had nothing to do with the United States.

Peking’s Commitment to Improving Relations

There are many possible conclusions which might be drawn from the atmospherics of this visit to Peking. In my opinion, one conclusion stands out above all the others: the Chinese leadership is committed to a course leading toward an improvement of relations with the U.S. The *People’s Daily* announcement and photographs, the display of friendship toward us by top PRC officials before their cadres, the public gestures of friendship, the toning down of anti-U.S. propaganda, and the many instances of personal courtesies extended to us, all underscore this commitment. Any reversal of the direction in which the PRC leadership is moving would at this point probably involve serious domestic repercussions for Prime Minister Chou En-lai and the other senior personalities who have joined with him in this endeavor.

164. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 1971.

SUBJECT

My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues

Chronology

Prime Minister Chou En-lai and I held very intensive substantive discussions for some twenty-five hours, building on the solid base that we had established in our July conversations. We had an additional five hours of talks at two banquets that he hosted for us and I spent many more sightseeing hours with Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chi Peng-fei, Acting Foreign Minister, and other officials which lent greater insight into Chinese thinking.

(Attached at Tab A is a list of my meetings with Chou; at Tab B is a full itinerary of our stay, including all meetings and sightseeing tours.)²

Chou and I met ten times at the Great Hall of the People and our guest house. The opening general session included all my substantive assistants plus Messrs. Chapin and Hughes on our side; our other meetings were private, with usually only one assistant on our side. On the Chinese side, Chou was generally flanked by Acting Foreign Minister Chi, their top American expert in their Foreign Ministry, Chang Wen-chin, the secretary to the Prime Minister, Hsuing Hsiang-hui, the Deputy Chief of Protocol, Wang Hai-jung, plus interpreters and notetakers.

The first session on the afternoon of our arrival, October 20, was devoted to general philosophy, our overall approach to the People's Republic of China, the agenda for our discussions, and the major questions concerning your forthcoming trip. This was followed by over ten hours of very intense discussions in three meetings on Thursday and Friday, at which, in addition to your trip, we explored the major issues

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK's October 1971 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. Dated "11/71." This text is 45 pages long; a 32-page version is *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 443, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, China. This version is edited much the same way as Kissinger's report on his July 1971 visit to the PRC (see footnote 1, Document 144) and also lacks references to progress toward a Sino-American communiqué.

² Both are attached but not printed.

that we had covered in July—Taiwan, Indochina, Korea, Japan, the Soviet Union, South Asia, and arms control, as well as touching on other subjects by way of illustrations. Concurrently one of my assistants and the State Department representative held two meetings on subsidiary issues such as ongoing diplomatic contacts, exchanges, and trade. And the technical people met on arrangements for your visit.

These substantive meetings provided the background and framework to enable me to table a draft communiqué for your visit, which you had seen, at the end of the meeting on Friday afternoon. On Saturday evening, in my sitting room, Chou and I settled the major remaining issues concerning the arrangements for your trip, and Chou said that his Acting Prime Minister would meet with us the next morning to begin the redrafting of the communiqué. The next morning Chou showed up instead and delivered a sharp speech. We subsequently launched right into a rigorous drafting process which Chou decided he had personally to conduct. We consumed the better part of five meetings lasting eleven hours as we went through seven drafts over a sixty hour period which included two rugged nights of drafting and negotiation, from Saturday afternoon through the morning of our departure, October 26. This process and the resulting tentative communiqué I have described to you in a separate memorandum.³ Discussions on the communiqué, of course, included a great detail of substantive exchange on the draft formulations as well as general philosophy and principles.

At the last session, in addition to clearing up the final issues concerning the communiqué, we resolved other outstanding technical problems such as the announcements concerning my visit and the date of your visit and the general public line the two sides would take.

Major Results

Against the backdrop of my July conversations with Chou there were no major surprises.

The basic premises on which we have both moved to open a dialogue remain. Both sides know there are profound differences but recognize that domestic and international constraints demand a phased resolution of outstanding issues. Meanwhile the very momentum of our joint initiative carries inherent advantages: for them, the burnishing of their global credentials, a general direction on Taiwan, and the prospect of a lower American military profile in Asia; for us, some assistance in reaching and safeguarding an Indochina settlement, and built-in restraint on Chinese activities in Asia; for both of us, less

³ Document 165.

danger of miscalculation, greater exchanges between our peoples, and a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

Chou confirmed an essential ingredient for launching this process and moving it forward—Chinese willingness, despite their past rhetoric, to be patient on solutions. He was even more explicit than in July that they do not require time deadlines so long as principles are established. Several times he emphasized that the PRC, being a big country, could afford to wait on issues of direct concern, such as Taiwan, while the more urgent matters were those concerning her smaller friends, such as Indochina and Korea, whom one couldn't expect to have a broad perspective. This line is consistent with Peking's virtuous stance of championing the cause of smaller nations and refusing to be a superpower with its characteristics of bullying and overinvolvement.

Another consistent theme, as in July, was Chou's insistence on frankly acknowledging that there is much turmoil in the world and great differences between us. Both in our discussions and in the communiqué drafting, the Chinese showed their disdain for pretending that peace was either near or desirable as an end in itself; for submerging differences in ambiguous formulas of agreement, or for discussing such subsidiary issues as arms control, trade, or exchanges which only serve to make relations look more "normal" than they really are.

Among the general points that I emphasized were the fact that in some areas we could set trends but the policy implementation had to be gradual; that we should not push the process too fast because this would give your domestic opponents a chance to sink your initiative; and that Peking should not try to complicate our relations with our allies.

In brief, the essential outcome on each of the major topics was as follows:

—*Your trip.* We achieved all of our major objectives, thanks both to our approach of minimizing our requirements and Chinese willingness to do all within their capabilities. The basic technical and substantive framework has been established: the arrangements have been agreed upon in principle; another technical advance will flesh out the details; the substantive discussion clarified both sides' positions; and a tentative joint communiqué has been drafted.

—*Taiwan.* Both sides understand the direction in which we are heading and what the U.S. can and cannot do, but we have not yet agreed on what can be said in the communiqué. We will gradually withdraw our forces from Taiwan after the Indochina war. We urge that any solution of the Taiwan question should be peaceful; and we will oppose, within our capabilities, Japanese sway over Taiwan. The PRC

is in no hurry to get all our forces out but wants the principle of final withdrawal established; is most interested in global acknowledgment that Taiwan is part of China and its status is not undetermined; will try for a peaceful solution of the issue; and strongly opposes Japanese influence or Taiwan independence.

—*Indochina*. Peking will be helpful, within limits. Both in formal and informal talks the Chinese made it clear that they hope we achieve a negotiated settlement and are saying this to Hanoi. They recognize the desirability of tranquility in Indochina for your visit and our relations generally (indeed they consider it the “most urgent” question in the Far East), as well as the link between the conflict and our forces in Taiwan. In addition to sounding these themes, I outlined the history of our private negotiations; stated that Hanoi needed Peking’s largeness of view so that there could be a settlement; and warned that we have gone as far as we can and negotiations had to succeed in the next couple of months or we would carry through our unilateral course which was more risky all-around.

—*Korea*. We are both clearly sticking with our friends, but the working hypotheses are that neither side wants hostilities and neither Korea can speak for the whole peninsula. Chou pushed for equality for Pyongyang, said that a permanent legal resolution of the Korean war was required, and transmitted an abusive eight point program from their ally. I rejected the latter, said that we were prepared to consider a more equal status, and warned against North Korea’s aggressiveness.

—*Japan*. We agree that an expansionist Japan would be dangerous, but we disagree on how to prevent this. Our triangular relationship could prove to be one of our most difficult problems. The Chinese are painfully preoccupied and ambivalent on this issue—they seem both genuinely to fear Japanese remilitarism and to recognize that our defense cooperation with Tokyo exercises restraint. The latter point I emphasized, pointing out that Japanese neutralism, which the PRC wants, would probably take a virulent nationalist form. I also warned against Peking’s trying to complicate Tokyo–Washington relations, a seductive temptation for the Chinese to date.

—*Soviet Union*. The Chinese try to downgrade the Russian factor, but their dislike and concern about the Soviet Union is obvious. I reiterated that we would not practice collusion in any direction, that we would treat both nations equally, that we would keep Peking informed about our relations with Moscow, and that we have many concrete issues with the USSR. Chou accepted the last point, including the fact that some of our negotiations with Moscow would work objectively to Peking’s disadvantage.

—*South Asia*. The PRC doesn’t want subcontinent hostilities any more than we do. Indeed the Chinese seemed more sober about the

dangers than they did in July. Chou reaffirmed their support for Pakistan and disdain for India. In turn I made clear, in our talks and in the communiqué, that while we were under no illusions about Indian machinations and were giving Pakistan extensive assistance, we could not line up on either side of the dispute.

—*Subsidiary Issues.* The Chinese clearly want to keep the focus on major bilateral and regional issues and not get sidetracked on more technical questions that suggest a regular bilateral relationship. Thus they showed almost no interest in arms control, airily dismissed the subject of trade, and unenthusiastically included a reference in the communiqué to facilitating scientific, cultural, technical and journalistic exchanges.

—*Prisoners.* We can expect some movement before your trip on at least one of the two CIA agents held by the Chinese, with release of the two pilots linked to an overall Indochina settlement. Premature public disclosure would, of course, be ruinous.

Opening Session

A brief rundown of the opening meeting is important, because it set the basic framework and tone for all the subsequent conversations.

I began by delivering the *opening statement* which you have seen, with some of the rhetoric pruned.⁴ My approach was to sketch the general principles which guide our relations toward the PRC and our attitude toward your meetings with the Chinese leaders; lay out the agenda for the following days and secure agreement on how to conduct our business; and raise the principal questions concerning the technical arrangements for your visit.

I described the U.S. *attitude toward the PRC* as the following:

- You are personally committed to an improvement in relations;
- Our policy is based on the profound conviction that better relations are in our interest and is not an attempt to create a power combination;
- We are aware that our two countries have different views and that neither the PRC nor the U.S. would trade in principles;
- We believe that our two countries share many congruent interests and that it is no accident that they have had such a long history of friendship;
- Asian and global peace requires Chinese cooperation and we would not participate in arrangements affecting Chinese interests without involving the PRC;

⁴ The opening statement was included in the briefing materials for the October trip. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1034, Files for the President—China Material, Polo II, Briefing Book, Issues and Statements, October 1971 HAK visit to PRC)

—We do not accept the proposition that one country can speak for all socialist countries;

—The one issue that divides us (Taiwan) is itself a product of history and if we could agree both on the general direction and a realistic process to resolve this issue, there should be no fundamental obstacle to the positive development of our relations.

I then set forth the case for *gradual resolution of the issues* between us, first implicitly by sketching the reactions to the July 15th announcement both at home and among our friends. I said that while we had set new currents in motion, we could not suddenly overturn traditional relationships; the old must coexist for a while with the new. Chou, here and later, acknowledged this but naturally his emphasis was on the importance of new departures. I added that foreign reaction to the July announcement was generally positive, but not all nations (e.g., the Soviet Union and India) really felt that way. I then emphasized the domestic problems you faced from some of your traditional sectors of support and the courage you have shown and which Reston had so much difficulty in acknowledging in his interview with the Prime Minister. (These were themes that I had instructed our whole party to stress in their social conversations.) Chou acknowledged that the PRC also had internal difficulties.

I then became more explicit about the need for gradualism. We had expected some of the adverse reactions and were determined to carry forward the constructive beginning that had been made in July. Both the PRC and we had been meticulous in implementing our understandings to date and were treating each other as men of honor. Looking to the future we had to sort out the questions which could be resolved immediately, from those on which we could agree in principle but would need time to implement, and those which had to be left to historical processes. We would carry out scrupulously whatever we had agreed to; this phased approach was not a pretext for avoiding fundamental problems but a guarantee that we would be successful in resolving them.

I then suggested an *agenda* consisting of three types of subjects: (1) the major issues such as we had discussed in July; (2) subsidiary issues such as ongoing contacts and exchanges; and (3) the technical arrangements for our visit, the major aspects of which I then touched upon. (See the next section of this report.)

Chou and I then informally agreed on a game plan for the three types of issues that we had already settled in advance through communications and a private talk I had with the senior Chinese representative who had come to meet us at Shanghai.

(This game plan was carefully followed over the next five days: On the technical subjects, I laid out the fundamental considerations and handed over the books we had prepared in advance. The Chinese

studied these and came back with questions in meetings with technical personnel headed on our side by Messrs. Chapin and Hughes. The major issues were referred back to me and Chou and were settled in social and private sessions. Chou and I held a series of private meetings on the major substantive issues and the drafting of the communiqué. The State Department representative and a member of my staff held two sessions on the subsidiary issue of diplomatic contacts, exchanges, and trade.)

Chou made some preliminary comments on the *substantive agenda* which foreshadowed his approach on subsequent days. He termed *Taiwan* the crucial issue for normalizing our relations. He called *Indochina* the most urgent issue in order to relax tensions in the Far East. He moved *Korea* to third on the agenda, giving it a higher priority than in July, citing both sides' responsibilities for settling this question which the 1954 Geneva Conference had not treated. His fourth and fifth topics were *Japan*, which he said had a far-reaching influence on reducing Asian tensions, and *South Asia* where both sides were concerned. He put relations with the *Soviet Union* sixth and last; this was not a main issue, as Peking was not opposed to our relations with any other country.

Then, clearly for the record, Chou once again said that they would prefer it if you visited Moscow before Peking. I subsequently repeated for the record that it was we who had set the date for the Moscow summit, and this was based on the ripening of conditions, not on Peking's desires to interfere with U.S.–USSR relations. Chou eagerly assented.

Chou came back to my statement that the old must coexist with the new. He knew that it was impossible for us to cut off all our traditional foreign policy relationships at once, but there was also a need to break with some conventions. He again referenced your July 6 Kansas City remarks about new power relationships and a speech that Prime Minister Heath had just delivered concerning Britain's future role. He said that Heath had shown courage by recognizing the necessities to adapt to the realities of the new Europe, just as you had shown courage in your China initiative. He noted that conservative parties were often the ones to make bold new moves, citing as additional examples Ike's ending of the Korean war, Lincoln's handling of the Civil War, and Britain's expelling of Soviet spies. Following his regular custom, he once again put Chairman Mao's stamp on your visit by saying that when you two meet it should be possible for you to understand each other even though your stands differ greatly.

I then sounded a warning about Peking's making trouble for us with our allies. First, I noted that we supported Britain's entry into the Common Market and a more unified and autonomous Europe. I added that we didn't seek to drive a wedge between the PRC

and its friends, and it would be shortsighted if either side tried to use the improvement in our relations as a device to destroy the traditional friendships of the other side. This would only cause the two sides to draw back into the rigidity from which they were trying to escape.

Chou rejoined this was only part of the story and could not be accepted absolutely. Since we were entering a new era it was necessary that some relations change; otherwise life would be as it was before. He cited an old Chinese proverb which says that “the helmsman must guide the boat by using the waves; otherwise it will be submerged by the waves.” I replied that we had no intention of avoiding difficult problems, such as Taiwan, but until we were able to cement our friendship we should not give domestic opponents on both sides an opportunity to destroy progress. Many were saying that China was only using the initiative as a trick to destroy our traditional relationships so as to resume the old hostilities from a better tactical position. Chou once again said that times were advancing and that we would either seize upon the opportunities presented or be submerged by the tides of the times.

This exchange set up the basic philosophic tension in our ensuing discussions as we sought, generally successfully, to strike a balance between their imperatives for change and ours for time.

Your Trip

You already know the agreements reached on the arrangements for your visit through my earlier messages, our conversations, and Dwight Chapin’s separate report.⁵ Our approach was to scale down our requirements to the minimum in advance, present all technical considerations in writing, let the Chinese come back to us with questions,

⁵ Not found. During an October 14 conversation, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the February trip. Nixon stated: “Let me say, there’s never been a, no president in my memory has made a state visit longer than 4 days. That’s our standard rule. And I’m just not going over that.” Kissinger replied: “I have no problem with that, the more serious, the more businesslike—” After a brief discussion, Nixon added: “I just meet them at the airport and then I go in and get closeted for 4 days. And she [Mrs. Nixon] goes out to the goddamn schools. You know what I mean? So they get the feel of Americans; you see there’s a missionary feel about China. And they just like the idea that we love the goddamn Chinese, that’s what I really meant about that.” They eventually agreed upon a 5-day visit with one trip outside Beijing. Nixon decided he wanted to visit another city to “get a feel for the goddamn place. That’s one thing about the Communist system, the capital is the least, it’s like Washington, it’s the least representative. It’s so tightly controlled. You get to another city, it’s an entirely different thing.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–19) The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here especially for this volume.

and not try fruitlessly to squeeze extra mileage out of them once they told us what they would do.

This approach paid off handsomely. The Chinese appreciated our attitude, knew that we were not bargaining in conventional fashion, carefully clarified the issues so that they knew what was involved, and then agreed to the maximum that their technical capabilities would allow. In each case they met our essential requirements in terms of numbers and facilities, and when we left, there remained only a few issues on the itinerary for me to check with you.

At the opening session I outlined our general approach, stressed that we would not let technical issues interfere with the historic thrust of your visit, and then ticked off the major issues to be resolved:

—On the *itinerary*, I said that we were thinking of a five-day trip with perhaps one other stop besides Peking.

—On *communications*, I stressed the need for secure and rapid communications for the President at all times and said a ground station was the easiest method. Chou asked when a Vice President could take over some of the responsibilities of a President, and he revealed that he had read extracts of *Six Crises*, which showed that you had restrained yourself when President Eisenhower was incapacitated.

—On *security*, I said that we would rely on them as host country, that we had reduced our numbers drastically, and that the primary function would be for our men to serve as liaison with the Chinese security people.

—On the *press*, I explained the dimensions of the corps on other Presidential visits and how we had cut back the numbers.

—Finally I sketched the outlines of the official (12) and unofficial (16) *party*.

I then explained the books that we had prepared which showed the dimensions of past Presidential visits, the reduced optimum plan for your visit to China, and then the bare minimum plan that we had finally made.⁶ (During this exchange Chou revealed that, after hearing of your liking for it, he had seen the movie *Patton* and believed that you admired the General because he was one to break through conventions.)

⁶ Copies and drafts of the materials provided to the Chinese are *ibid.*, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Box 30, Dwight L. Chapin, Preliminary China Plan. These materials are described in an October 12 memorandum from Chapin to T. Elbourne, General J. Hughes, General A. Redman, R. Taylor and R. Walker. The materials include information on a typical presidential trip, the “optimum plan” for the China trip, the “absolute minimum” contingent for a trip, and minutes from counterpart meetings held during the October 1971 trip to the PRC. (*Ibid.*) A copy of the complete book provided to the PRC by Chapin is *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 1138, Jonathan Howe Trip Files, Notebook: Summary Description of Presidential Trips.

Later in this opening meeting, after I made clear that we would still proceed with the summits in the order that they were announced, Chou moved quickly to indicate that the Chinese preferred the February 21 date. He thus made it clear that there would be no haggling over this issue despite whatever other differences might crop up during the next few days. He also indicated that the Chinese were thinking of a visit lasting seven days instead of the five that I had indicated.

During the first part of our first private meeting the next morning, Chou and I explored further some of the major questions concerning arrangements. We pinned down February 21 as the *date* for your visit. We agreed to the general concept of meetings during your visit similar to the ones during this one—a general opening session of the two official parties, followed by private meetings between you and the Chinese leaders and concurrently between the foreign ministers, and perhaps another closing general session. And we confirmed that neither side would say anything to the *press* during or after your visit which was not first mutually agreed upon.

We then discussed the *meeting between you and Chairman Mao*. Chou said that the Chairman wanted to meet you early during your visit, after greeting the official party, and again towards the end. I said you wanted to meet alone with Mao. He rejoined that the composition of our side was up to us, but that the Chairman was always accustomed to having the Prime Minister present for specifics, although Mao was of course fully at home on general principles.

On the *itinerary*, we agreed that I would come back to Washington with two formulas, one for a five day visit and one for seven days. He said that he would accompany you wherever you went, made clear that they would expect you to travel on a Chinese plane, and introduced the idea of an overnight visit to Hangchow. There was further discussion of these issues during which I made another pitch for the ground station, and said that I would have to consult with you on the question of the aircraft, since an American President had never traveled on another nation's plane.

Meanwhile the Chinese technical personnel were studying for twenty-four hours the books we had given them. On Thursday afternoon they began two days of meetings with our counterparts during which they posed a series of questions to clarify the meaning of our presentations.

After a private meeting on late Thursday afternoon, I took Chou aside and expressed *Mrs. Nixon's* desire to see his country; he said he would check with Chairman Mao.

During our sightseeing trips to the Great Wall and Summer Palace, the Chinese mentioned *Hangchow* several times, underlining their hope

you could go there. (Mao will probably be there, for in July Chou had said that you might be meeting him outside of Peking. However, an inconsistency arises since Chou has said that you would meet Mao early in the trip and Hangchow would come at the end of it. Since there will be two meetings between you and Mao, there could be one in Peking early in the visit and one at Hangchow at the end.)

At 9:00 p.m. on October 23 Chou came to my sitting room in the Guest House and proceeded to settle the major outstanding technical issues. He first accepted the *overall dimensions* of the Presidential party and support group, i.e. some 350 personnel. He said the Chinese had accepted these numbers out of respect for our having cut down the figures drastically in advance. (Chinese acceptance included 80 press. This represents a large incursion for them, but they explained on other occasions that their only concern was whether they could properly accommodate all the journalists, including having sufficient interpreters.)

Having heard our preference for a five day *visit* and that a trip to Hangchow would increase the numbers, Chou began to back away from that suggestion. He said that we could compromise on a six day visit which included five days in Peking and one day in Shanghai. Knowing of the intense Chinese interest in Hangchow, I said that I would be prepared to raise this issue with you. He then made clear, in typical Chinese fashion, that *Mrs. Nixon* would be welcome by saying that once she saw the villa in Hangchow she would not want to spend the night in Shanghai.

Picking up a reference I made to the legal aspects of sovereignty, Chou said they would like to buy the proposed *ground station* and *Boeing 747 processing center*, and if not they would rent it. I replied that it would be easier to lease it. As I then acknowledged to Chou, this was clearly an example of their “principled” approach on technical as well as substantive questions. They want to do things themselves and maintain their concepts of sovereignty. Within their capability, they would be as forthcoming as possible. Thus, this equipment was admissible so long as it “belonged” to them.

The only comments on technical matters with an edge to them were Chou’s references to *security*. He made clear that this was the responsibility of the host country and several times noted our requirements with a slight dose of sarcasm. (The Chinese did show some genuine concern about the security problem caused by the large press contingency.)

We settled on the text of the communiqué for my visit and the October 27 release date and we agreed that the announcement of the date for your visit would be in the latter part of November. After first suggesting that the text of the latter could refer only to “late February,”

Chou was soon persuaded of the need to be specific about the date.

Chou then was once again very firm on your traveling in a Chinese plane, and I said I would discuss it with you. Chou said that the idea of an *occasional U.S. envoy* to Peking after your visit could be in the communiqué, and I made a pitch for Bruce once the Indochina war was behind us. He stipulated there would be two *meetings* between you and Chairman *Mao*. After some further discussion, which included agreement on what I would say at my backgrounder and my informing them of the upcoming Cannikin test, we adjourned the session.

This exchange left only a few loose ends which we have since tied up. At the final session, I confirmed that there would be another *technical advance* party, led by General Haig, after the announcement of the date of your visit. Since my return, we have informed the Chinese that *Mrs. Nixon* will accompany you and that we accept a *seven day* visit, including an overnight at Hangchow. We have also informed the Chinese that we believe the *date* for the announcement of your visit should be November 23, 1600 Washington time. On the question of your *travel within China*, we should take some more time to respond so that the Chinese will realize that this is a major decision for us.⁷

These discussions on arrangements for your visit confirmed both that our somewhat unconventional approach of presenting our minimal requirements at the outset made sense and that the Chinese do not engage in haggling over technical details once agreement in principle has been reached. Their acceptance of our numbers, their leasing of the ground station and 747, and their insistence on a Chinese plane for your travel within their country illustrate their basic attitude on arrangements.

⁷ The October 27 announcement of Kissinger's trip is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 29, 1971, p. 627. On October 31 Walters met with Huang Chen in Paris and passed along three points: 1) The United States wished to announce the President's visit on November 23; 2) Mrs. Nixon accepted the PRC's invitation to accompany her husband on the February visit; and 3) The United States accepted a 7-day visit with 1 night spent in Hangchow. Haig's instructions to Walters, October 30, and Walters' memorandum for the record are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. At a November 18 meeting, Huang informed Walters that the PRC proposed making the announcement on November 29 (Washington time). Walters' memorandum for the record, November 18, is *ibid.* As instructed by Haig, at a November 20 meeting Walters announced that the United States accepted the November 29 date. Haig's instructions, November 19, and Walter's memorandum for the record and attachments, November 20, are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 58, 59, 62, 64, and 65. The announcement of Nixon's trip is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, p. 1143.

Chou might have engaged in some brinkmanship by raising shadows about your trip while we were wading through some of the difficult substantive issues. He did not do this, partly because this is not his style and partly because he needs the visit as much as we do. In any event, while we had some rough and tough private discussions, there was never any doubt cast by either side on the fact that your visit would proceed as planned.

Taiwan

This remains, as we always knew it would, the single most difficult issue. On the one hand Chou says that the PRC, being a large country, can afford to be patient; that it is showing restraint in the language that it is suggesting in the communiqué for your visit; and that Indochina, and even Korea, are more urgent problems, because the PRC can be less generous about its allies' interests than about its own. On the other hand, the Taiwan question remains one of fundamental principle for Peking, as it has for 22 years; Chou is pressing formulations in a communiqué which we still cannot accept; and he has made it clear that there will be no normal relations until this problem is resolved.

Resolution of this issue in a way that allows our relations to move forward over the next few years depends on China's willingness to accept our thesis that we can do more than we can say, that to push the process too fast and too explicitly could wreck the whole fabric of our China initiative. While Chou understands our dilemma, he has problems of his own and he must show concrete progress on this issue for his own domestic and international audiences. Accordingly, our discussions and our communiqué drafting were dominated by the tension between the Chinese thrust for clarity and ours for ambiguity.

This was the first substantive issue that we discussed. I opened by reviewing the *understandings* that we had laid out in July:

—We would withdraw those forces on Taiwan related to Indochina in a relatively short period after the war in Indochina is over.

—We would reduce other forces on Taiwan progressively over a longer period of time, depending on the state of our relations. In response to Chou's query, I said that we would not set a final date on these withdrawals but that both sides understood the evolution.

—We would not advocate a two-China or one China, one Taiwan solution. At this point Chou said that we should not advocate a one-China, two-government solution as suggested by our UN position. He noted the PRC had been very restrained in its attacks on this position.

—We would not support or encourage the creation of an independent Taiwan movement, and we would take action on any information provided to us that Americans officially or unofficially were doing so. Chou interjected his concern over recent demonstrations at UN Headquarters for an independent Taiwan which he claimed were nationwide, even global in scope. I said that as far as I knew the U.S. had nothing to do with this and that I would check into the facts. Chou

took the occasion to criticize CIA actions around the world, and I rebutted briefly.

—We would not support, indeed we would oppose, to the extent we could, the establishment of Japanese military forces on Taiwan or attempts by Japan to support a Taiwan independence movement.

—We would support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and would pose no obstacle to this.

—We were prepared to move toward normalization of relations with the PRC, keeping in mind Chinese views.

I said that you would be ready to reaffirm all of these points to the Chairman and the Prime Minister in a restricted meeting. I added that this was a painful process for us; we had worked with the government on Taiwan for years and whatever the historical causes, it was not easy to make such changes. Opposition to this policy would certainly arise as it began to unfold. We would not challenge the PRC view that this was an internal matter, but the PRC should settle the issue peacefully.

On the UN, I noted that we had carried out the policy I had outlined in July and that we had kept our rhetoric down. In fact it was better for both of our countries if the Albanian Resolution did not pass this year, for then the process would be pushed too fast and there would be a rallying point for opponents of your China policy.

I then reemphasized that we could do more than we could say on Taiwan, and that some things had to be left to historical evolution so long as we both understood the direction in which we were headed.

Chou then asked a series of questions which underlined that their primary concern is not so much our policy but Japanese intentions and the possibility of Taiwan independence, neither of which we can completely control.

After a brief historical lesson on why Taiwan is Chinese territory, Chou revealed what the British were prepared to do in order to elevate their diplomatic mission in Peking to Ambassadorial level: acknowledge that Taiwan was a province of China, withdraw their consulate from Taiwan, and support the Albanian Resolution at the UN. The British would also agree privately that they would not promote the view that the status of Taiwan was undetermined, and if they received inquiries the British government would say that its position was unchanged.

Chou said this would be sufficient if the PRC acted expediently, but instead they considered it unacceptable. The PRC objected to the British reserving their position if the issue of Taiwan's status were raised; Chou noted that Britain signed the Cairo and Potsdam declarations declaring Taiwan belonged to China. He reinforced this by relating some more history, including the U.S. role, to demonstrate why the *status of Taiwan* was not undetermined and to underline PRC

sensitivity to this issue. He then got to his point: what was the U.S. policy? Do we maintain that the status of Taiwan is still undetermined or was it our view that Taiwan had already returned to China and was a province of China? This was the crucial question. How the Chinese people would solve the question of Taiwan was of secondary importance. He added that, as he had already said in July, the PRC would try to bring about a *peaceful settlement* of this problem. He acknowledged that this was a difficult question for us.

I responded by again saying that we must separate what we could say and what our policy is. We did not challenge the premise that all Chinese maintain there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of that China. In that sense we didn't maintain that the status of Taiwan was undetermined. Expressing this in a communiqué was a different matter, but we were prepared to note that all Chinese maintain there is but one China. We would also make sure that there would be no further statements by our officials that Taiwan's status is undetermined. In response to Chou's question about what we would say if other countries were to raise this question, I said that I would have to check this with you. I assured Chou that we were not encouraging any government to maintain that the status of Taiwan was undetermined and that the UK position had not received our encouragement. Furthermore, if a government were to raise this issue we would certainly not support it; I pointed to our UN position which was careful not to address this question.

I again declared that we would do nothing to promote the elaboration of a two-China or one-China, one Taiwan policy in whatever form such plans were presented and that we would attempt to encourage a solution within the framework of one China by peaceful means. This question was for the Chinese to settle and not something we could actively push.

Chou then raised the issue of our defense treaty, asking whether once Taiwan returned to the Motherland it would still have effect. I replied that if Taiwan and China were to become one again by peaceful means the treaty would automatically lapse. Chou repeated that they considered the treaty illegal and that we should withdraw all our forces from the area. I said that we understood their position, that we hoped for a peaceful solution, that the evolution of events would make unnecessary any formal action on the treaty.

Chou emphatically stated that *diplomatic relations* between our countries were not possible until our forces had been withdrawn and the defense treaty had lapsed. They could not send an ambassador to Washington if another Chinese ambassador were there; it was possible for you and me to go to China since Peking considered there was but one U.S. and there was no competing U.S. ambassador in Peking. He

pointed out that the presence of the Nationalist ping-pong team in the U.S. had prevented the sending of the PRC ping-pong team. (In other contexts the Chinese indicated they still planned to send their team, however.) This problem of there being a GRC ambassador in our country underlies the PRC position about ongoing contacts: i.e. they agree to our sending an envoy to Peking but do not wish to reciprocate; and Chou turned down the suggestion of a return invitation to him as a result of your visit. It may also influence their lukewarm attitude on other subsidiary issues which smack of more normal relations, such as trade and exchanges.

I then pressed further on the need for a *peaceful solution* of the Taiwan question. We would place no obstacle in the way of a political resolution which saw Taiwan and China get back together again peacefully. Chou commented that if Chiang Kai-shek or his son wished to negotiate, the PRC would not discourage it. I interjected that frankly what we most would like and encourage is a peacefully negotiated solution after which our military relations would automatically be at an end. A peaceful settlement would solve the questions of the defense treaty and our military forces. If there were no peaceful settlement, then it would be easier for us to withdraw our military presence in stages than to abrogate the treaty. The latter was unlikely.

Chou acknowledged these points but raised concerns about the *Japanese* taking our place. I replied that we would oppose that and that we had a common interest in preventing the military expansion of Japan. To encourage Japanese expansion in Taiwan would be shortsighted, but we had to select the issues on which we were able to enforce our discipline.

Chou cited Secretary Laird's comments which suggested increasing Japan's military potential.⁸ I responded that this was not official U.S. policy, and while we could not prevent such statements, we could make sure that they would not have any practical consequences.

Chou then dwelt further on his fear of Japanese influence in Taiwan, not only military but also political and economic, and he cited contacts between various Japanese elements and officials on Taiwan. I said that it was relatively easy for us to prevent the projection of Japanese military presence on Taiwan while our forces were there; we would continue to oppose these forces after we departed but this was less under our control. If the Japanese began sending military forces outside of its territory, we would be forced to reconsider our entire policy in the Pacific. Political and economic expansion was more difficult to measure, but it was not American policy to let Taiwan become

⁸ See footnote 14, Document 140.

subsidiary to Japan. Chou warned that this would be most disadvantageous to the relaxation of tensions in the Far East. (Indeed, so concerned was Chou about Japan's role that in a later meeting he said that he didn't want all U.S. forces withdrawn from Taiwan for fear that Japanese forces would then move in.)

I made the point that if before diplomatic relations there were visible signs of Sino–American cooperation such as exchange programs, this could affect the situation on Taiwan as well as in Japan. I also warned Chou against exploiting U.S.–Japanese differences, saying that we were coming under attack in some quarters for giving up Japan in our initiative toward China. There had to be some restraint on the Chinese side. He then claimed that they had shown restraint toward Japan and said that they would not deal with Sato.

That afternoon, October 21, Chou picked up the *United Nations* issue. He dispassionately noted PRC opposition to our position, and I explained that we had chosen this route over one that clearly indicated a two-China policy. Chou emphasized that the status of Taiwan was much more important to them than the UN seat and that they would refuse to go to the UN if our position prevailed. He then revealed that they didn't particularly like the Albanian Resolution either, since it did not specifically address the question of the status of Taiwan. (At our final meeting, which as it turned out, occurred at the very end of the UN debate, Chou pointedly complained that his talking to me at this time was very embarrassing for China's friends at the UN.)

When I invited Chou's views on a successor to U Thant, he offered nothing, saying that they had not thought about the matter. He did take the occasion to praise Hammarskjöld and indirectly denigrate U Thant, a sign that the PRC might want an activist Secretary-General.

Chou concluded the brief UN discussion by repeating the need to make progress on the Taiwan question. I again pointed out that if we moved too quickly on this issue our opponents could destroy the fragile relationship that we were trying to build with the PRC. I acknowledged the PRC's need to show some progress, but repeated that if we went too fast we would tear the whole fabric of our relationship. We thus had to establish a direction in our conversations, insure that every step was implemented, and take no steps that were detrimental to our relationship.

This intensive discussion on Taiwan was later picked up in the communiqué drafting process which I have reported separately. Chou did indeed show some restraint in their language formulations and attempted to meet some of our concerns. We in turn moved toward their position by not challenging the one-China position of all Chinese and by indicating that we would reduce our forces in the Taiwan area. Chou's formulations, which I could not accept, would have us actively

express the wish that a one-China solution be brought about by peaceful means and pledge that we would finally withdraw all our forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.

Chou explained repeatedly that they were not setting a deadline on our withdrawal and, in fact, surprisingly admitted that they hoped we would keep some forces on Taiwan for a while in order to keep out the Japanese.

The Chinese will be patient but at one point toward the end Chou did suggest that if, e.g., six years passed without solution of the Taiwan issue, the Chinese would be forced to liberate by "other means," his single reference in our discussions to the use of force.

As reported separately, I told Chou that I would talk this issue over with you and see whether we could come back with a new formulation for the communiqué. He indicated little further budging on their part but said that they might be able to change a word or two of their position if we presented a new formula. It will prove difficult and painful to close the remaining gap between us, but I think we can do it successfully.

Indochina

Our discussions on the afternoon of October 21 on this subject were generally similar to those we held in July.

I underscored the reasonableness of our approach, pointing out that our negotiating proposals had addressed every concern of their allies. I stressed the advantages to the PRC of an Indochina settlement, on the one hand, and the risks of continued conflict on the other hand. Against this backdrop I made a somewhat more emphatic pitch than July for Chinese help with Hanoi, while still making it clear that we would not embarrass Peking. Chou, in turn, emphasized the desirability of our setting final withdrawals before your visit (without insisting on a political solution). He reiterated that peace had to be made with Hanoi directly, but explicitly hoped that negotiations would succeed. As in July, he was obviously uninformed about the details of our negotiations with the North Vietnamese.

Chou led off the session by citing Indochina as an urgent issue and the need for final U.S. withdrawals. He asked why we had not accepted, or at least replied to, Mme. Binh's seven points. He then explained that they could not accept Ambassador Bruce in Peking while a war was still going on. I interjected that we understood this, but given the trust he had in the White House we hoped that the PRC would find him acceptable after the war.

Chou continued that our not setting a date for final withdrawal could prevent your visit to China from being as successful as otherwise, although he made clear that this was not a condition. He repeated

the PRC's support for the seven points and said that final decisions on a settlement rested with Hanoi, not Peking. He then inquired why we had not set a final date and said that this was more urgent than the UN question or the normalization of Sino-US relations.

Telling the Prime Minister that he had been misinformed about the negotiations, I proceeded to give him a fairly detailed rundown of our negotiating efforts over the summer, including the outlines of our most recent proposal of October 11.⁹ I did not give him either a piece of paper or all the details on our proposal, but enough to show its forthcoming nature. I pointed out how we had met all of the concerns of the North Vietnamese and the PRG, even to the point of using some of their formulations. We had addressed ourselves primarily to the North Vietnamese nine point proposal, which, according to Hanoi, superseded the PRG seven points. I told Chou that it was tempting for us to publish our negotiating proposals since this would dominate public opinion in our country, but that we preferred to try and reach a settlement. I then sought Chinese influence in Hanoi with the following arguments:

—We understood that Peking didn't want to interfere in the negotiating process. But we questioned whether one small country, obsessed with its suffering and conflict, could be permitted to thwart every sign of progress between the U.S. and Peking because its suspicions were so great that it would not make a negotiated settlement.

—Why would we want bases in one corner of Asia when the whole trend was toward a new relationship with Asia's most important country?

—If Hanoi showed Peking's largeness of spirit we could settle the war within days.

⁹ At their November 20 meeting in Paris, Walters gave Huang Chen a message for Chou reviewing negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam. The message reads in part: "On October 11, 1971, the United States presented to North Vietnam a new comprehensive proposal designed to bring a rapid end to the war on a basis just for all parties." The message also noted that the United States had proposed a private meeting between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho for November 1. On October 25 the North Vietnamese indicated that Le and Xuan Thuy would meet Kissinger on November 20, a date U.S. officials accepted. On November 17 the Vietnamese cancelled the meeting, and on November 19 U.S. officials informed Vietnamese officials that Kissinger would not be coming to Paris. The message to Chou added: "As I told you and Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, and as we have made clear to the North Vietnamese, the United States is prepared to treat North Vietnamese concerns with generosity. At the same time, the People's Republic of China, as a great country, will recognize that we cannot permit ourselves to be humiliated, no matter what the possible consequences for other policies. We know that the People's Republic, like the United States, does not trade in principles. We have no specific request to make, and we do not expect an answer to this communication." The message for the PRC and Walters' memorandum of record, November 20, are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 64 and 65.

—We wanted the independence of North Vietnam and the other countries of Southeast Asia. Perhaps there were others (i.e. the Soviet Union) who might wish to use Hanoi to create a bloc against China.

—We had made our last offer and we could not go further. We knew the PRC did not trade in principles, but the proposals we had made would end the war on a basis that would not require it to do so.

Chou then asked a series of questions about our withdrawals, the new elections, and the ceasefire. He frankly admitted, as he had in July, that he had not heard a word about these negotiating proposals. He asked whether we had sent a message with Podgorny¹⁰ to Hanoi. When I said that we had not, Chou laughed contemptuously about Russian diplomatic efforts, including their extensive travels since the July announcement. He indicated privately that Moscow had made unspecified proposals in Hanoi which Hanoi had rejected.

Chou said that our withdrawal would be a “glorious act” for us, and I responded that we had to find someone with whom to negotiate. We would withdraw in any event: the only question was whether it would be slowly through our unilateral policy or more quickly as a result of negotiations.

Chou made a distinction between Vietnamese and Indochina-wide ceasefires. He expressed concern that an Indochina ceasefire would freeze the political situation in the entire region (his main problem being Sihanouk’s status, of course). I said that we would not interfere with whatever governments evolved as a result of the ceasefire. We then had a testy exchange on Cambodia where I pointed out that there would not be any need to arrange a ceasefire if North Vietnamese troops would withdraw and let the local forces determine their own future. Chou did not deny their presence; he said that they were there in sympathy for their South Vietnamese compatriots. In order to explain Hanoi’s suspiciousness, he recalled the “deception” of 1954 when the North Vietnamese had been tricked and no election had been held. Getting quite excited, he termed this a “dirty act,” launching into Dulles. I replied that the guarantee for our actions in a peace settlement lay not in clauses but in the difference in our world outlook compared to the Dulles policy of the 1950s.

I again pointed out the generosity of our proposals and the temptation to go public with them. Chou said that he could not comment on our offer since he did not know about it in detail. (Later I said that I was not giving him our detailed proposal since that was up to the PRC’s ally to do. Chou agreed. In a later meeting Chou did acknowledge

¹⁰ Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

that our political proposal represented a new element.) He maintained that Hanoi's preoccupation and suspicion were understandable for a small, deceived country. The North Vietnamese could not be expected to have a large view like the Chinese. (Marshal Yeh on another occasion told me that Hanoi was too proud; having, as it thinks, defeated the world's largest military power, Hanoi was very reluctant to take advice. In this it was egged on by Moscow. Peking, according to Yeh, genuinely wanted peace, but it did not want to make it easier for Moscow to pursue its policy of encircling China by creating a pro-Moscow bloc in Indochina.)

In any event, Chou said, the settlement was up to us and Hanoi. He again emphasized that it was important to have this problem essentially settled before you came to China.

I then summed up:

—I had made seven secret trips this year to Paris which was not the activity of a government seeking to prolong the war;

—We were no long-term threat to the independence of Vietnam and wanted to make peace;

—We recognized the limits to what the PRC could do and the complications of the Soviet role, but nevertheless if the opportunity presented itself, we would appreciate Peking's telling its friends its estimate of the degree of our sincerity in making a just peace;

—We could not go any further than our proposals of October 11.

Chou again commented that they hoped we could settle and get out, whereas the Soviet Union wished to pin us down. He said it would be impossible not to mention Vietnam in the communiqué if the war had not been settled. I rejoined that there should be no misapprehension that Vietnam was an extremely sensitive issue for us and that it was impossible to accept a communiqué that was critical of us. When Chou asked why we had not made a public pledge of final withdrawals, I said this would gain us two to three months of favorable headlines, but we were interested in making a settlement rather than empty propaganda victories.

Chou concluded by again wishing us well in negotiations, calling Indochina the most urgent problem with regard to the relaxation of tension in the Far East, and saying that U.S. withdrawal would be a glorious act. I closed with the hope that he understood what we were trying to do even though we recognized that the PRC had to support its allies. When I said that the Prime Minister should teach his method of operation to his allies, he commented that the styles of various countries differed and that they couldn't impose their will on their friends.

In a subsequent session where Chou was bearing down on the issue of foreign troops, I pointed to the Chinese forces in Laos. He said that these were ordinary workers plus antiaircraft forces needed to protect them. If peace came, the latter could be withdrawn "in a day's

time." In any event these personnel were building the road at the request of the "neutralists" and would all leave when the job was done.

In our last meeting Chou made the rather remarkable comment that he believed we "genuinely want a peaceful settlement."

Hopefully this issue will have been transformed by the time you go to Peking. We cannot expect Peking to lean hard on its friends. We can expect it to help tip the balance for a negotiated settlement if the other objective realities move Hanoi toward a bargain. If so, Peking will have incentives to encourage North Vietnamese compliance. On the other hand, if the conflict continues, Peking (and Moscow) will not want to see a major offensive—and our reaction—shadowing the summit. Thus the situation on the ground, and our declining role should provide a relatively quiet setting. And the communiqué draft has Peking backing its friends in inoffensive language while we emphasize a negotiated settlement.

Korea

Chou devoted considerable time and passion to this subject, which he placed as number three on the agenda. In East Asia, the three principal "powder kegs," in his view, were Taiwan, Indochina and Korea, with the last two the most urgent. (This had some quality of being for the record to prove loyalty to allies.)

He opened his presentation on the afternoon of October 22 by regretting, as he had in July, that the 1954 Geneva Conference had not settled the Korean question. A ceasefire had been reached but no treaty had been concluded and a serious crisis could therefore arise. He said that the Panmunjom meetings had gotten nowhere, that North Korea had no participation in the UN debate, and that North Korea could participate in UNCURK only under unacceptable conditions. He noted with approval the recent opening of talks between the Red Cross Societies of North and South Korea, and I pointed out that we had helped this process along since the July talks.

Chou continued as follows:

—U.S. military forces should withdraw from South Korea as Chinese forces had done in 1958. He acknowledged that we had already taken out a third of our troops and said that we had paid a great price to do it, i.e., extensive military assistance.

—The 1965 treaty with Japan was even more serious and there was the possibility that Japanese military forces would replace American ones. Officers of Japanese self-defense troops had been going to Korea (I had checked on this since July and Chou was indeed correct).

—If there were increased military strength and hostilities after we withdrew this could not but directly affect relaxation of tension in the Far East.

—Their Korean friends were "most tense" and this could not but affect the Chinese government and people.

Chou then handed over a list of eight points from the North Korean government, published in April 1971. This document is a generally abusive series of demands upon us to withdraw our forces and military support for Korea, give North Korea equal status, prevent Japanese influence, disband UNCURK, leave the Korean question to the Koreans themselves, and let North Korea participate in the UN debate unconditionally. Chou reaffirmed the importance of this question and noted that while big China could live with the problem of its divided status for a while, the PRC could not ask its smaller friends, Vietnam and Korea, to be so patient.

I retorted in extremely sharp fashion. I said that the Nixon Administration was dedicated to improving relations and easing tensions in East Asia, but we reject the translation of this goal into a series of unilateral demands upon us. We were prepared to set certain directions, but we could not accept a paper which listed all the things that the U.S. "must" do and called our ally a "puppet." The PRC had never done this, and we respected it for standing by its friends. But it was important for North Korea, as it was for North Vietnam, to show some of the largeness of spirit of its large ally.

Chou backed off from the abusive language, stating that it was "firing empty guns." I said that the substance was more important in any event. I informed him that we had received a communication from North Korea, through Romania, earlier this year and had responded in a conciliatory fashion but had heard no more. I then clarified what the objectives in the peninsula should be. We were prepared to discuss the possibility of a more permanent legal basis for the existing situation in Korea, but we were not interested in a legal situation that made the reopening of hostilities possible (i.e. we would not scrap present arrangements so as to invite aggression). When I noted that our ultimate objective was the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea, Chou again raised the fear of Japanese troops replacing ours. I assured him that our policy here was the same as on Taiwan, namely that it was not our objective to replace our forces with Japanese self-defense forces and that we were opposed generally to the military expansion of Japan. Chou declared that the PRC attached great importance to that statement.

I then pressed Chou further to clarify Chinese objectives. I said that if their goals were to bring about stability in the peninsula, avert war, and lessen the danger of the expansion of other powers, then Chinese and American interests were quite parallel. If, on the other hand, their goals were to undermine the existing government in South Korea and make it easier for North Korea to attack or bring pressure upon the South, then a different situation existed.

In response to his inquiries, I made clear that we would not encourage South Korean attacks against the North, and in the case of clear

South Korean aggression, our mutual defense treaty would not apply. I also said that we were already reviewing the UNCURK question and that we recognized North Korea as a fact of life. Chou stressed that the PRC was interested in equal legal status for both Koreas. Unification should be left to the future.

In our further exchanges I said that it was our policy:

—not to allow Japanese military forces to enter South Korea to the extent that we could control this;

—as tensions in the Far East diminished the number of U.S. forces would continue to go down and could be expected to be small;

—in any event, we would not allow South Korean military attacks while our forces were there;

—as an end of a complicated process, but not as an immediate objective, we could envisage North Korea as a lawful entity in the UN and elsewhere;

—there was merit in North Korea's having fair representation in discussion about the peninsula;

—as for final reunification, we had not studied this problem but it should be accomplished peacefully.

At the end of our discussion, Chou in effect accepted our position that the issue of Korea would take time but that opinions could be exchanged in the interim. There was some agreement on general objectives although not about specific methods and we had reached no conclusion about the way peaceful reunification should be effected. In addition, we agreed that the two parties in the peninsula should treat each other as equals and that neither one had the exclusive right to unify the country.

Chou again emphasized that keeping Japanese military forces out was paramount. I said that we would attempt to do this, but that if North Korea should start aggression then one could not be sure of the consequences. I made very clear that whatever we could do in Korea depended on North Korean restraint. Chou agreed that all these issues were mutual and that both of us should use our influence with our friends to keep them from military adventures. He cautioned, however, that the era of negotiations, such as the Red Cross meetings, could be the era of "dragging out" and while they would wait on Taiwan, it was harder for their smaller friends to be patient.

In the communiqué draft we agree to disagree. The Chinese back their allies' eight points and call for abolition of UNCURK. We honor our commitments to South Korea and endorse reduced tension and increased communication in the peninsula. These formulations are preferable to a formal joint position that suggests we are negotiating on behalf of our allies.

Japan

In addition to discussing Japan's role in Taiwan and in Korea, reported elsewhere, Chou En-lai and I talked about Japan's future in Asia

in our afternoon meeting on October 22. We agreed that neither country wanted Japan to rearm and to resume the outward thrust that it had shown in the 1930s and 1940s. But we disagreed on the best way to assure that this would not happen.

Chou suggested that we drop our mutual defense ties and that Japan pursue a policy of neutralism, and I sharply rejoined that this was the best way to encourage a remilitarized, expansionist Japan and that the security we provided exercised restraint. I think Chou recognized the validity of our arguments, but obviously had difficulty acknowledging the virtues of a U.S.–Japan defense relationship. His ambivalence was reflected in his uncharacteristically lame presentation, during which he seemed unsure of himself, his strategic arguments were weak, and he continued to fall back on pat phrases.

At my invitation, Chou outlined Chinese views of Japan:

—Japan’s “feathers have grown on its wings and it is about to take off,” i.e. its tremendous economic expansion was inevitably leading it toward military expansion;

—Its economic assistance to other countries was not to help them develop but rather to establish Japanese economic domination;

—The Soviet Union was looking for Japanese investment and markets and was encouraging it to be more aggressive;

—China was not hostile toward Japan, and great changes have taken place in both countries since the war; the PRC was ready to conduct its relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

When I questioned Chou on what he meant when he said that the PRC wanted Japan to pursue a policy of “peace and friendship,” he defined this as Japan’s recognizing the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan, giving up all ambitions for both Taiwan and Korea, and respecting the independence and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China. I responded as follows:

—China’s philosophic view had been generally global while Japan’s had been traditionally tribal;

—Japan had always thought that it could adjust to outside influences and still maintain its essential character;

—Japan was subject to sudden explosive changes, such as going from feudalism to emperor worship and from emperor worship to democracy in very short periods;

—These Japanese traits imposed special responsibilities on those who deal with them;

—We had no illusions about Japanese impulses and the imperatives of their economic expansion;

—The present situation is a great temptation for everybody, especially the PRC and the USSR, since Japan’s orientation has been made uncertain by the July announcement.

I then said that the Soviet Union had made a special effort to exploit the situation and the PRC had too—I cited a *People’s Daily*

September 18 editorial which said that the U.S. could betray Japan at any moment.¹¹ I sharply warned that such competition could only encourage Japanese nationalism. The present relationship with the U.S. exercised restraint on Japan; conversely, leaving Japan on its own would be a shortsighted policy. Someone would be the victim, for neutralism in Japan would not take the form of Belgian neutralism which had been guaranteed by others, but rather that of Swiss and Swedish neutralism which rested on large national armies. Both those Americans who believed that Japan would blindly follow the American lead and those other foreigners who tried to use Japan against the U.S. were shortsighted. It was therefore important that both the PRC and the U.S. show restraint on this issue.

I then repeated some of our principal policies toward Japan:

—We opposed a nuclear rearmed Japan no matter what some officials might suggest to the contrary:

—We favored keeping Japan's conventional rearmament to a level adequate only to defense;

—We were opposed to the overseas expansion of Japanese military power;

—We recognized that Japan's economic development concerned the whole world and not just Japan.

I repeated that for these major principles to be effective there must be restraint on all sides. When Chou claimed that a nuclear umbrella tended to make Japan aggressive against others, I said that the alternative of Japan's nuclear rearmament was much more dangerous. There was no question that if we withdrew our umbrella they would very rapidly build nuclear weapons. When Chou asked whether we were capable of limiting Japan's self-defense strength, I said that I could not promise this, but that we would have a better opportunity to do this with our present relationship than in a situation when Japan felt betrayed by us and Japanese nationalism asserted itself. I said that we had no incentive to encourage Japan to be dominant twenty-five years after World War II when we had fought against this very concept. If Japan did rearm itself, then the traditional relationship between the U.S. and China would reassert itself.

Chou noted that the Russians were cooperating with the Japanese and trying to use them in Siberia. I commented that I thought that they would pull back once they were confronted with Japanese methods and that in any event it was dangerous for the Russians to whet Japanese appetites for Siberia. I thought both sides would play with each

¹¹ *The People's Daily* editorial of September 18 (reprinted in FBIS, China, September 20, 1971, pp. A7–A10) was one of several articles in the newspaper on that date, the 40th anniversary of Japan's occupation of Manchuria.

other but neither would reorient itself that completely. Chou again was skeptical on whether the U.S. could control the “wild horse” of Japan, and I again rejoined that while we couldn’t do this completely, we had a better chance of controlling the military aspects under present arrangements than under the neutralism that he was pushing.

We ended up agreeing to disagree, with my commenting that our two countries had certain parallel interests with regard to Japan.

Chou closed by noting that we had helped Japan greatly to fatten itself, which I acknowledged. I pointed out that we did not need Japan for our own military purposes and that whenever Japan wanted us to withdraw military personnel we would do so. However, this would not be cause for Chinese rejoicing.

The tentative communiqué draft clearly delineates U.S.–PRC differences on Japan, consistent with the general approach of the first part of the document. Thus the PRC opposes Japanese militarism and supports a neutral Japan, while we place “the highest value” on friendly relations with Japan and state we will continue to honor our mutual defense treaty obligations. This can only help us with Tokyo and is much preferable to artificial—and suspicious—agreed U.S.–Chinese positions.

South Asia

This issue surprisingly consumed much less time than I expected, and while China clearly stands behind Pakistan, I detected less passion and more caution from Chou than I had in July.

Chou opened up by mentioning an October 7 letter from Kosygin to Yahya which he termed equivalent to an ultimatum threatening Pakistan. He said the situation was very dangerous and asked for our estimate.

I made the following points:

—At first India had a reasonable complaint about the political and economic burden of the refugees coming from East Pakistan. We had moved to meet this problem by providing over one-half of the foreign relief to refugees in India, or nearly \$200 million.

—However, India was now trying to take advantage of the crisis as a means of settling the whole problem of Pakistan, not just East Pakistan. The Indian strategy apparently is to change abruptly the situation in East Pakistan so as to shake the political fabric of West Pakistan.

—I then outlined U.S. policy and the steps we had taken to support Pakistan in the consortium, debt relief, and other bilateral areas. I emphasized our total opposition to military action by India, the warnings that I had given the Indian ambassador about cutting off economic aid if they were to move, and the fact that you would repeat these warnings to Mrs. Gandhi when she visited the U.S. I added that we had urged the Russians to exercise restraint. They had told us they were trying to do so, but we were not sure whether this was in fact the case.

—We thought there was a good chance that in the near future that India would either attack or provoke Pakistan into action.

—Finally, I outlined our proposal that both forces withdraw their troops from the border and that Yahya make some political offers so as to overcome hostile propaganda and make it easier to support him in the UN and elsewhere.

Chou thanked me for this information and said that he wished to study the Kosygin letter further before discussing this issue the next day in more detail. He commented that Tito¹² had been persuaded to the Indian view by Mrs. Gandhi, and this plus Soviet support would increase the risk of Indian miscalculation.

I then stated that we had no national interest in East Pakistan and only wanted the political solution there to reflect the will of the people. We had made many proposals to India to separate the refugee problem from the political evolution in a way that would not prejudice the future. However, India had made it very clear that they were trying to force political steps on Yahya in so short a time frame that it could only wreck the structure of West Pakistan.

Chou commented that the Soviets were exploiting the situation, as part of their general strategy of exploiting contradictions in Asia so as to free their hand in Asia. He thought this was “a very stupid way of thinking.” I commented that Moscow would learn that gratitude was not one of the outstanding qualities of the Indian leadership.

Perhaps significantly, Chou, despite his promise, never came back to this subject nor mentioned the Kosygin letter again. This might be partly due to the fact that we spent so much time on other substantive subjects and that we now had the communiqué drafting process in front of us. However, there were opportunities to raise South Asia again in our subsequent meetings if Chou had really wanted to.

In any event, China still stands clearly behind Pakistan, as reflected in their formulation in the draft communiqué which reads that “it firmly opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan’s internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the Asian subcontinent.” I believe the PRC does not want hostilities to break out, is afraid of giving Moscow a pretext for attack, and would find itself in an awkward position if this were to happen.

Chou surely recognized from my presentation and from our communiqué formulation, which urges India and Pakistan to resolve their differences peacefully, that we have too great stakes in India to allow

¹² Josip Broz Tito, President of the Republic of Yugoslavia and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

us to gang up on either side. Nevertheless he did not attempt in any way to contrast their stand with ours as demonstrating greater support for our common friend, Pakistan.

Soviet Union

Chou initiated this topic by asking our views, and I replied as follows:

—We had kept the PRC scrupulously informed over the summer about our relations with Moscow.

—The Moscow summit would now take place because the necessary conditions had been met. There had been various attempts to have the President visit Moscow first, which he had, of course, turned down.

—Our July 15 announcement had not changed the direction of Soviet policy but had improved Russian manners. I had pointed out in my opening statement that this announcement had triggered an extraordinary amount of Soviet diplomatic activity and we were aware that it was designed to outmaneuver the PRC.

—We have a number of concrete issues with the Soviet Union which we have every intention of pursuing, such as SALT and Berlin. The Russians were now pressing us very hard on a European Security Conference.

Chou commented acidly that in the final days of the *Berlin* negotiations the Soviet Union had made concessions very rapidly and given up all their principles. He said indeed that the Berlin Agreement had turned out to be much more substantive, with Soviet concessions, than we had estimated in our private communications. I responded that we had foreshadowed that the agreement would primarily concern access procedures and asked him what other concessions he thought Moscow had made. He said that the Russians had conceded that West Berlin was a part of West Germany, which they had never done before and which would embarrass East Germany.¹³

I pointed out that the Soviet Union wished to free its hands in *Europe* so as to concentrate elsewhere, and Chou admitted this possibility. There was a contradiction in the Soviet policy—on the one hand they wanted to ease tensions so that they could concentrate on the East, but on the other hand their policy was apt to loosen things up in Eastern Europe.

I said that we recognized that the Berlin Agreement increased Chinese problems, and Chou responded “that does not matter.” I assured

¹³ Reference is to the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed on September 3. Printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 27, 1971, pp. 318–325.

him that we did not make deals for that purpose and that we would keep him informed on the details concerning the negotiations on Berlin. The Soviet Union wanted a European Security Conference to solve their contradictions in Eastern Europe by at the same time dealing on a bloc-to-bloc basis and easing tensions with the West.

I then gave Chou a brief accounting of the Gromyko talks, saying that the European Conference was one of the topics that Gromyko had raised with you, along with the Middle East and subsidiary questions like *trade*. Concerning the latter I informed him that Secretary Stans would be traveling to Moscow in November. Chou inquired about the *Middle East*. I told him that if there were any serious chances for settlement I would let him know; prospects were generally gloomy at this point. I added that Gromyko had asked me to tea where we went over the same ground that you and he had covered. In addition, he had discussed U.S. relations with *China* with the standard Soviet line that Moscow had no objections to our improved relations but would object to our colluding. (On the way to the airport, Marshal Yeh said that he thought the Soviet Union wanted to settle the Middle East so that it could concentrate on China. He therefore hoped we would settle our problems with China quickly.)

I summed up our discussions by echoing some of the themes I had sounded in my opening statement with regard to our policy toward Moscow. I repeated that we would keep Peking informed of anything that might affect its interests; that we would conclude no agreements that would work against Peking (mentioning our deflection of the Soviet proposal for provocative attacks in 1970 as well as the third country aspects of the accidental war agreement); and that anything Peking heard from other sources about what was going on could not be true.

Chou asked if the Russians had talked to us about their border dispute. I replied that they had made an oblique reference to China's exorbitant claims, but that I had refused to discuss this question. (On the way to the Great Wall the Acting Foreign Minister explained to me the nature of the Sino-Soviet border dispute. It was not true that the PRC wanted to regain all territories lost by China in the 19th century. What the PRC wanted was (a) an acceptance by the USSR that the treaties had in fact been unequal, and (b) a delineation of the border in minor aspects such as putting the demarcation line into the middle of rivers instead of on the Chinese side as the Soviets claim. Also, he said, the Soviets had pushed troops into all disputed territories—this was unacceptable.)

Throughout our meetings Chou often interlaced disdainful and hostile comments about the USSR, but always in the tone that the PRC was not afraid of any confrontation. He referred to their petty negotiating

tactics, their sticking their hands out in various places, and their complicating of efforts for an Indochina settlement (a point reiterated by Marshal Yeh in one of our sightseeing conversations).

As for our policy, the Chinese should be under no illusions that we fully intend to pursue our interests with Moscow while we try to improve our dialogue with Peking, that we have a number of concrete areas of interest with the Russians, and that while we will not conclude any agreement with the purpose of complicating Chinese problems, we can not be held accountable when the objective consequences of such dealings have this effect.

In the draft communiqué the PRC declares it “will never be a superpower” and opposes “hegemony” and “power politics.” Chou specifically suggested we might want to leave in some of our language (which I was prepared to delete) about improving communication so as to lessen the danger of confrontation because this would refer to our relations with Moscow. Both our countries declare against collusion, forswear hegemony in Asia, and oppose “efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.”

Arms Control

Chou reflected the same Chinese disinterest in this subject that was so manifest in July.

I led into the topic when I was outlining our approach toward our relations with the Soviet Union, and I reaffirmed that we were prepared to make with the Chinese any agreement on arms control that we had made with the Soviet Union. I repeated that we would not participate in any agreement that would “lasso” the PRC.

I said, as I had in communications over the summer, that we were prepared to sign an agreement on *accidental war*, for example, with the PRC. Such an agreement would mean no restraints on China’s military preparations but would provide an opportunity for each side to inform the other about unexplained events. I made clear that we were not urging this on the PRC or making a formal proposal, but were merely letting them know that we were prepared to make a similar agreement with them. I mentioned also our willingness to conclude a *hot line* arrangement.

Chou responded disingenuously that such agreements as accidental war and hot line did not really apply to them, since they had said they would never use nuclear weapons first. He said, more out of politeness than genuine interest, that he would accept the texts of possible agreements to look them over. I subsequently gave him the text of our accidental war agreement with the Soviet Union.

Chou referred to the Soviet proposal for a *five power nuclear disarmament conference*, and I recalled that we had in effect rejected this

proposal also.¹⁴ He then inquired about the new Soviet initiative in the United Nations for a *world disarmament conference*. I noted that although it was not a formal proposal, we would have to reply; I thought all countries, whether in the UN or not, would be included. When I asked about the Chinese attitude, he responded that he thought the Soviet proposal might be an attempt to reply to the Chinese initiative for a world nuclear disarmament conference, but pointed out that the Soviet idea concerned general disarmament, not just nuclear disarmament. I commented that Khrushchev had made a similar proposal every year and we did not consider it very useful. Chou then labelled the Soviet proposal unrealistic and an exercise in firing an “empty cannon” (a phrase he had used to describe Chinese propaganda against the U.S.). Nobody really needed to pay attention to it; it would waste the time and energies of nations. I said that we would try to deflect discussion on this initiative into specific subjects and try to treat problems on a regional basis rather than on a global one.

Chinese coolness towards arms control was further demonstrated in the communiqué drafting process. I put into our drafts our willingness to sign with the PRC any arms control agreement that we had made with other major powers and Chou took this reference out.

I think we have made a useful record in recent months of making clear to the Chinese that we are not trying to conclude arms control agreements at their expense, that we recognize their current lack of interest in the subject, and that we are always ready to conclude with them any agreement that we have made with the Soviet Union. While I do not think they will want to discuss these subjects seriously in the near future, our stand should be both reassuring to them and a clear demonstration of reasonableness and equal treatment.

American Prisoners in China

As in July, I waited until the final meeting to raise this subject and did so as asking the PRC a favor, not making a formal proposal. You will recall that the PRC holds four men: Downey (life) and Fecteau (20 years) downed on a CIA-sponsored flight in 1952; and Smith and Flynn (no charges), pilots in Vietnam who went over the border in 1965 and 1967 respectively.

Since July, I had checked into the actual circumstances concerning Downey and Fecteau whom the Chinese had claimed were CIA agents. They indeed were, and CIA, for its part, would be willing for us to admit their activities if this were required to get the men

¹⁴ See footnote 4, Document 155.

released.¹⁵ In my talks with Chou, I confined myself to saying that I had found that these men had engaged in activities that would be considered illegal by my country. I thus said that our plea had nothing to do with the justice of the case, on which we conceded that the Chinese had a correct legal position. However, if, as an act of clemency, the PRC would consider that they had been sufficiently punished, this would make a very good impression in the U.S.

Chou responded as follows:

—As he had said in July, the Chinese legal process permitted a shortening of sentences if the prisoners behaved well, which he further defined as confessing to crimes. In response to my question, he said that they had all confessed.

—In about two months time the PRC might consider lessening the sentence of some of the men who had behaved well and they would let us know later what they had in mind.

—They had released early this year the old man, Mr. Walsh. I said that we would do our best to see that anyone released would not engage in propaganda against the PRC, and Chou admitted that Walsh had behaved well since his release.

I then inquired about the two pilots; to my knowledge theirs were unintended intrusions into Chinese territory and they were victims of the war. Chou replied that Peking had to deal with these men “in a different light.” If the pilots were released before the Vietnam war were concluded, this “might give a bad impression” (i.e., Peking believes it has enough trouble already with Hanoi).

Chou concluded by suggesting that they could move on the two agents first, pointing out that they had already served long sentences and that Fecteau’s term was almost completed. I said this would mean a great deal to the American people and we would treat any release as an act of clemency.

¹⁵ On September 9 Helms informed Kissinger: “This Agency feels that if it would help secure the release of these officers [John Thomas Downey and Richard George Fecteau], an admission to the Chinese of their affiliation with the Agency and the fact that they were on an intelligence mission at the time of their capture would not now present serious security problems.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 208, CIA, Vol. IV, January–December 1971) For background to this issue, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Documents 406, 415, and 435. These two men were discussed during many of the U.S.–PRC ambassadorial talks held in Geneva and in Warsaw. An overview concerning all U.S. citizens held in China was transmitted in Airgram A-28 from Hong Kong, February 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–7) Nancy Oullette (standing in for Walters) in Paris was given a message by the PRC representative on December 10 stating that Fecteau and Maryann Harbert (who had been detained aboard a yacht in 1968) would be released on December 13. Downey’s life sentence was reduced to a 5-year term beginning in December 1971. Gerald Ross McLaughlin, who had been detained with Harbert, committed suicide in March 1969. The message from Oullette to Haig, undated, is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-13, Document 72.

Thus in the near future we might expect a release of Fecteau and perhaps the shortening of Downey's life sentence. If we can reach a settlement on the Indochina war, we could get the two pilots back as well. All of this may be possible without our having to make any public statements about the activities of our men. However, it is absolutely essential to keep this information secret, for any public disclosure of Chinese intentions would almost certainly wreck our chances for early releases.

Subsidiary Issues

I knew in advance that the Chinese would be cool to proposals in the commercial and exchange program fields. In the Warsaw talks they resisted our approach of focusing on these side issues, and they made the same point in a note this summer. Even now that we are talking about Taiwan and other major issues, they want to keep the emphasis there and away from areas which suggest a "normal" relationship.

I sought to meet this resistance head on in my opening statement by acknowledging their attitude and explaining ours. We considered progress in these fields not as a substitute for fundamental agreements but rather to give impetus to them. It would keep off balance those who wished to see the new U.S.–China dialogue fail. Chou and I agreed that such questions could be discussed by our assistants while we held private talks on the major issues.

These side discussions touched upon three questions: continuing U.S.–PRC contacts; exchanges between the two countries in the fields of science and technology, culture, sports, and journalism; and bilateral trade (in brief and low-key fashion).

On continuing contacts, the Chinese reaffirmed their backing of a proposal Chou had made in July—the sending of a high-level U.S. representative to the PRC from time to time. On several separate occasions I emphasized your preference for Ambassador Bruce, whom we hoped would be acceptable to Peking once the Indochina war was over. Chou did not confirm or deny acceptability. The Chinese were not interested in more formal contacts such as "liaison offices" or "interests sections" in friendly Embassies on the grounds that the liaison arrangement they had with Japan was entirely non-governmental and that the presence of a Chiang Kai-shek Embassy in Washington precluded their establishing an interests section here.

Cautious interest in *exchanges* was displayed by the Chinese. Our side explained the rationale for and outlined a broad spectrum of exchanges in a variety of areas, and the Chinese accepted a representative list of possible programs. They indicated that while there would be exchanges, these would be strictly non-government and limited in number from the Chinese side.

When we raised the subject of *trade* and said we were prepared to liberalize our restrictions further, they said bluntly that they had absolutely no interest in the matter. Indeed they were grateful that the USSR and the U.S. had caused them to be self-reliant.

Of possible follow-up interest was a strong statement against *hijacking*—whatever the motive—by Chou in one of our private meetings.

The Chinese disinterest in these subsidiary issues probably stems partly from a wish to focus more on the fundamental issues in the U.S.–PRC relationship, and partly from a desire to preserve as much ideological purity as feasible by not appearing to rush into a too-active program of contacts and exchanges with the U.S. As for trade, they may not have defined their goals and probably see little immediate potential in any event.

On the other hand, the Chinese appeared to appreciate our rationale for seeking to make some progress on subsidiary issues: that this would help make movement possible on the more fundamental questions and convince detractors of improved relations that gains could, in fact, be made from this course. Thus they included references in the draft communiqué to sending a periodic envoy to Peking and to facilitating exchange in various fields.

165. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

My October China Visit: Drafting the Communiqué²

Prime Minister Chou En-lai and I negotiated a tentative draft communiqué for your China trip (attached at Tab A) in the course of going through seven drafts and eleven hours of meetings during the last two and a half days of my visit.³ During this process Chou was extremely tough and skillful but also reasonable and broad in outlook. The result of our efforts is an unusual communiqué that clearly states differences as well as common ground between the two countries and reassures the friends of both sides rather than raising anxieties because of the compromise language, which would be subject to varying interpretations. A communiqué along these lines should portray your conversations with Mao and Chou as being between leaders who stuck by their principles but had the largeness of perspective to move relations forward despite profound disagreements.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK's October 1971 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

² On October 14 Nixon and Kissinger discussed the communiqué and upcoming talks with the People's Republic of China. Nixon told Kissinger that "we're in a stronger position, particularly in Cambodia, than they are, and a lot stronger than we were in October. I'd be tougher on Cambodia and I'd be tougher on Laos." He continued: "But with Japan, I believe that we have got to frankly scare the bejeezus out of them more on Japan. It's just my sense as I read through this [an early U.S. draft of the communiqué]. I can see what they're doing. He's [Chou En-lai] talking with strong language. But on the other hand, here's the key thing, they have got to become convinced that a Japan and going further, a non-Communist Asia, without the United States is potentially more dangerous than an Asia with the United States. Now, you made that point, but I'd hit it right on the nose, say we're going to stick around." Later Nixon stated: "For example, we'll take the Taiwan thing, we know what has to happen. Korea, we will work that out in an oral way. Except, I'd work that out orally. But also—But I would state very, very firmly, 'Now look, the United States is a Pacific power and an Asian power, and we are going to maintain a presence there.'" (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

³ The first six drafts, Tabs B–G, are attached but not printed. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 57.

Our position on Taiwan (page 6) is the only remaining issue.⁴ Although we significantly narrowed our differences on this most painful issue, including a clear effort by Chou to show some restraint, I said that I could not accept the final Chinese compromise formulation, that I would have to check with you, and that we would go back to them with counter-language. The rest of the communiqué remains tentative, of course, and is subject to change because of events during the next four months and your talks with the Chinese leaders. But we now have a working draft which should be acceptable to both sides, though causing both some domestic problems, and which could never have been produced under the time and publicity pressure of your stay in China.

The Process

Tabling of Conventional U.S. Draft

As reported in separate memoranda, we spent the first three and a half days of talks establishing the basic framework of arrangements for your visit and exploring in depth the various substantive topics we had covered in July. With this backdrop I tabled a draft communiqué—which you had seen—the evening of October 22 (Tab G). It was highly conventional, stressing fuzzy areas of agreement and using vague generalizations. Its basic thrust was to glide over differences and emphasize common ground. I purposely held back our formulations on specific areas like Indochina, Korea, South Asia, or the military forces on Taiwan. On the evening of October 23, Chou gave me his initial reaction. It was that it could serve as a basis for discussion, that naturally they would want to add their views in some places to show differences, and that he would send his Acting Foreign Minister to undertake the redrafting process the next morning.

⁴ Nixon and Kissinger also discussed Taiwan on October 14. Nixon supported the idea of stating that the PRC and ROC should agree that only one China existed, and that the United States and PRC “agree there should be a peaceful solution.” Kissinger pointed out that the PRC would not accept any commitment to a peaceful solution. He added that ending the U.S. treaty commitment to Taiwan “can’t even be considered now” and “the thing we have to hope for is that there will be an evolution that leads to a negotiation.” Kissinger feared that “one of two things are going to happen. After the election either Peking is going to get impatient and then there’s going to be a blow up in their relations with you because their demands [unintelligible]. Or Chiang will die and they’ll be negotiations. Or Mao and Chou will die and there’s such a goddamn turmoil in Peking that no one will know any more what the hell is going on any more.” Nixon replied: “So the only thing I think is that we have to remember that everything always comes out. I don’t think we can have a secret deal, if we sold out Taiwan, you understand? I know what we’re doing, but I want to be very careful.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Sharp Chinese Response

On the morning of October 24, Chou showed up personally instead and delivered a scorching one-hour presentation—as he indicated—at the explicit instructions of Mao. His basic theme was that the Chinese believed in revolutionary progress rather than a Metternich-type peace that stressed stability at the expense of justice and was bound to be short-lived because of its essential oppressiveness. Progress required struggle not peace, or peace only after struggle. The world is in turmoil and the small would inevitably overturn the big. We could not continue to hang onto our old friends if we were entering a new era.

Chou clearly had been ordered by Mao to emphasize the Chinese revolutionary dogma and reject our effort to submerge differences and accent cooperation. He said that our basic approach was unacceptable. Our fundamental differences had to be set forth in a communiqué; otherwise the wording would have an “untruthful appearance.” Our present draft was the sort of banality the Soviets would sign but neither mean nor observe. The Chinese kept their promises; they were not afraid to state disagreements.

I replied very harshly, saying that Chou’s position hadn’t surprised me, but that such language of infallibility and preaching was intolerable for a communiqué. I pointed out that the Chinese wouldn’t respect us if we started our new relationship by betraying our old friends, and that problems had to be solved by history, not force. I said that we could accept the basic approach of each side’s stating its view so long as we also staked out common ground so as to indicate progress. I emphasized that we would reject language that tended to put us on trial or to humiliate an American President. After explaining the difficulties with drafting a communiqué from scratch during your visit, I concluded by saying that the choice was up to Chou, reminding him that he had said to an American group that it didn’t matter if your trip failed. Chou affirmed their wish for a successful visit and asked for a break. He then agreed to launch into a drafting process.

This exchange foreshadowed our basic positions in the negotiating process we then embarked upon. Chou’s emphasis was on sharp delineation of our respective positions while my objectives were to dilute the rhetoric and shorten the length of opposing views, and expand areas of agreement.

Chinese Counter-draft Stressing Differences

The Chinese worked on a draft all day and, after stuffing us with roast duck at a banquet, tabled their first draft that evening (Tab F). It contained very strong rhetoric on their general approach to international affairs and sharp formulations of Chinese views on specific issues. Despite my needling, Chou was at first reluctant to hand his

draft over. I responded that I agreed with the basic concept of both sides plainly stating their views and then common positions, but that the Chinese views were phrased in the most intransigent fashion and you would not travel all the way to China to hear propaganda that one could read in the newspapers.

I then voiced our principal objections. In the general section, we could not have an American President sign a document which said that revolution has become the irresistible trend of history or that “the people’s revolutionary struggles are just.” Nor would we brook reference to racial discrimination—while we were equally opposed to it, mention of it in this communiqué would be certainly interpreted as a critique of American domestic problems. There was almost no mention of agreed principles in international or bilateral relations.

On specific issues, the Chinese draft had us both stating that Vietnam was the most urgent question for the relaxation of tension in the Far East. It cited China as “the reliable rear area” and Chinese backing for the Indochinese peoples’ “fighting to the end for the attainment of their goal”—clearly unacceptable phrasing while Americans were dying or held prisoner in Indochina. The Chinese called for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and Japan and the unconditional return of Okinawa. The draft had both sides agreeing that Taiwan is the “crucial issue” obstructing normalization of bilateral relations. And the Chinese had linked periodic visits of U.S. envoys to progress on Taiwan; this I rejected too.

I stated that the total impact of their draft would be disastrous and inconsistent with our self-respect—the rhetoric must be toned down and some progress shown. I delayed our scheduled departure from the next morning to the next afternoon. Our side then went back to our Guest House to redraft the better part of the night.

Muting the Rhetoric and Expanding the Positive

Our counter-draft (Tab E), which we presented the morning of October 25, took out their most offensive language, put in our own positions and beefed up areas of agreement. On specific regional issues we kept the structure of each side’s expressing its views and then a common position, albeit rather vapidly. I defined our objective as being to state differences without being offensive and showing a positive direction without raising false hopes. I again put off our departure, to the next morning. The Chinese took our draft away, and we once again endured a lengthy wait until dinner time that night when we got the second Chinese draft (Tab D).

Because of time pressure we had but two hours to deal with what remained a tough version. There was still much objectionable Chinese rhetoric and not enough positive material. The Chinese had also changed the structure, lumping regional issues with general

views under each side's position and not attempting to state explicit agreed positions on these specific questions. Chou explained his reasons:

(1) We should not state common positions for appearance sake, but only when they in fact exist—this wasn't really the case for the regional issues.

(2) The agreements were so vague as to lead each side to explain its position in contradictory manner giving rise to post-summit controversy.

(3) It gave impressions of Sino–U.S. condominium which was in neither party's interest.

I pointed out with melancholy that the Chinese draft still accentuated our differences in provocative fashion. We had to decide whether we were starting a new period in our relationship or employing new tactics in a continuing struggle. We would be condemned for signing such a document which still had a largely negative cast to it, appealed to revolution, and spoke of supporting the Vietnamese people to the end. I then gave them our third draft (Tab C) proposing once again reduction of their offensive phrasing, e.g. on revolution and backing the Indochinese peoples' struggles, and restoring some positive language of agreement. I also was somewhat more forthcoming on Taiwan which now was clearly emerging as the most difficult issue. Making clear that I was stretching my instructions, I used language that said the U.S. would not challenge (rather than merely noting) the views of all Chinese that there is but one China and indicated progressive reduction of U.S. forces on Taiwan.

During two hours of sparring Chou elaborated some of the philosophic underpinning of their approach to the communiqué. He drew a clear distinction between principle and policy execution, in effect paralleling our approach that we could set a course on certain issues but time was needed to resolve them. In this session particularly, but also in others, he emphasized that while they had to have principles like troop withdrawals or sovereignty over Taiwan, they clearly could do without time deadlines. They were in no hurry but the direction must be clear. Chou was startlingly frank and concrete with respect to our military withdrawal from Taiwan—not only would they not press for a timetable, they actually preferred that some U.S. forces remain so as to keep the Japanese forces out!

After very candid exchanges, the Chinese took away our draft for revision at 11:35 p.m.

Agreement on a Tentative Draft

At 4:45 a.m., October 26, we were given a third Chinese draft (Tab B) which was a considerable improvement. It muted some of their rhetoric in the direction of our changes and kept most of our additions

of positive language. On Taiwan, they clearly made an effort but their formulation was still beyond what I could accept.

We met at 5:30 a.m. with four or five fundamental issues remaining. I pointed to a few phrases which remained annoying and to the deletion of our reference to our honoring our commitments to Korea.

Chou said that it was a difficult situation because they had accepted without change our statements of principle, such as individual freedom and peaceful competition (this was true) while we were trying to dilute their formulations. There was no question that the two sides have deep differences and they should be stated. He suggested that it was extremely difficult to reach agreed language before I left, that this text was tentative, and that some work could be left until your visit. I rejoined that the more we could settle now the better. Chou agreed but stressed the need for confidentiality. He then again displayed reasonableness as he made a further effort to curb some of their language and agreed to restoration of our Korean language.

We also had another long exchange on Taiwan during which he made clear he could budge no further. He pointed out that they had used great restraint on this question, had thought hard about reformulations which could meet our concern, and were not stipulating any timetables. However, there had to be some concreteness or the Chinese people would not understand. He agreed with me that their objective was to be explicit on this question while ours was to be ambiguous. In turn I said I was already operating on the margin of my authority with the formulation I had proposed and was extremely doubtful that you would consider their language. We left it that I would discuss this with you and might propose a new formulation, in which case they might be able to change a couple of words.

By 8:10 a.m., we had reached agreement on the tentative draft at Tab A except for Taiwan (underlined portion)⁵ as well as cleaning up remaining technical issues such as public announcements and statements. I reaffirmed to Chou that knowledge of this communiqué would be confined to the White House. They clearly want secrecy about this document for the same reasons we do, as well as not to derogate from Mao's authority before he has had a chance to talk to you.

The Result

The draft communiqué should serve us better than the conventional type which contains contrived and ambiguous language. It is an honorable document in which both sides vigorously and inoffensively set forth their differing views on the world scene and specific issues. This reflects the basic reality, which you have been stressing, that there

⁵ Printed in the text below in italics.

are fundamental differences between us and the Chinese. The communiqué then states how despite these differences, we have common interests in our conduct of international relations and bilateral dealings and how we propose to further them. There is thus both realism and forward movement.

This paper should prove more reassuring to our friends than a blander document where they would search for hidden meanings or understandings. U.S.–PRC joint positions on such questions as Indochina, Japan and Korea would be all but meaningless given our differences and could only be expressed in language that each side could interpret as it wished. Such agreements would either be an artful exercise in semantics or suggest we and the PRC were negotiating on behalf of third countries (which, moreover, the communiqué states that we won't do).

Instead, while the PRC supports its allies, we go clearly on record as honoring our commitments to Korea and placing the highest value on our relationship with Japan and honoring our mutual defense treaty obligations. On the Asian subcontinent our neutrally-phrased position compares with Peking's pro-Pakistan stance—this should help us marginally with India while not really hurting us with Pakistan, for whom we remain the only real Western friend. On Indochina, we restate our standard position, and this issue may well have been transformed by the time of your visit.

Some of the Chinese rhetoric in the document is unpleasant and this, combined with what inevitably will be a painful section on Taiwan, will cause us some problems. But Chou took out the most offensive language such as supporting revolutions and opposing racial discrimination and generally rounded off the Chinese statements so that they are very mild in comparison to standard Maoist expressions.

The Chinese hardly need the communiqué as a propaganda vehicle. They have many other instruments for that purpose (including now the United Nations). Indeed the language on Chinese positions, while naturally still grating on American ears, can only look restrained to any audience familiar with the usual public lines. In fact, it is difficult to see how Chou could have gone much further on the language and still preserved his international and domestic positions. He recognized the points I made about our own domestic problems and took them into account in his redrafting. Furthermore while he let us edit his formulations, he did not attempt to change ours—he even reinserted some language of ours that we had dropped because we had deleted some of their phrases.

Another positive element was Chou's restraint in terms of making any demands on us. While there is some vigorous rhetoric on general principles, the Chinese do not, for example, specifically call for the withdrawal of our forces from Korea or Japan. Indeed Chou time and

again emphasized that, while in principle foreign forces should be withdrawn, the PRC was not specifying any time limits.

Thus the Chinese are willing to pursue their objectives by banking on the thrust of history. They will continue to be tough, but they essentially accept our arguments that we can often do more than we say, that the process must be gradual, and that some issues must be left to evolutionary pressures. This involves great risks for them, at home and abroad, given their past public demands and dissidents in their own camp.

Furthermore, they are clearly gambling on your reelection. Chou specifically pointed out toward the end that they could be in real trouble if your Administration was not in power to implement our understandings. He shares what he described as your wish that you preside over the 200th anniversary of America's birth.

All of this does not mean that Chou was easy to deal with—he emphatically was not. But nevertheless he was able to empathize with our difficulties and he made an effort to produce language to meet our concerns. Nor is the communiqué without domestic and international problems. But it is fair to say that the problems for Chou and the PRC are at least as great.

In short, if we can navigate the Taiwan issue successfully, we should have a communiqué that is realistic, clear, dignified, reassuring to our friends and positive for the further development of U.S.–Chinese relations.

Tab A⁶

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ (Tentative Draft)

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from _____ to _____, 1972. Accompanying the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon), U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on _____ and _____. The two leaders held conversation for _____ hours and had an exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

⁶ A typewritten note at the top of the page reads: "Final Draft, 10/26–8:00 A.M." The "Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People's Republic of China" (commonly known as the Shanghai Communiqué), February 27, 1972, is printed as Document 203.

During the visit, further talks were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and frank discussions on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:

Also taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were:

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured _____ and _____ where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

During their meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the United States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are taking place and great upheavals exist and expounded their respective positions and views.

The Chinese side stated that wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want progress—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples; it firmly supports the eight-point programme for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971 and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;" it firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan; it firmly opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the Asian sub-continent.

The U.S. side stated that peace in Asia and peace in the world required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the

basic causes of conflict. The U.S. side believes that the effort to reduce tension is served by improving communication between countries that have different world outlooks so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and with a willingness to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The U.S. side desires to work with others to build a just and secure peace: just because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress, secure because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The U.S. side stated that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; that its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution, and that in the absence of a negotiated settlement it envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of true self-determination for each country of Indochina. The existing commitments between the U.S. and Republic of Korea would be honored; the United States would support all efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States placed the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan and it would continue to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. The United States urged India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations; all attempts to use armed force to settle international problems are contrary to the interests of the people of this region.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of interest.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

—progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
- neither seeks hegemony in the Asia–Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and the U.S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position; *it hopes that the settlement of the Taiwan question consistent with this position will be achieved through peaceful negotiations and states that it will progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the U.S. troops and military installations from Taiwan.*

The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.

The two sides agreed that the U.S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking at irregular intervals for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations and carry forward negotiations on issues of common interest.

The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present frankly to one another their respective views on a variety of issues. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

166. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

Concrete Commitments to the PRC Made During HAK
October 1971 Visit

1. We will propose within 10 days a proposed *date*, within November 20–24 period, *for the announcement* of the date for *the President's visit*.²

2. We will provide Dr. Kissinger's *October 27 briefing* transcript to the Chinese as soon as possible.

3. We will consider *Taiwan language* and if we have a concrete formula will give it to the Chinese, either via General Haig or perhaps just before President's visit. Also we must decide whether to keep our language about reducing risk of war through accident or miscalculation.

4. HAK will look into the *recent demonstration at U.N. headquarters* (and allegedly throughout US and other countries) on behalf of the *Taiwan Independence Movement*, to see who was behind it and if it were premeditated and global. We will let Chinese know the results of the investigation.

5. HAK will confirm with President and let Chinese know what our position would be if another government raises the point that the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK's October 1971 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The only notation is a handwritten "W Lord." An updated and more detailed paper, "Checklist of Understandings with PRC," was prepared by Lord on March 16, 1972. It included commitments made during the February 1972 trip to the PRC and listed the date and persons involved, the nature of the agreement, and status. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, Far East, Commitments to the PRC) An updated version of the March report, June 17, 1972, is *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 116.

² See footnote 7, Document 164.

status of Taiwan is undetermined. HAK said that we would never encourage 2 China or 1 China, 1 Taiwan movement and would attempt to bring about a solution within the framework of 1 China by peaceful means, but he had to check on what tactically we would say if another government raised the Taiwan status issue.

6. HAK will let Chinese know if *Kishi*³ conversations dealt with U.N./Taiwan question or other relevant issue. HAK said he thought Kishi talks centered on economic issues.

7. We are trying to stop possible *Chinese nationalist plane* overflight of China designed to complicate US–PRC relations. If it occurs it will be without our permission and against our opposition.

8. HAK will make full review of *reconnaissance flights* like CINC-PAC's SR-71 plane during HAK visit. Until HAK's return these were stopped.⁴

9. We will let PRC know whether *Mrs. Nixon* will go to China.⁵

10. We will let Chinese know the *length of visit* and number of stops, including whether Hangchow is to be included.

11. HAK will discuss with the President the issue of what *plane* he uses to *travel within China*.

12. We will provide technical information on *ground station* and the equipment which will be in the 747.

13. We will let Chinese know if our current *Mideast negotiating effort* shows any chance of success.

14. We are studying *UNCURK* question and will let Chinese know results of our study either through channel or at very latest when President goes to China.

³ Japanese Prime Minister Kishi met with Haig and Nixon on October 22 and discussed textiles, Okinawa, Chinese representation in the UN, the President's upcoming trip to the PRC and Soviet Union, and other topics. Two memoranda of conversation, October 22, are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 86, Memoranda for the President.

⁴ On October 22 Haig informed Kissinger in Beijing (apparently in response to a query from Kissinger) that one SR-71 mission flew over Southeast Asia on October 21, passing as close as 40 nautical miles to the PRC–DRV border and 20 nautical miles from Hainan Island. Haig wrote: "We are holding such flights until further notice. You will not be pleased to learn that this series of flights apparently is not covered or reviewed in any way by 40 Committee. It is a CINCPAC operation." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK's October 1971 Visit)

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 164.

167. Editorial Note

In October 1971 the People's Republic of China (PRC) replaced the Republic of China (ROC) in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. As documented in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume V, most of the maneuvering in the United Nations concerned the Important Question and Albanian Resolutions. Items placed before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that were Important Questions (IQs) required a two-thirds majority to pass. In December 1961 the General Assembly approved a resolution sponsored by the United States, Australia, Colombia, Italy, and Japan, making the issue of Chinese representation an Important Question, thus reducing the likelihood of the Republic of China's expulsion. (UNGA 1961, United Nations doc. A/L 372, Resolution 1668 (XVI), adopted on December 15, 1961) The Albanian Resolution, so named for one of its primary sponsors, called for expelling the ROC and seating the PRC in the General Assembly and Security Council. Until the 1963 General Assembly session the Soviet Union had been a sponsor of the Albanian Resolution. After 1963 the Soviets voted for, but did not sponsor, the resolution.

On September 17, 1969, the General Assembly agreed to consider the Albanian Resolution, sponsored by 13 other nations as well as Albania, entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China." On October 17 the United States, joined by 17 other nations, introduced a resolution reaffirming the 1961 General Assembly decision that China's representation was an Important Question. For the first time, the Soviet Union did not speak publicly in support of PRC admittance into the United Nations. The U.S.-sponsored Important Question Resolution passed on November 11 by a vote of 71 to 48, with 4 abstentions. However, the Albanian Resolution also garnered a slim majority. An attempt in the Assembly's Credentials Committee to declare invalid the credentials of the ROC was defeated by a vote of 5 to 3, with 1 abstention. See Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, *U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1969*, Department of State Publication 8540, October 1970, pages 59–62.

In 1970 the United States and its supporters continued to support the Important Question Resolution. On November 20 the resolution passed 66 to 52, with 7 abstentions. The Albanian Resolution also passed 51 to 49, with 25 abstentions. The Soviet Union requested a vote in the Credentials Committee on ROC representation. The measure to accept the ROC credentials passed on October 26, by a vote of 5 to 2, with 1 abstention. See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970*, volume 24 (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1972), pages 194–200.

Department of State officials struggled in July and August to obtain ROC acceptance of a plan to allow the People's Republic of China

to enter the United Nations (and almost certainly obtain a seat on the Security Council) while the Republic of China would remain in the General Assembly. Secretary of State William Rogers met with ROC diplomats in late July, stating that the “only chance of preserving membership of ROC in UN is for US to support a resolution which would provide representation for your government and government of Peking and at least to acquiesce in majority view that government in Peking should hold seat on SC.” (Reported in telegram 139288 to Taipei, July 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger wanted the Department of State to take the lead on the UN fight, telling Ambassador to the UN George H.W. Bush to “fight hard” to keep the ROC in the General Assembly. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Bush, September 30, 1971, 9:22–9:54 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 581–2) The President asked Rogers to handle the UN issue: “I think getting me involved puts in too direct a deal, particularly when we’re working out the Peking, too direct a case and I’m just, you know, they’ll try to play it as if we’re playing it against Peking, which is really not the case.” (Ibid., Recording of conversation between Nixon and Rogers, October 17, 1971, 6:13–6:26 p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 11–105) On another occasion, Nixon told Rogers that he wanted to avoid personal involvement in the UN issue, and he wished to enable Rogers to gain support from conservatives for his role in attempting to keep the Republic of China in the United Nations. (Ibid., October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18)

The timing of the UN vote on Chinese representation and Kissinger’s October trip to the People’s Republic of China became a source of concern as it became apparent that the vote would be held earlier than U.S. officials had anticipated—in late October rather than in November. In numerous conversations, Nixon and Kissinger wondered whether the trip would reduce the chances for the ROC to remain in the United Nations. On September 30 Kissinger concluded that “I think basically the votes are set now. I do not think that objectively it affects the votes of anybody.” Nixon responded: “I know that, I know that. People will use things for excuses.” They also debated attempting to change the date of Kissinger’s trip to China but felt that going to the People’s Republic of China immediately after defeat in the United Nations would be even more difficult. Ultimately Kissinger felt that there was little chance of winning the UN vote: “I mean I thought as long as we were going to lose we were better off losing on the old stand. But I think we’re farther behind than they [the Department of State officials] think. You have to consider that these diplomats, when they talk to us, they’ll try to make it sound as good as possible. Why annoy us for weeks before the vote?” (Ibid.,

Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, September 30, 1971, 2:25–2:50 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 582–3)

On October 12 NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis sent a memorandum to Department of State Executive Secretary Theodore Eliot for distribution to all diplomatic posts: “You may be asked by host governments about ChiRep implications of Kissinger trip to Peking at end of this month. If so, you should stress that sole purpose of trip is to make arrangements for Presidential visit and that there is no connection between Kissinger trip and ChiRep issue. The U.S. is firmly supporting the continued membership of the ROC in the UN.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, China Trip, October 1971)

Nixon was not optimistic concerning the future of the Republic of China in the United Nations, stating on one occasion that “my view is that the time for Taiwan to go out is next year, it shouldn’t go this year, it’s not good for the Chinese.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18) On October 25 the General Assembly approved the motion for priority (61 in favor, 53 opposed, 17 abstentions), then defeated the Important Question Resolution (55, 59, 15). Bush’s motion for a separate vote on expulsion of the Republic of China lost (51, 61, 16), and the Albanian Resolution was adopted (76, 35, 17). Information on the debate and final vote is in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971*, volume 25 (New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1974), pages 126–137.

168. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–8–71

Washington, October 28, 1971.

COMMUNIST CHINA’S WEAPONS PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

[Omitted here are the table of contents and a 1-page “Note on the Evidence.”]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79R1012, NIC Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Stage and Direction of the Chinese Effort

A. After some 15 years of effort, China is now beginning to deploy strategic weapon systems. Starting from scratch with a limited industrial, technical, and scientific base, and denied Soviet assistance after 1960, the Chinese had to proceed on their own with the development of requisite skills, the construction of basic facilities, and the design and testing of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

B. China clearly intends to attain the status of a major nuclear power, accepting the economic burden involved and the risks of slowing basic economic development through diversion of scarce resources and skills to specialized defense tasks. This is evident on the China scene today where activity in both general purpose and strategic military programs is at an all time high. Though any forecast of China's future must allow for additional periods of disruption and upset, it seems reasonable to assume that the existing high priority for strategic programs will endure in the years ahead.

C. Obviously, China's efforts in the military field will be limited by available skills and resources. But we lack the data to place any useful ceiling on the level of the Chinese effort. Based on the pattern of Chinese military programs to date, the Chinese seem sensitive to the dangers of trying too much too fast in their strategic programs in a country whose population growth threatens continuously to outstrip economic growth. While stressing the wide-ranging and ambitious nature of China's present effort, we should also stress its relatively moderate pace. The Chinese have been deliberate in testing weapon systems and in no apparent rush to undertake costly and large-scale deployment of weapon systems of limited capabilities. No doubt the large issues of priorities and costs serve to trouble Chinese internal politics at the highest levels, [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*].

D. No elaboration of the rationale for developing a strategic force nor any discussion of strategic doctrine has appeared in China. Evidently some principles other than Mao's "peoples' war" doctrine guide the costly and wide-ranging strategic weapon programs now underway in China. It seems most likely that Peking seeks through the development of a substantial nuclear force to enhance its claim to great power status, to deter the USSR and the US from the resort to force against China, and to insure for China a leading and dominant political role in Asia.

Strategic Missiles

E. It is probable that China has now deployed some CSS-1 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. This missile has a range of about 600 n.m. and probably uses

non-storable liquid propellants. We estimate that there might be about 10 units deployed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

F. A second missile, the CSS-2, has a range of at least 1,400 n.m. and probably uses storable propellants. We believe that the development stage of this system is well advanced and that it probably has reached the point of deployment, although there is uncertainty about this. While the CSS-2 is superior to the CSS-1 in range and reaction time, it probably does not incorporate any great improvement in accuracy [*2 lines of source text not declassified*].

G. The Chinese are developing another liquid-propellant missile. This missile, which appears to have sufficient range to provide full coverage of the USSR, could be ready for deployment by late 1973 or early 1974. This system, referred to as the “Ching-yu” missile, is a two-stage vehicle with the first stage probably incorporating the design and technology of the CSS-2. Its maximum range is unknown, but our calculations, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] suggest that any capability against the continental US would be marginal at most.

H. Further down the road, China is almost certain to deploy a large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of full coverage of the continental US. China could have a large, liquid-propellant ICBM ready for deployment as early as 1974 but more likely a year or two later. When full range testing into the Pacific or the Indian Ocean occurs, we should be able to learn more about the performance of the system and to make more confident estimates of its probable initial operational capability.²

I. In addition to these four liquid-propellant missiles, China has a large and ambitious program underway for the development and production of strategic missiles using solid propellants. If flight testing begins within a year, solid-propellant strategic missiles—most likely in the MRBM or IRBM class—might be ready for deployment as early as 1974, but 1975 or 1976 is more likely in view of the special problems involved.

Submarines

J. China has also shown an interest in nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and it is building shipyards which appear capable of producing and servicing such submarines. We judge that China could have SSBNs equipped with solid- or liquid-propellant missiles as early as 1976. But this would require a crash effort and early success in overcoming a multitude of support, training, and operational

² Smith of the NSC Staff had written to Kissinger on April 7, 1971, informing him of 1970 tests of what was probably the PRC's first ICBM. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI)

problems. Thus, even if they now have a prototype under construction, the first Chinese SSBN probably will not be operational until after 1976.

Bombers

K. Production of TU-16 medium bombers began in late 1968 and has reached a level of two per month. About 30 of these aircraft are now operational. The TU-16 can carry a 6,600 pound bombload to a radius of about 1,650 n.m., but it is relatively slow and highly vulnerable to sophisticated air defenses. While there is no doubt that some TU-16 crews are now sufficiently trained to deliver thermonuclear (TN) bombs to designated targets, it will be at least a year and probably longer before the Chinese have two or three regiments with crews trained to perform coordinated missions against modern air defenses.

Nuclear Bombs and Warheads

L. To arm its delivery systems, China has concentrated successfully on the development of a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] TN device and could now have bombs and warheads with this yield in stockpile. It could also have fission weapons [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. It is likely that the Chinese are working to expand production of fissionable materials, and although there is a broad range of possible error in estimating the output of these materials, it seems clear that China will have ample fissionable material, particularly after 1973, to arm the strategic delivery systems it is likely to deploy.

Space

M. The two earth satellites launched by China over the past 18 months marked the beginning of what probably will be an ambitious space program. Over the next few years, we expect continued launches involving larger and increasingly sophisticated payloads, partly in response to urgent military needs for targeting and geodetic data.

Projected Forces

N. We expect whatever strategic forces China now has deployed to be augmented gradually over the next two years, principally by a build-up of CSS-2 units and by the continued series production of TU-16 medium bombers. Beyond 1973 and for the period five years ahead, there is much uncertainty (Section VI attempts to project to that period). But one thing is certain: the force will be weighted heavily on the side of systems capable only of reaching targets in Asia (including US installations there) and the USSR. A capability against the continental US may begin to emerge, however, toward the end of this period.

[Omitted here is a 39-page Discussion section, which was divided into the following sections: I. Communist China's Nuclear Weapons Capabilities; II. Communist China's Strategic Missile Program; III. China's Bomber Force; IV. Ballistic Missile Submarine Systems; V. China's Nascent Space Program; and VI. Projected Strategic Forces.]

169. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 29, 1971, 5:23–6:03 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chow Shu-kai, Foreign Minister, Republic of China
James Shen, ROC Ambassador to U.S.

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT

Mr. Kissinger's Visit to Peking, the UN Vote on Chirep, and U.S.–ROC Relations

Ambassador Shen asked Mr. Kissinger how his trip to Peking was. Mr. Kissinger said that he wished that he could inform his visitors that Chinese hospitality no longer existed on the Mainland, but he was, in fact, treated very well. However, he wanted to tell them on behalf of the President and of himself personally that he and the President couldn't feel worse about the UN vote, and couldn't understand why it had come so quickly. Why had this been? Foreign Minister Chow explained that the other side had wanted to exploit the atmosphere in the UN, which was favorable, and at the last moment had withdrawn a number of speakers. In addition, some of those who spoke had shortened their speeches.

Mr. Kissinger interjected at this point to ask how many people in Taiwan would receive reports of the present conversation. Foreign Minister Chow said that he would send the report only to President Chiang and the Prime Minister.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. The time of the meeting is taken from Kissinger's Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) Chow and Shen also met with Rogers, Pedersen, Green, De Palma, and Moser at the Department of State on October 29. The 4-page memorandum of this conversation is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM.

Mr. Kissinger then went on to say that he had been given to understand that the vote at the earliest would be on October 29. He had heard from Ambassador Bush that the vote would probably be on the 2nd or 3rd of November, and under these circumstances he had thought that if he could come back and say he had been received well at the same time that the vote was being prepared, he could demonstrate that the vote had not been influenced by his visit and turn it into a plus. In fact, he had considered going to New York himself for this purpose.² Therefore, he had been stunned when he had received word that the vote had taken place.³

Continuing, Mr. Kissinger explained that his second visit to Peking had been arranged last summer, but when the coincidence of the UN vote with the second trip became apparent, he had had a meeting with Ambassador Bush, who had said he couldn't delay the beginning of the debate but could string out the proceedings—this was easy. He, Mr. Kissinger, personally didn't know the situation in "that madhouse" (the UN), but thought that this would have been possible. He realized that the ROC could not agree with what we were doing with Peking, but the last thing we wanted was to have the ROC out of the UN. In fact, in February and March the President and he were sitting on everything concerning the UN vote so as to delay it as long as possible. Then, as the ROC knew, we had sent a special emissary to Taiwan. Mr. Kissinger indicated he had felt earlier that once the ROC's position had changed, it would be done for.

Mr. Kissinger noted that it had never come into anybody's mind that the UN vote would take place while he was in Peking. As he had told the Ambassador, whatever he had done, he had done openly. He was not the ROC problem; he didn't want the ROC out of the UN, nor did any people deserve what had happened less than they.

Foreign Minister Chow asked, had Mr. Kissinger been surprised at the outcome? The Foreign Minister referred to Mr. Kissinger's remark that once the ROC position had changed, it would be done for. Mr. Kissinger explained that he had meant maybe over the next five years, in which time many other things could happen. What he questioned was the strategical judgment which we had used, that is, was it right to move with so much publicity, rather than to work quietly with some centers so we could take a position not so visible out in front? Starting from early September, we might have talked to somebody like Lee Kuan-yew, who didn't want the PRC in the UN.⁴

² Kissinger's handwritten addition to this sentence reads: "while in Peking."

³ Kissinger's handwritten addition to this sentence reads: "was [unintelligible]."

⁴ Kissinger wrote next to this sentence: "and promised him advanced warning if we changed our position. He could care less about all our legal arguments."

Foreign Minister Chow expressed agreement, but noted that in Singapore's vote Lee Kuan-yew had to go along with Malaysia.

Mr. Kissinger declared that he did not blame himself for being in Peking; his visit was ambiguous, and could have worked as much for the ROC as against it. Peking also found it troublesome, because the leaders there had to explain to their own people why they were talking to him at the same time we were voting against them at the UN. He did feel badly, though, about our tactics. Looking over the list of the countries who voted against us, it was hard to see why a miserable country like Guyana, which we could buy, voted against us. Mr. Kissinger observed that there was no sense in making a foreign policy issue out of this, and he didn't want to be crude, but there were ways of handling this sort of thing. But when we went the diplomatic route, things were different. Take Lee Kuan-yew, for example; the only thing of interest about him was whether he would be left high-and-dry if we changed our position. Going through the list of those who voted against us, we had killed ourselves by using normal diplomatic channels. What he, Mr. Kissinger, deserved criticism for was that he had not supervised our tactics as much as he should. Two months ago he had asked Ambassador Bush for a list of those whom he thought would support us, and some countries clearly shouldn't have been on it. For example, Cyprus, where Makarios has two nationalities to deal with; he couldn't agree to dual representation. Mr. Kissinger remarked that he didn't know what had happened in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, but he had felt that Belgium, also with two distinct elements in its population, wouldn't vote for us even though it had been listed as doing so.

Foreign Minister Chow stated that Belgium had changed its vote at the last minute. Mr. Kissinger retorted that many countries had voted the way they intended to, but had made the judgment that if they were going to get the U.S. sore, it would be better to get us sore at the last minute. Returning to the question of whether he had been surprised at the outcome of the vote or not, Mr. Kissinger said that he had sent back a cable from Peking to delay the vote unless we were certain we could win, and when this cable had been sent on Wednesday night, he had thought we were indeed going to win. It should have been possible in this nut house to be able to find a means of delay. To be candid, he was really mad.

Foreign Minister Chow mentioned that the UN now had a weak President, who didn't know the procedures. Mr. Kissinger said, yes, this was Malik,⁵ whom he knew. Foreign Minister Chow thought that

⁵ Reference is to Adam Malik, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs and President, 26th Session of the UN General Assembly.

Malik may have been scared and unwilling to offend people such as the Russians. There were, of course, many ways of bringing about a delay. Mr. Kissinger asserted that if he had been given the assignment, he could certainly have stretched out the debate. The last two days were too late, however. His instructions of September 29 were to get the vote into November. He didn't care how, but didn't have to rack his brain—it would have been possible to delay the Political Committee for a few days. The airplane business could have been gotten in (the hi-jacking of a 747 to Cuba), and a Security Council meeting convened. No one should say that we couldn't screw it up; we had done so hundreds of times.

Mr. Kissinger added that when he had gotten the message about the vote he had been absolutely beside himself. He believed that if he had had a week in between, the situation would have been different. He didn't know how he would have gone about it, but countries such as Guyana wouldn't have played around. Keeping the ROC in the UN was something which we wanted, and which State wanted, but we had gotten the rug pulled out from under us at the ROC's expense. Mr. Kissinger hoped that the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador would not report all of what he had said. Foreign Minister Chow remarked that there were no Chinese expressions to parallel many of the expressions used by Mr. Kissinger. Ambassador Shen said that the report of this conversation would be sent only to President Chiang.

Foreign Minister Chow raised the question of where we would go from here. Mr. Kissinger declared that we were not going to give up in Peking our defense commitment to the ROC.⁶ Foreign Minister Chow should tell his President and Prime Minister that this wasn't going to happen, and that he wanted them to know this. As to where we would go from here, we would certainly maintain our usual cordial relations. If Ambassador Shen invited him to dinner and put this in the papers, he would be delighted.

Mr. Kissinger asked Foreign Minister Chow if he, himself, had been surprised at the vote. Foreign Minister Chow replied that, frankly, he had not been surprised—he had thought from the beginning that the trend was against them. Mr. Kissinger referred to the fact that one of those voting against the ROC was Botswana, a country of only 300,000 people. Foreign Minister Chow noted that the ROC had an Ambassador in Botswana, and also had sent an agricultural team there. Mr. Kissinger remarked that countries such as Botswana and Guyana drove him crazy—they had no business voting against us. We couldn't do much about the Arab states, although countries such as Oman and

⁶ This sentence was underlined in an unknown hand.

Qatar probably didn't know where China was. All these were countries which had leaped to his, Mr. Kissinger's mind. Anyway, he hadn't gone into our tactics, and had assumed that our experts knew what they were doing. He had suffered under the impression that he could get into this matter when he came back, and that we would come out ahead. If he had been able to say to the President that it was possible to be received in a friendly way in Peking while fighting it in the UN—.

Foreign Minister Chow noted that he didn't know what was going to happen now, with Peking coming into the UN. He could see a ground-swell of resentment in the U.S., not only in Congress, but from the man-in-the-street. Mr. Kissinger agreed, observing that what got people mad was the behavior of African delegations after the vote.

Foreign Minister Chow indicated that with respect to the future relationships between the U.S. and the ROC, it would be most important for the ROC to strengthen its bilateral relations with the U.S. and Japan. He was relieved that Sato for the moment had weathered the storm. Mr. Aichi had left New York for home yesterday, but he didn't know what to say to Sato because he didn't know Sato's future. Anyway, the vote of no confidence in Sato had been rejected. For the ROC, bilateral relations with the U.S. and Japan were of preeminent importance.

Foreign Minister Chow went on to say that there had to be a calm atmosphere on Taiwan so that there would be no sharp flight of capital or panic in the market. In practical terms, if the ROC could withstand the initial shock, keep the economy stabilized, and maintain industrial production, the ordinary people couldn't care less whether the ROC was in the UN or not.

Foreign Minister Chow remarked that he was happy to see that the Senate had rejected the Cooper–Church Amendment and the repeal of the Formosa Resolution. Now, if the President could reaffirm the U.S.–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty at a press conference—. Mr. Kissinger promised that the President would indeed reaffirm the Treaty. Foreign Minister Chow said that there should be no doubt in the minds of the ordinary people on this score. Mr. Kissinger raised the possibility in addition that we might just have somebody ask if U.S. commitments to Taiwan had been affected by the UN vote, to which Ziegler or somebody else could say “no.”⁷

Foreign Minister Chow observed that even if Taiwan's security was assured, the question of its economic viability remained important.

⁷ Les Janka underlined the three previous sentences and also wrote on the first page “NB-p. 5, 7, 8,” indicating the pages that contained his underlining.

They didn't want a flight of capital and falling investments. At the moment, economic expansion was halted prior to the beginning of the new year, and if the flow of foreign investments was not resumed there would be difficulties. As long as they still had a stable environment in the Government and military, though, he was confident that the economic problems could be handled.

Mr. Kissinger informed Foreign Minister Chow that he had just talked to Governor Reagan, and the ROC had certainly made a deep impression on the Governor. Foreign Minister Chow went on to say that the ROC's trade this year had been \$400 million, and it still needed to trade with the Common Market countries. Mr. Kissinger asked if it was still possible for the ROC to trade with these countries, and asked about the possibility also of the ROC maintaining trade missions. Foreign Minister Chow said that they were trying to do this. They were not going to undertake rash measures against countries like Botswana. He had personally received the Foreign Minister of Botswana, who had been in New York himself, and had been told that, so sorry, the Botswana vote was a cabinet decision.

Mr. Kissinger informed the Foreign Minister that the President had done a lot on the ROC's behalf. We had switched the Israeli vote, where people had said there was no hope. The President had also called Morocco and Mexico and others on the telephone and had written about ten letters. He himself had made about three or four phone calls. Mr. Kissinger added that he personally had gotten in touch with Prime Minister Heath, and had said that we understood the UK couldn't work with us, but also should not work against us.

Again recalling the voting pattern, Mr. Kissinger recalled that Uganda, which had a Communist friend on its border, Tanzania, had voted against us. Why was this? Foreign Minister Chow mentioned that the other side had worked 'round the clock and had wined and dined delegates; some had just simply been bought. Mr. Kissinger commented that two could play at that game. Anyway, it was a mistake not to look at the tactics. The Peking trip had not been a problem, not one country had changed its vote as a result. Mr. Kissinger added that he had thought the earliest the vote could have come was that same day, October 29. Foreign Minister Chow commented that we had lost momentum. One evening when the Soviet Mission had drawn the proceedings out the UN President could have called for a continuation the next morning.

Mr. Kissinger agreed, saying that we could have asked for adjournment. We then could have focused on the airplane hi-jack incident. In this madhouse if one didn't pay attention to the *New York Times*, we could delay. In addition, October 25 was a U.S. holiday, and we certainly could have used this as a delay. Mr. Kissinger noted that he was

speaking very candidly, and relied on the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador not to repeat what he was saying. He reiterated that he was very unhappy over the outcome of the voting. What we had done in Peking had to be done, because it fitted into our strategy, but our strategy was not to get the ROC out of the UN; rather it was to keep the ROC in. Did the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador think that we wanted a PRC delegation running around New York next week?

Foreign Minister Chow remarked that we had to defend Tokyo from pressures which were very heavy. With respect to Mr. Kissinger's Peking visit, he was of course in a closed society but had he noticed anything? Mr. Kissinger replied that he had seen literally nothing. As far as he could see, Chou En-lai had the same assurance that he possessed before. He was the chief person with whom Mr. Kissinger had dealt, and there was no visible change in his appearance or position. Mr. Holdridge mentioned that the PRC had made quite an effort to put Mr. Kissinger and the members of his party on public display, suggesting that they wanted the people to understand that the policy of improving relations with the U.S. enjoyed official sanction.

Foreign Minister Chow asked if Mr. Kissinger had seen or heard anything of Lin Piao. Mr. Kissinger replied that, no, he had not; nor had he asked about Lin Piao. In response to a question from Foreign Minister Chow about the convening of the National People's Congress, Mr. Kissinger stated that somebody had mentioned to him that it would be convened within the next year. Peking literally had not looked any different, and there had been no added military people in the streets. In fact, the military presence seemed less than had been the case in July.

Foreign Minister Chow returned to the subject of the UN voting and the question of getting a delay. Belgium had been very funny about this, and because the ROC was negotiating with the Belgians, they had delayed their announcement. They had tried to delay it somehow, but on the 25th couldn't delay more. In a way they were quite decent, and if they had voted earlier could have voted for or abstained. Mr. Kissinger asserted that he had never had any illusions about Belgium. He had told his people more than two months ago he had never thought that they would vote for us. He had been stationed there at the end of World War II, and knew their leaders, some of whom had been students of his. With two big leftist parties, they just delayed so we wouldn't be any madder at them than necessary.

Foreign Minister Chow declared that the ROC needed by hook or crook to stabilize its international relations. He referred to the King of Saudi Arabia as having gone all out for the ROC. Baroody was a clown, but the policy of the King was unquestionable. Foreign Minister Chow went on to say that in key centers the ROC had to arrest further

erosion. Mr. Kissinger informed the Foreign Minister that Ambassador Shen and he were staying in close consultation. We couldn't help the ROC too much openly, but could do a great deal behind the scenes. Foreign Minister Chow said that if there was evidence of U.S. support for the ROC, he hoped that after the initial period the shock would wear off. Mr. Kissinger assured the Foreign Minister that he would produce this evidence of support. The following week he would get a question put to Ziegler as to whether the UN vote affected U.S. support for Taiwan, and Ziegler would say no.⁸ The main thing that we should all do was not to attack each other. The ROC should do what it wanted to, but we would get this thing set next week, which was important for Peking to hear. If Ambassador Shen came to say that he had problems with certain countries, we would look into them. Foreign Minister Chow indicated that he was not planning to return to Taiwan too soon, in order to try and have a clearing period. He was not going to engage in a post-mortem.

Ambassador Shen wondered when the President's next press conference would take place, to which Mr. Kissinger said that the President would repeat our support for the ROC, but we would also get a statement out the following week. This matter should not be left unsettled, and if the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador agreed, we would come out with something on Monday or Tuesday.⁸ The President would raise it again in his press conference.⁹

⁸ Janka underlined the two previous sentences.

⁹ Attached but not printed were memoranda dated November 3, 11, 12, and 13 from Janka to Ziegler, requesting that he make explicit the U.S. treaty commitment to the ROC. On November 13 Janka wrote to Kissinger that Ziegler had not yet made the statement promised to the ROC officials. This issue was revisited on November 15; see Document 172.

170. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation Between Governor Reagan and President Chiang Kai-shek²

At Tab A is a State memorandum to you forwarding a memorandum of the conversation October 11 in Taipei between Governor Reagan and President Chiang Kai-shek.³ The principal points of interest are:

—Governor Reagan reaffirmed, on behalf of the President, our defense commitment to and continued interest in the ROC, and explained the rationale of the President's trip to mainland China.

—As regards the President's Peking trip, Chiang said he did not question the President's good intentions, but thought such a trip could not be justified unless essential to avert a major crisis, which does not now exist. Given the Soviet military presence on Peking's northern border, it cannot soon pose a serious threat to other Asian countries.

—Chiang was certain that Peking would aim its major efforts at extracting U.S. concessions on Taiwan.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A note on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

² On February 16 John M. Dunn, Military Assistant to the Vice President, informed Haig that Mike Deaver, an assistant to California Governor Ronald Reagan, had called to indicate Reagan's interest in making a trip to the Philippines, Japan, and other East Asian nations in the fall. "It was Mr. Deaver's understanding that the President had discussed the possibility with Governor Reagan of extending the trip to add certain other countries." (Ibid., Box 830, Name Files, Gov. Reagan) In a February 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig noted that he had asked Holdridge to develop scenarios for the trip. (Ibid.) Holdridge's March 11 memorandum discussed Reagan's possible visits to South Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea. Kissinger's handwritten comment on the memorandum reads: "I suggest Reagan go to Taiwan, October 10 [China's National Day] and that we handle rest of trip. Advise [illegible]." (Ibid.)

³ Attached but not printed. Reagan and McConaughy met with Chiang and Acting Foreign Minister Tschen Hiong-fei at the President's residence in Shih-lin at 10 a.m. The memorandum of conversation was forwarded to the White House by Eliot on October 26. (Ibid., Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX)

—Chiang asserted that the trip would only enhance Peking's prestige, and would be especially hurtful to his government.⁴

—Chiang wanted the President to know that he and his people would never permit a Chinese Communist takeover of Taiwan, and would fight to the last man if necessary to prevent it.

⁴ In a meeting with Nixon on November 17, Reagan observed that "the situation in Taiwan was understandably unsettled as a result of the China initiative but that in the final analysis he felt the people of Taiwan understood the reasons for the President's trip to Peking." (Memorandum for the President's File, November 17; *ibid.*, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 86, Memoranda for the President) According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon, Haig, and Reagan met in the Oval Office from 11:06 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files)

171. National Security Study Memorandum 141¹

Washington, November 12, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Implications for U.S. Policy of the Participation of the People's Republic of China in Multilateral Diplomacy

The President has directed that a study be made of the implications for U.S. policy and strategy of participation by the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, related agencies, and in multilateral negotiations. The study should provide a comprehensive survey of both the problems and the opportunities which the United States may face as a result of the entry of the People's Republic of China into multilateral diplomacy.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-188, NSSM Files, NSSM 141. Secret. Copies were sent to Moorer, Gerald Smith, and Russell E. Train (Chairman, Council of Environmental Quality). The memorandum was initiated by Haig. In a November 16 memorandum to De Palma, Cargo wrote that De Palma was to chair the group. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 141)

The study should, *inter alia*:

(a) Identify those conferences and negotiations (e.g., disarmament, trade, environment, law of the sea) in which the question of PRC participation is likely to create problems or opportunities;

(b) Identify major specific problems before, or likely to come before, the UN or its related agencies in which Chinese participation could significantly affect the U.S. position; and

(c) Identify and discuss the alternative courses of action available to the United States, including initiatives which the United States might take toward the People's Republic of China in connection with the specific international problems or activities identified in the paper. The discussion should include the advantages and disadvantages of each.

The study should be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. The views of the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, the Council on Environmental Quality and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be obtained where appropriate. The study should be submitted not later than December 1, 1971 for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

172. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 15, 1971, 12:08–12:49 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador James Shen, Republic of China

Henry Chen, Counselor, ROC Embassy

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger and Shen met in Kissinger's office. The time of the meeting is taken from Kissinger's Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) On a November 17 covering memorandum prepared by Holdridge, Kissinger indicated that he did not want further distribution of this document. Henry Chen, Political Counselor at the ROC Embassy, relayed a summary of this meeting to Charles T. Sylvester (EA/ROC) on December 1, to which was attached an unsigned December 10 note, which reads in part: "This one is marked for a very restrictive distribution because we know from earlier conversations with them that the Chinese were told by Kissinger to hold the information very closely and the implication was clear that State should not be informed." (Memorandum of conversation and covering note; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US)

SUBJECT

Mr. Kissinger's Trip to Peking and US–ROC Relations

Mr. Kissinger said that he owed Ambassador Shen something. He had been telling Mr. Ziegler for two weeks to “get that thing done”: (get a statement into a press briefing to the effect that US support for the ROC and for the Mutual Defense Treaty has not been affected by the Chinese representation vote in the UN), and then the thought was to get it into the President's press conference instead. However, the President forgot which reporter to ask, and asked the wrong fellow. The statement definitely would be made, though, either by Ziegler or by the President. We would see if it could be made next week. It was in our interest, and there was no question but that it would be done. We were not playing games.²

Continuing, Mr. Kissinger indicated that one of the problems in getting the statement made was finding an opportunity for a question which did not suggest that we had stimulated it. But the subject had not come up, and there was no good way to make the point. Mr. Kissinger noted that he would see if he could get Ziegler to do it in the next day or two. We didn't want it done ostentatiously so it could be said that the White House had planted the question. We wanted it to come up in a normal way. Ambassador Shen observed that if the matter was, in fact, coming up this was satisfactory for him.

Ambassador Shen asked Mr. Kissinger for information concerning his, Mr. Kissinger's trip to Peking. Mr. Kissinger began by referring, first, to the story in the *New York Times* of November 15 alleging that contact was being established between Washington and the PRC UN Delegation in New York.³ He firmly denied that any such contact was being established, or that we had any intention of doing so.

Ambassador Shen called the matter unimportant, adding, however, that at some point some contact was needed in order to take care of the many small details concerning the President's trip. Mr. Kissinger denied that we would have any such need. We of course had means of contacting the PRC, but not at New York. Ambassador Shen wondered whether the US might wish to contact the PRC in New York on

² See Document 169. At his November 30 press conference, Kissinger declared: “Our defense commitment remains unaffected. The question which I was asked was ‘Will we settle the future of Taiwan in Peking?’ My answer to that was: ‘It is our judgment that the future relationship between the People's Republic and Taiwan should be worked out between Taiwan and the People's Republic. So this is our policy, but it is without prejudice, as I have pointed out, to existing commitments.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 20, 1971, p. 709)

³ Tad Szulc, “U.S. and China Set 2-Tier Contacts,” *The New York Times*, November 15, 1971, p. 1.

bilateral matters—was this likely? Mr. Kissinger stated firmly that this was unlikely. It was his personal view that they did not want to create the impression their delegation in New York would be a Chinese Embassy. Their objective was to break up US relations with the ROC, but something like this would not be in their book. It would suggest acceptance of “two Chinas.”

Ambassador Shen turned again to the subject of Mr. Kissinger’s visit to Peking, asking for information as to what had gone on. Mr. Kissinger declared that he was having a helluva time convincing Ambassador Shen and the Japanese that what had happened was less than meets the eye. He had had to spend much time on technical matters, for example communications and similar details, in preparation for when the President went to Peking. He had no information to offer with respect to the Lin Piao thing. They hadn’t mentioned it, and we didn’t raise it.

Ambassador Shen asked, had Mr. Kissinger possibly heard anything from third country diplomats? Mr. Kissinger replied that he hadn’t seen any third country diplomats, nor had he seen any journalists. He of course had had access to international reports, but all his conversations with Chinese officials had more or less gone over the same ground as last time. As expected, they had stated their views to him with respect to Taiwan.

Ambassador Shen asked, had there been any changes since last July in the PRC attitude with respect to Taiwan? Mr. Kissinger said he hadn’t noted any, and had received no impression that they were planning any military operation against Taiwan. Ambassador Shen requested Mr. Kissinger to reiterate this statement which Mr. Kissinger did. Ambassador Shen went on to say that he did not find this unduly surprising, with the Chinese Communists having the Russians on their back. Mr. Kissinger commented that he had been about to say the same thing. He didn’t know how much the PRC attitude was a matter of self-restraint or of necessity.

Ambassador Shen wanted to know whether Mr. Kissinger’s impression in Peking on the second time was like that of the first—that Chou En-lai was in control, and there was no threat to his position. (*Note:* In referring to Chou En-lai, Ambassador Shen called him “Chow,” rhyming with “now,” although in previous conversations he had spoken of him as “Chou,” rhyming with “go.”) Mr. Kissinger stated that this was his impression. Again he had to say that he could only judge from the way Chou acted, but he didn’t know if any other person could possibly have spoken with confidence equal to that of Chou’s. Ambassador Shen remarked at this point that Chou En-lai had at one time been an actor on the stage. He had been a female impersonator in Peking Opera. (Mr. Kissinger left the room to receive a

telephone call, and Ambassador Shen explained to Mr. Holdridge that Chou En-lai had been an amateur performer, not a professional.)

Returning to the room, Mr. Kissinger noted that it was very tough for him to tell, but his guess was that Chou acted in a way to suggest that he was in complete charge. Mr. Holdridge referred to the fact that the PRC leaders had made a point of putting Mr. Kissinger and the other Americans on public display in Peking, which suggested confidence in their ability to implement a controversial policy. Ambassador Shen recalled that there had indeed been many pictures of Mr. Kissinger and Chinese leaders visiting public places.

Ambassador Shen asked, when was the President going to Peking? Mr. Kissinger said that the date had not been announced yet, but would be no later than two months before the President's Moscow visit, or the end of March. He would let Ambassador Shen know before the public announcement.

Reverting to the subject of Taiwan, Ambassador Shen wondered whether Mr. Kissinger had been discouraged over Chou En-lai's talk about Taiwan. Mr. Kissinger replied that, no, he hadn't been, nor were we going to give up our defense commitment to Taiwan. Chou En-lai knew this. Ambassador Shen asked if this wasn't an inconsistency, to which Mr. Kissinger remarked that this was Chou's problem. Mr. Kissinger went on to say that he was assuming Chou was moving toward the US for his own necessities and not for sentimental reasons, and so long as these necessities existed, Chou would find a way to overcome or ignore the inconsistencies.

Ambassador Shen asked, what did the US want them, the ROC, to do? Mr. Kissinger responded emphatically that we wanted them to stay alive, and to maintain their integrity and their identity. We would do what we could to support them, and to keep them in as many international organizations as possible. He didn't know what specific things Ambassador Shen had in mind, but we were not going to change our bilateral relations with the ROC.

Did Mr. Kissinger visualize a second Marshall Mission, Ambassador Shen inquired? Mr. Kissinger replied, "absolutely not." Any such initiative would not come from us, but we were pretty well protected because Peking wouldn't accept a new Marshall Mission anyway.

Ambassador Shen wondered what Mr. Kissinger thought of rumors in Hong Kong to the effect that the ROC had opened contact with the PRC. To this, Mr. Kissinger observed that if the ROC asked us about contacts, we might say to make them but would not take the initiative. Speaking personally, Mr. Kissinger said he thought that the ROC would be very ill-advised to do this—they would be under no pressure or even advice from this Administration to make contacts with the PRC. If they did this, it was their problem.

Ambassador Shen asked Mr. Kissinger how far ahead was he looking—was it five, or maybe ten years? Mr. Kissinger said that he felt ten years was a long time, and a period of five years was more likely. However, this was only because so many things could happen, for example, after the death of Mao China could split into five to ten competing power centers. Ambassador Shen agreed.

In elaboration of what he had just said, Mr. Kissinger observed that no one could predict what could happen after Mao's death. If Lin Piao had indeed been ousted, how would the succession to Mao be managed? Who would take what positions? We simply didn't know the answers to these questions. Ambassador Shen speculated that Mao might be succeeded by collective leadership involving a part of the army, to which Mr. Kissinger declared that collective leadership hadn't worked in the USSR and might not work out any better in the PRC. Since a civil war had barely been avoided with Mao's authority, how could it be avoided without Mao?

Ambassador Shen expressed the opinion that the President's visit would work more to Chou En-lai's advantage than to the President's. Chou needed help in the struggle for power, and while Yeh Chien-ying had been brought into the picture to fill the image vacuum created by Lin Piao's fall, Yeh was not capable of commanding the allegiance of much of the Red Army. Mr. Kissinger commented that Yeh had not struck him as being an energetic man. Ambassador Shen pointed out that Yeh was 72 or 73. Previously he had had much to do with South-east Asia and the Vietnam war. Yeh was a Hakka, from the eastern Kwangtung Coast, and had been given authority over Kwangsi, Yunnan, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Yeh's prestige could be particularly useful now. As people on Taiwan looked at what was happening on the mainland, it appeared to be an attempt by Mao with Chou's assistance to put down the army, which had become too powerful, and too demanding. There was a chance that the army might "run away" (get out of control). Chou had succeeded in dislodging Liu Shao-ch'i because Liu didn't have any army support, but in trying to dislodge the army now he could run into serious repercussions because Lin Piao had the support of half of the PLA. Did this mean the PLA air force, Mr. Kissinger asked? Ambassador Shen replied that he didn't know, but the air force was squarely in the middle of things in countries such as the PRC. Mr. Kissinger observed that such was not the case in the US—we kept it from being so.

Referring to what Mr. Kissinger had said about seeing five years ahead, Ambassador Shen asked, then what? What would be the set-up on mainland China, and would there be a separate status for Taiwan? Was the status of Taiwan going to change? According to Mr. Kissinger, one of two possible situations could occur: the first was that there could

be negotiations between Peking and Taiwan, and the other was that Taiwan would develop more and more in the direction of a separate status. (Ambassador Shen said he felt that this could happen.) Continuing, Mr. Kissinger spoke of a third possible situation—that of civil war breaking out on the mainland, with Taiwan aligning with one of the factions later on.

Ambassador Shen remarked at this point that by moving into relations with Peking the US was precluding such things from happening. Mr. Kissinger asserted that the ROC would see that the relationship that we developed with the PRC would not be a love-feast. We would be courteous with one another, but many points of difference would remain.

Ambassador Shen asked for Mr. Kissinger's thoughts on what the ROC should do now—sit tight and work harder? Mr. Kissinger's reply was, "what are your choices?" For now the ROC should work hard, sit tight, and see what happened. In Mr. Kissinger's opinion, the ROC should not do anything precipitate. He assured Ambassador Shen that if they waited until we were in Peking, they would see that we would not sell them out. Whatever happened would happen very slowly. They would be very foolish to commit suicide in order to avoid death. Ambassador Shen asked if Mr. Kissinger saw death coming, and Mr. Kissinger answered "no." His judgment was that if the ROC could maintain itself, the situation could change in a dramatic way. We had no intention of withdrawing recognition from it.

Ambassador Shen mentioned that if the US–ROC defense pact was reduced to a shadow, the ROC would have difficulty buying military spares from the U.S. In fact, he had already been informed that the Department of State was holding up approval on the sale of some military spares. Mr. Kissinger expressed considerable surprise at this, and strongly declared that such was not our policy. He told Ambassador Shen to give him concrete examples, and reiterated that it was absolutely not our policy to cut the ROC off from equipment or spare parts. Mr. Holdridge confirmed that there was no such policy. Mr. Kissinger once again requested Ambassador Shen to give Mr. Holdridge any facts about the ROC being unable to get equipment or spare parts. We were not going to do things like this; if we were going to do them, it would be much more honest to tell the ROC. But we were not about to throttle their defenses. There might be some doubt about new weapons, but that was the case even before the Peking trip. This was definitely not our policy on parts. As an indication of our attitude, Mr. Kissinger mentioned that we had approved the training of ROC sub crews.

Ambassador Shen noted that in talking about equipment he meant M-48 tanks, and the parts he had in mind referred to those for use in

smaller tanks which were already on Taiwan. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that this was not our policy, and that Ambassador Shen should give Mr. Holdridge the facts. With these in hand he could call the State Department and be able to respond if they said there was nothing to it. Unless there was some technical reason, for example, the parts in question were not made anymore, the ROC would get them within one month.

Ambassador Shen recalled that in a previous conversation he had asked if Mr. Kissinger saw normalization with the PRC as coming during the President's first term, or later, and that Mr. Kissinger had said later. Did the UN thing have any effect on this time-table? Mr. Kissinger replied in the negative. Nothing which had occurred in the UN had any effect on the timing. To a surmise by Ambassador Shen that if anything would happen, it would take place in 1973, Mr. Kissinger said that he didn't think anything would happen in 1973 either. Again, nothing had been affected by the UN vote. Ambassador Shen remarked that he expected to see the President here in the White House in 1973. Mr. Kissinger agreed.

As a final point, Ambassador Shen mentioned that the ROC was seriously interested in staying on in the world bank group.⁴ Mr. Kissinger stated that he had spoken the day before to Secretary Connally on this, who had said he would do everything to keep the ROC on in the IMF, World Bank, etc. Secretary Connally had talked to the ROC Ambassador in Saigon, had been much impressed with him, and had said following this conversation that he would move heaven and earth on the ROC's behalf. Mr. Kissinger again said that his advice to the ROC was to sit tight. He did not see any blow to them next year or in the next year and a half, and could say with certainty or almost certainty there was nothing on the horizon right now. Ambassador Shen asked if he might come in from time to time, and Mr. Kissinger strongly assented.

⁴ See Documents 237 and 245.

173. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

My November 23 Meeting with Ambassador Huang Hua, Permanent PRC Representative to the UN²

I met secretly with Ambassador Huang Hua, Peking's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, for two hours in New York on Tuesday night, November 23. He was accompanied by their Deputy Permanent Representative, Ch'en Ch'u, who is also the Director of the Information Department in the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and an interpreter. On our side were Ambassador Bush, General Haig, and Winston Lord.

The meeting served to establish this new channel for UN matters as agreed to by both governments through our regular channel, to make arrangements for future communication, and to begin discussions on such UN issues as South Asia, a new Secretary-General, and the Middle East.³ The Ambassador, whom I had met in Peking in July and has since been the PRC Ambassador in Ottawa, was affable but cautious. He generally cited his government's public statements as the approach they would take in New York. It was abundantly clear from Huang's

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

² The 19-page memorandum of conversation is *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 68.

³ On November 16 Walters met with Chinese officials at the PRC Embassy in Paris where he passed along Kissinger's suggestion that they open a second channel of communications through the PRC's UN delegation in New York. Kissinger's message reads: "The US intends to use Paris as the primary channel for communications on major and longer-range policy issues and sensitive questions unless it receives a contrary view from Peking. There will be, however, a number of policy issues arising in New York requiring early decision on which a more rapid contact may be necessary than would be possible through our arrangement in Paris." Instructions to Walters, November 15, and memorandum of record and message for the Chinese, November 16, are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. At a November 20 meeting in Paris, the PRC accepted the plan for talks in New York, to be held with Huang Hua. Walter's memorandum of record, November 20, is *ibid.* Lord contacted Huang at the Roosevelt Hotel on November 21 to arrange for a meeting by Howe on the 22. Lord's memorandum for the record, November 22, is *ibid.* Howe provided the PRC representatives with information on a suitable meeting place for the November 23 meeting with Kissinger. Howe's memorandum for the record, November 22, is *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 62, 67, 68, 69, and 70.

performance that the PRC was surprised to gain admission to the UN this year, that it was not particularly enthusiastic about its entrance, and that its delegation is feeling its way in an unfamiliar environment.

Following are the highlights of the session, which took place in a small apartment on the East Side, hastily arranged by CIA.

The Private Channel and Public Performance

We confirmed our agreement with the Chinese that Huang Hua and I would secretly exchange views on “relevant major questions of principle within the scope of the work of the United Nations.” We will communicate only on subjects of major importance, such as South Asia, at least until your visit, when various issues may become clearer. When consultations are necessary, we will decide on an ad hoc basis how each issue should be handled between us, and establish understandings which could then be implemented by Ambassador Bush in New York. I pointed out that it was in our mutual interest that we don’t appear to be cooperating visibly, and I made clear that we did not seek a great deal of contact.

After complimenting the Ambassador on how the PRC had turned aside requests from Democratic candidates to visit China, I emphasized the need for restraint in public statements between now and your visit. I said our side would avoid polemics, and pointed to their opening UN speech on November 15 as fodder for domestic opponents of your China policy. Many parties would like to derail your initiative; therefore while both sides would clearly stand by their convictions, we both had to be alert to this problem. I said that Vietnam was a particularly sensitive subject, a pointed reference to statements coming out of Peking during North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong’s current visit there.

South Asia

This took up the bulk of our time. I explained our approach both generally and in the United Nations; Ambassador Huang Hua referred to their public statements and reaffirmed PRC support for Pakistan.

I said that we knew what the Indians were up to, and I repeated our intention to cut off assistance if they clearly launched aggression. We were alleviating the suffering and economic dislocation of the refugees, having given more to this effort than the rest of the world put together; we had earmarked \$250 million for humanitarian relief in East Pakistan; and we favored a political solution of the problem and had taken many steps in this direction.

Reemphasizing that we would not accept military aggression by India, I outlined what we were currently doing to prevent hostilities,

including our approaches to New Delhi, Moscow, and Islamabad, our consideration of UN action, and our approaches to the British and Germans.

Ambassador Huang Hua pointed to Chou's statements to me, their note in the other channel, their Foreign Minister's speech during Bhutto's visit in Peking, and their recent speech in the UN as representing Peking's basic position.⁴ This adds up to strong backing of Pakistan, including military assistance, but falls short of a commitment to send troops in the event of hostilities.

I outlined the type of resolution we were considering, and he said that they would have to study it.⁵ He inquired, and I confirmed, that we would probably not propose a Resolution but would work toward one that might have a restraining impact. He indicated the PRC's unenthusiastic resignation to the prospect of Security Council action, saying it was out of their hands. I pointed out that it was in our mutual interest not to appear to have positions too close on this issue, thus establishing the fact that we will have to be more evenhanded than they.

I assured him that we would not force the pace on this issue and would give them advance information on anything that we know would occur. My efforts to elicit more precise positions on their part were fruitless, as he clearly was restricting himself to their public statements and to assessing the situation as it evolves.

Ambassador Huang asked for our assessment of the military situation and I gave him the rundown of our latest intelligence estimates.

Successor to U Thant

I said that we would take into account their views on U Thant's successor, making it clear that I did not expect an answer at this time.

⁴ In their November 20 meeting with Walters in Paris, the PRC representatives handed over a note claiming that India was interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs, and that the PRC supported President Yahya Khan's proposal for a mutual withdrawal from the border areas. The note concluded: "Should Pakistan be subjected to aggression by India, China will support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle. China already made public its above stand during the visit of the Pakistan Delegation to China. China has also agreed to continue to provide military assistance. It is hoped that the United States will exert its influence to prevent the further deterioration of the situation through persuasion."

⁵ After receiving instructions from Haig, on November 28, Walters met with Huang Chen on November 29 to discuss the situation in South Asia. He detailed U.S. diplomatic efforts regarding India and Pakistan and provided a draft Security Council resolution. Haig's instructions and Walters' memorandum of record are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. On December 3 Howe delivered a note to the PRC's UN delegation in New York, updating them on U.S. efforts and suggesting that Kissinger and Huang Hua meet on December 10 to discuss South Asia, a successor to UN Secretary General U Thant, and other issues. Message for the Chinese and Howe's memorandum for the record, December 4, are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 71, 72, and 73.

He asked our views, and I said that we had not made any final judgment but had a slight leaning toward Jacobson at this point. The only candidate we had ruled out was Herrera.

He stated that they were unfamiliar with all the candidates and were still studying the situation. He pointed out that our official rejection of Herrera had put them in an awkward position when they were asked about his candidacy. I said that we would give them advance warning of any new official positions on the various candidates that we might take. He wondered whether there was anything to the suggestions that U Thant might stay on for a brief interim period while a successor was chosen; Ambassador Bush and I knocked down this possibility, saying that a decision was needed by January 1.

The Middle East

He raised this subject, asking in particular how it might be treated in the United Nations. I briefly recounted the negotiating history—the bilaterals with the Soviet Union, the Four Power talks in the UN, and our recent intermediary role. Ambassador Bush and I pointed out that no serious discussion had really been held among the Four Powers. I mentioned in low key that we would not be opposed to their participation in this forum, and he emphasized that the PRC was not interested in joining these talks.

I said that we had hoped that negotiations would move away from discussions of theoretical formulations toward concrete progress, and I pointed out the difficulties which had arisen over an interim settlement which we had thought was important to show movement. Our immediate efforts in the UN debate would be to prevent exacerbation of feeling on both sides, as well as more rigid commitment by the Israelis to existing lines. I explained that making too absolute demands on Israel had the practical tendency of making it easier for it to dig in.

Taiwan Independence Demonstrations

I preempted this subject, knowing their sensitivities and the fact that there had been some recent demonstrations around their hotel. I reaffirmed that there was no US official involvement in these demonstrations. We could and would not interfere in demonstrations so long as they were legal and orderly. I pointed out that you had been the target of larger demonstrations than they. Ambassador Huang did not press the issue, but pointed out that there had been increasing Taiwan independence activities recently in the US and in other places, such as Japan. I repeated what I had told Chou En-lai, namely that we would not encourage or participate in such movements.

The meeting ended with agreement on future contacts and additional pleasantries. I repeated that we would do anything that we could to make their stay in New York more comfortable.

**174. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China
to the Department of State¹**

Taipei, November 30, 1971, 1130Z.

5869. Eyes Only for the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Green. Subj: Conversation of Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-kun With Ambassador.²

1. Following is an account of an important presentation which Foreign Vice Minister Yang Hsi-kun made to me end of last week at a tete-a-tete luncheon. Its extremely sensitive nature will be self-evident. I feel any additional distribution should be severely restricted but undoubtedly White House should be aware of it. I hope that Green will be in a position to discuss it with me preliminarily when I see him in Honolulu next week.

2. H.K. Yang launched almost immediately into discussion of critical situation facing GRC following October 25 expulsion from UN. He recalled he had told President Chiang last winter that withdrawal from UN would mean "eventual political suicide" for GRC. Expulsion amounted to about the same thing as withdrawal, and he feared that the increasing isolation that the Chinese Communists can force on the GRC from their improved position within the UN will mean the rapidly increasing besiegement and eventual strangulation of the GRC unless drastic change is undertaken immediately.

3. Yang continued that he has spoken very privately and frankly to President Chiang since his recent return after the UN debacle. Yang had found President Chiang impressively open-minded and willing to listen. Yang said he had spelled out the full depth of his misgivings and had indicated in a general way the sweeping nature of the changes which he felt would be mandatory if not only the GRC but the future of the people on Taiwan is to be preserved. He characterized the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

² This was not the first time that Yang had spoken with Americans about the Republic of China's foreign policy and domestic politics. In July Yang met with McCaughy to discuss his efforts to have the ROC "keep its representatives in any diplomatic capital or in UN or any multilateral organization where they will be accepted." Yang noted that Chiang was in "virtual isolation" in order to consider "the crises facing the GRC." (Telegram 3541 from Taipei, July 20; *ibid.*, UN 6 CHICOM) On November 3 Yang made similar statements to Green (memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*) and to U. Alexis Johnson and Brown (memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Memcons, 1971).

President as not necessarily concurring in any proposed changes but as showing a profound awareness of the existing realities and dangers and a willingness to examine the case for far-reaching changes in the existing structure.

4. Yang said he had told the President that it is of paramount importance to issue in the near future a formal declaration to the world that the government on Taiwan is entirely separate and apart from the government on the Mainland and that henceforth the government here will “have nothing to do with the Mainland.” The declaration should prescribe a new designation for the government here, namely “the Chinese Republic of Taiwan.” It would be stipulated that the term Chinese did not have any political connotation but was used merely as a generic term stemming from the Chinese ethnic origin of the populace on Taiwan. It would be used in a way similar to the manner in which the various Arab countries use “Arab” in their official governmental titles.

5. Yang said that most of the President’s top advisers around the President see the need for some sort of sweeping move to counter the ChiCom drive to isolate the GRC internationally and force general recognition of ChiCom right to take over Taiwan as an integral part of China. It does not mean they necessarily endorse his formula but they are showing some resilience in the face of the crisis and are open to persuasion.

6. He said that the principal negative, stand-pat influence was exerted by Mme. Chiang who seems determined not to budge an inch from the old claims, pretensions and “return to the Mainland” slogans. He believes she still wields considerable influence on the President. He said she in turn is greatly influenced by her nephew, K.L. Kung, the son of Mme. Chiang’s elder sister and her deceased husband H.H. Kung. He said K.L. Kung from the security of his New York residence is waging a reactionary campaign for the GRC to stand absolutely rigid. He termed K.L. Kung’s influence extremely malign. He said that K.L. Kung is very vocal in various influential quarters. Yang said that he had refused to see K.L. Kung on his trips to New York in recent years despite various requests from Kung. Yang spoke contemptuously of the Soong–Kung family group as fanatically advocating a die-hard line, although he said most of them were among the first to retreat to safety when the Communists moved.

7. Yang said that when Chang Chun was in Japan last summer, he had a very significant talk with Prime Minister Sato and ex-Prime Minister Kishi. After that talk Sato and Kishi transmitted a closely-guarded message to President Chiang through Chang Chun to the effect that the only hope for the future of the Republic of China was to adopt a course of separation, giving up all Mainland claims and pretensions.

The message strongly urged President Chiang to adopt such a course. He felt sure that CCK knew of the message but he believed that neither Vice President C.K. Yen nor Foreign Minister S.K. Chow knew about it.

8. Yang said that in his view the President in making the sort of declaration described should concurrently, or very soon thereafter, use his emergency powers to set aside the Constitution and dissolve all of the parliamentary type bodies. He should then set up a new unicameral provisional representative body to be composed of two-thirds Taiwanese and one-third Mainlanders. A new cabinet should be formed with some Taiwanese and some younger men included. He said a new image needed to be created with the government freed of the outworn trappings, encumbrances and shibboleths of the party and the establishment. He said the emergency decree of the President should provide for an island-wide referendum with universal suffrage to determine the future status of Taiwan and provide for a constituent body. Yang indicated further that he felt that the President might do well to make these fundamental moves next spring just before the end of his current term, and then move up to an emeritus position as head of the reformed party and revered elder statesman (somewhat parallel to Mao's position), with C.K. Yen taking over as Chief of State and Chiang Ching-kuo as Premier.

9. Yang identified George Yeh and Y.S. Tsiang as associated with his thinking.³ He identified as top officials who are concerned, realistic and open-minded, but not yet committed: Vice President C.K. Yen, Presidential Secretary General Chang Chun, Director of the National Security Council Huang Shao-ku, and Secretary of the KMT Chang Pao-shu.

10. Yang said no member of the current cabinet is informed of his thinking and none of them are involved or likely to take a position. He spoke rather deprecatingly of Foreign Minister S.K. Chow as not inclined to become exposed and he said K.T. Li and Y.S. Sun were nonpolitical in the sense he was talking about. He added that former Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming was entirely out of the picture, also.

11. Yang said that although President Chiang is increasingly convinced of the imperative requirement for some early and radical ac-

³ George Yeh was Foreign Minister, 1949–1958, and Ambassador to the United States, 1958–1961. "Y.S. Tsiang" is an apparent reference to Tsiang Ting-fu, Ambassador to the United States, 1962–1965.

tion, he is not likely to move without the application of a powerful persuasive effort by the US Government. He felt that Vice President Agnew would be the right man to present the US position and make the major effort, supported of course by myself. He felt that Agnew even with direct message and mandate from President Nixon would need the help of an advance group of private American citizens who are old and close friends of President Chiang and completely trusted by him. (Presumably he has in mind such personages as Dr. Judd, Admiral Radford, ex-Senator Knowland and General Wedemeyer.) He said even Americans who know China can hardly visualize how difficult it will be for the President to fly in the face of all the deepest traditions and articles of faith by which he, his government and his people have lived since departure from the Mainland. Such a reversal of the course would be traumatic in the extreme. But he felt that the President is showing incredible adaptability and flexibility for a man of such advanced age. He had not yet given in to the urgings of his wife and he is keeping his options open.

12. Yang indicated that he had shared some but not all of what he had just said with Ambassador Christopher Phillips at USUN Headquarters.⁴ I gather that Phillips is the only other American representative who has been even partially clued in. Yang said he knew he did not need to urge on me the extreme and vital sensitivity of the subject and the absolutely overriding need of total security. Any leak would be disastrous and he hoped the number of persons informed could be kept to the absolute minimum of those who had to know in order to support the handful of senior officials who should be involved on the US side.

Comment: I have reported this conversation at length because it seems so pertinent to the kind of study you have requested regarding the prospect of US–Taiwan relations.⁵ I should emphasize, however,

⁴ Christopher Phillips, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations. No record of this conversation has been found.

⁵ “The Future of Taiwan” grew out of a September 30 memorandum from Kissinger, not found. According to handwritten notes on a November 15 memorandum from Linwood Starbird (EA/ROC) through Brown to Green, Starbird and Brown discussed Kissinger’s request and decided to expand its focus from succession and contingency planning for the ROC to a more general discussion of Taiwan’s future. Although Starbird wrote that the paper was to be submitted to the NSC’s Washington Special Actions Group by December 10, there is no record that it was discussed in subsequent WSAG meetings. (National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, Political Files (1964–1972), POL 1–1 Contingency Planning) On November 30 Brown submitted the 12-page paper (drafted in EA/ROC) to U. Alexis Johnson. (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 TAIWAN) See Document 208.

that although H.K. Yang is an important and highly responsible official, his views reflect the outer dimension of tolerable concepts and undoubtedly go beyond the point where practical considerations are likely to lead the government in the near future. Yang himself is imaginative and broad-gauged; he is also bold and seems to feel adequately protected to pursue his proposals. However, he tends to underrate the practical complications that inescapably concern the principal ROC leaders, or he rather casually seeks to enlist external intervention to help overcome resistance from his fellow countrymen. For example, there is not much real prospect that President Chiang would sweep away institutions and commitments of the past and establish a legislature composed of two-thirds Taiwanese and one-third Mainlanders. Similarly Yang probably underestimates the domestic and foreign consequences of changing the ROC's international identity.

14. Nevertheless, Yang's views strike me as highly important, both as an indication of the direction in which some responsible officials are thinking and as a symbol of the considerable ferment developing on Taiwan concerning the future. In brief, the evolution of US China policy and the UN defeat have precipitated some of the thinking that many would not have expected at least until President Chiang departed the scene.

McConaughy

175. Response to NSSM 141¹

Washington, December 3, 1971.

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

PRC AND US OBJECTIVES AND ATTITUDES

Introduction

The PRC will combine three elements in its multilateral diplomacy. It will make common cause with the less developed world and attempt to marshal sentiment against “superpower domination” and “collusion”. Yet, since the PRC is in fact a big power with interests that differ from those of the small countries, it will in some cases act pragmatically and take stands that substitute ideology to practical interest. Finally, sooner or later the PRC will, like everyone else, find it necessary to engage in some logrolling in order to accomplish its objectives. We expect the first of the elements will be the most prominent for some time.

The combination of Third World leadership aspirations with pragmatism is the essence of the Chou line which emerged victorious after the Cultural Revolution. It would take a major internal change in China to alter those essentials of PRC policy.

The PRC’s immediate political objective will be to make sure that the ROC does not remain in any UN-related organizations or participate in international conferences. It will press for international recognition that Taiwan is an integral part of China and will insist that the ROC cannot take part in international organizations or conferences under any name. At the same time, there may be a wide range of organizations and conferences in which it will choose not to participate actively. These may include for the foreseeable future the international financial institutions.

Although it may hold back until it can appraise the results of the President’s visit, we can anticipate a major PRC effort to isolate the US on the Taiwan question within the UN and possibly gain UNGA approval for a resolution recommending the end of the US “occupation” of Taiwan.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 141. Secret. The response was submitted by De Palma, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group for NSSM 141, on December 3. A December 3 note in the file by Herz stated: “The NSC Staff has agreed that NSSM 141 should be regarded essentially as a briefing paper.” The NSC staff distributed the paper on December 7 with a covering memorandum that stated that it would be discussed at a Senior Review Group meeting on December 8. No meeting was held however. (Both *ibid.*) NSSM 141 is printed as Document 171.

It is apparent that the PRC is not yet familiar enough with the issues and tactical problems to engage itself actively on all subjects before the UN and in international conferences. It will therefore enter multilateral diplomacy slowly, sending representatives to selected agencies and conferences where it sees clear opportunities to pose as the friend of the weak against the strong, or to achieve specific national interest objectives. Examples include the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and conferences on the environment and law of the sea. The PRC may refuse to participate in organizations or conferences in which participation would tend to compromise its non-superpower image or would conflict with already announced PRC policy: e.g. disarmament conferences limited to militarily significant countries.

Given its desire to become the leader of the "Third World" and its antagonistic posture vis-à-vis the US, USSR and Japan, the PRC will be especially radical on colonial and economic development issues, placing ideology and propaganda ahead of practicability. Similarly, it will press for radical disarmament measures, both to embarrass the US and USSR and, when necessary, to protect itself against lesser measures which would interfere with its own nuclear aspirations (much as the French have done). In a number of cases, we can expect that disagreements between the PRC and the USSR may impede progress toward desired goals (e.g. disarmament) or may add more heat to already difficult situations (e.g. Southern Africa). This will add to our difficulties, but in some cases it could also afford us opportunities since common-sense solutions offered by us will contrast better with unworkable, propagandistic Communist proposals.

Yet in the long run, to succeed in the leadership role it seems to be intent on asserting, Peking will have to demonstrate that multilateral diplomacy can, with PRC participation, produce results and reach agreements more satisfactory to the Afro-Asian states than those reached prior to PRC entry into the UN. Therefore, although we anticipate that PRC statements will continue to reflect a sharp tone whenever there is a tempting ideological target, the need to achieve results should eventually force the PRC to adopt more pragmatic bargaining positions and become more willing to reach compromise settlements, especially when such settlements are acceptable to the Third World.

We do not know to what extent the PRC intends to use international forums for negotiation of Asian problems. In this paper we discuss only the problems and opportunities in connection with possible UN discussions of the Korea and Taiwan issues, and more briefly Vietnam and Cambodia. PRC attitudes toward Japan will also be a problem for us in the multilateral context, but are not discussed here. It must be noted, however, that the entry of the PRC into the UN makes

the Japanese goal of a permanent seat on the Security Council more difficult to attain.

What we ourselves do in the UN and related international bodies should be designed in general to:

—facilitate an early and active participation by the PRC in a wide variety of UN activities where its presence is inevitable or where a basis for cooperation with it exists;

—discourage the PRC from looking at these institutions from a purely political and propaganda point of view and try to engage it in substantive discussions of mutual advantage;

—preserve a place for the ROC on the international scene, at least as a party to economic arrangements.²

Peking's participation in the UN offers some potential opportunities to further US policy objectives. While at first Peking is likely to crowd the Soviets toward more radical positions, the PRC may also in some cases tend to push the Soviets closer to positions taken by other major powers. For example, if Peking should endorse the more radical Arab positions on the issue of a Middle Eastern settlement the Soviets may find it advisable to work for more realistic solutions in keeping with the mainstream of Arab policy.

In the field of arms control, even though its initial contribution is likely to be largely propagandistic, the participation of the PRC could lead to its engagement in mutually advantageous arrangements, for instance on non-proliferation.

Peking's participation also creates at least a theoretical possibility for reexamining the original UN concept for peacekeeping, centered on the role of the Military Staff Committee. While it will take time to establish Peking's interest in formal peacekeeping measures, we may find it useful ultimately to explore the feasibility of revitalizing the UN Charter's original peacekeeping concept. Even if this proves impossible, we shall want to see if Peking's presence enhances the possibility of moving the Soviets toward agreement on reasonable arrangements for consent-type peacekeeping missions.

It goes without saying that if Peking displays an interest in UN discussions relating to population, drug abuse, and environment, these discussions should also benefit from the PRC's presence. It may take some time to determine Peking's stance on this array of issues, however.

² *Note:* The evolving US/ROC relationship is the subject of a separate study. Pending availability of that study, which will provide the basis for decisions about defending the ROC's position in multilateral organizations, we assume that we will wish to keep the ROC engaged in multilateral diplomacy where it is reasonable and feasible, but without a great expenditure of diplomatic capital. [Footnote in the source text. See Document 208.]

Perhaps the most interesting possibility opened up by Peking's participation is that of some form of UN political mediation between India and Pakistan. On the assumption that none of the five permanent SC members will see its interest served by an outbreak of major hostilities between India and Pakistan, the Security Council could perhaps play a role in preventing major hostilities and promoting a political settlement in East Pakistan. Peking's link with Pakistan will balance Moscow's with India and might conceivably establish a basis for a UN effort in which the five Permanent Members could help restrain Indian military moves while permitting a political solution in East Pakistan.

No difficult policy choices have surfaced in preparing this paper.³ The problems are essentially tactical, how best to obtain PRC cooperation in particular cases, how best to deal with expected troublesome PRC actions, how best to protect some remaining ROC positions without a major expenditure of diplomatic capital. Common sense usually suggests the limits within which the answers will have to be found. It is clear that we must soon consult with the PRC on the next UN Secretary General. We shall have to deal with them when the India/Pakistan and Middle East issues are discussed in the UN. Tactical decisions will also soon have to be made on how to open the door for PRC participation in the discussions of arms limitation and oceans policy.

[Omitted here are 46 pages of text divided into the following sections: On-Going Negotiations (Arms Limitations, Ocean Problems, Peacekeeping, and Outer Space); Political Issues (Korea, Middle East, India-Pakistan, Southern Africa, Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Micronesia, Specialized Agencies); Economic and Social Issues (Environment, Drug Control, Other Economic and Social Questions, and Red Cross Conference); and Institutional Arrangements (PRC and ROC Adherence to Conventions, UN Finances, Secretary General, and PRC Personnel in UN and Specialized Agencies).]

³ On December 22 Wright, with the concurrence of Kennedy and Holdridge, suggested to Kissinger that he issue a NSDM that "instructs the bureaucracy to deliberately eschew progress on the issues, in so far as this is constructively possible, until the President's visit has clarified the new US–Chinese relationship, and perhaps provided a better basis for cooperation than that which now appears to exist." Kissinger did not issue the NSDM. Wright's memorandum and the draft NSDM are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—general—November 1971–February 26, 1972.

176. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, December 10, 1971, 6:05–7:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations
and Ambassador to Canada

Ch'en Ch'u, PRC Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and
Director, Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

T'ang Wen'sheng, Interpreter

Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador George Bush, US Representative to the United Nations

Brig. General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Winston Lord, Senior NSC Staff Member

Dr. Kissinger: I see you in the newspapers all the time. You're a great publicity expert. And very argumentative.

Ambassador Huang: No, I always argue in self-defense.

Ch'en Ch'u: He counterattacks in self-defense.

Dr. Kissinger: Preemptive attack.

Mr. Ambassador, what we have is not strictly UN business, but our contact in Paris is not there.

Miss T'ang: Mr. Walters?

Dr. Kissinger: He is not in Paris right now. He is going to be with the President in the Azores.

This may turn out to become UN business, but we wanted the Prime Minister urgently to know certain things we are doing. Therefore we have taken the liberty of this slightly irregular procedure. (Ambassador Huang nods.)

The apartment is slightly improved over last time. Next time we meet we will really have a suitable place. (Looking at a Chinese scroll on the wall) There seems to be a wandering Chinese painting that we hang up every time we have an apartment. (Chinese laughter.) I hope those sentences are friendly.

Ambassador Huang: I can't see them from such a distance.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to a December 15 attached covering memorandum from Lord, Kissinger approved this memorandum. No summary of this meeting for the President was found.

Ch'en Ch'u: (Looking at the scroll) It is an ancient poem.

Dr. Kissinger: I have some great colored pictures of you (Ch'en). I will send them to you. They were taken at the Great Wall.

Let me explain to you what we have done in various categories. Incidentally, just so everyone knows exactly what we do, we tell you about our conversations with the Soviets; we do not tell the Soviets about our conversations with you. In fact, we don't tell our own colleagues that I see you. George Bush is the only person outside the White House who knows I come here.

You know we have made a number of public declarations about India. I held what is known as a press backgrounder this week in which I pointed out that India is at fault. I will give you the text of it before you leave so that you can read it. And we will continue to pursue this line publicly.

You know what we have done in the United Nations so there is no point in reviewing this with you.

In addition we have taken other measures. We have canceled \$87 million of loans to India and \$14 million of military equipment.

Ambassador Huang: \$40 million or \$14 million?

Dr. Kissinger: \$14 million. But in addition, there is \$17 million due to be purchased which fell through because we aren't issuing new licenses. So the net cancellation amounted to \$31 million. In fact, we have canceled the entire military equipment line to India. There is no military equipment going to India. This means specifically we have canceled all radar equipment for defense in the north.

Then we have two other items due to be signed this week that we are not signing, and that we have no intention of signing. One is an agreement for \$72 million worth of food, PL 480.

Miss T'ang: PL 480?

Dr. Kissinger: That's a food program, a specific program. Another is \$100 million in loans. And we are working, using our influence, at the World Bank to defer loans of \$75 million which are becoming due. Our Ambassador (looking toward Bush) thinks we are never doing anything.

Ambassador Huang: You mean Mr. Bush thought that you are doing nothing?

Dr. Kissinger: He thinks we just sit in the White House and do nothing.

Ambassador Bush: I think I do all the work and that they do nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: What he really thinks is that we are pursuing an evenhanded policy. That's what our press spokesman says.

Now I want to tell the Ambassador, for the Prime Minister, about a number of communications we have had with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Huang: You mean in the sense of the first question just discussed, i.e., the question of the India-Pakistan subcontinent?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, India–Pakistan. We have had the following contacts—the Soviet Ambassador is back in Moscow, so I have to deal with the Chargé. Last Sunday I called the Soviet Counsellor Vorontsov to the White House.

Miss T'ang: Soviet Counsellor?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Vorontsov. He's the Chargé. And I told him that the Soviet support of Indian aggression endangers the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Incidentally, these conversations are known only in the White House and only to you.

On Monday, President Nixon sent a letter to Secretary General Brezhnev in which he said that Indian aggression with Soviet support is unacceptable to the United States, and that if pursued this would complicate for a long time the international situation and would have an adverse effect—this is a quote—on the whole range of our relationships. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.)²

Mr. Brezhnev sent a reply—we sent the letter December 6 and we received the reply December 9th in the morning. The letter was phrased in conciliatory language and it proposes a ceasefire and “an immediate”—this is quoting again—“resumption of negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and the East Pakistan leaders concerning a political settlement.” (Miss T'ang asks and Dr. Kissinger repeats)—this is a quote—“concerning a political settlement in East Pakistan.” The continuation of the—quote—“the negotiations should, naturally, be started from the stage at which they were discontinued.” I said this meant on the basis of a united Pakistan.

Miss T'ang: You said . . . ?³

Dr. Kissinger: I said orally that on March 25 there was a united Pakistan, and he (Vorontsov) said yes. Incidentally, we inform the Pakistani Ambassador of everything we do. I don't know whether he informs you.

Yesterday, December 9, we learned that the Soviet Minister of Agriculture was in Washington and that he was a friend of Brezhnev who wanted to see the President.

Ambassador Huang: His name?

² For documentation on the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XI.

³ All ellipses are in the source text.

Dr. Kissinger: Matskevich. These gentlemen (the Chinese) have a file on everybody. Someday I must find out what they know about me; it is more than I do. (Ambassador Huang gestures in mock denial.)

During this discussion, which lasted 15 minutes and was primarily a statement by the President, the President emphasized that Pakistan is a friend of the United States and that if India were to continue its attacks and launch an attack against West Pakistan, it could lead to a US–Soviet confrontation.

Today, on December 10, we sent forward a reply to Brezhnev. We pointed out that—this is based on the information we have that the Pakistani commander in East Pakistan has asked for a ceasefire—we said if there is not a ceasefire in West Pakistan as well, “we would have to conclude that there is in progress an act of aggression directed at the whole of Pakistan, a friendly country, toward which we have obligations.”

In order to underline what we have said, we worked with a number of countries to provide aid to Pakistan.

Ambassador Huang: But this is not in the letter that you are quoting.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am telling you about this. This is terribly complex. We are barred by law from giving equipment to Pakistan in this situation. And we also are barred by law from permitting friendly countries which have American equipment to give their equipment to Pakistan.

So we have worked out the following arrangements with a number of countries. We have told Jordan and Iran and Saudi Arabia, and we will tell Turkey through a channel other than the ones with which Ambassador Bush is familiar. We said that if they decide that their national security requires shipment of American arms to Pakistan, we are obliged to protest, but we will understand. We will not protest with great intensity. And we will make up to them in next year’s budget whatever difficulties they have.

On this basis, four planes are leaving Jordan today and 22 over the weekend. Ammunition and other equipment is going from Iran.

Ambassador Huang: You mean over the weekend?

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t know the exact time, but immediately we understand. And six planes from Turkey in the near future. This is very confidential obviously, and we are not eager for it to be known. At least not until Congress gets out of town tomorrow.

In addition, we are moving a number of naval ships in the West Pacific toward the Indian Ocean: an aircraft carrier accompanied by four destroyers and a tanker, and a helicopter carrier and two destroyers. I have maps here showing the location of the Soviet fleet in

the Indian Ocean if you are interested. These are much smaller ships. They are no match for the US ships. (Showing Ambassador Huang the map) Here is a merchant tanker . . . a submarine . . .

Ambassador Huang: (laughing) I'm no expert.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm not either. There is no difficulty.

There is not much in the Soviet fleet. What is the total number, Al? (to Haig) I've read it somewhere.

Ambassador Huang: There's a cruiser coming in now.

Dr. Kissinger: Their ships are not much.

I now come to a matter of some sensitivity. We have received a report that one of your personnel in a European country, in a conversation with another European, expressed uncertainty about the Soviet dispositions on your borders and a desire for information about them. We do not ourselves concentrate on tactical intelligence. We only have information about the general disposition, and we collect it at irregular intervals by satellite. But we would be prepared at your request, and through whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever information we have about the disposition of Soviet forces. I don't have it with me, but we can arrange it easily wherever you wish and in an absolutely secure way.

Secondly, the President wants you to know that it's, of course, up to the People's Republic to decide its own course of action in this situation, but if the People's Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the People's Republic. We are not recommending any particular steps; we are simply informing you about the actions of others.

The movement of our naval force is still East of the Straits of Malacca and will not become obvious until Sunday evening when they cross the Straits.

I would like to give you our assessment of the military situation on the subcontinent. I don't know whether you have any assessments. I would like to give this to you and then tell you one other thing.

The Pakistani army in the East has been destroyed. The Pakistani army in the West will run out of what we call POL—gas and oil—in another two to three weeks, two weeks probably, because the oil storage capacity in Karachi has been destroyed. We think that the immediate objective must be to prevent an attack on the West Pakistan army by India. We are afraid that if nothing is done to stop it, East Pakistan will become a Bhutan and West Pakistan will become a Nepal. And India with Soviet help would be free to turn its energies elsewhere.

So it seems to us that through a combination of pressures and political moves it is important to keep India from attacking in the

West, to gain time to get more arms into Pakistan and to restore the situation.

We sent yesterday the relevant paragraphs, the non-rhetorical paragraphs, from Brezhnev's letter to President Yahya for his opinion. (To Ambassador Huang and Miss T'ang) Why don't you read what we told him? It is an unusual method of proceeding, but we have to understand each other. This is just a quotation, an extract. (To Miss T'ang) Don't write it down word for word, Nancy.

You don't need a master spy. We give you everything (handing over his file). We read that you brought a master spy with you. You don't need him. He couldn't get this by himself. (Chinese laughter) Next time he (Ambassador Huang) will show me one of his dispatches, but it will do me no good at all, since I can't read it. (Chinese laughter)

(To Ambassador Bush) Don't you discuss diplomacy this way.

Ambassador Bush: I'm trying to understand it. I'm waiting for the Chinese translation.

(Miss T'ang continues to read out the cable to Yahya).

Dr. Kissinger: This is to our Ambassador, but it goes through a secret channel. No one in the bureaucracy sees it. (Miss T'ang keeps reading.)

I went over this with the Pakistani Ambassador. I showed it to him to see if he thought it was alright.

Miss T'ang: And then you sent it.

Dr. Kissinger: So we are being open and we are doing it in friendship.

Miss T'ang: (Repeating) "disassociation".

Dr. Kissinger: Let me explain, Mr. Ambassador. If the Russians advocate negotiations as they were in March, that means they cannot accept Bangla Desh. (To the Ambassador) You can read the next page.

Miss T'ang: It says "exclusively eyes only."

Dr. Kissinger: There's a better one that says "burn before reading."

(Dr. Kissinger confirms the translation.)

(Miss T'ang keeps reading) I wanted you to know so that you know exactly what we tell them. Now they have replied to us. Can I read it to you, which is the answer from Yahya?

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: He said that subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of my communication—in other words these two provisions concerning negotiations being done in a united way—India and Pakistan should agree to an immediate ceasefire with the separation of armed forces standing fast; and the UN or another international organization should provide observers to see that the ceasefire is effective; and

India and Pakistan at any effective level should immediately open negotiations aimed at a settlement of the war and troop withdrawal; and coincident therewith there would be negotiations looking toward the political satisfaction of Bengali aspirations, that is, a political settlement. (Miss T'ang repeats, then interprets)

So now you know everything we know. Our judgment is if West Pakistan is to be preserved from destruction, two things are needed—maximum intimidation of the Indians and, to some extent, the Soviets. Secondly, maximum pressure for the ceasefire.

At this moment we have—I must tell you one other thing—we have an intelligence report according to which Mrs. Gandhi told her cabinet that she wants to destroy the Pakistani army and air force and to annex this part of Kashmir, Azad Kashmir, and then to offer a ceasefire. This is what we believe must be prevented and this is why I have taken the liberty to ask for this meeting with the Ambassador.

One other thing. The Acting Secretary of State—the Secretary of State is in Europe—called in last night the Indian Ambassador and demanded assurance that India has no designs, will not annex any territory. We do this to have a legal basis for other actions.

So this is where we are.

Ambassador Huang: We thank Dr. Kissinger very much for informing us of the situation on the subcontinent of India–Pakistan, and we certainly will convey that to Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

The position of the Chinese Government on this matter is not a secret. Everything has been made known to the world. And the basic stand we are taking in the UN is the basic stand of our government. Both in the Security Council and the plenary session of the General Assembly we have supported the draft resolutions that have included both the ceasefire and withdrawal, although we are not actually satisfied with that kind of resolution. But we feel that the draft resolution which had support in the Security Council and especially the one which we voted in favor of in the General Assembly, reflect the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the small and medium countries. And in the plenary session of the General Assembly this draft resolution was put forward by Algeria and Argentina and 38 more and it was adopted by a majority of 104. The opposition consisted in effect of only two—the Soviet Union and India. The others were either their followers or their protectorates. We feel that this reflects the aspirations, it shows where the hearts of the people in the world turn to.

Miss T'ang: (To Dr. Kissinger) Do you understand?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Ambassador Huang: It shows what the majority of the people in the world support and what they oppose. Because if India, with the

aid of the Soviet Union, would be able to have its own way in the sub-continent then there would be no more security to speak of for a lot of other countries, and no peace to speak of. Because that would mean the dismemberment and the splitting up of a sovereign country and the creation of a new edition of Manchukuo, the Bangla Desh. It would also mean aggression by military forces and the annexation of sovereign territory.

Therefore we believe that the draft resolution that was put forth in the General Assembly in the UN put forward two minimum principles, two minimum criteria. One is ceasefire; the other is withdrawal. And in his speech in the General Assembly with regard to this matter; Deputy Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua has explained this question in a more comprehensive and fuller way. We should persist in this stand, and we hold that any action that may be taken by the UN cannot go below the resolution passed by the General Assembly. It cannot be anything that carries less than that resolution.

And on this point of view, in my personal opinion, we feel the position taken by the United States Government has been a weak one. From what I just heard in the letter to Yahya Khan and your conversation with the Indian Ambassador and also your communications with the Soviet Union, we have found that you have not put forward both the principles of ceasefire and withdrawal.

Dr. Kissinger: That's not correct. We put forward both principles. There are two separate problems, in all due respect. We don't want in the principle of withdrawal to have West Pakistan go the way of East Pakistan.

Ambassador Huang: And then there's this question that the British put forward that they wanted the leaders of the Pakistan government to enter into political negotiations. You also mentioned that, picked up their position that negotiations should begin.

Dr. Kissinger: Not to Brezhnev.

Ambassador Huang: And you mention negotiations should start from where they were continuing.

Dr. Kissinger: Brezhnev said that. What I showed you was a question to Yahya. We have not agreed with Brezhnev.

Ambassador Huang: But Brezhnev's proposal is essentially the same one that Mr. Malik has been saying here.

Dr. Kissinger: That's true.

Ambassador Huang: In fact, it means legalizing of the new refurbishment of another Manchukuo, that is, to give it legal status through the UN, or rather through the modalities of the UN.

This goes against the desires of the people in Pakistan, against the desires of the peoples of the world that was expressed in the voting of

the General Assembly on this issue. The Soviet Union and India now are progressing along on an extremely dangerous track in the subcontinent. And as we have already pointed out this is a step to encircle China.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no question about that.

Ambassador Huang: And you also are clear about our activity, that is we are prepared to meet attacks coming from the east, west, north, and south.

Dr. Kissinger: When we have an exchange program between our countries, I hope to send a few State Department people to China. I'll send you a few of our State Department people for training. I may look weak to you, Mr. Ambassador, but my colleagues in Washington think I'm a raving maniac.

Miss T'ang: We didn't finish.

Ambassador Huang: We are prepared for attacks on the east, west, north, and south. We are prepared to engage in guerrilla warfare once again with millet and rifle, and we are prepared to begin our construction over again, after that eventuality. And the private attitude adopted by Brezhnev which we see now, in which he talks about so-called political negotiations is in fact direct and obvious intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country and something we feel is completely unacceptable, is inadmissible.

Of course we have nothing here about the military situation in the India-Pakistan subcontinent except what we read in the newspapers. But from our experience of a longer period we feel that the struggle waged by the people in Pakistan is a just struggle and therefore it is bound to have the support of the Chinese people and the people of the world. Whoever upholds justice and strives to defend their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity . . .

We have an old proverb: "If light does not come to the east it will come to the west. If the south darkens, the north must still have light." And therefore if we meet with some defeats in certain places, we will win elsewhere. So we keep persevering. So long as we persevere in principle and a just struggle, then final victory will still be ours. I don't think there's need for any more elaboration on that, because the history of the Chinese people's revolution itself is a good example.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, we agree with your analysis of the situation. What is happening in the Indian subcontinent is a threat to all people. It's a more immediate threat to China, but it's a threat to all people. We have no agreement with the British to do anything. In fact we are talking with you to come to a common position. We know that Pakistan is being punished because it is a friend of China and because it is a friend of the United States.

But while we agree with your theory, we now have an immediate problem. I don't know the history of the people's revolution in China nearly as well as you do. I seem to remember that one of the great lessons is that under all circumstances the Chinese movement maintained its essence. And as an article on the Chungking negotiations makes clear, it is right to negotiate when negotiations are necessary and to fight when fighting is necessary.

We want to preserve the army in West Pakistan so that it is better able to fight if the situation rises again. We are also prepared to attempt to assemble a maximum amount of pressure in order to deter India. You read the *New York Times* every day, and you will see that the movement of supplies and the movement of our fleet will not have the universal admiration of the media, to put it mildly. And it will have the total opposition of our political opponents.

We want to keep the pressure on India, both militarily and politically. We have no interest in political negotiations between Pakistani leaders and East Pakistani leaders as such. The only interest that we possibly have is to get Soviet agreement to a united Pakistan. We have no interest in an agreement between Bangla Desh and Pakistan.

We are prepared also to consider simply a ceasefire. We are prepared also to follow your course in the UN which most of my colleagues would be delighted to do and then Pakistan would be destroyed. If we followed your course of insisting on ceasefire and withdrawal and do nothing then Pakistan will be destroyed, and many people in America will be delighted. If you and Pakistan want this then we will do it. That is no problem for us. That is the easiest course for us.

So we will . . . we agree with your analysis completely. We are looking for practical steps in this issue which happens to be a common fight for different reasons. We will not cooperate with anyone to impose anything on Pakistan. We have taken a stand against India and we will maintain this stand. But we have this problem. It is our judgment, with great sorrow, that the Pakistan army in two weeks will disintegrate in the West as it has disintegrated in the East. If we are wrong about this, we are wrong about everything.

What do you think of ceasefire without political negotiations? The only reason we want political negotiations at all is to preserve East Pakistan, not to weaken it.

Ambassador Huang: Are you prepared to take the step in the UN of putting forward a proposal simply for ceasefire, along this course?

Dr. Kissinger: No, that's why I'm talking to you. Let's be practical—by tomorrow the Pakistan Army in the East will have surrendered. Therefore should one have a resolution for a ceasefire in the West?

Ambassador Huang: Why should we not condemn India for its aggression against East Pakistan? Why should there not be a demand for the resolution already passed in the General Assembly which calls for withdrawal? And if it is . . . if you find it impossible to condemn India . . .

Dr. Kissinger: We do. We don't mind condemning India.

Ambassador Huang: . . . A step should not be taken backward from the resolution already passed in the General Assembly.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: There are two separate problems. The resolution in the General Assembly is one for the whole problem—that can be maintained. We are not saying we accept the occupation of East Pakistan; we don't have to accept that. But this would be a resolution for a cease-fire only. And the Arabs would not accept the occupation of their territory even though there is a ceasefire. So . . . but we are not here to tell you . . . When I asked for this meeting, I did so to suggest Chinese military help, to be quite honest. That's what I had in mind, not to discuss with you how to defeat Pakistan. I didn't want to find a way out of it, but I did it in an indirect way.

But this is for you to decide. You have many other problems on many other borders. What is going to happen is that the Pakistani commander in East Pakistan, independent of anything we did, has asked the UN to arrange a ceasefire in East Pakistan. We will not take a stand in opposition to you on this issue. We think we are on the same side. So . . .

Ambassador Huang: We feel that the situation on the subcontinent is very tense and is in the process of rapid development and change. And therefore, as I expressed earlier, we will immediately report what you tell me.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want the Prime Minister to misunderstand. We are not looking for a way to get out of the situation. We are looking for a way to protect what is left of Pakistan. We will not recognize Bangla Desh. We will not negotiate with Bangla Desh. We will not encourage talks between Pakistan and Bangla Desh.

We have the immediate practical problem—is it better to have a ceasefire or is it better to let the military events continue? In either event both of us must continue to bring pressure on India and the Soviet Union.

(There is an exchange in which Dr. Kissinger confirms to Bush that he talked to Bhutto, that he was meeting him the next morning

⁴ The General Assembly passed Resolution 2793 (XXVI) on December 7 by a vote of 104 to 11, with 10 abstentions. It called for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all troops from the territory of the other. See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971* (New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, n.d.), pp. 143–161.

and that Bush's appointment with him was confirmed for later this night.)

I shall tell him (Bhutto) he should take his direction from you on whatever resolution he wants and that we will support him. I shall tell him to disregard any American official except me and General Haig. He doesn't have to take his direction from you, but I will tell him to check with you. Usually you criticize us for sticking too much to our friends, so we will not in this case create the wrong impression.

Ambassador Huang: As for Bangla Desh, has Ambassador Bush recently met with anybody from Bangla Desh?

Ambassador Bush: The Ambassador is referring to a squib in the *New York Times*.

(Ambassador Bush then explains the incident that led to Ambassador Huang's query. Mr. Choudury, who used to be in the Third Committee of the UN, three weeks ago asked Ambassador Bush for an appointment in his capacity as a judge in Pakistan. Ambassador Bush had his staff check the man out. Choudury then made a personal call but brought along three men with him. When they started mentioning Bangla Desh, Ambassador Bush told them to wait a minute, pointing out that Choudury was seeing him as a judge. It was a humiliating experience for Ambassador Bush. He had not seen the men since. Ambassador Bush had told them that they should wait a minute, that he was inhibited from discussing such matters. Mr. Choudury left two to three weeks ago. Ambassador Bush repeated that Ambassador Huang was referring to a story in the *New York Times*. He pointed out that Mr. Choudury is around a great deal of the time including in the delegates' lounge. He added that it was very embarrassing to him.)

Ambassador Huang: I am clear now.

Dr. Kissinger: In any event, no matter what you read, no one is authorized to talk to the Bangla Desh. We don't recognize Bangla Desh and will not recognize it.

Ambassador Huang: I thank Ambassador Bush very much for his explanation.

Ambassador Bush: One of the men had defected from the Pakistan Embassy in Washington and came here. Ambassador Shahi would kill me.

Dr. Kissinger: My former personal assistant is now working for Senator Muskie. There are many defectors around these days.

Mr. Ambassador, I am going to the Azores on Sunday afternoon with the President for 48 hours. General Haig has my complete confidence, and we have very rapid communication. So if you have some communication for us . . .

But I want Peking to be clear that my seeing you was for the purpose of coordinating positive steps, not to prepare you for negative steps.

Ambassador Huang: I don't have anything else.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. I wish happier occasions would bring us together. We have particular affection for Pakistan because we feel they helped to reestablish contact between the People's Republic and the United States.

So we are prepared to listen to any practical proposals for parallel action. We will do our best to prevent pressure against any country that takes unilateral action. I shall speak to Mr. Bhutto tomorrow in the sense that I have indicated to you.

Ambassador Huang: Of course, we will also contact Mr. Bhutto and, of course, as you later clarified yourself, we of course will give no directions. Yahya Khan is the President, and we only have friendly exchanges.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. The word "direction" was not well-chosen.

Ambassador Huang: We think that is all there is today. What we need to do is to relay this to Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

(There were then a few minutes of closing pleasantries while the Chinese waited for their automobile.)

Ambassador Bush clarified to the Chinese the public disclosure in the newspapers of the five-power meeting on U Thant's successor.

Ambassador Huang confirmed that Deputy Minister Ch'iao, as well as Miss T'ang and others, would be returning to Peking on December 16 at the close of the General Assembly session. Miss Shih, who was present for the meeting, would replace Miss T'ang as principal liaison with the U.S. side.

Dr. Kissinger also asked Ambassador Huang whether his secretaries could make social contact with the girls in the Chinese delegation, saying that they wanted to, but that he had prohibited them on the grounds that it might be embarrassing to the Chinese. Ambassador Huang indicated that this would be alright.

Dr. Kissinger asked if the Chinese were going to stay in the Roosevelt permanently, and Ambassador Huang asked if Dr. Kissinger had any suggestions for a new locale. Dr. Kissinger then offered to help the Chinese by getting someone in Governor Rockefeller's organization in touch with someone on the Chinese delegation. He explained that Governor Rockefeller controlled a great deal of real estate in New York and knew of many openings and could be of great service. Dr. Kissinger would make sure that contact was made Wednesday or Thursday of the following week after he got back from the Azores. Ambassador Huang then named Hsing Sung-yi as the contact on this question, noting that he had already seen many places.)

177. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, December 12, 1971, 3:50–4:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations
and Ambassador to Canada

T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Winston Lord, Senior NSC Staff Member

General Haig: I understand there was some excitement around your hotel.

Amb. Huang: Yes, twice. There were demonstrations for and opposing Bangla Desh, for and opposing Indian aggression.

General Haig: At least it's kept evenly divided.

Amb. Huang: I would like you to convey the following message. (Amb. Huang reads from a printed text and the interpreter translates):

"The Chinese side has carefully studied the opinions put forward by Dr. Henry Kissinger last time. We agree to the principle he has spoken of, that is, in order to implement the UN resolution of the General Assembly within the framework of a united Pakistan, an immediate ceasefire must first be effected both in East and West Pakistan which will be followed by troop withdrawal by both sides. For this purpose we also agree to the convening of an emergency meeting of the Security Council. However, in so doing, one must not show the slightest sign of weakness toward the Soviet Union and India. The ceasefire and withdrawal will be realized in steps and no recognition must be given to Bangla Desh. For our part we are stepping up support and assistance to Pakistan. And we must adhere to the principle that no recognition be given to Bangla Desh."²

That is roughly our reply to the talk we had last time.

General Haig: That is very good.

I thought it would be helpful if I tell you what we have done since we last met. On Friday, we sent a very strong warning to the Soviet Union, and we told them that if we had no indication from them that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

² On the same day, the PRC message and a brief summary of the meeting was relayed by Colonel Kennedy to Kissinger, then en route to the Azores with President Nixon. (Ibid.)

they would act constructively in this situation we would proceed within the framework of the Security Council along the lines that we proposed, that is with a ceasefire and withdrawal. After this warning we had not heard from them, so we proceeded with a very strong public statement. After setting in train moving to the Security Council, we received an urgent message from Moscow. In that message they indicated that they were most anxious to find a solution and a way out of the situation. We have not received the details of their proposal.

So we intend, as you know, to proceed in the United Nations with the General Assembly resolution in the Security Council. We will ask for a ceasefire and withdrawal.

Here are the other steps we have taken. The movement of the forces of the Seventh Fleet is underway and will go through the Straits of Malacca tomorrow and proceed to the Indian Ocean by Wednesday.

We are informed that the King of Jordan has sent six fighter aircraft to Pakistan and intends to send others up to a total of fourteen very soon. The Government of Iran is sending aircraft to Jordan to replace those aircraft Jordan sends to Pakistan. We are informed that Saudi Arabia and the Iranians are sending small arms and ammunition. And there is some indication that the Government of Turkey is sending up to twenty-two aircraft. We, of course, are doing all we can to facilitate this.

I think the most important indication that we have is that the Soviet Union now is very concerned. We intend to watch that situation very carefully. We have no intention of weakening the US position in any way on this situation.

Where we go from the UN Security Council Resolution of ceasefire and withdrawal, and ultimately ceasefire, will be largely the result of the wishes of Pakistan, but without pressure from the United States of any kind.

Now the Soviet response to us was again very conciliatory. They informed us that they sent Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to New Delhi and that he met with Madame Gandhi, and they are very anxious to arrive at some way out of this situation. We intend to stay very, very firm with the Soviet Union on this issue.

Amb. Huang: That's all up to now?

General Haig: That's all up to now, yes.

I think it is very important that the People's Republic understand that we have taken a full range of steps which have been very cognizant of the interests we have in preserving the integrity of Pakistan, and that your side recognize that these measures have been strenuous, given the realities of the political situation here domestically. And it is in our view quite important that your government recognize we have done every step with full coordination with you. We have told you

each step. We don't think it is helpful to characterize the measures we have taken as weak or vacillating, because that is not an accurate characterization of the steps we have taken and are prepared to take.

Amb. Huang: Do you have other plans with regard to the Security Council?

General Haig: At this moment none other than to insist on a vote in the Security Council along the general outlines of the General Assembly resolution and to hold with that. If this does not succeed, then we will move with ceasefire alone and leave it at that.³

I would welcome anything the Ambassador has to offer in terms of what the People's Republic will see as coming at that point.

Amb. Huang: We have the same views on this question, that is to preserve the unification of Pakistan and in the Security Council we are in favor of the draft resolution along the lines of the resolution adopted at the General Assembly meeting, that is ceasefire and troop withdrawal. If the Soviet Union vetoes that resolution, then we must adhere to the principles that ceasefire and troop withdrawal constitute an integrated whole, but they can be effected by steps, that is the ceasefire must first be effected immediately in East Pakistan and West Pakistan.

General Haig: Both sides.

Amb. Huang: Then that would be followed by troop withdrawal.

General Haig: I would like to give the Ambassador a copy of the White House text which was issued today.

Amb. Huang: We heard the news, but we didn't have the full text. (General Haig hands the text over at Tab A.)⁴

Amb. Huang: We have nothing more to say.

General Haig: Very good.

Amb. Huang: I will take leave then.

³ After receiving unsigned instructions on December 17, Walters met with PRC diplomats in Paris the next day to update them on United States efforts involving India and Pakistan. Walters' instructions and memorandum of record, December 20, are *ibid*. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 73 and 74.

⁴ The attached White House statement reads in full: "On December 7th, the General Assembly by a vote of 104 to 11 with ten abstentions called on India and Pakistan to institute an immediate cease fire and to withdraw troops from each other's territory. Pakistan has accepted the resolution. India has refused. In view of India's defiance of world opinion expressed by such an overwhelming majority, the United States is now returning the issue to the Security Council. With East Pakistan virtually occupied by Indian troops a continuation of the war would take on increasingly the character of armed attack on the very existence of a member state of the United Nations. All permanent members of the Security Council have an obligation to end this threat to world peace on the most urgent basis. The United States will cooperate fully in this effort."

General Haig: I hope the Ambassador will feel free at any time to contact us. It is important that we continue to exchange views as we proceed.

(There was then some continued small talk and light conversation as the Ambassador waited for his car to arrive. General Haig mentioned that Ambassador Bush would like to know if the Chinese wish to conduct bilateral discussions on the question of a successor to Secretary General U Thant. Ambassador Huang replied that they were ready for both bilateral and multilateral consultations. He added that this was their attitude with respect to the other three permanent members of the Security Council also.

Other topics of conversation included the fact that Ambassador Huang and his colleagues had been very busy the last few weeks, the heavy social schedule imposed on Ambassador Huang which he termed a “punishment,” the heavy traffic in New York City, and a brief rundown by General Haig on the latest reports on the military situation in the South Asian subcontinent.)

178. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

P’eng Ming-min Between the ROC and PRC: Prospects for “Formosan Independence”

Recently we have received two intelligence reports on contacts between P’eng Ming-min and both the ROC and the PRC.² P’eng is the most visible leader of the Taiwan Independence Movement. As you know, he escaped from Taiwan last year and is now in Ann Arbor, Michigan.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 524, Country Files, People’s Republic of China, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. Initialed by Holdridge and Solomon. According to the attached NSC Correspondence Profile, the memorandum was “noted by HAK” on December 17.

² These reports have not been located.

³ See Documents 65 and 91.

In August the ROC sent an emissary to the United States to establish contact with P'eng. The emissary appeared to have been briefed by Chiang Kai-shek himself.⁴

The man urged P'eng to return to Taiwan and cooperate with the GRC. P'eng turned down the invitation because he found the conditions set by the ROC unacceptable. The emissary had told P'eng that if he would accept the continued validity of the "return to the mainland" policy, and of ROC control of the military forces on the island, he would be permitted to become active in provincial political affairs. The emissary expressed fears that if P'eng did not cooperate the ROC would use increasingly repressive measures against the Taiwanese population.

More recently, P'eng himself took the initiative of calling John S. Service before his trip to China to ask Service to arrange with Chou En-lai for a (P'eng) visit to mainland China, or to otherwise enable P'eng to establish direct contact with authorities of the PRC. Chou En-lai is reported to have said to Service when P'eng's message was raised: "Any friends of P'eng who have not taken part or approved of the Taiwan independence movement can come here and then report back to P'eng."

FBI reporting has revealed that P'eng attempted to get his mistress out of Taiwan through the ploy of having the woman marry an American soldier who would bring her to the U.S. as his wife. The ROC authorities are aware of the ploy, and have moved to block the woman's exit. They have expressed to USG officials the hope that pressures will not be applied from the U.S. side to allow the woman to leave the island. P'eng thus may find his situation in this country increasingly frustrating at a personal level, compounding what must be his political frustrations about lack of support for Taiwan independence by U.S. authorities and the world community in general (as demonstrated by the U.N. Chirep vote).

Taiwanese close to P'eng describe the man as an opportunist. At least one could assume that a man as politically active as P'eng—finding the direct road back to Taiwan unattractive, and disappointed by the U.S. position on Taiwanese independence—might begin to think about making some kind of an arrangement (à la Sihanouk?) with the PRC. Certainly P'eng's initiative toward Chou En-lai suggests that he may be thinking in this direction.

⁴ Solomon had relayed news of contacts between the Nationalist representatives and Peng on November 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1317, NSC Secretariat Files, Richard H. Solomon Chronology File, 1971)

The fact that Chou at present has adopted a “hands off” policy toward those associated with Taiwanese independence gives one more indication of mounting PRC anxiety over the possibilities of an independent status for the island. As times goes by, however, and as the difficulties of recovering the island become more obvious, PRC leaders may seek ways of using a man like P’eng to sustain their claims to the island and to the “Chineseness” of its people.

In an article in the *New York Times* on October 27, P’eng gave evidence of the current state of his thinking about “Formosa’s” future.⁵ He listed five basic conditions shaping a settlement of the island’s status:

1. The U.S. cannot maintain its military presence on Taiwan permanently.
2. The PRC cannot simply annex the island.
3. The ROC cannot continue to sustain its rule over the island on its present “absurd basis.”
4. The people of the island cannot live in a state of hostility with the mainland.
5. “The unique history and identity of the people on Formosa cannot be disregarded, nor their aspiration to decide their own destiny denied.”

P’eng then added that, “the Formosan people want to live in the most friendly association with the Chinese people, and would spare no effort to establish the closest economic, commercial, cultural and even political ties with China.”

Where this all comes out at the moment is uncertain. On the assumptions that P’eng does not just withdraw from politics and that the Taiwan issue is not settled between the PRC and the present ROC leadership on a bilateral basis, one can foresee three possible futures for P’eng and his strivings for “Formosan independence”:

1. *Cooperation with the post-Gimo leadership.* With Chiang Kai-shek’s passing, the successor ROC leadership may move to broaden its base of support from the Taiwanese population. In such circumstances, P’eng might be offered more acceptable terms for a return to Taiwan than the ROC offered him this fall. P’eng thus might help to link the KMT to the local population and strengthen the de facto autonomy of the island.

2. *Co-optation by the PRC.* In circumstances of increasing personal frustration and political isolation, P’eng might be tempted to play the role of a Sihanouk with Peking, using a relationship with PRC authorities for public claims that he has worked out “the most friendly association with the Chinese people” which would give a measure of

⁵ Peng Ming-min, “Formosa’s Future,” *The New York Times*, October 27, 1971, p. 47.

local autonomy to the Taiwanese within a larger context of “political ties with China.” [The quoted phrases are from P’eng’s October 27 *New York Times* article.]³

The PRC leadership might seek to accommodate P’eng to such a public, “united front” role if they felt it would strengthen their current assertions that the Taiwanese people wish to be “reunited with the motherland.” This approach may become increasingly attractive to Peking if it finds that avenues toward a negotiated solution to the island’s status favorable to their interests are not forthcoming.

3. *A link between the PRC and ROC (?)*. A third, but less likely, alternative might involve P’eng in negotiations between Peking and (post-Gimo) Taipei. If some formula could be found for Taiwanese “autonomy” within a one-China framework acceptable to both the ROC and Communist leaderships, the key political problem would be holding the loyalty of the Taiwanese. Naturally they would fear that the ROC was selling out their interests to the mainland. In such circumstances, P’eng—as the most visible leader of the Formosan autonomy position—could play a key role as a public figure supporting a negotiated solution to the Taiwan question. His backing could play a major part in preventing a Taiwanese revolt against a PRC–ROC deal, for he is one of the few men whose public cooperation would imply sufficient local autonomy for the Taiwanese to ease fears of direct “communization” of the island.

³ Brackets in the source text.

179. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines)¹

Washington, December 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

Proposal by ROC Vice Foreign Minister for Covert Emissaries to President Chiang

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 285, Department of State, 1 Sep–31 Dec 1971, Vol. XIII. Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum and attachments were forwarded by Deputy Executive Secretary Curran to Haig on December 27. A short handwritten note, attached, reads: “12/28/71, Laura: No distribution. Gen. Haig has copy with him for HAK. Holdridge has seen. Col. Ken.”

Thank you for your memorandum of December 14, 1971 regarding Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-kun's proposal that "old and trusted" friends of President Chiang be sent covertly as emissaries of President Nixon to induce Chiang to change ROC policies to those that Yang regards as more realistic.² Yang's conversation [*1 line of source text not declassified*] parallels a recent talk he had with Ambassador McConaughy, too.³

As you correctly note, Yang is in the forefront of ROC officials advocating significant changes in ROC policy not only in foreign affairs but also in domestic political reform. Although respected and valued as a technician and as a source of fairly frank assessments, not unexpectedly, he has not been able to move President Chiang as far or as fast as he, Yang, thinks desirable. As he did several times during Chirep earlier this year, he has once again proposed that the US add its weight on the side of reason and push the ROC and President Chiang to move further and faster.

We do not think that it is necessary for the ROC to move so far and so fast as Yang advocates in order to maintain the viability of Taiwan in the face of its recent setbacks on the international scene. Further movement is clearly necessary, but much already seems to be in the works. As we did during Chirep, we are prepared to give the ROC our assessment of various situations, our analyses of the courses of action open to it and our judgments about their relative chances of success. As the decisions are clearly ones for the ROC itself to make and as many of them go to the heart of its claims to political legitimacy, we would be reluctant to have the US push very hard on particular policy lines.⁴ We are prepared to point out to the ROC the value of certain positions it has adopted for maintaining US public and Congressional support for our policies toward the ROC and to inquire into ROC intentions in areas that impact on US interests. Likewise we are prepared to warn of the dangers inherent in other courses of action being considered. This stops short, however, of pressuring the ROC to adopt certain policies at our behest.

As for the channels of communication urged by Yang, we have some reservations. Ideas about policy changes for the ROC are not new and their assessments of what is necessary to accomplish certain objectives have been quite realistic and certainly so far at least the past

² Attached but not printed.

³ See Document 174.

⁴ In a January 11 letter to McConaughy, Brown concluded that "While we should do what we can to strengthen the reputation and impact of sound and pragmatic men like Yang, we simply cannot allow ourselves to become their instruments in the internal politics of Taiwan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHINAT-US)

year. While we would not now want to rule out completely the possibility of a high-level emissary if some future situation should seem to require that kind of US intervention, we think that using our Ambassador as the channel to President Chiang for US views is probably more effective and more compatible with the low-key posture which we think is the appropriate US role at this time.

We think [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] could usefully inform Yang that his views have been given consideration at appropriate levels within the US Government. He might go on to say that we generally plan to rely on our Ambassador as the primary channel for conveying the views of the US Government to President Chiang and the policy-making levels of the ROC.⁵

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⁵ The message was conveyed to Yang on January 7, and on January 12 Johnson received a memorandum of the conversation. After reviewing these materials, Green wrote to Johnson on January 21, and expressed concern that "Yang does not seem to have clearly gotten the message." He suggested that Johnson reiterate the Department of State's views. The memorandum of conversation and Green's memorandum are *ibid.*

180. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Key Biscayne, Florida, December 30, 1971, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Chou Shu-kai, Foreign Minister, Republic of China
Director Cheng, Republic of China
His Excellency, James Shen, Republic of China
Ambassador to the United States
Coleman S. Hicks, notetaker

The conversation began with light banter among the participants.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held at Kissinger's villa at the Key Biscayne Hotel. A short attached note reads: "Coleman: This is ready to go to file. JHH doesn't think it's necessary to have HAK read it through. Eileen."

Chou: It is very nice of you to take the time to see us here in Key Biscayne. I have just come from Japan and you, of course, will be meeting the Japanese in San Clemente. I have three questions that I would like to ask you. First, how secure is Taiwan from Communist attack?

Second, will you press us to negotiate with Peking?

And number three, I would like to raise matters regarding confiscation of property. The Japanese are very excited about these concerns.

Kissinger: Well, I won't tell you anything until the Ambassador promises to invite me to another Chinese dinner. (Laughter)

Chou: What we are seeking is reassurance from you about these matters. We are concerned that the Communists can gain control of the air.

Kissinger: Let's settle the defense question first. At my press conference in November I commented that our defense commitment was unimpaired.² I have also said that to Chou En-lai, and our defense commitment has not been affected by our dealings with Peking. If you are attacked, we will come to your defense. Personally, I don't think China can maintain control of the air.

Chou: But we are in a situation where the quantity and quality of the Communist military capacity is going up and our impression is that the military assistance program is standing still. This results in a change of the military balance.

Kissinger: There has been no stoppage of our military assistance program to the Republic of China.

Chou: This is encouraging but there is concern about it.³

Kissinger: Can you give me particular items? I will check into it.

Chou: We are interested in excess equipment, F-104s, tanks and so forth. We do not seek offensive weapons.

Kissinger: I can reassure you that no steps have been taken to limit the military assistance program to the Republic of China.

Chou: There are rumbles in the lower levels at the State Department about tie-ups in the program.

Kissinger: Look, the lower levels of the State Department are prone, as you have probably seen, to take credit whenever it is due

² Kissinger held a short press conference on November 29 to announce the date for the President's trip to the PRC, where he was asked about the U.S. defense commitment to the ROC. (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 20, 1971, p. 709)

³ In a January 14 memorandum, Holdridge informed Kissinger that "Chou's comment probably represents a form of mild pressure on us to avoid delays or disapprovals rather than discontent over an actuality; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reporting has indicated considerable anxiety in the ROC Defense Ministry that we might tighten or reduce the flow of military assistance." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X)

someone else but at the same time to undermine support for Presidential policies. The President has a warm personal feeling for the Republic of China. The steps we have taken with the Communists have been necessary. They are cold-blooded, calculated diplomatic moves. They have nothing to do with sympathy.

Chou: Well, I hope you can stir things up on this military assistance program.

Kissinger: I thought everything was in normal channels. What did Rogers say when you talked to him this morning?

Chou: (unintelligible)

Kissinger: I, of course, don't know the exact details about the military balance between you and the Communists, but personally I don't believe that the Communists have the capacity to use their military force outside their borders. But if so . . .⁴ Coleman, get Colonel Kennedy to look into this matter.

Chou: Another issue relates to the submarines.

Kissinger: I approved that two months ago.

Chou: All the key matters relate to training. Secretary Rogers appears to be apprehensive about this.

Kissinger: We have approved this. Why would it be in our interest not to go ahead and do it? Of course we will do it.⁵

Chou: The next issue I would like to raise with you is the handling of the Senkaku Islands. When you talk to the Japanese in San Clemente, may I encourage you to consider our position? The Japanese watch very carefully the U.S. role in the Pacific and seek consultation with you. We have a difficult domestic political situation regarding the Islands. Peking wants to develop an anti-American campaign on Taiwan. We need help from our friends. The Islands don't make any difference to Japan but they do to the people of Taiwan. Perhaps you could discuss these withered pieces of rock—there is no oil there—with the Japanese.

Kissinger: We will raise it with the Japanese.

Chou: We hope to keep them quiet about it.

Kissinger: You don't want the Islands back; you just want to avoid a big fuss about them, is that right?

Chou: Yes, that's right. It is like Outer Mongolia. The Japanese have an interest in Outer Mongolia. If we were on the Mainland, we might

⁴ All ellipses are in the source text.

⁵ Holdridge informed Kissinger that the Department of Defense had passed to the ROC the White House's request that no crew members arrive in the United States prior to March 11, 1972. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X)

be over-sensitive about Outer Mongolia and Tibet. The important thing is that they remain politically autonomous.

Kissinger: You are interested in Tibet. (Laughter)

Chou: In our bilateral relations we will continue to play it cool. We have told the Japanese that, for instance, we will trade with everyone. We will even trade with the socialist countries like East Germany. We would rather trade, of course, with our friends, but . . .

Kissinger: Will you negotiate with the Mainland?

Chou: No.

Kissinger: People have asked me often about my comments on this in my press conference at the end of October. To be honest, I thought that my comments would be helpful to you. I was trying to remove that item from the agenda in Peking during the President's visit. What I indicated was a policy of allowing the Mainland and Taiwan to settle the problem politically themselves, without the use of force. You will get no pressure from us to settle this matter as long as President Nixon remains in office. I think this is the best possible formula from your perspective. If we were to say that we would not accept a political solution, the result would be a big international incident—problems at the United Nations; in short, a big issue. As long as no pressure is put on you for a political settlement, why isn't this formula the best possible policy?

Shen: When you say that it is an internal Chinese affair that gives the impression though that you are washing your hands of it.

Kissinger: I didn't say that we were washing our hands of it. I said merely that we would put no pressure on you to make a political settlement and that we would tolerate no force on the part of either side in resolution of the dispute. It seems to me to be a very practical solution. Regardless, I don't think that Chou En-lai will renounce force. He isn't about ready to ask us to act as an intermediary in this matter.

Shen: The last thing anybody would be interested in would be having you act as an intermediary.

Kissinger: It is important to do a little Chinese thinking here, to look at the matter in a complicated light. This issue will come up at the UN year after year. We will continually say that our policy is to tolerate no use of force in settling the political matter. What can go wrong?

Shen: But we need desperately to maintain our defense capacities. If they lag, it might lead the Communists to a miscalculation.

Kissinger: We have already talked about the defense matters. Personally, I don't see a military capacity by the Mainland Chinese which would be effective against you. They are not about ready to use their

air force against you. They are too scared of the Russians; why would they bother to take you on? You know, a hundred miles of water to cross is quite difficult.

Chou: But they might use tricks. They might link this issue to the prisoners of war or the Vietnam problem. Of course, we know that you are smart enough not to be taken in.

Shen: People on Taiwan are concerned. What we are confronting here is largely a psychological question.

Kissinger: Whatever materials are in the military pipeline on our systems program, we will deliver on. To be frank, I don't know the details of exactly what is, but, Mr. Foreign Minister, when you were Ambassador in Washington, we did what you wanted, didn't we? What you needed, we gave you. You appear to think that the Communists are quite flexible. I don't. I believe that their domestic problems are very serious, that they will not renounce the use of force in the Taiwan issue, and also that they will not use Vietnam to pressure us on a political settlement.

Chou: There are many rumors about . . .

Kissinger: Yes, of course, I hear all these rumors. There is one that I made a deal with Chou in China that we would withdraw troops from Taiwan before his visits. Have we? Let me ask you this: Have we withdrawn any troops? I certainly don't think so, to the best of my knowledge. There may have been some rotations, but no withdrawals.

Chou: (The Foreign Minister made some comments about General Barnes⁶ which were not intelligible.)

Kissinger: You get all the stories that aren't true.

Chou: (The Foreign Minister discussed some aspect of dealing with the Japanese—more was not understandable.)

Kissinger: We will talk to Sato and Fukuda in San Clemente and attempt to restrain their activities in the Islands. You stick to your guns and be sure to keep us informed on all your dealings with the Communists.

Shen: We have certainly learned our lesson. We have talked to the President three times, to the Vice President once.

Kissinger: You have showed great dignity and character. Of all the sons-of-bitches in the world, you are the last of all who deserve what has happened this year.

⁶ Apparent reference to Major General John Winthrop Barnes, who became Chief, MAAG, in the ROC in 1972.

Chou: Thank you very much for taking the time to meet with us today.

Kissinger: You must understand that what we do, we do with a heavy heart. We don't do it to betray our friends. We take actions vis-à-vis the Communists only because those actions are required. I assure you again that you will get no pressure from us on any political deal with the Mainland.

[At this point the party retired from Dr. Kissinger's villa and began to walk back to the hotel, where the Chinese boarded their vehicle. During the walk, Dr. Kissinger spoke with the Foreign Minister about several problems. Dr. Kissinger emphasized again his impression that the formula of no-military action, but an openness to political accommodations, was the best possible formula for the Chinese Nationalists. On the UN issue, he acknowledged that the United States had engaged in what turned out to be a bad strategy vis-à-vis the timing of the second return from China. He indicated that he thought a two-week delay would have been possible had the matter been handled more properly. General comments were made about the Japanese vis-à-vis the United States; their touchiness on the China trip, their trading role with Taiwan, etc.]⁷

⁷ Brackets in the source text.

181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, January 1, 1972, 1800Z.

27. For Ambassador. Please deliver soonest following letter from President Nixon to President Chiang Kai-shek. Signed original follows by pouch. USG does not intend make text public and requests GRC respect confidentiality of message. GRC may, however, announce receipt of letter of assurance from President. Further, Department will consider possibility of authorizing release certain extracts from letter if GRC

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Text received from the White House on December 15.

wishes to do so. These extracts should be cabled back for clearance prior to release. Signed original is dated Dec 31.

Begin message. Dear Mr. President: As I prepare for my forthcoming trip to meet and talk with leaders in Peking and Moscow, I would like to share with you some thoughts concerning the conversations I expect to have there.

It is my earnest hope that the visit to Peking will contribute to the development of a more stable and peaceful situation in East Asia and in the Pacific area. I recognize, of course, that the principles which move the leaders in Peking are in many cases diametrically opposite to our own. I hope, however, that my conversations with them will be a step toward relaxing the longstanding tensions between Peking and Washington.

Gradually and over a longer period, such discussion can result in a reduction of tensions in Asia, which would benefit all nations in that area.

You may be absolutely certain, Mr. President, that in taking steps toward the goal of a peaceful Asia, the United States will not overlook the interest of its allies and friends nor seek any accommodations at their expense. I have very much in mind the interests of your government. We intend to honor all of our treaty commitments, including that with the Republic of China. As I said in assuming office, and have frequently repeated since, the United States has no intention of disengaging from Asia.

The talks in Peking will focus on bilateral questions affecting that government and ourselves, of which there are many. Given the existence of the deep and complex differences which exist in our relationship, the question of establishing formal diplomatic relations between our two governments most assuredly will not arise.

The events which are now taking place in East Asia will have a profound effect on the nations of the Pacific for the remainder of this century. I look to your continued understanding of our purposes, Mr. President, to help ensure that these events will move us all in the direction of a stable and enduring international order.

It is my hope that my visit to Moscow in May 1972 will also contribute to greater international stability. In Moscow, as in Peking, the United States will not deal over the heads of its friends and allies in any matter where their security interests might be involved. For example, there have been no, and there will be no, bilateral United States–Soviet negotiations on mutual withdrawal of forces from Europe. I hope, however, that some concrete progress might be made, either before or during my Moscow visit, in such bilateral areas as arms control and economic relations.

May I assure you, as always, of my highest personal regards and warm good wishes for your continued excellent health.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

*End message.*²

² McConaughy delivered the message to Acting Foreign Minister H. K. Yang on January 3. (Telegram 5 from Taipei, January 3: *ibid.*) On January 9 Yang gave McConaughy a copy of Chiang's January 6 reply, which reads in part: "I am confident that, with your wisdom, rich political experience, and your thorough understanding of the true nature of the Chinese Communist regime, you would certainly have full cognizance of Peiping's treacherous tactics and intrigues in its international activities, and would not be beguiled. I am also confident that in all decisions vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists you will not only take into account both the traditional friendship and common interests of our two countries, but also bear in mind the long-term national interest of the United States and her position in world history." (Telegram 132 from Taipei, January 10; *ibid.*) The signed original was delivered by Ambassador Shen on January 11. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence File, Republic of China, Corres. Pres. Chiang Kai-shek) Shen apparently delivered the letter in his meeting with Rogers, where they discussed the summit in San Clemente between Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato. (Telegram 7012 to Taipei, January 12; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON) Kissinger informed Nixon of the contents of Chiang's response on January 11. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 38, President's Daily Briefs)

182. Editorial Note

Officials in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House were concerned that no reconnaissance or related activities against the People's Republic of China (PRC) complicate President Nixon's trip to China. In a January 3 letter to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, U. Alexis Johnson pointed out that Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard had agreed in November 1971 to "hold all surface and air surveillance activities at least 12 nautical miles (NM) from the PRC-claimed Woody and Lincoln Islands in the Paracels Group." Johnson stated that the PRC had issued a warning on December 24 alleging that a U.S. naval vessel violated its territorial integrity. He noted that the ship had not come within 12 nautical miles of the islands themselves, but that the PRC claim was based on "the straight baseline method between the islands, that is drawing a line between the islands and marking off the 12 NM limit from that line." Johnson asked: "if it would be feasible for our ships, at least for the time being, to avoid entering the claimed area around Lincoln and Woody Islands, it would

avoid the problem of additional 'serious warnings' in this period before the President's visit to Peking." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Diplomatic Security: Lot 96 D 695, U. Alexis Johnson Files, Chrono-Official, January 1972)

In early January Kissinger approved monitoring potential GRC activity and the proposal that, "If there is any increase in noise level, have State request McConaughy to approach Chiang Ching-kuo and emphasize that sabotage activities such as those alleged to have occurred in Kwangtung during October would be unhelpful to President Nixon." Kissinger wrote: "Let's decide this when it happens." The memorandum from Jessup to Kissinger and attached CIA reports are in National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, China. On February 12, McConaughy reported to Rogers that "As instructed Ambassador made representation to Vice Premier Chiang emphasizing need for full GRC cooperation in safeguarding good atmosphere for President's visit to PRC and supplying us with any information that might have even indirect bearing on security of President or environment of visit. Ambassador noted that we expected Chicoms to maintain non-offensive posture during period which should make it easier for GRC to do same. Ambassador made clear he was referring to action by GRC sympathizers on mainland, coastal activity by GRC armed forces, or even moves in places remote from cities President will visit that would put GRC in position to be plausibly blamed for untoward incident." McConaughy concluded that Chiang gave "categorical assurances that GRC would refrain from any actions of an offensive or provocative nature." (Telegram 712 from Taipei, February 12; *ibid.*) No incidents were reported around the time of Nixon's trip to the PRC.

183. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, January 3, 1972, midnight.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai

Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. Chi P'eng-fei Vice Foreign Minister

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, Haig Trip—Memcons, January 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig was in the PRC January 3–10 with a team of Americans who made technical arrangements for Nixon's February visit. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.

Mr. Chang Wen-chin, Director of the West European, American and Australian Affairs, MFA

Mr. Han Hsu, Director, Protocol Department, MFA

Miss Nancy T'ang (Interpreter)

General A. M. Haig, Jr.

Haig: I am very honored that the Prime Minister is seeing me personally.

Chou En-lai: Yes, because I heard from Minister Fei and the Director of West European, American and Australian Affairs, who both told me that you had important matters to convey.

Haig: Yes, Dr. Kissinger and the President asked me to request an audience to give you, in blunt terms, a soldier's assessments of recent events in South Asia and discuss them in context of the President's visit.²

Chou En-lai: How is Dr. Kissinger? I heard he had a slight cold.

Haig: He has had a touch of the flu but is much better today.

Chou En-lai: You have to be careful here too because it is snowing. I don't know whether it has snowed in Washington yet.

Haig: We have had no snow yet. Usually by this time we would have had snow.

Chou En-lai: This is your first visit to China, I suppose?

Haig: Yes, both myself and Mrs. Hartley.³ We are very honored to be here. I said today that my father-in-law came to China some 48 years ago for his first visit to China.

Chou En-lai: 48 years ago. Very interesting. I believe he is still well? Your father-in-law? So you can now write him a postcard from Peking.

Haig: Yes, his trip was 48 years ago. Mr. Prime Minister, I thought what I would like to do is not belabor any of the special details that we have passed on in our messages but the Prime Minister will recall that we took a number of steps during that period.

Chou En-lai: Yes, I remember that you conveyed certain messages through a certain channel.

Haig: We believe and we have very strong confirmation that those steps were effective in convincing the Soviet Union to influence the Indians to accept a cease-fire rather than to proceed with attacks against West Pakistan—in other words to stop short of what had been their goal against Pakistan. One of those steps was Dr. Kissinger's reference

² Haig's opening statement based on undated talking points is *ibid.*, Haig Trip—January 1972, Talking points—private meeting.

³ Apparent reference to Muriel Hartley who was assigned to the NSC staff.

to the possible cancellation of the President's Moscow trip if the conflict continued. Since the cease-fire has gone into effect, we have made a very careful assessment of the overall implications of recent events on the subcontinent and we have concluded that up until recently the Soviet policy on the subcontinent has been, in general, to keep the subcontinent divided. This was manifested in their performance during the earlier conflict between India and Pakistan but we think they have decided on a rather precipitous shift in their policy to adopt one in which they would now seek to encircle the PRC with unfriendly states. We believe that this modified Soviet strategy has evolved as a result of recent events and has caused them to overhaul their former strategy for the subcontinent. We also noted when the crisis developed that the Soviets tried very hard to divert us from the course that would converge with the policy of the People's Republic. In short, they sought to influence us to maintain a hands off policy. During the period when this crisis started to develop, they invited Dr. Kissinger to visit Moscow personally on several occasions as guest of Mr. Brezhnev. They also offered to reach agreements with us in the accidental attack and provocative attack areas, all of which we rejected. We rejected these approaches by the Soviet Union on two grounds—one was on the grounds of principle. We felt we had certain obligations with respect to Pakistan and we felt we could not tolerate use of force to dismantle that country. But we also rejected the Soviet approaches because we felt that the future viability of the PRC was of the greatest interest to us and a matter of our own national interest.

Again, speaking the blunt language of a soldier, I would not be so naive to infer that this is a precipitous shift in our attitude which has suddenly developed after the years of differences which have divided us. Rather, we have arrived at these conclusions because we are convinced that the Soviet strategy is first to neutralize the People's Republic and then turn on us. Therefore, our interests are self interests. I would want this clearly understood.

Since the cease-fire has gone into effect between India and Pakistan, we have carefully assessed subsequent Soviet actions and we are convinced that they intend to continue their efforts to encircle the People's Republic. We say this based on a number of factors. Included among those factors are their repeatedly announced support for the Bangladesh, and their offer to move advisers and assistance into East Pakistan, the recently announced visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Japan and, above all, their stepped up expression of support for Hanoi in its conduct of the war, as well as increased Soviet materiel support for Hanoi. In the context of what I have just said, I would also like to comment very briefly on the recent decision of the U.S. Government to launch a series of limited aerial attacks against North Vietnam.

This was a decision that was taken only with the most careful thought and with the greatest reluctance. We believe that our policy with respect to the war in Southeast Asia is very clear at this point. We have undertaken every reasonable step to bring the conflict to an early conclusion. On the 11th of October, we transmitted to Hanoi the most forthcoming set of proposals for settlement of that conflict that we could conceivably develop, including the offer to have the current leader in Vietnam step down prior to a post-settlement election. In the face of these proposals, no one can doubt that we have any intention of maintaining our presence in South Vietnam. We have told Hanoi that we would withdraw and withdraw totally and they understand this. Despite these proposals of October 11th, we have yet to receive any response from Hanoi nor have we even received from them an expressed willingness to discuss these proposals in Paris as we have offered to do.

Instead, from Hanoi, we have seen a step-up of attacks in Cambodia and Laos. We have seen increased attacks against our unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over North Vietnam. We have seen the continued development of Hanoi's supply route through the demilitarized zone and we have seen rocket attacks against populated centers in South Vietnam. We have seen increasing numbers of missile attacks from sanctuary in North Vietnam against our air forces in Laos. These actions we could not but interpret as an effort by Hanoi to humiliate the United States—a humiliation that no great power can accept. In this context, our retaliatory strikes were launched. Also in this context, future U.S. air activity over North Vietnam will be directly related to Hanoi's future actions. For our part, our strongest wish is to settle the conflict as quickly as possible and on terms, the fairness of which cannot be doubted. On the other hand, we cannot subject ourselves to the kind of humiliation which Hanoi's actions seem designed to achieve.

In the context of what I have just said, we have concluded that the continuation of the war in Southeast Asia can only give Moscow an opportunity to increase its influence in Hanoi and to further the encirclement of the People's Republic. We feel strongly that Moscow is urging Hanoi in the direction of continued military action and as such, they are forging another link in the chain which is designed to constrain the People's Republic. In all of these circumstances, we also believe that President Nixon's visit takes on a new and immediate significance which transcends its earlier importance. In the context of the events I have just described, i.e., the immediate effect to the People's Republic and the revised Soviet strategy, the President's visit is not only one of long term historic significance—the original motivation and the guiding force underlying the visit—but now we see an immediate significance which must now be considered with respect to the President's visit. In the light of our own strategic interests—America's strategic

interests which I described earlier—we are convinced of and dedicated to the proposition that the viability of the People's Republic should be maintained. We have accepted this premise in full consideration of those things which divide us. We recognize that these differences are both ideological and practical in nature. On the other hand, just as Dr. Kissinger outlined to you earlier, Churchill was willing to cooperate with Stalin in order to cope with the greater danger of Hitler Germany. We feel that the United States and the People's Republic must concert at this critical juncture. We are prepared to use our resources as we did during the crisis between India and Pakistan to attempt to neutralize Soviet threats and to deter threats against the People's Republic.

In sum, this is an overly generalized and soldier's blunt elucidation of Dr. Kissinger's and the President's views. It suffers from brevity and hence the oversimplification which a more careful exposition would avoid. We have considered some of the implications of this assessment and we have asked ourselves in the short term what the United States could do within the context of this assessment to deal with some of the events which we think could occur in the future. One of the steps we are prepared to do unilaterally and without any reciprocity on the part of the People's Republic—is to provide you with our assessments of the Soviet threat which exists against the People's Republic to the degree that our own technical resources are able to do so. I would emphasize that these would be steps taken without condition and without reciprocity and Dr. Kissinger has asked me to inform you that when he arrives with the President he would be ready to discuss the modalities of furnishing this information, perhaps through a third country or through whatever other means you might prefer.

An additional implication of the assessment I have just provided is the fact that we have a major problem developing within the United States which your Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Huang Hua⁴ can confirm, and Miss Tang has observed first hand also. This is a strange merger of forces within the United States—all dedicated to either preventing the President's visit to Peking or to contributing to its failure. The forces which have converged are composed of first the American Left which is essentially pro-Soviet and if it is not truly dominated by Moscow in that sense of the word, it is at least strongly attracted toward Moscow and future U.S. alignment with Moscow. In this instance, the Left has been joined in a strange wedding with those conservative elements who are strong supporters of Taiwan. A third area of difficulty for us in the United States is a degree

⁴ Huang Hua was one of the PRC representatives at the United Nations.

of bureaucratic haggling concerning the wisdom of the initiative to visit Peking.

All of these factors have converged in a way which poses a very serious threat to the success of the visit. In the short run, these forces would hope to prevent the visit at all—in the longer run, they would hope to prevent or deter the normalization of relations between the People's Republic and the United States. For this reason, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger are all the more concerned about making President Nixon's visit a success not only in reality but also in the appearance of the visit itself. Thus, we feel it must succeed in both fact and in appearance.

Unfortunately, most American journalists are shallow idiots. They draw their editorial line from the immediate atmospherics of the situation and from what is essentially the instantaneous reporting of a set of circumstances rather than from a careful analysis of the realities and implications of these realities. For this reason, it is crucial that there be no public embarrassment to the President as a result of his visit to Peking. It is in our mutual interest that the visit reinforce President Nixon's image as a world leader. I have brought several journalistic efforts of recent weeks from some of our more important newspapers, such as the *New York Times*, which I would like to leave with the Prime Minister so that he can see how these forces have been working in the United States against both the normalization of relations and the President's visit. In the light of these trends, we would hope that between now and Dr. Kissinger's visit that perhaps certain steps could be taken—one might be some strengthening of the positive aspects of the Joint Communiqué which was worked out so satisfactorily during Dr. Kissinger's visit. We are thinking along the lines of a possible reference to trade or something that would give an immediate sense of accomplishment as a result of the visit, such as increased scientific or cultural exchanges.

Finally, the most crucial issue in the Public Communiqué which would be released at the time of the President's visit is the unresolved issue of the status of Taiwan. You will recall that Dr. Kissinger left without this language being agreed upon. We have looked at this problem from two perspectives. The first is what we will actually do about Taiwan in the future and second, is what we will say about Taiwan in conjunction with the President's visit. In order for us to be, very bluntly, anti-Soviet and pro-People's Republic, we must have the support of the American conservatives. As I pointed out, this support is intimately linked today to the issue of Taiwan. At this point, I would like to categorically reaffirm what Dr. Kissinger told you about our future policies towards Taiwan:

First, we will do nothing to encourage or support the movement towards an independent Taiwan. Second, we will do nothing to

encourage or to support Japanese efforts to manipulate the future of Taiwan either through the independence movement or a Japanese presence in Taiwan. And third, we will withdraw war-related U.S. forces from Taiwan as soon as the war has been concluded. Also, over the longer period we will gradually reduce our presence there.

In summary, the United States finds itself caught between the dilemma of a Left Wing which is dominated by forces friendly to the Soviet and by the Right Wing which is dominated by pro-Taiwan forces. For this reason, and in the light of all the considerations I have mentioned tonight, we would urge you to reconsider very carefully the language in the Joint Communiqué that pertains to Taiwan and, hopefully, to agree to a formulation that is somewhat less truthful and somewhat less precise than the language which Dr. Kissinger carried away with him during his last visit. I have brought another version of the paragraphs pertaining to Taiwan which I would like very much to leave with you, on an ad referendum basis. Perhaps when Dr. Kissinger arrives there can be further discussion on this subject. In the interim, Dr. Kissinger felt that you should have our assessment of what we consider to be the overriding strategic implications of Soviet actions and strategy. We have made some very careful soundings since Dr. Kissinger's return and we know that the language that was considered during his visit would cause an uproar in the United States. This, we feel, would only strengthen the very forces that are working against the visit itself and the implications of that visit for the future of both of our countries.

That concludes the strategic assessment of the President's and Dr. Kissinger's or rather my interpretation of that assessment. I must apologize for its bluntness but I felt that you would appreciate this kind of candor. Candor was certainly the characteristic of Dr. Kissinger's discussions here and especially those with the Prime Minister.

I do have several minor administrative matters to raise in this very restrictive forum and in such a way that the rest of our party would not be privy to them. With your approval, I will discuss them now.

Chou En-lai: Yes. Go ahead.

Haig: First, Dr. Kissinger considers that it is essential that he attend all the meetings between the President and yourself and whatever meetings might occur between the President and the Chairman. That is the first item.

Secondly, Dr. Kissinger again asked me to emphasize the essentiality of having concurrent meetings at the level of the Foreign Ministry and the Department of State which would occur whenever the President would meet with you and with the Chairman. It might pose a challenge of some magnitude to have sufficient substantive topics to cover but we are confident that together we can accomplish that constructively.

Next, I would like to reiterate what I have given to your very hospitable representatives today and that is that the composition of our party is made up of many technicians. Some of them are not governmental. They are all great advocates of their particular specialty. They may, during their visit here, be the source of some abrasive demand or requirement which would run counter to our mutual best interests. I want to emphasize if there are any demands of that kind that develop at the technical level you should not feel obliged to accept them but rather bring them to me so that no technical matter can be permitted to act as a source of irritation or detract from the success of this visit.

Each of our representatives who has been to China before now has returned with the greatest respect and admiration for the hospitality and for the professionalism and skill of your representatives. I am determined to keep that high level of cooperation and respect alive during this visit and I am prepared to take whatever steps you or your representatives might feel necessary to insure it. Therefore, I would again urge that anything your side feels may be counterproductive is brought directly to my attention.

One last very minor thing, Mr. Prime Minister, is that Dr. Kissinger was concerned because just before I left a female television personality called him and told him she was going to contact your Ambassador in New York and try to get him on her show and to use Dr. Kissinger's name to get him on the show. Dr. Kissinger wanted you to know that he had not given approval for this and felt that this was totally a Chinese matter as to whether the Ambassador appears or not.

Chou En-lai: We have not gotten news of this yet.

Haig: The commentator is a Miss Nancy Dickerson

Chou En-lai: So she approached Ambassador Huang Hua about that?

Haig: If she has not already, she will probably do so soon and she may use Dr. Kissinger's name.

Chou En-lai: That is a small matter.

I thank you for your rather clear notification. Of course, you have said you have not gone into great detail but we understand the general idea. And, of course, we must report this to Chairman Mao Tse-tung and also must consult with other colleagues. Therefore, I am not able to give an official reply. However, I would like to comment on what you have said. The first thing is just as you mentioned that the coming together of our two countries would be beneficial to the promotion of the normalization of relations between our two countries and also to the relaxation of tension in the Far East. We believe this will not only be beneficial to the U.S. but also to the People's Republic of China and also to the peoples of our two countries and to the people in the Far East.

The second point is that Soviet meddling in the South Asian subcontinent and in Indochina, in my opinion, is not due to a change in the strategic policies of the Soviet Union but rather a necessary consequence of reaction on the part of the Soviet Union toward the coming closer between China and the United States. And I mentioned this to Dr. Kissinger during his first visit to China—that we were anticipating to shoulder, to bear the consequences of this coming together of U.S. and China and that we were prepared for this and we do not, therefore, find it to be unexpected. For instance, the question of the subcontinent. It was because the Sino–American Communiqué of July 15—the first announcement of July 15th, your time, was published that the Soviet–Indian Treaty, a so-called treaty which was actually a military alliance, came into being after having been delayed for two years. It was finally signed in Delhi in August and it can be said that Pakistan did not deal with that very earnestly at that time.

Of course, this is not something that either China or the United States could do for them as their friend. And, therefore, when later on in December, the situation had already become rather urgent, when we heard of Dr. Kissinger’s information about the policy as adopted by the United States, we considered that although it was rather late at that time already, we considered that that was the only possible policy that could be adopted at that time. Of course, now, the question of the subcontinent has become complicated. And we believe that it will continue to develop. And if the United States Government has any other new further opinion with regard to this situation, we are willing to hear it. Because the obstruction of India’s advance toward West Pakistan is only a temporary phenomenon. And with the development of the already complex situation on the subcontinent, will undergo still more changes. And, therefore, in the interim period from now until the visit of your President to China, if the U.S. Government has any new information it would like to convey, we are willing to exchange opinions on the situation in the area.⁵

⁵ On January 4 Haig sent an abbreviated version of this conversation to Kissinger, along with another message summarizing his efforts. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1015, Alexander M. Haig Special Files, Haig China Trip File [Haig Advance Party, Dec 29, 1971 to Jan 10, 1972]) Kissinger’s January 5 reply stated in part: “With respect to South Asia, you can tell them we will communicate further thoughts through Paris channel. At present the primary objective is to gain time and to arm Pakistan. We have used our influence with Turkey and France in this regard; we welcome any PRC efforts. We are starting economic assistance programs again and on a larger scale.” (Ibid., Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, China—AH January 1972 visit) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 75–77.

I would like to say also, very frankly, that our opinions differ from yours on Vietnam.⁶ We believe that it was not necessary for the U.S. Government to bomb North Vietnam in such a way as President Nixon has never done since he has taken office, as he did around Christmas last year. And, in addition, this action was taken after President Nixon had withdrawn I believe around 400,000 troops from South Vietnam, and, therefore, this action made it even more unacceptable to the people of the world, including the people of the United States and this was also reflected in the press of the United States. And this also occurred at precisely the time when President Nixon declared to the world around Christmas that he wished to move toward relaxation of tension and toward peace in the world. And if we should say that Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean and in the South Asian subcontinent have increased, we should say that they were led into that area by India. But if we should say that the Soviet Union was given an opportunity to increase its influence and its force in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam then we should say that it was assisted by the recent action of the United States. Because as I remember, when Dr. Kissinger was here discussing things with us, he expressed particular admiration and appreciation of the fifth point put forth by Madame Binh of the Republic of Vietnam. The basic spirit of that clause was to change South Vietnam and Indochina into a non-allied area, i.e., an area which would maintain peaceful and friendly relations with all sides. And this would be beneficial to the relaxation of tension in Southeast Asia. It would also be beneficial to the improvement of relations between the United States and China. However, now the U.S. bombing has increased the Soviet influence and tension in this area. Of course, this is not of great consequence to us but it is quite bad for the local area. It will make the situation in all of Southeast Asia tense and it will also be a matter of great concern to the people of the U.S. and the world and it will not be favorable toward the ending of the war in that area.

Originally, we were waiting to convey these views to President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger when they come later on but since you have now mentioned these matters, we think this is also another opportunity to advance some of our opinions. Of course, this is also just an initial exchange and I believe we will have another opportunity to ex-

⁶ Concerning Vietnam, Kissinger's January 5 message to Haig reads in part: "With respect to Southeast Asia you should stress that in our view Moscow is blocking negotiated settlement. We have made sweeping proposal; Hanoi cancelled meeting set for November 20. You can reaffirm everything I said on my visits, particularly our readiness to accept non-aligned Southeast Asia. The only reason in our view the war continues is for Soviet, not U.S. aims. No patriotic Vietnamese need fear of eventual domination."

change opinions. And, of course, as you said, this exchange is limited to us two.

And as for the third factor, we have taken into consideration the fact that you have certain internal problems which we see from the press and also Dr. Kissinger mentioned it during his previous visits and we have also felt the three forces which you mentioned. I would also like to ask something very bluntly and to you as you are a military man. Is it that the Pentagon also has differing opinions?

Haig: Some elements in the Pentagon have differing opinions but those who are the most responsible and strategic thinkers are in full agreement with this initiative and the visit of the President.

Chou En-lai: As for the two questions—the two issues that Dr. Kissinger raised about the Joint Communiqué.

The first is essentially a question of trade. We understand this proposal and we can also see from American opinion that they are also attaching importance to this question and this is also an issue that carries weight.⁷

The second is the suggestion you have brought from Dr. Kissinger about the wording of the part about Taiwan. In our opinion, the paragraph that we have written down—I am not speaking about the part the Chinese says but the part that the U.S. side says. We believe that in the wording of that part we have fully taken into consideration the present dilemma that you just now mentioned between the United States Government and the forces you mention from the Left and the Right because this is a force of crucial significance to the United States but since you have brought a new opinion, we would be willing to take it into consideration, because as we have mentioned before we are always willing to get the work done as best as possible because you must work with a view toward the future. And also Dr. Kissinger has already given some hints about this question to the press—five points, isn't that so?

Haig: Five points?

Chou En-lai: You have not seen them? A Minister of Japan—we found it in the Japanese press. They were representatives of the Democratic Socialist Party—the leader of that party.

Haig: He did talk to him.

Chou En-lai: And he announced these five points to the Japanese press.

⁷ Kissinger's January 5 message to Haig reads in part: "On the communiqué the ball is in their court. The trade section can wait till we get there as long as they understand what we have in mind. An additional area for strengthening is cultural and scientific exchanges where we might mention some specific projects. Please raise this."

Haig: I don't recall Dr. Kissinger using five points.⁸

Chou En-lai: We have been trying to get a copy.

Haig: I will find out about that. I did not sit in at the meeting.

Chou En-lai: We will try to get a copy and give you an English translation. Of course, it quoted Dr. Kissinger and these words came from the Japanese. As for the specific questions you later mentioned (administrative questions), we don't think there is any question to that because we believe during his second visit Dr. Kissinger mentioned these points. I believe we can cooperate very well on them. Of course, you can continue discussions with Acting Foreign Minister Fei, either directly or you can have separate group discussions with various other people. Of course, we will not do anything to embarrass you and if anything comes up at lower levels, they will not be settled there. They will be brought to you.

As for your plans for this present visit to China, there are two suggestions. One was that you would spend a great portion of your time in Peking and then go to Shanghai and Hangchow for a visit. Another would be you would stay here for a short time—then go to Shanghai and Hangchow and come back here. In my personal opinion, it would be better to have all issues decided in Peking and then go to other places. It would be economizing on the time. But, of course, if you would like to wait for a reply from Washington before you would like to finalize certain details or if you have other political matters to discuss later on, then a return trip would be better. Either question is entirely up to you to decide.

Haig: I think, at first glance, we would favor a longer time here and then the trip to the other two locations and depart from there. I think we will know that better after we have had discussions of the schedule tomorrow morning at the plenary sessions, after which we could decide. But I believe that this would be the best way to proceed.

⁸ Kissinger's January 5 message to Haig reads in part: "On Taiwan, you should take any counter draft ad referendum. They do not want to use Paris channel for this so do not suggest it." He also wrote: "I am puzzled by reference to Japanese Social Democrat. Given Japanese propensity to leak, you can be sure I said nothing. Memcon is being sent to you separately. Chou may have obliquely asked for reaffirmation of my commitments to him. Withdrawal of Southeast Asia related part of forces within a reasonable period after end of Indochina War. Gradual withdrawal of remainder as tensions ease. No support for Japanese return to Formosa or introduction of Japanese troops there. No further reference to status of Formosa being undetermined. No encouragement of Taiwan independence movement." (Ibid.) Kissinger sent a message to Haig, January 4, that included a version of the memorandum of conversation between himself and Ikko Kasuga, Chairman of the Japanese Democratic Socialist Party. Haig discussed the contents of Kissinger's January 5 message in his meeting with Acting Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei on January 6. The memorandum of conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, Haig trip—memcons, January 1972. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 78.

Chou En-lai: I am sorry to have taken up too much of your sleep.

Haig: I am honored that you have taken this time to see me.

Chou En-lai: I am also very happy to have been able to meet you. Anyway, if you are going to contact Dr. Kissinger, please send my regards to him.

Haig: I will do so.

184. Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Beijing, January 8, 1972

On evening of January 6 entire group was presented to Prime Minister and Marshal² in three segments (Advance Group, Technicians and air crew). He spoke to advance party for period of nearly 30 minutes presenting guarded expressions of friendship for American people and emphasizing again PRC limitations which preclude great power status.

Following meeting with Prime Minister, we were given sumptuous duck dinner. Concurrently, I had to step into technical arrangements which were totally stalled due to contract squabble on both satellite and production center. Technicians worked until dawn and finally arrived at solutions which appeared to satisfy PRC officials. It now appears that we can wrap up these details based on the most unorthodox legal arrangements conceivable. I have pushed this to a solution, despite considerable reservations on part of Redman³ and network technicians. We departed at 3:00 PM, January 7, for Shanghai and will leave China on schedule on January 10.

At 11:00 PM Thursday night, January 6, I was informed that Prime Minister again wished to see me. Thirty minutes later, I was informed he was ready and Muriel and I were ushered into a room in the Great

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1015, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Haig China Trip File [Haig Advance Party, December 29, 1971 to Jan 10, 1972] Part 1 of 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The message is incorrectly dated January 8, 1971.

² The full memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, Haig Trip—Memcons, January 1972. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 79.

³ Reference is to General Albert Redman, Commander of the White House Communications Agency.

Hall where Prime Minister and a host of Chinese officials were assembled, including Fei, Chang, Hsiung, Han Hsu and Wang Hai-jung.

After a most cordial exchange of small talk, Prime Minister started to read from a paper which was presented as Chairman's formal reply to my message of Tuesday A.M.⁴ The reply was tough and polemic in tone, especially on the subject of Vietnam and our assessment of that situation. The December air action was the subject of special attack. The Prime Minister stated it had, in fact, "brought an unfavorable element into the visit". The Prime Minister's language in this regard was guarded and most carefully chosen. He also attacked Soviets and expressed agreement with our South Asian policies. He took strong exception to our expressions of concern for PRC's viability and independence. The Prime Minister insisted this is their problem and they need no help from us. Prime Minister also insisted that our strategic assessment of Soviet South Asian strategy is in error and that Soviet expansion into that area has always been a Soviet objective. Your trip in July merely provided pretext for concluding military pact (not friendship) with India which had been in readiness for two years. Prime Minister insisted relations between United States and PRC were not normalized and that we diverged on a number of issues in fundamental ways. He also stated our concern for Nixon image as world leader was misplaced since Nixon image will evolve from his actions—not theatrics. In any event, PRC will do nothing to embarrass President during his trip.

Inter alia, Prime Minister made following specific points:

- Expressed appreciation for my frankness.
- PRC people desire normalization but hostile forces are intensifying their destruction and sabotage.
- USSR hastily made concessions in Berlin after announcement of President's visit and concurrently concluded military alliance with India.
- There has been no shift of Soviet policy of contending for hegemony in South Asia.
- Subcontinent will remain in turmoil.
- There is a fundamental difference between PRC and United States on Vietnam questions.
- China firmly supports struggle of Vietnamese people and U.S. should withdraw now and accept seven points.
- Relations between U.S. and China are not normal.
- PRC does not object to further consultations on Taiwan and will do its best to take our difficulties into consideration in draft. At same time, this is the crucial question for PRC and yielding to forces opposed to normalization will bring no benefits.

⁴ Apparent reference to Haig's statement contained in the January 3–4 memorandum of conversation, Document 183.

—PRC will consider putting references to future trade in communiqué and cultural and scientific exchanges as well. Expect our side to bring some views on these issues when party comes.

—Requests text PRC reply be given to Kissinger and President upon return of our party.

In view of foregoing and strong attack on Southeast Asian problem and fact that several PRC officials were in attendance, I replied in a manner designed to not accept unreasonable PRC polemics but in a way also designed to wind the exchange down rather than to launch a new round.

I therefore told Prime Minister I was responding briefly on a personal basis, believing only you and President should respond officially for our side:

—Language of Tuesday's and Thursday's messages was my own—blunt and that of a soldier.

—Re Southeast Asia, it does appear that we differ since from our perspective it is Hanoi and Moscow that are blocking peace. Furthermore, over the longer view it is our view that PRC and U.S. interests will converge in Southeast Asia.

—Re viability of PRC, my language was not designed to convey that we were presuming to assume role of PRC protector but rather that our own interests now have led us to conclude that China's continued viability is in our own self-interest—this being a simple statement of fact.

—Re "President's image"—I was speaking strictly in context of affording enemies an opportunity to place obstacles in way of our policies. Imagery has never been a factor in President's calculus for decisions as his past performance confirms.

—Re Taiwan, more detailed discussions should be held in February.

—Re trade, scientific and cultural matters in communiqué, we will have modest proposals in February and we recognize issue of trade is long-term proposition.

—Re South Asia and elsewhere, experience has shown both of us that good intentions may not be enough. In that area, the U.S. was slow in recognizing the dangers, how it behooves both sides to be equally cognizant of dangers, both there and elsewhere, and to concert where indicated before the situation turns sour.

—Finally, I noted that our technical talks had been characterized by candor and frankness. Some of the substantive topics on the President's agenda cover points of past disagreement which lend themselves to standard rhetoric which contributes to further misunderstanding. I therefore urge the same kind of frank exchanges which have characterized discussions during our visit. (This was indirect slap at PRC rhetoric on Vietnam which Prime Minister seemed to accept, though perhaps not too happily.)

Prime Minister then touched upon history of Korea and Vietnam, carefully pointing out that Democratic Presidents led U.S. in and Republican Presidents must lead us out. He again launched attack on air action; noted there is still room for changes on Taiwan language—referred to trade, cultural and scientific matters as "rather minor" which

can be settled. Prime Minister concluded by pointing out that situation in Vietnam is different from that which pertained in Korea. In Korea, he was involved and agreement could be reached with U.S. Now the participants are different.

The meeting concluded at 2:15 A.M.

We depart this evening by train for Hangchow and will remain out of direct contact with the aircraft for next twenty four hours. Should you have anything urgent, please instruct aircraft crew to contact me by phone in Hangchow.

Warm regards.

185. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

Results of Initial Steps Toward Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People's Republic of China and the United States, and Recommendations for Further Steps to be Taken

The memorandum and study appended at Tab A respond to your request of June 9, 1971.² They were delayed in preparation, with the agreement of the NSC Staff, to allow further time for assessment of U.S. initiatives vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China, and in part because of the difficulties encountered in the reconciliation of widely divergent viewpoints.

The most important problem dealt with is the question of a) whether the PRC should be afforded equality with the USSR in respect to commodities and products of technology available for export to them under general license and b) if so, when these actions should be accomplished. On point a) the majority, including State and Commerce, believes that full equality should be afforded as part of a general process of bringing our trade policies with the PRC and the USSR into alignment. Defense objects on the grounds that different levels of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters: Lot 73 D 288, NSC-U/SM Memoranda, 1972. Secret.

² See Document 131 and footnote 14 thereto.

military, industrial and technological development of the PRC require different criteria for decontrolling items for general license export to the PRC until such time as experience provides a basis for bringing our trade policies in closer alignment. On point b) the majority, including Defense and Commerce, believes that the principles of gradualness and reciprocity should be given full weight.

The Department of State believes that the earlier and more thoroughly our policies on trade with the PRC are brought into line with those toward the USSR, the greater the likelihood of favorable impact upon U.S.–PRC relations. State therefore favors early implementation of the recommendations in this paper.

The recommendations of the Committee are summarized in my report which is attached. They are more fully described with their relative advantages and disadvantages in Annex A to my report.³

Where different viewpoints occurred, the agency dissenting from the majority viewpoint has in each case presented its position in a footnote. Such footnotes express the view of the author agency only. Because of the desire to allow full expression of dissent, and the inability of the drafting committee to accede unanimously to dissenting viewpoints, I believe that the current format of the memorandum is more responsive to your desire to see all the options than any other practical alternative. Accordingly, the suggestion of Secretary Laird to redraft the memorandum (Tab B) was partly but not wholly accommodated.³

The concurrence of the Department of Commerce which explains its position more fully is appended at Tab C.⁴

John N. Irwin II

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed. Holdridge forwarded these materials to Kissinger on February 2. In a February 10 memorandum to the President, Kissinger summarized three recommendations presented in the Under Secretaries Committee's report: 1) Place the PRC in the same commodity control group as the Soviet Union; 2) Abolish the FAC regulations requiring U.S. firms in COCOM nations to obtain licenses from the Treasury Department for the export of strategic goods to the PRC; and 3) Delay consideration of the sale of aircraft, cotton textiles, PRC and U.S. claims, and ship or aircraft visits until after the trip. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, Country Files, Far East, U.S. China Policy, 1969–1972) In a February 11 memorandum for the record, Eliot wrote that Haig had called him to inform him that the President had approved the recommendations. (Ibid., RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters: Lot 73 D 288, NSC–U/SM Memoranda, 1972) Ziegler announced the relaxation of export controls on February 14. (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 6, 1972, p. 291) Kissinger also informed the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, State, and the CIA through NSDM 155, issued on February 17. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–232, NSDM Files, NSDM 155)

186. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, January 24, 1972.

President Nixon, in his speech of January 25, reaffirms once again the United States desire to find a negotiated settlement to the Indo-China War and presents a plan whose outlines have already been given to Prime Minister Chou En-lai by Dr. Kissinger.² With the view towards keeping the record of current United States actions concerning the conflict in Southeast Asia complete, the U.S. Government is enclosing a copy of the new detailed plan designed to bring the war to an end on a basis that is just for all parties. This action completes each of the commitments made by Dr. Kissinger to the Prime Minister with respect to the conflict.

The United States has now taken every reasonable step to meet North Vietnamese concerns and respect the sacrifices and interests of all parties. These proposals go to the limits of United States generosity. They make it clear that there is no reason for the conflict to continue.

The North Vietnamese nevertheless seem intent to keep on trying to embarrass the United States by a major military offensive; the timing of their plans is noteworthy.

The People's Republic of China should understand that the United States would have no choice but to react strongly to actions by the North Vietnamese which are designed to humiliate us. Such developments would be to no one's benefit.

The United States believes that all concerned countries have an interest in helping end this war and that its proposals mean that no country need trade in principles in promoting this objective.

This note is sent in the spirit of frankness and mutual understanding which have characterized our exchanges thus far.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. This message, a 3-page "Republic of Vietnam and United States Proposal for a Negotiated Settlement of the Indochina Conflict," and information about communication, aircraft, and other preparations for the President's February 1972 trip were sent to Paris on January 24, under a covering letter from Haig to Walters. (Ibid.) The 3-page document was replaced with a later version, which was sent at 2 a.m. on January 25 under a covering memorandum from Haig to Walters. (Ibid.) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 80 and 81.

² "Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace in Vietnam," January 25, 1972, *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 100–106.

³ According to an undated memorandum for the record by Walters, he delivered this message and other materials to PRC diplomats in Paris on the evening of January 26. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges.) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 82.

187. Memorandum From the Defense Attaché in France (Walters) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Paris, January 30, 1972.

Chinese Ambassador handed me following this afternoon. He seemed slightly embarrassed but offered no comment to accompany it. He, Wei and Tsao were very cordial throughout.²

"The Chinese side has studied Dr. Kissinger's message of January 26, 1972³ on the Vietnam question and deem it necessary to reply as follows:

"1. During the exchange of views between China and the United States, we made clear on many occasions the Chinese government's principal stand on the Indochina question and repeatedly pointed out that the question of the three Indochinese countries, and first of all the Vietnam question, should be settled between the United States and the concerned parties of Indochina. China has never asked the United States to make any commitments to her with respect to this question, nor has China ever made any commitments to the United States. It was stated in the message that the United States had presented a new plan for resolving the Indochina war and that 'this action completed each of the commitments made by Dr. Kissinger to the Prime Minister with respect to the conflict'. What could be your intentions in saying so? We are most surprised.

"2. The United States proposals are by no means reasonable steps, but are, as the Vietnamese side has pointed out, a fraud for dragging out the war and continuing its interference in Vietnam's affairs. It was asserted in the message that 'these proposals go to the limits of United States generosity'. This is in effect an ultimatum demanding that the Vietnamese people submit.

"3. The United States has launched a war of aggression against Vietnam and thus insulted Vietnam, and it is not a question of Vietnam humiliating the United States. Being the victims of the war of aggression, the Vietnamese people have the inalienable right to hit back at the aggression at any time and in any form. The Chinese people will not flinch from even the greatest national sacrifices in giving resolute support to the Vietnamese people. The message alleges that the Vietnamese side is trying to humiliate the United States. This is a sheer

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Secret.

² Walters' 1-page memorandum for record of this, the 37th meeting with PRC diplomats in Paris, is *ibid.* See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 84.

³ See Document 186.

confusion of right and wrong. The United States of America should understand that its declaration that it would react strongly can intimidate no one, and that the end result can only be detrimental to the United States itself.

“4. It was asserted in the message that it was believed the United States proposals mean that no country need trade in principles in promoting the objectives of ending the war. This assertion was directed at China. We believe we should tell Dr. Kissinger that these words of his mean precisely that he wants us to abandon principles and exert pressure on the Vietnamese side on behalf of the United States. This is absolutely impossible. If the United States truly wishes to end the war in Vietnam it should forthrightly accept the reasonable seven-points proposal of the Vietnamese side. Neither war threats nor petty maneuvers will be of any avail. As was mentioned in the message, frankness has characterized our exchanges thus far, and it is exactly in this spirit that we are applying to you.”

188. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Defense Attaché in France (Walters)¹

Washington, January 31, 1972.

Please request appointment at first opportunity with Chinese Ambassador and convey to him the following message:²

“The U.S. side wishes to respond as rapidly as feasible to the question raised in the response of the People's Republic of China to the U.S. communication dealing with its eight-point peace proposal for Southeast Asia.³ The U.S. side affirms that there is no reciprocal obligation between the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the United States with respect to this problem. The use of the term ‘commitment’ was intended to convey that in Dr. Kissinger's discussions with the Prime Minister, he had revealed that the U.S. side had devel-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. By wire. A handwritten notation on the document reads: “WH 20114 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]”

² According to Walters' 1-page memorandum for the record, he delivered this message to Huang Chen in Paris on February 1. (Ibid.) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 84.

³ See Documents 186 and 187.

oped an eight-point plan for the settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia and that at an appropriate time, it might be published. Dr. Kissinger had also pointed out that pending publication of its eight points, the U.S. side could not divulge the details of its proposal to the People's Republic of China but that it would inform it of the details as soon as appropriate. Thus, the term 'commitment' merely referred to the fact that the U.S. side was completing that portion of the conversation dealing with the eight-point peace proposal. The term 'commitment' in this context connotes a unilateral promise rather than reciprocal obligation. Nevertheless, the U.S. Government believes that it has offered through its eight-point proposal a fair and honorable formula for the solution of the conflict in Southeast Asia."

189. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Defense Attaché in France (Walters)¹

Washington, February 5, 1972.

Please deliver following message to Chinese, hopefully before your departure.² If not possible, please have your secretary deliver at first opportunity.

"The United States side has seen recent reports to the effect that Special Adviser Le Duc Tho may be visiting Peking during the period just before the arrival of President Nixon and his party. If these reports are true and if Special Adviser Le Duc Tho expresses an interest in a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A typewritten notation on the document reads: "(Transmitted 2/5/72 for delivery by Gen. Walters on 2/6/72)."

² Walters' undated memorandum for the record reads in full: "On the morning of February 6th I called at the Chinese Embassy in Neuilly and delivered the message which I had received the previous evening and which indicated that we had heard that Le Duc Tho might be visiting China just before President Nixon's visit and that if he wished to discuss the Indochinese question, Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to meet with him. I was received by Tsao and Wei. Ambassador Huang Chen was not present. I was received cordially and with the usual rites. They promised to transmit this message that afternoon. I told them that I was going to the United States for a few days later that morning. They asked how they could get in touch with our side during my absence. I explained that Miss Ouellette was skiing but if called she could return at once to Paris and transmit any message to our side which they wished but that I myself would be back at the latest Thursday morning February 10th. They seemed fully satisfied with this and cordially wished me Bon Voyage." (Ibid.)

private meeting, Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to discuss the situation in Indochina in the spirit of generosity and justice. The Chinese side could count on the meticulous observation of secrecy. This is not a request for any action by the Chinese side and is simply for its information. No reply is expected.

“As the time for President Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China nears, the U.S. side wishes the People’s Republic of China to be aware of the nature of the toast which President Nixon will make at the opening banquet on February 21st. The President’s remarks will be in the spirit of Prime Minister Chou En-lai’s October toast at the banquet for Dr. Kissinger and his party. He will stress the themes of the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and the peoples of the U.S. and the need to make a new beginning between our countries. He will avoid any reference to current disputes, and he will not claim any similarity of views where none exist. This information is being provided now so that the Chinese side will know of the President’s approach to this important initial event.”

190. Memorandum From the Defense Attaché in France (Walters) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Paris, February 15, 1972.

On February 11, 1972 during call on Chinese and after handing them your message regarding easing of trade restrictions I was given following:²

“The Chinese side has studied the U.S. side’s February 1 message on the Indochina question.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² A February 11 telegram from the White House to Walters reads in full: “Dr. Kissinger is requesting that the following information be brought to the attention of the Prime Minister. 1. The White House will announce on Monday, February 14 that the U.S. Government is further easing its trade regulations with respect to the People’s Republic of China. This will have the effect of bringing the People’s Republic of China into a comparable position with that of the Soviet Union. 2. With respect to the Indian subcontinent, the President will take no policy decisions until after he has had a full exchange of views with the Prime Minister. The U.S. continues to approach this region with the attitude of pursuing an approach which parallels that of the People’s Republic of China.” (Ibid.) See Document 185.

"1. The Chinese side has noted the following clarification made in the U.S. message:

"The United States side affirms that there is no reciprocal obligation between the governments of the People's Republic of China and the United States with respect to this problem.'

"2. As for what is called in the U.S. message a unilateral promise, the facts are: In his discussion with Premier Chou En-lai, Dr. Kissinger revealed of his own accord that the U.S. side had submitted an eight-point plan to the Vietnamese side, and at the same time said that it would not be appropriate to show the Chinese side the documents of the secret U.S.–Vietnamese negotiations, including the details of the U.S. eight-point plan. Premier Chou En-lai on his part did not ask for that either. Dr. Kissinger also indicated that the U.S. side was not inclined to publish the eight-point plan, nor was it mentioned that the Chinese side would be informed of the details of this plan as soon as appropriate.

"3. Above is simply to clarify the situation and there is no need for a reply from the U.S. side."³

Comment: They were obviously embarrassed by tone of message. Said it was their New Year and produced lavish cake with rose on top. We toasted New Year in Roseflower wine. They could not have been more cordial. Ambassador Huang Hen leading joviality.

³ A February 11 memorandum from Walters to Haig, which was probably sent as a backchannel message, reads in full: "Chinese today handed me following message 'The Chinese side has received the US side's message of February sixth, in which it mentioned that Mr. Le Duc Tho might visit Peking just before President Nixon's arrival in China and indicated that the US would be prepared to discuss the Indochina question with Mr. Le Duc Tho. In this regard, we wish to reaffirm our consistent position: The negotiations on the Vietnam question are a matter between Vietnam and the United States, in which no other countries have the right to intervene. China supports the just struggle of Vietnam, but will definitely not meddle in the Vietnamese-US negotiations.' " Walters also prepared a memorandum for record of this, the 41st meeting with the Chinese in Paris. Both memoranda are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 85.

191. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, February 16, 1972.

The U.S. side would like to comment on the Chinese message of February 11, 1972.²

1. As the Chinese side is aware, the U.S. side has voluntarily undertaken to keep the People's Republic of China informed of significant events that could affect the People's Republic of China. This has been done without any request for reciprocity but rather with the intention of placing the relationship between our two peoples on a new basis. The U.S. side has meticulously implemented this unilateral undertaking concerning several areas of the world. Given this general policy it was natural for the U.S. side to continue this procedure with respect to a U.S. peace overture in Indochina.

2. As for previous conversations, both sides have undoubtedly kept careful records; they make clear what transpired on specific issues such as the degree of specificity concerning the U.S. approach in its eight point plan. There is no need to continue further exchanges on this matter.

3. The U.S. side would like to reiterate that it has engaged in these exchanges not to enmesh the People's Republic of China but rather to symbolize the new approach necessary to effect the fundamental change in relationships that it is U.S. policy to pursue. At the same time, this attempt to bring about trust requires a measure of mutual confidence and becomes difficult if isolated phrases assume an exaggerated significance which was never intended.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The date was handwritten. Another handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: "Gen. Walters, Per our conversation the following message should be passed to the Chinese." According to Walters' undated memorandum for the record, he passed this message to PRC diplomats in Paris at 6 p.m. on February 17. (Ibid.) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 87.

² See Document 190.

192. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs¹

Washington, February 14, 1972, 4:09–6:19 p.m.

[The President met with André Malraux, translator Sophia K. Porson, and Henry Kissinger. A broad-ranging discussion of 39 minutes not related to China was not transcribed.]

Nixon: When he [Malraux] said, you know, he said: “You will meet a colossus, but he’s [Mao’s] a colossus facing death.” And then he said: “You know what will impress him most about you? That you are so young!” [laughter] Isn’t that something! God almighty, that’s a commentary on the leadership of the world these days. It’s all too damn old. But—

Kissinger: You will find, Mr. President, that these people are the—

Nixon: What would he think if he could see Kennedy?

Kissinger: He would have thought Kennedy was a lightweight.

Nixon: You think so?

Kissinger: Mao would have had total disdain for Kennedy. He would have felt about him the way De Gaulle did. De Gaulle had absolutely no use for Kennedy.

Nixon: Oh, I found him very interesting.

Kissinger: These historical figures can’t be bluffed, and they won’t fall for pretty phrases. And these Chinese, I mean the only security they have at this moment is our understanding of the international situation. The tactical details are relatively unimportant. And you will find that even Chou, of course, I’ve never met Mao, will always begin with a general discussion—

Nixon: You know, it’s a very strong speech—

Kissinger: And, but not—

Nixon: One thing to note that is very important, though I even felt that Malraux who is basically, you know, has raised hell about Vietnam and not to mention anything else, and I know all that. But is also, everybody is ready to say the United States should get the hell out here, and everybody says . . . But I think you’ve got to always try to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 671-1. Secret. This transcript was prepared by the editor specifically for this volume. Nixon and Kissinger spoke shortly after a meeting with author André Malraux, a conversation that takes up the first half of this tape recording. A memorandum of the conversation with Malraux is *ibid.*, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President. Alexander Butterfield was also present for part of the discussion between Nixon and Kissinger.

stand very firmly on the point, do you want the United States as an island with no—

Kissinger: No foreigner wanted us to get out anywhere. It's our domestic—

Nixon: He didn't want us to get out of Japan. He didn't want us to get out of Europe. He wants the United States to play a role, a role in the world. He only says let it be an intelligent role.

Kissinger: It's our domestic critics who don't understand anything, who want us to get out—

Nixon: I don't believe it; it's a matter of fact. I believe, I believe, well, the Chinese I noticed there throughout the thing, the United States should withdraw from all nations. They don't really believe that. They can't really believe that.

Kissinger: Well you, Chou said to me, we need a general principle, but the troops we are worried about are the million troops on our northern frontier. While we're there, Mr. President, I should seek an occasion to give them some information about the disposition of Soviet forces on their frontier.

Nixon: They're worried; I should say so.

Kissinger: You shouldn't do it. But I'm going to get from Helms . . .

Nixon: I think that what I would like to do though, the way I would do it, is to say—

Kissinger: You ordered it.

Nixon: I ordered this for our trip and I would like for Dr. Kissinger to give it to [unclear] or whoever you want.

Kissinger: Yes, but only at a private meeting.

Nixon: Oh yes, at a private, well, I'll say it.

Kissinger: No, you should say it at a private meeting, not in a plenary session.

Nixon: Well, I hope it wasn't too painful for you. It is hard when a man has a—I mean, you feel for the poor guy, he's got such a [unclear] fighting it all the time.

Kissinger: I found it—

Nixon: I admire a guy who goes over physical disability. You know, it's painful for him to talk?

Kissinger: I found it fascinating; I didn't find it at all painful. First of all, I completely agree with him in his analysis of these people. Now, you have a tendency, if I may say so, Mr. President, to lump them and the Russians. They're a different phenomenon—

Nixon: No, I know.

Kissinger: They're just as dangerous. In fact, they're more dangerous over an historical period. But the Russians don't think they're

lovable, and the Russians don't have inward security. The Russians are physical, and they want to dominate physically. What they can't dominate, they don't really know how to handle. The Chinese are much surer of themselves, because they've been a great power all their history. And, being Confucians, they really believe that virtue is power.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: Now, their present philosophy is different from Confucianism, but the basic principles, that if you have the correct principles, you can dominate the world. It's still inbred in their civilization.

Nixon: I realize that. I think—

Kissinger: No, as far as he's concerned, that's correct, but I just, I'm just taking the liberty of saying this for the action when you deal with them. I think, in a historical period, they are more formidable than the Russians. And I think in 20 years your successor, if he's as wise as you, will wind up leaning towards the Russians against the Chinese. For the next 15 years we have to lean towards the Chinese against the Russians. We have to play this balance of power game totally unemotionally. Right now, we need the Chinese to correct the Russians and to discipline the Russians.

Nixon: You know, looking at the situation in Vietnam, I suppose if we had only known the way the war would've, was going to be conducted, that we would have to say that it was a mistake to get into it. The way—

Kissinger: Yeah. Oh, yeah—

Nixon: The way it was conducted, correct?

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: Because the way it's been conducted has cost us too much, compared to what it would cost to let it go. However, having taken it where we found it, we had no other choice. You know, you wonder, after you read Malraux and, of course, you remember De Gaulle saying, and we were there at the palace—

Kissinger: Mr. President—

Nixon: He said you should get out; you should wipe your hands of it and so forth.

Kissinger: I am sure that historians . . . you wouldn't have had the China initiative without it. It's the demonstration of strength. The Chinese are torn about us. The reason we had to be so tough in India-Pakistan, for example, is to prove to them that we could be relevant in Asia. On the one hand, they want us out of Asia as a threat. On the other, they need us close enough so that they know we can do something. They don't want us back on the West Coast, because if we're back on the West Coast we're just a nice, fat, rich country of no concern to them. And I am convinced that the history books, if we don't

collapse now this year, if the whole thing doesn't fall apart, is going to record the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam on the same caliber, at least, of De Gaulle's behavior in Algeria. It took him 5 years to get out of there. And after all, I think that game isn't, isn't over. I think we've, they've come to us now, that's a fact. That's a significant fact—

Nixon: Damn right. Well, whatever it is you said this morning, you saw much more through it than I did, and Bob [Haldeman] saw it too, that regardless of how it comes out, it gives us a two-edged sword for our enemies at home. My God, the fact that they asked for this meeting—

Kissinger: And it won't break up right away. They cannot possibly want me at a meeting, unless they have something to say. It's not their style. So, what we're gonna to get out of this is another series of meetings.

Nixon: Of course, you say another series of meetings. We have to remember that now time is running out. There isn't a helluva lot we can do about it, is there?

Kissinger: Well, but they must know that, too. I mean, we're coming now to the—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: We're going to get it to a point where you'll have to say yes or no to some difficult [unclear]—

Nixon: Yeah, that's right. We do want to remember that the meetings are enormously important to us in terms of the POWs. And they've got to know that.

Kissinger: Well, we, Mr. President, you always correctly express concern, are they stringing us along? If we have to draw up a balance sheet of the meeting, I think we gained a helluva lot more from the secret meetings than they did. In fact, I don't see what they gained out of the secret meetings. They didn't prevent Cambodia. They didn't prevent Laos. They didn't prevent anything we really wanted to do. They gave us a tremendous coup in public opinion, which is an important weapon in this war. And they settled six of eight points. I think we're not too far. If they are willing to maintain a non-Communist structure in the south for a while, I think we can find a solution.

Nixon: He [Malraux] obviously feels that China is inevitably going to dominate Southeast Asia. Do you agree?

Kissinger: I think that's true.

Nixon: You think so? Maybe they're just going to gobble them up?

Kissinger: No, but I think 800 million people confronting 30 million people—

Nixon: No, but I meant how? By subversion?

Kissinger: By subversion, by cultural example.

Nixon: So they'll go Communist? You also ought to remember that there's a strong pull the other way. One system works a little bit better than the other one [laughs].

Kissinger: Yeah, but it's a—

Nixon: That, of course, is the big argument.

Kissinger: But we'll be so weak—

Nixon: The reason Japan will not go the other way is the Japanese are going to like their living too damn well to turn toward the Communist system. Don't you agree?

Kissinger: I think the Japanese could do surprising things. I don't think they'll do it. They'll begin competing with the Chinese. But I think for our immediate problem is we can get out of it with an interim period where we are not the ones that have thrown our friends to the wolves.

Nixon: I agree.

Kissinger: There is a possibility—I don't think the Chinese are in a condition for 5 years to put real pressure on Southeast Asia, and even then—

Nixon: What do you think of his argument to the effect that the Chinese foreign policy is all posture?

Kissinger: There's a lot to that, but—

Nixon: I brought up, you know, that deal of his, which I thought was a nice little point. Where he said they had 2,000 dancers and 300,000 people in the street for the King, for the President of Somalia.²

Kissinger: Our concern with China right now, in my view, Mr. President, is to use it as a counterweight to Russia, not for its local policy.

Nixon: I agree.

Kissinger: As a counterweight, to keep it in play in the subcontinent for the time being. But above all as a counterweight to Russia. And, the fact that it doesn't have a global policy is an asset to us, that it doesn't have global strength yet. And to prevent Russia from gobbling it up. If Russian dominates China, that would be a fact of such tremendous significance.

Nixon: Well, quite frankly, Henry, if Russia or China dominated Japan that would have to be a factor and have enormous significance to us.

² According to the memorandum of conversation, Nixon and Malraux discussed a passage in the latter's book that concerned a visit by the Prime Minister of Somalia to the People's Republic of China. Malraux observed that this was "nothing but speeches and receptions for small chiefs of state. What, in fact, Malraux asked the President, had the Chinese done in Africa?" (Ibid.)

Kissinger: That's right. I think, Mr. President—

Nixon: It would be in our interests; it is important to us to maintain the Japanese alliance.

Kissinger: The decision you made that Sunday morning, when we asked you what you would do in case China came in, and you in effect said we'd back it.³ That is the decision some future president may have to make, or it may be you in your second term. And I think it's gonna be tough one, but we may be able to bring it off without the decision having to be made.

Nixon: Yeah. Malraux, of course, has seen every top leader in the world. I suppose going over back to 1918. He's 70 years old. He started to write, when he was 20, in 19[unclear]. You know he spent 3 years in prison in Cambodia for stealing sacred art, trying to take a sacred art object out of the country when he was 22 years old. But you know it's really a nice thing, in a way, for this old man. Any, I say "old man," but this man who has seen so much, who is out, you know on the shelf, to be invited over here, to—

Kissinger: I thought your questions were very intelligent.

Nixon: I was trying to keep him going, because—

Kissinger: Well, you did it very beautifully.

Nixon: I know he was having a hard time talking.

Kissinger: That, incidentally, is a good method to use with Chou too, because that's not too strong, understated.

Nixon: We'll try to be a little more subtle about it.

Kissinger: No, no, well, maybe a little more—

Nixon: Except that we cannot, we cannot be too apologetic about America's world role. We cannot, either in the past, or in the present, or in the future. We cannot be too forthcoming in terms of what America will do. Well, in other words, beat our breasts, wear a hair shirt, and well, we'll withdraw, and we'll do this, and that, and the other thing. Because I think we have to say that, well, "Who does America threaten? Who would you rather have playing this role?" I mean there's a lot of people that could look at their hole cards here. There's a lot of things they've got to consider about the American role that they—

Kissinger: Yeah, except they will do it, they will separate what they want you to do immediately from the principles.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And that's perfectly . . . I mean, we shouldn't, you should say we'll withdraw from all these places, except on Formosa

³ See Documents 176 and 177.

you have to repeat those five things I told them, because that they pretty well expected. And the degree to which you say it will make them easier on the communiqué. It's easy for Connally and Rogers to talk big. They haven't dealt with these people. And—

Nixon: I haven't talked to Connally, but you went and you saw him. You said that it was not satisfactory.

Kissinger: Well, he said, Alex [Butterfield], did you find that book for the President, the briefing materials?

Butterfield: [unclear]

Nixon: Well, what I was getting at [unclear]. We have to, we have to, of course, have in mind, not only in the communiqué but the possibility that the secret record or anything could come out.⁴

Kissinger: They won't make it come out. Well—the secret record—all we said was that we wouldn't encourage the two Chinas.

Nixon: All we say, we certainly can say we won't encourage two Chinas. We can say that our withdrawal, we can withdraw all our troops from Formosa when the, two-thirds of them, when the war in Vietnam is over, and a third we will in effect [unclear]—

Kissinger: We won't let Chiang, we will not—

Nixon: We will not encourage an attack on the mainland—

Kissinger: And we will oppose Japanese troops from going—

Nixon: We will oppose Japanese troops—certainly, my God, we've got to say that.

Kissinger: We won't encourage the Formosan independence movement. I think that all the five things we promised them is very easy

Nixon: Yeah. The communiqué language, I know this is a tough one, because there we've got to get as much as we can. We've got the connection, because we don't want to give the Buckleys and frankly some others, I don't mean to jump on him, Bill Buckley and others, a chance to go out and say "ah, we've went over and sold Formosa down the river." We haven't sold Formosa down the river. We haven't at all. The one thing that did concern me about that, which I don't know whether we should change the others in order to make it conform, as you realize, with regard to Korea and with regard to Japan, we indicate that we will stand by our treaty commitments. We do not say that in regards to Formosa. The point being that, I only note it, I don't object to it.

Kissinger: No, no. Have you, we say, we maintain our advisory commitments.

⁴ Apparent reference to the memoranda of conversation.

Nixon: Friendship.

Kissinger: No, well, but there's a separate section on Formosa.

Nixon: No, I know, I know. But we say, we do not say a treaty commitment, we use the word "treaty" on the other two. I just, you know what I mean. I just know that they're trying to nitpick it from the standpoint of—but I am totally aware that Rogers, and certainly Rogers and John Connally, can't expect you to uh . . . You know you have to realize that, first, that as far as Bill is concerned, if he'd done it himself it would be an entirely different game. And wouldn't be nary as good as this. Now let's face it, we know that. The second point, with regard to, and frankly let me [unclear]. The second point, with regard to Connally, I think Connally, in dealing with the Europeans, I don't think he could possibly deal with the Chinese because—I don't think so.

Kissinger: No. I don't think he can even deal well with the Europeans. I think he's the best man in your Cabinet, and I like him personally, but foreign relations is not, quite honestly, in my judgment—

Nixon: He picks it up as he goes along.

Kissinger: He's very pugnacious. It, uh, the phrase we have in there is that the United States retains its abiding interest in a peaceful settlement.

Nixon: Yes, that's fine.

Kissinger: Uh—

Nixon: Then, tell me—could I ask you one other thing? What have you done with regards to Rogers in terms of the communiqué?

Kissinger: I've just shown him the Formosa section.

Nixon: What's he say he wants to do with it? Is he trying to re-write it?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Has he offered you anything?

Kissinger: Yeah, but it's totally, I mean, it's ridiculous. They'll never accept it. We can take part of it.

Nixon: What, I'm sorry you offered it to him. I was going to, I should have gotten it sooner. I would not have shown him the sections that you have. You've shown him the ones that Haig has worked on?

Kissinger: No, no, that I haven't shown him. I've shown him the first draft of theirs [the PRC's]. So, if they accept the Haig, the one we've sent through Haig [in his early January trip to the PRC] that will be a big improvement over what he's seen. And he [Rogers] hasn't seen that.

Nixon: Well, what's he want to put in, has he said?

Kissinger: Well, what he wants to put in is to get a Chinese commitment that they will not use force in the settlement of the dispute, and that's almost inconceivable. I mean it's not that they—

Nixon: On the other hand, after it's over, and after we get out of there, we could certainly agree to the effect that, well, if they do use force, then we have a treaty with Formosa.

Kissinger: Oh yes.

Nixon: I mean, we're not giving up on our treaty.

Kissinger: Oh no, we have in the general language, we have a statement that we maintain our treaty commitment.

Nixon: We in the—

Kissinger: At the beginning.

Nixon: Oh, that's something to point out. Oh, I see. I know how hard this thing is, but I, I'm not going to—what you've only shown him part? You haven't shown him the other parts of the communiqué? Of course, there's a perfectly good reason not to, because I told him back in October that Mao Tse-tung would make the deal.

Kissinger: And I've told him it doesn't exist.

Nixon: That's right. We don't want him to find one of these books lying around.

Kissinger: I've just told him the—

Nixon: And how do we go about, for example, writing the communiqué on culture and so forth [unclear] the stock parts of [unclear]?

Kissinger: Well, I've gotten them to give us some language on that.

Nixon: State?

Kissinger: Yeah. We can stick that in.

Nixon: Yeah, he's going to give you language on that. Did you ask him for language on Korea or anything?

Kissinger: I don't want it, because that we've already got set.

Nixon: I know we've got it all set, what I'm getting at is, when they play their little games.

Kissinger: I mean, but the Korean language is so perfect from our point of view.

Nixon: It's brilliant. I mean, my point is, you might ask for something to look for. I don't know, maybe not. I'm just to try to find ways to keep them out of the communiqué writing. I just wonder how physically you were going to do the communiqué, do you feel that—

Kissinger: Well, physically, I think the way to do it is—

Nixon: I'll be meeting with Chou En-lai, and I'll be meeting with Mao Tse-tung, and after that—

Kissinger: Well, what I should do, what I thought, Mr. President, is, if you agree, is that I send Chou a message that I'd like to see him before your first plenary session, so that we can work out the strategy. I could see Chou during some morning while they are free and technically work on the communiqué. Then, in your meeting with Chou,

you'd ratify it. I don't think you want to get into a drafting session with Chou.

Nixon: Exactly.

Kissinger: You should put yourself on the level of Mao.

Nixon: How do you then explain to Rogers?

Kissinger: That we used some of these private sessions to work on a communiqué.

Nixon: Yeah, uh, but then—

Kissinger: Then he'll start nitpicking it.

Nixon: That's what I'm trying to get at. I'm trying to avoid that. How did we do that on the other summit communiqués?

Kissinger: We didn't—no, we did it in Bermuda.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Burke Trend and I did it.⁵

Nixon: You did?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: And then submitted it to Rogers?

Kissinger: Yeah, and he accepted it. And in France, we did it also in the meeting.

Nixon: And that's the way we've established [unclear]?

Kissinger: For the Germans, I forget how it was done.

Nixon: Well, you weren't there.

Kissinger: I wasn't there.

Nixon: Then it's established that we do them that way, isn't it?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I'm just not going to have any goddamn unpleasantness over there. The way it's going to be is such a hard—

Kissinger: It only, Mr. President—

Nixon: We're all going to sit down and get it. The trip must succeed. We're not going to have any bullshit or unpleasantness, and—

Kissinger: This communiqué is so much more, I mean, if you read the news magazines, the news magazines expect a renunciation of forces, establishment of the common principles on the conduct of foreign policy, both countries say they do not want hegemony in the Pacific and will oppose hegemony. It's—the danger is that some people can interpret it as a tacit Sino-U.S. alliance. And there's a statement that both countries are opposed to hegemony in the Pacific and will oppose it.

⁵ Reference is to Sir Burke Trend, Secretary of the British Cabinet who participated in a private meeting with Nixon, Kissinger, and British Prime Minister Heath in December 1971.

Nixon: That's directed against Russia, isn't it? Or is it? And Japan.

Kissinger: Well, yes, and Japan and, and, but—so no one is going to say that we didn't have any understanding.

Nixon: Have you shown that to Rogers?

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: That's good.

Kissinger: I figured, Mr. President, it's much better for you. Now—

[Approximately 1 minute 15 seconds omitted as White House steward Manolo Sanchez enters the Oval Office and President Nixon steps out.]

Kissinger: Well, I enjoyed it. I have a volume here, which has all the changes that are in the communiqué.⁶

Nixon: Well, I want to, I'll take a quick look at it. [Unclear] communiqué [unclear] I'll have a chance to read on [unclear]

Kissinger: Well, we have to change the Indian part a little bit.

Nixon: That's obvious. I know that.

Kissinger: And, but if you, for example, we have got them to drop from the draft the word "revolution." They said, revolution is the law of history and stuff like this.

Nixon: Go ahead.

Kissinger: And, I think the only contentious part of the communiqué is Taiwan. We've told them we couldn't accept their version, and—

Nixon: They know that?

Kissinger: Yeah, now what I think should happen, Mr. President, is that I have one session with Chou on the communiqué before you meet Mao. Then you should just put it to Mao, you can say, we can do a lot, but if you force us into a tremendous domestic debate on it, with so many people in our bureaucracy—

Nixon: Put it on Rogers.

Kissinger: I would just put it to Mao. Mao is a big man. And Chou. Time and again I've said, "I promise this to you, I keep all my promises, I'm a man of principle." Just treat him—"we've kept every promise we've made to you, we've" . . . but we need some softer language.

⁶ Nixon's briefing books for the February 1972 trip include a section with these drafts. See Document 193 and footnote 1 thereto.

[Nixon and Kissinger continue to discuss China, the communiqué, Vietnam and the possible timing of a Communist offensive in 1972, Kissinger's trip to Paris, Mitchell's resignation, and the impact of dispatching aircraft carriers to the Bay of Bengal.]⁷

⁷ Kissinger and Nixon discussed these topics further in a February 16 meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, February 16, 1972, 4:15-5:38 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 673-3)

193. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 19, 1972.

SUBJECT

Mao, Chou and the Chinese Litmus Test

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 847, President's File—China Trip, China Visit—Readings on Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, Book IV, *The President*. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. Much of this document was underlined by Nixon. On February 15 Kissinger forwarded to the President a 21-page paper "prepared by my staff" that "distills some of Mao's major philosophic and political themes drawn from his writings, statements, and actions throughout his life." Kissinger's covering memorandum and the report are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical Files, China, Trips, February 1972, Briefing Book. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 86. Other briefing materials or reports on the trip include: 1) Detailed Schedule (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON); 2) Record of Previous Visits Arranged by Subject Matter (ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 846, President's File—China Trip, Book I—HAK's 1971 Visits by Subject Matter and Book II [part I]); 3) Record of Previous Visits (ibid., Box 847, China Trip—Record of previous visits, Book III); 4) Readings on Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai (ibid., China Visit—Readings on Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, Book IV); 5) Briefing Books (ibid., Briefing papers for the China trip, The President, Books V and V-a); 6) Reading Materials (ibid., China Trip—Reading materials, Book IV); and Department of State reading materials (ibid., Box 848, General reading material, State Department Briefing Book, Book I [Parts I-III]). The President's Daily Diary also contains detailed information on the trip. (ibid., White House Central Files) as does the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, February 28, 1972, pp. 461-499; *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 367-384; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, People's Republic of China*, Special Report: President Nixon's Visit to China, March 9, 1972, no. 48, supp. 7; and Department of State *Bulletin*, March 20, 1972, pp. 419-440. The CIA also prepared Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-72, "Security Conditions in the PRC," for the President's visit. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R1012, NIC Files)

The Litmus Test

Over the long term, the intangibles of your China visit will prove more important than the tangible results. We should be able to leave the People's Republic of China with a creditable public outcome—because of the advance work, the careful scaling down of expectations, and the needs of both sides for various audiences. The crucial factor, however, will be the Chinese judgment of our seriousness and reliability: this litmus test will determine their future policy. If we fail it, the immediate results will be less satisfactory than we expect, but more importantly, they could turn sharply away from us in subsequent months.

In that case, they could easily resort to the tempting levers of public opinion. They could then deal with us like the North Vietnamese do—inviting in opposition politicians, dealing with unfriendly private groups, appealing to hostile journalists, lambasting us in the United Nations, and generally turning popular pressures on us while being tough on the state-to-state level. We can be certain that they would be especially skillful at this game; we would pay a double price at home and abroad for our alleged naivete at trying to deal with these people in the first place.

Thus, the Chinese will be concentrating on your strategic concepts as they discuss the various tactical issues. They will want to know if you understand their perspectives, how we chart the future, and whether we can be counted upon to move ahead surely and steadily. This does not mean that we shouldn't be firm with them. On the contrary, they will only respect strength and resoluteness. Nor does it mean that we shouldn't demand reciprocal treatment from them. On the contrary, they must be made fully aware of our own international and domestic imperatives.

Mao

When one refers to the Chinese one is in effect discussing Mao and Chou, they are the premier exhibits, the two clearly dominant figures on the Chinese scene today, and your only real interlocutors during your visit.

A convenient distinction between Mao and Chou—and one that is generally valid today—is to cite the Chairman as the philosopher and Chou as the practitioner. Thus we can think of Mao as the philosopher, the poet, the grand strategist, the inspirer, the romantic. He sets the direction and the framework and leaves the implementation to his trusted lieutenant. He can be counted on to speak in broad, philosophic, historic terms and leave the negotiations to Chou. He will want to talk about the long view, the basic tides running in the world, where China and the U.S. are heading, with each other and with others.

Chou is the tactician, the administrator, the negotiator, the master of details and thrust and parry. His emphasis will be on the concrete substantive issues, and he will invoke the Chairman's authority and prescience with what seems total sincerity.

However, this distinction between the two men can be misleading. Chou is perfectly at home on the philosophic plane, and he couches his tactical arguments in historical and conceptual terms. No man could have endured and accomplished what he has without a strategic vision.

More importantly, Mao can be as ruthlessly pragmatic as he is ideologically fanatic. Now in his final years, he envisions himself as a man above practical details, but his writings and his actions have shown hard-nosed adaptability as well as philosophic insight. After all, in the past half-dozen years a whole string of his closest associates have been declared guilty of the most serious crimes and whisked out of sight—including two hand-picked heirs apparent and his personal secretary.

Mao's style then, includes audacity and the activist impulse with a skillful sense of political tactics. He has repeatedly shown a unique capacity to judge when to press, when to retreat and adopt a humble posture, how to build a broad coalition of support, and also an unflinching willingness to attack his opposition when his own position is strong.

His pragmatism and tactical adaptability is reflected in what was clearly his decision to use one barbarian (the United States) to control another (the Soviet Union) and invite you to the Middle Kingdom. He is reported to have remarked:

"Bad things can change into good things, and bad persons can become good persons. I like a person such as Nixon, but I do not like Social Democrats or Revisionists. These kinds of people say one thing and do another. Although Nixon has his cunning side, he is not as bad as the others, for his policy is more open."

Pointing out Mao's tactical agility should not, however, obscure his basic philosophic trait. His stature as one of the 20th century's outstanding political figures derives from his visionary side—a combination of personal assertiveness, charismatic self-confidence, and a creative native intelligence. This man knows where he wants China to go, and has been pushing his country's social revolution for more than fifty years. He has torn China apart twice in a decade—in the Great Leap Forward and in the Cultural Revolution—to meet what he considered ideological requirements.

When he started his revolutionary road back in the 1920s there was absolutely no prospect of success. Since then, again and again, he has faced one towering crisis after another—the annihilation campaigns of Chiang, Long March, Japanese invasion, civil war with the Nationalists, Korean War, Great Leap Forward, split with Moscow,

Cultural Revolution, progressive Soviet encirclement. Surmounting such challenges requires vision as well as tactics.

Mao's peasant background is evident in his direct and earthy humor, which he often used to ridicule or disarm opponents. At the same time, he has the sensitivity to write appealing poetry, displays a good working knowledge of Chinese history, and has a capacity for insight and abstract social analysis which has produced a number of philosophical writings and a clear (if not necessarily attainable) concept of his country's future.

And he has made this vision real to others, like Marshal Yeh who told me in July of Mao's romantic appeal to him. Yeh was a general in Chiang's army in the 1920s when he heard of Mao in the mountains and what he was doing for the peasants and for China. The Marshal decided that his place was alongside this man, and he has been with him ever since. Countless others followed his example.

Chou

Chou is clearly running China. He is the dominant figure in both the party and government, and he steers both foreign and domestic policy. He refers to Mao for major issues of principle but clearly has great latitude in carrying out policies and decision-making.

He is charming, articulate and tough. You will enjoy the give-and-take with Chou on several planes, on all of which he is equally at home—historical discussion, philosophic dissertation, tactical jousting, hard bargaining, light repartee.

You can be sure that he had done his homework, not only on the issues but also on America and you personally. He has a good command of American politics and society, although his picture must be distorted.

His negotiating style is extremely effective and requires finesse to counter. If he states a position in absolute terms, he will stick by it at least for a while. He is not to be pressed if he is not ready to be pressed.

If, however, he is at all evasive or ambiguous—which is the usual case—this suggests room for exploration. In this case it is better to go at the issue circuitously rather than frontally. Either later in a meeting, or on an informal occasion, you could pick up the subject again and suggest another approach. He might then absorb this and come back subsequently with a new statement incorporating elements of what you said but presenting it as the Chinese view.

The indirect approach, the use of analogy, is typical of the Chinese in general and Chou in particular. Almost everything he says, no matter how far it seems to stray from the subject at hand, is making a relevant point. This oblique style is not at all inconsistent with candor. Indeed, frankness was one of the dominant elements in our talks with Chou, and frankness would serve you well in your conversations.

Chou can be extremely—and suddenly—tough. Both General Haig and I have been treated to withering blasts, although Chou has never been vituperative or harsh in personal terms. In dealing at your level, he may round a few edges, but you can assume that you will get some very hard speeches, spoken with a simple eloquence and perhaps just after some cordial small talk.

You should not let such statements stand but rather respond very firmly, though non-abusively. If you start pulling back he will stay on the offensive. If his thrust is philosophic, you should counter with your own viewpoint without attacking his. If he makes a frontal assault on a specific issue, however, you should retort directly.

Chou's firmness, however, is not the kind of brutalizing toughness which we have come to expect from the Russians, but rather a hardness and consistency of purpose derived from fifty years of revolutionary experiences. To these people "struggle" is a way of life, without which they never would have gotten to where they are. Peace in the abstract is not a virtue; without justice it can serve to ratify oppression.

Thus if Chou (or Mao) makes hard statements, your response must be different than what you would use with the Russians. The latter can be met with tough language as well as tough substance. With the Chinese it is important to counter strongly with one's own viewpoint, but in a way that reflects comprehension of their point of view. My own experience is that if you remain firm on principles but express yourself with restraint, they are likely to modify their rhetoric and address points of contention in a relatively realistic way. They may actually try to test you by firing some "empty cannon" of rhetoric at you, but a polite, though firm, rebuttal should get them to drop this tactic.

Conclusion

In sum, these people are both fanatic and pragmatic. They are tough ideologues who totally disagree with us on where the world is going, or should be going. At the same time, they are hard realists who calculate they need us because of a threatening Soviet Union, a resurgent Japan, and a potentially independent Taiwan.

The Chinese leaders are deadly serious people who will not be swayed from their convictions by anything that in their view smacks of opportunism or convenience. They take a very principled approach, but within that framework they are willing to be realistic. This reflects the tension between their sense of history and their imperative for movement.

On the one hand, they have been surmounting towering internal and external obstacles for some fifty years. They take a long view. They see history on their side.

On the other hand, these leaders are in their seventies, and they surely want to reach certain goals before they depart the scene. Assuring the security of their country and their system for their successors must preoccupy them. In addition, the mysterious events last fall and the alleged Lin Piao challenge underline the great gamble Mao and Chou have taken in dealing with us and inviting you. Thus they will need to show some immediate results for *their* domestic audience.

Our essential requirement is to demonstrate that we are serious enough to understand the basic forces at work in the world and reliable enough to deliver on the commitments we make. If in our formal and informal talks we can impress the Chinese with these intangibles, we will have truly made your visit an historic success. If we fail to do so, we can expect the Chinese to be an increasingly thorny adversary, and history could record your visit as a gallant but stillborn venture.

194. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, February 21, 1972, 2:50–3:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman Mao Tse-tung
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol of the Foreign Ministry
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at Mao's residence. A March 8 covering memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon reads: "Attached at Tab A is the transcript of your meeting with Chairman Mao. I thought you might be interested in looking it over before we put it in the files." A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. According to a March 28 memorandum from Holdridge and Lord to Kissinger, the NSC staff oversaw the "massive typing workload" needed to prepare these memoranda. (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 88, Country Files, Far East, Sensitive, China—President's Trip, 15–29 Feb 72) The memoranda arranged by subject are *ibid.*, NSC Files, President's File—China Trip, Presidential Conversations in the PRC Arranged by Subject) Copies of short, handwritten notes made by Kissinger and the President during their talks with Chou are in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical Files, Box CL115, China, Trips, February 1972, Richard Nixon. A complete collection of records of Kissinger's talks in the PRC is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 92, President's Trip, February 1972, HAK Conversations; and *ibid.*, Box 92, Dr. Kissinger in the PRC During the President's Visit, February 1972.

President Nixon

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, National Security Council Staff (Notetaker)

(There were opening greetings during which the Chairman welcomed President Nixon, and the President expressed his great pleasure at meeting the Chairman.)

President Nixon: You read a great deal. The Prime Minister said that you read more than he does.

Chairman Mao: Yesterday in the airplane you put forward a very difficult problem for us. You said that what it is required to talk about are philosophic problems.²

President Nixon: I said that because I have read the Chairman's poems and speeches, and I knew he was a professional philosopher. (Chinese laugh.)

Chairman Mao: (looking at Dr. Kissinger) He is a doctor of philosophy?

President Nixon: He is a doctor of brains.

Chairman Mao: What about asking him to be the main speaker today?

President Nixon: He is an expert in philosophy.

Dr. Kissinger: I used to assign the Chairman's collective writings to my classes at Harvard.

Chairman Mao: Those writings of mine aren't anything. There is nothing instructive in what I wrote.

(Looking toward photographers) Now they are trying to interrupt our meeting, our order here.

President Nixon: The Chairman's writings moved a nation and have changed the world.

Chairman Mao: I haven't been able to change it. I've only been able to change a few places in the vicinity of Peking.

Our common old friend, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, doesn't approve of this. He calls us Communist bandits. He recently issued a speech. Have you seen it?

President Nixon: Chiang Kai-shek calls the Chairman a bandit. What does the Chairman call Chiang Kai-shek?

Prime Minister Chou: Generally speaking we call them Chiang Kai-shek's clique. In the newspapers sometimes we call him a bandit; we are also called bandits in turn. Anyway, we abuse each other.

² Apparent reference to Nixon's airplane trip from Shanghai to Beijing on the morning of February 21. No record of this conversation has been found. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch'iao Kuan-hua and other PRC officials accompanied Nixon on the *Spirit of '76*.

Chairman Mao: Actually, the history of our friendship with him is much longer than the history of your friendship with him.

President Nixon: Yes, I know.

Chairman Mao: We two must not monopolize the whole show. It won't do if we don't let Dr. Kissinger have a say. You have been famous about your trips to China.

Dr. Kissinger: It was the President who set the direction and worked out the plan.

President Nixon: He is a very wise assistant to say it that way. (Mao and Chou laugh.)

Chairman Mao: He is praising you, saying you are clever in doing so.

President Nixon: He doesn't look like a secret agent. He is the only man in captivity who could go to Paris 12 times and Peking once and no one knew it, except possibly a couple of pretty girls. (Chou laughs.)

Dr. Kissinger: They didn't know it; I used it as a cover.

Chairman Mao: In Paris?

President Nixon: Anyone who uses pretty girls as a cover must be the greatest diplomat of all time.

Chairman Mao: So your girls are very often made use of?

President Nixon: His girls, not mine. It would get me into great trouble if I used girls as a cover.

Prime Minister Chou: (laughs) Especially during elections. (Kissinger laughs.) Dr. Kissinger doesn't run for President because he wasn't born a citizen of the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: Miss Tang is eligible to be President of the United States.

President Nixon: She would be the first woman President. There's our candidate.

Chairman Mao: It would be very dangerous if you have such a candidate. But let us speak the truth. As for the Democratic Party, if they come into office again, we cannot avoid contacting them.

President Nixon: We understand. We will hope that we don't give you that problem.

Chairman Mao: Those questions are not questions to be discussed in my place. They should be discussed with the Premier. I discuss the philosophical questions. That is to say, I voted for you during your election. There is an American here called Mr. Frank Coe, and he wrote an article precisely at the time when your country was in havoc, during your last electoral campaign. He said you were going to be elected President. I appreciated that article very much. But now he is against the visit.

President Nixon: When the Chairman says he voted for me, he voted for the lesser of two evils.

Chairman Mao: I like rightists. People say you are rightists, that the Republican Party is to the right, that Prime Minister Heath is also to the right.

President Nixon: And General De Gaulle.

Chairman Mao: De Gaulle is a different question. They also say the Christian Democratic Party of West Germany is also to the right. I am comparatively happy when these people on the right come into power.

President Nixon: I think the important thing to note is that in America, at least at this time, those on the right can do what those on the left talk about.

Dr. Kissinger: There is another point, Mr. President. Those on the left are pro-Soviet and would not encourage a move toward the People's Republic, and in fact criticize you on those grounds.

Chairman Mao: Exactly that. Some are opposing you. In our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad.

Prime Minister Chou: Maybe you know this.

Chairman Mao: Throughout the whole world, the U.S. intelligence reports are comparatively accurate. The next was Japan. As for the Soviet Union, they finally went to dig out the corpses, but they didn't say anything about it.

Prime Minister Chou: In Outer Mongolia.

President Nixon: We had similar problems recently in the crisis on India–Pakistan. The American left criticized me very heavily for failing to side with India. This was for two reasons: they were pro-Indian and they were pro-Soviet.

I thought it was important to look at the bigger issue. We could not let a country, no matter how big, gobble up its neighbor. It cost me—I don't say this with sorrow because it was right—it cost me politically, but I think history will record that it was the right thing to do.

Chairman Mao: As a suggestion, may I suggest that you do a little less briefing? (The President points at Dr. Kissinger and Chou laughs.) Do you think it is good if you brief others on what we talk about, our philosophic discussions here?

President Nixon: The Chairman can be sure that whatever we discuss, or whatever I and the Prime Minister discuss, nothing goes beyond the room. That is the only way to have conversations at the highest level.

Chairman Mao: That's good.

President Nixon: For example, I hope to talk with the Prime Minister and later with the Chairman about issues like Taiwan, Vietnam and Korea.

I also want to talk about—and this is very sensitive—the future of Japan, the future of the subcontinent, and what India's role will be; and on the broader world scene, the future of U.S.–Soviet relations. Because only if we see the whole picture of the world and the great forces that move the world will we be able to make the right decisions about the immediate and urgent problems that always completely dominate our vision.

Chairman Mao: All those troublesome problems I don't want to get into very much. I think your topic is better—philosophic questions.

President Nixon: For example, Mr. Chairman, it is interesting to note that most nations would approve of this meeting, but the Soviets disapprove, the Japanese have doubts which they express, and the Indians disapprove. So we must examine why, and determine how our policies should develop to deal with the whole world, as well as the immediate problems such as Korea, Vietnam, and of course, Taiwan.

Chairman Mao: Yes, I agree.

President Nixon: We, for example, must ask ourselves—again in the confines of this room—why the Soviets have more forces on the border facing you than on the border facing Western Europe. We must ask ourselves, what is the future of Japan? Is it better—here I know we have disagreements—is it better for Japan to be neutral, totally defenseless, or it is better for a time for Japan to have some relations with the United States? The point being—I am talking now in the realm of philosophy—in international relations there are no good choices. One thing is sure—we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled. The Prime Minister, for example, has pointed out that the United States reaches out its hands and that the Soviet Union reaches out its hands. The question is which danger the People's Republic faces, whether it is the danger of American aggression or Soviet aggression. These are hard questions, but we have to discuss them.

Chairman Mao: At the present time, the question of aggression from the United States or aggression from China is relatively small; that is, it could be said that this is not a major issue, because the present situation is one in which a state of war does not exist between our two countries. You want to withdraw some of your troops back on your soil; ours do not go abroad.

Therefore, the situation between our two countries is strange because during the past 22 years our ideas have never met in talks. Now the time is less than 10 months since we began playing table tennis; if one counts the time since you put forward your suggestion at Warsaw it is less than two years. Our side also is bureaucratic in dealing with matters. For example, you wanted some exchange of persons on a personal level, things like that; also trade. But rather than deciding that we stuck with our stand that without settling major issues there is nothing

to do with smaller issues. I myself persisted in that position. Later on I saw you were right, and we played table tennis. The Prime Minister said this was also after President Nixon came to office.

The former President of Pakistan introduced President Nixon to us. At that time, our Ambassador in Pakistan refused to agree on our having a contact with you. He said it should be compared whether President Johnson or President Nixon would be better. But President Yahya said the two men cannot be compared, that these two men are incomparable. He said that one was like a gangster—he meant President Johnson. I don't know how he got that impression. We on our side were not very happy with that President either. We were not very happy with your former Presidents, beginning from Truman through Johnson. We were not very happy with these Presidents, Truman and Johnson.

In between there were eight years of a Republican President. During that period probably you hadn't thought things out either.

Prime Minister Chou: The main thing was John Foster Dulles' policy.

Chairman Mao: He (Chou) also discussed this with Dr. Kissinger before.

President Nixon: But they (gesturing towards Prime Minister Chou and Dr. Kissinger) shook hands. (Chou laughs.)

Chairman Mao: Do you have anything to say, Doctor?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, the world situation has also changed dramatically during that period. We've had to learn a great deal. We thought all socialist/communist states were the same phenomenon. We didn't understand until the President came into office the different nature of revolution in China and the way revolution had developed in other socialist states.

President Nixon: Mr. Chairman, I am aware of the fact that over a period of years my position with regard to the People's Republic was one that the Chairman and Prime Minister totally disagreed with. What brings us together is a recognition of a new situation in the world and a recognition on our part that what is important is not a nation's internal political philosophy. What is important is its policy toward the rest of the world and toward us. That is why—this point I think can be said to be honest—we have differences. The Prime Minister and Dr. Kissinger discussed these differences.

It also should be said—looking at the two great powers, the United States and China—we know China doesn't threaten the territory of the United States; I think you know the United States has no territorial designs on China. We know China doesn't want to dominate the United States. We believe you too realize the United States doesn't want to

dominate the world. Also—maybe you don't believe this, but I do—neither China nor the United States, both great nations, want to dominate the world. Because our attitudes are the same on these two issues, we don't threaten each others' territories.

Therefore, we can find common ground, despite our differences, to build a world structure in which both can be safe to develop in our own ways on our own roads. That cannot be said about some other nations in the world.

Chairman Mao: Neither do we threaten Japan or South Korea.

President Nixon: Nor any country. Nor do we.

Chairman Mao: (Checking the time with Chou) Do you think we have covered enough today?

President Nixon: Yes. I would like to say as we finish, Mr. Chairman, we know you and the Prime Minister have taken great risks in inviting us here. For us also it was a difficult decision. But having read some of the Chairman's statements, I know he is one who sees when an opportunity comes, that you must seize the hour and seize the day.

I would also like to say in a personal sense—and this to you Mr. Prime Minister—you do not know me. Since you do not know me, you shouldn't trust me. You will find I never say something I cannot do. And I always will do more than I can say. On this basis I want to have frank talks with the Chairman and, of course, with the Prime Minister.

Chairman Mao: (Pointing to Dr. Kissinger) "Seize the hour and seize the day." I think that, generally speaking, people like me sound a lot of big cannons. (Chou laughs.) That is, things like "the whole world should unite and defeat imperialism, revisionism, and all reactionaries, and establish socialism."

President Nixon: Like me. And bandits.

Chairman Mao: But perhaps you as an individual may not be among those to be overthrown. They say that he (Dr. Kissinger) is also among those not to be overthrown personally. And if all of you are overthrown we wouldn't have any more friends left.

President Nixon: Mr. Chairman, the chairman's life is well-known to all of us. He came from a very poor family to the top of the most populous nation in the world, a great nation.

My background is not so well known. I also came from a very poor family, and to the top of a very great nation. History has brought us together. The question is whether we, with different philosophies, but both with feet on the ground, and having come from the people, can make a breakthrough that will serve not just China and America, but the whole world in the years ahead. And that is why we are here.

Chairman Mao: Your book, *The Six Crises*, is not a bad book.

President Nixon: He (Mao) reads too much.

Chairman Mao: Too little. I don't know much about the United States. I must ask you to send some teachers here, mainly teachers of history and geography.

President Nixon: That's good, the best.

Chairman Mao: That's what I said to Mr. Edgar Snow, the correspondent who passed away a few days ago.

President Nixon: That was very sad.

Chairman Mao: Yes, indeed.

It is alright to talk well and also alright if there are no agreements, because what use is there if we stand in deadlock? Why is it that we must be able to reach results? People will say . . . if we fail the first time, then people will talk why are we not able to succeed the first time? The only reason would be that we have taken the wrong road. What will they say if we succeed the second time?

(There were then some closing pleasantries. The Chairman said he was not well. President Nixon responded that he looked good. The Chairman said that appearances were deceiving. After handshakes and more pictures, Prime Minister Chou then escorted the President out of the residence.)

195. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, February 21, 1972, 5:58–6:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

William P. Rogers, Secretary of State

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the President

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

John A. Scali, Special Consultant to the President

Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director of Office of Asian Communist Affairs, State
Department

John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Charles W. Freeman, Jr., State Department Interpreter

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission
Li Hsien-nien, Vice Premier of the State Council
Chi Peng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hsiung Hsiang-hui, Secretary to the Prime Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Han Hsu, Acting Chief of Protocol
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director of Protocol
Chai Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Peng Hua, Chien Ta-yung, Shen Jo-yun, Li Chung-ying, Ting Yuan-hung, Chang
I-chun, Ma Chieh-hsien and Lien Cheng-pao—Leading Members and Staff
Members of Departments Concerned

Prime Minister Chou: We have too many elderly people in our leadership. So on this point we should learn from you. I have found that you have many young men; Mr. Chapin is very young indeed, and Mr. Green is not very old either.

Mr. Green: Very old man.

Prime Minister Chou: You used to stay in Hong Kong, didn't you?

Mr. Green: That's right, 1961 to 1963.

Prime Minister Chou: Then you know something about China.

Mr. Green: No, I know very little.

Prime Minister Chou: And then you can hold discussions this time when you come to China with our Minister of Foreign Affairs, under the leadership of your Secretary of State. You can raise any question you like.

Secretary Rogers: You will raise the questions.

Prime Minister Chou: Those who are concerned with these affairs, we shall see to it that they are able to know what they want to. Don't you think that's right.

President Nixon: Absolutely, but I hope they find some answers too.

Prime Minister Chou: We shall reply to them (the press) not only what we have done wrong. Only in this way can we enable others to make comparisons and to look at things from the point of view of development.

It seems none of you are smoking. Then let us have some tea. We shall start out with some tea. So the meetings are prickly.

President Nixon: They have lots of questions too.

Prime Minister Chou: They wanted me to receive them, and I said it would be better after Mr. President leaves for me to receive them. It is not very easy for me to answer their questions in the middle. Nor am I very adept at briefing conferences like Mr. Kissinger. Because if I

were to hold such briefing conferences I might tell the truth about what went on and then I would not be abiding by good faith. It is indeed not easy to deal with correspondents. Before we obtained power throughout the country, then we were more free and easy and could speak on more easy terms with correspondents.

President Nixon: Having read the transcripts of conversations the Prime Minister had with Dr. Kissinger, I think the Prime Minister can handle himself with anyone in the world.

Prime Minister Chou: No, I don't feel I am in a position to take such an exaggerated position. The knowledge of any one person is limited. As Chairman Mao just said, there is much we do not know about the United States; because we have been cut off for many years and tremendous changes have taken place in your country and that is also the case with China. China too has undergone many tremendous changes.

Having said so much, I should say that we express our welcome to President Nixon in bringing such a large party to visit the People's Republic of China. And I believe the thinking of Mr. President is that we should engage in serious discussions on matters we consider important, and first of all, as to how to promote the normalization of relations between our two countries. And particularly, you came despite the great distance between our two countries of more than 16,000 kilometers, and we express to you our thanks for that. And, what is more, there is such a big time difference between our two countries, so our first meeting we will make as short as possible.

One addition, however, is that before talks have even begun, Mr. President has already met with Chairman Mao and discussed questions which are to be discussed and that is advantageous.

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, I first express appreciation on behalf of our party for receiving us. You have mentioned the fact that you do not know our country, and we on our part do not know your country. And this is a great loss to both of us.

Prime Minister Chou: So now we should make amends to that.

President Nixon: Now we begin a process through which we will have a chance to know each other as peoples and also to communicate as governments.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right.

President Nixon: And as we meet we have the opportunity to discuss our past differences, which the Prime Minister has pointed up in his conversations with Dr. Kissinger, and as we discussed today with Chairman Mao. We also can discuss those areas where we have common interests. I believe that when this trip was announced that a very solid majority of the American people approved the idea of the visit.

Prime Minister Chou: And we can notice that spirit both from your press, as well as the resolution passed by your two Houses. And also it can be seen from the "Spirit of '76" on your plane. (laughter) This "Spirit of '76" includes a period of 200 years, a pioneer spirit. I discussed this question of the pioneer spirit with Dr. Kissinger.

President Nixon: One of the side benefits of this visit was one of the rare occasions that I was able to get from our Congress a unanimous resolution. (laughter) What that means is that our people and our Congress of both parties want to see a new relationship between the People's Republic and the United States of America. They know, as the Prime Minister has pointed out in his statements, that the differences of the past and of the present are not going to be resolved by one visit.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right.

President Nixon: But they also know that if the world in which our children are to live is to be a more peaceful world, China and the United States must, when possible, work together rather than against each other.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, we hope so.

President Nixon: And while we have, of course, been talking about differences, and in our private talks will discuss these differences both in our meetings with the Prime Minister and Chairman Mao and our Secretary of State's meetings with the Foreign Minister, we must not overlook the fact that the People's Republic of China has no territorial designs on the United States, and the United States has no territorial designs on China. Neither of our countries desires to dominate the other, and neither of our countries—I can say this and the Prime Minister and Chairman Mao have said it—wants to reach out and control the world. These things, then, we have in common.

As we look at the whole world, and the balance of power in the world, there is no reason for the People's Republic of China and the United States of America to be enemies, and there are many reasons why the People's Republic of China and the United States should work together for a peaceful Pacific and a peaceful world.

One of the refreshing things about the talks I have had already with Chairman Mao and with the Prime Minister is that they have talked directly, and honestly, and candidly. We cannot cover up with protocol and fine words the differences we may have. It does not serve the cause of better relations to put a cosmetic covering over fundamental differences of opinion.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right.

President Nixon: The conventional way to handle a meeting at the summit like this, while the whole world is watching, is to have meetings

for several days, which we will have, to have discussions and discover differences, which we will do, and then put out a weasel-worded communiqué covering up the problems.

Prime Minister Chou: If we were to act like that we would be not only deceiving the people, first of all, we would be deceiving ourselves.

President Nixon: That is adequate when meetings are between states that do not affect the future of the world, but we would not be meeting our responsibility for meetings which the whole world is watching, and which will affect our friends in the Pacific and all over the world for years to come.

As we begin these meetings we have no illusions that we will solve everything. But we can set in motion a process which will enable us to solve many of these problems in the future. And the way to do it at the beginning, as the Prime Minister did in his conversations with Dr. Kissinger, and as we have done today and will do the rest of the week, is to lay the problems on the table, talk about them frankly and with good temper, and find the areas where we can agree and where we cannot agree. The men in this room and women in this room have fought a long hard struggle for a revolution which has succeeded. We know you believe deeply in your principles, and we believe deeply in our principles. We do not ask you to compromise your principles, just as you would not ask us to compromise ours.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, indeed. In spite of the fact that there exists now such great differences between us and in the future there will still be differences. But as Mr. President has said, we will invariably find common ground to promote the normalization of relations between us.

I am very sorry—I would like to apologize to Mr. Ziegler—for not telling you in advance about the meeting between President Nixon and Chairman Mao. It came awfully suddenly. But I have already promised Mr. President that the press release of the meeting, the photos as well as the release, will be issued by your side first.

President Nixon: That is unprecedented. No other nation we have ever dealt with has been so generous.

Prime Minister Chou: That is what we should do because this is an initiative of your side, so you should take the initiative.

President Nixon: One of the points it is important for all our colleagues here to understand is that the meetings we will have will be ones in which we can talk frankly, and there will be no disclosures to the press unless we agree—unless the Prime Minister or the Chairman and I agree, and the Foreign Minister and Secretary Rogers agree—because it is important that the talks we have be completely open, and they will not be completely open if we are talking to the press rather than to each other.

Prime Minister Chou: We can immediately reach agreement on that.

President Nixon: Right. I will see that even Dr. Kissinger gives no backgrounder. (laughter) Or Ziegler.

Prime Minister Chou: As you said to Chairman Mao this afternoon, today we shook hands, but John Foster Dulles didn't want to do that.

President Nixon: But you said you didn't want to shake hands with him.

Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily. I would have.

President Nixon: We will shake hands. (Shakes hands with Chou.)

Prime Minister Chou: His assistant, Mr. Walter Bedell Smith, he wanted to do differently, but he did not break the discipline of John Foster Dulles, so he had to hold a cup of coffee in his right hand and, as generally one doesn't shake hands with the left hand, so he used his left hand to shake my arm. (laughter)

But at that time we couldn't blame you because the international viewpoint was that the socialist countries were a monolithic bloc, and the Western countries were a monolithic bloc. But that is not the case. Now we understand.

President Nixon: We have broken out of the old pattern. We look at each country in terms of its own conduct rather than lumping them all together, and saying because they have this kind of philosophy they are all in utter darkness. And I would say in honesty to the Prime Minister that my views, because I was in the Eisenhower Administration, were similar to those of Mr. Dulles at that time. But the world has changed since then, and the relationship between the People's Republic and the United States must change too. As the Prime Minister has said in a meeting with Dr. Kissinger, the helmsman must ride with the waves or he will be submerged with the tide.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right. (he laughs) Dr. Kissinger introduced this to you very well, because that is indeed what I said.

President Nixon: He tells me some things. (laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: I suppose that our future discussions should be separated into groups. We can proceed faster that way. Don't you suppose so? That is, for some assistants to have restricted meetings on basic major questions. And then for the Secretary and his assistant to discuss with the Foreign Minister and his assistants various specific matters to promote the normalization of relations between our two countries. As Chairman Mao said to Mr. President, this afternoon, we must first of all discuss major problems and should not discuss specific matters.

But then since Mr. President took office, this gate to our contacts has been opened, and to have these specific contacts between us would

be beneficial to the promotion of the normalization of relations between the two countries. And we should say on this matter, Mr. President took the initiative. But our Minister of Foreign Affairs was rather slow in responding. I don't know about your State Department . . .²

Secretary Rogers: We were fast.

Prime Minister Chou: So during the table tennis championship matches in Nagoya, Japan, the decision to invite the American table tennis team to China was made by Chairman Mao personally, and when it was issued, your State Department approved the visit. That shows that since the desire long existed, once the opportunity for that came it was taken.

And so, since that is the case, then for these bilateral specific matters, they can be discussed by your Secretary of State or his assistants and our Foreign Minister and his assistants.³ That will surely further relations. Of course, in discussing these specific matters of principle, I am sure Mr. Green will raise them, and we will reply, but our Foreign Minister and his assistants will also raise their questions. I believe that so long as both sides have this desire to promote normalization of relations then we can proceed rather easily on these specific matters.

But as for basic matters, we must depend on Mr. President and ourselves to solve. It goes without saying it involves all kinds of relationships as well as the question of the Taiwan situation. Shall we start this way tomorrow?

President Nixon: I think the Prime Minister has outlined a very satisfactory and workable process, and as our Foreign Ministers discuss the problems of normalization of contacts, or trade . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Culture . . .

President Nixon: Culture . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Scientific . . .

President Nixon: Right . . . technology. All of these matters they are prepared to discuss. In the meantime I know that the Prime Minister will want to discuss, and we will want to discuss with him, not only Taiwan but the problems of Southeast Asia, Korea, South Asia, and then related problems in the Pacific area—the problem of our relations with Japan and then world problems generally, the relations with the great superpowers.

While our emphasis will necessarily be on the bilateral matters, in order to discuss these matters in an intelligent and effective way, we must do so in the framework of the whole world because—as I said

² All ellipses are in the source text.

³ See Document 198.

earlier—while neither of our countries wants to rule the whole world, each of us by destiny is a world power, and we therefore must discuss issues of the whole world, not just the issues which are problems at the moment.

For example, we cannot discuss a critical area like South Asia, and India, without evaluating the policy of the Soviet Union toward that area. And the same can be said of the whole problem of arms control.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, Mr. President had already pointed out this principle in your talks with correspondents in Kansas City in July of last year.⁴ There may be some differences or you may have changed your view. You overestimate us. You said we are a potential power. Prime Minister Heath also overestimated us in his speech to the annual Conservative Party Conference. And that shows that there has been great turmoil and tremendous changes in the world since the Second World War.

So it is important for us to exchange views and seek some common ground.

President Nixon: The Prime Minister should not underestimate—and I am sure he does not—the reality of China. Not only is it a potential power, but so significant a power that the Soviet Union has more units on its border with China than it does on the border with Western Europe.

Prime Minister Chou: That is indeed the case. Our Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission is here, and he can testify to that.

President Nixon: We have very good intelligence on that.

Prime Minister Chou: I heard that Mr. President would want to deal with your domestic matters in the mornings, so the discussions will always be in the afternoon. Tomorrow, and maybe the day after, we can start in the afternoon. Maybe we should have a longer session in the afternoon, because I think two hours is not enough.

President Nixon: No, does the Prime Minister prefer to meet in the morning?

Prime Minister Chou: It is better for you to engage in your work in the morning.

President Nixon: But I can be available in the early afternoon.

Prime Minister Chou: Starting from 2:00?

President Nixon: Yes, that is good. I don't know whether I can stay up as late as the Prime Minister, but I will try.

Prime Minister Chou: It will be 2:00 Peking time.

⁴ See footnote 14, Document 139.

President Nixon: That's when I am supposed to be asleep. The Prime Minister takes advantage of me. (laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: Well, tomorrow after the performance, if you are still in a vigorous spirit, we can continue the discussions.

President Nixon: And as our discussions go along, if morning discussions seem to be useful I can turn my schedule around.

Prime Minister Chou: Well, as for tomorrow, let us set it at 2:00.

President Nixon: And then each day we can make a different plan.

Prime Minister Chou: As for the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister, they can decide on their time. And the Foreign Minister works in mornings, afternoons, any time.

President Nixon: They are much younger than we are (laughter).

Prime Minister Chou: And then, as the visit is not so very long and there is the previous question of a communiqué to do, it would be wise for us on each side to designate someone to do some thinking on it.⁵

President Nixon: I think we should do that.

Prime Minister Chou: For our side, I will designate Mr. Ch'iao Kuan-hua. He will take part in our discussions as well.

President Nixon: And we will designate Dr. Kissinger for our side. He will, of course, work with the Secretary of State and me.

Prime Minister Chou: You know the Soviet Representative Malik is very dissatisfied with our Representative to the United Nations (Ch'iao Kuan-hua).

Secretary Rogers: We like him. (laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: He cooperated with Mr. Bush.

President Nixon: One of the more attractive aspects Dr. Kissinger told me of working with Chinese friends is they always publish the same text. That does not always happen (with the Soviet Union).

Prime Minister Chou: We must act like that. Otherwise one would not enjoy any confidence.

President Nixon: I think this is a helpful kind of meeting, because if we begin this way, knowing we can talk in confidence and our press people will say only what we tell them to . . . and second, we will have people work on the communiqué being honest, and if there are areas of disagreement stating them. I think that will be a very good procedure.

Prime Minister Chou: It is good to make clear our differences because then it will be easier for us to find a common point, because there will be a comparison.

⁵ The final text of the Shanghai Communiqué is printed as Document 203.

President Nixon: It is also important for us to know why we differ. We may find areas of disagreement not as wide as we thought, and sometimes it may be only a question of timing as to how long the difference will exist.

Prime Minister Chou: As Chairman Mao said, if we find there are differences between us and cannot solve them this time, we can try to solve them next time. We will find most by reason why we are not able to solve these differences. Maybe one side is wrong; maybe the other; and maybe both, and then. . . .

President Nixon: And maybe time will change it.

Prime Minister Chou: I won't take any more of your time now. For our side, in many of our sessions, the Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission, and Mr. Li Hsien-nien may not take part in all the sessions.

President Nixon: Whatever you desire. And one question—there, of course, is very great interest in the fact that I did meet with the Chairman. When should we . . .

Prime Minister Chou: That has already been announced.

President Nixon: That's the trouble, the President is the last to find out anything (laughter).

Prime Minister Chou: I abide by what I promised. I told the New China News Agency not to publish it until 8:30. That means we gave the priority to Mr. Ziegler.

Mr. Ziegler: We appreciate that.

Prime Minister Chou: Because even Mr. Yeh and Mr. Li Hsien-nien didn't know about that. I didn't have time to inform the two before.

President Nixon: The Prime Minister is spoiling Mr. Ziegler.

196. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, February 22, 1972, 2:10–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.

John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director of Protocol
Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

(The meeting opened with an exchange of pleasantries between Prime Minister Chou and President Nixon. The Prime Minister remarked that none of those on the U.S. side smoked. He said that Madame Mao would attend the ballet that evening and noted that it was difficult to combine classical ballet with revolutionary themes. The President noted that the Prime Minister had been an actor in his youth, and that he himself had met Mrs. Nixon while acting in a play in which he did not get the girl. The Prime Minister commented that the play therefore did not match reality.)

The Prime Minister confirmed that the room in which the meeting was being held—the Fukien Room—was the same one in which he had entertained Dr. Kissinger in 1971 and had the duck lunch. Dr. Kissinger related he had gained two pounds his first trip to Peking and five pounds his second.)

President Nixon: I want to tell the Prime Minister that last night's banquet was superb. All our party and the press are talking about it this morning, what a wonderful time they had. I talked to my daughter by telephone this morning, and she saw the banquet on television live, at 6:00 a.m. Boston time. She heard the Prime Minister's toast, and was very impressed. She was very impressed, too that I could use chop sticks. My tipping glasses with the guests and going around the tables also made a very great impression. All this was on live television, from about 6:00 to 8:00 a.m.

Prime Minister Chou: It is a good thing to draw the attention of the people to this trip of the President. It shows you did not come in vain.

President Nixon: As I said, more people than at any time in the history of the world heard our two speeches live.

Prime Minister Chou: Your earth satellite played a role there, and we hope that other earth satellites will serve purposes like this.

President Nixon: That's what we would prefer.

Prime Minister Chou: That is not an easy thing.

President Nixon: What is the Prime Minister's preference as to how we should proceed? Whatever he would like—I would like to conform with his wishes.

Prime Minister Chou: I would also like to hear Mr. President's views on this matter: whether we should start out with major world questions and then move on to the question of Taiwan and the normalization of relations, or start out with Taiwan and then move toward major world questions. I would like to hear Mr. President's views.

President Nixon: I think a better way to proceed so the Prime Minister can get a better idea of my views—which he has not yet had except through my agent Dr. Kissinger—is if he would permit me to make a general statement. I would cover Taiwan briefly, then turn to the world scene and discuss it, and then go back to concrete issues such as Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and the subcontinent and other issues as they relate to the world scene. The reason is that I feel it is important that the Prime Minister understand how I relate specific issues to the world scene and why I have reached conclusions regarding certain questions. I want the Prime Minister to have my thoughts and to know why I think certain things are important. Afterwards we can talk about concrete items. He will want to probe my general feelings. If he will permit, that's the way I would like to proceed.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, I approve. Please.

President Nixon: I would like to begin by commenting upon the statement Chairman Mao made at the start of our meeting yesterday. He very properly raised the question of whether our talks would be in confidence or whether we were going to talk for publication. I assured him and have also assured the Prime Minister in our conversation in the car that they would be confidential.

Let me be more specific. When Dr. Kissinger returned from his trip in July and in October, the total number of pages in the transcript was over 500.

Prime Minister Chou: That must have been quite a tiring thing to read that.

President Nixon: It was very interesting. I think the Prime Minister will find this hard to believe, but except for General Haig and these gentlemen here, and Dr. Kissinger of course, I am the only one who has seen these 500 pages. I have read the whole 500. We provided a sanitized memorandum of conversation for others—I am talking here in great confidence—who are on the trip with us, like Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Marshall Green. This is because they need to have some of this information in order to do their work.

This does not indicate any lack of confidence in either Secretary Rogers or Mr. Green, but our State Department leaks like a sieve. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Also within our bureaucracy there is great opposition to some of the positions I have taken, for example, our positions with respect to India and Pakistan.

Prime Minister Chou: (laughs) The record of three of your meetings were made public because all sorts of people were there.

President Nixon: Now, I want to tell the Prime Minister that as far as the conversations I have with him and with Chairman Mao and any other conversations with the Chairman, this rule will apply. The only people who will get the transcript will be the people at this table and General Haig. General Haig must have it because he is Dr. Kissinger's deputy. We will prepare for Secretary Rogers a memorandum only for those matters that can be generally discussed and regarding which the State Department must act. But the transcript of the conversations in this room will go no further than the people at this table and General Haig, who is totally reliable.

The Prime Minister may think we're being too careful, but as you know, we had the Pentagon papers from the previous Administration, and we've had the Anderson papers from this Administration, and Dr. Kissinger and I have determined that this will never happen in the new relationship that we have established with his (the Prime Minister's) government. Let me say to the Prime Minister in a lighter vein that the problem we have in keeping things in confidence in our country are greater than the ones which he has.

Prime Minister Chou: That I believe.

President Nixon: For example, I do not believe in making a public spectacle of a state gift. I wanted the musk oxen, which I think are a great idea, to be a surprise to the Prime Minister but the zoo keeper called in the press and said I was giving them the minute he heard of this idea. He wanted to get the credit. (Chinese laughter) That of course seems like a small matter, but I'm determined where the fate of our two countries, and possibly the fate of the world is involved, that we can talk in confidence.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes indeed, and since Dr. Kissinger made his first visit to Peking, we have abided by the principle of strict confidence. So we understand that is really quite difficult for you to do that.

President Nixon: In the eight years in which I was Vice President, in the three years I have been President, and in the six years I was a member of Congress, I have never seen a government more meticulous in keeping confidences and more meticulous in keeping agreements than his (the Prime Minister's) government. It's difficult, but we want to reciprocate in kind and that's why we want to keep such iron control. I wish—as I know he will—I hope the Prime Minister would convey that to the Chairman, what I have told to him, because it is very important he (the Chairman) knows this. When I give my word—I don't give it very often—I want him to know I will keep it.

Now, if I could turn and, as we have discussed, begin with the subject of Taiwan briefly at this point on things regarding which there is no disagreement. I thought we would return to it later, or I'm sure we will want to discuss the issue in more detail.

Dr. Kissinger when he was here stated our agreement to five principles. I completely endorse these principles, and the Prime Minister can count on that no matter what we say on other subjects.

Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the status of Taiwan is undetermined.

Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement.

Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement. I will only say here I cannot say what Japan will do, but so long as the U.S. has influence with Japan—we have in this respect the same interests as the Prime Minister's government—we do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan and will discourage Japan from doing so.

The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out. And related to that point, we will not support any military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to the Mainland.

Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People's Republic. We know that the issue of Taiwan is a barrier to complete normalization, but within the framework I have previously described we seek normalization and we will work toward that goal and will try to achieve it.

(Prime Minister Chou pauses and offers tea. When he asks Mr. Holdridge if he would like more, the latter replies that he hasn't had time to start drinking it. President Nixon said he was being kept busy.)

President Nixon: Now, I would add to that, as Dr. Kissinger had pointed out, two-thirds of our present forces on Taiwan are related to the support of our forces in Southeast Asia. These forces, regardless of what we may do here, will be removed as the situation in Southeast Asia is resolved. I have made that decision. And the reduction of the remaining third of our military presence on Taiwan will go forward as progress is made on the peaceful resolution of the problem.

The problem here, Mr. Prime Minister, is not in what we are going to do, the problem is what we are going to say about it. As I said yesterday, my record shows I always do more than I can say, once I have made the decision as to the direction of our policy.

Now with regard to the technical matter of what we can say, I know that Dr. Kissinger and the Prime Minister had long discussions, and I know that Dr. Kissinger and the Deputy Foreign Minister had a discussion on it this morning. I don't believe it would be useful here to go into the wording here at this point.

I know the Prime Minister also has a problem. This is an issue which basically is an irritant and has a high emotional content and therefore he needs to show progress on the issue. That's his side, and I recognize this. I am taking that into consideration as to what we can say in the joint communiqué.

Let me in complete candor tell the Prime Minister what my problem is, from a political standpoint. What we say here may make it impossible for me to deliver on what I can do. Our people, from both the right and the left, for different reasons, are watching this particular issue. The left wants this trip to fail, not because of Taiwan but because of the Soviet Union. And the right, for deeply principled ideological reasons, believes that no concessions at all should be made regarding Taiwan. Then there is another group, the people in our country who are obsessed with pro-Indian sentiment, who don't like the idea of a U.S.–China détente. All of these forces have lines into the various political candidates. And so, what we might find is that they might seize on the language we finally agree upon to attack the whole trip, and you would have the very unholy alliance of the far right, the pro-Soviet left, and pro-Indian left.

Mr. Kissinger: You forgot the pro-Japanese, like our friend, Professor Reischauer.²

President Nixon: I could add there is another strong group, those who are pro-Japan, like Reischauer; not because of Taiwan but because of Japan. He, too, was Dr. Kissinger's student. (Chou laughs) They hope our movement toward relations with the People's Republic of China will fail.

Now, the Prime Minister as a sophisticated observer of the American political scene, could very well interpret what I have said as being a self-serving statement, and solely devoted to assuring my political survival. I would simply respond by saying that there is something much more important than whether I am around after November this year or January next year, and that is the whole American–Chinese initiative. That is what is involved.

So what we need to do, and what we are trying to find is language which will meet the Prime Minister's need, but language which will not give this strong coalition of opponents to the initiative we have

² See footnote 3, Document 143.

made, that we have talked about, the opportunity to gang up and say in effect that the American President went to Peking and sold Taiwan down the river.

The difficulty is that as you get into the political campaign, and as critics join in, not because they are for Taiwan but because they oppose the American–Chinese initiative, as they join together, the debate will force both candidates to assure the American public on this issue. This we must not let happen if we can avoid it.

Now I would like to come back to Taiwan with the Prime Minister's permission, after I have had the opportunity to discuss world views. I know this will take some time. Since Dr. Kissinger and the Deputy Foreign Minister had an interesting conversation today, I want the Prime Minister to know why we seem to be, shall we say, difficult on this issue. It is not because of a fatuous argument but because we see here a danger to the whole initiative. Our problem is to be clever enough to find language which will meet your need yet does not stir up the animals so much that they gang up on Taiwan and thereby torpedo our initiative. That is our goal.

I will simply sum up by saying I do not want to be forced when I return to the United States, in a press conference or by Congressional leaders, to make a strong basically pro-Taiwan statement because of what has been said here. This is because it will make it very difficult to deliver on the policy which I have already determined I shall follow.

If I could turn now, with the Prime Minister's permission, to the world scene, this will enable me to put into context my feelings with respect to Japan, Korea, Vietnam and India. I apologize for talking so long.

Prime Minister Chou: No.

President Nixon: . . . but if Mr. Kissinger had 500 pages I must have equal time.³

Prime Minister Chou: Surely. This visit is mainly for the purpose of talks.

President Nixon: Right. I am anxious to hear the Prime Minister talk, but I know he hasn't had a chance to hear me talk, except through Dr. Kissinger, whose views I support, of course.

The Prime Minister and Chairman Mao are both correct in what they have said in previous years about what my attitude has been on the whole issue of East-West relations. Before 1959, it did seem to us in the U.S. that the socialist world was monolithic, and that the Czar was in Moscow (Prime Minister Chou laughs). Now, during the period of 1960–1968 when I was out of office, I had the opportunity to travel

³ All ellipses are in the source text.

a great deal in the world and to reach what seemed to me some very sound principles about how the world had changed—conclusions which I summarized in my Kansas City extemporaneous speech.⁴

Incidentally, that speech was better thought out than the grammar would indicate. I was once talking to Winston Churchill's son Randolph, who was Churchill's biographer and who recently died. I had heard Winston Churchill make a brilliant speech without notes and I asked Randolph Churchill with some amazement how in the world Winston Churchill could make such a magnificent speech just off the top of his head. Randolph Churchill answered, and said "Mr. Vice President"—I was Vice President then—"my father spends the best hours of his life writing out his extemporaneous speeches."

Now, with regard to the situation we now face, what is it that brings China and the U.S. together? For example, we have differences on Taiwan, not in my opinion so significant over the long run but difficult in the short run. We have differences over Southeast Asia. We have different attitudes toward Japan. We have different attitudes toward Korea. Now we say, and most of our rather naive American press buys this line, that the new relationship between China and America is due to the fact we have a basic friendship between our peoples. But speaking here, the Prime Minister knows and I know that friendship—which I feel we do have on a personal basis—cannot be the basis on which an established relationship must rest, not friendship alone. I recall that a professor of law when I was a first-year student said that a contract was only as good as the will of the parties concerned to keep it. As friends, we could agree to some fine language, but unless our national interests would be served by carrying out agreements set forward in that language, it would mean very little.

Now, I come to a point where I find I am in disagreement with the Prime Minister's analysis of what America's role in the world should be. Let me say that in terms of pure ideology, if I were in the Prime Minister's position, as one who deeply believed in the socialist revolution, I would take the same position he took with regard to the United States in his talks with Dr. Kissinger. And publicly I think that the Prime Minister and Chairman Mao have to take that position, that is the U.S. is a great capitalist imperialist power reaching out its hands and it should go home from Asia, home from Europe, and let the democratic forces and liberation forces develop in their own way.

There are some of my advisers who tell me I could win the next election in a landslide if I advocated such a policy, because the American people did not seek this position of a world power and they would

⁴ See footnote 13, Document 139.

like to be relieved of maintaining forces in Europe and the burden of maintaining guarantees to various other nations in the world. And some would say why not cut the American defense budget from \$80 billion to \$40 billion and then we could use the money for domestic purposes to help the poor, rebuild the cities, and all that sort of thing.

I have resisted that—it is what we call the new isolationism for the U.S.—and have barely been able to get a majority on some key votes. I am in an ironic position because I am not a militarist. I don't want the U.S. to be engaged in conquest around the world, but because as I analyze the situation around the world I see we would be in great danger if we didn't maintain certain levels of defense, I have had to come down hard for those levels of defense.

Now let me come to the point. I believe the interests of China as well as the interests of the U.S. urgently require that the U.S. maintains its military establishment at approximately its present levels and that the U.S., with certain exceptions which we can discuss later, should maintain a military presence in Europe, in Japan, and of course our naval forces in the Pacific. I believe the interests of China are just as great as those of the U.S. on that point.

Let me make now what I trust will not be taken as an invidious comparison. By religion I am a Quaker, although not a very good one, and I believe in peace. All of my instincts are against a big military establishment and also against military adventures. As I indicated a moment ago, the Prime Minister is one of the world's leading spokesman for his philosophy and has to be opposed to powers such as the U.S. maintaining huge military establishments. But each of us had to put the survival of his nation first, and if the U.S. were to reduce its military strength, and if the U.S. were to withdraw from the areas I have described in the world, the dangers to the U.S. would be great—and the dangers to China would be greater.

I do not impugn any motives of the present leaders of the Soviet Union. I have to respect what they say, but I must make policy on the basis of what they do. And in terms of the nuclear power balance, the Soviet Union has been moving ahead at a very alarming rate over the past four years. I have determined that the U.S. must not fall behind, or our shield of protection for Europe, or for some of the nations of the Pacific with which we have treaties, would be worthless.

Then, as I look at the situation with respect to China, as we mentioned yesterday, the Soviet Union has more forces on the Sino–Soviet borders than it has arrayed against the Western Alliance. Now, I think that, as the Prime Minister knows, I have asked Dr. Kissinger to provide a briefing to whomever the Prime Minister designates on very sensitive material, what we know to be totally reliable on both the position of the Soviet forces versus China and also the general nuclear

balance. I suggest that if the Prime Minister could designate, in addition to people on the civilian side, someone such as the Vice Chairman for Military Affairs, (*note*: Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Mission of the CCP) I believe it would be extremely interesting for him. The meeting place should be highly secret, however, if this could be arranged.

Dr. Kissinger: We have.

President Nixon: O.K.

Now as I see China, and as I look at China's neighbors, this is what would concern me. I believe Chairman Mao and the Prime Minister when they say that China does not seek to reach out its hands, and that while it will support forces of liberation, it does not seek territory around the world. However, turning to what others may do, and looking to the south, as far as India is concerned, China could probably handle India in a month in the event they went to war. India is no threat to China, but India supported by the Soviet Union is a very present threat to China because China's ability to move, to deal with respect to India and to take military action would be seriously in question if the Soviet Union, its northern neighbor, was supporting India.

That was why in the recent crisis that was one of the reasons we felt it was very important to call the hand of India in moving against West Pakistan—and we had conclusive evidence that the Prime Minister of India was embarked on such a course—why we had to call their hand and prevent that from happening. In other words, when we took a hard line against India and for Pakistan, we were speaking not just to India or Pakistan but also—and we made them well aware of it—to the Soviet Union.

That brings us back again to my major premise: if the U.S. were in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, whatever policy the U.S. followed would have much less credence with the Soviet Union. For the U.S. to be able to inhibit the Soviets in areas like the subcontinent, the U.S. must at least be in a position of equality with the Soviet Union.

We took a lot of heat on this policy because, again, we had an unholy alliance against us (Chou laughs)—the pro-Soviet group, and the pro-India group which has an enormous propaganda organization in the U.S., and also what you could call the anti-Pakistan group because they didn't like the form of government in Pakistan. They charged we were sacrificing India, the second biggest country in the world, because of our desire to go forward with the China initiative. That's to a certain extent true, because I believe Mr. Prime Minister, it is very important that our policies—and this is one area I think we can agree—that our policies in the subcontinent go together. I do not mean in collusion, but I mean we don't want to make movement with respect to India and

Pakistan unless you are fully informed, because we believe your interest here is greater than ours. We face a problem here because the question of resuming aid to India, economic aid, will soon arise when I return. A case can be made against this on the grounds that they will be able to release funds from buying arms from the Soviet Union which can then be manufactured in India.

But a very critical question which we have to ask ourselves, the Prime Minister and I, is would it be better for the U.S. to have some relation with India, some influence in India or should we leave the field for the Soviet Union?

Let me use one other example to bear out my argument that a U.S. presence in Asia is in the interest of not just the U.S. but in the interest of China. I think that the Prime Minister in terms of his philosophy has taken exactly the correct position with respect to Japan, for example the U.S. should withdraw its troops, the Treaty between Japan and the U.S. should be abrogated, and Japan should be left to become a neutral country that is unarmed. I think that the Prime Minister has to continue to say that. But I want him to understand why I think strongly that our policy with respect to Japan is in the security interest of his country even though it is opposed to the philosophic doctrine which he espouses.

The U.S. can get out of Japanese waters, but others will fish there. And both China and the U.S. have had very difficult experiences with Japanese militarism. We hope that the situation is changed permanently away from the militarism that has characterized Japanese government in the past. On the other hand, we cannot guarantee it and consequently we feel that if the U.S. were to leave Japan naked, one of two things would happen, both of them bad for China. The Japanese, with their enormously productive economy, their great natural drive and their memories of the war they lost, could well turn toward building their own defenses in the event that the U.S. guarantee were removed. That's why I say that where Taiwan is concerned, and I would add where Korea is concerned, the U.S. policy is opposed to Japan moving in as the U.S. moves out, but we cannot guarantee that. And if we had no defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where that is concerned.

On the other hand, Japan has the option of moving toward China and it also has the option of moving toward the Soviet Union.

So the point I would summarize on is this. I can say, and I think the Prime Minister will believe me, that the U.S. has no designs on China, that the U.S. will use its influence with Japan and those other countries where we have a defense relationship or provide economic assistance, to discourage policies which would be detrimental to China. But if the U.S. is gone from Asia, gone from Japan, our protests, no

matter how loud, would be like—to use the Prime Minister’s phrase—firing an empty cannon; we would have no rallying effect because fifteen thousand miles away is just too far to be heard.

Now I realize that I have painted here a picture which makes me sound like an old cold warrior (Prime Minister Chou laughs). But it is the world as I see it, and when we analyze it, it is what brings us, China and America, together; not in terms of philosophy, not in terms of friendship—although I believe that is important—but because of national security I believe our interests are in common in the respects I have mentioned.

I will just close by saying that after this analysis I would not want to leave the impression that the U.S. is not going to try to go to the source of the trouble, the Soviet Union, and try to make any agreements that will reduce the common danger. Our policy will be completely open and frank with China. Since Dr. Kissinger’s visit, we have informed his (Prime Minister Chou’s) government completely with respect to the contacts we have had with the Soviets. When we have had my meeting in Moscow, if the Prime Minister agrees, I would like to have Dr. Kissinger come and report personally to the Prime Minister on what we have discussed and what agreements we reached in Moscow. We are going to try, for example, to get an arms limitation agreement and also make progress on the Middle East if that subject is still before us.

But the most important fact to bear in mind is that as far as China and the U.S. are concerned, if the U.S. were to follow a course of weakening its defense, of withdrawing totally or almost exclusively into the U.S., the world would be much more dangerous in my view. The U.S. has no aggressive intent against any other country; we have made our mistakes in the past. And I do not charge that the Soviet Union has any aggressive interests against any other country in the world, but in terms of the safety of these nations which are not superpowers in the world, they will be much safer if there are two superpowers, rather than just one.

I have taken too much of the Prime Minister’s time, but I wanted him to get the feel of my general philosophy on these points.

Prime Minister Chou: (in English): Thank you.

(Prime Minister Chou then suggested a ten minute recess and the President agreed this was a good idea. During the recess, from 3:50 to 4:00 p.m. there was light talk, including the difficulty of translating Chairman Mao’s poems.)

Prime Minister Chou: I would like to thank Mr. President for your rather comprehensive introduction to your views and your line of action.

Of course, some of that was already said by Mr. Kissinger before. But to hear it directly from Mr. President has enabled us to have a clearer understanding of your views and to know them more clearly.

Of course, the world outlooks of our two sides are different, basically different, which we do not cover up. But that should not hinder state relations between our two countries from moving toward normalcy, because owing to the interests of a state during a certain period of time one is able to find common ground.

As for the fact that peoples of various countries want progress, and to move forward, neither the Chinese Government nor the American Government can do anything about that. It is not a matter for us; it is a matter for posterity. As Mr. President has said, you wanted to strive for a generation of peace, but can only talk about the present generation.

President Nixon: But it would be longer than (the era of) Metternich.

Prime Minister Chou: But I didn't agree with the view of Dr. Kissinger in his book, and we had a discussion on it.

President Nixon: It was very interesting.

Prime Minister Chou: The times are different.

Dr. Kissinger: I told the Prime Minister I had enough difficulty discussing American foreign policy without concerning myself with Austrian foreign policy.

President Nixon: It was a brilliant debate.

Prime Minister Chou: So this question arises, that is, in view of the current interests of our two countries, there is the possibility we may find common ground. But this common ground must be truly reliable. It should not be a structure built upon sand, because that structure will not be able to stand.

And so Mr. President just now has made a description of the world scene, and the situation of the world, as we have said on previous occasions, is a situation of upheaval in the twenty-six years or so since the Second World War and this situation is increasing, not decreasing. Of course, as we have said, a worldwide war did not break out during this interval, but local wars have never stopped. And so the question arises as the President put it, there can be no vacuum in the world. But here again arises a question of philosophy.

For example, with respect to China after the Second World War; according to the Yalta Agreements, the U.S. was the principal country having a sphere of influence in China, whereas the Soviet Union only had a partial sphere of influence, in some parts of China.

(There was a brief interruption as snacks were served and Prime Minister Chou reported that Wang Hai-jung had told him that TV pictures of the Nixon–Mao meeting had already been transcribed. There

was some blurring because the Chinese cameramen found the equipment too heavy and shook and thus the pictures were not very clear. Also since the meeting was on the spur of the moment, they were not at all prepared and thus were very tense.)

Prime Minister Chou: Shall we continue?

So the situation at that time, immediately after the Second World War, was clearly stipulated by those agreements. What is more Chiang Kai-shek had a treaty with the Soviet Union at that time, which also was called the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. It was to last for twenty years. In addition, according to the agreements reached at Yalta, Chiang Kai-shek recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia, which is now called as the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia. Now, however Chiang Kai-shek says he regrets very much the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic of Mongolia. I would like to write a letter to Chiang Kai-shek to ask him who signed the agreements providing independence for Outer Mongolia.

At that time, Lady Cripps of Britain⁴ went to Yen-an and met Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao asked her why you powers were interested in drawing up spheres of influence. She said she could do nothing about it, but Britain was on the downgrade. And so as I saw it at that time, the situation was fixed as it then was.

Then, as the President probably recalls, the U.S. sent Ambassador Hurley⁵ to China to mediate between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, who advocated the establishment of a coalition government. And later President Truman sent General Marshall as an envoy to mediate.⁶ At that time, Ambassador Hurley was quite enthusiastic. Besides he had the courage to draw up a provisional coalition government and sign those articles with me in Yen-an. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

After that, Chairman Mao immediately sent me off to Chungking, because I was already the representative of the Chinese Communist

⁴ Lady Isobel Cripps, wife of Sir Stafford Cripps, was a World War II-era British Labour politician and Minister of Aircraft Production. She visited Mao and Chou in Yen-an in 1946.

⁵ Patrick J. Hurley was Presidential envoy to China (1944) and Ambassador to China (1944–1945).

⁶ President Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China in November 1946 as a special envoy to negotiate a cease-fire between Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops and the Chinese Communist forces. Cease-fire was declared in 1946 but political and military questions stalemated the peace negotiations. Marshall returned to the United States in early 1947 without reaching a solution.

Party in Chungking, to continue negotiations. But Chiang Kai-shek didn't agree. President Truman's reasons for having Ambassador Hurley act as he did was because Stalin had told him that you should advise the Chinese Communist Party to join in a coalition with the KMT. As for us, the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet Union gave us no help at all. We had no contact with them at that time. We didn't even know about the Yalta Agreement. We learned of the terms of the Yalta Agreement quite late. In fact, we learned them from the KMT side. Since Chiang Kai-shek opposed establishment, the coalition government couldn't be established. Then General Marshall came, and the history of that is mostly published in Acheson's White Paper. At that time, Mr. Chang Wen-chin was my interpreter, my assistant. We engaged in negotiations with them (the KMT) for one year and signed all sorts of things, but to no effect. What happened then was that Civil War broke out and still continues. The U.S. sided with Chiang Kai-shek because of your state relations with him, which we understand.

But what were the results? The results were, as Mr. President said in one of his campaign statements, the Truman Administration lost a country of 600 million. Well, having lost China a new relationship could have been established. The fact, however, was that at the beginning the Truman Government admitted that they had no territorial ambitions against China, including Taiwan. But because of his suspicions and his belief that it might be possible for Chiang Kai-shek to make a comeback, he did put that into effect (establish a new relationship), and the result was that he sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits.

From that the policy of the Truman Administration developed to the point of Dulles' signing a treaty with Taiwan at the end of 1954 which was ratified at the beginning of 1955.⁷

There is still a question now which the State Department often have replied to (Prime Minister Chou laughs) that is to say, the Committee for a Free China organized by Walter Judd, the organizer of the Committee of One Million. Walter Judd's Chinese name is Chou Yi-de, so my surname and Judd's are the same.

The development of history shows that there was no vacuum in China. The U.S. forces left China, the Soviet forces, too, left China, and the Chinese people themselves filled up the vacuum. Therefore, if we really believe in the people, and believe people can liberate themselves, then there can be no real vacuum appearing. The biggest change after the Second World War was the liberation of China.

In your campaign speech, Mr. President, although you did complain about the dangers of the Truman policy, you also recognized the

⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. II, Document 3.

realities of China, the success of the Chinese people. It was because of that we are meeting today. The situation in China today is like what it was almost two-hundred years ago—you talk of the Spirit of '76—when the British Colonial forces were driven out of America, and the American people themselves filled up the vacuum. That is one way of looking at things.

I would like to ask Mr. President a question, because Mr. President pointed out possible dangers. We too have taken note of these dangers. But what is the best way out? Should we do it by expanding armaments mutually? There is an old Chinese saying that as the tide rises the boat also rises. You have made public your military expenditures. The Soviet Union does not make public its military expenditures. There is no question that the percentage of their budget for military expenditures is no less than yours. Otherwise how is it that the life of the Soviet people is so bad, and the agriculture situation is so bad. They can't say it was only bad weather. (President Nixon laughs.) Agricultural production in Canada is not bad at all although the weather there is the same as the Soviet Union. So they cannot explain by the weather, but because the Soviets use the greater part of their budget on military expenditures.

As for disarmament conference, there have been many dozens but no result whatever. The Soviet proposal at the UN was only to deceive people, so Mr. Ch'iao Kuan-hua expressed our position on it and Czar Malik was thrown into a frenzy, with the result that this proposal was postponed. Nevertheless, the Soviets asked the UN General Assembly to vote to express appreciation for their proposal.

Now both of you keep on expanding armaments like this, what will be the result. It will only be war. Of course, it may not necessarily be a nuclear war, but could start as a small-scale conventional war which could develop into a larger scale conventional war. Of course, if you two big powers can get an agreement limiting armaments, that would be good. We don't have the least opposition to the improvement of relations between the United States and Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger can bear testimony to that fact. We even suggested that Mr. President visit the Soviet Union first and then us. That is what Chairman Mao wanted me to tell Dr. Kissinger, that is to say that if you felt there was advantage in visiting the Soviet Union first, you could. When I say advantages to you, it doesn't mean a unilateral advantage, but to both sides and to the world as a whole.

But now, Mr. President, you first came to China, and Moscow is carrying on like anything. But let them go on. We don't care. They are mobilizing a whole mass of their people, their followers, to curse us. What we are concerned about is that you two big powers spend so much money on arms expansion. What does this mean for the future of the world, the far reaching results?

The worst possibility is what I told Dr. Kissinger in the record of our proceedings, that is to say the eventuality that you all would attack China—the Soviet Union comes from the north, Japanese and the U.S. from the east, and India into China's Tibet. Under these circumstances, of course, our people would have to make terrific sacrifices. But it is also possible under these circumstances that the question could be solved. Of course, that's talking only about the worst possible contingency. But just as Dr. Kissinger and Mr. President have said, there is no conflict between our two countries; there is no necessity for our interests to conflict or for the U.S. to occupy Chinese territory, even though on philosophy our two sides differ and we have the slogan, "Down with U.S. Imperialism." Chairman Mao mentioned this yesterday that it is just "empty cannon." Dr. Kissinger knows the phrase.

Dr. Kissinger: The Vice Minister knows it now too.

Prime Minister Chou: And Mr. Bush. But even despite that Malik and the Soviet Union are cursing us, saying that there is a synchronized duet between the U.S. and the PRC.

President Nixon: Let me interrupt to pay a compliment to the Vice Minister. The most effective thing he did was at one point when Malik talked, he just smiled at him. That drove him nuts. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: You saw that on T.V.? So you have that advantage over us. We didn't see it here. On these matters we are still backward and we admit our backwardness. We don't have the idea we're number one in the world. One thing Chairman Mao constantly teaches us is that once one thinks one is number one under heaven one is bound to suffer defeat. Because no matter what people or what nation, that people and that nation are bound to have shortcomings. Similarly, that people and that country are bound to have strong points. Dr. Kissinger has said that Vietnam, although a small country, has a great people. Only in this way can one have a sense of reality.

So proceeding from these considerations, if one country tries to gain superiority over another merely through expansion of armaments, there will be no end to it.

You're in a very important position vis-à-vis that question. You have said you have no intention to dominate the world, nor have you any territorial designs. You want to see peace in the world and first of all see a relaxation of tensions. We believe that this indeed reflects a genuine desire of your people.

But as to whether the U.S. will completely revert to isolationism, I don't think that is possible, because the times have changed and are no longer the times of the beginning of the twentieth century. Speaking quite candidly, so-called isolationism these days is not real isolationism but merely a desire to see that other countries don't meddle in

the affairs of the Americas. Mr. President, you are quite right when you said that the Chinese people couldn't understand either the Monroe Doctrine or the Open Door Policy.

The question is now of great importance not only to Sino–American relations but to the future of the world. Since neither China nor the U.S. has any territorial ambitions on the other and neither side wishes to dominate the other, and what is more, each wants to make some contribution to the relaxation of tensions in the world, then we should see to it first of all where there is a possibility for relaxation of tensions in the Far East. Because we are not in a position to look into the possibility of other parts of the world; they are too far away from us. If we were to do that, it would only give rise to new troubles. Our help to the African people is only a very small part of our efforts. So we will only talk about the situation around us, and the crucial question then is the question of Indochina.

On this question, only the Indochinese people themselves have the right to speak, to negotiate with you. But as the Indochinese area is of concern to us we should have the right to raise our voice on that matter. What's more we have the obligation to give the Indochinese peoples assistance and support. I said this to Dr. Kissinger on a number of occasions.

Since the U.S. had decided to withdraw all of its forces from Vietnam and the whole of Indochina, and the U.S. would like to see the region more or less neutral, that is to say, non-aligned, with no particular force occupying that region, then if that is the President's policy and that of your Government, I think it would be better to take more bold action. Otherwise, you would only facilitate the Soviets in furthering their influence there. As for us, we are not afraid of that eventuality because whatever our help to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, we have never asked for special privileges, and we have never interfered in their internal affairs.

We have not even looked at their different ideology. For example, Prince Sihanouk's ideology is Buddhist and we respect him. The ideology of Vietnam, too, may not necessarily be completely the same as ours, but we have never interfered in their ideology.

So in this sense the later you withdraw from Indochina, the more you'll be in a passive position, and although your interest is to bring about an honorable conclusion of the war, the result would be to the contrary. You admitted that General DeGaulle acted wisely when he withdrew from Algeria. In fact, General DeGaulle even withdrew more than two million European inhabitants from Algeria, an action which we didn't dare to envision, and to have withdrawn in such a short space of time. And General DeGaulle encountered great opposition at home. But maybe because he was a soldier his life might actually be

different from that of yours, Mr. President. I know Mr. President appreciated Mr. Patton. Of course, you didn't appreciate his desire to attack Russia, but you appreciated him for his daring and for his doing what he thought was right.

Maybe these words of mine are superfluous in trying to persuade you, Mr. President, but I want to make my views clear. It is easier for us to discuss other matters. I appreciate that on this matter we don't see eye to eye. As Dr. Kissinger told us, on this our attitude is even stronger than Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Than the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: It's clear what they say doesn't count. I believe it is possible for you to take bolder action, and you would only gain a better feeling. Because if peace can be brought about in that region at an earlier date, then you'll be able to maintain more influence there.

The French have something else in mind. The French are thinking to bring the U.S. and the Soviet Union together in some form of international conference for détente. But that would not do. You don't approve either?

President Nixon: I think that is a moot question.

Prime Minister Chou: When I consider the form of the Geneva Agreements,⁸ my conclusion is that this was a mistake.

President Nixon: 1954?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. At that time we were taken in by agreeing to sign. The result for you was that the U.S. was drawn into a quagmire. At that time, President Eisenhower brought about the end of the Korean War—quite a courageous action of President Eisenhower. But President Eisenhower didn't expect that Dulles would lead him into the morass of Indochina, and have America sink in it.

How is it conceivable that a country could enter into an agreement and not sign? You said you would live up to the agreements, but actually disturbed them. The result was the elections that were supposed to take place two years afterwards were not realized, and if they had been held, even without international supervision it goes without saying that Ho Chi Minh would have been elected throughout the country. He was a very old friend of mine—I knew him in France in 1922. If Ho Chi Minh had led the whole of Vietnam, the relations between the whole of Vietnam and the U.S. could not have deteriorated, and may have been much better.

⁸ The Geneva Agreements on Indochina are *ibid.*, 1954, vol. XVI, Part 2, pp. 1505–1546.

But history twists and turns, just like the history of our two countries, in which after twenty-two years we are meeting again. That's history, and there are many examples of this. But if the U.S. Government would take a very bold move in Indochina you would gain very good feelings on the part of the Indochinese people. As to how to resolve this issue I can't say, since we do not take part in the negotiations nor do we want to take part. Our position is that so long as you are continuing your Vietnamization, Laoization, and Cambodianization policy, and they continue fighting, we can do nothing but to continue to support them.

But I would like, Mr. President, to take note of the fact that our policies of assistance to the countries of Indochina, that is Vietnam and other peoples of Indochina, differ from that regarding Korea. Why did we send the Chinese peoples [as] volunteers during the Korean War? Because Truman compelled us. He sent the Seventh Fleet in to the Taiwan Straits so that it wasn't possible for us to recover Taiwan. What was more, his troops pressed straight toward the boundary of the Yalu River, and we declared at that time that if the American forces pressed toward the Yalu River, although China was newly liberated, we could not stand idly by. So when Truman's forces came to the Yalu River, we had to show that what even we say counts. We couldn't be sure, though, that we would win, because the Soviets were not willing to send forces. You are quite clear about that.

The end result was that when President Eisenhower took office, he realized the war should be brought to an end. But the loss of lives and material losses you suffered in Korea is incomparably less than in Vietnam. No one expected that. Rather than spending so much effort in a war of contention in such a localized area, you should adopt a most courageous attitude and withdraw when you should.

The Taiwan question can be discussed rather easily. For example, the five point program you mentioned was told to us by General Haig on instructions from the President, and the President reiterated it just now. We have already waited over twenty years—I am very frank here—and can wait a few more years. I can go a step further. Even when Taiwan comes back to the Motherland, we will not establish any nuclear bases there. Mr. President knows more about it than I. What use is there to establish nuclear bases in a place like that? Only the Soviets continue to hold four islands north of Japan. They will either hang on or maybe sell. What's more, their condition for a peace treaty with Japan is that Hokkaido cannot be defended. We can tell Mr. President in advance, and also Japan, that when Taiwan returns to the Motherland we will not establish bases there. What use are they? We have no desire to send one single soldier abroad. We have no design on the territory of others. So why establish bases there? Our purpose is merely self-defense.

The most pressing question now is Indochina, which the whole world is watching. So in making your present visit, the Democratic Party tried to put you on the spot on this question by alleging that you came to China to settle Vietnam. Of course this is not possible. We are not in a position to settle it in talks. Of course, we can have an exchange of views on the matter in which we can proceed from a relaxation of tensions in the Far East and proceed in the interest of relaxation of tensions throughout the world. As Mr. President didn't say much on this, I would like to hear your views. Possibly Mr. President has different views on these questions. As for the other questions, we can discuss them tomorrow. I would like to hear your views (on this) now.

President Nixon: On Vietnam?

Prime Minister Chou: Indochina as a whole.

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, the problem of Vietnam is one that no longer should divide us. The Prime Minister has suggested that if we could move more quickly this would be a wise, and as he points out, courageous thing to do. This is a possibility which we have considered, but is one on balance which we feel we must reject.

Let's look in terms of how quickly we are moving. We now have less than 100,000 [troops]. We have already removed our forces to less than 100,000, and in mid-April I will make another announcement regarding reduction of forces. We therefore would be at a point where we are only talking about two or three more months before the American role, insofar as our presence in Vietnam is concerned, will be finished, unless, of course, the problem of our prisoners is still outstanding. The difficulty we now confront is not simply ending American involvement by the withdrawal of our forces, which is now a foregone conclusion and only a matter of a few months, but the difficulty now is the question of bringing peace to the whole of Indochina, including Laos and Cambodia. That is why we believe the offer I made in October and reiterated in January is one which should be given serious consideration by the North Vietnamese.

Let me cut away the eight points, five points, and thirteen points, etc. and come right down to what our offer really is. If I were sitting across the table from whoever is the leader of North Vietnam and we could negotiate a ceasefire and the return of our prisoners, all Americans would be withdrawn from Vietnam six months from that day. And let me also point out that while we're willing to settle on that basis, when this was suggested to the North Vietnamese as far back as the middle of last year, they rejected it and always insisted there had to be a settlement in which we had to impose a political settlement as well as to resolve the military side.

I couldn't agree more with the Prime Minister's view, to let the political decision be made by the people of those countries themselves

without outside interference. We have already offered that. We have offered to withdraw all Americans, with no “tail” behind—to use the Prime Minister’s expression—and to have a ceasefire throughout Indochina provided we get our prisoners back. Then we would let the decision be made by the people there. But the North Vietnamese insist that we not only make a military settlement, they want us to impose a political future and remove the existing government and impose a government which basically would be one of their choice. That we can’t do.

I greatly respect the Prime Minister’s views on this subject because this is simply an issue on which the only gainer in having the war continue is the Soviet Union. They want the U.S. tied down. They, of course, want to get more and more influence in North Vietnam as a result. From all the intelligence we get they—should we say—may even be egging on the North Vietnamese to hold out and not settle.

I should also say that we realize we may not reach agreement on this, and who knows who’s right? We think we are right. As the Prime Minister knows, I have great respect for General DeGaulle’s resolution of the terribly difficult and wrenching Algerian experience. But what happened between France and Algeria only affected France and Algeria. France is a great country, but France at this time is no longer a world power.

If the U.S. were not only to get out of Vietnam—which we are going to do through the policy of Vietnamization in a few months in any event—but get out and at the same time join those who have been our enemies to overthrow those who have been our allies, the U.S. would in my view, perhaps be permanently destroyed insofar as being a country which any other nation could depend upon.

I realize there are views to the contrary, but when a nation is in a position the U.S. is in, where around the world, in Europe for instance, there are nations that depend on the U.S.A. for their defense, if the U.S. does not behave honorably—and I don’t believe dying for honor is enough—if the U.S. does not behave honorably, the U.S. would cease to be a nation to have as a friend and which the people of the world could depend upon as an ally.

The point that the Prime Minister has raised here is one which neither of us is going to convince the other, and I respect his point of view. I hope he can understand our policy is one which is truly designed to bring about an end of the war, not only for the people of Vietnam but for all of Southeast Asia as quickly as possible. I think it is very important for the Prime Minister to know this, because I don’t want to leave any false impressions: the negotiating track is open, and as I indicated, we are willing to negotiate a settlement on military issues alone, if they are willing, to negotiate a general political settlement in

which Thieu would resign and an impartial commission would run the elections. If, in answer to our proposals, North Vietnam chooses to step up the fighting, I have no choice and the action I take is apt to be very strong. This is my record, and that is what it's going to be so that other nations in the world know that the U.S. will react strongly if tested.

There is also something else very important for North Vietnam to consider. When we talk about Vietnamization, that's the longer road. It does envisage the withdrawal of U.S. forces over a period of time, months, but on the other hand, if we are talking about total withdrawal, no residual force, that is something they are going to have to negotiate about—we're not just going to walk out of there without an agreement.

I should point out also that there are no American forces in Cambodia and no American forces in Laos. It's true that in relation to our policy in Vietnam we've found it necessary to use U.S. air action against North Vietnamese forces in both countries. If North Vietnam would withdraw its forces from Cambodia and Laos at least the war would end for those two countries, and let the people determine their own future.

The U.S. is prepared, just in conclusion, to provide a very heavy economic assistance to Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam for rehabilitation, and to South Vietnam in the event a settlement is made. We don't want to leave a tail behind. We don't want bases. And we would accept the idea the Prime Minister referred to as a neutralized area. On the other hand, it takes two to make a deal.

We really feel if our offer were seriously studied, it would be seen that we have gone very far indeed to settle military issues only and let historical processes decide or settle military and political matters in which the issue would be taken to the South Vietnamese; we would hope there would be elections. Here the situation would be very different from 1954 because here we would guarantee the elections and they would be supervised by an impartial body set up and guaranteed by outside powers.

The Prime Minister is very perceptive to note that some of my political opponents have created the impression that I am coming to see the Prime Minister in order to settle the war in Vietnam. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) Let me say I want him to know in all candor that we, of course, would welcome any moves, any influence to get negotiations. We don't expect anything, however, and if we cannot get any assistance we understand. We shall proceed to deal with North Vietnam in the way I have suggested. This will be a longer and harder road for them, much harder than for us. There is the shorter road of negotiations if they prefer.

Prime Minister Chou: Probably it is not easy for us to make these things very clear quickly. I have discussed this matter with Dr.

Kissinger on many occasions. We can only remain in a position of supporting them and not speaking on their behalf. I understand the joint communiqué has been discussed?

President Nixon: Yes, I believe the communiqué draft is in very good order.

This (Vietnam) is one of the ironic situations where the U.S. will be equally damned by both the People's Republic and the Soviet Union. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

Dr. Kissinger: Except the People's Republic wants the war to end and the Soviet Union wants the war to continue.

President Nixon: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

The President: We can be very honest in this conversation. I understand the Prime Minister's position. We noted the Prime Minister's comments before coming and know that this is an irritant in our relations. I want to assure the Prime Minister I am removing this irritant as fast as anyone in my position could. My predecessor sent in 500,000 men into Vietnam, and I've taken 500,000 out. I will end American involvement—it's a matter of time. I can speak with certainty on this point. All we are really talking about is whether we can hasten the process, not by our moving out in a precipitate way, but by agreement.

We can—if I can put it quite directly—we *will* withdraw, we are withdrawing, but what we cannot do—and we believe this very strongly—we cannot remove the government of South Vietnam and in effect turn over the government to the North Vietnamese. That we cannot do. We believe they can have a fair chance to do it through what we regard as a fair election. But we are not going to withdraw and go one step further and remove the government of South Vietnam and turn it over to North Vietnam. That we cannot do. The U.S. then would be a nation which would, in my opinion, deserve nothing but contempt before the people and nations of the world, whatever their philosophies.

Prime Minister Chou: That is still your old saying—you don't want to cast aside old friends. But you have already cast aside many old friends. Of these, some might be good friends and some might be bad friends, but you should choose your friends carefully. (PM Chou laughs.) That again is a question of philosophy. For example, Mr. President, you asked me yesterday if Chiang Kai-shek was an old friend, and I said he was even an older friend of ours than yours. I cooperated with Chiang Kai-shek once. I also quarreled with him and fought against him. Chiang Kai-shek still believes in one China. That's a good point which we can make use of. That's why we can say that this question can be settled comparatively easily.

As for Vietnam, you went there by accident. Why not give this up? Vietnam is different from Korea because Korea was indeed divided into

North and South by the results of the war. According to the terms the Soviet forces went north and you went south. I don't recall whether this was a result of the Potsdam Agreement or what. It would be beneficial for the relaxation of tensions in the Far East to bring about a nonaligned Southeast Asia.

The President: I believe that will eventually happen. It is a question of . . .

Prime Minister Chou: You have this confidence? But if the Soviet Union goes in and you two big powers contend there, then there can be no talk of relaxation. The American government made public that reason when you increased your military expenditures. Now you have realized that we pose no threat to you, and as for us, you have no reason to believe that we have territorial designs in Southeast Asia.

The President: We have no designs on the territory of Southeast Asia either.

Prime Minister Chou: But you are tied down by the South Vietnamese regime. Actually that regime has nothing to do with your former treaties. You worked it out with Bao Dai. But according to the Dulles method you had Bao Dai represented by Diem.

The President: Bao Dai was out hunting lions.

Prime Minister Chou: Then you worked with Diem and his brother. He and his brother went to see God. These fellows are not reliable. If the U.S. really wants to create a good impression in the world, you don't need these so-called friends. You may say that if you withdraw your influence from the area a vacuum is created and the Soviet Union will fill it up. The fact is, the later you move out, the more serious the contention there, and another Middle East will develop. Then that will be another extension of tension from the Mediterranean to the Middle East to the Indian Ocean to the Subcontinent to Southeast Asia to the South China Sea.

If the war in Indochina continues we will, of course, continue our aid to them because what we say counts, but we will not get involved unless, of course, you attack us. So tensions will continue there and, under those circumstances, how can you talk about a relaxation of tensions? When I first met Dr. Kissinger he said you wanted relaxation of tension. You must start somewhere.

The situation in Japan is different from Southeast Asia. That's another matter.

The President: If I may interrupt. Before the Prime Minister goes on to that subject, I would only add that we have our proposal on the table now at Paris, and will continue to press it. We believe it is a fair proposition, and we think it would be in the interest of the relaxation of tension and very helpful if the North Vietnamese were to finally

negotiate. I don't ask the Prime Minister to do anything about it, and certainly not do anything about it publicly. I would simply say we want a relaxation of tension. We don't want bases.

This is quite different from what I am sure the Prime Minister is going to say about Japan.

Prime Minister Chou: Let us conclude our discussion today. We still have to have dinner before going to the performance tonight.

The President: I want to say to the Prime Minister that I very much appreciated his frankness on these issues. Of course, I have tried on my part to give him my feeling of my own views on these issues. I believe that this kind of discussion these next few days will show that where great issues are involved our interests will bring us together. That is why I believe we can find understandings which will be very important for the rest of the world.

Prime Minister Chou: At least on issues which are important for the Far East.

The President: Yes.

Just as a historic note—who can be a prophet these days?—I think that looking ahead for the next twenty-five years, peace in the Pacific is going to be the key to peace in the world, there being a relative balance in Europe. The Middle East is a candidate (PM Chou laughs). But I believe the Pacific is the key, and that is why our meetings are so important for the whole world.

Prime Minister Chou: When you say a generation, does that mean twenty-five years maybe?

The President: I am using it in the sense that we are one generation since World War II and in that period we in the U.S. have had two wars, in Korea and Vietnam. I'm not so presumptuous as to look beyond twenty-five years—if I can see twenty-five years ahead, that is as far ahead as I can see. And also, Mr. Prime Minister, I have often referred to the fact that every generation of Americans in this century has experienced wars—World War I, for the first generation; World War II, for the second generation; Korea in the 1950s; and Vietnam in the 1960s. I think four wars in a century is enough. (PM Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: It should be so. That's why we also think there should be a way to solve armaments expansion.

The President: This is one subject I would like to take up at a later meeting. One reason we are pursuing the matter with the Soviet Union on limits to arms is that we believe a breakthrough in this area is essential if we are going to avoid an arms race.

Prime Minister Chou: Too much money has been spent on it. Our posterities will condemn us for such huge wastes.

President Nixon: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: That is why we say we are only in the first stage. We don't want to spend too much money. You probably took note of this.

President Nixon: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: We say that in a very honest way. We don't wish to expand.

The President: I understand. In terms of world peace, I would say that a strong China is in the interests of world peace at this point. I don't mean to suggest that China should change its policy and become a superpower. But a strong China can help provide the balance of power in this key part of the world—that is desperately needed. Then, too, I have a selfish reason—if China could become a second superpower, the US could reduce its own armaments. (PM Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: You have too much confidence in us. We don't want to.

We can meet again tomorrow at 2:00 p.m.

197. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, February 23, 1972, 2–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff

Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Prime Minister Chou En-lai

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director of Protocol

Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter

T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

Two Notetakers

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the President's Guest House.

(There were some opening pleasantries in which Prime Minister Chou asked about Mrs. Nixon and the President said she was fine. He added that she had been impressed with the acupuncture demonstrations she had seen. The President noted that there were forecasts of snow and asked if they would get to the Great Wall the next day. Chou responded yes.)

Chou then referred to a mural hanging in the room painted in 1935 which depicted a battle in which the Chinese Communists won a big victory over Chiang Kai-shek, a very great turning point. The battle was near Tsunyi, in Kweichow province, after which the Communist forces marched west into Yunnan. In response to the President's question of whether this was the battle in which the Communists crossed the river, Prime Minister Chou said this occurred later. Prime Minister Chou then proceeded to describe the battle and the various maneuvers used by the Communists to achieve victory. He gave a very detailed and precise rendition of the military maneuvers, describing the battle with great vigor and arm movements.)

President Nixon: Did Chairman Mao make all the strategic and tactical decisions or did he have a staff organization?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. I could be considered one of the members of his staff at that time. But it was Chairman Mao who took the initiative on how far we should march every day and where we should stay at night. Chairman Mao made all the strategic decisions.

President Nixon: We hope we have no necessity of facing you in battle after hearing that description.

Prime Minister Chou: I don't think that will happen. I hope it won't.

President Nixon: It won't.

Prime Minister Chou: You know our policy. We don't disguise our policy. We of course support revolutions waged by the peoples of the world, but we don't send a single soldier abroad. The revolution of any country must depend on the people of their country.

That was the case with George Washington, in your eight-year war of independence. Of course, at that time you had the assistance of the volunteers of Lafayette; they were not troops sent by the State of France. Also Abraham Lincoln in his Civil War had volunteers. He was defeated in many battles, but he was finally able to turn the tide of battle. He was able because he relied on the people. He had three phrases about the people. If something is really important, we then can really mobilize the people.

And although our philosophies differ, we think in managing our state relations we should act in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence that I mentioned yesterday at the banquet.

Actually the five principles were put forward by us, and Nehru² agreed. But later on he didn't implement them. In my previous discussions with Dr. Kissinger, I mentioned a book by Neville Maxwell about the Indian war against us, which proves this.³

President Nixon: I read the book.

Dr. Kissinger: I gave it to the President.

President Nixon: I committed a faux pas—Dr. Kissinger said it was—but I knew what I was doing. When Mrs. Gandhi was in my office before going back, just before the outbreak of the war, I referred to that book and said it was a very interesting account of the beginning of the war between India and China. She didn't react very favorably when I said that (Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but you spoke the truth. It wasn't a faux pas. Actually that event was instigated by Khrushchev.

President Nixon: You think it was? Khrushchev?

Prime Minister Chou: He encouraged them. Mr. Holdridge probably knows this. He has studied it.

Mr. Holdridge: I can remember the editorial that came out in the press.

Prime Minister Chou: In looking at 1962, the events actually began in 1959. Why did he go to Camp David? In June of that year, before he went to Camp David, he unilaterally tore up the nuclear agreements between China and the Soviet Union. And after that there were clashes between Chinese and Indian troops in the western part of Sinkiang, the Ak-sai Chin area. In that part of Sinkiang province there is a high plateau. The Indian-occupied territory was at the foot of the Karakorums, and the disputed territory was on the slope between.

Dr. Kissinger: It's what they call Ladakh.

President Nixon: They attacked up the mountain.

Prime Minister Chou: We fought them and beat them back, with many wounded. But the TASS Agency said that China had committed aggression against India. After saying that, Khrushchev went to Camp David. And after he came back from Camp David he went to Peking, where he had a banquet in the Great Hall of the People. The day after the banquet he went to see Chairman Mao. Our two sides met in a meeting.

² Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, former Prime Minister of India.

³ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970).

At that time our Foreign Minister was Marshal Chen Yi, who has now passed away. Marshal Chen Yi asked him: “Why didn’t you ask us before releasing your news account? Why did you rely on the Indian press over the Chinese press? Wasn’t that a case of believing in India more than us, a fraternal country?”

And what did Khrushchev say? “You are a Marshal and I am only a Lieutenant General, so I will not debate with you.” He was also soured, and did not shake hands when he left. But he had no answer to that. He was slightly more polite to me.

President Nixon: To the Prime Minister?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. He said: “The casualties on the Indian side were greater than yours, so that’s why I believe they were victims of aggression.” If the side with the most casualties is to be considered the victim of aggression, what logic would that be? For example, at the end of the Second World War, Hitler’s troops were all casualties or taken prisoner, and that means that Hitler was the victim of aggression. They just don’t listen to reason.

So they had no way of passing this away, and anyway, the TASS Agency account had the effect of encouraging India. And also Neville Maxwell mentioned in the book that in 1962 the Indian Government believed what the Russians told them that we, China, would not retaliate against them. Of course we won’t send our troops outside our borders to fight against other people. We didn’t even try to expel Indian troops from the area south of the McMahon line, which China doesn’t recognize, by force. But if your (e.g. Indian) troops come up north of the McMahon line, and come even further into Chinese territory, how is it possible for us to refrain from retaliating? We sent three open telegrams to Nehru asking him to make a public reply, but he refused. He was so discourteous; he wouldn’t even do us the courtesy of replying, so we had no choice but to drive him out.

You know all the other events in the book, so I won’t describe them, but India was encouraged by the Soviet Union to attack.

Of course, Mr. President also comes from Camp David, but we have no interest in asking you not to have good relations with the Soviet Union. And we also hope that you will reach agreements with the Soviet Union on disarmament and other matters. We have even expressed the wish that you visit the Soviet Union first.

President Nixon: I would like to ask the Prime Minister a question with regard to Bangladesh recognition. I know his government must make a decision on recognition, and we must make our own. As I told you yesterday, we have delayed recognition, even though Britain and other countries have done so.

Prime Minister Chou: France has also recognized Bangladesh.

President Nixon: Before we make a decision on that, we have tried to find out the attitude of Bhutto. And Bhutto has indicated he does not object to recognition. In fact he could see that we would have some advantage in not leaving the field clear to the Soviet Union in that region. It is our understanding that India is supposed to withdraw all its forces from Bangladesh by the 24th of March. And based on that we have for consideration—the decision is not yet made—we have for consideration the possibility of recognizing Bangladesh about that time.

I wonder what the Prime Minister's reaction is to that?

Prime Minister Chou: As for the first matter, we have always stressed that the General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions passed by the United Nations should be implemented, because these have won the support of both of our nations and of the people of the world.

President Nixon: Ten to one.

Prime Minister Chou: In the past, generally speaking there hasn't been so large a majority vote. After vetoing the resolutions three times, the Soviet Union was embarrassed to veto further, and could only abstain. Of course, it was finally passed at a rather late date, but it still had some binding moral force. By that time India had already seized East Pakistan, but they stopped their advances toward West Pakistan.

President Nixon: That was the important thing.

Prime Minister Chou: Because of this we truly wish to see them truly withdraw their troops in East Pakistan, now called Bangladesh. We wish to see them truly do this and not just with words. Of course they can only do that superficially, because if they get some Bengali forces to remain and join with Mujibir Rahman, there would be no way to be sure because the Bengalis all look the same. But that would bring trouble to the future of India and Mrs. Gandhi herself.

Also, in the West both sides should also truly cease-fire and withdraw their troops, and they must come together to negotiate. The Indians said they had no territorial ambitions, but the development of events is that they have remained in their place and have refused to withdraw. Once again we can only cite the events of the Indian aggression in the 1962 war. At that time our troops pressed to the foothills quite close to Tezpur in Assam, and when they reached that place, Chairman Mao ordered that all troops should turn back. We turned back all the equipment to the Indians—this is in Maxwell's book—and we withdrew all troops back north of the so-called McMahon line because one must show one can be trusted and must not wait for others to act. One must do one's own account and show good faith.

And since she (India) has also agreed to the UN resolution that things should be settled in the eastern part of Bengal, why are they not willing to settle with West Pakistan? At least the issue of West Pakistan

should be settled, because if the question of West Pakistan is not resolved there is bound to be a return of trouble in the future. From our point of view, even if the subcontinent were under one country there would still be turmoil there, because they have nationality problems there even more complicated than yours which are now covered up. If India took over all of the subcontinent, there would be even more trouble. India is not able to exercise hegemony—this is our philosophy. But speaking from the question of state relations, this should not be done because, after all, after the partition Pakistan became an independent country in 1947. This was something left over from Britain.

President Nixon: 1949.

Prime Minister Chou: 1947.

President Nixon: 1947.

Prime Minister Chou: Since that is the case, then India should withdraw its troops from the areas it is occupying in West Pakistan, and Pakistan should also withdraw from the lesser areas it occupies in India. Bhutto agrees. These two things, at least, the Indian side should abide by. If the U.S. recognizes Bangladesh after this situation is brought about, then we believe this would raise the prestige of the U.S. in the United Nations. And you would be in a better position to speak on this issue.

After all, what you want is to bring about the withdrawal of all troops from Bangladesh and West Pakistan. Also, you will be able to encourage Mr. Bhutto and give him some assistance. That is what they need. You said your actions should be parallel with ours, and we don't mind that. We said that both to Yahya, the former President, and to the present President. Both of us owe something to Yahya, although he didn't show much statesmanship in leading his country, for bringing the link between our two countries.

President Nixon: He is a bridge.

Prime Minister Chou: We should not forget and we cannot forget, especially that Dr. Kissinger was able through him to come secretly for talks here. And when a man makes a contribution to the world, we should remember him.

Dr. Kissinger: Actually the President sent a message to Bhutto that he should treat Yahya well in retirement and we would not look favorably on any retribution. It was a personal message from the President.

Prime Minister Chou: He also told us that he was taking good care of him and protecting him, and that if he didn't do so, some other generals would want to take care of him (Yahya) differently.

Of course we don't want to interfere in others' internal affairs, but Yahya really did not lead his troops in East Pakistan well. Even though

we assisted with armaments, we didn't send a single military personnel, what the Soviet Union calls military adviser. We only sent some people to train in the use of the planes and guns we sent, and afterwards brought those people back. At the time of the ceasefire they (the Pakistanis) still had 80,000 troops in East Pakistan. It was not a situation in which they couldn't keep fighting. We know the Pakistanis are good fighters, and the men wanted to keep on. The trouble was the Commanders were terrible—they really just scattered the troops. General Patton, whom you admire, would not have done that. Yahya should have concentrated his troops to win a victory, and once the Indian side had suffered a defeat they would have stopped because West Bengal was not very secure either. The Indians had eight divisions at first, but these were also scattered. They had three divisions in the west part of East Bengal; the northwest part had two divisions; in the eastern part they also had two divisions.

They also had two other divisions on the McMahon line, which they didn't move. They only took one division from the McMahon line down to East Pakistan. Also, in Sikkim they originally had an army of three divisions, from which they took one division over to eight in East Pakistan and left two divisions facing us.

If at that time the Pakistanis had concentrated a force of 40,000 against one Indian division, they would have been able to win and that would have demoralized the Indians. So at that time even our Vice Foreign Minister still believed they could win the war. Bhutto too. They are both men of letters; not soldiers. But we didn't believe this. We said that if they fought, they would sacrifice everything.

(To Dr. Kissinger) Can that be said here?

Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely.

Prime Minister Chou: You saw Huang Hua on December 10.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, the 10th.⁴

Prime Minister Chou: That time was the best time, the first ten days of December. They lost within 20 days. That was from the 25th of November to the 15th of December, but at that time they still had plenty of time. President Yahya was probably a good man, a man of good intentions, but he didn't know how to lead an army, how to fight. So there was some reason for the dissatisfaction of the younger generals in the Pakistani army with President Yahya, but there is also some reason to say good words about him. I agree with that spirit.

⁴ See Document 176.

President Nixon: As Dr. Kissinger said in his conversations with the Prime Minister, one doesn't burn down a bridge which has proved useful.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, there's a Chinese saying that to tear down a bridge after having crossed it is not good.

President Nixon: With regard to Bangladesh, in view of what the Prime Minister said, we will have Dr. Kissinger inform you with regard to the timing of recognition. Our decision will be made depending on our information with regard to Indian withdrawals, but we will inform you about that decision. We are pressing the Indians to withdraw and we believe we have some leverage there.

Now with regard to the problem of West Pakistan. We want to help there because it is essential to carry out the Prime Minister's philosophy which is also ours, that no nation should establish dominance in that part of the subcontinent. We have a problem with regard to military assistance, because our Congress, and as I informed the Prime Minister and as the Deputy Foreign Minister knows, American public opinion, oppose military assistance to Pakistan. Incidentally, in retrospect it is my belief that had we been able to provide more assistance to Pakistan it would have averted war, because India wouldn't have been tempted to win what they thought was a cheap victory. But that is water over the dam.

Prime Minister Chou: And I would also like to add here that the Pakistani Government policy toward East Pakistan had many errors. But because this was their internal matter we could only give advice and nothing more.

Dr. Kissinger: (Reading from a cable⁵) Mr. President, you were speaking of military shipments. We have information that the Soviet Union has shipped since November 150 tanks from Poland and 100 armored personnel carriers from Czechoslovakia. They were shipped in two ships each month in November and December. In January a third ship was to bring military equipment to India.

President Nixon: To India?

Dr. Kissinger: To India.

President Nixon: The problem is to find some way that West Pakistan can find some military equipment and assistance. On our side, what we will do is to supply substantial amounts of economic assistance to West Pakistan. That would enable West Pakistan to—we would think in the interest of its defense—to acquire arms from other sources. As a matter of fact, that is the tragedy of our policy in India. We supplied almost 10 billion dollars in assistance to India in the last 20 years—very little

⁵ This cable has not been identified.

was military assistance, it was economic—and that relieved India so that it could purchase very substantial amounts of arms from the Soviet Union, and also manufacture arms. That was not our intent, but that's what happened.

With regard to our aid to India on this point—economic assistance—we are going to move in a very measured way. I am resisting considerable pressure from the public and the press to rush in and resume economic assistance at former levels. (Chou laughs) We are going to wait and see what India does with regard to the border problem and our relations generally.

Prime Minister Chou: And India actually is a bottomless hole. (President Nixon laughs)

President Nixon: When the Prime Minister referred to the problem India has with Bangladesh, as I look at India's brief history, it has had enough trouble trying to digest West Bengal. If now it tries to digest East Bengal it may cause indigestion which would be massive.

Prime Minister Chou: That's bound to be so. It is also a great pity that the daughter (Madame Gandhi) has also taken as her legacy the philosophy of her father embodied in the book *Discovery of India* (in English).⁶ Have you read it?

Dr. Kissinger: He was thinking of a great Indian empire?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, he was thinking of a great Indian empire—Malaysia, Ceylon, etc. It would probably also include our Tibet. When he was writing that book he was in a British prison, but one reserved for gentlemen in Darjeeling. Nehru told me himself that the prison was in Sikkim, facing the Himalayan mountains. At the time I hadn't read the book, but my colleague Chen Yi had, and called it to my attention. He said it was precisely the spirit of India which was embodied in the book. Later on when I read it I had the same thought.

President Nixon: When did Chen Yi die?

Prime Minister Chou: Just recently. Chairman Mao attended the funeral. He had cancer of the stomach. Do you have a way of curing cancer?

President Nixon: It is a serious problem. One of the programs we want to undertake this year is a massive research program on cancer. We hope to have such a program. Who knows when we will find the answer? Scientific genius is not natural any place in the world, and we don't know where to find it—here, or there. But whatever money is required will now be provided for massive cancer research.

Prime Minister Chou: We can cooperate in that field.

⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York: The John Day Company, 1946).

President Nixon: We would approve of that. I was going to suggest it in the counterpart meetings if the question of medical research comes up. We will make all our facilities available on cancer, because research should not be for one country but for all the countries of the world.

Prime Minister Chou: (Nods) Yes. There would be some beneficial cooperation in this field for the world.

President Nixon: With regard to the subcontinent, I should emphasize our policy is not anti-Indian any more than the Prime Minister's policy is anti-Indian. It's pro-peace. It is the right of every nation in the subcontinent to survive and develop. This right should be recognized and protected, and if one country should be allowed to gobble up another, it would be a very unsafe world. We apply that to every country, including ourselves.

Prime Minister Chou: It would be another question if the people of that country rise up themselves to change the government. It is quite another thing if foreign troops invade a country. That can't be allowed. That's a very important principle.

President Nixon: We shall set up procedures to inform you on recognition.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, through our channels.

President Nixon: Through the established channel, in Paris.

Prime Minister Chou: We will probably recognize Bangladesh later on. Perhaps we will be the last one. Our reasons for that have to do with two questions. The first is the withdrawal of Indian troops from both East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The second thing is it would not do for them (the Indians) to proclaim that the problem of Kashmir is already settled because the UN hasn't agreed and we (*sic*) still have observers there. It is very complicated. It is also something that Great Britain deliberately left behind.

President Nixon: It's so sad because Kashmir has poisoned relations between India and Pakistan since 1947.

Prime Minister Chou: But Britain purposely left that problem behind. Another question is that the Islamic countries haven't recognized Bangladesh, and we must respect their views.

President Nixon: We must respect them too.

Dr. Kissinger: We had a letter from Bourghiba⁷ expressing approval of your stand on India/Pakistan.

Prime Minister Chou: Even Bourghiba, who is considered to be a rightist, has supported Pakistan. As Chairman Mao mentioned yesterday, sometimes it is a good thing to be on the right.

⁷ Habib Bourghiba, President of Tunisia.

President Nixon: Another is the Shah.⁸ He's on the right, but he's "right" in this instance. (Chou laughs before the translation)

Prime Minister Chou: And also your case. You dared to have contact with China. Mr. Mansfield has said that he wouldn't have had the courage to come. But he supports you.

President Nixon: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Last night I received all the news reports from your country on your visit. I found that all views I saw were favorable, even Meany of the AFL–CIO supported you.

President Nixon: Meany? That's really a surprise.

Prime Minister Chou: He said that you had done right.

President Nixon: The Prime Minister would like Mr. Meany. He's a man of the people, very earthy and very honest, but he's not always right. (Chinese laugh)

Prime Minister Chou: It is impossible for a person to be correct always. No one on earth can call himself infallible. (President Nixon laughs)

President Nixon: I was going to say—the Prime Minister mentioned Senator Mansfield—while he is, of course, of the other party and has disagreed with us on some policies, as he should, on our Chinese initiative he has been a strong supporter. He visited China many years ago, as did Senator Scott the Republican leader. Before we left I said that I would mention to the Prime Minister that I think it would be useful, and significant, if the Republican leader of the Senate and the Democratic leader could visit China. It would show bipartisan support. This would not be now, when Congress is still in session, but perhaps later on at the end of the session in July. And your government may want to consider this. I'm saying this because they asked me, but I did want to bring it up.

Prime Minister Chou: Congress will recess in July?

The President: Yes, around July.

Prime Minister Chou: We have abided by our promise to Dr. Kissinger, and even though we had considered allowing—we felt it would be difficult to refuse to let some people in the political field come after (last) July—even so we have still put off this matter until your present visit. I think it was more beneficial to have them come after your visit. We think your present proposal is a very good one, and it would be even better if they came together.

President Nixon: They are two very good friends, although they are a Republican and a Democrat. On this issue they agree. They would not embarrass your government if they come.

⁸ Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran.

Dr. Kissinger: It's fair to tell the Prime Minister that Senator Scott sometimes has the same tendency of our Japanese friends—anything you say to him is likely to find its way into the press. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

President Nixon: But Mansfield does not leak. Now to show how fair I am, I'll say that the Democrat does not leak but the Republican does leak. (Chinese laughter) All the virtue is not just in one party in our country.

I do appreciate the Prime Minister's actions in not having political personages before my visit. I wish to emphasize that this visit has bipartisan support, and for other visits now it would be perfectly proper. As I indicated to the Prime Minister it is important to have policy carried forward whoever sits in this chair next year. I may be here next year and I may not, under our system. I want to be sure of that whether a Democrat or Republican occupies the presidency—actually I expect to be here, but I may not. It is bigger than one party or one man. It involves the future for years to come. When I go back I'm going to enlist bipartisan support for what we agree to and for continuing that.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, from what I read last night about the response of public opinion in your country, both to your actions and our speeches, we find that on that response you have done right and we believe this unprecedented event is a correct action. Although there are four forces that oppose you, pro-Soviet, pro-India, pro-Japanese and pro-Chiang Kai-shek, yet the strength combined of their voices is not very loud. George Ball⁹ also opposes you, doesn't he? Is he pro-Indian?

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger: He is pro-Japanese.

President Nixon: He represents some Japanese businesses. He thinks in different terms.

Prime Minister Chou: And Mr. Reischauer. And even if Walter Judd or McIntyre¹⁰ or George Ball or (to Dr. Kissinger) your former student, Reischauer, would like to come here, we wouldn't oppose that.

President Nixon: Yes. We think it would be best if people came here—I would not dictate a decision of Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou—to have the two leaders of the Senate. This avoids having political candidates. A candidate does not act sometimes with the same responsibility as someone who is not a candidate.

⁹ George Ball, Under Secretary of State, 1961–1966; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 1968.

¹⁰ Senator Thomas J. McIntyre (D–New Hampshire).

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, they try to seize an opportunity. In your dining room upstairs we also have a poem by Chairman Mao in his calligraphy about Lushan mountain, the last sentence of which reads “the beauty lies at the top of the mountain.” You have also risked something to come to China. There is another Chinese poem which reads: “On perilous peaks dwells beauty in its infinite variety.”

President Nixon: We are at the top of the mountain now. (Chinese laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: That’s one poem. Another one which I would have liked to put up, but I couldn’t find an appropriate place, is “Ode to a Plum Blossom,” I had an original plan to take you to see the plum blossoms, in Hangchow, but I have heard that their time has already passed. They are ahead of season this year.

Dr. Kissinger: They have passed already?

Prime Minister Chou: I don’t know why. In other years they have not shed so early.

In that poem the Chairman meant that one who makes an initiative may not always be one who stretches out his or her hand. By the time the blossoms are full-blown, that is the time they are about to disappear. (Chou reads the whole poem) The Chinese at the same time have a different meaning for this. (Chou gestures at the end as he reads the poem)

President Nixon: That’s very beautiful.

Prime Minister Chou: Therefore we believe we are in accord with the idea you just now expressed. You are the one who made the initiative. You may not be there to see its success, but of course we would welcome your return. We would think that is a very scientific approach.

Dr. Kissinger: A very unlikely event, though.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, that’s what you should say.

I was only trying to illustrate the Chinese way of thinking. It does not matter anyhow. Regardless of who is the next President, the spirit of ’76 still exists and will prevail. From the standpoint of policies, I hope that our counterpart will be the same so we can continue our efforts. We also hope not only that the President continues in office but that your adviser and assistants continue in office. Also various changes may be bound to come. For example, if I should suddenly die of a fatal heart attack, you would also have to find another counterpart. Therefore, we try to bring more people to meet you. At least perhaps the interpreters have the hope of living longer than the Prime Minister.

I hope you won’t complain that I am too lengthy in my words.

President Nixon: Not at all. I am very interested.

Prime Minister Chou: This belongs to the philosophic field, but also to the political point of view. For example, this poem was written

after military victory over the enemy. In the whole poem there is not one word about the enemy; it was very difficult to write the poem.

President Nixon: Of course, I believe it is very useful to think in philosophic terms. Too often we look at problems of the world from the point of view of tactics. We take the short view. If those who wrote that poem took the short view, you would not be here today. It is essential to look at the world not just in terms of immediate diplomatic battles and decisions but the great forces that move the world. Maybe we have some disagreements, but we know there will be changes, and we know that there can be a better, and I trust safer, world for our two peoples regardless of differences if we can find common ground. As the Prime Minister and I both have emphasized in our public toasts and in our private meetings, the world can be a better and more peaceful place.

I think one thing which Dr. Kissinger has greatly contributed in his services to my administration is his philosophic view. He takes the long view, which is something I try to do also, except sometimes my schedule is so filled with practical matters and decisions on domestic and foreign policy that I don't have as much time to take the long view as he does.

I think if we could . . . incidentally, I should mention to the Prime Minister he can be sure that if we survive the next political battle, as we hope and expect to do, I will still have Dr. Kissinger with me.¹¹ He can't afford to stay, but I can't afford to have him leave, because the book he would write would tell too much. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, indeed, I think it would be better if he remained (to Dr. Kissinger). Yes, if it is your wish to promote the normalization of relations between China and the United States and if you left before fulfilling that mission, just to write a mere book, that would not be in accord with your philosophy.

Dr. Kissinger: I will not leave as long as the President thinks I can be of service and I will not write a book in any event.

President Nixon: I will amend that in one way. I will authorize him to write a book, but he must write poetry.

Prime Minister Chou: Write poetry; I like that. That would be good.

Dr. Kissinger: Because of my Germanic origin it would be 400 pages. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: As for the question of Korea, we know of course your ideas, and of course you also know our ideas. First, the

¹¹ All ellipses are in the source text.

official policy of the President is that he is prepared to finally withdraw troops from Korea in the future, and also to prevent the entry of Japanese forces into South Korea because this would not be beneficial to the cause of peace in the Far East. How does one promote contacts between North and South Korea? How does one promote peaceful reunification? That question will take a long time.

President Nixon: What is important here is that both of us exert influence to restrain our allies.

Let me give you an historical note. In 1953, in my first trip around the world as Vice President, President Eisenhower gave me a long oral message for Syngman Rhee. Syngman Rhee was thinking of going north and I had the unpleasant duty to tell him that he couldn't go, and that if he did we wouldn't support him. I remember Syngman Rhee cried when I told him. I was the one that kept Syngman Rhee from going north. Of course, I was the agent of President Eisenhower, his Vice President. This story has never been told before.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and the characteristics of Syngman Rhee as you just now described are also similar to what we have heard about him.

President Nixon: Similar to what?

Dr. Kissinger: What he had heard about him.

Prime Minister Chou: A few years after that he left the scene.

President Nixon: The Koreans, both the North and the South, are emotionally impulsive people. It is important that both of us exert influence to see that these impulses, and their belligerency, don't create incidents which would embarrass our two countries. It would be silly, and unreasonable to have the Korean peninsula be the scene of a conflict between our two governments. It happened once, and it must never happen again. I think that with the Prime Minister and I working together we can prevent this.

Prime Minister Chou: The thing is also to promote their contacts.

President Nixon: Like the Red Cross and political contacts.

Prime Minister Chou: And we think also it will be good when the day comes that the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should be able to end its life. That would be a good thing.

Dr. Kissinger: We are examining this question, Mr. President.

President Nixon: You raised that with Dr. Kissinger, and we are looking into it.

With regard to Japan, I must emphasize what I said yesterday. It is our policy to discourage Japan from any military intervention in Korea, but the extent to which we are able to implement that policy will depend on the extent to which we maintain close relations with Japan.

I cannot guarantee it, but we believe we can very strongly influence Japan and our purpose will be to discourage any Japanese adventure against Korea or Taiwan.

Prime Minister Chou: I always try to cite the 1969 Joint Communiqué,¹² but now the situation has changed. The situation on Okinawa has begun to change. And the question they face now is not Taiwan or South Korea, but the question of the four islands in the north.

President Nixon: I hope our Soviet friends will be as generous with Japan as we were on Okinawa. (Chinese laughter) I told Sato that when I saw him in San Clemente. The Okinawa decision was the right thing to do, after a period of time, for it belonged to Japan.

Prime Minister Chou: What caused the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people was that you still maintain nuclear bases. That still causes a problem.

President Nixon: That is a political issue created by the opposition to Sato. The point is really a false issue, because the problem of nuclear bases is covered by the statements we made at the time and later.

Dr. Kissinger: We have moved all nuclear weapons off Okinawa. They have already left.

President Nixon: There are none there.

Prime Minister Chou: Japan is now at the crossroads, as I had discussed with Dr. Kissinger. If Japan were to be able to make a friendly approach to both China and the United States, then the development of its economy could be in a more regular way, not such an abnormal way as it has been up to now. Its previous development is abnormal. That is very clear because they have no raw materials; their raw materials come from abroad and their markets also. Since their development has been at such a great rate the result is bound to be expansion abroad. Expanding in such a great way as they are toward foreign lands, the inevitable result will be military expansion.

You have now also said that your relationship with Japan is one of partnership, not the previous relationship between the victor and a defeated force. But when they reach a certain point they will cease listening to your words, and this development, if it goes in such a direction, will affect the security of the entire Pacific. Because of their tradition of militaristic thinking, this would be quite worrisome to some other people. Of course, only a very small section of their population are militaristic—old politicians and military men left over from the

¹² Apparent reference to the joint statement after the meeting between President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato, November 21, 1969. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 953–957.

Second World War, who in recent years have been making a lot of propaganda. And as you mentioned in our previous meeting, neither you nor we will forget the historical past between us and Japan.

We hope that a new, independent, peaceful and democratic Japan will appear which will express a friendly attitude toward China and the United States.

President Nixon: I want the Prime Minister to know that we do have an alliance with Japan despite the great war we fought with Japan. We have developed a friendly relationship which you have described as a partnership, including the economic field. We believe that this relationship is actually in the interests of peace in the Pacific. Because the Japanese as a people have drive and a history of expansionism; if they are left alone as an economic giant and a military pygmy the inevitable result, I think, will be at this point to make them susceptible to the demands of the militarists.

If, on the other hand, we in the United States can continue a close relationship with them, providing their defense—because they cannot have a nuclear defense—we believe this can restrain Japan from following a course which the Prime Minister correctly pointed out could happen, of economic expansion being followed by military expansion. Our policy is, to the extent possible, to restrain the Japanese from going from economic expansion to military expansion. But we can only do that if we have a close relationship with them. If we don't have that close relationship, they aren't going to pay any attention to us.

The Prime Minister pointed out yesterday the danger, based on past history, that China might be carved up by its major neighbors, by the Soviet Union, India, by Japan, or possibly even by the United States. I, of course, can assure him unqualifiedly that not only will the U.S. never follow such a policy, but, to the extent we have influence, we will attempt to discourage Japan and others if they embark on such a policy.

One of the tragedies of history . . . Dr. Kissinger would tell you that I have read China's history at night, on many nights; I didn't know much about it, not adequately, and hadn't known that China's history has been one of so many foreign invasions. China is so strong it absorbs—as it has been said, China sifts all water that runs into it. On the other hand, as the leaders of their country, the Prime Minister and Chairman Mao rightly must be concerned by what happened in the past and must make every effort so that it does not happen in the future. The Prime Minister can be sure that the new relationship which we have established is one which will serve that purpose. We are not talking in terms of being philanthropic—it is in our own self-interest. It is in the interest of the United States that China be a strong independent country and that China's neighbors not engage in carving it up.

I would like to give—before taking ten minute break—I would like to give the Prime Minister one other assurance. I am sure the Prime Minister, who follows our press very closely has noted that some rather cynical observers have implied that it would be in our interests to have the two great socialist superpowers—the USSR is one, and China could be one—be in conflict because this would make things safer for us. Some have written this. The Prime Minister probably didn't notice this, but I was asked in one of my press conferences a year ago about this, and I categorically said that it was not in the interest of the United States to have war between the Soviet Union and China. War between major powers can never be contained, and the whole world would become involved.

Prime Minister Chou: Because everything is linked.

President Nixon: Now to the assurance that I give the Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, I also read your press conference.

President Nixon: To the assurances I already gave the Prime Minister I add this. In December, when the situation was getting very sensitive in the subcontinent—I'm using understatement—I was prepared to warn the Soviet Union against undertaking an attack on China. A warning, of course, means nothing unless the individual being warned realizes you may have the will to carry it out. Insofar as Japan is concerned and India, there is no question about where our influence will be used. With regard to the Soviet Union, I can also give assurances that the U.S. would oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to engage in an aggressive action against China. This we would do because we believe it is in our interest, and in the interest of preserving peace as well, world peace.

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps they now feel calmer, more at ease, after reading the World Report, the first part.¹³

Dr. Kissinger: They complained bitterly to us. (Chou laughs)

President Nixon: Shall we take a ten-minute break? Afterwards, perhaps, I would like to hear the Prime Minister's views on this.

Prime Minister Chou: The World Report part on the Soviet Union was the thickest. After they read that they became quieter.

President Nixon: We had to devote the most attention to the nation which, as of now, seemed to pose the greatest threat to peace.

(At this time 4:00 p.m., the two sides took a ten-minute break.)

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Ambassador complained bitterly about the World Report, the Arms Control and South Asian sections.

¹³ Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, February 9, 1972. See *ibid.*, 1972, pp. 194–346.

President Nixon: Dobrynin.

Prime Minister Chou: Is that so? He probably thought that Dr. Kissinger drew up those sections for the President.

President Nixon: I don't want to blame Dr. Kissinger for our Indian policy, since when he writes his book he will point out it was my policy.

The Indian decisions were mine. If anything, again speaking to the Prime Minister in the confidence we always use, we made two mistakes. The first of these I could do nothing about—not seeing that Pakistan had enough arms to discourage an Indian attack. Secondly, when I saw Mrs. Gandhi I made the mistake of listening to my advisers, who said to reassure her. So I spent the whole time reassuring her when I should have warned her. So I'm the hard-liner on India. I must say he (Dr. Kissinger) was a conspirator with me. We agreed on that policy. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

I would like to get the Prime Minister's views on a very fundamental question. As he knows, we are planning to have a meeting with the Soviet leaders, neither of whom I have met before. Our policy as the Prime Minister has also agreed, should be one of seeking arms limitation and a relaxation of tension if possible. We will of course make no, and have no, understandings with the Soviet Union that we will not only inform your government and the Prime Minister about, but also in any event would provide the option of having a similar understanding with China.

For example, we have already made some progress in this area, unilaterally without any understanding as to what comes from it. I have made a further adjustment with respect to trade just before this trip, to put China and the Soviet Union on an absolutely equal footing. We made that announcement just before we came here.

And now to my question. As the Prime Minister knows, I feel that it isn't pieces of paper that you sign but the motives behind these pieces of paper that really matter. Why, in the Prime Minister's view, is the Soviet Union so critical of the meeting we are now having? What is the reason behind its policy? China has not criticized the fact that we are meeting with the Soviets; in fact you suggested that we go there first. Why is the Soviet Union so critical? It would be helpful to get the Prime Minister's view on that.

Prime Minister Chou: The policy of the Soviet Union, although they don't admit it themselves, is actually a policy of expansion, but they don't admit that. In the course of this expansion they, of course, meet with criticism and naturally our criticism is rather sharp. And our criticism also has its influence in the world. We have called them "social-imperialists." They don't like that name, but they have no way of defending themselves because this name we have given them was taken from Lenin.

Dr. Kissinger: (Looking toward Vice Minister Ch'iao): He's particularly bad.

Prime Minister Chou: Lenin talked about people who were socialist in words but imperialist in deeds. We began to give them this name when they invaded Czechoslovakia. At that occasion, it happened just by coincidence that Romanian National Day occurred at that time. On that day I personally went to the Romanian Embassy and in front of the Soviet Ambassador I gave them that title. (President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger laugh.)

Since then they have hated us to the very core and since then they have been haggling with us. They have been doing various things to cause us great trouble. Because an overwhelming great number of countries of the world would have the same feeling about them, not to mention the peoples of the world.

The second point is that we also want to relax tensions between the Soviet Union and China to a certain extent. It was Kosygin, one of the troika, who came to do that.

President Nixon: In 1965?

Prime Minister Chou: In 1969. He came through China on the 11th of September, 1969.

Dr. Kissinger: In 1969 on his way back from attending the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam.

Prime Minister Chou: Even before that they created the Chen Pao Island incident in the Ussuri River in the northeastern part of China.

That occurred in March 1969. It happened exactly when we were preparing to convene the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. And Mr. President, who is a great American lawyer and has a knowledge of the laws, will know that an international boundary running along a river should go along the centerline of the main channel. And that was also stipulated in the diplomatic dictionary that was compiled under the direct (*sic*) direction of Gromyko. In Russian, of course. But they don't apply that rule to us. The two boundary rivers between China and the Soviet Union, the Ussuri and the Amur in Heilungkiang Province, were even stipulated in this way in the unequal treaties of the 19th century.

That was the time of the Czars. And we have already acknowledged that these treaties were concluded at a time when neither the Soviet nor the Chinese people had power in their hands.

President Nixon: So neither people had a representative. That was very generous.

Prime Minister Chou: And in Lenin's time he had declared all unequal treaties between the Soviet Union and China should be abolished.

President Nixon: Because the present government is totally different from then.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. At that time the Chinese government was a war-lord government and was not able to solve this problem. But now China has been liberated, and as a socialist country should take the initiative to conclude new treaties.

Of course, China would not take the opportunity to exert new territorial claims, but would only ask for adjustments along the border. We would take the present status quo along the border as the basis, because we have been living in such a status quo for over a hundred years. But the Soviet Union did not take such an initiative. On the contrary, it very often made demonstrations and provocations along the borderline between the USSR and China on the Ussuri River and also on the borderline between Chinese Sinkiang and the Soviet Union.

Then it was we who took the initiative to hold border negotiations. They began in 1964. We suggested that we should hold such negotiations and they agreed, but when negotiations began they took out the old maps of the Czar. They wanted to settle according to these maps instead of according to the present situation. But in those times they had no idea where the border lay. The borderline was just drawn as the pencils in the hands of the Czar's surveyors went along the border, sometimes on the right bank, sometimes in the middle, and sometimes on the other bank. In a similar fashion the railroad between Moscow and Leningrad—Petrograd—was just drawn by a stroke of a pencil. Also in the same fashion, Britain's McMahon drew the so-called borderline between China and India. That still exists today. This was also the way European countries carved up Africa.

President Nixon: That's why so many African countries are really not countries. It was a terrible error.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and many countries are divided. But even so, we still have a desire to settle problems through negotiations. We have settled our border question with Burma. Part of the McMahon line runs along the Sino-Burmese borderline. But General Ne Win¹⁴ was a farsighted man, and we solved the question between China and Burma. But U Nu refused to do so. He was very difficult and raised many petty matters. However, the boundary settlement of this Sino-Burmese boundary line was one of mutual accommodation, but actually the result was that Burma gained a bit more, which was reasonable. Since they are a smaller country than us we gave them the benefit of the doubt.

¹⁴ General Ne Win, Burmese Prime Minister.

Also we settled the border question between China and Nepal. We have a treaty with Sikkim, and a non-disputed borderline with Bhutan and later with Pakistan. Of course, this raised a problem with India, because they said the borderline included part of their territory. In settling the boundary between China and Nepal, we resolved that the highest peak in the world, Mount Everest or Chomolungma, should belong to both China and Nepal, and we each took half. The second highest mountain is on the border between China and Pakistan, K-2, and we also shared it.

We also have a very tiny border between China and Afghanistan, where the silk road ran, and we solved that question.

As for Mongolia, there is the problem that the People's Republic of Mongolia used to be part of China, but since Chiang Kai-shek put his signature on the Yalta Agreement we could only take his legacy. But now he refuses to recognize his own signature. If I met with him I would have to ask him about that. But we were able also to define the border between China and the People's Republic of Mongolia at a time when the People's Republic of Mongolia took a rather reasonable approach.

We also have a border between China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. There is a lake on it, T'ien Ch'ih, on the peak of a very high mountain. In the past the Manchus said the lake belonged to them, and the Koreans said it belonged to them. We finally solved the question by dividing and sharing the lake.

It is very easy to solve questions if both sides are reasonable. We have generally settled the borders between China and Vietnam/Laos, and although there are still questions in some places, it is mostly settled. There are only two big countries, the Soviet Union and India, which haven't settled. They're cooperating in this.

President Nixon: Do they want to create incidents?

Prime Minister Chou: They want to leave a pretext so that they can take the opportunity to make provocations against us when they need it.

The border negotiations which began between China and the Soviet Union in 1964 lasted only one year, and we could only leave the table. So the time passed until 1969, in March, when they created the Chen Pao Island incident (they call the island Damanstey). It is actually on our side of the central line, but they had border guards on that island. We also had border guards there. They tried to attack us, but the first assault was not successful, and they had losses. We also had some losses.

On the second assault they used tanks, for the river is frozen in March. They maneuvered their tanks behind our island, and then tried

to cut the island off. But the tanks were rendered useless by our side and fell in the river, so they couldn't go back. They used that as a pretext that we made the provocation against them. But their tanks were on our side of the river. How could they say that we made provocations against them?

A very interesting coincidence was that at the very same time the West German Presidential elections were being held in West Berlin. Because the Soviet Union had before that warned West Germany against holding elections in West Berlin, they (the Soviets) now took the Chen Pao Island incident as a pretext to tell East Germany it was not now possible for them to pay attention to that matter because they were occupied elsewhere. As a result the West German President was elected in West Berlin. They also used that incident as a pretext to shift the main body of their forces from Western border to the Far East.

But at that time Kosygin felt a bit uneasy. Before that we had a so-called hot line, between the Soviet Union and ourselves, but by that time it had already become cold because the Kremlin hadn't called us. Their line existed, but they didn't use it. At the time of the Chen Pao incident, Kosygin called us. He asked the operator to find Chairman Mao. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Without orders, the operator, unauthorized, answered him, "You are a revisionist, therefore I will not connect you." Then he (Kosygin) said, "If you will not try to reach the Chairman, will you please find the Prime Minister." The telephone operator gave him the same unauthorized reply.

Afterwards, we learned about this. Of course, we criticized the telephone operator. That telephone operator shouldn't have intruded in such matters without reporting them. Later on we found other means to communicate.

President Nixon: I imagine the telephone operator was like the heroine in the ballet last night. They took her pistol away and then gave it back to her. I think that happened to the telephone operator too. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Both disobeyed for a good cause.

Prime Minister Chou: That's right. So, the result was that at the funeral of Ho Chi Minh they told us through the Vietnamese that Kosygin would like to see us at the Peking Airport. We agreed to that and he came. That was on the 11th of September 1969. It was in the waiting room of the airport that you landed at that we talked for three hours. I also invited him to dinner. We reached agreement to relax tensions between our two countries. First and foremost was that the boundary question should be resolved.

By that time they had already increased the number of troops along the border in the six months that had passed between March and October. Of course, the number of Soviet troops along the Soviet border was not as great as at present.

Dr. Kissinger: Actually less than one-half, because they have nearly doubled it.

Prime Minister Chou: We said that we were willing to enter into border negotiations, but we said there would be one condition—they could not ask us to enter into them under the threat of force. The principles I would put forward then were as follows: one, maintain the status quo at the border; two, to enter into negotiations free from the threat of force so as to avoid armed conflict;—there is a method about the third point—disengage troops immediately facing each other.

At that time we agreed to these principles. He (Kosygin) also said that we should write down those principles into a draft agreement and send it to him after he returned to the Soviet Union. The main idea then, the main idea of the agreement, could be summarized in those three points: one, maintain the status quo of the border; secondly, avoid armed clashes; and the third point, that both armed forces on the two sides should disengage.

At that time Mr. Kosygin considered those points reasonable. He asked me to give him a written draft of those principles, after we met.

The second thing we discussed was that the two sides should send back ambassadors, and as a result both countries now have ambassadors to each other.

The largest embassy in Peking is the Soviet Embassy. What I mean by large is that it has the most members on the staff. They have over 200 cars alone, so that they can go everywhere. They engage in activities all over the place. Of course, there are certain places they are not allowed to enter.

The third point was the restoration of trade, because they had disrupted previous long-term trade agreements. They disrupted these long-term agreements when Khrushchev passed through China in 1964. We discussed that last night. The thought was that when we discussed the problem of polemics and principle, though, we said that this could go on for 10,000 years. At that time there was still trade. They wanted Chinese tinned pork, and we also needed their timber. This agreement was on a very equal, mutually beneficial basis, but they disrupted it the next year. They suddenly declared that the Chinese pork was bad, and didn't want any more. They finally had to make up the imbalance in money and other trade. We don't owe them—they owe us.

President Nixon: I wonder if the telephone operator was working in a pork packing plant. (Chinese laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: That might not have been the case. Maybe that operator knew about the suspended trade agreement.

After discussing these three points, Kosygin went back to the Soviet Union. On the 20th of October those boundary negotiations finally

began between China and the Soviet Union. It was decided the negotiations would be held in Peking at the Ministerial level and the Vice Minister here headed our delegation. Mr. Ch'iao began these talks, and when the Vice Minister went to the United Nations we assigned another Vice Minister, Mr. Han Nien-lung. The Soviets had Mr. Kuznetsov, but it is said he is now ill in Moscow. (*Note: Ilichev is now the Soviet negotiator.*)

The negotiations have been going on from October 1969 up to the present date, a period of over two years and three months, but we still haven't been able to reach agreement, even on the provisional agreement on the three principles. This is because whenever we approach them on one issue, they raise another. Perhaps you have also had the same experience. They draft something and insist that agreement be on the basis of their draft, but we will not agree. That is not equal. Why should we accept their draft? Edgar Snow's article on his conversation with Chairman Mao mentioned that. "We are those who are not entirely in accord with the Soviet Union." Perhaps Mr. Edgar Snow didn't think it appropriate to appear in *Life*, and didn't publish it.

Dr. Kissinger: He didn't publish it. He was very discreet. He didn't publish anything you didn't authorize.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, on the one hand we authorized and on the other hand he was discreet even when it was authorized.

President Nixon: He didn't want to embarrass you. That's very unusual for a journalist.

Dr. Kissinger: He didn't tell us, for example, what Chairman Mao said about the President's visit until after we met.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, he was a very prudent man. Also an honest man. And therefore we commemorate him. He dared to come to visit us when it was difficult to do it. He dared to make public to the world our situation.

Therefore up to the present date the Sino-Soviet border negotiations are stagnated in the same place. So when they feel the necessity of relaxing tensions they come and have negotiations, and when they want to raise tensions they cease negotiations. Otherwise they try to bind us to their terms, which we have not agreed to. They always say that we have territorial claims. We have documents to show that we have *no* territorial claims. I believe Dr. Kissinger already has seen them; the Foreign Minister's statements issued in 1969 on behalf of the Chinese government.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't believe we have formally received a letter. I am unfamiliar with them. Last time, your Foreign Minister explained your position to me orally.

Prime Minister Chou: Those are all published documents. We have made our attitude very clear in them, that we want to settle the issue

because otherwise it would always be a source of tension. Anyhow, it is very difficult to talk with them. They are really very frightened that the U.S. and China are coming closer. They always think we are trying to put them on the spot. But actually we met them and entered negotiations with them first before negotiating with you. We met with Kosygin at the airport, and although Mr. President was already in office, we met the Soviet Premier first. In my opinion, Kosygin already had an interest in solving some of the questions, but after he went back to the Soviet Union and had a Politburo meeting, and after the troika had discussed the question among themselves, the problem became more difficult. Mr. Brezhnev is stronger, and has more ambition. He is the one who is most emotional.

President Nixon: Do you know him?

Prime Minister Chou: Probably we have met, but I am not familiar with him. I don't know Podgorny. As for Mr. Kosygin, from time to time he is able to talk reason, but he has a very technical mind, and he is not very farsighted.

Perhaps now because of their increasing nuclear strength Brezhnev has larger ambitions than Khrushchev. Because he thinks he had success in Czechoslovakia, he now has ambitions in the Balkans.

President Nixon: Yugoslavia?

Prime Minister Chou: Romania. First Romania, then Yugoslavia.

President Nixon: Maybe Yugoslavia after Tito. The Yugoslavs are afraid of that.

Prime Minister Chou: Because they (the Soviets) are already engaged in subversion in Yugoslavia.

President Nixon: In Yugoslavia?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

President Nixon: That is what we've heard.

Dr. Kissinger: Very actively.

Prime Minister Chou: We would like to wait for them to relax tensions. We have quite a large enough country and have a lot of work on our hands already. The land left over from our ancestors is very large, and there are large tracts of land not yet cultivated. The land on which we grow grain only accounts for one-ninth of the area of our country. The greatest potential we have is our land. We also have not used enough fertilizer on our land, and once there is more fertilizer we will be able to gain even greater potential. In accordance with advanced methods used by other countries around the world we will have great potential to grow more grains such as wheat and rice.

And also, because we are trying to build socialism, how can we expand abroad? Wouldn't that be against our principles? It is our be-

lief that ideology has no national boundary in the same way that religion has no borders. Newspapers of various countries are sold in other countries. News reports, books and magazines can flow across borders. But it is the people of a country who can control their own destinies.

It is through this concept that we have been able to formulate the five principles of peaceful co-existence. They (the Soviets) do not believe in those principles. Therefore these two ideologies (of ours) are diametrically opposed. Therefore, in this case not only is it difficult to maintain party relations, but it is also difficult to maintain state relations and diplomatic relations. But such things as diplomatic relations must be continued. But once they see more and more of your people going to China, they will be quite disturbed. But they have lots of people from your country and we say nothing about that.

President Nixon: Do they fear you for the future? Is that the problem? The border dispute has to be an excuse, not a reason. It can't be that important to them.

Prime Minister Chou: Just because of that—they fear there will be a chain reaction. That is what they have told Japan. They said that if the four islands were returned to Japan, then there would be problems along the whole border, all the way to Finland, East to West. They have gained territory along their whole border; there is no country where this is not so. In the past we thought this was not the case with Afghanistan, but we found it was the case even with them. You know the border situation between the Soviet Union and Iran, Turkey, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and even Germany, East Prussia—. (Talking to Kissinger) You know about that. Königsberg, a most beautiful city.

Dr. Kissinger: They took the northern half of East Prussia and Königsberg, the biggest city in East Prussia, which they named Kalinograd.

Prime Minister Chou: They also took Karelia from Finland. We don't want them to return all the territory they have taken from us, only a small readjustment, because there is no meaning to dispute in such a way over a border. But it won't do if they don't treat us equally and if they don't abide by what they say. Something must be discussed about that.

President Nixon: Do they fear that you threaten their leadership of the so-called socialist camp?

Prime Minister Chou: We don't even recognize them as belonging to the socialist camp.

President Nixon: That may worry them.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course.

President Nixon: Because the Russians don't need territory.

Prime Minister Chou: The socialist camp no longer exists because there are many different ideas.

The second point is that there should always be one head of that camp, and that all others should listen to that head.

President Nixon: How long have they felt that way in their relations with you? Since 1965? 1966? When did you see the conflict developing?

Prime Minister Chou: We began to come apart in 1956, at the time they had the 20th Party Congress. We came apart then because of ideology, and because it was unfair at that time to write off all of Stalin's achievements at one stroke. Chairman Mao made the remark that 30 percent of what Stalin did was wrong but 70 percent was right. We don't say that it was all right. Anyway we must recognize that he (Stalin) made contributions in the Second World War. Even our American friends recognize this.

President Nixon: The Russians fought very well. They had heavy losses.

Prime Minister Chou: Even leaders of Western countries, such as Winston Churchill, who differed in their ideologies from Stalin, recognized Stalin's contributions the most. And if it had not been Stalin in command at that time, but Khrushchev. . . . It was utter nonsense for him to claim that it was not Stalin, but he, Khrushchev, who led the battle.

President Nixon: Khrushchev?

Dr. Kissinger: They rewrote history and said that Khrushchev had led the battle into the Ukraine.

Prime Minister Chou: Therefore they're constantly rewriting Party history. Now Brezhnev must stand out, but they can't do that because it's against history.

Although at that time we had ideological differences with the Soviet Union, we still wanted to find a way to unite in order to maintain our relations. In 1957 Chairman Mao went to Moscow, and supported the issuance of the Moscow Declaration although we had some reservations about the Declaration which we also put forth at that conference. But in 1960 they withdrew all their experts from China and tore up all their contracts.

President Nixon: All the technicians—all their technical assistance in 1960—yes, I remember.

Prime Minister Chou: They withdrew. But after that we still went to Moscow for another conference of 81 nations, which also issued a statement at that time.

President Nixon: It is interesting to note that when Khrushchev met with Eisenhower this had already happened, but our people did not know about it.

Dr. Kissinger: They met in 1959. Tensions had already developed, but not that technician thing.

President Nixon: Your cooperation had stopped before Eisenhower had met Khrushchev but our people didn't see the significance, what with other great events developing at the time. That is when that great meeting took place. The meeting President Eisenhower had with Khrushchev in 1959 was not a very comradely one. I think he was just warming up for when he got here. (Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: In 1960 he quarreled with you in Paris, at the Elysee Palace.

President Nixon: He had a good reason, the U-2. We admit it was good reason.

Prime Minister Chou: It was a very good pretext.

President Nixon: I agree it may have been a pretext and not a reason. That was the analysis some of our experts made at that time—Khrushchev wanted the summit to blow.

Dr. Kissinger: I once asked a Swedish diplomat, who had served in Moscow, for his estimate of Khrushchev's greatest quality. He said it was Khrushchev's ability to extricate himself from difficulties he himself had created. In 1960, he started the Berlin crisis, and he didn't know how to end it. The same thing in 1961 and 1962; he started a crisis every year and he didn't know how to end them. He couldn't go forward and he couldn't go backward. Therefore I agree with you, Mr. President, he couldn't have the meeting fail, without success.

Prime Minister Chou: It is possible, because we do not know very much about the issues and the situation at that meeting. I only know what he said publicly about the U-2 incident. And it was I who went to the Soviet Union in 1961 to take part in the 22nd Party Conference. At that time we had a semi-split.

President Nixon: 1961?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. The Soviet Union itself unilaterally declared that they were going to expel Albania from the conference as not being a socialist country, and they wouldn't let them attend. The ships they had sent to Albania were all called back, and all their exports were called back. This was an attempt to bully a small country.

President Nixon: It is ironic. Most people say Albania is more socialist than the Soviet Union. (PM Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: That is right. The result was that we couldn't refrain from sympathizing with a small country, because it was in the right. We withdrew from the meeting and criticized them, but not very strongly.

Perhaps, Mr. President did not take note of these developments because he was not in office at that time. In July 1963, when you were not in office, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed.

Dr. Kissinger: In 1962?

Prime Minister Chou: In 1963. At that very time they were, on the one hand, holding meetings with three countries about the partial test ban, and on the other hand, were holding meetings with other parties regarding the treaty. We knew beforehand that no good would come from this, because they were attempting to exert pressure on us at a time when we didn't have nuclear weapons.

President Nixon: You had your first nuclear explosion in 1964?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and the day after Khrushchev fell from power.

Dr. Kissinger: Did you plan that?

Prime Minister Chou: No, it was not planned beforehand. It was a coincidence.

President Nixon: You can say that he went out with a big bang. (Chinese laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: He tried to use a meeting to exert pressure on us. Since that meeting there has been a split. We said that party relations were only suspended, and didn't want to go to the extremity. But after the talks were suspended they immediately made public to the whole Soviet people and the other Communist parties that the Sino-Soviet party talks had ended in failure, and made public the whole proceedings of that meeting.

Miss Wang just now corrected me. The Soviet Union does not have 200 cars for the Embassy, but they can send cars out 200 times in one day. Two hundred times, that is the number their cars go out. Miss Wang is from Protocol, and it is not under her charge. It is under the charge of the place that takes care of cars.

In 1964 Khrushchev fell from power. Although we had already exploded a nuclear explosion, at that time we still placed some hope on the new leadership in the Soviet Union. So we went to Moscow to celebrate the anniversary of the October Revolution in 1964, and suggested to other parties that they also should go in an attempt to unite. But the result was it was impossible. The policies pursued by Brezhnev were the same as those of Khrushchev.

And in their cocktail parties they instructed people like Malinovsky¹⁵ to make provocations against us. This was something we could not accept. No matter how we talked with them, the talks were not successful. Since then I have also met them many times—since then, party relations have been severed. We could do nothing about it because we made every effort and were not successful.

¹⁵ Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, former Soviet Minister of Defense.

President Nixon: There is a point which I particularly want to make with the Prime Minister. In our relations with the Soviet Union, we do not want to do anything which would be against the interests of his country, China. For example, we do not want this meeting with Chairman Mao and the Prime Minister to become an embarrassment to China in its relations with the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: That won't be the case.

President Nixon: Dr. Kissinger has told Mr. Dobrynin not to be concerned about this meeting, but Dobrynin doesn't believe him.

Dr. Kissinger: They are a little bit hysterical on this subject.

Prime Minister Chou: If they have confidence in themselves, they would not be upset, because China doesn't oppose them.

President Nixon: That was the point I was trying to get to in my question, and I am very glad to get the Prime Minister's analysis of the problem. Certainly China is not a threat to the Soviet Union at this point because of the nuclear superiority of the Soviet Union over China. So what we think is that they are not so concerned about the border, which is a pretext, but about the leadership and doctrine of what they say is the socialist camp, which you don't accept.

They also must be afraid of whether China could become powerful in the future, because the Soviet leaders in my experience tend to take a long view.

Certainly we will conduct ourselves with complete correctness in dealing with them and will make every effort to see that no pretext will be created by this meeting to indicate we are setting up a condominium against them.

Prime Minister Chou: Condominium?

President Nixon: Cabal. There are probably better Chinese words for this than we have. What concerns us about Soviet intentions was the recent experience of India, because certainly in the early stages of that conflict they were doing nothing to discourage India in its actions against Pakistan. It was only after we made a very strong stand—I personally intervened with Brezhnev, and Dr. Kissinger made a statement that was widely quoted in this respect—that they took a more reasonable attitude and a more moderate position in the United Nations, as you may recall.

I believe, in other words, the best policy towards the Soviets as far as the U.S. is concerned is one of firmness but not belligerency, and a willingness to negotiate. But we should make it very clear we would be willing to resist if incidents like Pakistan occur.

I think a fundamental fact which at present assures a possible period of peace without world conflict is that the Soviet Union certainly doesn't want a conflict or confrontation with the U.S., and we don't want it with them either. We both know it would be mutual suicide.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, a world war especially a nuclear one. They are also in a dilemma on this. A nuclear war would be detrimental not only to the two big countries but also to the people of the whole world. But on the other hand, they refuse to cease the arms race. But the more nuclear weapons, the more difficult it is to engage in a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons cannot be eaten, not worn as clothing, nor can they be used as utensils. They can't raise the standard of living. The only thing they can do is lie there waiting to be used. Mr. President probably knows much better than I what a great waste they are. The people in the next century will blame us for this waste.

President Nixon: We completely share the Prime Minister's view that we should attempt to work out an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. I think our meeting in Moscow will be the acid test. It will not prove everything if we do make an agreement because it will be a limited agreement, but if it doesn't work out it will have a great effect on the U.S. because we will have to increase the nuclear arms burden so as not to fall behind. We can't fall behind, but we don't want this.

I completely agree with the Prime Minister about waste. When there are so many hungry people in the world and poor people in the world it would be a disaster to spend so much money. On the other hand, if the Russian level is going up, we would have no choice.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, you are in that position.

Dr. Kissinger: In this connection, it is interesting to point out to Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister that we have not deployed land-based missiles for six years.

President Nixon: No new land-based missiles in six years and no new submarine-based missiles in four years. In all that time the Soviet Union has been building very heavily. They only agreed to talk to us about a limitation of arms and only began to show a willingness to discuss submarine weapons when we began to increase ours. So only when we started a new program were they willing to talk. So this is very curious, a paradoxical situation. When we stop unilaterally they raise their levels, and when we raise ours they talk about stopping.

Prime Minister Chou: I have taken note of certain incidents—I don't know whether we are correct in this. We found that when your navy ships were moving toward the Indian Ocean they also very quickly sent nuclear subs down from Vladivostok to the Indian Ocean.

President Nixon: Your intelligence is very good.

Prime Minister Chou: Once they decide to take action they move very speedily. They even passed through the Suvarov Straits, which should be considered internal waters of Japan between Hokkaido and Honshu. This was the first time, and Japan was very tense.

President Nixon: We didn't know that, did we? It must have been known.

Prime Minister Chou: It was the first time the ships went into the Straits, and the Japanese were upset.

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, I want to assure you that the arms race is not our choice. It was only with great reluctance that I approved the ABM, but it is either that or fall behind. And I felt it would be very dangerous for ourselves and for our allies, because we would be subjected to very great pressures.

I should point out that this is a limited agreement. It does not, for example, cover intermediate range missiles.

Dr. Kissinger: I informed the Vice Prime Minister this morning. . . .¹⁶

President Nixon: The information Dr. Kissinger gave you is totally reliable.

Dr. Kissinger: Right now there is a recess in the talks, and they will not resume until March 28. No matter what the press says, it is not reliable. When they resume, and there is any development, I will inform you through our regular channels. With the President's approval, I will inform you of our position so that there will be reliable information.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you for your information. You, of course, know that we do not want to have too much money spent on this. Since your two big countries have already had that experience, we don't want to follow that. We have no wish to waste so much money. You are now on the peak of two very high piles, and it is very hard to come down. It is very unfortunate. We hope you will be able to succeed in your negotiations with the Soviet Union.

We must also say this has two sides. On the one hand, we hope you will succeed in your discussions, but on the other hand, that will not be easy.

President Nixon: I want to say, in bringing this afternoon session to a close, that I recall what the Prime Minister said about the battle in which the Chinese troops were on the top and the Indian troops suffered more casualties, and how Khrushchev misinterpreted this. I just want to say, in conclusion, that I don't want the situation with evidence that they are on top of the peak and that we are way down below. (Chinese laughter.)

¹⁶ Kissinger met with Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, from 9:35 a.m. to 12:34 p.m. on February 23. The memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 92, China, President's Trip, February 1972, HAK Conversations. See footnote 2, Document 202 for a complete list of Kissinger's private meetings while in the PRC.

Prime Minister Chou: I understand. But we still hope you will succeed.

President Nixon: I was going to say that I think we may, but the Prime Minister is absolutely right that these will be hard, tough negotiations.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe the SALT talks have lasted already more than two years, the same as the border negotiations. Our easy negotiations haven't succeeded, nor have your difficult negotiations succeeded yet.

There is something else I would like to ask you, one other question. We have heard that Mr. Rogers told us—our Foreign Minister—that the Secretary of State would like to take part in the discussions about the communiqué. And our Foreign Minister replied, in the first day plenary meeting, that Mr. Prime Minister assigned Mr. Ch'iao Kuanhua, and Mr. President assigned Dr. Kissinger, and that was all that he had on the subject since there had been no further understanding.

President Nixon: I think there is a misunderstanding. Secretary Rogers may have some ideas which he can discuss with the Foreign Minister. I have delegated Dr. Kissinger to be our representative, as the Prime Minister has designated the Deputy Foreign Minister. That is the way we would like to have it done.

I would like to say in this connection that I have talked to Dr. Kissinger at length about the communiqué. And after these talks I feel much more strongly than ever that we should have a communiqué that rises above the usual nit-picking pettiness that usually characterizes a communiqué.

Naturally, there will be statements of disagreements made, but I hope that Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Ch'iao can give us language that is worthy of the occasion because this is a historical occasion on which we have the opportunity to say something of significance. I am glad they have to do that because I don't want to do the work. (PM Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: So far, we have held two meetings, and I am thinking that tomorrow afternoon we should have another meeting in which on our side we can give you our overall assessment of the situation in which we link together all issues so that Mr. President can have a better understanding of us. It will not take a long time. As for the communiqué, I understand they have already agreed to meet. They should start working and will have to skip the Great Wall.

President Nixon: I think he (Dr. Kissinger) is too lazy and does not want to climb the Wall again.

Dr. Kissinger: I will have a stomach ache.

President Nixon: If he has a stomach ache, there will be a story in the press.

198. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, February 23, 1972, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Counterpart Meetings Between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China—II

PARTICIPANTS

Chi P'eng-fei—Foreign Minister
Hsiung Hsiang-hui—Secretary to the Premier (Foreign Affairs)
Wang Chen—Deputy Director, Information Department
Ch'ien Ta-yung—Deputy Director, West European, American and Australasian Affairs
Li Tsung-ying—Leading Member, Research Group
Ting Yuan-hung—Member, Delegation to the UNGA
Shen Jo-yun—Interpreter
Hu Chuan-chung—Interpreter
Hu Fang Hsien—Stenographer
William P. Rogers—Secretary of State
Marshall Green—Assistant Secretary of State—EA
Ron Ziegler—Press Secretary to the President
John Scali—Special Consultant to the President
Alfred le S. Jenkins—Director for Asian Communist Affairs—EA
Nicholas Platt—Assistant to the Secretary
Commander John Howe—National Security Council Staff
Charles W. Freeman, Jr.—Interpreter

MFN Impact on Trade

The Secretary opened the meeting by speaking to the point on MFN Treatment raised by the Foreign Minister the day before. He said that in order to answer the question fully, the US would need to know the particular exports involved. For some exports, for example, like tea, rice, tung oil and turpentine, no tariff is imposed at all and MFN status makes no difference. For other items, like hog bristles, a differential exists, but it is very small. As matters now stand, MFN Treatment has little effect on the limited number of items the PRC may be interested in exporting to the US. As trade broadens and the list expands,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Nodis; Homer. The meeting was held in Villa 5 of the Guest House Complex. Drafted by Platt and approved by Rogers on February 28. A complete set of the Rogers–Chi P'eng-fei memoranda of conversation is also *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 91, Country Files–Near East, Memoranda of Conversation between Secretary Rogers and PRC Officials, February 1972. Rogers met with Chi February 22–25 and 28. He had a brief meeting with Chou on February 27. He also attended the February 26 meeting with Nixon and Chou; see Document 201. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 91, 94, 101, 105, 107.

however, the impact of non-MFN status would widen. The Secretary concluded by reiterating the US position on trade.

Taiwan

The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary for the information, and suggested that the discussions proceed to cover general questions. As the problem most central to the relationship between the PRC and the US was Taiwan, he would like to begin by discussing that. Ten years of talks on the subject at Warsaw had proved fruitless, but the President had taken the initiative to come to China, and the topic was an important one to discuss.

The Secretary agreed and asked the Foreign Minister to present his views first.

The Foreign Minister began by reiterating the sentiments expressed in the President's and the Prime Minister's toasts at the welcoming banquet and the Secretary's statement the day before; that the Americans and Chinese were great peoples, that establishment of normal relations under the five principles would be in the interests of the world; and that the history of the past two decades had been an aberration.

History

Reading from a prepared text, the Foreign Minister then proceeded to review the history of Sino–American relations. The Chinese and American peoples had been close in the past, he began. Large numbers of Chinese workers had come to America and participated in her construction and development. The US for its part had introduced modern techniques to China. Americans appreciate Chinese culture and the Chinese admire the American pioneering spirit, both knowing and respecting the names of Washington and Lincoln.

However, relations between the governments of the two countries have not been good, the Foreign Minister continued. He proceeded to cite US participation in the Opium War (1840), the Cushing Treaty (1844), the Boxer Rebellion (1901), US support for Chiang Kai-shek after World War II, US intrusion into Chinese territorial waters and airspace (against which 497 serious warnings had been issued since 1958), the trade blockade, deprivation of the PRC's legitimate rights in the UN, and travel restrictions.

Most of the problems between the two governments, the Foreign Minister continued, stemmed from the policies of Secretary Rogers' predecessors. Nevertheless, he felt the need to cite the record in order to prove that it was the United States which was responsible for the abnormal relationship of recent years. For its part, the PRC had expressed upon its founding willingness to negotiate its differences and establish a normal relationship with the United States. In 1955, Premier

Chou had declared that the Chinese did not want a war with the United States, and initiated discussions on the means to ease tensions in the Far East and the Taiwan Strait. More than 100 talks ensued, without result.

The attempts of American policy makers to isolate and contain the Chinese people were foolish, the Foreign Minister went on. China was neither isolated nor contained. On the contrary, the Chinese people were aroused to high resolve and determination to rely on themselves. As Chairman Mao has put it, the United States has played the role of teacher by negative example, and the Chinese are grateful for this.

The PRC has noted, the Foreign Minister continued, that President Nixon has expressed the desire several times for a new start. The Chinese government would like to regard such expressions as being earnest and has made its response. There is an old saying that it is difficult to turn around when weighed down by burdens. Nevertheless, we cannot stand still, still less move backward. The policies of the past were not formulated by President Nixon or the Secretary of State, so why keep these heavy burdens? The key to normalization is the Taiwan question.

PRC Position

The Foreign Minister went on to outline the PRC position on Taiwan. Taiwan has been Chinese territory since the Sui and Tang Dynasties, long before Columbus set foot on North America. The Taiwanese are blood brothers. The Foreign Minister cited the State Department White Paper in 1949, the Cairo Declaration in 1943, the Potsdam Declaration in 1945, the Chinese government acceptance of Japanese surrender in 1945, and President Truman's January 5, 1950 statement as evidence supporting the PRC claim to Taiwan and US recognition of it. He cited President Truman's June 27, 1950 statement and the signing of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Chiang government as evidence that the US had gone back on its word.

Again, the Foreign Minister apologized for telling the Secretary things he already knew, but felt he had to establish that the blame for blocking normal PRC–US relations lay with the US.

To normalize relations, he continued, the US must recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China. The Chiang "government" is an illegal insurgent. During the American civil war were there two Americas? Was there one United States and two governments? Certainly not. The Secretary's statement of August 2, 1971 that the US government still wants to maintain its commitments and friendship with the "Republic of China" shows that the US still clings to the errors of the past and is incompatible with the desire for better relations.²

² See Department of State *Bulletin*, August 23, 1971, pp. 193–196.

Taiwan is part of China, the Foreign Minister continued, and there can be no interference in Chinese domestic affairs. Any attempt to create a “one China, two governments” formula, or to continue to maintain that “the status of Taiwan is undetermined” is untenable and utterly wrong. The Chinese government is firmly against the Taiwan Independence Movement instigated behind our backs by foreign forces. The US government must withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan and the Strait area, dismantle its military installations on Taiwan and abrogate the “defense treaty.”

Insofar as the means for liberating Taiwan are concerned, the Foreign Minister continued, that is the PRC’s affair. He could say to the Secretary, however, that the Chinese people are willing to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means as far as this is possible. In the past, the Chinese people had liberated Chinese territory by force of arms, but there was no lack of precedent for liberation by peaceful means. Furthermore, the PRC had always treated with leniency those whom they had liberated that desired to live in peace.

In closing, the Foreign Minister reiterated his belief that the Chinese and American people are friends. China had never menaced the United States or invaded it. He welcomed the visit of the President and the Secretary, hoped that they would show courage and foresight, and that the visit would prove to be a turning point.

The US Search for Peace

The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for his views, and said that since the President discussed the same question the day before, he would not repeat what had been said. He would, however, like to clarify the US position further. Thanks to the discussions today, the US does in part understand the PRC position as it sees it in history. China is an old culture. The United States is a young country which has been through the difficulties of two World Wars and has different perspectives. As both sides proceed to improve relations, the US will take these historical views into account.

The predominant impression in the United States, the Secretary continued, is of friendship toward the Chinese people. What his own generation remembers is that we fought on the same side in World War II, and that pilots downed inside China were treated with friendship.

President Nixon had made three points, the Secretary went on. The US has no territorial ambitions. Neither the US nor the PRC have any intention of controlling the world. Neither the US nor the PRC fear each other. US policy under the Nixon Administration is to maintain its strength so that it will never be second best and to further the cause of peace through discussions. Twice the US has become involved in world wars and twice it has been ill prepared. This will never happen again.

The US feels it is important for the cause of peace that the world's strongest and most populous nations have better relations. Mankind has developed the ability to destroy itself in the event of a nuclear war. The President's visit to China and the talks today are part of an effort to reduce tensions in the world and in the long run make it possible to have a generation of peace.

The US believes, the Secretary continued, that the fundamental issue is peace, and how both sides can work together to promote it. Improvement in our relations is one way. In that spirit it is important to consider the past and keep it in mind. However, we want to concentrate on the present and the future, and not let preoccupation with the past, or even past injustices, hurt the prospects for the future. The Secretary said he would not attempt to comment on some of the PRC's historical statements. Rather, he hoped that the US and the PRC could change their relationship on the basis of experience; the experience which Chairman Mao has valued so highly in his writings.

The Secretary said he was not clear what the Foreign Minister had in mind when he said it might be difficult for the US to turn around while carrying heavy burdens. The President's policy is not based on burdens, but rather by his belief that we should work for peace.

The Secretary said that he could think of no time since he had first become involved in government in 1941 when the US was stronger or more prosperous than now under the leadership of President Nixon. People can get the wrong idea from reading the news, and the idea that the US was changing its policy through weakness or any burdens it carried was a fallacy.

Assistant Secretary Green had commented, the Secretary continued, that the US had welcomed contacts with the PRC rather than restricting them. The US favors contacts and wants as many Chinese to visit the US as possible, and vice versa.

The Secretary welcomed the Foreign Minister's statement that President Nixon's initiatives had been treated in earnest by the PRC. At the same time, the US has been very careful to avoid hostile comments toward China. Those of us in this room understand why the US is called names in the PRC press, but the American people don't understand. The Secretary hoped that one result of the visit would be an end to name calling on both sides.

Before discussing Taiwan, the Secretary wished to point out that an improvement in relations between the PRC and the US was in the interest of all mankind. Both of us recognize that there are predatory forces in the world which could bring us to the brink of a world war. These are the fundamentals.

As far as Taiwan is concerned, the Foreign Minister was correct in pointing out that the US has no predatory designs, the Secretary

continued. No useful purpose would be served by going into the statements made by Truman and Acheson except to say that their positions had been affected by the events of the Korean War.

The Secretary outlined the US position on the Taiwan question as follows:

Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits agree that Taiwan is a part of China and that there is only one China. We take note of that position on the part of both parties.

The US will accept and abide by any solution the parties can arrive at as long as it is peaceful. We are prepared to take note of the PRC position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

The United States is not trying to promote “two Chinas and one Taiwan,” or “one China, two governments.” We want to proceed from *where we are* to see how we can improve our relations.

The US is not providing encouragement or assistance to any Taiwan independence movement or group.

The Secretary noted in the Foreign Minister’s comments that the PRC would be willing to pursue a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, and underscored the US hope that it would occur.

Because of the history of the problem, the US presumes it will take some time to solve, both socially and economically.

Insofar as US troops on Taiwan are concerned, as tensions in the area lessen, and we think they will, the US is prepared to reduce its military forces there. A reduction is already in train and further reductions are contemplated. Any expression by the PRC of a determination to follow a peaceful solution would facilitate further reductions.

The Foreign Minister has referred to US efforts to contain and isolate China, the Secretary continued. Surely, the PRC had taken note that President Nixon’s policy was quite the contrary. We have reduced troop levels in the Pacific by 450,000 men during the past two years. This is not containment. We have no desire to isolate China. On the contrary, the US welcomes the PRC’s new policy of diplomacy, welcomes increase in contacts, and welcomes its membership in the UN.

Clarifications and Arguments

The Foreign Minister said that he had a few points to clarify. As far as his statements on heavy burdens were concerned, he was referring to the great differences between the two countries in the past and not to US domestic difficulties or weakness. When citing the policy of containment and isolation, the Foreign Minister had been referring to the actions of the previous administrations and not the Nixon Administration.

The PRC would try to liberate Taiwan peacefully insofar as this was possible but this should not be taken as a precondition. The Secre-

tary had mentioned that as long as a statement of intention to solve the problem peacefully was made, the US would reduce its troop levels. The PRC does not share this view and cannot make such a statement.

The Secretary said that he understood that the PRC could not make such a statement as a precondition, and did not have a precondition in mind. We do not have to make one statement in exchange for the other. These are parallel policies. The United States has no predatory interest in Taiwan and we have already reduced our troop levels. The PRC is prepared to attempt to solve the problem by peaceful means separately from that.

The Foreign Minister responded that Taiwan is China's internal affair.

The Secretary said that he was not sure that he had made our position clear. No precondition is involved. The PRC's position is that Taiwan is an internal problem which the PRC will try to solve peacefully. The PRC need not say anything that will show that actions it takes will be affected by anything the US does. The PRC policy is to try to solve this internal problem by peaceful means. At the same time, the US has no predatory aims toward Taiwan and will reduce its forces there as tensions lessen. These are parallel policies; or policies which coincide and on which no agreement is necessary. There must be some formulation that we can make, the Secretary continued, to avoid any appearance of a precondition or a bargain.

The Foreign Minister responded that it was quite clear that there could be no precondition or bargain, that the liberation of Taiwan is an internal question and that the American withdrawal is separate.

The Secretary agreed that the two policies should be stated separately. The Foreign Minister said that the United States must first make up its mind to withdraw the troops. The US had put them there in the first place.

The Secretary said he understood that time was necessary to solve the problem. However, the US and the PRC were working on parallel courses, each seeking a peaceful solution by the Chinese themselves.

The Foreign Minister replied that when he had referred to heavy burdens, he had meant that the Taiwan problem would take time to solve. The PRC does not expect the US to withdraw its troops tomorrow. However, it should at least promise that they will be withdrawn. Unless US troops are withdrawn, it will be difficult to liberate Taiwan peacefully.

The Secretary then quoted Assistant Secretary Green as saying that time is a cure for muddy waters. The Secretary said that time was indeed a very important factor in the solution of the problem. He thought that the two sides could formulate a statement at the end of the meeting which would outline both positions. Because President Nixon has

already reduced troops, the Secretary felt sure that the Foreign Minister was reassured about US policy.

The Foreign Minister replied that President Nixon and Premier Chou at the plenary session had appointed Dr. Kissinger and Chiao Kuan-hua to work out a communiqué. He suggested that he and the Secretary leave it to them.

The Secretary replied that the point had been made at the plenary that the communiqué would be worked out under the supervision of the Foreign Ministers and that, therefore, both should be clear in stating our position.

The Secretary then asked the Foreign Minister to contrast US troop withdrawal policy with Asia and Europe. The US had started to withdraw troops in the Pacific but by contrast NATO forces would remain in place because the US felt them necessary for the stability of Europe. He repeated that the PRC should be reassured by the trend in US policy.

The Foreign Minister replied that the US should remove its troops in the Asian area as soon as possible.

As tensions are reduced, the Secretary responded.

The Foreign Minister said that the PRC understood the US was reducing its troop levels.

The United Nations

The Foreign Minister stated that the legitimate rights of the PRC in the UN had been restored. The Secretary's use of the word "admission" or "entry" into the UN implied that the US still clings to the idea of "one China, two governments."

The Secretary replied that it was an academic question. The US had avoided the legalities and taken the position that the United Nations' function and the trend toward universality made it important to have as many people represented as possible. The US voted for representation for the Taiwanese people as a practical matter. The vote went against us.

The United Nations General Assembly rejected your position, the Foreign Minister replied.

The Secretary asked whether the Foreign Minister was trying to win all over again. The PRC was successful, the Secretary continued; we don't have to debate this question again.

The Foreign Minister said the Chinese people felt strongly about this question. We are trying to have exchanges between our peoples; however, this is impossible if you are trying to create two Chinas.

We don't accept the idea that we are trying to create two Chinas, the Secretary replied. We have acknowledged publicly that Chinese on

the mainland and in Taiwan believe that there is one China. We recognize that fact, but there are two entities no matter what you call them. The Secretary then asked the Foreign Minister what it was about the UN situation that troubled him now. In view of the General Assembly vote, he should be satisfied.

Not necessarily, the Foreign Minister replied, but that is a long story and we can discuss it later. The US has its stand and its views. That is why it is difficult for you to turn around.

The Secretary replied that the discussions were helpful. It had been particularly useful for the Foreign Minister to point out that time was required to solve the problems between the two countries.

The Foreign Minister said he was grateful to the Secretary for the frank exchange they had had. The opportunity to make each other's positions known would promote mutual understanding. He knew that there was considerable disagreement between them, but that both sides should try their best to find those points on which they could agree.

The Secretary closed the meeting by paying tribute to his colleagues on both sides of the table for having listened so long and patiently. He hoped that it would be the beginning of many such exchanges.

199. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, February 24, 1972, 5:15–8:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff

Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Prime Minister Chou En-lai

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director of Protocol

Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.

Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

Prime Minister Chou: You took a rather tiring trip to the Great Wall this morning.

President Nixon: Nothing is tiring that is interesting.

Prime Minister Chou: How about Mrs. Nixon?

President Nixon: She loved it.

Prime Minister Chou: Was it cold?

President Nixon: No, it was a beautiful day. We didn't need the big coats.

Prime Minister Chou: Dr. Kissinger didn't go to the Wall today. Mr. Lord neither.

Dr. Kissinger: The Vice Minister was very difficult. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

President Nixon: I'm sure Dr. Kissinger was too.

Prime Minister Chou: That's right.

Vice Minister Ch'iao: That's fair.

President Nixon: On things of very great importance it is necessary to be frank. One must discuss matters good-humoredly but directly. It was very different with Mr. Khrushchev. He took his shoe off and hit the table. That was before the Vice Minister was there.

Prime Minister Chou: As I said yesterday to Mr. President, today I would like to say something about our general position and point of view. Because we plan to talk in the joint communiqué about the five principles of peaceful coexistence and that both sides are prepared to make efforts for realizing these principles in our relations. As Mr. President has said, neither side has any territorial designs on the other. Neither side wants to dominate the other nor impose its will. But, of course, to realize this a process is required. On our side there is less difficulty with that. But as for you, Mr. President, it is not only a matter of a political step by you, yourself, it is a matter of things left over from the previous administration. These are things you must clear up.

So, precisely, it is our hope that you will be able to continue in office. As I said yesterday, it is also our hope that Dr. Kissinger too will remain with you to help, Mr. President, in your work. Otherwise it won't be so good to discuss something today and someone else takes office tomorrow. Then the question arises whether it can be effective or not.

President Nixon: That's true.

Prime Minister Chou: In this sense, after publishing the joint communiqué, we consider it good for the leaders of the two parties to come

to China and have further discussions on this matter and to further explore the communiqué frankly and in an aboveboard manner. Of course, we will say nothing about the private discussions. We would then hope that both parties in your country would support that approach and that attitude, since it is not a question of the President's election, but for the benefit of the long-term interests of the two people.

And so those four points of principle that we would declare we will have in common, in the latter part of the communiqué, that is something we should work to put into effect. That is to say, to normalize relations between our two countries is not only in the interest of the two peoples but also in the interest of the peoples of the world. We are not xenophobes. And our attitude toward US-Soviet negotiations can bear testimony to that. They claim that our two sides are discussing how to oppose the Soviet Union, to conclude an anti-Soviet alliance. In Moscow they are making that proposition. So our attitude in this matter is very clear.

And then on the second principle which is common, both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict. I have indicated our opinion that the US and Soviet Union reach an agreement on limiting nuclear armaments; wouldn't that be good? If an agreement to that effect is not reached, that is their fault.

President Nixon: The Soviets?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

President Nixon: We are ready.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

The third principle is that neither of us should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. And that would imply not only our two countries should not seek hegemony in this region, but that Japan should not either.

President Nixon: And the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: That's right. Nor the Soviet Union.

President Nixon: Nor India.

Prime Minister Chou: That's right. Here it implies that both will try to do good things, not do bad things.

President Nixon: Let me clarify. It implies that neither of our two sides should seek hegemony. It also implies, to the extent that each of us can, that we will resist efforts of others to seek hegemony. Is that what it means?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, that is we oppose any efforts by another country.

(Dr. Kissinger reads the sentence from the joint communiqué on hegemony.)

Prime Minister Chou: And the fourth principle agreed upon is that neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of third countries or enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.

So, it's very clear that what we are engaged in is bilateral negotiations, and we do not negotiate on behalf of any third countries. The matters of third countries are their matters.

So these four principles between us will be able to keep any misunderstanding from arising.

President Nixon: He has to explain to the press because most of the press don't even know what "hegemony" is. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Dr. Kissinger: But as I told the Vice Minister, the President has instructed me to work out a line either with the Vice Minister or you, if you agree.

President Nixon: What you want to say.

Dr. Kissinger: What we will say we will decide ahead of time and not go beyond it. I will tell you ahead of time exactly how I explain the communiqué subjects.

Prime Minister Chou: Since we are going to reach agreement, then we should see to it that the interpretations of the two sides should be identical or approximate to each other. We should not have misunderstandings arise over the communiqué. You face more trouble than we. You have to report to the Secretary of State. The Vice Minister, of course, reports to his Minister. The problem is easier for him to report to his Minister than for you to report to the Secretary of State. Because, as Mr. President is aware, we absolutely will not leak anything out of what is discussed.

Now, I will go on to some concrete issues.

First, the question of Taiwan. That memorandum that Secretary Rogers submitted to Mr. President is already known to the Japanese.²

Dr. Kissinger: I gave the Vice Minister yesterday a draft of the State language in order to show that we really had gone very far. It is possible that they showed it to them.

Prime Minister Chou: We learned of this last night. And I saw this news in bed early this morning, a dispatch from a German news agency from Tokyo that Foreign Minister Fukuda leaked it out. And the content that Fukuda revealed to the press was similar to what the Secretary of State gave you on Taiwan.

President Nixon: Taiwan, not Japan.

² Apparent reference to the memorandum summarized in Document 208.

Prime Minister Chou: Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: The only section I showed was the Taiwan section.

Prime Minister Chou: I told Mr. President yesterday the Secretary of State told my assistant Chi Peng-fei that he wants to take part in the discussions on the Taiwan portions, and that shows that this Taiwan question is the crucial question for you as well as for us.³ Because if in the communiqué the U.S. is not to point out all the direction in the future toward solution of the question, if this is not pointed out, it would not be possible to give an account to our people, or neighboring countries or other countries concerned with us.

And in the draft Dr. Kissinger handed over this afternoon, it was mentioned at the end that question about the withdrawal, the final withdrawal, and there is no question about the date for such withdrawal. But you had it linked up with certain conditions.

That, of course, is a matter for Dr. Kissinger and the Vice Foreign Minister to rack their brains as to what should be the proposed formulation. That is to say to have it so both sides understand some obligation but not make it so that people know exactly. It should not be so rigid.

President Nixon: That's what we want. We have not found it yet.

Prime Minister Chou: At the same time you want a peaceful liberation. Dr. Kissinger mentioned in his private talks on the last day and in reply to Dr. Kissinger we said that we will strive for peaceful liberation. It is a matter for both sides. We want this. What will we do if they don't want it? While your armed forces are there our armed forces will not engage in military confrontation with your armed forces. That I mentioned in the toast at the banquet. I also said that 15 years before. Therefore, our position in this matter is very clear. When the President first took office one of the first signs of the good will of your Administration was that the Seventh Fleet no longer patrolled the Taiwan Straits, but just passed by now and then. So both our sides had by implication envisaged how this Taiwan question would be solved.

I already told Mr. President yesterday that even after Taiwan is returned to the mainland, there is no necessity for us to engage in such construction on Taiwan as building nuclear bases. That is to say, we will not use Taiwan against Japan. Japan may feel at ease about that.

And so in this sense it is our hope, it would be good if the liberation of Taiwan could be realized in your next term of office. That, of course, is only a hope. Of course that's our internal affair. We cannot express the hope that you should not interfere in this internal affair.

³ See Document 198.

You should not impose anything on us nor should we impose anything on Chiang Kai-shek. But also, Mr. President, you should be aware that there are not too many days left to Chiang Kai-shek.

President Nixon: Age?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

President Nixon: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: But his idea is that there is only one China. So we appreciate this point of his. In 1958, then Secretary Dulles wanted Chiang Kai-shek to give up the islands of Quemoy and Matsu so as to completely sever Taiwan and the mainland and draw a line there. Chiang Kai-shek was not willing to do this. We also advised him not to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu. We advised him not to withdraw by firing artillery shells at them—that is, on odd days we would shell them, and not shell them on even days, and on holidays we would not shell them. So they understood our intentions and didn't withdraw. No other means or messages were required; just by this method of shelling they understood.

As Chairman Mao told you the other day, he has known Chiang Kai-shek since 1924, that is, he is an acquaintance of almost 50 years. So we have fought with him and cooperated with him at different times. So we are quite clear about both sides. Since it is your principle, Mr. President to have no territorial designs on China and approve of only one China, then we should make efforts to try to apply those principles while you are still in office. Because that would be beneficial to our two countries, while at the same time posing no threat. I should say very frankly that when Dr. Kissinger said that it would take ten years, that would be too long. This was at a briefing conference, you said that maybe it would take ten years, but that would be too long. It is better not to mention any date. I can't wait ten years. You have ten years. You can wait for ten years. Mr. President may be reelected to a third term.

Dr. Kissinger: That's against the Constitution.

Prime Minister Chou: After four years then you can run again because your age permits you to do that. But in view of the age of the present leaders of China, it is not possible. They're too old.

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, former presidents of the United States are like British Kings; they have great responsibility, but no power. I mean one who is out of office.

Prime Minister Chou: But your career is quite rare in history. You have been Vice President for two terms, then lost and then won an election again. It's quite rare in history.

President Nixon: One can still have influence if one is out of office.

Prime Minister Chou: As Chairman Mao said the other day, he will give you one vote.

President Nixon: That would be a big vote.

Prime Minister Chou: So we hope to solve this question in a friendly way, since already more than 20 years have passed. According to the solution to the question put forward by John Foster Dulles at the Warsaw Talks the time limit has already been passed. Dulles put forward the proposal through the American Ambassador that so long as China did not use force for a period of 10, 15 or 20 years he would be satisfied. If we had concluded such an agreement then the 15 years would have long passed by now. You can look at the archives in the State Department.

Dr. Kissinger: You have never been wrong on a factual matter yet.

Prime Minister Chou: I have grounds for what I am saying. But if we accepted such a principle, it would be equivalent to accepting interference in our internal affairs. So we cannot accept that.

In our present efforts at formulation it is shown that the two sides approach each other in views, but there is no question of interfering in internal affairs, and that would be good. We are not asking you to remove Chiang Kai-shek. We will take care of that ourselves.

President Nixon: Peacefully.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, we have self-confidence. How would we do that if we didn't have self-confidence? As we solve ourselves this question, your forces, of course, may leave and that would be quite natural.

So the Taiwan question is the crucial question between our two countries, and here I cannot but add that it was the result of a mistake by former President Truman. We needn't put that in the communiqué. I want to say it here.

That is to say, it is indeed not an easy thing for two countries which have been hostile toward each other for so long to adopt such methods to solve problems. This was made possible only because we have the great spirit of Chairman Mao. He has the courage to write such things down and realize them in such a way. Because in the formulation of the Taiwan question we are going to work out, each side states its own position, but if one has profound understanding one can see that there is common ground between our two countries toward this question. But if one looks at it in a general or superficial way one may not see that common ground.

So on this question it is only the great spirit expressed by Chairman Mao that makes us dare to do so. Only because of the great trust placed in Chairman Mao by our 700 million people that we are able to put forward such a document.

So Mr. President should realize that we do have our difficulties, but we have the courage to take on such difficulties, to overcome them.

So we must arrive at an agreement on this one matter. Once agreement is reached on that, all others can be solved easily. That is, the Taiwan question is the crucial question. I believe you will surely be able to find some formulation to at least approximate our view.

President Nixon: Does the Prime Minister want me to comment now or wait for the other issues?

Prime Minister Chou: Please.

President Nixon: As I said in my opening statements, we have first the problem of what I will do. And I have indicated already that my goal—the Prime Minister has already referred to it directly—my goal is normalization with the People's Republic. I realize that solving the Taiwan problem is indispensable to achieving that goal. Now, the problem of direction, therefore, between the Prime Minister and myself, and Chairman Mao and myself, is decided. This direction is normalization. I started down this road in 1967 in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, with some rhetoric. And now we are trying to follow it with action. The goal of normalization is the one which I alone at the outset initiated and it's my intent to realize this goal.

Now the problem of what we say about achieving that goal will directly affect whether I can achieve it. And if our communiqué, after our two experts work on it, is one that gives opponents a chance to seize upon the communiqué and say that the President of the United States came 16,000 miles in order to repudiate a commitment to the government on Taiwan, this could poison our relationship in the months ahead.

To give an example, when I ordered action with regard to the Seventh Fleet, there was opposition in our bureaucracy, but I did it. And as Vietnam is concluded, as it will be concluded one way or another, the removal of the two-thirds of our forces (on Taiwan) will be done. There will be opposition, but it will be done.

And I can also move to reduce our other forces, the remaining one-third, I can do that as our relationship develops.

One thing that is very important—and I know the Prime Minister with his understanding of our press and Congress will realize this—I must be able to go back to Washington and say that no secret deals have been made between the Prime Minister and myself on Taiwan. So what I must do is to have what we would call "running room" which the communiqué language I hope will provide, which will not make Taiwan a big issue in the next two or three months and next two, three, or four years. So I can do the things to move us toward achieving our goal.

Prime Minister Chou: On this our Foreign Minister has similarities with the Secretary of State—he has his limitations. We were just discussing this a few minutes ago because I said we should leave some running room, and no time limit. That is, you have your difficulties, and we have our difficulties. On this point our Foreign Minister represents the feelings of the people. But it is possible for us to persuade our people because of the prestige of the leadership of Chairman Mao.

President Nixon: Chairman Mao takes the long view, as I do. I don't mean 1,000 years, nor do I mean ten years on this issue. But I think the Prime Minister should have in mind, and Chairman Mao should have in mind, that I have stated my goal is normalization. If I should win the election, I have five years to achieve it. I cannot, for the reasons just mentioned, now make a secret deal and shake hands and say that within the second term it will be done. If I did that, I would be at the mercy of the press if they asked the question. I don't want to say that.

Let me use a comparison with Japan. For example, I know the Prime Minister's position is that we should withdraw our forces from Japan. I do not agree with that position, as shown in the communiqué, and I will not withdraw our forces from Japan, because I believe that our interest in peace in the Pacific is to restrain Japan. All the things that we have talked about require our forces staying.

With regard to Taiwan I do not believe a permanent American presence—whatever happens in our meetings—is necessary to American security. And for that reason my goal—we can now use this term in this meeting—my goal is the withdrawal of our remaining forces, not just two-thirds, but all forces, including the remaining one-third. That is a goal which I can achieve.

Now, if the Prime Minister could also understand how I may have to present that in order to sell it to our Congress. That is, it must be consistent with the doctrine—which I know the Prime Minister does not approve of—the so-called Nixon Doctrine. Under the Doctrine we are cutting our forces in Korea. Of course, Korea is a different case because in some ways it is tied to Japan and is different from Taiwan. I think how I do this, Mr. Prime Minister, is something I have to handle with my public opinion. Two-thirds will go, hopefully as soon as we can finish our Vietnam involvement. My plan also is one which reduces the one-third and withdraws it during the period I have the power to act. But I cannot do it before January of next year. It has to be over a period of four years.

Now if someone asks me when I return, do you have a deal with the Prime Minister that you are going to withdraw all American forces from Taiwan, I will say "no." But I am telling the Prime Minister that it is my plan, and as step-by-step I withdraw I can develop

the support that I will need to get the approval from our Congress for that action.

And I would put it on a basis for our public opinion—I think it would not be harmful to your public opinion either—that the presence of American forces on Taiwan is no longer needed.

Now I said to Chairman Mao that he didn't know me and therefore he shouldn't trust me. But I only said that because I feel it is important that we develop complete candor and recognize that neither of us would do anything unless we considered it was in our interests. And what I am saying to the Prime Minister is this: I am not asking him to trust me. This policy—I am not asking for a piece of paper on it—I have determined, looking at American self-interest, looking at the desire to have normalization with the People's Republic, I have determined that we should proceed with the withdrawal of American forces according to the timetable I have just described.

I would simply close by saying that I can do this without question in my mind because I know the political situation very well, if I can do it gradually but inevitably. But if I were to announce it now, it would make it very difficult to do it, because it would raise the issue at the wrong time.

That is all.

Prime Minister Chou: Our request is not to have any time limit. We didn't raise the question of a time limit. As for the question of one China, that is already mentioned in the five principles. I have attached importance to these points put forward by Mr. President.

Firstly, you hope for and will not hinder a peaceful liberation. Secondly, it was that you would discourage and not allow Japanese armed forces to come to Taiwan while your forces are still there. You will try to avoid in any event—but need forces in Japan to do that.

President Nixon: That's right, while we still have forces in Japan. But you meant while our forces are still on Taiwan?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, while your forces are still on Taiwan. You will discourage the Japanese from coming in while they are there?

President Nixon: I will go further. We will try to keep Japanese forces from coming into Taiwan *after* our forces leave.

Prime Minister Chou: That is to say, while you still have forces in Japan?

President Nixon: Precisely that. Unless we have forces in Japan, they won't pay any attention to us.

Prime Minister Chou: And the third point you mentioned was that you would not support or allow a Taiwan Independence Movement, nor encourage it, either in the U.S. or Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: Encourage. "Allow" is beyond our capability.

Prime Minister Chou: Discourage?

President Nixon: Discourage.

Prime Minister Chou: But you should say that you would not allow a Taiwan Independence Movement on Taiwan while American forces are still on Taiwan. That is important.

President Nixon: While they are still there.

Prime Minister Chou: Because you know even Chiang Kai-shek said that you let Peng Meng-min out.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: That is not true. I mention this simply because the Prime Minister and I have talked about it before. Mr. President, as you will recall from the transcripts I told the Prime Minister that no American personnel, directly or indirectly, nor any American agency, directly or indirectly, will give any encouragement or support in any way to the Taiwan Independence Movement. If he has information, give it to us through our channel, and we will take action to stop it.

President Nixon: I endorse that commitment at this meeting today.

Prime Minister Chou: I have received material to effect that Peng Meng-min was able to escape with help from the Americans. He was Dr. Kissinger's student, like Mr. Reischauer.

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, Chiang Kai-shek did not like it. You did not like it either. Neither did we like it. We had nothing to do with it.

Dr. Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge that professor was probably able to leave because of help from American anti Chiang Kai-shek left wing groups.

President Nixon: Chiang Kai-shek objected to us.

Dr. Kissinger: It was politically difficult for us to stop because we were not then in contact with each other. We tried to discourage it. If it happens again we can probably stop it. He had gone to Sweden. He was not on Taiwan. He was in Sweden, from which it was very hard not to let him come to America.

I also told the Prime Minister, Mr. President, that we would not support directly or indirectly as a government, or any other form, the Taiwan Independence Movement within the United States. And if he has any other information to the contrary we would try to stop it.⁵

President Nixon: And I endorse that commitment.

Dr. Kissinger: What we cannot do is to use our forces to suppress the movement on Taiwan if it develops without our support.

⁴ See Documents 65, 91, and 178.

⁵ See Document 212.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true. Chiang Kai-shek will do that. That he has the strength to do.

President Nixon: That is what we have heard.

Prime Minister Chou: As to what kind of proper formulation to find on the Taiwan case, you two will work that out. Only after that is solved, can we very well agree to hold a plenary meeting to discuss the matter.

President Nixon: Absolutely.

Prime Minister Chou: After we solve the question.

President Nixon: This is a matter we should solve between ourselves and not put in a big meeting.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true.

President Nixon: We have to sell our people, Rogers and Green. That is our problem. That is Dr. Kissinger's job. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) But not in a plenary session.

Prime Minister Chou: I would like to discuss another matter. Of course, we are only having an exchange of views. The second question then is Indochina. As for Indochina, you know about the proposal of the Indochinese. We support this proposal.

President Nixon: The seven points.

Prime Minister Chou: We support the seven points of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and also the two point elaboration, and also the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. That is quite clear.

And if the war there continues, whether after the withdrawal of American forces or whether there are still some American forces left and the war goes on, we will continue our support, not only to Vietnam but to all three Indochinese countries. That is inevitable.

Thirdly, if the U.S. completely disinvolves itself and it becomes primarily a civil war, we would still support the sides which we are supporting, whether in Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. That has been our position all along and we will not change it. Of course, we hope the war will stop. But your two sides have not yet found a way out, and we cannot meddle in this. We can only wait. And we have repeatedly made clear that we only have the duty to support them, not the duty to negotiate on their behalf. This has already been made clear in the four points.

But I would like to say something which was not put into the communiqué. Nor is it a view that we want to impose on you; it is only our view. And that is, Mr. President, for a leader like you, who is known for your farsightedness, it would not be beneficial for you or for the honor of the United States to leave behind a "tail," although you are still determined to carry out the withdrawal of 500,000 troops. Because

there are people in Saigon and Phnom Penh who are not reliable friends, in the end the people will cast them aside. The war there might be dragged out.

President Nixon: What does the Prime Minister mean by a “tail?” Does he mean American military forces?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. The “tail” means American forces. You have already said that if there is no agreement with them, then the Air Force bombing and the Navy bombing will continue, and you will continue to help them with transportation.

President Nixon: I appreciate the Prime Minister’s frankness. He knows we have a difficult position, in the sense that the Prime Minister mentioned, that we came here with many saying that we were going to get help from the Prime Minister’s government in ending the Vietnam war. Of course, what the Prime Minister is telling us is that he cannot help us in Vietnam.

Prime Minister Chou: That is, your opponents are trying to make use of that as a campaign slogan, the Democratic Committee.

President Nixon: Obviously what will be said, even with a skillful communiqué, is what the People’s Republic of China wanted from us was movement on Taiwan and it got it; and what we wanted was help on Vietnam, and we got nothing.

Understand that I realize what the Prime Minister’s position is, but I do want him to know it does cause problems for us. I have never, as Dr. Kissinger can tell you, I have never given any encouragement to Congressional leaders before coming here on Vietnam. On the contrary, I said the Prime Minister’s government has a very difficult problem on this, and we would settle Vietnam in our own way.

Dr. Kissinger: You put that in your State of the World Report also.

Prime Minister Chou: What is more, it is said in the four points of common ground (in the communiqué), that you would not represent any third parties in talks.

President Nixon: I want the Prime Minister to know that naturally we have to do what is necessary to defend our interests, to protect our forces and get back our prisoners. I realize that the Prime Minister’s government may have to react to what we do. We will do nothing that we do not consider necessary to accomplish our goal. And our goal is an eventual withdrawal after the return of our prisoners. But if we cannot get negotiations, it is not we, but the North Vietnamese who have forced us to continue to use military action.

But the settlement of Vietnam, Mr. Prime Minister, is inevitable because I have made a decision. But it must be done in the right way. It won’t be with us very much longer.

Interpreter: You mean withdrawal?

President Nixon: Yes. Completion of American withdrawal.

But as I have said, I emphasize that it must be done in the right way. We are not going to engage in unilateral withdrawal without accomplishing the objectives of our policy there.

Prime Minister Chou: But that makes things rather complicated. Because your policy is not something started by your government, but by your predecessors. In the first place, there was no need to send American forces in. When you did send them in more and more were sent in, and you got yourself bogged down. And so your present government was compelled to want to bring about withdrawal, and you found this unfortunate problem on your hands.

As for the release of the prisoners of war, they are bound to be released. That is the natural thing. But there are also some exceptions, like India. They have captured so many prisoners of war from Pakistan and want to keep them for bargaining.

President Nixon: That is what North Vietnam is doing to us.

Prime Minister Chou: In talking about prisoners of war, I want to mention something. It happened while you were Vice President and you may not be clear about that. We exercised great control over ourselves. It is a good thing, after all that President Eisenhower brought an end to the war in Korea. But your prisoners of war and the prisoners of war of other countries on your side were all released by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But as for our prisoners of war, quite a large number of them, Chiang Kai-shek sent people to work with them who engaged in all kinds of special activities in the prisoner of war camps in South Korea. The formal repatriation of prisoners was done under the supervision of an international commission with India as chairman. And there was a so-called screening process set up—a small cubicle—and they let prisoners come in one door, asked them if they wanted to go back to Taiwan and then let them out the other door. Under those circumstances, under armed threat to their person, it was not really possible for these prisoners to say what they wanted to say. Many of those prisoners were sent to Taiwan; some fled and then came back to the mainland.

We could have made a big issue, and say: "What right does Chiang Kai-shek have to meddle in this matter of repatriating prisoners?" Because both sides wanted to terminate the conflict, and we sent only volunteers there, we thought it was not good to insist that the war continue over the question of prisoners. The number of our prisoners who were coerced to go to Taiwan was not in thousands, but up to ten thousand or more. But we tolerated that.

So whenever there is war things cannot be the same. For us at that time although it was a matter of principle, as far as we were concerned we thought the best thing was to end the war. I just say that much. It is a matter of history, but something very much in our hearts. But when

prisoners of ours went to Taiwan, it was still Chinese territory. Maybe some of them went into the Chiang Kai-shek army. Most of them now are quite old, and some have fled back to the mainland.

President Nixon: With regard to Vietnam, if I may just add one point. We understand the Prime Minister's position. However, we would hope, while he cannot say he can interfere in this situation, that he would at least not do what the Soviets appear to be doing, that he would not encourage the North Vietnamese to refuse to negotiate.

The problem is the Soviet Union wants the U.S. to be tied down in Vietnam. It doesn't want our involvement to end. It appears to be discouraging the North Vietnamese from negotiating. I do not ask the Prime Minister to respond, but if they are discouraged from negotiating by *both* the Soviet Union and the People's Republic, this poses a problem.

Prime Minister Chou: When the Johnson Administration, at the beginning, announced the bombing halt in 1968, at that time we were not very much for the Paris negotiations. At that time we felt it was not very opportune, but after 1969 our position changed to supporting the negotiations. In fact, in order to help the Paris negotiations bear fruit, we stopped the Warsaw Talks. And then, it was only later because of what happened in a fashion show in the Yugoslav Embassy in Warsaw that these talks again started. And they told us something about what was going on in negotiations. From that time onwards we were for negotiations because in fighting there is also bound to be negotiations, such as in the Korean War.

Mr. Ch'iao Kuan-hua also took part in the Korean negotiations which went on for over two years. Finally an armistice agreement was achieved in 1953.

The channel of negotiations should not be closed. We can only go so far. We cannot meddle into their affairs.

I will tell you a story. That is with regard to Cambodia, as I see it, Prince Sihanouk is quite an intelligent man.

President Nixon: I knew him.

Prime Minister Chou: And a patriot. And I believe that he is quite different from Lon Nol or Sirik Matak or Son Ngoc Thanh.⁶ Of course, as they are in a state of war it is quite inevitable, natural for Prince Sihanouk to ally himself with leftist forces in Cambodia. But they have their own independent policies. Although some members of Prince Sihanouk's government are in Peking we have never meddled in their affairs. He has already written over 30 messages and published these for his people. And we offer him free access to the *People's Daily* for publishing.

⁶ Son Ngoc Thanh, Cambodian First Minister under Lon Nol in 1972.

He writes his messages entirely according to his own thinking. His ideology is completely different from ours. Dr. Kissinger knows that and so will the President. On this point our freedom of speech is greater than any other country. He has now been in China almost two years. The articles that he has published in the *People's Daily* could be compiled into thick books. The number of articles and statements issued by any of us could not exceed his. Why? Because he is a patriot. So we support him. He is neither a communist nor a socialist nor a Marxist, but a patriot.

So as we continue to have a mutual understanding with each other I like to tell you that this is our position.

President Nixon: We . . .⁷

Prime Minister Chou: You know, Senator Mansfield is a close friend of Sihanouk.

President Nixon: I met Sihanouk twice in 1953.

Prime Minister Chou: In Phnom Penh?

President Nixon: In Phnom Penh, and also when he came to Washington in early 1953. No one believes this, but it was not our policy that deposed him in Cambodia.

Prime Minister Chou: (Laughs) We had a dispute about that with Dr. Kissinger.

President Nixon: I think that if he had a closeness to China, this would not hurt Sihanouk, but his closeness to the North Vietnamese hurt him because the Cambodians hate the North Vietnamese. That is my analysis; I realize it is not the same as the Prime Minister's. But I think that is what happened.

If the North Vietnamese would get out of Cambodia, then the Cambodians could determine whether they might want Sihanouk back. But as long as they are in Cambodia, I think there is very little chance of his returning to power. That's just my view, but we have no way to control that event.

Prime Minister Chou: As our method of analysis differs, so we cannot come to the same conclusion. Because as we see it, the Johnson Administration sent American forces to suppress patriots in South Vietnam, and under these circumstances how can you refuse their compatriots in the north coming south to assist their brothers in the south?

President Nixon: I think I can understand this although I oppose it. I can understand North Vietnamese going into the south; it's all Vietnam. But North Vietnam has no business going into Cambodia. The Cambodians always fought the North Vietnamese, all Vietnamese.

⁷ All ellipses are in the source text.

There is no justification to their going into Cambodia. That's my way of thinking. But I am afraid what we say here will not affect it.

Prime Minister Chou: It is a question of historical perspective, because the French colonialists linked together the three Indochina countries and linked their interests together. The very word "Indochina" was given by the French. Before there was no such name. There was no such name before. They are three separate countries in history. China's relations with Vietnam were very close; second, we had ties with Cambodia by sea; there was not so much relations with Laos.

It was French colonialism which linked their interests. Then there was the question of redrawing boundary lines by the French, which enhanced the contradictions between the three countries, like the British in Africa.

President Nixon: The McMahon Line (Prime Minister Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: And then after Japanese were defeated, the French returned and again occupied the three countries of Indochina, and that again linked the three peoples together to fight French colonialism. After the 1954 agreements, the three countries were again separated. Only then did we come to know the situation in the three countries; before we knew little about them, only Vietnam. President Ho Chi Minh was on very close terms with us.

And after the Geneva Conference, if the then American Government had not sabotaged the Geneva Agreements, the situation would have been different. Vietnam would have been unified. Cambodia probably would have remained under Prince Sihanouk. As for Laos, that situation is different, but would have been solved by the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos.

But then during the Johnson Administration, Johnson sent so many forces into South Vietnam—if you look merely at the numbers, the physical strength, they exceed the South Vietnamese armed forces and also the North Vietnamese armed forces. These were circumstances that were well known throughout the world. Even the American people talked about them, as did the Chinese people.

And because of that, the Vietnamese forces made use of Cambodia as a place for troop movements and cover but we only came to know about that in 1969. The fact was that Prince Sihanouk sympathized with the Vietnamese troops and allowed them to pass through Cambodia because in the days of resistance against French colonialism they were together. So that sympathy expressed by Prince Sihanouk for North Vietnam should be understandable.

So if the war comes to an end, the Vietnamese forces will surely withdraw from Cambodia, and Cambodia will be Cambodian.

President Nixon: The Prime Minister stated that the principle of the People's Republic is not to intervene militarily with armed forces in neighboring states. Does the Prime Minister then oppose North Vietnamese domination of Cambodia and Laos by military forces? That is our position.

Prime Minister Chou: It is only because the war had already broken out, the war was given rise to by the U.S., that they are conducting their operations there.

President Nixon: When the war is over, does the Prime Minister believe that North Vietnam should get out of Cambodia and get out of Laos?

Prime Minister Chou: If the war is completely stopped, that is to say a reversion of Cambodia to Prince Sihanouk, then the North Vietnamese will surely withdraw. If there is still Lon Nol in Cambodia, that is not possible. Because even the majority of the Cambodians themselves do not support Lon Nol. He is someone imposed from the outside.

I still maintain on the Indochina question you made a mistake. Of course, that is not the responsibility of your government. Because at that time that region could have become a region of peace and neutrality, or at least two-thirds of the region could have become that. But because of John Foster Dulles' policy of drawing lines here and there and sabotaging the Geneva Agreements, the whole thing turned into a mess. That was borne out by Anthony Eden in his memoirs. The agreements arrived at in Geneva explicitly stipulated a plebiscite after two years, but Dulles said that was just for domestic consumption.

So if we are to bring about an area of peace and neutrality, not only for the three countries of Indochina but for Southeast Asia as a whole and friendly to the area as a whole, I think the time is not too late to do that. Otherwise there will be no tranquility. I mean not just Indochina, but Southeast Asia—Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines. There is that tendency now in those countries. We should help them in that direction, to gain independence in that way.

But in that case, Mr. President, you might say that another power vacuum would be built up, and it would complicate the situation. Anyway, you know that we would not go in those places. You admit that. Our conviction is that if trouble arises the people will fill up the vacuum. In the first meeting I discussed that; but, of course, the timing may not be so quick. It depends on the political consciousness of the people in each country.

So indeed there is a possibility that in a particular country if the people have not yet risen up, a certain big power will go there and set up a sphere of influence. We have that in our communiqué (reading from the communiqué).

President Nixon: We have a different view. As I told the Prime Minister we respect his views. Regarding Vietnam, the North Vietnamese have rejected our eight-point proposal. It is a good one which could bring about the very goal the Prime Minister is describing of a neutral Indochina, as far as the neutrality of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam is concerned. I will say that this is our problem now, and I will solve it in the right way.

I am glad that the Prime Minister's government will not try to discourage the North Vietnamese from negotiating. That is the best way to solve it rather than by solving it militarily.

Prime Minister Chou: Then here is a concrete question, just an isolated problem. They said they wanted to continue negotiations. You said no on the 17th of this month and then agreed to the 24th. The reason you refused was because of the Peoples' Conference in Versailles.

Dr. Kissinger: We felt it was not appropriate for negotiations. They are meeting today.

President Nixon: Right. We will be very forthcoming in trying to negotiate, but we cannot be dictated to on this issue by North Vietnam. We are not trying to dictate to them. They are not trying to negotiate. They say here it is, take it or leave it and that we cannot accept. If they talk reasonably, as the Prime Minister and I are talking, though we disagree we could find common ground. This could have been settled two years ago when secret talks started, but they won't talk that way. Right, Henry?

Prime Minister Chou: You have held 12 secret meetings?

Dr. Kissinger: Right, but once there were two meetings in one day so we counted them as one. (Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: Another question is Korea.

President Nixon: Korea?

Prime Minister Chou: Korea. We of course appreciate the gradual reduction of your forces in Korea.

President Nixon: We are down by one third already.

Prime Minister Chou: But if Japanese armed forces are allowed to invade South Korea that would create tension. Dr. Kissinger admitted that Japan had made some attempts, and they had already sent personnel. Of course, these are not in the form of troops, but some military men. We are watching closely such activity of theirs, and we believe you are, too.

President Nixon: That is one place that where neither the interest of the People's Republic or the United States would be served by the Japanese intervention in Korea. We cannot guarantee we can keep out Japanese intervention, but to the extent we can do so, we will use our influence to discourage it.

Prime Minister Chou: As for the question of Japan, I suppose you are aware that a state of war actually still exists between China and Japan because the so-called peace treaty with Chiang Kai-shek cannot count; even Chiang Kai-shek admits that. So they are bound to want to find a way out.

The present Sato government's words do not count. The Sato government may say one thing one day, and on another day they say another. Even their own Diet no longer believes them.

So we are placing our hope on the next Japanese government, because if China and Japan are able to restore diplomatic relations, Chinese-Japanese friendship should not hurt the relations between Japan and the United States.

We even said that if we are able to establish diplomatic relations with Japan and conclude a peace treaty with Japan, then we will even consider a mutual non-aggression pact with Japan. They are worried about our nuclear armament, but we can guarantee that we will not be the first to use them. So we don't pose any threat to them. But such a treaty would not exclude Japan from having relations with other countries.

At the present moment the Soviet Union is probably more strongly opposed to Japan's having diplomatic relations with us than you. In Gromyko's recent visit to Japan he openly told Fukuda, that is Gromyko told Fukuda, that within five years you will see a conflict between China and the Soviet Union that would be even bigger than that which occurred in the Chen Pao Island incident.

The second thing Gromyko told Fukuda is that the Soviet Union might consider the question of the four Northern Islands in the peace treaty but that those four islands cannot be returned now. Why? Because the Sino-Soviet boundary negotiations are going on, and if the Soviet Union returned them now it would be favorable to China versus the Soviet Union.

President Nixon: A chain reaction. They will never get them back. The Soviet Union has never returned anything to anybody.

Prime Minister Chou: They always regret the Czar's selling Alaska. How much was it, \$5 million?

Dr. Kissinger: \$10 million.

President Nixon: It was the best purchase ever made. Now it has oil.

Prime Minister Chou: They didn't know about that at that time.

President Nixon: There is a very big oil field there.

Prime Minister Chou: You received the Japanese Emperor there last year. And you are going back this time. . . .

President Nixon: We will stay overnight.

Prime Minister Chou: It won't be as warm as Guam or Hawaii.

President Nixon: There is no daytime; it is all night. Maybe two to three hours of sunlight. The "midnight sun," they call it.

Prime Minister Chou: On this question of Japan, if either of our sides learns anything it would be good if they would inform the other side. Because we also hope that in the Pacific region it would be good if Japan were to become a peaceful, independent, and neutral country.

President Nixon: The important thing there is if we can do it in total confidence.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true. We shouldn't let Japan think we are imposing on her, because we really are not doing so. In China's history we have never invaded Japan although Japan did invade China, in the end we drove them out. Now we pose no threat to Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: I think, Mr. President, that one matter might be mentioned, given the tendency of the Japanese Government to speak to the press and the unreliability of the Japanese press. We should have an understanding that if we say something to one another, we should say it to each other directly and not indirectly through Japan. I had a bad experience with the Japanese political leader of the Democratic Socialist Party, Kosaka, to whom I gave an interim assessment on the Taiwan question, among other things. He treated it as if it were a formal pronouncement on Taiwan; but this was totally incorrect.

President Nixon: This should be in total confidence.

Prime Minister Chou: Japan is engaging in economic development and she should engage in economic development, but she develops too rapidly, and that excessive rapidity has something to do with your former policies on Japan. You didn't pay enough attention to that. You helped Japan fatten herself, and now she is a very heavy burden on you.

President Nixon: It is interesting to note, however, that both the defeated countries in World War II, Germany and Japan, received U.S. aid. Also many other countries did, and I think if we analyze why Germany and Japan have done so well, it is because they have qualities of drive and are willing to work hard, whereas some other countries we have helped do not have this quality. This brings me to the point: it is not the help that is provided a country that counts, it is whether the people of that country have the will to use this help. If they don't have that, the money just goes down a rathole.

A pretty good example is aid to India. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) We don't regret having given it, apart from the fact that the more aid we have given, the less influence we have. The point is that India is not able to do much with aid because as compared with Japan, it does not have the drive, or the spirit of determination that the Japanese people have.

Prime Minister Chou: Well, the quality of people is something, but people throughout the world have common qualities. The most important thing is that both Japan and Germany were defeated powers who wanted to restore their vitality. You could also say Italy, but it lacks spirit. You could find that example.

President Nixon: Japan and Germany have great drive, and the Chinese people also. They have common qualities. But some people on the subcontinent, maybe because of the environment, never had these qualities. I would only respectfully advise the Prime Minister that if his government provides aid to India, don't expect anything in return. (Chinese laughter.) Except a slap in the face. (Chinese laughter.) Dr. Kissinger was a great supporter of aid for India, but I have made a convert out of him now. Now you can speak for yourself.

Dr. Kissinger: The President meant the American Indians. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: As for the subcontinent, our first sympathy is with Pakistan for being dismembered. We should give her help. Mr. President said that he was only in the position to give her economic aid. I have noted that. As for recognizing Bangladesh, when a decision is made to recognize, please tell us beforehand. It has already been agreed that you would tell us you would do that.

As for us, our recognition of Bangladesh certainly will be later than yours, and we may be the last. But that does not mean we will refuse to have any contact whatsoever with an area with so huge a population. That is not in our interest. We don't want to place Pakistan in a predicament, make her think that she has no friends. Also we must take account of the feeling of Islamic countries.

Even before the India–Pakistan conflict, we were contemplating returning our ambassador to India. We wanted to improve our relations with India. The Indian government expressed a desire for that, too. Madame Gandhi published this.

President Nixon: She told me that when I saw her in New Delhi and in Washington. But she also told me some other things, too. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) She said she would not oppose my meetings with the Prime Minister and the Chinese government, just don't harm her.

Prime Minister Chou: But . . .

President Nixon: But . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Don't harm her—who wants to harm her?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. President, we should point out again, with regard to recognizing Bangladesh, the decision you have made to gear our recognition to the withdrawal of Indian troops at the end of March. It is an issue on which the Prime Minister no doubt will read endless

speculation of the American press because this is one issue on which the bureaucracy disagrees with us. They wanted us to move faster. Bangladesh has asked us for recognition, too.

President Nixon: They wanted us to move before the trip, and I refused.

Dr. Kissinger: So we will inform you when we do. Do not believe what you hear before then.

President Nixon: Only believe it when you hear it from us, from me. Don't believe the press.

Prime Minister Chou: That's right. I would like to ask another question. How do you envisage a solution the Middle East question? (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) France wanted us to take part in the Middle East question, and we refused to meddle because we are not involved there.

President Nixon: We are working on a possible interim settlement of the Suez problem alone, and trying to get talks going indirectly between the Israeli government and the government of the United Arab Republic. But I would have to say that I see no prospect of a settlement in the foreseeable future. It may be that one of the keys to a settlement in the Middle East will be the attitude of the Soviets on this.

I would like to be more precise, being perfectly honest with the Prime Minister. We will try to keep the ceasefire. We will try to get both sides engaged in talks and use our influence with the Israelis. But the parties are very far apart as far as a settlement is concerned. I would say that this problem is so complicated and difficult that maybe when the Deputy Foreign Minister goes to the UN he could bring some Chinese wisdom and that would solve the problem. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: That is not possible.

President Nixon: You have to work it out with Mr. Malik. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: Even Dr. Kissinger doesn't want to discuss this problem because being Jewish he is afraid that they suspect him, so Dr. Kissinger does not want to talk about the Middle East question with me.

What do you think of the Soviet practice of on the one hand expressing support for the Arab states while on the other hand sending so many Jewish people to Israel. Wouldn't that make things more complicated? I hear that up to 500,000 may go to Israel. Can't they feed the people in their own country?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think, Mr. Prime Minister, that they are sending that many.

President Nixon: They want to go.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they want to go. So far they are sending mostly old people, non-productive, who are a terrific drain on the State of Israel. They are not very productive.

President Nixon: It is not a rich country. There is no oil.

Dr. Kissinger: I must confess that the Soviet behavior is puzzling. I think it is much less than 500,000. I think 5 or 10,000 per year. I can get the exact figures. I'll get the figures.

President Nixon: One reason we took a strong stand on the India-Pakistan matter was to discourage Soviet adventuristic policy in a place like the Middle East. India-Pakistan, that struggle was one really that involved stakes much higher than the future of Pakistan, and that was high enough. It involved the principle whether big nations supported by the Soviet Union would be allowed to dismember one of their small neighbors. Once that principle is allowed, the world would be unsafe. That is why the vote in the United Nations was 10–1 against it. It didn't get much play though; you would think the UN hadn't said anything about it.

Prime Minister Chou: Never before in UN history was there such an overwhelming majority. The vote was 104 to 11 and of those 11 actually they only represented two countries, the Soviet Union and India.

President Nixon: I think the Prime Minister would be interested in my view on the Middle East. The Soviet Union doesn't see Israel itself as a problem. I know the attitude of the Prime Minister's government towards Israel. The Soviet Union is playing for much bigger stakes. It is playing for a dominant role in the Mediterranean. It is playing for the gateway to Africa, as well as playing for total influence in the Middle East area. That's what I think is involved, and Israel is only a pawn, a pretext as far as the Soviets are concerned.

And our concern, Mr. Prime Minister, in the Middle East, at least my concern—incidentally it is his (Dr. Kissinger's) too, he says he is Jewish, but he is an American first—our concern is much bigger than Israel. We believe the Soviet Union is moving to reach its hands out in that area. It must be resisted. That is why we have taken a position in the Jordanian crisis, for example, a position warning the Soviets that if they move aggressively in that area, we will consider our own interests involved.

Prime Minister Chou: Time is already up. I will say two more words. We can have more talks tomorrow. In fact I have more than two words. Let us continue tomorrow, because Mrs. Nixon is coming. It is better to stop because Mrs. Nixon is coming right away. We can go on tomorrow.

President Nixon: Or 3 o'clock tonight. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Dr. Kissinger: He will accept—he kept me working the whole night once.

Prime Minister Chou: You can have night work with the Vice Minister after the duck dinner. Mr. President wants to see the former Imperial Palace tomorrow.

(As the parties left the table, there was discussion on future plenary and private sessions.)

200. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, February 25, 1972, 5:45–6:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff

Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Prime Minister Chou En-lai

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Cha Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter

T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

Two Notetakers

(The conversation began with a brief exchange of pleasantries between Prime Minister Chou and the President concerning the President's trip to the Great Wall and weather conditions in Peking.)

Prime Minister Chou: I understand that the weather will be clear between here and Hangchow tomorrow, and there will be no trouble in your flight there.

We don't have too much time left tonight, so if we don't finish we can go on in Hangchow and Shanghai. We can also let the two negotiators (Dr. Kissinger and Ch'iao Kuan-hua) work later on tonight after the banquet.

The President: We should tell them to get finished!

Prime Minister Chou: Then we can meet for about 15 minutes to hold a plenary at the airport tomorrow before your departure (for Hangchow).

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the President's Guest House.

The President: I think that a half-hour would be better. It would make some of our people who have not had a chance to sit in on the private sessions feel that they have had a part to play, too. We could also have some photos taken.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, photos would be all right with me. And, if we go for a half-hour, you can say more.

The President: No. I'm through talking. We will let the negotiators have a chance to speak. They haven't talked enough.

Prime Minister Chou: We can also ask Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei to say more. They can talk about what went on in their meetings.

The President: That's a good idea. They haven't had a chance to talk to us, and we should hear them.

Prime Minister Chou: Now I have two questions which I haven't discussed yesterday.

One is the question of Sino-Soviet relations. I have spoken very clearly about that question in the meeting of the 23rd in this very room. That was a recall of history. Now, we face a situation of great tension between China and the Soviet Union, but it won't be difficult to solve if there is truly an intention to solve it. There is only a further question, and therefore we are willing to solve the boundary question if it is not done under the threat of force. Then, we have always striven (*sic*) to reach a provisional agreement. That's what the question is all about. We have neither territorial claims against the Soviet Union nor the wish to impose our will on them.

As for other disputes on principle between the two centers, they are bound to continue. As Mr. President said, ideological disputes are of a long-term nature. But this should not prevent countries and states from improving their relations—their good neighborly relations—and reaching a state of harmony. That is what Chairman Mao told the deputy head of their negotiating delegation on May Day 1970. This was at a period when the head of the Soviet delegation, Kuznetsov, was back in the Soviet Union ill. We heard he was ill. Since 1964 and 1965, we have conveyed our opinions to the Soviet Union through the former Pakistan Head of State Ayub Khan. This was, first, we would not make provocations. At that time we conveyed this message to *two* heads of state, the Soviet head of state and President Lyndon B. Johnson, that we would not make provocations. The second point was that if you did attack us and came into our country, we would defend ourselves.

Prime Minister Chou: Just as the President mentioned yesterday, the Great Wall was for the purpose of defending, not dividing people.

President Nixon: That's right.

Prime Minister Chou: And our digging underground air raid shelters is becoming known. Every family is digging underground shelters

and linking them together. I believe soon that Americans will find out about that.

President Nixon: Dr. Kissinger didn't know about it?

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't know this.

Prime Minister Chou: I don't think he mentioned it. He knows about it.

President Nixon: President Yahya told me.

Prime Minister Chou: Our Soviet friends also know because some also tried to see them.

A third point we made was that what we say counts.

The fourth point was that if your country from the air launches attacks against us, we would also consider that war; you should not think that you could get away with that.

Our attitude toward the Soviet Union at the present time still consists of these four points.

As for relations between our two countries, since Mr. President initiated contacts between our two countries, some changes have occurred in the tension that existed between our two countries. And Chairman Mao also mentioned to Mr. President when they met on the first day that the question of aggression by the United States against China or the question of aggression by China against the United States was not a major problem.

But another question exists, that is the question of the Soviet Union which has not yet been solved. But we are still maintaining a position of defense. We also maintain our position of willingness to improve state relations with the Soviet Union.

But it is absolutely impossible for us to enter into negotiations under the threat of force. Our request to the Soviet Union is not for them to withdraw troops, because we do not interfere in their internal affairs. Our request is only to disengage in areas that are disputed and this is a most fair position. That is what we mentioned the day before yesterday. Three points I mentioned on that day were: one, to maintain the status quo on the border; two, to refrain from military threats; and third, to disengage from disputed areas.

Yet from reports which we have received from various quarters, the Soviet Union is engaged in major military maneuvers in this part of the world or in others, and from what Gromyko told Fukuda, within the next five years there will be greater conflict between China and the Soviet Union than there was at Chen Pao. Perhaps they want to do as they did in Bangladesh, and maybe they will try to create a Republic of Turkestan, or something.

President Nixon: We won't recognize it.

Prime Minister Chou: But such words can not intimidate persons. We will resist. It is not so easy for them to enter the Sinkiang Province, and even if they come in it will be hard for them to get out. No matter what, we will not make provocations. At the same time our attitude toward contacts and negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union is not one of opposition, but rather an attitude of viewing these things as a normal phenomenon. And therefore we wish that the negotiations you are going to hold in May will be able to make progress and also be successful. We also have to admit that that will not be easy.

And we can't understand why we, who are much weaker than they, have greater confidence; while they, who are much stronger than we, show such great fear. This is something we cannot understand. Mr. President, you will understand their mentality.

President Nixon: They are pathological on the subject. The only major nation attacking this trip is the Soviet Union. I am sure the Prime Minister has noted that European nations, Latin American nations, all favor this trip. The press is very good in Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Japan and India are not ecstatic.

President Nixon: Yes, but they can't do anything about it.

Prime Minister Chou: They'll have to wait and see.

Our attitude toward Japan is also one of willingness to promote good relations. And in the Communiqué we wish to issue, it may be written that neither of our sides seeks hegemony in the Pacific Ocean region and doesn't want other powers to do so, and that also includes them. And this is also our attitude towards the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union asks the President about our attitude toward them, you may tell them that. Otherwise it may appear that we two here are colluding against them and are up to some tricks; for example, they may think that we're trying to subvert them.

The question for their own country is their business to solve. We don't meddle in their affairs.

President Nixon: And I'm glad to get this information from the Prime Minister, because when I go to the Soviet Union, under no circumstances will I negotiate about or discuss our relations with the People's Republic of China without his approval or knowledge. We are not going there for that purpose. And it will be our purpose as I indicated . . .²

Prime Minister Chou: I said that because they might ask you about that subject.

President Nixon: Would you prefer that I not raise it?

Prime Minister Chou: There is no need for you to raise it, but they will probably ask about that. This should be your response.

² All ellipses are in the source text.

President Nixon: (to Kissinger) That is something we will do. We will meet seven days and we will need topics in order to meet every day; we will also have to find the topics. They have already asked Dr. Kissinger three times about what was discussed when he was here in the People's Republic.

Dr. Kissinger: I expect a phone call from the Soviet Ambassador 9:00 o'clock Tuesday morning, February 28.

Prime Minister Chou: I also heard that Dr. Kissinger told the President to use the name People's Republic of China in a toast to Ceausescu, and the Soviet Ambassador immediately called attention to that, and when you also mentioned the title properly in the World Report.

President Nixon: Rather than "Communist China."

Prime Minister Chou: That is a very strange thing. Since they have been calling us by the People's Republic of China for so many years, why should they be unhappy when you call us the same thing? We find it very difficult to understand them. It is truly a kind of pathology.

President Nixon: I think they apparently welcomed an antagonistic relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. That is why they react when we showed we had changed our attitude. They did not want us to have more normal relations.

I would not try to judge motives, but based on their conduct they apparently want the People's Republic and the United States to be at odds. However, our policy is not, as I said to the Prime Minister, to have the People's Republic and the Soviet Union at odds. As I told the Prime Minister, I reject the proposition that it is in the interest of the United States to have the Soviet Union and China in a state of belligerency.

In a sentence, we want good relations with the People's Republic and we want good relations with the Soviet Union. And we would welcome better relations between the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. That, however, is something the Soviet Union and the People's Republic will have to work out.

As I said when I was in Romania and Yugoslavia, my principle is any nation can be a friend of the United States without being someone else's enemy. That is my view.

I realize that is sometimes very difficult to achieve, because there is a tendency for some nations to gang up against other nations. But in the very delicate power balances in the world we in the United States would not gain in the long run by trying to stir up trouble between other nations. We, the United States, would not gain by trying to stimulate conflict between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic. The People's Republic would not gain, the Soviet Union would not gain, and we would not gain by trying to stimulate conflict between the others.

That is the idea, but in practicality we realize that the real world is very different than the ideal, and that is what we are concerned about, the real world.

Prime Minister Chou: Because we are speaking about practical questions, I would like to mention the question of the Middle East. Why is it not possible for Israel to return to the Arab nations the lands that it occupies? Wouldn't that be beneficial to the relaxing of tensions?

President Nixon: The return of territory is, of course, the key to the problem. But Israel feels that it cannot return territory unless there is a better balance—so that it is better able to defend itself against an attack should one occur. But the subject of returning territory is one we are constantly discussing in these very intricate negotiations.

May I say to the Prime Minister that while this subject is not on our agenda, I can understand the Prime Minister's interest in it and his interest in some of the other countries on Israel's borders. I would like to authorize Dr. Kissinger when he comes in June to discuss this with the Prime Minister. It must be kept totally confidential, however, because otherwise it will blow. We may not get a settlement anyway, but Dr. Kissinger can inform the Prime Minister as it occurs. What is happening in this arena is like the tip of the iceberg.

No confidential talks have yet begun but we are considering, just the two of us, the possibilities here. That is why [*what*] I am referring to. One of the problems is that I don't think I can sneak Dr. Kissinger into Cairo, as I did into Peking.

Prime Minister Chou: That would be rather difficult. But actually it originally was possible for you to have contacts with the Arab countries.

President Nixon: Our policy, as Dr. Kissinger can tell you, since the day I took office has been to develop better contacts with the Arab countries. I haven't visited most of the countries. I knew Nasser and, of course, several other leaders in the area, so that is a goal, but the Israeli problem, I confess, makes more difficult the attainment of that goal. But we are working toward it.

They in effect say, for example, that they cannot resume relations with us in a formal sense until they settle the problems of the Israeli–Arab dispute. But we have a number of informal contacts, and we are expanding those. It makes no sense, looking at the Middle East situation in terms of Israel, which as I pointed out is not the real problem in the Middle East, but in terms of the geopolitical forces there, to leave the Soviet Union as the only major power to whom the Arab countries can turn to for assistance.

Prime Minister Chou: After you have withdrawn from Libya, do you still help the Libyans exploit their oil?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we still have oil companies in Libya. The percentage being paid to Libya is being increased compared to what it was

previously. Actually, the Libyans are becoming a foreign policy power because they have an enormous amount of dollars and a very small population. They have offered a subsidy to Malta, for example. (PM Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: That is also an abnormal development since the Second World War.

Dr. Kissinger: It's an indirect program of American aid. American economic aid goes through Libya to other countries. (PM Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: They also say that you have taken away their natural resources, and therefore you should give them a percentage of the profits.

President Nixon: They have a good deal, a better percentage than any other nations are given by other companies.

Prime Minister Chou: Therefore they're not only opposing your colonialism, but also Soviet colonialism. That is one of their advantages. You probably already know they do not have relations with us.

President Nixon: I did not know that.

Prime Minister Chou: You withdrew your largest airbase from Libya.

President Nixon: Yes, Wheelus.

Prime Minister Chou: You made it impossible for the British naval base to stay on there. The Soviet Union cast eyes on that base, but Libya resisted that. So there are some good things in your oil profits.

President Nixon: Libya is one of the artificial countries the Prime Minister referred to, primarily in Central Africa; this is northern Africa. And I am not referring to boundary problems.

Prime Minister Chou: It is the only country in north Africa that I have not been to.

President Nixon: It is an artificial country which should never have been created. It has never been a country; that is my view. I don't tell the Libyans that, however. Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, the UAR—all have a certain identity but Libya just has oil.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe in the past it had closer relations with Egypt than with the Maghreb countries.

President Nixon: Oil.

Prime Minister Chou: It is one of the few places where Chiang Kai-shek maintains one of his Ambassadors. That is a very particular place. You, of course, also understand our policy towards that. We understand their policy and don't want to impose anything on them.

I would like to go on to another question, that of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. I'm just putting forward this question for discussion in an informal way. Why is it you don't persuade Portugal to give up its two big colonies in Africa, because those are places where the black people are subjected to the most oppressive policies.

President Nixon: The influence I think we can assert on Portugal would be very minimal. The Portugal Government has a totally negative reaction towards providing independence for these countries.

Dr. Kissinger: They consider them technically part of Portugal. They are not treated as colonies, but they are treated as part of Portugal.

President Nixon: Just as France used to treat some of its colonies, like Algeria, as part of France.

Prime Minister Chou: France could say that, but Portugal is so tiny and yet has such great colonies abroad. It even has a very small piece of our territory, a very small place called Macau, and call it part of Portugal. It was acquired 400 years ago. Many of our comrades say that with a brush of one's finger we could get that territory back, but we have always maintained a very restrained attitude and want to wait awhile.

India showed her courage and reconvened [*recovered*] Goa, which is as small as Macau. Mr. Menon³ once boasted to me about that, and asked why didn't we take back Macau? I said we were not in such a hurry because the major question was the national independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea in the south. Besides them, what is Macau in comparison?

We believe that this is the question most unequal toward Europe, and also toward Africa and Asia. There are two things. First, the Portuguese colonies. Second, there is the white rule in South Africa, also in Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa. This is something too unequal, too unjust. Recently in the U.N. our Vice Foreign Minister spoke about that, and also mentioned that in the Security Council meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. And on these matters even the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie II, and also the very conservative President of Kenya, were the most indignant ones when the issue was brought up.

And so, entirely based on the coming-closer relations (*sic*) which are happening between our two countries, I want to say that this is a question worth saying something about, because the U.S. could say something in this regard. Because the policy adopted by the governments of South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia they impose on other countries to accept.

President Nixon: We have, of course, stated our position in the U.N. on many occasions on these points. The question is not really one of goals, or of ideals. We believe in majority rule; we don't believe in racism. We said that and we mean that. On the other hand, the

³ V. I. Krishna Menon, former Indian Minister of Defense.

military resolution of the problem in South Africa and Rhodesia would be a great tragedy, not so much for the whites as the blacks. That's our view. While other nations like the People's Republic may take a strong position, and may take a more immediate approach while we have a more restrained position, I think our goals are the same.

Prime Minister Chou: But the Portuguese Government is adopting an attitude of even greater military repression and suppression of those places according to what we have learned. And the white rule in Southern Rhodesia also is supported by the British, who support Smith.⁴ Of course, this is a very informal exchange of opinions. There is no major difference in our stands.

President Nixon: I hope the Prime Minister understands that we are not always going to vote the same way on resolutions in the United Nations. But he also understands that each of us must make the best judgment as to our best approach. We are, of course, vitally interested in the problems of the black people of Africa. There we are also allies of the British and of Portugal, and it is very difficult for us to take a position which goes as far as the Prime Minister goes on this. I think we can perhaps influence more effectively by more of a restrained course of action so that we can have some influence with our allies. (PM Chou checks the time.)

I wonder if the Prime Minister and I would have a chance to talk informally on the plane.

There is one personal matter which I would like to submit for the Prime Minister's consideration. That is the problem of Downey that Dr. Kissinger discussed with him in October.⁵

Prime Minister Chou: Downey?

President Nixon: The American prisoner. We know that Downey was guilty. We know also the Prime Minister's government has shown compassion in commuting his sentence to five years.

Prime Minister Chou: Mr. Fecteau has already been returned.

President Nixon: Fecteau's and Harbort's release had a very good impact on our country.

Incidentally, we know, too, that there are two flyers involved in Vietnam about whom no action can be taken until the Vietnam problem is solved. Naturally we would appreciate that those two be treated as well as possible until we are able to work out the prisoner of war matter with North Vietnam.

⁴ Ian Douglas Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia.

⁵ See footnote 16, Document 164.

What I now present to the Prime Minister for consideration is not a request—there is no legal basis—and he has no obligation to act, but Downey’s mother wrote me before I came. She is now 76 years old. She is not well. After five years she will be 81 and the possibility that she will not be alive when her son returns is quite obvious. I told her I would raise the subject with the Prime Minister. You must make this judgment. It would be a very compassionate act, especially since the mother is old and not well. It would have an enormously good impression in the United States, as you know when you were there (looking at Ch’iao) the story Harbort and Fecteau did.

Prime Minister Chou: Last year we already commuted his sentence to five years. And it seems he has behaved rather well recently. And therefore it is possible for us to take further measures when we have the opportunity. Of course, that will take some time. It is a complicated process for us because there are no relations between our two countries and there exists no legal precedent.

President Nixon: Exactly.

I must get to the banquet before the Prime Minister.

201. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, February 26, 1972, 9:20–10:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

William P. Rogers, Secretary of State

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the President

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

John A. Scali, Special Consultant to the President

Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director of Office of Asian Communist Affairs, State

Department

John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Charles W. Freeman, Jr., State Department Interpreter

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This meeting was held at the Beijing Airport. A memorandum of this conversation prepared by the Department of State is *ibid.*, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files—Far East, Box 91, Memoranda of Conversation between Secretary Rogers and PRC Officials, February 1972.

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission
Li Hsien-nien, Vice Premier of the State Council
Chi-Peng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hsiung Hsiang-hui, Secretary to the Prime Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Han Hsu, Acting Chief of Protocol
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director of Protocol
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
T'ang Wen-Sheng, Interpreter
Peng Hua, Shen Jo-yun—Leading Members of Departments Concerned

Prime Minister Chou: Would Mr. President like to begin?

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, we have had very extensive talks, perhaps the most extensive talks that have been conducted, at least since I have been in office, between two heads of government. The Secretary of State and Foreign Minister have had talks at the same time. As a result we have covered our bilateral relations and have had an opportunity also to discuss in a less formal way the problems of mutual interest to the world.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

President Nixon: This was necessary because we had to find some common ground. I think what is important is that as we conclude our talks, as we issue our statement at the end it will reflect honestly what the talks were, rather than the usual kind of communiqué in which you have diplomatic double-talk to cover up what may be serious differences of opinion. Honesty and goodwill and direct talk has characterized our relationship up to this point. On this basis we will have a solid foundation to build for the future. And I think the Prime Minister perhaps has some views on this point you may want to express.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you very much. Indeed, as Mr. President has just now said, our meetings and discussions in the past five days have truly been going along the direction that you have just now pointed out. We have both put forward our differences of principles in various fields and, but also in this process we have also been able to find common ground. And I also agree with Mr. President when you said just now we should both declare to the world, and first of all to the people of our two countries, our differences while at the same time we should also declare to them our common ground so as to reflect the real situation of our talks, and in this way we will be able to break through some diplomatic conventions. And, Mr. President, both you and Chairman Mao have this characteristic, that is to do away with superfluous coverings and also to do away with all the diplomatic language and various other coverings.

President Nixon: And in our talks we came to the point very quickly.

Prime Minister Chou: And this was also showing a new face to the world. Why should we cover up our differences in front of them with diplomatic language? In this way we can at the same time show to the people of our two countries the true situation of our talks and also show to the world a new style of work. Perhaps at the first—at the beginning—they may not be able to accept this new style, but I believe through a gradual process they will finally come to say that this is a good way of doing things. Just as Mr. President mentioned in the first meeting on the first day that we had that we would be able to do more than we will say.

President Nixon: Right.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe that will be better. On the contrary, it would not be good and it would be disappointing to the peoples of the world and our two countries to feed them illusions. And if we present them, on the contrary, with the true situation of our talks, and do not engage in something behind their backs that we cover up, that will be a new style of frank, honest and serious discussions.

President Nixon: I think it can also be said that we do have differences, and you can't build a bridge covering 16,000 miles over 22 years in one week. But on our part, and I think the Secretary of State will agree, on our side there is more common ground as a result of these frank discussions than we anticipated and hoped. We want to emphasize not just the negative but the positive. The world wants to hear that these two great countries who have had this gulf between them do find that there is common ground between us.

Prime Minister Chou: That will be a very good point—that you can't build a bridge over 16,000 miles over 22 years in one week.

President Nixon: I am a fast learner. After hearing Chairman Mao and also the Prime Minister has the ability as a poet . . .²

Prime Minister Chou: That's your talent—your original talent. And how are we going to begin? How can we start? This is the first step in the long march over hundreds of thousands of miles, so once we have begun the first step the next one will come easily.

President Nixon: But not 10,000 years.

Prime Minister Chou: That will be too long. As you mentioned at that point, 10,000 years is too long. "Seize the day, seize the hour," as you quoted in your speech and your toast.

² All ellipses are in the source text.

So we shall also listen with pleasure to anything supplementary Mr. Secretary of State and our Foreign Minister would like to say in this regard. Would you agree?

Secretary Rogers: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. President, I am sure the Foreign Minister agrees with me when I say our discussions were conducted in the same spirit as the discussions the President and Prime Minister were conducted. They were frank, but never at any time unfriendly, and we agreed that in order to build the bridge we were speaking about, or to make the long march we were talking about, it was necessary to have communications and contacts. And for our side I pointed out we were prepared to engage in activities involving communications and frequent contacts in a way that best suited your government.

Prime Minister Chou: Both sides.

Secretary Rogers: Also, it was clear from these discussions that the talks and communications helped clear up misunderstandings. For example, the Foreign Minister was under the impression that our visas required fingerprints of Chinese who visited the U.S., and he said that was unacceptable from his standpoint. I said I didn't think that was the case, but to make certain we went out into the adjacent room, picked up the phone, called Washington and in ten minutes notified the Foreign Minister that fingerprints were not required on visas.

President Nixon: I think the practice, Mr. Prime Minister, was stopped when Secretary Rogers was Attorney General under Eisenhower.

Secretary Rogers: To make certain we made the phone call.

Prime Minister Chou: That's a very serious and earnest attitude.

Secretary Rogers: But it does indicate how misunderstandings can be cleared up when we have fast communications and contacts. I just want to close by thanking the Foreign Minister and his associates for the very generous hospitality at every step of the way, and in every way possible, that has made our trip here a most pleasant and enjoyable one.

Prime Minister Chou: That's what we should do. But I would believe that there are some places in which we have not done enough. I have found, for instance, a shortcoming that your press pointed out to us. For instance, for your visit to the Great Wall we did some preparation which we believe was necessary, and it was earnestly, honest. But it was quite unnecessary to put up a show in the Ming Tombs, because it was quite cold that day. Some people got some young children there to prettify the Tombs, and it was putting up a false appearance. Your press correspondents have pointed this out to us, and we admit that this was wrong. We do not want to cover up the mistake on this, of course, and we have criticized those who have done this.

I did not go myself to the Ming Tombs, and I admit that I did not know about it previously that they would do that. I came to know that only through your press last night, and when I investigated the matter I found out that that had truly been the case, and I must thank that correspondent. I may have a chance to do that when we arrive in Hangchow and Shanghai. This is Chairman Mao's spirit—that is, we should not cover up our errors and you will understand it is not easy indeed to implement a policy. Although that is a very simple thing, it is bad. And therefore we would like to express this before Mr. President and Mr. Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger. And to our guests we believe we should admit what we have done wrongly, but, of course, we cannot admit anything we have not done wrongly. Only by doing this can we improve our work. And only in this way will it be made possible to decrease our bureaucracy. It is not easy, indeed, to do away with bureaucracy even when you have a large state apparatus and so many requirements in that apparatus.

I have been saying too much. Let our Foreign Minister say something.

Foreign Minister: As for the recent days of talks between our side and the Secretary of State's side, I am in full agreement with the opinion expressed just now by Mr. Secretary of State. The general atmosphere of our talks has been characterized by friendliness. Both of our sides have been adopting the attitude of looking forward in a positive spirit to seek common ground, to improve the relations between our two countries and in this manner I believe that both sides have been working together. And in order to seek common ground we have at certain points reviewed history and touched upon differences in opinions and differences of principles that we have had in the past. However, in order to make a good start in the beginning of the normalization of relations between our two countries and to move forward in this field, we have both discussed some concrete issues and also some general principles. And with regard to how we can move forward in specific areas, we have discussed questions of people-to-people visits and exchanges in the sports and scientific areas, and also exchange of medical personnel.

Prime Minister Chou: And cultural exchanges, also.

President Nixon: And teachers.

Foreign Minister: And in these fields we have agreed with each other. We have also considered that the matter of trade between our two countries would also be helpful to the promotion of the normalization of relations between our two countries. And this would also have political significance and therefore we have reached an agreement—a meeting of the minds—with regard to the initial beginning of trade.

But also we have reached the common view that before the relations between our two countries have been normalized we believe that

it would be better for these above matters to be conducted through people-to-people channels, with the assistance of our respective governments, and they should also facilitate this. We have also reached the common view that these matters should be developed gradually and progressively. At the beginning our quantity may not be very large, but that will be developed very progressively.

Chou: 10,000 years is too long. Yet to finish the long march in one year probably will not be enough time, so that the time perhaps will have to be longer than that. But we must start—we must first seize the day and seize the hour, and in fact the President agreed with Chairman Mao on that. So we will have to ask Mr. Secretary of State and Mr. Foreign Minister to share the major part in seeing that it is done.

Rogers: I would like to remind the Foreign Minister that under our system President Nixon only has five years.

Chou: Five years is quite enough to do that.

President: Maybe only eight months.

Chou: But you see that your Secretary of State still supports you so why be so pessimistic?

Foreign Minister: And I also would like to express my appreciation and thanks to the Secretary of State in our talks.

President: I would like to add one point that is very important in terms of our future relations. The Prime Minister has been very forthright in talking about a press story that he saw with regard to our visit to the Ming Tombs. I would only say that I would not reprimand whoever set that up because I liked the little girls. I enjoyed seeing them. But the incident poses a problem that could poison our relations in the future that I think we must avoid. I think that the Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger and all our party could agree that in the U.S. this new relationship with the People's Republic of China is the big story of the century. We have 1,000 newspaper columnists who consider themselves experts. We have 1,000 politicians, Congressmen and Senators who also will want to comment on this. And they have a right under our system to make statements. They do not consult with us before they make these statements. For example, the story that came out yesterday was that the President had made a decision to recognize Bangladesh at a certain time. We are considering it, but I have not made a decision. The columnist made it up because it was what he wanted.

Now there will be stories written by columnists. There will be statements made by politicians that many people abroad will consider to be authoritative and representing the policy of our government. And it seems to me that at this early stage of our relationship we must develop between ourselves at the highest level what I would call mutual trust. Ayub Khan once told me that trust is like a thin thread—once it breaks it is very hard to put it together again. And I think it is important

for us all to recognize that when statements are made, as they will be made, about this great historic event in the future, the Prime Minister and his government should realize that until the President speaks or the Secretary of State speaks, or someone authorized by the President to speak speaks, it is not the policy of our government. And we cannot control what others say, but we will be absolutely scrupulous and trustworthy and honest in the discussions that we have and the communications that we have. I would like the Secretary of State to say whether he agrees.

Rogers: I think what the President said is of tremendous importance. I mentioned to the Foreign Minister the other day that I would appeal to him when a misunderstanding appears to be developing if he would get in touch with me.

Chou: Directly?

Rogers: Yes.

President: And then we will clear it up.

Rogers: I mentioned to the Foreign Minister that I have an arrangement with any Foreign Minister that they just pick up the phone. If we have a problem with Home of the United Kingdom or Schuman of France they call me. If we have a way to communicate together we will be very happy to clear it up. I think if we stay in touch we will be able to clear it up.

President: I would like to say to the Prime Minister and to his colleagues that never in my term, and I am sure the Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger will agree, have we dealt with a government in which that government has been more meticulously and absolutely trustworthy in our communications. There have been no leaks and it is on that basis that we should try to develop for the future.

I noticed, for example, that we were criticized by one of the TV correspondents because we on our side have not informed the press about what we were talking about to each other. We have done that because that is the understanding we have had with the Prime Minister, and we have tried to keep that understanding. And that is the role that I want all of our people to understand and that the Secretary of State and I will convey when we get back. Our interest with regard to this great step forward in our dealings with the People's Republic should never be the headline that we make today but the history we make for tomorrow.

Chou: Right. I agree with this idea, that is, that in order to make communications more accurate, the relations between our two governments should be done directly and the communications should be done directly; that is, between Mr. President, Mr. Secretary of State or anyone who is authorized by the President to talk directly with our government, only to make things more accurate. As for the general public opinion we should accept what is correct because there are

always those correct in public opinion, but we should not believe that which is wrong. And in that way we can avoid misunderstandings.

And we would also like them to know that the Chinese can also stand up to criticism, and if we are in the wrong we will change that, and if we are mistaken we will correct our mistakes; and there is always good from that.

We still have two days in which we can finalize our communiqué, and I hope that our task in this field will be fulfilled. Do you agree with that Mr. President?

President: Yes. And I think that will answer the understandable questions that the press raise as to what we have been talking about. I can only say now that we have not been talking about the weather.

Rogers: Mr. Prime Minister, if I could just add one other word. We have had people in our party who have had experience in China before, and they have been impressed with the progress that you have made in conditions for your people. We wish you well in that program and hope that you have great success in that program for your people.

Chou: I thank Mr. Secretary of State for your good wishes, but we have done not enough and we still have quite more efforts to make.

In view of this final plenary session meeting we are holding in Peking, I would like to suggest, Mr. President, that if you would like Mr. Ziegler to say something to the press about this meeting, you could just say that we have held this meeting, and we can also say this to our own news agency. Would you agree to that?

President: Yes.

202. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Shanghai, February 27–28, 1972, 11:05 p.m.–12:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files–Near East, Box 92, China, President's Trip, February 1972, HAK Conversations, Dr. Kissinger's Meetings in the People's Republic of China during the Presidential Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at Kissinger's guest house in Shanghai.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
One Notetaker

Kissinger: I thought we would do two things—give you the supplementary information which I did not have the other day.² I gave you numbers on motorized rifle divisions and tank divisions. Motorized rifle divisions have the following major items of equipment. You remember I mentioned that there are 186 medium tanks; 200 armored personnel carriers; 4 frog launchers; 144 artillery pieces. They are broken down into 54 mortars; 54 122mm howitzers; 18 152mm howitzers; 18 multiple rocket launchers; 28 anti-aircraft weapons; 45 anti-tank artillery; 1,178 trucks and tender purpose vehicles (fuel tankers). I will review some of these figures that seem low to me. The tank division has 310 medium tanks; 80 armored personnel carriers; 4 frog launchers; 18 mortars; 60 122mm howitzers; 18 multiple rocket launchers; 68 anti-aircraft weapons; 9 anti-tank artillery; and 1,108 general transportation that includes cargo trucks, vans, and tankers. On Soviet surface-to-air missile sites. I gave you the number of sites last time. Each SA-2 site has four double launchers. Or, eight missiles—two together like this (HAK shows with fingers). Each SA-5 site has six launchers.

I told you I would let you know about Soviet tactical aircraft in western Russia and Europe. The total number in eastern Europe and western Russia is 2,230 of which 1,000 are in western Russia and 1230 in eastern Europe. We estimated that about 1,000 could be shifted to these. Of course, in practice they can all be shifted. We think in a realistic scenario that the ones in western Russia could be shifted.

You asked about lend lease aid to the Soviet Union in World War II. It amounted in total to \$10.8 billion. We have asked for reimbursement only for \$1.3 billion which involves civilian-type vehicles. We did not ask for repayment on military equipment. The Soviets offered \$170 million and they have now raised it to \$300 million. For us at this point it is the principle. It has nothing to do with the money. Those are the figures. I think those were the questions you asked last time.

² Kissinger's reference is not clear. Memoranda of conversation for his private meetings are *ibid.* Kissinger met with Chou En-lai twice on February 21, and once on February 25; with Ch'iao Kuan-hua on February 22, twice on February 24, five times on February 25, once February 26, and twice on February 27; and with Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Yeh Chien-ying on February 23. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 88–106.

Ch'iao: Thank you. We will report these figures to the Prime Minister.

Kissinger: One question. We will not volunteer information constantly but if we should learn of anything we think is of a special interest to you—this will happen most rarely. Should we give it to Ambassador Huang Hua? I am talking about military target type.

Ch'iao:³ In this connection I will reply to what I said I would reply to you when we met. Our secret channel will be through Ambassador Huang Hua and the open channel will be through Paris. And if we obtain any material through the open channel and if there is anything of substance, we will give the reply via the secret channel. And so that is fixed. We will not mention it again.

Kissinger: Can we mention that publicly?

Ch'iao: At a certain time when it is appropriate and when it is asked as you said in a very low-key way mention Paris.

Kissinger: Okay. I understand the Foreign Minister is seeing the Secretary of State tomorrow.⁴ He will no doubt be asked about the open channel—they don't know about the secret channel. I think it would be best if you said it is still being considered.

Ch'iao: On the question of the open channel?

Kissinger: Just say it is still being considered and just let us know because then we can control the announcement in a very low-key way and do it in about a week or so. Otherwise it will become big fan-fare. I talked to the President about it and he thinks this is the best solution. Otherwise it will be on television and people will get in touch with your Embassy in Paris to see when they can get a visa. I think we should let things quiet down for a week, if you agree.

Ch'iao: We approve—a week or even longer.

Kissinger: Tell us when.

Ch'iao: I fully agree to these views, Dr. Kissinger. If the Secretary of State asks our Foreign Minister about this the Foreign Minister will tell him this is still under consideration. And we also approve that this

³ A sanitized version of this conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files—Near East, Box 92, China, President's Trip, February 1972, HAK Conversations, Dr. Kissinger's Talks in the PRC during the President's Visit, February 1972.

⁴ Chi Peng-fei and Rogers met on the morning of February 28 in Shanghai. The memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. See footnote 1, Document 198 for a list of Rogers' meetings while in the PRC.

news be revealed in one or two weeks time. And before you make that public we hope you will tell us through the secret channel.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Ch'iao: Because our Embassy in Paris must have a certain degree of preparation beforehand. Because people would ask it how are these contacts being made.

Kissinger: At what level should the contacts be made in your judgment?

Ch'iao: What is your view?

Kissinger: Why don't the two ambassadors get together and work it out.

Ch'iao: That's a good idea.

Kissinger: So what we will announce in about two weeks and we will let you know ahead of time is that Ambassador Watson and Ambassador Huang Chen in Paris will meet periodically to discuss these changes and other matters of common interest. Meet at irregular intervals—meet from time to time. How much advance notice do you want? Three days?

Ch'iao: It would be better if you can make it five days.

Kissinger: We will let you know at the end of the coming week what day we propose and it will probably be the end of the following week—Thursday or Friday.

Ch'iao: Alright. And when you tell us five days in advance you also will tell us the wording you are planning to use in this announcement.

Kissinger: We may not even make a formal announcement. We may just have Ziegler say it.

Ch'iao: It is not necessary to make a formal announcement.

Kissinger: It is a daily press briefing by Ziegler and he will say it at that time. So I will send you the approximate date. But it will not be necessarily word for word the same thing. We won't say it is a joint announcement. We will just say we want to inform you that this has been worked out with the PRC. Is that all right?

Ch'iao: That is all right.

Kissinger: I will miss seeing your Ambassador in Paris. He is a very nice man.

Ch'iao: You will still have a chance to meet him.

Kissinger: I am sure. I also like Ambassador Huang Hua. I will see more of him. When you come we will have a dinner with Kraft.⁵

⁵ Reference is to journalist Joseph Kraft.

Ch'iao: So that is resolved. And we will tell our Foreign Minister when your Secretary of State mentions that, we will say it is under consideration.

Kissinger: And you will let us know as quickly as you can through the usual channel. He hasn't even a vague idea. Now shall we have a few words about Vietnam. We understand your position on Vietnam and we don't want to embarrass you with respect to it. From your point of view it should be desirable that the war ends because any realistic analysis makes it clear that we are obviously on the way out of Vietnam and that we don't need Vietnam as a military base. It is our analysis that the reason the war continues is because the Soviet Union encourages its continuation. We are speaking here frankly and not officially and we will not treat your discussion as an official discussion so I will tell you what we think.

Ch'iao: We are doing this as a general exchange of views on the matter of common interest and that is the spirit in which we will carry out these discussions, and so we certainly are not going to say anything on behalf of Vietnam nor are we conveying anything to them. Nor do you have that intention.

Kissinger: Nor with anybody else in our Government except the President. So that as General Haig already told the Prime Minister, we believe one purpose of the continuation from the Soviet point of view is to complete the encirclement of the PRC. In this respect, simply for your information, you may be interested to know the sequence of events about this eight-point proposal. I know you have said it is a fraud but it may be interesting that when Foreign Minister Gromyko was in Washington at the end of September after I had been in Peking the first time but before he knew I was going to Peking the second time, he asked whether they could transmit a message to Hanoi for us. Podgorny was then going to Hanoi. We then gave them a general outline of our thinking similar to what we gave to the Prime Minister when I was here at the end of October. They then told us that Hanoi wanted to discuss this so at least then they did not consider it a fraud. We then turned it into a formal proposal and sent it directly to Hanoi and not to Moscow. Hanoi then accepted a date for a meeting, which at least indicates they must have thought it was a serious proposal because otherwise they would have rejected it right away.

Then we announced our visit to Peking—the interim visit—and then afterwards things happened which you are familiar with. They accepted the meeting when we were here. I think the Soviets influenced them to turn in the other direction. I am just trying to give you our reasons for our analysis.

You asked me what do we want in Vietnam. It really is more interesting than it seems. It doesn't make any sense for us to start the

exchanges we have with the People's Republic and at the same time try to maintain a permanent base in South Vietnam. And thus, any realistic assessment must come to that conclusion. On the other hand, we have never had a really serious negotiation with Hanoi. When we talk to Hanoi they do two things. They either repeat at great length their various struggles for independence which is interesting but not useful, or they read the list of demands we must do and then treat us as if we were students taking an examination.

I told the Prime Minister that certainly if Hanoi had discussed this with us in the spirit we have discussed Taiwan, we would have settled this very quickly. They have to understand that we cannot respond to an ultimatum—that is impossible. We can agree to a historical process and we have no interest in tricking them. They had a bad experience in 1954 but John Foster Dulles was a different person from what we are. At that time we were going into Asia, while now we are reducing our engagement.

So I must say Hanoi has wasted the opportunity of talking to me. As you know I have authority to make rapid decisions. It is a waste of time for them to have me hear the formal speeches that they are already making in the plenary sessions. Nor can I be interested in tricking them, because if they are tricked we have learned they will fight again and they will be 300 miles from South Vietnam and we will be 12,000.

It is a phony procedure to make a secret nine-point proposal and ten days later make a public seven-point proposal. We wanted to discuss the nine-point proposal and then they attacked us publicly for not responding to the seven-point proposal. Even you are in an odd position. You are publicly supporting the seven-point proposal which—I have a transcript of a meeting—which they have said that they don't want to discuss, but they want to discuss the nine-point proposal to which we have replied.

I don't want to waste time. I just want to use it to illustrate the difficulty. The longer the war continues the more they are forced to make demands we cannot meet, because the stronger the Government in Saigon becomes. So now on the one hand they want us out but on the other hand they want us to overthrow the government for them. We are prepared to withdraw and on the basis of what the Prime Minister said without leaving a "tail" behind. And then we are prepared to see what the evolution brings. We are prepared to limit our economic assistance if Hanoi limits the assistance it receives. We are prepared to have a serious, sincere and frank discussion in which we could look at their point of view and if they could have stated it in a way that is something other than a series of absolute demands. This is our general attitude but I would be glad to answer any questions you might have.

Ch'iao: In raising this question it was not that I wanted to learn about your detailed process of your negotiations with them, because we have said on many occasions this is a matter for solution between you and Vietnam. The reason that I raised this question at that time was because there were many exchanges of views between the President and Prime Minister on this matter and because of our discussions and so that is why I wanted to know something about the fact why the war does not stop. And if you continue with your present way, most frankly speaking, we don't think there can be an end to the war. And so under these circumstances we think it is not to your interest.

Kissinger: What is not to our interest?

Ch'iao: What I mean if you continue with your present line of action, then the war there cannot be brought to a conclusion. As you have repeatedly told us, you have no intention of maintaining any base in South Vietnam, but if you continue with your present line of action it would result in the continuation of the war. It would not be beneficial to you while the Soviet Union will take the opportunity of using that. . . .⁶ We always said that so long as the war continues we will continue to give support to them.

Kissinger: We will not ask you to stop giving support to them.

Ch'iao: That we know.

Kissinger: But what is it about our actions that you think makes the war continue?

Ch'iao: On this matter it is purely our view, which you surely don't agree with, and maybe after some time we may have an opportunity to have a further exchange of views on this matter. We will be in a better position to settle our views in this situation. As we see it, for you to maintain the Thieu regime for South Vietnam is not a way out. In that way it can only make the war continue. Of course you have now already withdrawn one-half of your troops but you are not being able to cut off your tail.

Kissinger: Like what?

Ch'iao: You don't find it possible to withdraw your air force. Nor is it possible for you to withdraw in toto your combat forces. And should a turn take place in the war unfavorable to Thieu and his regime, then again you may have to return. That has been the history for more than twenty years and that has also been your experience in Vietnam. In the beginning you really did not have any wish to have military involvement. You got involved really without your being aware of it.

As for how you conduct your negotiations with the North Vietnamese, that is your business. You sometimes tell us what is happening—

⁶ Ellipsis in the source text.

we on our side never made this request. And the reason we are having another exchange of views on this matter is because we want to know more about your views as to what is to be done because, as we see it, according to your present plan of action although you think you will be bringing about an end to the war by your present action we see it will not bring an end.

Even though we would admit the Soviet Union has her motives here we do not think that is the crucial question involved. As for the question of the Soviet Union wanting to encircle China, we do not attach importance to that. The war has already been going on for so long. As for us we continue to carry out our present line. And after your exchange of views between our Premier and your President you have made it very clear. This is just an exchange of views.

Kissinger: I think you understand our views. In our judgment what you said is not absolutely correct because we have offered the total withdrawal of our forces and they have not accepted it. And we have offered it either with political settlement or without political settlement.

Ch'iao: Well speaking rather frankly, our view is that your present line of action cannot bring an end to the war. The Soviet Union does have her motives here, but in our view what you are doing precisely offers an opportunity for the Soviet Union to promote the realization of her motives.

Kissinger: I think we have probably covered the subject sufficiently.

Ch'iao: Yes, because this does not involve only a localized matter but it involves a difference in our fundamental outlook. And so maybe a period will still be required before these matters will become more clear. This is just within the framework of an exchange of views.

Kissinger: Exactly. And then I would like to say something more in relation to the Communiqué which I mentioned this morning.⁷ First of all it is perfectly obvious that there is no question about victory or defeat in our talks we held in the past week because the truth of the fact is after the discussions we did arrive at an agreement in some matters and in others we did not. The President said that at the banquet. We could not make absolute assessments for who was the victor and who was defeated.

Ch'iao: But that would not be in the spirit and we won't say that. And then further on in the Communiqué itself, it cannot be regarded only as a policy on Taiwan because it does cover certain other things although the Taiwan question is the crucial one in our bilateral relations. But we also discussed many international matters, which was reflected in the Communiqué, and in discussing these matters on certain

⁷ The final text of the Shanghai Communiqué is printed as Document 203.

points there was indicated a common direction or a common hope which did not involve Taiwan. So, here, too, it is obvious that as far as our side is concerned we will not say it only involves Taiwan because if that is what is said it won't reflect it realistically.

This morning you did express the hope—not as a request—that our side will not make interpretations or shift the Communiqué in a way that would embarrass you. And then you further said you also hoped that China's friends would not do that either. That's rather vague. I can tell Dr. Kissinger very frankly that what some of our friends like Korea and Vietnam in their view think of our Joint Communiqué will be certainly not the same as what other ones think, and our policy with regard to them on that is we would not impose our will on them. That is for their own views.

So I must make this clear in advance otherwise it may give way to misunderstandings. Because we are only beginning our contacts and are probably not so very clear on our situation. And when I say our situation, I mean the situation of our relations with these friends of ours. It is really the truth, it is indeed, that on certain questions our views and their views differ, and that is quite natural. And as I said also before—we don't only say it, we really do respect their views, although on certain matters our views differ with theirs. This is quite natural. So in view of what you said this morning that you hoped that we would say nothing about the Communiqué which would embarrass you, we have to make this understanding.

Of course, your situation is different from that of ours and we know that your Administration is even more complicated than ours. We have discussed that many times. And then from our side we will like to express the hope that the principal departments of your Government—that does not include the Congress and of course not the press—but the principal departments of your Government, White House, State, Pentagon, that they will adopt the same attitude as that openly advocated by your President, particularly towards the Communiqué, because we know the complexity of your government system.

Kissinger: Mr. Minister, we have called my deputy, General Haig and we have told him to tell all departments to keep quiet until I come back and to say nothing other than what I said in my press conference. After that I will do my very best to exercise discipline, but we don't have our bureaucracy under the same control as you have. I think you will have noticed since my trip in July we have on the whole maintained rather good control.

Ch'iao: I agree to this estimate.

Kissinger: And we will continue to do our best. If you objected to something and there is time to let me know privately before you do something publicly it may be desirable. But we understand that sometimes you have to react publicly.

Ch'iao: And we will not lightly make any public reaction. Dr. Kissinger said we have a number of questions about what was said by your Department of State—but of course which we did not make public.

Kissinger: Can you give me an example.

Ch'iao: For instance, the statement that status of Taiwan remained undetermined and those matters that I first wanted to tell you in private. I am just talking about the direction.

Kissinger: I agree with the direction and we will carry it out scrupulously.

Ch'iao: This was a hope and no request.

Kissinger: We will on our part and in the spirit of the Communiqué unilaterally carry it out.

Ch'iao: In addition to this question about our friends, your question with respect to various speculations by the press where you do not refute them, this article—that comes under a broad heading. Here I should tell you very frankly that there are some of our friends of our war years who are opposed to the policy of improving relations between China and the U.S.

Kissinger: Some of your friends or ours?

Ch'iao: They may be both your friends and our friends. Just to be forward, that country I am referring to is the Soviet Union. Just look at how many articles they have written since you started the initiative in July. But up to now we did not refute any article and we should emphasize this. In fact you could say there will be accusations and slander and the main spearhead of that attack will be against us and possibly against the U.S. and under those circumstances it is possible that we will find it necessary that we must reply.

Kissinger: I was thinking more of comments to our press than comments to the foreign press.

Ch'iao: Yes, I know what you meant but in relation to the question which you raised, I raised this question to let you be prepared for any such possibility. So far that has not yet happened. But now that we have the Joint Communiqué that might become the object of their attack. And it is quite possible that circumstances will arise that we will have to reply to them. In our reply to them only we will mention their fundamental positions. But as for our comments on the Communiqué itself we will not say anything inappropriate and I think you should understand this attitude of ours for the whole course of our discussions, because the entire spirit that we have presented it in carrying out these discussions has been a positive one; that is, to progressively improve our relations.

Kissinger: We can't lay down exact rules here. We have to do it on the basis of mutual trust. You have to understand that our enemies in

America will portray this as surrender on our part and your enemies will try to put it that it is surrender on your part. It was a stalemate. We will say both tried to make progress at the same time.

Ch'iao: Just an exchange of views. Because even though we have started our contacts they are still in the preliminary stages and so it is beneficial if we are able to tell each other in advance our views of things we are thinking of doing. For instance, your informing us of your possible trip to Japan, and we are grateful to you and we understand it is something which you really could not avoid. But in telling us in advance it helps us to know about the situation beforehand.

Kissinger: It won't happen before the end of March.

Ch'iao: That doesn't matter.

Kissinger: No, no. I am just informing you.

Ch'iao: We have been quite prudent in doing this. Of course, we are also aware that there are matters of principle which are of great difference between us and we are not covering it up.

Kissinger: Mr. Minister, it has been a pleasure to work with you and I think the spirit in which we have dealt with each other is a good basis to build our future relationship. You have your principles which we won't ask you to give up, but on the basis of frankness and mutual trust we can move towards closer cooperation. That is our policy and we will very carefully follow it. And look forward to seeing you in June.

Ch'iao: And I will be very happy to have an opportunity to offer our hospitality again. From my side there is nothing more to say.

Kissinger: Nor from my side.

Ch'iao: These discussions of ours on the Communiqué have been a very good beginning. Maybe you will rest some tonight. And then starting from tomorrow you will be unemployed and so will I.

Kissinger: My life will be ended. But I shall miss you and also his Grace.

Ch'iao: And then you must be the Pope because Cardinals are nominated by the Pope.

203. Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People's Republic of China¹

Shanghai, February 27, 1972.

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest, and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 376–379. Commonly known as the Shanghai Communiqué.

reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their

goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, nonaggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
- neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the people of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.²

² A Note following the text of the communiqué reads: "The joint statement was released at Shanghai, People's Republic of China. On the same day, the White House released a statement by Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler and the transcript of a news briefing on the joint statement. Participants in the news briefing were Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The statement and the transcript are printed in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (vol. 8, pp. 480 and 476)." On February 14, the White House released a statement by Ziegler on further relaxation of trade with the People's Republic of China. The statement is printed in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (vol. 8, p. 438). On February 21 the White House released a statement and transcript of a news briefing by Ziegler on the President's meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The statement is *ibid.*, p. 466.

204. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Shanghai, February 28, 1972, 8:30–9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

(There was some opening pleasantries on the activities of the previous night and observations on the city of Shanghai. Prime Minister Chou commented that Dr. Kissinger and Vice Minister Ch'iao had met again the previous night. President Nixon remarked that they had had an interesting talk and that Dr. Kissinger had said he was with the Vice Minister; however, maybe he was out on the town. Dr. Kissinger then told the Vice Minister that he had to protect him. Prime Minister Chou

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the President's sitting room at Ching Kiang Guest House.

remarked that when he tried to call the Vice Minister and ask how the talks had gone, he found that he had already gone to bed and probably Dr. Kissinger had gone to bed also.

President Nixon then remarked that his room was very nice. Prime Minister Chou responded that this was the highest floor, although of course there was another dining room above it. President Nixon commented that he had woken up at 6:00 a.m. that morning and walked on his balcony and looked at the city. He remarked on the skyscrapers which he had not realized were in the city. Prime Minister Chou commented that the houses, streets and bridges in the city included old ones which went back to the eighteenth and nineteenth century, new ones in the twentieth century, and even some built after liberation. Before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Shanghai was only a small community and there weren't many buildings at that time.)

President Nixon: I appreciate the opportunity to impose on the Premier's time before taking off for Washington. There are a couple of points that I would like to make in confidence to him.

First, I would greatly appreciate it if he would extend my thanks to Chairman Mao for the talks we had and also for the great hospitality we have received. Particularly one of the things I would like the Prime Minister to tell Chairman Mao was that I will always take away memories of the Guest House in Hangchow where he has stayed.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you very much for your kindness. I will certainly convey that.

President Nixon: I would like to send a letter to the Prime Minister. I would like to write a letter to Chairman Mao. How should we get them there?

Dr. Kissinger: We could give them to Huang Hua in New York, the secret channel.

President Nixon: I want to write a personal letter.²

Dr. Kissinger: That's the secret channel, Mr. President. We have agreed not to tell anyone about the existence of this channel. We will keep Paris visible. No one knows about the secret channel except these people here.

Prime Minister Chou: Indeed.

President Nixon: I want the Prime Minister to know what my plans are when I return.

² Nixon wrote short letters to Mao and Chou dated March 14. In each, he offered his thanks for "the gracious consideration with which we were received in the People's Republic of China." He also expressed his hope for continued improvement in relations. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 525, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. III) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 111.

First it is obvious, of course, to the Prime Minister that what we have done this week is a very important beginning. But what we do from now on is even more important; otherwise, all progress we have made will be destroyed. I want to be sure that we handle matters on our side with the discretion that the Prime Minister has handled matters on his side. I assured the Prime Minister and assured Chairman Mao that the talks we have had would be kept confidential. I want to reassure him on that point. We will not put the record of these meetings in any channel except our own office, what we call the Top Secret file. It will not go into the Pentagon papers file. (PM Chou nods.)

When I return I will make a brief statement at the airport. The next day I will have to meet with Legislative leaders, up to ten people. Then I will meet with the Cabinet. The meetings with the Legislative leaders and the Cabinet will be private, but whenever I meet with groups that large, I assume they leak, so I will be very discreet with them.

As a major example, the Prime Minister and I have talked with a great sense of confidence and discussed our relations which each of us has with the Soviet Union, India, and Japan. I want to assure the Prime Minister that under no circumstances will we embarrass him or his government, by implication or otherwise, that those subjects were discussed. I know the Prime Minister and I want to say that in the spirit of the communiqué we discussed relations between China and the United States, not at expense of third parties. We know what we discussed on these issues. The Prime Minister can be assured that while I will be pressed by the leaders and the newsmen on those subjects I will see that nothing comes out which will be embarrassing because I consider that part of our confidential agreement.

As the Prime Minister knows, I cannot control what the press may speculate with regard to our meetings, but we will take every precaution to knock down any stories that are inaccurate and that are in violation of our understanding.

Dr. Kissinger: I told the Vice Minister last evening, Mr. President, on your behalf in answer to a question, that we would do our best to maintain discipline in the principal departments, especially the State and Defense Departments, so that they do not put anything out that is wrong. We cannot avoid some reference to Japan and India, since they are in the communiqué.

But we will keep in the bounds of the communiqué and force the Departments to clear everything at the White House, as we have in the period since my visits. I think our Chinese friends will understand if occasionally discipline isn't total, but we will maintain it.

You (the President) told me to say that with the Vice Minister.

President Nixon: I was going to cover that point with the Prime Minister if you hadn't. And we, of course, must realize that we have

some nations abroad and there are some political factions at home which take the line of some of the nations abroad, who will try to seize on any statement made by us or made here to demonstrate that the new relationship between China and the United States has broken. It is very important that we do all we can not to give them any ammunition for their guns which they have pointed at us.

On the other hand I am totally aware of the fact that on some issues like Vietnam and the African problems we discussed, the Prime Minister and his government, because its principles are different from ours, will take a different position from us, and we naturally expect that. The only wish that I would express would be that on both sides when we differ we could avoid personal references. If when the Government of People's Republic differs from the policy of the U.S., we can avoid personal references I believe that it would take care of the situation, don't you think, Henry?

Dr. Kissinger: Also the adjectives.

President Nixon: And keep the rhetoric cool. You have a position, in your country and in the whole socialist movement and the world, a position of principle which we, of course, expect you to maintain. We have a position on our side which is a different one. We will avoid giving any indication that either of us changed our principles. The only indication we will give is that we tried to find here common ground, and as time goes on, we will try to find more common ground. We recognize that between two major countries that have different systems there can never be all common ground.

And we will recognize—and this is the last point and perhaps the most important point—the enormous importance of not giving the Soviet Union any grounds to launch attacks of rhetoric against the People's Republic due to the fact that this meeting has occurred.³ I have noted very carefully the Prime Minister's remarks concerning how we should respond if the Soviet leaders do raise points, as we think they may on our relations with the People's Republic. The Prime Minister

³ On March 3 Rodman delivered a message to Shih Yen-hua of the PRC's United Nations Mission in New York that reads in part: "The Soviet Ambassador called on Dr. Kissinger on March 1, 1972, to obtain an account of the President's trip to the People's Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger talked in a most general way, repeating what he said in his press conference in Shanghai about discussions on world affairs. In reply to a question, Dr. Kissinger said that the People's Republic of China expressed no objection to the relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. When asked whether the People's Republic of China felt threatened by the Soviet Union, Dr. Kissinger said that the matter did not arise. The Soviet Ambassador inquired whether the U.S. was prepared to make a joint appeal to the People's Republic to participate in talks on nuclear disarmament. Dr. Kissinger replied in the negative." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 108.

can be sure I will be meticulous and also will not violate any confidence and will do nothing to cause embarrassment to China as a result of our meetings. I would have to say, based on past performance, that we will probably have to expect a few verbal blasts from Moscow. We will not react, but most importantly we will not give any ammunition that will make the blasts get bigger if we can avoid it.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you. I am very happy we had this opportunity just before you are leaving to frankly discuss some issues.

First of all, with regard to some things we have discussed secretly and in our secret meetings, that is not only regarding the questions of the Soviet Union, Japan and India but also things we have decided to do but not to say, we believe that we will maintain that secrecy and that what happened after the two visits Dr. Kissinger paid to China can serve as proof to that. And we believe it can continue in that way.

As for what we mean by secrecy, that does not mean that we have something unspeakable or that we are engaged in schemes or plots against third countries. On the contrary that cannot be done, and it is better not to speak about that. Because we wish to achieve better possibilities but at the same time we prepare against the worst possibilities. This is only a precaution against the worst possibility, while naturally the better possibility is the one which we are striving for.

History proves that it is better to adopt a serious policy toward the direction we are working for; that is better than talking lightly about these matters. It is not as foreign propaganda describes, secret agreements behind countries' backs.

President Nixon: What we have to do is hope for the best and prepare for the worst.

Prime Minister Chou: That's right.

The second point is that after the issuance of the joint communiqué both sides shall, of course, do our best not to harm the other side. But you have your difficulties and we have ours.

President Nixon: I know.

Prime Minister Chou: For instance, and as you have just now mentioned, you on your side will do your best to maintain agreements not only with the White House but also with the State Department and the Pentagon. But sometimes they may misfire, and this will give rise to speculation in the world. We can't refrain from refuting these. Of course, we will not direct these at the President personally but we will direct our comments at the one who misfired. You on your side must first take measures to deal with the misfiring; and, of course, that's better.

As for debate in Congress and news reports, we will deal with them in a different way. And also I have already agreed to Mr. President's proposal that leaders of both parties should come together, for that is better.

President Nixon: Mansfield and Scott.⁴

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. Because that makes it easier then to combine them.

President Nixon: Remember what I said, that Mansfield of the other party keeps secrets better than Scott of my own party.

Dr. Kissinger: May the President say tomorrow that you have agreed in principle to their visit?

President Nixon: But we would not announce anything.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

President Nixon: Could they say it? If I mention it, Scott will say it.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to expect that they will then say this will happen.

President Nixon: Will that be alright?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. Also, in view of fairness we welcome that proposal that they come at the same time because this matter will affect relations between our two countries.

Dr. Kissinger: Again—because they will ask practical questions—we can tell them that when we have an operating channel set up they can deal with your Ambassador in Paris. We won't tell them yet that Paris is [is] the channel. That gives us two or three weeks time.

Prime Minister Chou: Alright. Of course, as for the disputes in Congress and various public opinion and misunderstandings directed against us, we will, of course, rebuke them. That will also have to do with our public opinion.

President Nixon: Using Peking radio and newspaper.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. And also regarding countries close to us, they have their own stands and view. First of all Vietnam . . .⁵

President Nixon: And Albania on the left. (PM Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: . . . have their own points of view and positions. We cannot account for or dominate their points of view.

⁴ The March 3 message to the PRC reads in part: "The President appreciates the invitation extended to Senators Mansfield and Scott to visit the People's Republic of China. At the same time, he has found an equally intense interest on the part of the leaders of the House of Representatives—a co-equal branch of the Legislature. The President would therefore be extremely grateful if the Prime Minister would also entertain a request for Congressmen Hale Boggs, Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, and Gerald Ford, Minority Leader, to visit the People's Republic of China in the near future, but subsequent to the visit of Senators Mansfield and Scott." See Document 223. This message also suggested that both sides announce on March 10 that Paris would be the public contact point between their governments. "The U.S. side believes it would be beneficial if the actual contact could begin soon in order to show some concrete results to the American public." For the PRC response, see footnote 2, Document 207.

⁵ All ellipses are in the source text.

You understand and know that Albania opposed both Kosygin's visit and yours. They wish us to be isolated, but, on the other hand, they also believe we have great power. It is not their subjective wish, but they want objectively our isolation. Of course, this is only for your ears and we say this merely to explain the situation we are in. We have always held that all countries no matter what their size are equal, and we respect their view. We will not interfere publicly and definitely will not act as the Soviet Union is doing, in attempting to dominate the opinion of so-called fraternal countries. I have said a lot to you about this.

On the third side there will be slander from the Soviet Union and this will not only be occurring in the future. Since our July 15 announcement last year up to the present day their stand has never ceased. I believe in the future they will be even more virulent. I think your side also will reply, not just ours.

President Nixon: Oh yes.

Prime Minister Chou: You must also be prepared for that. We told you our position. You can tell them about our position.

Another important matter is that we still maintain the view, that I have repeated on many occasions, that if the war in Vietnam and the other two countries of Indochina does not stop, no matter what form it continues in, it will be impossible to relax tensions in the Far East. And we will be forced to continue aid to their just struggles. We have only an obligation to sympathize with them and support them. We do not have the right to interfere in their position nor put forward various stands. We have no right to negotiate for them. This I have said repeatedly. This is our very serious stand.

Our hope is that in dealing with this question in the future you will see farther to the future. It can be said with certainty that if peace is really brought to that area then that area will become an area that is non-aligned. That also will be beneficial not only for easing tensions in the Far East but also in the world. Only in this way will it be possible for the U.S. to realize some common points that we have realized together.

President Nixon: It would also help the direction on Taiwan.

Prime Minister Chou: But Mr. President also understands that we would rather let the question of Taiwan wait a little while, while we would rather have the war in Vietnam and the whole of Indochina come to a stop because we feel this is a more urgent issue.

President Nixon: I was referring only to the level of forces in Taiwan.

Prime Minister Chou: Because Taiwan is our internal affair, and also we have our own efforts which we have to make. We cannot place too much hope on the U.S. and Mr. President to achieve this. We can't hope that you will do everything. Of course, what you guarantee is only final withdrawal, and no support of the so-called Taiwan independence movement, and not allowing Japanese military forces to en-

ter Taiwan while you are still there, and so on. As for the final settlement, that is our internal affair and that is something we must do.

And then there is another point that Mr. President appreciates, and Dr. Kissinger has mentioned. Everything must be concretely analyzed and concretely solved in accordance with a concrete situation. One must not take a simple principle and use it dogmatically. One must not apply it everywhere. That would not be good.

President Nixon: What, for example?

Prime Minister Chou: That is, we being so big, have already let the Taiwan issue remain for 22 years, and can still afford to let it wait there for a time. Although the issue of Taiwan is an obstacle to the normalization of our relations, yet we are not rushing to make use of the opponents of your present visit and attempt to solve all the questions and place you in an embarrassing position.

But as for Vietnam and the rest of Indochina, during the 26 years since the Second World War, war has never ceased in that area. People there have been bleeding. Therefore we have extreme sympathy for the people of that area. We believe they are closely linked with us. We thought of using wording in the communiqué but then we thought maybe there would be other implications and so we did not do so. You must understand this feeling. Because during the struggles against others, whether Korea or Vietnam, our three countries have participated in each other's country struggle. Historically, old China has committed aggression against these two countries. Of course this was during the times of the expansion of the old feudal empire.

Our assistance towards these countries, toward Korea and Vietnam, can be said to have been unconditional. But there is one thing we scrupulously abide by, that is our respect for their sovereignty and independence, the five peaceful principles of peaceful coexistence.

As Chairman Mao has pointed out, we who have been victorious have only an obligation to assist them, but not the right to interfere in their sovereignty. The debt we owe them was incurred by our ancestors. We have since liberation no responsibility because we overthrew the old system. Yet we still feel a deep and full sympathy for them.

I believe that it is the hope that Mr. President and Dr. Kissinger have conveyed, that you hope tensions in the Far East will be progressively reduced. In this easing of tensions the question of Vietnam and the other countries of Indochina is the key point. I believe Mr. President said in the toast at the reciprocal banquet in Peking that your relations with China were the key to world peace. And we believe that the question of Vietnam and other Indochinese countries is the key to the relaxation of tensions in the Far East. We are extremely sad that North Vietnam has been bombed in the period just before and during your visit here. To speak frankly, I would like to say the U.S. would suffer no losses if it had not bombed in that area. But now you have given

the Soviet Union a chance to say that the music played in Peking to welcome President Nixon has been together with the sounds of the bombs exploding in North Vietnam.

I would like to say in conclusion, to express our feelings, and you know that we have exerted great restraint. Dr. Kissinger can bear witness . . .

President Nixon: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: . . . that we have exerted extreme restraint since July of last year. Yet the key to easing tensions in the world does not lie there and Mr. President and I and Chairman Mao all understand that.

At the time of departing for home, these final words will have a deep impression on Mr. President and our other friends. Of course, there are great negotiations for Dr. Kissinger to deal with.

President Nixon: The two buddies.

Prime Minister Chou: And it is very clear that it is due precisely to these reasons that negotiations between China and the United States are comparatively easier than negotiations between Vietnam and the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: Simply a point of honor . . . I don't believe that we have bombed in North Vietnam while we are here.

Prime Minister Chou: In the DMZ, the line along the DMZ, on both sides.

Dr. Kissinger: Not while we are here.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We will check it.

Prime Minister Chou: It has already reached Quang Ninh.

Dr. Kissinger: We will check. There was an order not to do it.

Prime Minister Chou: You can find out upon your return to the U.S.

President Nixon: On a less serious note. The press has reported a statement by Mrs. Gandhi on our visit.

Prime Minister Chou: I don't think that is very serious, and we won't take it very seriously.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but . . .

President Nixon: I don't take it seriously.

Prime Minister Chou: Although she is so big a state. I think that this maneuver is very petty.

(The meeting then ended. Prime Minister Chou escorted the President and Mrs. Nixon downstairs to say farewell to the Chairman of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee. They then proceeded to the airport to depart for the United States.)

China, March–December 1972

205. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 1, 1972, 12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. James C. H. Shen, Republic of China Ambassador to the United States
Mr. Henry Chen, Political Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of China
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. John A. Froebe, Jr., NSC Staff Member

ROC Doubts on U.S. Defense Commitment

Mr. Kissinger said that we have a very important problem. The President during his China visit last week did not give up any commitments. Rather, our defense treaty with the ROC was reaffirmed by Mr. Kissinger in his Shanghai press conference, by the President in his Andrews Air Force Base speech on his return, and it has been reaffirmed to Congressional leaders and in a press briefing this morning.² The worst thing now would be to begin casting doubts as to the U.S. defense commitment to the Republic of China. Peking knows our commitment is in force. Mr. Kissinger said he understands that the trip was a very painful experience for the Republic of China. He said he hoped, however, that the ROC's criticism would be directed at other part of the communiqué.³ If

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House. According to a March 20 covering memorandum by Froebe, Kissinger approved this memorandum of conversation "with no further distribution to be made." Memoranda of conversation between Kissinger and the ROC Ambassador to the United States are also in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memoranda of Conversation. On February 24 Shen met briefly with Clark MacGregor at the White House to "elicit some background information from me on 'how things were going in Peking.'" Shen requested a meeting with Kissinger on February 29 or March 1 and a meeting with Nixon on March 2, 3, or 4. (Memorandum from MacGregor through Kissinger to Nixon, February 25; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) See Document 207 for a record of Shen's March 6 meeting with Nixon and Kissinger.

² The remarks in Shanghai and at Andrews Air Force Base are in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 20, 1972, pp. 426–435, and *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 381–384.

³ The President's daily briefing memoranda from Kissinger, February 28 and February 29, summarized the initial reaction of the ROC to the Shanghai Communiqué. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 39, President's Daily Briefs) The initial press reaction on Taiwan is in telegram 992 from Taipei, February 28. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON) The official reaction from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reported in telegram 994 from Taipei, February 28. (Ibid., POL 17 CHINAT-US)

the United States does not say that our commitment is in doubt, the Republic of China should have no reason to. The President made no commitment in his talks with PRC leaders as to the withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces on our military installations on Taiwan; Mr. Kissinger quoted the pertinent two sentences from the communiqué. He said that this has always been the U.S. position as regards U.S. forces on Taiwan. At present the U.S. Government has only a contingency figure of 3,000 by which it might reduce its forces by late FY 73; this was the figure that Ambassador McConaughy had conveyed to the ROC before the President's PRC trip. Mr. Kissinger said we have no present plans for reductions beyond this figure.

Ambassador Shen said that his government objected particularly to the communiqué's omission of any reference to the U.S. defense commitment. Mr. Kissinger replied that it would have been impossible to ask a country in which such talks were being held to include the mention of this commitment in a communiqué, and pointed out that the PRC refrained from attacking the U.S. defense commitment in the communiqué. Ambassador Shen asked how significant this PRC omission was. Mr. Kissinger said that the PRC knew in advance that he would reaffirm our defense commitment to the Republic of China at his press conference in Shanghai. The PRC had said that it would not sign a communiqué which contained a reaffirmation of our defense commitment.⁴

U.S. Policy on Status of Taiwan

Ambassador Shen asked why the U.S. in the communiqué said that it did not challenge Peking's claim to be the government of all China. Mr. Kissinger said this was not our position. The Republic of China's position is that it represents all China and that there is only one China. Thus, our understanding is that both Peking and Taipei agree that there was only one China. The U.S. position as stated in the communiqué is simply that we do not challenge the Chinese claims that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Ambassador Shen said that in Taipei this U.S. statement was interpreted to mean that

⁴ Rogers met with Shen on March 2 and discussed many of the same issues. Rogers stated that "the progressive reduction of US forces 'as tension in the area diminishes' was specifically intended to refer to the Vietnam draw-down." The PRC was aware of this interpretation since earlier drafts had been explicit on this point. When asked by Shen why the ROC was not referred to by name in the Shanghai Communiqué, Rogers answered, "any attempt by US to refer to the ROC as such would only have unnecessarily complicated the problem of arriving at an agreed text." Rogers added that the U.S. side did not want to refer to treaties with Japan and South Korea without mentioning the Republic of China. Therefore, they "deliberately left out any reference to such treaties." (Telegram 37582 to Taipei; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, China, Vol. X)

the U.S. now recognizes the People's Republic of China's claim to Taiwan. Mr. Kissinger said that this was foolish—that the U.S. position as stated in the communiqué definitely does not do anything of the sort. He added that this statement of U.S. position is wholly consistent with the position that we took in the Chinese representation question in the U.N. General Assembly last fall—one China, two governments.

Ambassador Shen asked if the communiqué's use only of the term "Taiwan" was significant. Mr. Kissinger said it was not. Ambassador Shen said that the U.S. could have used the name Republic of China in the communiqué. Mr. Kissinger admitted that this was a valid criticism. Ambassador Shen noted that when the President first used the name People's Republic of China, his use of this term was deliberate. Mr. Kissinger said that perhaps we should have added another sentence in which we used the name Republic of China. However, he pointed out, the use of the term "Taiwan" was used only in reference to U.S. military forces and installations in the geographical entity and did not refer to Taiwan as a political entity. Ambassador Shen said that people now have the impression the Republic of China is a non-nation and asked if this was the U.S. intent. Mr. Kissinger replied that the Ambassador had his word that it was not. Ambassador Shen said that nevertheless people cannot be blamed for reading this meaning into the communiqué. Mr. Kissinger said he did not blame anyone. The problem now is what we should do from here on out—now that the ROC has called our attention to these omissions.

U.S. Force Withdrawals from Taiwan

Ambassador Shen said that in his meeting with Mr. Kissinger on February 16 just before the trip, Mr. Kissinger asked that the ROC withhold comment on the trip.⁵ He regretted that his government had not been able to do so, but pointed out that its comment had been quite restrained. Mr. Kissinger said the United States Government had no complaint on this score. Ambassador Shen, noting the communiqué's reference to withdrawal of all U.S. military installations from Taiwan, asked what installations the U.S. could withdraw. [Shen was probably referring to the fact that the great majority of our forces on Taiwan are bases jointly used by the U.S. and GRC. There are, however, a very limited number of small installations solely used by the U.S. such as the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command Compound, Taipei Air Station, and the Shu Linkou Air Station.]⁶ Mr. Kissinger said that the communiqué is

⁵ Kissinger met with Shen from 12:22 to 12:45 p.m. on February 16. No other record of this conversation has been found. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

⁶ Brackets in the source text.

not a treaty, and that it is better therefore to keep its language vague. For FY 72 and FY 73 the only plans of which Mr. Kissinger said he was aware was the contingency plan for the withdrawal of two squadrons of C-130 aircraft for FY 73. This withdrawal has been planned for some time. If the Vietnam War ends, the U.S. might then consider further Vietnam-related reductions. A total withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations would not, however, be undertaken until peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question is achieved.

Peking–Taipei Negotiations

Ambassador Shen asked what kind of peaceful settlement Chou En-lai seemed to have in mind. Mr. Kissinger said that Chou wants to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek. The United States would not, however, offer its good offices nor would it either encourage or discourage such negotiations. Chou said that “as bad as” Chiang Kai-shek is, he has the quality of a great Chinese nationalist. Mr. Kissinger stressed that the U.S. will exert no pressure on the Republic of China, and that it has deliberately avoided playing any intermediary role.

Future U.S.–GRC Relationships

Ambassador Shen asked where we both go from here. Mr. Kissinger replied that the U.S. has no intention of going anywhere. The U.S. wants to maintain its diplomatic relations with the ROC. It contemplates no drawdown of its forces beyond the possibility of the two C-130 squadrons. The U.S. has made clear it will not alter its diplomatic relations with Taipei. Our two countries should define some topics of practical cooperation. The U.S. purpose is not to liquidate Taiwan, and not to scuttle our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. The U.S. objective is to move in a new direction with Peking.

Ambassador Shen asked if Chou En-lai has not been greatly encouraged by the results of the President’s visit. The U.S. has recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only government of China. The communiqué records Peking’s opposition to five different formulations on the relationship of Taiwan to the mainland. Mr. Kissinger replied that the U.S. had taken the position that it would not challenge the Chinese claims that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Ambassador Shen said that in context in the communiqué this could only mean that the People’s Republic of China exercises sovereignty over Taiwan. Mr. Kissinger rejected this interpretation, and said this was certainly not the U.S. intention. In the communiqué whenever reference to the government in Peking was intended, the name People’s Republic of China was used. The PRC for example had wanted to use the term “leaders of China” but the U.S. refused, insisting on the term “leaders of the People’s Republic of China.”

Negotiation of U.S.–PRC Differences on Taiwan Question in Communiqué

Ambassador Shen asked the reason for burning the oil all through the night of February 25–26 to put the communiqué in final form. Mr. Kissinger said that this had not been the case. The President had gone to bed that night although he was awakened several times to approve points that officials of the two sides were working on. Ambassador Shen asked what the sticking points were. Mr. Kissinger said that they included, first, the rate and character of the withdrawal of U.S. forces and installations—which we insisted on linking to the prospects for a peaceful settlement and reduction of tensions—and, second, U.S. hopes for a settlement of the Taiwan question that would be consistent with our position on force withdrawals. On this last night it was the PRC that made all of the concessions.

Possible U.S. Clarification on Taiwan Question

Ambassador Shen asked if the President was planning on making any report to the American people. Mr. Kissinger responded that he is inclined not to, but asked if Ambassador Shen thought he should. Ambassador Shen said that it would be logical for the President to do so since he had reported publicly on the acceptance of Peking's invitation. Mr. Kissinger noted that the President had already made one report—that at Andrews Air Force Base on returning.⁷ Ambassador Shen argued that if the President made a report, he could correct the misinterpretations of the communiqué now current. Mr. Kissinger agreed that if the President decided on a public statement, it would be an appropriate vehicle for making such clarifications. The President might make the report a written one and could possibly do so next week.

Ambassador Shen said the President's report should use the name Republic of China and should reaffirm the U.S. defense commitment to the Republic of China. He said that these omissions are the reasons for the Administration's domestic troubles in the wake of the trip. Mr. Kissinger demurred, saying that no such major domestic problems existed. Noting Ambassador Shen's reference to Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Kissinger said the opposition of left-wing Democrats such as Hubert Humphrey cannot be taken seriously—to which Ambassador Shen replied that he was only using Mr. Humphrey as an example. Mr. Kissinger said that if on the other hand Senators Goldwater, Buckley, or Governor Reagan were speaking out in criticism of the trip's impact on the ROC, their criticism would reflect a moral right on their part.

Mr. Kissinger said that when Mao and Chou—or at least Mao—die in the next five years this will cause a tremendous upheaval in

⁷ See footnote 2 above.

China. Ambassador Shen interjected that this is what the GRC has been predicting all along. Mr. Kissinger continued that a Sino–Soviet conflict might result. Thus it is most important that the U.S. and the ROC keep their relationship alive until then. Mr. Kissinger said he did not believe, however, that the PRC would attempt any attack on Taiwan in the next three to four years, noting that they do not possess the required military capability. Ambassador Shen agreed that Peking would not be able to pull off such a military campaign particularly in light of Soviet pressure from the north.

Ambassador Shen returned to the question of a written report by the President in which he might correct the mistaken impressions that he had mentioned earlier in conversation. Mr. Kissinger said that the President had not yet decided whether one would be issued.

Ambassador Shen said that during the President and Mr. Kissinger's absence he had made a request through Mr. MacGregor for a call on the President. Mr. Kissinger said that the President would not be back from Key Biscayne until Monday, noting that Ambassador Shen was planning to leave for Taipei on Saturday. If Ambassador Shen could stay until Monday, Mr. Kissinger said he was willing to recommend to the President that he receive the Ambassador. Ambassador Shen said that he was willing to stay over until next week, and would wait for Mr. Kissinger's response.

206. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 6, 1972.

Over the weekend, I have had an opportunity to evaluate the results of the China summit and the reactions at home and abroad. On the plus side it is encouraging to note that some initial expressions of concern have now been successfully allayed and the positive accomplishments are, for the most part, being generally recognized.

As I am sure all of you will agree, it will require skillful leadership on all fronts if we are to avoid erosion of our present position.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—General—February 27–March 31, 1972. Secret; Eyes Only.

It is particularly essential for our delicate and complex relationship with the People's Republic of China that not only those of us who may make public statements but that everyone throughout the bureaucracy—at the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department, adopt a very restrained and disciplined approach in our on-or-off-the-record comments.

For your guidance and the guidance of your staffs, there should be no further public commentary or elaboration on the substantive talks or the communiqué of the China visit. Any answers to questions on those subjects should be set strictly within the framework of my arrival remarks at Andrews Air Force Base on February 28, 1972.²

These guidelines are particularly important in the following areas:

—There should be no “inside” information given out on the meetings with the Chinese officials.

—There should be no characterization of how the two sides fared at the summit, neither trumpeting of successes nor defensiveness.

—There should be no further reiteration of the maintenance of our defense commitments. Our public statements have now made it sufficiently clear that they have not been affected. Any further repetition is unnecessary and would only risk provoking counterargument from the PRC and jeopardizing what we have achieved. If it is necessary to answer a question on this subject, simply refer back to my statement of February 28 and without restating the comment in such a way that it makes a new story.

—There should be no further elaboration of the communiqué statement that the U.S. “does not challenge” the position that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” The “does not challenge” should not be interpreted in the direction of either endorsement or rejection; we leave this question to the Chinese themselves.

—There should be no further elaboration of the communiqué language on U.S. forces on Taiwan.

—Discussion of overall China policy should be limited to the most general observations along the lines of my February 9, 1972 Foreign Policy Report.³

RN

² See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 381–384.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 194–346.

207. Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador of the Republic of China (Shen)¹

Washington, March 6, 1972, 4–5:04 p.m.

[Not transcribed were the first 36 minutes of the tape, which included Nixon's conversation with Haldeman concerning International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and Nixon's conversation with Ziegler on press briefings, busing, and the Florida primary. Haldeman and Ziegler departed the Oval Office as Kissinger entered.]

Kissinger: Before you see him [Shen], I didn't want to bother you, but I should tell you that the Chinese [PRC] have called us, that they have an urgent message to give us, which can only be delivered by their Ambassador.² So I have to send somebody else up there. And the North Vietnamese have asked to see us, almost concurrently. I'm really very worried that this public linking of Taiwan to Vietnam, which we promised them we wouldn't do, which State did on Thursday [March 2].³

Nixon: Which what? State did?

Kissinger: You know, the State Department spokesman said that the 6,000 troops [on Taiwan] would be unrelated. You hinted at it.

Nixon: Yeah, I hinted at it, I did. I take some responsibility on it. Yeah.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 678–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² According to Howe's March 6 memorandum of conversation, Huang responded to issues raised in a March 3 message from the United States (see footnotes 3 and 4, Document 204), agreeing to disclose the Paris channel on March 10 and to invite Congressmen Ford and Boggs to China. Huang also raised concerns over security in New York and the death of a member of the PRC delegation. Howe's memorandum of conversation and Haig's March 7 covering note to Kissinger are *ibid.* NSC Files, Box 849, President's Files—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 110. For additional details on the death, see footnote 3, Document 213.

³ Possible reference to a report in *The New York Times*, which reads in part: "Mr. Bray said there should be 'no surprise' if American forces on Taiwan, earmarked to support the United States operations in Indochina, continue to be withdrawn as the conflict winds down. He said that of the 8,200 United States military men on Taiwan, some 6,000 'related directly and uniquely' to Southeast Asia. The balance, he said, are related to defense commitments on Taiwan." (Tad Szulc, "Rogers Assures Taiwan on Defense Commitment," *The New York Times*, March 3, 1972, p. 3) For Rogers' comments to Shen, see footnote 4, Document 205. Nixon's own statement, made upon his return to the United States, reads in part: "With respect to Taiwan, we stated our established policy that our forces overseas will be reduced gradually as tensions ease, and that our ultimate objective is to withdraw our forces as a peaceful settlement is achieved." (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, p. 382)

Kissinger: But they didn't—yours wasn't picked up. Yours was repeated by Hugh Scott in sort of a mushy way.⁴ But—well, we'll have to see, but it makes it important now that we don't add salt to the wounds and let—I think you should just say to him [Shen] what I've repeated. You know what I've said to him, you repeat that assurance. But I wouldn't say another quote he can give.

Nixon: Well, that's why I wondered whether we should see him.

Kissinger: Well, the way things were at noon—well, whatever damage has been done has been done, and we'll find out in the message. It may simply be that they'll tell us it's a funny coincidence. But they [PRC leaders] told us, they told me that when I put in [into the Shanghai Communiqué] the phrase “as tensions diminish” that it couldn't be linked to Vietnam, and it may be—I also sent them a message, as you requested, that we wanted to announce the Paris contact; it may simply be funny coincidence, it may be their answer. It's highly subjective.⁵

Nixon: Well, let me say you can't worry about every meeting.

Kissinger: No, no. The level at which they want to deliver it concerns me.

Nixon: Yeah. When do you have to get it?

Kissinger: We'll get it at 7.

Nixon: Tonight?

Kissinger: Yeah. And the others, we were going to deliver theirs at 8, their time, 8:30, and when we got there, they said it isn't 8:30, it's 10:30. But the North Vietnamese message, we'll have in another hour and a half. There's no sense worrying about it now. And I wasn't going to tell you if you hadn't seen this fellow until after we had the message.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: I think that would be too [unclear]. I think it's important.

Nixon: Why not just not sit down when he's here?

Kissinger: No, I'd sit down for 10 minutes. He put off his departure, he tells me. Just give him your regards and say we have—it may be something perfectly technical.

⁴ For Scott's statement, see Robert B. Semple, Jr., “2 Senate Leaders Will Go to China; Invited by Chou,” *The New York Times*, March 1, 1972, pp. 1, 16. The article reads in part: “According to Senator Scott's account of this morning's meeting at the White House, the President insisted that the communiqué was not meant to imply a simple withdrawal of American troops unrelated to other developments but, rather would be linked to a decrease in tensions in Asia—particularly in Vietnam. The present American force of 8,000 men, according to Senator Scott's account, would be reduced to 2,000, with total withdrawal contingent upon a ‘peaceful settlement’ of differences between Taiwan and Peking.”

⁵ Reference is to the March 3 message to the PRC, which was delivered in New York. See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 204. In fact, Huang Hua did not mention the linkage between the war in Southeast Asia and the United States on Taiwan during the March 6 evening meeting with Howe in New York; see footnote 2 above.

Nixon: I hope so.

Kissinger: But if even if it isn't—

Nixon: Of course, we're trying our damn level best, as you know.

Kissinger: Oh God, I mean—

Nixon: We're, I haven't said one word except that, of course, unfortunate thing that got picked up. But State then puts it out on the record, their statement was made publicly.

Kissinger: Their statement was on the record. Yours was a quotation from Scott in a sort of vapid way. But, I don't want to do them an injustice. It might not be that.

Nixon: Well, let me say this: Let's keep our balance on these things, Henry. After coming this long road with us and our going down a long road with them—

Kissinger: I'm not so worried.

Nixon: They're not going to, say discontinue relations.

Kissinger: Oh, no. That's true.

Nixon: At this point, I mean they—

Kissinger: No, but what they may do is to—it may be another delay in the Vietnam talks. That's the thing that worries me more. So that it doesn't—

Nixon: The Chinese wouldn't be doing that. I mean, what you're hearing from them, that's—hell, I don't care what we're hearing from the goddamn Vietnamese. They're—I've never felt they were going to do anything anyway. But I mean, we hope for the best. But what I meant is, if you don't, we not getting—

Kissinger: No, I think what the Chinese may do is to send us a blast to the effect that they had always said Taiwan and Vietnam were not related and that they want to officially state that our interpretation of something or other—

Nixon: Well, that wouldn't—

Kissinger: Well, it depends on how far they carry it.

Nixon: Yeah. We can confirm that we—

Kissinger: As long as they keep it in a secret channel, we can live with it.

Nixon: We can confirm that that is our understanding too, and that this public statement that was made was not authorized.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: That was an interpretation by a Senator and the other—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Of course, Scott's going there.

Kissinger: Well, Scott we can handle. It's important that—

Nixon: No, the fact that he said it though, that's what I mean.

Kissinger: Well, if we get a note, that's one reason, they said we could pick it up any time before 5 tomorrow evening. As long as we get—If we get it, I'll just tell Rogers and send him the note if it's a blast, so that he can guide himself at his press conference. That wouldn't hurt.

[At this point in the conversation, Kissinger left the Oval Office to greet Ambassador Shen. Omitted here is an exchange of pleasantries.]

Shen: Well, Mr. President, I'm going back to Taiwan tomorrow—

Nixon: Yeah.

Shen: And I just want to know if there's any message you have for my President—a very great old friend of yours. Also, if there's anything you want to say to him for his ear only. I'll mention your trip to the mainland and anything concerning Taiwan that you may or may not have discussed with Chou En-lai and the others.

Nixon: Well, I think that the important thing to first tell him is that, I know that when Green was there—Ambassador Green was there—that he indicated that he did not want to see him, that he wanted to see Kissinger.⁶ I think that you should know that when we came back I told Dr. Kissinger to talk to you.⁷

Shen: Yes.

Nixon: And he has talked to you. Of course, I have a record of the conversation. I knew what he was going to say before he talked to you. And I want you to tell the President that Dr. Kissinger's conversation with you represents my view. I mean to say it's an accurate description of what we talked about, and that the, and also, of course, my public statement when I returned.

Shen: Yes.

Nixon: Which is the public statement that I made. But I think that the more important thing is that he naturally, and I can understand this, knowing that Dr. Kissinger sat in on all the talks, and also that Dr. Kissinger had conversations before I got there, where no commitments were made. As a matter of fact, none were made this time, except indicating expressions of [unclear]. That you—he now, through you, and through my authorizing Kissinger, because he can't fly out there, of course, that you are able to convey to him the facts of the matter. I think that's the thing. Don't you agree, Henry, with that? Because you see, it's important that he not feel that we sent [went?] to see him on a matter, which is very important to him because somebody that he didn't feel had the information. Naturally, Green we had filled in on the basic facts. But Green sat in on the Secretary's talks, and not mine. And Kissinger was in on every minute. There was no conversation that took

⁶ See Document 215.

⁷ See Document 205.

place with Chou En-lai or Mao, of course, where Henry was not present. And I authorized Henry to tell you the substance of the whole thing. So, I think that we could have that, that you could convey to him the, in addition, of course, my personal regards, that you could convey to him, say that Dr. Kissinger has briefed you and that these are the facts of the matter. Now, of course, all this, you hear all sorts of talks about secret deals and so forth. You know I covered that in my remarks when I came home. What Dr. Kissinger told you are the facts; that's the fact of the matter. And you should rely on that statement. If he were to go to Taiwan, he would tell [unclear] exactly what he told you. Is that correct, Henry?

Kissinger: Absolutely. I told the Ambassador that what we have on the public record the facts [unclear] we've now said it through every organ of our government.

Shen: Mr. President, we're grateful to you for your government's continued interest in a peaceful settlement. Now, did Chou En-lai say anything on the steps he planned to renounce force or propose what he intended to do and how he could tackle the problems of—Any indication of anything? [unclear]

Nixon: [unclear] On the subject of Taiwan, I think that there is no other subject that is more thoroughly covered by the communiqué, and what Henry said in his backgrounder in Shanghai. What I indicated, when we talk about peaceful settlement, that is something which we're—well, for example, I think it can be said that despite great disagreements, the two things in which President Chiang and Chou En-lai agree on is the fact there's one China, that's one thing they can agree on. And the second thing is that therefore settling the problem [unclear] between the two. But in terms of how to do it and so forth, I would say that there was no discussion on that, that is something they don't think is our business frankly.

Kissinger: Well, except that we put in the communiqué two things, which are very clear. One is we reaffirmed our interest in a peaceful settlement—

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: In this case, which is after all saving our commitments. Then secondly we put in the phrase "with the prospect of a peaceful settlement in mind." So if the words—If you know your compatriots, the word prospect was not idly chosen.

Nixon: The Chinese, they're very careful about words.

Shen: [laughter]

Kissinger: They were not given a *carte blanche* to launch a military attack on Taiwan, quite the contrary.

Shen: What kind of time frame does this thing have, I mean—

Nixon: None set, as a matter of fact. None set. That was not discussed. That would be—in other words—when you say do it now, do

it next year, I mean it's a question of—And in fact, what we're trying to do now is put everything in that was there. We knew, on their part they knew too, that's a highly sensitive issue and felt it should be covered. But there was no discussion of should we do this now, next year, 2 years from now, 3 years from now, 4 years from now, 5 years from now, no kind of time frame.

Shen: Now, Mr. President, you're familiar with our history and our relationship with the Communists over the last 40 years.

Nixon: Oh, yes.

Shen: And you know the situation that exists there better than anybody else in the world.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

Shen: If you were in my President's shoes what would you do, and what would your advice to my President be about how to handle this thing? I mean, I hope it's not too much of a—

Nixon: Well, I know. Let me say I think along the following lines.

Shen: Yes.

Nixon: What would you do? And, I would say in the first instance, I would say that I would not raise the question of whether there is a U.S. commitment. I would accept that. Because if you raise the question, and force a vote, to do that is to create in this country, and also create in the PRC, the necessity [unclear]. We have stated the situation, and Kissinger on Chinese soil stated there wasn't [unclear]. Now the moment that you raise the question you hurt your own cause. I have to say that quite candidly. I understand your concern, you understand, but if you raise the question it will only hurt your own cause.

The second point is that in terms of what he does, what you do with regard to the mainland, I frankly do not have an answer, a view on that. In fact, Henry and I talked about that on the way back, and I said Henry, I meant we were asking ourselves the same question, how can this thing be worked out? And do you have any thoughts on it, Henry, since you and I have talked about it?

Kissinger: First of all—

Nixon: Because the Ambassador is certain to raise exactly the question I raised. You understand this. We're in a delicate position because both governments consider this to be an internal problem. So what—And I know there's some that say, well the United States should step in and set up some [unclear]. Some say that.

Kissinger: I told the Ambassador, first of all, we made it clear to the people in Peking, we called their attention to a phrase in the World Report, we're not urging either side to do something.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: So that means in effect they cannot count on us for, they can't expect us to exercise any pressure to negotiate. Secondly—

Nixon: Or to find a formula.

Kissinger: Or to find a formula. Secondly, I think we have to be realistic about the prospects. First, if you ask yourself what would have happened if the Chinese had done to us what the North Vietnamese do? Some of the people who now support you in the Democratic Party would be the first to start organizing peace conferences about our being tied up with another old aged military dictator. I'm just telling you the scenario.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And really undermining the commitment, they would have done to us what they're doing on Vietnam.

Nixon: And with no deadline at all.

Kissinger: And with no deadlines. Supposedly they had played a deadline game with us and used Quemoy and Matsu and other things as a lever. Thirdly, in the period ahead, say 4 to 5 years, as I told you when we met, many things can happen. You are under no pressure to settle. Mao could disappear. Chou could disappear. Or both could disappear. So that this is not an issue that we have the impression will be very urgent in any intermediate [immediate?] time frame. And therefore it would be a mistake for you to panic or do anything rash.

Nixon: Well, I would not be belligerent. And second, I would not quarrel with our statement to the effect that there is a commitment. We've made it. And when you keep raising it, all you do is cause us to answer and we say, well, we've covered that. But if you keep raising it, you're going to force an eventual failure, which would not be in anybody's interests. You see, there's, as you know, Mr. Ambassador, there's a tremendous isolationist movement developing in this country. And I'm having a helluva time ending Vietnam in the right way. As you know, ending it in the right way is important because if we don't end in the right way America will withdraw from the Pacific. Period. Because of enormous frustration. Now, so it is in other things. If the new isolationists in this country get the impression that we're going to become involved in a great conflict because of the defense commitment anyplace—it could be Japan, Philippines, even Thailand, Korea, Taiwan—you can have, you can set in motion forces that you and I, that none of us want to set in motion. It's for that reason that I think that your Foreign Minister made a very good statement when he said that he accepted the proposition and that the United States keeps [unclear] its commitment will be kept. And if I were to come—so I would start with that process. The second problem, with regard to how would we resolve it. Believe me, it would be—I just don't know. I have no answer to that problem. And incidentally, they didn't ask us. Right?

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: They didn't ask us how to resolve it. They must be—you must be thinking about it. What ideas you might have as I would say

would be certainly extremely interesting. But we are not going to try to intervene and force it either way. I think that's the proposition. I think that's a pretty clear assessment.

Kissinger: Except for the statement that we are opposed to the use of force.

Nixon: Oh, well, that's a different matter.

Kissinger: That we will resist it.

Nixon: No, but I meant intervene to force a peaceful settlement.

Kissinger: That's correct.

Nixon: You see, that's the difference. This isn't like the Israeli-Arab thing, where we are attempting to try to broker it. You know? Here we are not trying to broker anything. That's the difference that I think you should have in mind. Now, where it goes from here, I think has to develop over a period of time. I wouldn't be panicking. I wouldn't be in too much of a hurry to produce an agreement.

Kissinger: [unclear] There's no obligation to do anything. And there's no obligation—I mean first of all everything we said we stated unilaterally, not as an undertaking to the PRC.

Nixon: There's no treaty.

Kissinger: Secondly, it's very carefully drafted, if you read it carefully.

Shen: Yes.

Kissinger: And thirdly, we are under no obligation whatever to—

Nixon: It's unilateral on their part too, you see? Both sides—there's a Taiwan section as well as a Korea section, a Japanese section, a South Vietnamese section. It's all unilaterally stated; we agreed to disagree, you see? Because their position on Taiwan, you know is stated hardline.

Shen: We know that. [laughter]

Nixon: Oh, not as hard as it has been, because they didn't use the force line in it. Very significant.

Kissinger: They didn't attack the defense treaty. And also there's a slight nuance, they said Taiwan is a province of China, and we didn't say that. We said a part of China.

Nixon: I wrote that in. I used the word "part" instead of "province."

Kissinger: [unclear exchange]

Nixon: They say they agreed to it; they do not object to it. Of course, it depends on where you are as to whether you say province or part, isn't it?

Kissinger: It's slightly less, we just wanted to—

Nixon: Province indicates downgrading to Americans, and it would not indicate that to the Chinese because you think of the whole country being province, province, province, you know? But in our

country, the word province, and in most, it means a lower level, you see? Not an equal level.

Shen: Any personal word for my President?

Nixon: By all means, to him and to Madame Chiang my best wishes for their health. I'm amazed when I get reports from the Vice President and other friends who go out there, they say he's just as sharp as a tack, and I've always been impressed with that. And I wish him good health, and we know this is a painful time, and we know that this trip was a very difficult thing for him. We had to take a long view of what the great forces are that are operating here, also recognizing that we're looking at the long view—a peaceful resolution of these problems. We may be able to be more effective if we're talking to the PRC than if we're not talking to them. That's really the philosophy. The peaceful resolution is important. In the event that we have the use of force in any part of the world, in any part of Asia, in view of the Vietnam experience, it may be, we know what I would do if I were here, but I'm a little bit tougher than some, but I would have serious doubts about what other presidents might do. That's the real problem, you see? So with a peaceful resolution we think is very, very important, and that's what this trip is about. But—

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: Many times. But in terms of both, my very best wishes.

Shen: Your continued friendship?

Nixon: Oh, absolutely. Our friendship, personal, without question, as well as the [unclear]. We have a treaty, but we also have personal friendship. They know that and they will continue to have it. You've got a long journey ahead of you.

[The meeting closed with a discussion of Shen's trip and schedule.]

208. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 8, 1972.

SUBJECT

Memorandum from Secretary Rogers on Policy Toward Taiwan

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 529, Country Files, Far East, Homer, US-PRC Negotiations, Paris. Top Secret; Nodis; Homer. Sent for information. A typed note attached to the document reads: "Mr. President: Tab A has been removed and is available if you wish to see it. BAK, Staff Secretary."

Secretary Rogers sent you a memorandum in connection with your China visit enclosing his views on policy toward Taiwan over the next eighteen months (Tab A).² These views were reflected in the State position papers for your trip and are generally consistent with the line we took in Peking. No specific action is required now on this paper.

In brief, what Secretary Rogers proposes is that we should attempt to cool down Taiwan as an issue between the PRC and ourselves while encouraging an evolution of Taiwan's status either in the direction of reintegration with the China mainland by peaceful means or acceptance by the PRC of some form of separate status for Taiwan. To this end Secretary Rogers suggests a number of intermediate steps:

—Acting as if both the PRC and the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) were the *de jure* government of the area under its control. We would seek more contacts with the former, and maintain our existing relationship with the latter including the mutual defense treaty.³

—Avoiding legalistic formulations wherever possible regarding the status of Taiwan, and speak increasingly of the PRC as China and the ROC as "Taiwan."

—Doing nothing to close the door to the idea that Taiwan might eventually be reunited with the mainland.

—Making it clear to Peking that we will not attempt to put any special military or other pressure on it from Taiwan.

—Doing everything possible to rid our relationship with the PRC of the past aura of confrontation.

² See footnote 5, Document 174. Attached but not printed is a 10-page briefing paper entitled "The Future of Taiwan: Proposal for a 'Policy of Peaceful Settlement,'" which was drafted in late 1971 and early 1972 in EA. (Memorandum from Robert I. Starr (L/EA) to Green, January 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US) A copy of this paper, along with draft language on Taiwan for the Shanghai Communiqué, is *ibid.*, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Memcons, 1971; Top Secret, Nodis, PRC. It was forwarded to the President under a February 2 covering memorandum signed by Rogers. Holdridge and Lord forwarded it to Kissinger on February 3 under cover of a memorandum indicating "the paper still seriously underestimates the intensity of Chinese insistence on regaining Taiwan and the symbolic as well as real importance to them of this issue." They suggested sending it to the President "with a covering memo by you steering him in the direction of our own paper on this issue." (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 88, Country Files, China—President's Trip, December 1971–February 1972, Sensitive) Holdridge again forwarded the paper to Kissinger with a draft summary for the President on February 16. (*Ibid.*, Box 529, Country Files, Far East, Homer, US–PRC Negotiations, Paris) On March 1 Lord sent Kissinger a "slightly redone" memorandum to the President along with the Department of State briefing paper. (*Ibid.*)

³ These options are taken almost verbatim from the Department of State paper. The second, sixth, eighth, tenth, and eleventh paragraphs all have Nixon's handwritten "?" in the right margin.

—If possible, encouraging direct PRC–Taiwan contacts of an informal nature (trade, travel, reunification of families).

—Maintaining the ROC’s bargaining position in any talks it may have with the PRC (e.g., by reiterating our position that any settlement should be acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait).

—Emphasizing the economic aspect of Taiwan’s status over the political and the military. This would include our supporting Taiwan in international financial institutions.

—Quietly endorsing present trends within the ROC to make its government more representative, but also letting it know that we will not support Taiwan independence movement leaders.

—Reducing the possibility that Taiwan could become a major problem area in U.S. relations with Japan. This would require close consultations with the Japanese Government.

—On the assumption that Peking may become less dogmatic about gaining control over Taiwan in the long-term future, in effect not doing anything which would conflict with Peking’s acceptance as a fait accompli of Taiwan’s existence as a separate entity. (This section of Secretary Rogers’ memorandum does not make the point as explicitly as I have summarized it here, but the inference is obvious.)⁴

Comment: For the most part what Secretary Rogers proposes is very reasonable and logical, and in fact we are already doing many of the things which he suggests. I would differ with him on only one major point—the assumption that Peking might accept Taiwan’s existence as a separate entity. As you know, the depth of feeling among the PRC’s leaders is very great that Taiwan must come under PRC control.⁵

⁴ In a January 21 memorandum to Johnson, Green noted that the paper “deliberately excluded any mention of Quemoy and Matsu, the offshore island complexes in the Taiwan Strait held by the ROC. We decided not to address the issue of the Offshore Islands because we feel that the status quo there is both tolerable and likely to continue.” He concluded, “there is a strong chance that some successor government in Taipei may choose to use the Offshores as bargaining counters in talks with Peking—or even unilaterally withdraw from the islands. A more representative government on Taiwan would not need symbols of any continued pretension to be the rightful ruler of all of China; seeing the islands as an expensive and dangerous military and political luxury, it could easily decide to disengage. This day has not yet, however, arrived. Therefore, we feel the best policy for the US is not to open this issue of the Offshores in any way, and are operating on this basis.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 CHINAT)

⁵ The Department of State briefing paper stated: “as revolutionary fervor subsides and goals unfulfilled during twenty years remain unfulfilled, it is conceivable that Peking’s sense of urgency on the Taiwan issue will also be reduced.”

209. National Security Study Memorandum 148¹

Washington, March 9, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Science Advisor to the President

SUBJECT

US–PRC Exchanges

The President has directed that a study be made of ways in which US–PRC exchanges in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism, agreed on in the Joint United States-PRC Communiqué, can be facilitated.

The study should identify US interests and objectives to be pursued through these programs. The study also should address PRC attitudes and practices in such exchange programs, including the role of governmental and nongovernmental institutions and PRC political objectives in promoting or permitting such exchanges.

The study should include consideration of the following issues:

—The roles which should be played by US governmental and nongovernmental institutions and the relationship of the US Government to nongovernmental institutions included in such programs. An assessment and the pros and cons of particular private nongovernmental groups which might be considered as chosen instruments to further exchanges should be included.

—Ways in which direct contact in a third-nation capital should be used to facilitate the implementation of the Communiqué understanding.

—Specific types of exchanges to which the US should give priority and the means to promote these particular areas.

—Other problems associated with exchanges such as funding, security and legal implications.

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group comprising representatives of the addressees and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and chaired by the representative of the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, Country Files, Far East, U.S. China Policy, 1969–1972. Secret.

Secretary of State. The completed study should be submitted to the Senior Review Group no later than March 24, 1972.²

Henry A. Kissinger

² Irwin asked John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs, to chair the ad hoc group. (Memorandum from Hartman to Richardson, March 10; *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 148)

**210. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, March 9, 1972.

I have noted the comments in some columns to the effect that the Chinese statement of their position was much more aggressive and belligerent than our statement of our position. You handled the question extremely well in your backgrounder.² It occurred to me, however, that in some further discussion you may be having with members of the press, or possibly when you do a television program, you might have in mind this historical footnote.

You could begin by pointing out that I made the decision with regard to the tone of the statement of our position for two basic reasons. First, the more aggressive we stated our position the more aggressive the Chinese would have to be in stating their position. As a result of our presenting our position in a very firm, but non-belligerent manner, their position, while it was also uncompromising on principle, was not nearly as rough in its rhetoric as has been the case in previous statements they have issued over the years.

The second reason was that I realized while the statement of the Chinese position has been known to millions of Americans for many years the statement of the American position has not been known to the Chinese at all except to some at the very highest levels. In this first opportunity to present our position to the Chinese cadres and, to a certain extent, also to the Chinese masses we had to recognize that it would have no credibility whatever if it were stated in too harsh terms. This

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, President/Kissinger Memos, HAK/President Memos, 1971. Personal.

² Information concerning Kissinger's background press briefing has not been found.

does not mean that we had any illusions that by stating our position in less aggressive rhetoric we were going to win converts but it does mean that the fear that has been pounded into the Chinese for the past 20 years of American aggression against them should not be increased by the tone of the statement of our position in the communiqué.

Now to revert to the historical anecdote which shows that this approach on my part is not new. In July of 1959 when I visited Moscow we had an arrangement with the Soviets that I would have the opportunity to address the Soviet people by television and radio at the conclusion of my stay. We did not know until about two days before we were to leave the extent of the coverage or how long I would be allowed to talk. But then we learned that the coverage was probably going to be fairly extensive although not widely advertised and that I would be allowed to talk 30 minutes which meant, of course, approximately an hour when the translation was taken into account.

The preparation of this speech was a monumental task. State had done its best to prepare suggested remarks prior to the trip but Tommy Thompson agreed with me when we read State's draft as the trip neared the conclusion, and after I had had the Kitchen Debate and had traveled to several places in the Soviet Union, that the draft was too bland and too full of the usual bureaucratic banalities. On a crash basis, working late into the night for two nights before I was to go on, I dictated an entirely new draft with Thompson's very activist and helpful assistance. The fundamental decision we had to make was what tone the draft should take. I pointed out to Thompson that I would be speaking to two audiences—the American audience at home, which with an election coming up the next year was very important to me, and the Russian audience in the Soviet Union who for the first time would be hearing a senior American official address them on television. After thorough discussion of the matter I finally told Thompson that interested as I was in seeing that we said the right things as far as the American audience was concerned, I finally had to confront the hard fact that this was the first time an official of my rank would be allowed to speak directly to the Russian people and that I did not want it to be the last time. Under the circumstances, I decided that we should be firm on our principle but that the tone should not be aggressive and wherever possible conciliatory, provided there was no compromise of principle.

The result was a speech which most of the Kremlinologists thought was very effective from the stand-point of the Russian audience. What effect, if any, it had on the American audience is subject to question. I do recall that the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* had a favorable editorial on it—perhaps the only time in my memory that that paper has editorialized favorably on anything I have done in the foreign policy area. As

far as reaction of the general public is concerned, however, it certainly was not a positive and if anything might have been a slight negative.

Nevertheless, while because of the tremendous pressure we were under in attempting to get it prepared it was no gem of eloquence, I think even some of our more severe critics would have to agree that it was the statesman-like approach considering all the factors I have set forth.

I would suggest you read the speech. It appears in the Appendix of *Six Crises*.³

You can now easily see why this incident which occurred 13 years ago directly bears on the approach that we take in the communiqué. Having gone through that experience I was determined that in this document, which would be the first time Chinese leaders, and cadres, and to a certain extent even Chinese masses, would ever hear the American position expressed, I had to make the strongest possible effort to set it in a tone which would not make it totally incredible when they heard it. It would not have been credible, of course, had we set forth our position in more aggressive terms because 22 years of propaganda at the other extreme would have made it impossible for the reader of the communiqué, or those who heard it read on radio, to believe it at all if the tone was too harsh.

I am not suggesting that as a result of setting forth our position in a reasonable manner that any significant change was made in Chinese public opinion—if there is a Chinese public opinion (and I, of course, am the first to recognize that there is not), but more important on the Chinese leadership, particularly the younger leadership that is coming up. But I think by handling it the way we did in the communiqué we might have had just a chance to change their picture of the American President slightly but perhaps significantly also. Before I came, the United States President was a devil with horns. As a result of our trip and possibly because of the tone of the communiqué on our part they still see the United States President as a devil but the horns may not be nearly as prominent as they were previously. If this much was accomplished it was worthwhile, even at the cost of not writing a rip-snorting, political document as some of our advisers would have suggested which would have made our right-wingers at home stand up and cheer, but which would have served to defeat the purpose of our trip.

³ Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962).

211. National Security Study Memorandum 149¹

Washington, March 10, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

US–PRC Trade

The President has directed a study of ways in which the statement on trade in the Joint US–PRC Communiqué of February 28, 1972 should be implemented.

The study should address PRC attitudes and practices in conducting trade with other countries, with special emphasis on countries with which the PRC does not have diplomatic relations, and past trading patterns and specific commodities which have constituted the principal imports and exports of the PRC. The study should also examine the political aspects of PRC trade arrangements.

Consideration of the following means of facilitating trade should be included:

—Ways in which the US Government can begin and facilitate an exchange of general trade information and data between the US and the PRC. The possible uses of our third-country contact in this effort should be examined.

—Measures which the US Government can take to facilitate contacts between exporters and importers on both sides. This should include an examination of the role which should be played by the US Government and how it should relate to US private individuals and corporations.

—Effects on US–PRC trade of the China COCOM differential.

—The effect of non-tariff and tariff barriers and the claims settlement problem on US–PRC trade.

—Additional issues including the establishment of trade centers, the exchange of trade delegations, additional means of contact, and other measures to facilitate trade.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-189, NSSM Files, NSSM 149. Secret. Also issued as Council on International Economic Policy Study Memorandum 21.

This study should be conducted by an ad hoc group chaired by the State Department and including representatives of the addressees and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The study should be submitted to the CIEP Review Group and the Senior Review Group by March 24, 1972.

Henry A. Kissinger
Peter M. Flanigan

212. Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and his Chief of Staff (Haldeman)¹

Washington, March 13, 1972, 8:23–8:28 a.m.

[Not transcribed here is discussion of U.S.–PRC talks in Paris and the situation in Cambodia.]

Nixon: I noticed in the Washington daily news summary, the editorial, they made it to be critical of the fact that there was no mention of the Taiwan Independence Movement [in the Shanghai Communiqué].² Let me ask, is the Taiwan—that source is interesting because that's a more conservative paper. But is the Taiwan Independence Movement, is violently opposed to Chiang Kai-shek; violently opposed by the Chinese; and violently opposed to the Japanese, isn't it? Am I wrong? Or the Japanese—

Kissinger: Well the Japanese haven't taken a position on it, but it's—

Nixon: What in the hell is the Taiwanese Independence Movement all about?

Kissinger: It's not a significant movement now. It's violently opposed by both the Chinese Governments. Chiang Kai-shek had locked up the leader of the Taiwanese Independence Movement, and he's now in this country as an exile.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 532–17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² Possible reference to Milton Viorst, "Has Anyone Asked the Taiwanese?", *Washington Evening Star*, March 11, 1972, p. A-5.

³ Reference is to Peng Ming-min. See Documents 65, 91, and 178.

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: And we had major problems with Chiang Kai-shek when we let him in here.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: So—

Nixon: And with the Chinese in the PRC.

Kissinger: And with the PRC. But I noticed somebody must be feeding that because *The New York Times*, which never used to give a damn about Taiwan, had an editorial about that last week too.⁴

Nixon: On the independence movement . . .

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Do you think it's out of State? Or could there be somebody pushing the Taiwan Independence Movement? That's so goddamn—have you ever heard of the Taiwan Independence Movement?

Kissinger: No.

Haldeman: No. Not enough to matter.

Kissinger: I can't speculate.

Nixon: But we haven't, the other thing, I didn't see anything in the State Department papers indicating that we ought to support the Taiwan Independence Movement.

Kissinger: Absolutely not.

Nixon: Did we?

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: There's some kind of flap on it. Did Rogers raise that in his—

Kissinger: No. Well, they raised it at—

Nixon: At the end?

Kissinger: Well, they raised it at the end. At the end he raised it.

Nixon: He raised it at the end? What did he say—you ought to take note of this?

Kissinger: But he never raised it in the preparatory papers they gave us, never. At the end he did raise it among 500 other nit-picks.

Nixon: What 500?

Kissinger: Well, 18, 15. But in this catalog of nit-picks there was the Taiwan Independence Movement. But our formulation doesn't even preclude, it states it has to be settled by the Chinese themselves. Naturally the Taiwanese are Chinese.

Nixon: Are Chinese.

Kissinger: If they want to secede, that's their business.

Nixon: Well—

⁴ "The Forgotten Taiwanese," *The New York Times*, March 10, 1972, p. A-36.

Kissinger: Well, except—

Nixon: Our private understanding is that—

Kissinger: That we won't encourage it.

Nixon: We won't encourage it, that's all.

Kissinger: We didn't say we will oppose it either.

Nixon: We didn't say we will discourage it either.

Kissinger: We didn't say we'd oppose it. We said we will give it no support. And that's been our position. We have never given it any support.

[Not transcribed is a brief discussion of the upcoming trip to the Soviet Union.]

213. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 20, 1972.

SUBJECT

My March 14, 1972 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador, in New York

I met with the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Huang Hua, for an hour and 20 minutes on Tuesday afternoon, March 14, in New York City.² I had requested this meeting to cover New York City security and real estate concerns which they had raised, and other miscellaneous topics, including Dobrynin's information that we had given the Chinese military information on Soviet deployments; the functioning of the Paris channel; and Congressional visits to the PRC. At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador—somewhat ill at ease—presented a relatively mild verbal PRC complaint about our alleged bombing of North Vietnam. I said that their information was inaccurate and that we would not escalate unless Hanoi obliged us to do so. Following are the highlights of the session which was otherwise friendly.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² A 17-page memorandum of conversation of Kissinger's March 14 (4:40–6 p.m.) meeting in New York is *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 114.

Death of Chinese Official in New York

In early February, a young low-ranking member of the Chinese UN mission in New York died from apparent nicotine poisoning.³ The Chinese are convinced that it was foul play. (It may well have been, but the police now suggest the possibility that the man mistakenly gave himself an overdose while taking it for medical purposes.) They asked us last week for increased protection and a complete investigation by the Police Department once they have the full medical report.

I opened this meeting by assuring them that we will do everything possible to find out the possible culprit and increase the security of Chinese mission personnel. At my instruction, Ambassador Bush has talked to Police Chief Murphy in New York who assures us that a full-scale investigation and increased surveillance measures are being undertaken. We have also contacted FBI Director Hoover to assist the New York police in this effort. I told Ambassador Huang of these measures and suggested that he meet immediately with Bush and representatives of the New York police and FBI. The Ambassador agreed to try to keep this incident as low-key as possible. I believe they will continue to be restrained, and I will continue to monitor developments to make sure that the Chinese are given full cooperation.

New Location for Chinese UN Mission

I have been assisting the Chinese in their efforts to find a new location for their mission. They have now apparently struck a deal for a Lincoln Motor Inn on the West Side and hope to move in promptly once a contract has been signed. Here, too, they have appreciated White House efforts on their behalf.

Soviet Allegations

I told Ambassador Huang, without elaboration, that Dobrynin has alleged that Chinese sources had told Moscow that during my October visit I had given the Chinese information on Soviet troop

³ Wang Hsi-tsan, age 26, was found dead in his room in the Roosevelt Hotel on the morning of February 7. A detailed account of the investigation of Wang's death is in the March 6 memorandum of conversation between Jonathan Howe of the NSC staff and Huang Hua. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) On June 7 Bush met with Huang Hua to report that "the investigation is at a standstill but that the case is still open." Bush pointed out that the investigation had been hampered by the lack of access to PRC representatives for fingerprinting or interviews. Bush concluded: "It seems unlikely that Ambassador Huang or his staff will raise this case again with us in the immediate future unless Peking's reaction to the report given by Ambassador Bush is stronger than that apparently felt personally by Ambassador Huang." (Airgram A-925 from USUN, June 19; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 CHICOM-US) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-13, Document 113.

“dislocations” and missile installations along the Sino–Soviet border.⁴ I added that John Scali had picked up similar information (although keyed to my July visit) from an ABC executive who had talked to a Radio Moscow correspondent in New York. I said that I had told Dobrynin that I would not discuss any conversations with the Chinese, but that in any event this information was complete nonsense and a provocation. I added that it may have come from Taiwan sources or represent a Soviet fishing expedition. I noted that Prime Minister Chou and Marshal Yeh might wish to look into this matter and we would find interesting any comments they might have. Ambassador Huang was completely inscrutable during this exchange.

Moscow Summit

I informed Huang of this Thursday’s announcement that you will be going to Moscow on May 22 and gave him further tentative planning. I said that I had turned down a Russian invitation to advance your trip in Moscow, and that we were dealing with Dobrynin here on arrangements. I pointed out again that the Soviet tactic was to have agreements in many fields come to a head in May, and I briefly reviewed some of the technical negotiations and ministerial travels underway or in prospect in coming months. I reaffirmed that we stood ready to make any agreements with Peking that we concluded with Moscow.

The South Asian Subcontinent

I told Huang that Indian Ambassador Jha had probed us on the meaning of the Shanghai Communiqué.⁵ I said that I told Jha that I wouldn’t speak for the Chinese, but the US position was that we reject the hegemony of any outside country over the subcontinent or of any country within the subcontinent. I added that you were now planning the recognition of Bangladesh during the first week of April, but we had not yet informed the bureaucracy so that we could entertain PRC comments with regard to timing.⁶ I explained that I was filling in the Chinese on conversations with the Soviets and the Indians so as to head off any distorted versions which those countries might give to the Chinese themselves.

⁴ Kissinger met with Dobrynin on March 9 and 10. Documentation is scheduled for publication *ibid.*, volume XIV.

⁵ For information on Kissinger’s talks with Ambassador Jha, see *ibid.*, vol. E-7, Document 233.

⁶ In telegram 55123 to Paris, March 30, Watson was instructed to inform the PRC representatives that the United States would announce its intention of recognizing Bangladesh on April 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US)

Watson Channel and Travel to the PRC

I outlined Senators Mansfield and Scott's questions on their travel to the PRC and said that Watson would present Mansfield's letter in Paris at the next meeting on Monday. I said that we would forward a letter from Speaker Albert a week or so later requesting an invitation for Boggs and Ford (which, as you know, they have already agreed to in principle). Huang indicated that the PRC wishes to continue the system of Americans applying for visa applications at the nearest convenient embassy, in most cases Ottawa. We will have Watson raise this formally on Monday and get confirmation from his counterpart.⁷

PRC Complaint about US Bombing

After I had run through my business, Ambassador Huang somewhat sheepishly read a verbal message from his government complaining about alleged US bombing of North Vietnam since your visit to China. I consider their message relatively pro forma in language; also it is in the third person and in a channel where they know it will get no further distribution. He did not wish to even hand it over, but I requested it in order to get the precise language, assuring him that only you would see it (text at Tab A).⁸ The note alleges our recent bombing, said that the Chinese Government "cannot but express grave concern" over this and reaffirms their solidarity with the Indochinese people.

I responded by saying that we had checked into similar allegations which we had gotten from the North Vietnamese and found them to be untrue. I said that we would not escalate military activity unless forced to do so by North Vietnamese offensives. Since he had raised the subject, I pointed out that the North Vietnamese had postponed a scheduled meeting with us in Paris and opined that this was a curious way of proceeding.

⁷ See Document 214.

⁸ The attached statement reads in part: "In the fortnight since the conclusion of President Nixon's visit, the United States has carried out incessant, large-scale bombings against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. On March 10, the U.S. Government further proclaimed the week from March 26 to April 1 a so-called 'national week of concern for prisoners of war'. The Chinese Government cannot but express grave concern over this. The Chinese Government would like to state frankly that the United States will not be able to attain its goal by this line of action. If the U.S. Government truly wants to bring about an early release of its prisoners of war, it should accept the seven-point proposal and the two points of elaboration put forward by Viet Nam and enter into earnest negotiations with the Vietnamese side." The statement concluded that the Chinese people "can only express their indignation and support the three Indochinese peoples in their war of resistance through to the end. We hope that the U.S. Government will give serious consideration to this view." A notation on the statement indicates the President read it. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 114.

214. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to France (Watson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Paris, March 20, 1972, 1258Z.

639. To the White House Eyes Only for Dr. Kissinger. Had 65-minute meeting with Amb. Huang today.² Spirit extremely open and friendly. Accompanying him, like the last time, was interpreter and First Secretary Tsao, who speaks English but very little French.³

In discussing ping-pong team,⁴ Huang was concerned about Carl MacIntyre, President of the organization called "US March for Victory," and that he would invite a ping-pong team to the US from the "clique

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1038, Files for the President—China Material, China, Mansfield/Scott Trip to China [April–May 1972]. Secret. A shortened version of this message was sent through Department of State channels as telegram 5316 from Paris, March 20. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 115.

² On March 10 the White House announced that Watson would be the third-country contact point with the PRC. (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 3, 1972, p. 500) Watson returned to the United States and met with Kissinger on March 10. Talking points for Kissinger prepared by Lord, March 10, and handwritten notes from this meeting are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, China, Paris Channel, March 10, 1972–April 1973. General Walters held his forty-fifth and final meeting with Huang on March 5. See *Foreign Relations 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 116. President Nixon appointed Walters Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on March 2. He was confirmed by the Senate on April 10 and sworn in on May 2.

³ At the first meeting on March 13, Watson and Huang briefly met at the PRC Embassy. Watson's March 13 report to the Department of State in telegram 4739 reads in full: "For the Secretary from Ambassador Watson. Had first meeting at 1100 today, nothing of substance took place except for fact he wants to repay my call, which will take place Thursday at 1100 at our embassy." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) He gave a more detailed account in two March 13 backchannel messages to Kissinger, numbered 625 and 626. Watson and Huang agreed that they would handle "major" issues while subordinates could discuss routine matters. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—General—Feb. 27–March 31, 1972) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 117 and 118.

⁴ In a February 22 meeting among Rogers, Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei, and Secretary to Chou En-lai Hsiung Hsiang-hui, the Chinese complained that the PRC was prepared to reciprocate the U.S. team's visit of April 1971, but that they discovered in August that an ROC team was touring America. (Memorandum of conversation, February 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON) The Department of State's instructions to Watson for the March 20 meeting, approved by Haig, reads in part: "It is particularly important that early on you emphasize importance we attach to principle of reciprocity in exchanges" and suggested inviting the PRC team for a visit in either April or June. (Telegram 46040 to Paris, March 17; *ibid.*, POL CHICOM–US) The PRC team visited April 12–24 and visited the White House on April 18. (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 15, 1972, p. 698)

of Chiang Kai shek” during the visit of the table tennis delegation of China. The Chinese would like to call this to the attention of the Americans in this regard in hopes that America will take measures so that the bilateral exchanges between China and the US can take place without impediment. As far as concrete arrangements or details of the stay are concerned, the Chinese Association of Table Tennis will be told to have the Chinese delegation at the United Nations send somebody to contact the American association. Huang also hopes that the American Govt will be kind enough to cooperate along these lines and also take necessary security measures. If the American Govt has any propositions to make along these lines, Chinese will be glad to know of them.

I also received a paper, contents of which I will telegraph to Senators Mansfield and Scott, which reads of follows:

“Sirs,

The Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs has the pleasure to invite you to come to China for a visit in the latter part of April. Mrs. Mansfield and Mrs. Scott as well as your assistants are also welcome.

Practical matters such as the specific date of the visit and the composition of your party may be arranged through the Chinese Embassy in France. With regards.”

In answer to this invitation, I told them that the Senators would like to come either 16th or 27th of April, so when date is firm on their part, we are ready when they notify us to follow through it.

I also raised other matters as requested by State in their telegram 46040. They are also very pleased with the musk oxen/panda flying arrangements, but Huang will get official confirmation from his govt.

I also handed to him the thank-you letters from the President and the Secretary.⁵

I am not replying to State Dept. cable of instructions until receiving your ok later today.⁶

Comment: Most important thing it seems to me in the conversation was that today was the first official forward-looking example of carrying out the agreements in the joint communiqué. He laid great stress on this point, to which of course I agreed. I also said that he could be assured that all kinds of necessary security measures will be taken during the visit of their ping-pong team. I also took up with him the

⁵ Telegram 46040 to Paris, March 17, indicated that these letters, as well as a letter from Mansfield and Scott, were being sent via pouch to Paris. Copies of Nixon’s March 14 letters to Chou and Mao are in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 114, Geopolitical Files, China, Nixon, Richard M., Letters to Mao and Chou.

⁶ Apparent reference to telegram 46040, March 17.

matter of the press, as outlined in para 9 reftel, and he is absolutely in accord.⁷

Ambassador Huang during our meeting said that for routine matters he would like them conducted between his First Secretary Tsao Kuei-sheng and I restated I would use Allen Holmes, our Political Counselor (whom I trust completely). For the long pull I would appreciate your advice as to whether I should have a bright, Chinese-speaking officer.

At the close of the meeting I invited Huang to join Nancy and me at a small private dinner at the residence some time in April. He seemed delighted and accepted immediately. Date to be arranged.

Warm regards,

Watson

⁷ Paragraph 9 of telegram 46040 reads in part: "In contacts with press, you should not discourage speculation that talks are substantive. You should make it clear, however, that content of discussion will not be revealed."

215. Memorandum for the President's File by John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, March 23, 1972.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, on Thursday, March 23, 1972, at 4:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 88, Memoranda for the President. Secret; Nodis. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held from 4:08 to 5:02 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

Prior to hearing Mr. Green's account of the trip which he and Mr. Holdridge had made to brief Asian leaders on the President's visit to China,² the President gave Mr. Green guidance on the line which he should follow for his appearance on "Meet the Press" March 26.³ Mr. Green should put the purpose of the President's China initiative in the most positive light. The themes to mention were: the move could be a great historical landmark; we were acting not only in our own interests but in the interests of the friendly Asian countries, and in fact we were their spearhead; the Asian nations all welcomed the move and our allies were fully reassured as to its value to them and about continued U.S. support; the effort had to be made to see if relations could be improved with the PRC, even if this should not work out; there is now real hope for a peaceful future. The President suggested that Mr. Green might quote statements by Asian leaders welcoming the China initiative.

The President noted that if the question comes up of "why not wait until after Mao and Chou (who are 78 and 73, respectively) pass from the scene and then make the approach?", Mr. Green should point out that changes in leadership do not necessarily result in a softer line from the new leaders. The President cited the successors to Stalin in the USSR as cases in point.

The President said that another point to stress was that the Nixon Doctrine should not be interpreted as a U.S. withdrawal from Asia, but rather as a means for the U.S. to stay involved.

The President stated that Mr. Green should also play down the Taiwan aspect as much as possible. He wanted Mr. Green to give

² U.S. allies were briefed about the China trip in Washington, or by Green and Holdridge, and not through individual Embassies. According to telegram 33189 to Moscow, Tokyo, Taipei, Saigon, Hong Kong, and Paris: "President has directed that there should be no comment of any kind on US-PRC joint communiqué or explanatory press conference. You are directed to inform appropriate staff members of this immediately." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON) Nixon dispatched Green and Holdridge to meet with leaders in East and Southeast Asia immediately after the President's trip. In a February 9 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig discussed the trip and noted: "I think it is an exceptionally good idea and one that we should pursue but only if John Holdridge or some other NSC member accompanies Marshall to insure that he hews to the desired line." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1330, NSC Unfiled Material, 1972, 4 of 8) Green's mission was announced by the Department of State on February 16. (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 20, 1972, p. 440) Documentation on these meetings is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/GREEN). Holdridge also relayed backchannel messages directly to Haig; see footnote 4 below. Holdridge and Green visited South Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, South Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand.

³ Transcript of Green's interview on the National Broadcasting Company's *Meet the Press* news program is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 17, 1972, pp. 571-577.

minimal comment to the reaction on Taiwan, other than to cite what the ROC leaders said after his, Mr. Green's, visit since the heat had died down on this issue and there was no sense in reigniting it.⁴

Mr. Green said that he would of course follow the President's guidance. With respect to stressing the positive aspects of the President's China visit, he had in fact used such an approach in talking to the Asian leaders in the countries he had just visited.

Mr. Green remarked that one theme which he believed had been effective was that the President's China initiative offered a real hope for peace, and was particularly welcomed by the young people who had been turned off by the seemingly endless cold war.

The President talked at length on the philosophy which he had followed in making his China initiative. The move had to be made; we simply could not go on indefinitely in a hostile relationship with one-quarter of mankind, especially as the People's Republic of China grew in military power. It was far better to be on the inside talking with the Chinese than on the outside looking in. Moreover, the move had to be now, at a time when the Chinese leaders needed us. We needed them, but they needed us too. Now, as a result, the international situation had become much more fluid, and the Soviet Union could no longer take Sino-U.S. hostility for granted in its policy calculations.

The President recalled that he had set forth his thoughts on this issue in the October 1967 *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*.⁵ Mr. Green said that the President had spoken in similar terms to him in Djakarta that same year, before becoming a candidate.

The President mentioned that the PRC leaders had apparently tacitly accepted his explanation of the restraining role which the U.S. exercised with respect to Japan. He had pointed out that without the presence of the U.S., the likelihood of Japanese rearmament was high, since it was extremely illogical for a nation to be an economic giant while remaining a military pygmy. The failure of the Chinese leaders to challenge this position strongly suggested that they accepted it. (Mr.

⁴ Chiang Kai-shek cancelled their scheduled meeting, but Green and Holdridge did meet with Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai, Vice President C. K. Yen, and Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. Holdridge noted: "All were concerned particularly over need for continued U.S. support for Taiwan's economic development. My assessment is that leaders and people of Taiwan will try to make the best of situation, and with typical Chinese determination, will probably be able to get along quite well. Our relationship with them will continue, because they have nowhere else to go." Holdridge's summary of their meetings with leaders in the Philippines, South Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, and the Republic of China is in telegram 45662 from Saigon, March 6; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China-general—Feb. 27–March 31, 1972.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 3.

Holdridge corroborated this impression—the Chinese leaders had not belabored the President in stating their own position, but apparently just made it for the record.)

The President asked Mr. Green for a run-down of the reactions to the China visit in Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, and Singapore, as noted by Mr. Green during his recent tour.

Mr. Green said that in Japan, the Japanese leaders had been reassured by his visit and had no quarrel with the purposes and results of the President's China trip (particularly on the score of there having been no secret deals). The problem was the effect of the trip on Japanese internal politics. In Indonesia, there was real racial hatred of the Chinese but understanding of the President's purposes. There had been near-chaos in the Philippines, but this had quieted down after he had talked to President Marcos and Foreign Minister Romulo,⁶ and had backgrounded the press.

Continuing, Mr. Green observed that understanding and support of the trip had been greatest in the three countries of Indochina, where the leaders saw the outcome of the President's China visit as possibly benefitting their own countries directly. In Thailand, Thanom, Praphat, Dawee, Pote Sarasin, and the King had all expressed their support, although they all were concerned about PRC support for the insurgency in Thailand.⁷ They felt they were under pressure. The King had been particularly strong on the need for continued U.S. aid to cope with the insurgency. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, a typical Han Chinese, had immediately seen the value of the China visit.

Mr. Green stressed that his swing through the area had brought out clearly the need for continued U.S. assistance to our friends and allies. We would be judged by our actions, not our words. The President agreed.

In conclusion, the President asked Mr. Green to put in a good word for Ambassador Watson if the occasion arose on "Meet the Press." The line the President suggested was that we had full confidence in Ambassador Watson's ability, and that while he would of course be dealing directly with the PRC Ambassador in Paris he would be operating in ways that all Ambassadors operate in such situations—carrying out instructions which were very carefully drafted by experts in Washington. Ambassador Watson had always been impeccable in his official performance.⁸

⁶ Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo.

⁷ King Bhumibol Adulyadej; Chairman of the National Executive Council, Thanom Kittikachorn; Deputy Chairman, Praphat Charusathien; Director of Development, Agriculture and Communication Directorate, Dawee Chulasapya; and Director of the Economic, Financial and Industrial Directorate, Pote Sarasin.

⁸ Apparent reference to an incident involving Watson that occurred on a flight between Washington and Paris.

216. Memorandum From Phil Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

U.S. Forces on Taiwan

Secretary Laird had forwarded to the President (Tab B) a summary of current and planned FY 73 forces deployed on Taiwan.²

Laird reports that authorized U.S. personnel on Taiwan for FY 73 will total 1,139 spaces more than the 6,000 indicated on the deployment plan jointly recommended by State and DOD and approved by the President in February. The increase results from an error in the original plan and does not represent a change in the major unit deployments.

The new end FY 73 figure of 7,139 men compares with 8,735 in end FY 72 and about 9,000 in FY 71. *Instead of the 2,700 man reduction in FY 73 approved by the President, the reduction will only be about 1,600.*

Laird also separates Taiwan based personnel into three categories: (a) those primarily engaged in supporting the SEA conflict, (b) those with a broader post-war theater mission, and (c) those needed for the defense of Taiwan itself.

You will recall that prior to the China trip DOD stated that about two-thirds of our Taiwan deployments were SEA related while one-third were needed for defense of the island. In his memo, however, Laird objects to recent statements by Secretary Rogers and others at State based on this two-third–one-third formula that about 6,000 of the current 8,735 personnel on Taiwan are engaged in SEA support (see State Transcript, Tab A).³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Holdridge and Kennedy. Attached was a March 31 covering note from Kennedy to Kissinger, which reads in its entirety: "Henry: This all adds up to a suggestion that we need to cool off all comment on Taiwan force levels and stop further pronouncements. It would be best handled by a call from you to Secretaries Laird and Rogers or a call from Haig to Eliot and Pursley, if you agreed that this is the course to be followed." Kissinger's handwritten comment on this note read: "I want *no* reductions made on Taiwan until end of VN war under *any* pretext."

² Tabs B and C, attached but not printed, are two memoranda with summary tables from Laird to Nixon, both dated March 18.

³ Attached but not printed.

The Laird Position

Laird's position regarding the number of personnel needed for defense of Taiwan (about 2,400) has not changed. However, the figures on the personnel supporting the SEA conflict change markedly:

—only 3,100 rather than 6,000 personnel are primarily engaged in support of SEA operations.

—only half of these can be withdrawn after the SEA conflict ends, the others must remain to meet theater needs.

—the others (about 3,000 troops) are also required for theater missions and are scheduled to remain on Taiwan under current DOD planning.

The reason for the wide divergence between the current and past DOD positions is that previous DOD estimates assumed that all personnel deployed to Taiwan during the Vietnam build up are SEA related. However, although these forces moved to Taiwan in support of Vietnam operations, most of them now have a theater mission and no longer are directly involved in SEA support. Laird's current position narrows the definition to include only those forces currently engaged in support of SEA activity.

History of Taiwan Deployments

During the Vietnam build up, U.S. deployments in Taiwan nearly tripled rising from 3,700 personnel in 1964 to 9,800 in 1968. These increases were caused by growth of Taiwan based airlift, communications, maintenance and other Vietnam support operations.

Some forces came to Taiwan from elsewhere in Asia (principally Japan) to make room for forces arriving from the U.S. Others came from CONUS and will return home once the war winds down.

In an attempt to clarify the situation I had my staff do an analysis of current Taiwan military deployments. Based on data supplied by DOD, we divided them into three categories. The calculations are rough because many personnel are involved in support and maintenance activities which are difficult to break down by the missions they perform.

Personnel directly linked to SEA who would be withdrawn as the conflict ends include about 2,060 in FY 72 and 480 in FY 73. This is about 500 greater than Laird's estimate. These include:

—two C-130 airlift squadrons, one scheduled for return to CONUS and the second scheduled for redeployment to Okinawa by end FY 73. Total personnel 1,540.

—about 520 persons providing communications support, equipment repair and other general support for the airlift squadrons and general SEA activity.

On the other hand about 2,250 personnel are *linked directly to the defense of Taiwan* or have theater missions (e.g., intelligence) which

probably can not be accomplished from elsewhere in Asia. The Laird estimates are the same and include:

—about 450 persons in the Military Assistance Group, Taiwan Defense and Communications Command and the embassy.

—about 1,100 persons involved with intelligence operations that could not be accomplished from other locations in the Pacific.

—about 700 men involved with the maintenance of the air strip on Taiwan to provide rapid access for tactical air reinforcements.

The remaining 4,400 men have a *a theater role* and could be relocated (at a cost) to other Asian countries if political considerations dictate (Laird's estimate is 4,900). These 4,400 men include:

—about 3,060 personnel associated with two C-130 airlift squadrons including support.

—about 430 personnel associated with [*1 line of source text not declassified*] material on Taiwan.

—about 570 personnel manning regional communications facilities on Taiwan and about 390 material and general support personnel.

Tables summarizing these general categories and giving a more detailed description of the units involved are at Tab C.

Based on this analysis, therefore, the 6,000 man figure used by Secretary Rogers is an over estimation of our Taiwan deployments directly related to SEA activity. On the other hand, Laird's most recent position that only about 1,540 personnel are directly involved in SEA support and scheduled for return to CONUS or other redeployment understates the President's flexibility.

If necessary we could shift some units having a regional defense mission to other locations. For example, if the two C-130 airlift squadrons were relocated along with their maintenance and other support, Taiwan deployments could be reduced about 3,100 men to near pre-war levels (4,000 men). Moreover, about 1,300 communications support and maintenance personnel could probably be relocated without degrading the ROC defensive capabilities. This would reduce deployments below pre-war levels.

Next Steps

If you want to consider FY 73 deployments below the 7,135 currently planned by DOD I could prepare a memorandum to DOD requesting analysis of lower deployment postures. This would cause concern within DOD however, and I doubt we would get an objective analysis at this stage.

Alternatively, you could ask me to do an analysis of existing deployments and the implications of lower levels. This would avoid DOD concern and the possibility of a leak, but it would be difficult to obtain data. A thorough job might even require traveling to Taiwan itself.

Finally, you could wait for the preparation of the ongoing study of Asian deployments. This is part of our NSSM 69 work on overall Asian deployments and will be ready for DPRC consideration sometime late this spring.

In my opinion there is very little to be gained from further consideration of the exact number of Taiwan personnel related to SEA activity versus those personnel needed for other purposes. Moreover, I believe further public discussion of our Taiwan deployments and the number related to SEA activity will only increase ROC uncertainty regarding our future intentions and should be avoided.

I therefore recommend you call Secretary Laird and explain that:

—the 6,000 man figure mentioned by Secretary Rogers and others at State originated from DOD and refers to those deployments that are both SEA related *and* related to the overall defense of Asia, *but that*

—in the future, statements should avoid numerical estimates and reflect the uncertainty in our current plans. The overall question of our post-war Asian deployments will be addressed in the DPRC this spring.

In addition, Secretary Rogers should also be cautioned to avoid making numerical estimates of SEA related Taiwan deployments. In view of the joint memorandum you received from Secretary Laird and Rogers recommending FY 73 deployments, it would also be useful to remind State that our future Asian deployments will be addressed in the DPRC this spring.

Alternatively you could ask Al Haig to call both DOD and State or ask me to prepare a memorandum.

I will call.

Prepare a memorandum, to State and DOD.⁴

Other, see me.

⁴ Kissinger initialed his approval of this option. On April 7 Odeen forwarded to Kissinger a draft memorandum intended for Laird and Rogers. Kissinger did not sign it but wrote on Odeen's covering memorandum: "Let me do by phone. I don't want this to leak." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X)

217. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

SRG Meeting on U.S.–PRC Trade and Exchanges

In order to have the agencies consider ways in which the statements on trade and exchanges in the Shanghai Communiqué should be implemented you directed two papers:

—NSSM 148² called for a study of ways in which U.S.–PRC exchanges in such fields as science, technology, culture, and journalism could be facilitated. It asked that the study include the roles of U.S. governmental and non-governmental institutions, ways in which direct contact in a third nation capital should be used to facilitate exchanges, specific types of exchanges to which the U.S. should give priority, and other problems associated with exchanges such as funding, security and legal implications.

—NSSM 149/CIEP SM 21³ called for a study of PRC attitudes and practices in conducting trade with other countries, ways in which the USG can facilitate trade, and the effect on non-tariff barriers, tariff barriers, the claims settlement problem, and other trade issues on U.S.–PRC trade.

We suggest that you begin the meeting with a discussion of the trade paper, since Peter Flanigan and the CIEP people could then depart, if they so wished, before the session on exchanges.

Trade

The Trade Paper

The paper was prepared by the Ad Hoc Group chaired by Ambassador Brown.⁴ It discusses the background of U.S.–PRC trade to date, the objectives of both sides, PRC trade patterns and practices, ways

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-061, SRG Meeting, NSSM 148–149, 3/31/72 [1 of 2]. Secret. Sent for action.

² Document 209.

³ Document 211.

⁴ Davis forwarded the responses to NSSM 148 and NSSM 149 to members of the Senior Review Group on March 27. The papers and Davis' covering memorandum are in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 148. The papers are also *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-061, SRG Meeting, NSSM 148–149, 3/31/72 [1 of 2].

in which trade between the U.S. and the PRC might be facilitated, substantive issues which we should raise with the PRC, and U.S. laws and practices which affect our trade with the PRC.

The PRC appears concerned about import and export control discrimination against the PRC, and the lack of Most Favored Nation treatment. Foreign Minister Chi also indicated that the claims question could be discussed. The PRC has made it clear that trade could be expected to grow only slowly and hinted that the rate of growth would be determined politically.

The paper points out that despite the historic allure of the China market, we must recognize that trade will not grow rapidly, although in such areas as aviation and agriculture we may be able to sell to the Chinese. The PRC looks on trade as a means of obtaining items essential to its economy and exports only items which it must in order to get the hard currency for vitally needed imports. It also uses trade as a means of encouraging people-to-people relationships and influencing policies of other countries concerning such issues as Taiwan.

The paper contains a number of alternatives for facilitating trade between the U.S. and the PRC:

—Improve the ability of our Embassy in Paris to act as a contact point by assigning officers within the existing Embassy structure or personnel to a separate China Section of the Embassy. (The handling of this matter will depend on how much status you wish to give to the Paris talks.)

—Ask the PRC to designate one or more contact points to which American businessmen might be referred, continue and expand cooperation between the American Consulate General in Hong Kong and the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong (which is likely to become a middleman for U.S. businessmen in establishing contacts with PRC), encourage groups interested in trade with PRC by providing them with information and guidance, and encourage formation of a private “Sino–American Trade Council” (perhaps under the auspices of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).

—Undertake a number of other measures including: a vanguard trade delegation⁵—with U.S. businessmen and USG representatives—to establish liaison with the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT); a U.S. trade exhibit in the PRC; assistance to U.S. [PRC?] trade and industrial associations wishing to exhibit in the U.S.; and, contacts with PRC banks through the Treasury representative in Hong Kong.

—Among specific issues are: the U.S. position on the sale of civil aircraft to the PRC, mutual visits by U.S. and PRC ships, the question of scheduled air services, means of facilitating prompt issuance of export licenses, Most Favored Nation treatment, the COCOM differential, the private claims/blocked assets problem, the issue of Ex-Im credits, the cotton textile problem, and the issue surrounding meat imports.

⁵ Kissinger’s handwritten comment beside this paragraph reads: “Location?”

The paper does a good job of pulling together the major issues and provides a large number of *possible* ways in which we might facilitate trade with the PRC. There appear to be no major issues over which the agencies violently disagree. However, there is a danger that, in their enthusiasm to facilitate trade with the PRC, the *agencies are inclined to move too quickly and in too many areas at once*. In addition, State shows signs of wanting to take the ball and run without proper controls from the White House.⁶

The Meeting

The best way to handle the trade paper at the SRG would be:

—First, to determine what our objectives are in trade with the PRC and their objectives in trading with us.

—To identify which, if any, specific options or recommendations are disagreed on by the agencies.

—To seek agreement on the items of highest priority to facilitate trade between the U.S. and PRC in a way consistent with objectives.

—To determine the timing of our action on individual items and our presentations to the PRC.

The meeting should focus primarily on *our objectives and the timing, style, and coordination of our approaches to the PRC*. Specifically, we need to determine our priorities and try to *determine between those items which we should deal with now and raise with the PRC on a priority basis*—which may include means of facilitating contacts and transmittal of information, plus resolution of impediments to trade such as the claims issue. It should also *identify items of medium-term priority*—which could include trade missions and exhibitions *and issues presently of low priority* such as Most Favored Nation status and providing China with Ex-Im credits.

The Issues

The highest priority items at this point are to facilitate trade by:

—Encouraging the exchange of general information on products and trading techniques.

—Facilitating contacts between individual, or groups of, Americans interested in trading with the PRC.

—Removing, where feasible, major obstacles to trade and resolving pressing trade issues by settling the claims question, and providing the PRC with information on U.S. laws and regulations concerning trade. Other items such as trade exhibitions might be explored with the PRC in Paris, and the issues of Ex-Im credits and MFN need not be decided at this time.

In pursuing the above issues, our objectives should be to gradually improve trade relations, avoid giving the appearance of “rug mer-

⁶ Kissinger’s handwritten comment beside this paragraph reads: “How?”

chants" intent on pushing our products, recognize that the PRC will require balance in trade, and gauge our actions based on consideration of PRC receptivity.

The following considerations are major elements in assuring a rational approach to trade issues:

—Rather than pushing products on the Chinese—which particular agencies in response to prodding from the private sector may wish to do—we should attempt to exchange information on products and methods of trade so that importers and exporters on both sides know what the other country has and wants to sell or buy, and how to engage in trade.

—In approaching the Chinese, there may be a tendency to avoid raising unpleasant matters which may impede trade between us. (These would include the claims issue, questions of export licensing, U.S. legal obligations on textiles and meats.) However, raising these issues in a frank and businesslike manner will be far preferable in the long run to papering over potential problems.

—Regarding the variety of items recommended in the paper, it is important to get a better idea of when particular items should be raised with the PRC. (From the paper it is unclear when the agencies believe we should raise particular items.) In order to avoid pushing too hard, we should carefully assess PRC receptivity in determining how far and how fast to move. And, instead of venturing forth enthusiastically with a wide variety of programs, we might consider attempting to draw out the PRC.

Among the main issues are:

—How quickly should we move on the many items suggested in the paper to facilitate trade relations? Should we begin merely by making proposals in Paris for PRC reaction, or move now on a number of fronts? Which items should we move on now and which require Presidential decisions at this time?

—When should we bring up with the Chinese potentially sensitive issues such as the *claims question* and *textile restraints*. (*The claims settlement issue is extremely important.* Failure to settle the claims problem might mean that PRC ships or goods would be subject to harassing lawsuits by U.S. citizens, and this also should be settled with the PRC to remove a major impediment to trade. The textile problem could become embarrassing domestically and internationally if we do not clarify our position with the PRC, and I believe it should be brought up relatively soon.)

—Should the USG at this point encourage any one private group to clear information and research on PRC trade practices. The paper contains an option that the USG encourage formation of a "Sino-American Trade Council," perhaps under the auspices of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. (I am inclined to believe that this is a good idea since it would allow a primarily private organization to deal with the PRC to exchange information; however, this may raise domestic equity problems, and it is not certain that the PRC would deal directly with such a group.)⁷

⁷ Kissinger's handwritten comment beside this paragraph reads: "Can't we start dialogue?"

An additional issue which you should focus on is that of inter-agency coordination. The paper makes no mention of a White House role in future implementation of the trade scenario. You might stress in the meeting that in view of the President's keen interest in the development of trade with the PRC, and the number of specific questions of judgment and timing which will be necessary as relations evolve, there must be *constant interagency discussions on these matters and positions taken by our negotiators in Paris should be cleared by the NSC and CIEP staffs.*

Exchanges

The Exchange Paper

NSSM 148 was prepared by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs John Richardson, Jr. The study finds that while we and the PRC share a common interest in moving to normalize relations—in part through exchange programs—the specific objectives that each side will seek through such contacts are quite different. Where the U.S. will attempt to develop favorable attitudes toward the United States among PRC elite groups, the Chinese side will use people-to-people contacts to build popular support for their cause which can be used to undercut USG backing of the Nationalists. As well, there is a basic disparity of institutions through which exchange programs will be promoted which gives us very limited leverage to influence Chinese involvement in American society or to elicit genuine reciprocity on their part.

The study suggests that in order to provide some degree of structure and control on our side of the exchange relationship, the U.S. government will want to identify one or more “umbrella organizations” to coordinate exchanges and provide guidance, assistance, and funding to private groups. (It identifies as a likely organization to play such a role the National Committee for U.S.-China Relations.) It also suggests that the State Department will want to expand the capabilities of the Paris Embassy in order to facilitate negotiations with the Chinese on exchange matters, and to process specific requests. The study thus implies a three-tiered structure of exchange relationships between the U.S. and the PRC: an “approved” level of programs that have been negotiated between PRC and U.S. authorities in Paris, a second level of exchanges that have USG blessing but that are managed without negotiated approval via one or another “umbrella” organizations, and a third level of contacts that the Chinese will be free to develop through groups that are not directly subject to governmental influence.

While this NSSM makes substantial progress in identifying the problem areas and procedures related to implementing exchange pro-

grams with the PRC, we find a number of deficiencies in the present version:

—The study clearly envisages a predominant State influence in developing exchanges. There is no mention in the paper of White House interest, or of the NSC.

—No clear position is developed for responding to the Chinese should they resist dealing with “umbrella organizations” that are acceptable to the U.S.

—The paper does not spell out very clearly how official judgments will be passed in approving certain exchange programs and rejecting others.⁸

—The exact mechanics of dealing with the Chinese on exchange matters, and liaisoning with private groups in the U.S., are not clearly conceptualized.

—The paper looks at possible future problems, but does not address those that exist now, e.g., what is being done to process the myriad of requests for assistance on exchanges which we are now receiving.

It is our feeling that in some measure it is too early to define fully such aspects of exchange programs, in part because we have only limited evidence of Chinese intentions in this area. We are now in the process of gaining such experience through our dealings with PRC authorities and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations—as noted, now the prime candidate for an “umbrella organization”—in connection with the tour in the U.S. of the Chinese ping pong team. We suggest that shortly after the tour is over we assess this experience as the basis for more explicitly structuring our approach to dealing with the PRC in the area of exchanges.

The above noted problem areas concerning exchange programs are worked into your talking points for discussion of NSSM 148.

One important issue is common to both papers—the level and composition of State’s machinery in Paris for dealing with PRC representatives on these and other matters. State clearly prefers a major and all but independent section in the Embassy. This could have the effect of eroding over time Ambassador Watson’s role and White House control. Your talking points raise this issue in the context of the proposals in the two papers in order to get a firm grip on the question before State runs away with the ball on its own.

Your book contains:

- Talking points arranged to deal with *trade first and then exchanges*.
- Analytical summaries of each of the State papers.
- NSSM Response—Trade

⁸ Kissinger’s handwritten comment above this paragraph reads: “Can’t we get some systematic approach?”

—NSSM Response—Exchanges
—NSSM 148—Trade Issues
—NSSM 149—Exchanges⁹

⁹ Copies of these documents are attached but not printed. NSSM 148 and 149, the resulting reports, and “issues and summary” papers for each are also in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 148.

218. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 31, 1972, 3:05–3:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

SRG Meeting on NSSM 148 (US/PRC Exchanges) and NSSM 149/CIEPSM2
(US/PRC Trade)

PRESENT

Dr. Kissinger, NSC
Mr. Holdridge, NSC
Mr. Rush, OSD
Mr. Nutter, OSD
Mr. Doolin, OSD
Admiral Moorer, JCS
Ambassador Brown, State
Mr. Richardson, State (Cultural Affairs)
Mr. Hinton, CIEP
Mr. Helms, DCI
Mr. McGinnis, Treasury
Mr. Lynn, Commerce

Dr. Kissinger opened by saying that the major thing he wanted out of this meeting is a strategy—i.e., what do we want to do and, via the negotiations in Paris, how do we get there from here? He noted that the Chinese liked nothing less than a series of ad hoc choices and

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0094, China (Reds), 1972. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Doolin on April 7 and approved by Nutter. Copies were sent to Laird, Rush, and Nutter. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Laird saw it. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The time and place of the meeting are taken from a more extensive record in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 93, Country Files, Far East, China Trade/Exchanges, February 2, 1972–July 4, 1973, 2 of 2.

offerings, and said we need some sense of priorities so that we can proceed. After telling Mr. Hinton that he wanted the CIEP involved in a systematic way, he asked Ambassador Brown to explain our priorities concerning the trade issue. Ambassador Brown said that if the paper² met with the approval of the group, an action program of the most important items would be developed to be presented to the PRC. He also said that we should get something moving on the claims question, as well as establish a point of contact acceptable to the PRC that can be used by US businessmen. Mr. Hinton said we should not expect much by way of trade except at the ends of the spectrum where Japanese competition is weak (e.g., grain and civil aircraft), or possibly something in the middle such as fertilizer. Hinton expressed some doubt on the question of funnelling all US businessmen through one point of contact. He added that there is little chance for either MFN or EXIM in the near term, and that, in short, we should not move too fast too soon. Kissinger seemed to agree, noting that we do not want the big thrust submerged in a wave of uncoordinated trade applications. Mr. Lynn asked a series of questions: Where do we stand now? Should we create the image that we are all that eager to press ahead on the trade front? What is the trade potential, given PRC non-use of long-term credits? Lynn felt that we should not get US business convinced that there is a great market where none exists, at least over the next 3–5 years. (Mr. Helms said the CIA estimate was an annual market of \$300 million maximum.) Kissinger said that the question of contacts could be handled in one of three ways: (1) All contacts should be made at the Department of State for referral to Paris, (2) Another “umbrella” organization could be established which would refer requests to the PRC, or (3) A point of contact could be established in the PRC. Mr. Rush then focussed the discussion by noting that the entire subject is dominated by political considerations and that it was vital that allies such as Japan and Taiwan not be alienated. He cautioned that we should keep the bud growing but not overdo it. With regard to contacts, Mr. Rush argued that a close watch should be kept either through an umbrella organization or by the Department of State. Mr. Helms said he found Mr. Rush’s logic to be unassailable, adding that if we go too fast we will end up in a terrible mess. Ambassador Brown agreed. Kissinger said he felt that the PRC would likely take our guidelines in this regard and that if we give none, the Chinese will likely feel their way toward a congenial umbrella group. Mr. Rush said that there are two ways we can handle this. One way would be to tell the PRC through Ambassador Watson that we don’t want a flood of visas issued. The second would be to tell the business community, through

² Reference is to the response to NSSM 149, summarized in Document 217.

the Department of State, that there isn't a great potential for trade with the PRC. Kissinger then told Brown that the paper has to be put in action program format, as we must tell the Chinese soon how we visualize things or the Paris meetings will peter out—or the Chinese will devise their own contacts. Brown argued that the claims question negotiations should be separate; Kissinger agreed, but said that those negotiations should commence only after there is some glimmering of movement regarding the trade question. Hinton then raised a potential textile problem to which Kissinger replied that he thought the PRC would handle this unilaterally and with restraint. Brown closed the discussion of NSSM 149 by saying that an action program would be prepared within a week.³

Turning to NSSM 148,⁴ Mr. Richardson said that we are starting a learning process in which we are trying to show the PRC that exchanges through responsible structures are in their interest as much as in ours. Kissinger said that we should tell the PRC which groups are the responsible ones, and John Holdridge replied that this was done in February in Peking by the State contingent. Kissinger said that, in any event, Ambassador Watson should be provided a list to present to the Chinese as our recommendation, adding that he did not think the PRC would challenge our list. Richardson said the list would be drawn up but we would need more consultations with the private sector. A question was raised as to whether the exchanges would be on the basis of equality. Kissinger said there would be no fingerprinting of citizens of the PRC and seemed to indicate that equality would be the rule, but the meeting tailed off at this point, and Dr. Kissinger's reaction was not totally clear.

Dennis J. Doolin

Deputy Assistant Secretary

³ See footnote 9, Document 229.

⁴ Document 209.

219. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, undated.

1. The U.S. side has made a full investigation of the incidents that the Chinese side brought to its attention on March 24, 1972.²

The U.S. side has verified that the ship and aircraft in question on the dates cited went within twelve nautical miles of the Paracel Islands but at no time moved closer to the Islands than three nautical miles. The ship and aircraft were conducting surveillance on an infiltration trawler engaged in carrying contraband in the vicinity of Lincoln (Tung) Island in the Paracels.

In the interest of U.S.–Chinese relations the U.S. side has issued instructions that henceforth a distance of at least twelve nautical miles should be maintained from the Paracel Islands. This is without prejudice to the U.S. positions either on the territorial sea question or the various claims to the Paracel Islands.

2. The Chinese message read to the U.S. side on March 14, 1972, together with recent public statements by the Chinese side on the Indochina conflict, require comment.³

The U.S. recognizes that the People's Republic of China is obliged to take positions that support its friends. However, the Chinese side must understand that certain of its recent comments can only be considered inconsistent with the spirit with which the two sides have conducted relations. This spirit has consisted of an attempt to look with understanding at the other side's viewpoint across an ideological gulf.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. According to an attached April 3 memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, Lord delivered the message to PRC representatives in New York on the evening of April 3. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 119.

² At a March 24 meeting between Haig and Huang Hua in New York, the PRC Ambassador read a note protesting incursions by U.S. naval vessels and aircraft. A memorandum of conversation, March 24, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 118.

³ See Document 213. In his April 3 report to Kissinger (see footnote 1 above), Lord wrote: "Then (as you instructed) I made an informal comment on a personal basis along the following lines. I had been with Dr. Kissinger on all his trips and sat in on all his meetings, and I knew personally that there was no policy he believed in more than improving relations with the People's Republic of China. This was the spirit in which we approached our relationship and one which we were prepared to apply also to North Vietnam. And this was the framework of the message I have just given her. It was also in this light that we had issued instructions concerning the Paracel Islands contained in the message. Frankly speaking, I added, this had been a very difficult issue within our Government."

The United States has gone to great lengths to take account of deeply held Chinese views. With regard to the Indochina issue it has done nothing to embarrass the Chinese side or complicate its position and it has consistently acknowledged that a peaceful settlement must be made with North Vietnam directly.

The Chinese side can be under no misapprehension concerning the profound importance of this issue for the United States. Nor would it be in the long term interest of the People's Republic of China for the U.S. to be exposed to embarrassment. The Chinese side knows full well the attitude behind the proposals the U.S. side has put forward for a negotiated settlement; that the U.S. side recognizes that a settlement must meet Hanoi's concerns since North Vietnam is a permanent factor in the area; that the U.S. has no intention of maintaining bases or a military presence in Indochina after a settlement is reached; and that it cannot be U.S. ambitions in the areas that should concern the People's Republic of China.

In light of these considerations it is difficult to understand some recent Chinese statements. For instance, it is unacceptable to be accused of sabotaging the talks in Paris when the Chinese side knows full well that it is the North Vietnamese which effectively cancelled a private meeting set for last November and postponed a private meeting set for this March. On both occasions the lack of advance notice caused technical and scheduling difficulties. Furthermore, the U.S. side fails to understand the continued Chinese reiteration that the U.S. accept the PRG's seven point plan when it has been repeatedly explained that the North Vietnamese maintain in private talks the priority of their own nine point plan; that the U.S. has responded to both plans; that the North Vietnamese themselves acknowledge that only two points of their plan really remain at issue; and that the North Vietnamese have refused to date to consider seriously any American proposal. In this connection, the U.S. side wishes to call attention to the passage in the Shanghai Communiqué in which the U.S. side stated that "no country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good."

The U.S. side believes that major countries have a responsibility to use a moderating influence on this issue and not to exacerbate the situation. The U.S. side repeats its constant position. On the one hand, any attempt to impose a military solution upon the U.S. can only lead to unfortunate consequences. On the other hand, the U.S. will continue to do everything reasonable to bring the Indochina war to a rapid conclusion on a basis just to both sides.

The U.S. also wants to reiterate the extreme importance that it attaches to the improvement of its relations with the People's Republic of China.

220. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, April 12, 1972, 5:15–6:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger: I must tell you Mr. Ambassador, that you have seduced another journalist.

Ambassador Huang: Which one?

Dr. Kissinger: Joseph Kraft. He was convinced when he went to China that we were all taken in by you. He wasn't going to let this happen to him, and he even wrote some articles from China about excessive sentimentality toward China. But I saw him 48 hours after he returned, and he is already planning a return visit to China. He wants to take his wife to China, and he is talking about nothing else. This is not a recommendation on my part. It is information.

Ambassador Huang: Which paper is he accredited to?

Dr. Kissinger: He writes in the *Washington Post*, and he's syndicated all over the country. He is an unreliable friend and a dangerous enemy.

Mr. Ambassador, I wanted to see you in the spirit in which we have communicated with each other to tell you our thinking about Vietnam.

We recognize that you are men of principle, and we are not asking for your support or mediation. But we believe that what has started between our two countries is of such historical importance that whenever there is a possibility of misunderstanding it is important that we know what the other side is thinking. We know that you will make certain public statements, and this is not an attempt to debate your public statements.

I also have other relatively minor things, but let me talk about Vietnam first.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to the attached April 16 covering memorandum from Lord, Kissinger approved this memorandum but did not forward it to Nixon. Apparently no summary memorandum was prepared.

Ambassador Huang: It so happens that I got instructions from my government to make an appointment with you. That is about a reply from the Chinese side to the April 3 message of the U.S. side.²

Dr. Kissinger: I thought this might be the case. Would you like to give me your reply first?

Ambassador Huang: I am prepared to listen to the Doctor first.

Dr. Kissinger: See...how do you like your new quarters, incidentally?³

Ambassador Huang: They are quieter than the Hotel Roosevelt, and there are more conveniences than at the hotel.

Dr. Kissinger: It is comfortable?

Ambassador Huang: Yes, very comfortable.

Dr. Kissinger: I owe an apology to your lawyer. He is much more efficient than my reports indicated.

Ambassador Huang: We are also very pleased that we could move so quickly.

Dr. Kissinger: We are delighted.

Ambassador Huang: Anyway, we must thank you for your concern.

Dr. Kissinger: We didn't do much.

What I wanted to do then is to summarize what our concern is, what our attitude is. We are not seeking military bases. We are not seeking a military victory. We have taken very seriously the advice of the Prime Minister when I visited Peking in July about not leaving a "tail" of advisers behind. We will withdraw all our forces, including advisers. We are not concerned with the preservation of any one person. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.) In short we do not believe that we are the imperialism that need concern the People's Republic in Southeast Asia.

What we cannot do is to accept a military solution which is imposed on us. We do not believe that this is in anybody's interest. We believe that the same principles are involved in Southeast Asia, and the same motives, that were involved in South Asia three months ago. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.) We believe that without Soviet offensive weapons and without Soviet encouragement this recent series of events would never have happened. And we believe that the motive in the short term affects us, but in the long term it is not directed against us. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.)

I told the Prime Minister in July, I told him in October, and the President told him that we would not accept a military defeat. I told

² Document 219.

³ All ellipses are in the source text.

the Ambassador on March 13 (*sic*) that we would not expand military operations in Indochina unless they were expanded by our opponents against us.⁴ After the Chinese message to us I kept an especially close watch on military operations, and I don't think that one can find any military actions against the Democratic Republic between March 15 and April 2, after the offensive started. Indeed I can tell you in all frankness I received four different recommendations from our military commanders during that period who saw the military buildup of North Vietnam and asked permission to take preventive measures. In each case the President and I refused permission.

So I must tell you, Mr. Ambassador, that we did not want a military solution and even today we do not want a military solution. And I would like to summarize for you all the messages which have passed between us and the North Vietnamese. I'm not asking you to give me your judgment, but in considering the situation in Peking we want the Prime Minister, for whom we have such an enormous regard, to at least know our side.

On February 14 the North Vietnamese proposed a private talk with us for March 15 in Paris. On February 17 we accepted that without condition, and suggested March 20 as a date.

Ambassador Huang: The 17th?

Dr. Kissinger: No, the 20th. We suggested March 20th because for me it must always be worked so that my absence is not noticed so much, so that they think in Washington that I am visiting a girl.

On February 29 the North Vietnamese accepted the date of March 20. We then made all the preparations, which are quite complex for us, of getting airplanes, landing rights and so forth.

On March 7 the North Vietnamese informed us that this date was . . . that they wanted to postpone the meeting until April 15, claiming we had engaged in air attacks between March 2 and March 6. For the information of the Prime Minister, there were no air attacks between March 2 and 6. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.) And when we do something we tell you privately. We admit transgressions on Chinese soil when they occur.

On March 13 we accepted the new proposal and proposed April 24 as the date. The reason we proposed April 24 was because I had already agreed to go to Japan the weekend of April 15.

We then did not hear from North Vietnam at all for over ten days even though we were accepting their own proposal. So we suspended—since they had not agreed to private talks, we suspended the public talks.

⁴ Reference is to a March 14 meeting in New York. See Document 213.

On March 27 the North Vietnamese accepted the date of April 24. On April 1 (*sic*) we therefore informed the North Vietnamese that the plenary sessions would resume on April 13, in other words that we were prepared to return to the peace talks.

On April 2 they attacked across the DMZ. We then told them on April 6 . . . they knowing already that we had agreed to go to the plenary sessions, they held a press conference and publicly demanded that we go April 13 to a meeting. We then informed them on April 6 that in these conditions we could not come on April 13 and that whether we would come on April 20 depended on the military operations. Their reply to this was to start military attacks near Saigon.

Now I would like to tell you our attitude. The Prime Minister told me once that it was very difficult for you to enter the war in 1950, but you felt that you had to do it because your word counts.

Ambassador Huang: Would you please repeat that sentence?

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister once, in a historical discussion, told me that it was a very hard decision to send peoples' volunteers into North Korea, but you had to do it because you said you would do it and your word counts.

Well, we are in a similar position. We have told the Democratic Republic and told you that if we are put under military pressure we would respond and, painful as it is for us, our word counts also.

Now we have told the Democratic Republic that I, nevertheless, even though they've attacked across the DMZ and even though they've launched regular army attacks, I am prepared to come to the meeting on April 24 with Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, and I would come there with the attitude of bringing a rapid conclusion to the war. If this private meeting makes any progress at all, we will resume the public sessions very shortly thereafter.

If the Democratic Republic returns to the agreements it has made with us in 1968, we will stop the military operations in North Vietnam.

And I repeat that we accept a neutral Vietnam. We want no bases. We will discuss a fair political process. But painful as this is and whatever the price to whatever relationship, we will not swerve from the present course if the Democratic Republic continues to pursue the actions on which it is now engaged. We believe it would be tragic if this would jeopardize the relationship which is so important for our foreign policy and on which we have worked with so much seriousness. We are convinced that if Hanoi meets us with anything like the largeness of spirit of the Chinese leaders, we would find a solution as satisfactory with them as we have found in our relations with the People's Republic.

I have a few others things which do not concern Vietnam, but perhaps the Ambassador would want to give me his comments on Vietnam which I suspect are not in complete agreement with ours.

Ambassador Huang: I am going to convey a message to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Could you give us the paper informally? Then Mr. Lord would not have to write it all down.

Ambassador Huang: I can read it slowly.

(Dr. Kissinger says to Lord: "It must be pretty tough.")

Ambassador Huang: There are two points in the message.

(The Ambassador then reads the following from a typed message in Chinese and Miss Shih translates it slowly.)

"1. The Chinese side has noted the promise conveyed in the April 3, 1972 message from the U.S. side that U.S. ships and aircraft would no longer come within 12 nautical miles of China's Hsi Hsa Islands. At the same time, the Chinese side reiterates that the Hsi Hsa Islands are indisputably Chinese territory, that the width of the Chinese territorial sea stipulated by her is 12 nautical miles, and that it requires all quarters to show full respect for this.

"2. Regarding the second point of the April 3, 1972 message, the Chinese side has the following comments.

"The spirit with which the Chinese and U.S. sides have conducted relations consists of frankness in the exchange of views without concealing the great differences existing between them and an effort to seek common ground. The Chinese side has always acted in this spirit. The U.S. message reproaching against the Chinese side is unacceptable.

"The U.S. side can be under no misapprehension concerning China's principled stand on the question of Indochina. The U.S. side knows full well that the Chinese side firmly supports the peoples of the three Indochina countries in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. The Chinese side is convinced that the Vietnamese 7 point proposal and the 2 points of elaboration have provided a reasonable basis for a peaceful settlement, that any attempt by the U.S. side to intensify the war and exert pressures can only give rise to even stronger resistance by the Indochinese peoples, that the Chinese people sharing weal and woe with the Indochinese peoples will certainly give them strong support, and that the Chinese believe that such actions on the part of the U.S. side can only exacerbate tension and provide opportunities for others to take advantage of it.

"In the light of these conditions one cannot but be surprised that the U.S. side should express difficulty in understanding recent Chinese statements on the Indochina issue. China realizes that the United States of America is in a difficult position on the Indochina issue. However, the U.S. side must understand that this situation was brought about entirely by the U.S. itself. The concentration of U.S. naval and air forces for the wanton bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the clamors about expanding the war, the indefinite suspension of the

Paris talks, etc. decidedly will not help the U.S. gain its objective but can only make the U.S. even more bogged down in an embarrassing position.

“The Chinese side wishes to call attention to the following passage in the Shanghai Communiqué:

‘ . . . the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.’

“On the question of Indochina, it is the U.S. that has violated these principles and harmed Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and not Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos that have harmed the U.S. If the U.S. takes its above statement seriously and truly has a desire to effect a reasonable settlement of the question of Indochina, then it should examine its own attitude.

“The Chinese side reiterates that it attaches importance to the normalization of Sino–U.S. relations and that it is firm in upholding its principles.”

That is the full text of the message. (Attached at Tab A)⁵

(Dr. Kissinger says to Mr. Lord: “Did you get it?” Mr. Lord: “Yes.”)

Ambassador Huang: I will report to Peking what the Doctor has said just now.

Dr. Kissinger: May I make two informal comments about your message.

We too value the normalization of relations between the People’s Republic and the United States very highly. And we will examine this message with great care and great seriousness.

But I would like to point out first, that we did not . . . regardless of the public positions you have to take, the record I have given you leaves no doubt that we didn’t suspend the talks indefinitely. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.)

Secondly, with respect to the bombing, we are asking Hanoi to live up to its own agreement. We did not start the bombing.

But thirdly, and most important, and this is not put forward in the spirit of debate because these discussions remain secret, this Administration, which overcame twenty years of hostility toward Peking, has no dogmatic views about Hanoi. If we could normalize our relations

⁵ Attached but not printed was a typed version of the message. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 120.

with Peking, we can certainly normalize our relations with Hanoi. But if Peking had treated us the way Hanoi does, we would still be in a posture of hostility.

And the problem is, as I pointed out to the Prime Minister and Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, whether one small country should be able to threaten all international relations because its view is so totally focussed on a very special perspective of a very special problem. There is no reasonable objective for us to achieve in securing military bases in Southeast Asia. We want the independence and neutrality of South-east Asia.

But I have pointed out the other considerations to you already, and I'm just conveying this to the Prime Minister for his understanding of our approach.

I have a few other . . . unless you want to pursue this topic.

Ambassador Huang: I'm not ready to talk on this subject. Please go ahead.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to inform you of a number of things.

One is of some importance, which I tell you in the spirit of our relationship. We wanted the Prime Minister to know that the President has ordered that the number of nuclear weapons on Taiwan be reduced by 50 per cent before the end of this year. This will be done without announcement, and this information should, of course, be treated confidentially by Peking. This is simply for your information and this is a process which will continue.

We thought you should be aware of the fact that the campaign of allegations that I showed your people photographs of Soviet military installations is continuing. We have information that in March a high-ranking East European diplomat told a high-ranking Indian diplomat in Europe that this had occurred.⁶

With respect to the visit of Senators Mansfield and Scott, they are looking forward very much to their visit to your country. The President and I spoke to them yesterday, and I think they will provide very useful bipartisan support for the policy of normalization of relations. We have urged them, and they agree, that they will discuss with your officials any public statements they will make after returning to the U.S. in order to avoid any embarrassment or misunderstanding.

To mention Vietnam in connection with the two Senators, the Ambassador is, of course, aware that this is a very complex domestic issue in this country.

⁶ Kissinger had been informed of this through an April 7 "blind" memorandum, which was included with the briefing materials prepared by Lord for this meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges)

Ambassador Huang: Well, I don't quite follow you.

Dr. Kissinger: I have another sentence. And therefore it would on the whole be preferred by us to receive any communication of Chinese views on this subject through this channel rather than through the two Senators, though, of course, we recognize you will state your basic position.

Ambassador Huang: Could you repeat this sentence?

Dr. Kissinger: We understand you will state your basic position. But, of course, you are the best judge of this.

With respect to your table tennis team, we are doing everything behind-the-scenes to guarantee their security and to provide them as warm a reception as our table tennis team received in the People's Republic.

I can tell you that when they visit Washington, the President plans to receive them, but as a personal visit, and, of course, there will be no political statements of any kind. He will simply express the friendship of the American people for the Chinese people. And if any of them play table tennis with me and I win, then I know your courtesy has reached excessive limits.

I want to review very quickly the status of our negotiations with the Soviet Union.

There is no basic change in the discussions on Strategic Arms Limitation. If the discussions go on much longer there will only be five people in the world who understand them, none of them the head of a government.

Miss Shih: None of them . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Head of Government. Because they are getting technically complex. But the basic issue right now is whether submarines should be included in the limitations. However, we expect to solve this issue before our visit to Moscow.

Our Secretary of Agriculture is returning from Moscow today, and he was received by Mr. Brezhnev. We are discussing with them the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. The issue is for how long we can give credits.

We begin talks on the settlement of lend-lease debts this week. A Soviet delegation is in Washington.

We will open negotiations on April 17 on the opening of ports in the Soviet Union and the United States to each other's shipping.

On April 27, the Soviet Minister of Economics, Patolichev, will come to the United States for economic discussions, on economic relations.

We want to repeat our basic principle. We are prepared to make any agreement with the People's Republic that we have made with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Huang: Will you repeat that sentence?

Dr. Kissinger: Any agreement we have made with the Soviet Union we are also prepared to make with the People's Republic. Any commercial arrangement we make with the Soviet Union, such as extension of credits, we are also prepared to make with the People's Republic.

But most importantly—because I know that economic issues are not your principal concern—we understand the strategy that is being pursued in Moscow. We will not participate, directly or indirectly, in enabling any other country to increase or coordinate pressures on the People's Republic. And we will leave no doubt about this on our visit. And, of course, I plan, at the invitation of the Prime Minister, to visit the People's Republic at the end of June, on which occasion I will give him a full account. In the meantime, any comment from Peking will be taken extremely seriously in Washington.

The Prime Minister—this is a minor point—the Prime Minister mentioned to General Haig when he visited Peking⁷ a Japanese account about my alleged views and I have here a letter of apology from the Japanese about the falsification, if you are interested. If you would like to see it, this is a translation.

You are very safe—you can show me Chinese documents and I wouldn't know what I am reading. (Ambassador Huang laughs.)

(Dr. Kissinger hands over the material and the Ambassador reads it carefully while Miss Shih copies down highlights.)

Dr. Kissinger: I can let you see the original the next time I come.

I don't know what's in there (gesturing at the file the Ambassador is reading.)

Mr. Lord: I never know what he is going to hand over on me.

Dr. Kissinger: I am teaching Winston Lord an absolutely new method of diplomacy.

(At this point Dr. Kissinger excuses himself to make a phone call and for several minutes the Chinese continue to read the material. Mr. Lord makes some explanations of what occurred concerning the magazine article.)

Dr. Kissinger: (pointing toward the document) Did you read this? They wrote the article before the meeting with me.

Ambassador Huang: It is most interesting.

The Chinese table tennis team arrived in Detroit at about 11:30 a.m. The correspondents attached to the delegation informed us about the situation there.

Dr. Kissinger: Were they well received?

⁷ See Document 183.

Ambassador Huang: I believe that the United States knows their itinerary thereafter.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes. (Aside to Lord: "Make sure that I receive them.")

Ambassador Huang: We appreciate very much the concern shown by the U.S. side over the security and other matters with regard to the visit of our table tennis team. We hope, as our two sides have expressed, that this visit will help enhance understanding and friendship between our two peoples.

If the Doctor has nothing more to say, I will take leave.

Dr. Kissinger: I would never admit that I have nothing more to say. A professor must never admit that.

Ambassador Huang: I hear you are leaving for Ottawa tomorrow afternoon, so probably you have a lot of things to do before that. You are very busy.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it is not so complex a visit as one to Peking. But I will be back on Saturday.

How far are you permitted to travel outside the city, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador Huang: The U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations has given us a note on this question. It consists of some regulations.

Dr. Kissinger: Anything that causes you personal inconvenience, if you would point it out, we can adjust it.

Ambassador Huang: The regulation set down by the United States Government applies to China, the Soviet Union and other countries. And here we are preoccupied with the United Nations' affairs, so we do not need very much to travel to other cities.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand you have a swimming pool in your hotel.

Ambassador Huang: It is like a big bathtub.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you using it?

Ambassador Huang: We are not using it now because it is in the open.

(There was a further exchange of pleasantries and the Chinese then left to get in their car to drive back to their Mission.)

221. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 17, 1972.

SUBJECT

Chou En-lai on the Bombings on Hanoi and Haiphong

Chou En-lai has now spoken out against the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, but in what can be considered very mild and minimal terms. Following a call on him on April 16 by the DRV Chargé in Peking, during which the Chargé presented Chou with a copy of an April 15 NLF/PRG Central Committee appeal, Chou made a brief statement (Tab A)² containing the following points:

—He said that the Chinese Government and people “firmly support” the “just stand” of the NLF/PRG as contained in the appeal.

—He congratulated the “North Vietnamese people and army on the brilliant victories they have won on various battlefields.”

—He accused the U.S. of having embarked again on “the old track of war escalation,” including the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. However, this had failed before and would fail this time. It would only make the Vietnamese people, North and South, unite more closely to fight and defeat “the common enemy.”

—He stressed that the peoples of Indochina would never stop fighting nor would the Chinese Government and people cease to support them, so long as U.S. “aggression” continued. “Victory certainly belongs to the heroic Vietnamese people and other Indochinese people.”

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 295, Memoranda to the President, April 1972. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. An April 17 covering memorandum to Kissinger indicates that Lord drafted this memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is the April 16 New China News Agency International Service report. Rodman was dispatched to New York on April 16 to deliver to the Chinese a 2-page message from the U.S. that reported that the DRV had cancelled the April 24 meeting. The message reads in part: “For the information of the Chinese side, the United States side is proposing to the North Vietnamese the following compromise: The United States is prepared to state that it will agree to resumption of the plenary sessions on April 27, 1972 if the North Vietnamese attend the private meeting agreed upon for April 24, 1972.” The message concluded that the “cavalier behavior of the North Vietnamese” had “forced the President to take certain retaliatory measures. A continuation of the North Vietnamese effort to impose a military solution on the U.S. must have very serious consequences. The President wants to reiterate that his fundamental objective remains a rapid end to the war on a basis just for both sides. His strong preference is for a negotiated solution and it is not by his choice that a resurgence of the conflict takes place.” The message and Rodman’s memorandum of conversation are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations* 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 121.

—He pointed out that “if the U.S. Government really wants to solve the Vietnam question, it must stop escalating the war and pushing the ‘Vietnamization’ policy, and resume negotiations in Paris and seriously consider and actively respond to the seven-point peace proposal put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of the two key problems in the proposal.”

Comment: Chou’s line on this occasion is essentially what it has been before³—things are going very well for the “people” in both the South and the North, final victory will certainly be theirs despite the U.S. stepped-up military measures, the Chinese will continue to give their support so long as the fighting lasts, but no direct Chinese role is required. Chou’s remarks were *not* responsive to the NLF/PRG appeal’s call on “brothers and friends to demand that the Nixon Administration . . . end its escalation of the war against the DRV and to more strongly support and help the Vietnamese people in their efforts to completely defeat the U.S. aggressors.”

As before, Chou did not mention the Nixon Administration, but spoke only of “U.S. imperialism.” He referred only in passing to the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, citing it as just another instance of U.S. escalation and not as a major theme.

From the emphasis Chou placed on negotiations, it would appear that the Chinese would prefer a political settlement of the war rather than a continuation of the fighting.

³ Kissinger had sent a memorandum to Nixon on April 13 that discussed Chou En-lai’s views on Vietnam. Chou’s statement was prompted by the DRV’s April 11 statement, which was given to him by a DRV diplomat in Beijing. The April 11 statement was apparently prompted by DRV displeasure at the nature of the PRC’s April 10 statement on Vietnam. The memorandum to the President from Kissinger, drafted by Holdridge, concluded: “As indicated by the absence of references to the Nixon Administration, Peking is still trying to keep the Vietnam war separate from its relations with the U.S. There is no doubt, though, that Peking is indeed watching events in Vietnam very closely, and is concerned over the implications of the fighting on U.S.–PRC relations, particularly if heavy U.S. attacks on North Vietnam continue.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 525, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. IV)

222. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, April 18, 1972, 5:30–5:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Shin Yen-hua, Interpreter

Dr. Kissinger: We had your ping-pong team in Washington today. We had a very good session with your ping-pong team.²

Ambassador Huang: This morning?

Dr. Kissinger: At noon. The President received them at the White House. I saw some old friends, from the Foreign Ministry. (There was then a brief exchange on some of the Chinese with the team, including Mr. Chien and Dr. Kissinger's foreign office escort when he was in Peking.)

I already feel that they are old friends.

I have only a few items for you, Mr. Ambassador.

First, with respect to the note you handed us yesterday [*sic*],³ we are investigating it, but I can tell you now that if it happened, it was unintentional. We regret that it happened, and we shall take steps to reduce the possibility that it can happen again.

I must tell the Ambassador that I was at a dinner last night where they have two Chinese cooks. (Ambassador Huang laughs). It is embarrassing for other guests because I get very special treatment. They come in and shake my hand and talk to me.

Ambassador Huang: They certainly know you.

Dr. Kissinger: Through you.

Ambassador Huang: No.

Dr. Kissinger: I meant through our visits in China.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No summary memorandum of this conversation has been found.

² Nixon met with the PRC table tennis team from 12:04 to 12:21 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

³ Huang Hua gave Rodman a short note at 1 a.m. on April 18 protesting the incursion of a U.S. aircraft over Hainan Island. (Message attached to Rodman's memorandum of conversation, April 18; *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-13, Document 122.

The second thing I wanted you to know, for your information, is that we have learned that India has offered to Indonesia and Japan the same treaty commitment the Soviet Union has with India, and that they (India) have told Indonesia that they would be a bridge to the Soviet Union in this area. This is . . .⁴

Ambassador Huang: You mean that India will be the bridge between the Soviet Union and these countries?

Dr. Kissinger: India has offered exactly the same treaty, word for word, as the Indian–Soviet Union treaty. But this is simply for your information. We know that Japan has refused, and we think that Indonesia will refuse it.

Now, the major reason I wanted to see you was to tell you a rather delicate piece of information. You will remember, Mr. Ambassador, I told you, and before that I also told the Prime Minister, that the Soviet Government invited me on many occasions to come to Moscow to discuss the Summit, and I have always refused.

Now within recent days the Soviet Government has renewed this invitation and made it for a secret visit to review the summit and the entire international situation. In light of the rather complicated international situation, the President thought that I should go on a secret trip. And I shall therefore go within the next two days.⁵ (Ambassador Huang nods impassively.)

We wanted you to know. First, you are the only government being informed. We know that we can count on your discretion. We wanted you to know that all the principles we have discussed with the Prime Minister and other Chinese officials remain in full force as far as the President and I are concerned. (Ambassador Huang smokes a

⁴ Ellipses in the source text.

⁵ In a conversation immediately following the meeting with the PRC table tennis team (see footnote 2 above), Kissinger and Nixon discussed Sino-American relations and Kissinger's upcoming trip to New York. Kissinger affirmed: "I'm going to tell them [the Chinese] that they [the Soviets] invited me to go there [Moscow]. I had refused to go there just for the summit, but now they want to discuss the whole international situation." Nixon and Kissinger agreed that the trip would be a "jolt" to the Chinese. Kissinger added: "It doesn't hurt, we have to play it up with them as we're playing it up with Moscow." Nixon advised: "Be sure to say that the President has taken a very strong line with Moscow with regard to the China relationship, we will not let them discuss it in any way." Kissinger repeated that the Moscow trip will "shake them up." Nixon rejoined: "Good, so let them shake. They'll shake even more when we announce the Russian summit, but that's part of the deal." Kissinger answered: "No, the Russian summit we gave them advance warning of. But it's amazing that they're not playing the game that the Russians played with them, they're not needling the Russians about lack of support for Vietnam. They're beginning to needle Hanoi, with ambiguous references that imply we told you so." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 18, 1972, 12:21–1:46 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 711–14) Haldeman was also present for this meeting. The editor transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.

little faster on his cigarette.) We will under no circumstances engage in any collusion, direct, or indirect, against the People's Republic (Ambassador Huang examines his napkin), or that could harm the interests of the People's Republic.

And as a sign of good faith, we tell you this ahead of time. When I return I shall call you, and within a few days upon my return, if you are agreeable, I will tell you the major outlines of what was discussed as we have always done.⁶

Ambassador Huang: What time will you return?

Dr. Kissinger: When will I be back?

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I will be back on Sunday night or Monday night. No later than Monday night.

Ambassador Huang: We can fix a time when you are back.

Dr. Kissinger: I would prefer that, because I may be very busy immediately upon my return. If there is something that is especially urgent and I cannot get away, I will ask Mr. Lord, who will accompany me, to come see you.

In no event will you be faced with an unexpected situation. And I repeat, the previous piece of information that I gave you and the whole evolution since my visit to Peking, leaves us under no illusions as to the real purpose of the people we are visiting.

I must repeat again that this is very delicate information. We have told none of our allies or any other country.

Those are the principal items I have. I have one technical one which is related to my pedantic nature.

Miss Shih: What was that?

Dr. Kissinger: Pedantic character. He (Ambassador Huang) understands very well. (Ambassador Huang smiles.)

With all these visits I have to make my schedule many months ahead of time. Simply for my guidance, the best time for me to come to Peking after the Moscow Summit, which was arranged when the President was there (Peking), would be around June 24 for three or four days. I wonder whether the Prime Minister could let you know if

⁶ On April 26 Haig traveled to New York to meet with Huang Hua. According to the memorandum of conversation, Kissinger could not attend because he was helping Nixon prepare for a speech. Haig relayed information on the Soviet-American summit, arms talks, Vietnam, and other issues. He emphasized that "Nothing was discussed or agreed upon in any way which could harm the interests of the People's Republic of China." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 127.

that is convenient. Our difficulty after July 1 is that there is the Democratic Convention. I don't think I should be in Peking during the Democratic Convention.

Ambassador Huang: Three days or four days?

Dr. Kissinger: Three or four days. I am prepared to come for four days.

Ambassador Huang: June 24?

Dr. Kissinger: June 24 through June 28. I can do it anytime between the 21st through the 28th. I can't leave much later than the 28th. If three days earlier is convenient, we can do it, say from the 21st through the 25th.

That is all I have, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Huang: I remember that previously General Haig, and you also, mentioned a correspondent named Joseph Alsop would like to visit China.

Dr. Kissinger: Very much.

Ambassador Huang: We agree to his visit to China. We are going to inform him of that and will ask him to contact our Embassy in Canada to work out a specific time about the visa problem.

Dr. Kissinger: He is out of the country right now, but he will be back at the end of the week. That is very courteous of you.

Ambassador Huang: I have nothing else to say.

(There was then further discussion about Mr. Alsop, with Dr. Kissinger saying he was very demanding but also intelligent and well disposed to the People's Republic of China. Light conversation included a brief discussion of the Chinese pandas that had just arrived in the United States. As the Ambassador was leaving, he wished Dr. Kissinger "a good journey," and Dr. Kissinger replied that it would not be as good as his one to Peking.)

223. Editorial Note

Senators Hugh Scott (R-Pennsylvania) and Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) visited the People's Republic of China and held a series of meetings with top officials from April 19 through 22, 1972. Memoranda of conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, April 19 and 20, and Chou En-lai, April 20 and 22; reports from each Senator; and public statements made in Hong Kong are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box

316, Congressional, May–June 1972, Vol. 5. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–13, Documents 123–126.

At the April 22 meeting, Scott and Mansfield focused on ending the war in Vietnam and obtaining the release of all United States prisoners of war. They also briefly raised Korea, exchanges between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and Americans held in the PRC. According to an April 12 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt intended to brief the Senators about Americans imprisoned in China prior to their trip. Holdridge noted: "I do not see any reason why Senators Scott and Mansfield should not be briefed about the American prisoners in China, although in my opinion this should be done in a low-key way so as not to give the Chinese the impression we are carrying on a high-pressure campaign against them." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—general, April 1–June 22, 1972)

Chou En-lai revealed few specifics during these talks. For example, at the April 22 meeting, Chou raised the issue of Sino-Japanese relations and the dangers of a resurgent Japanese military. Near the end of their discussion, Mansfield asked Chou about the "timetable" for U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan, and added, "how do you expect to reclaim Taiwan?" Chou stated: "On this point I can only stand by our agreement that we should not discuss any issue we talked about—I can only say two sentences: (1) In any case, Taiwan will eventually return to the embrace of its motherland, and (2) in any case, the U.S. will finally withdraw all its troops from Taiwan."

After reviewing the memoranda of conversation and reports from this trip, Winston Lord wrote to Henry Kissinger on May 12 that "There is nothing in these materials that is particularly sensitive or startling." (Ibid., Box 1038, Mansfield/Scott Trip to China) Kissinger forwarded to the President the Senators' memoranda of conversation with a July 3 covering memorandum, noting that "While these materials contain no great insights regarding our developing relationship with the PRC, they do indicate that the Senators did an effective job in building on the official dialogue which we have initiated with the Chinese over the past year." (Ibid., Subject Files, Box 316, Congressional, May–June 1972, Vol. 5)

Mansfield and Scott's trip to the PRC helped initiate a similar visit by members of the House of Representatives. In a February 29 memorandum to the Counsel to the President for Congressional Relations, Clark MacGregor, and Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, William Timmons, Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, Richard K. Cook, reported, "Shortly after this morning's bi-partisan leadership meeting Jerry Ford called, expressing his and Speaker Albert's deep anger over the announcement that Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott would visit the PRC in the near future."

Cook then called Albert and summarized the Speaker's points in a February 29 memorandum: 1) "The House has 'carried the water' for the President on foreign policy" and "should be treated on at least a co-equal basis with the Senate." 2) "The pre-eminence of the Senate in matters of foreign policy is an anachronism not consistent with recent legislative challenges to the Executive on foreign policy matters." 3) Ford and Albert were not consulted prior to the announcement. 4) "Mansfield and Scott have not evidenced loyalty to the President on 'gut' votes and that the PRC deliberately chose to invite 'friendly' U.S. legislators." After discussing the matter with Kissinger, Cook wrote that a visit by Ford and Hale Boggs (Albert said he could not go to the PRC) to China would be considered and that they would meet with Kissinger privately. (Ibid., Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—general—Feb. 27–March 31, 1972) Boggs and Ford visited the PRC June 26–July 4. Documentation is *ibid.*, Box 1038, China—Boggs/Ford trip, June–July 1972, and *ibid.*, Subject Files, Box 316, Congressional, July–August 1972, Vol. 6.

224. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

Transfer of Two Submarines to Taiwan

At Tab A is a CNO message sent April 26 about noon to Chief MAAG Taipei approving the sale of two submarines to the Republic of China (ROC).²

So far as we know, this message does not have a White House clearance. If this is so, CNO's action would be contrary to (a) General Haig's memorandum of October 21, 1971³ asking DOD to obtain your clearance on the transfer of all major items of military equipment to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Haig. Kissinger's handwritten comment at the top of this memorandum reads: "What *are* the answers to these questions? Zumwalt freewheels too much."

² Attached but not printed is CNO telegram 2617242 to CHMAAG Taipei, April 26.

³ Document 160.

the ROC; and (b) Jeanne Davis' request last week that State and DOD send a joint memorandum to you or the President on the transfer of submarines to the ROC.

State has asked Embassy Taipei to hold up notifying the ROC until we have sorted this matter out here.

State cleared the CNO message in draft on the explicit understanding that DOD would obtain General Haig's clearance.

The CNO message also leaves unanswered the following questions:

—Why two, rather than one, submarines must be transferred to the ROC.

—Why the torpedo tubes and other equipment giving the subs an offensive potential are apparently not being removed. The subs are to be used only for anti-submarine warfare training. Thus, if we are going to transfer the craft, we would at least reduce the political irritation to Peking by being able to argue that the subs have virtually no offensive potential.

—Why the craft are being sold to the ROC for scrap value (of about \$150,000 apiece) rather than for their much higher current value.⁴

⁴ In an April 29 memorandum from Holdridge, Haig indicated that he did not authorize the CNO's message but wrote: "Go ahead w/transfer per HAK-Laird discussion." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) However, in a May 11 memorandum to Haig, Holdridge requested guidance on the three questions raised in his April 28 memorandum. He asked if only one submarine should be transferred. Haig wrote on this memorandum: "None—for now. Raise only after S.E. Asia clarifys." (Ibid.) On May 16 Haig sent a memorandum to Eliot and Pursley that reads in its entirety: "We are aware of the wish of the Republic of China to have its submarine crew now training at the New London Naval Base begin training on the Republic's own submarine at the mid-point of the course. However, it is desired that no offer to transfer one or more submarines to the Republic of China be extended at this time." (Ibid.)

225. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 3, 1972, 3:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. James C.H. Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States
Mr. Henry Chen, Political Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of China
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. John A. Froebe, Jr., NSC Staff Member

SUBJECT

Review of Ambassador Shen's Taipei Consultations

Ambassador Shen said that he had spent a useful ten days in Taipei on consultation during the latter half of March. He saw President Chiang twice and Vice President Yen twice, but had spent more time with Deputy Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. Ambassador Shen said that President Chiang had asked him to reciprocate President Nixon's greetings which the President on March 6 had asked Ambassador Shen to convey to President Chiang.² Ambassador Shen said Deputy Premier Chiang had also asked that he convey his to Mr. Kissinger. Shen said that his time in Taipei had given him a good chance to observe the reaction there to events of recent months, and added that he had found people to be taking it well in stride.

Mr. Kissinger said that the U.S. had held to its promises and that the U.S. is moving ahead only at a slow pace in its efforts to improve relations with Peking.

U.S.–PRC Discussions in Paris

Ambassador Shen complained that he had been unable to learn from the Department of State anything as to the progress of U.S. discussions in Paris with the PRC. Mr. Kissinger replied that there have been no political discussions in Paris, only exploration of the development of exchanges of various sorts. Asked, Mr. Kissinger said that the U.S. Government definitely would keep the Republic of China informed of developments in the Paris channel.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret; Sensitive. According to the attached May 10 covering memorandum from Froebe to Kissinger through Holdridge, Kissinger approved this memorandum of conversation and wanted no further distribution of it. The meeting was held in the White House from 3:20 to 3:35 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438 Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² See Document 207.

U.S. Military Assistance to the ROC

Ambassador Shen said that the Deputy Premier had asked him to stress two things to Mr. Kissinger upon his return to Washington. First, the GRC's basic policy of opposition to Communism remains unchanged. It has had no contacts with the Soviet Union. Second, the GRC has not been in touch with the Chinese Communists and it does not intend to establish any contacts with Peking. Similarly, Peking has not so far attempted to contact Taipei, although GRC officials believe that the Chinese Communists may well try to establish such contacts in the future.

Mr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Shen to inform his Government that U.S. Government contacts with Peking are now on the technical level, dealing with the problems of developing exchange programs and handling the cases of individuals. He reiterated that the U.S. has had no discussions of substance with the PRC in Paris.

Ambassador Shen asked what reason Huang Chen had given for departing Paris for Peking. Mr. Kissinger, taking note of Huang Chen's absence, said he understood that Huang would return before long, and added that in Huang's absence our Embassy in Paris had been in touch with a First Secretary of the PRC Embassy.

Ambassador Shen said that he had not brought a shopping list back to Washington, but had been asked by Taipei to check on the status of several items of military assistance: the transfer of 200 M-48 tanks, MAP support of 100 F-5Es and 45 F-5Bs for conversion of fighters and for training purposes, Phase II co-production of UH-1H helicopters and of T-54 helicopter engines and waiver of the ten percent military assistance deposit requirement. Mr. Kissinger assured Ambassador Shen that the White House was not holding these items up, and asked Mr. Froebe to give him a report on this list by the following Monday.³

³ Davis asked the Departments of State and Defense for "a coordinated status report" by May 9 (a Tuesday) on the military hardware raised by Shen. (Memorandum from Davis to Eliot and Pursley, May 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-CHINAT) On May 12 Eliot sent a 9-page status report to Kissinger. (Ibid.) Froebe reported to Kissinger on June 20 that Defense and State agreed on credits for helicopter co-production and that the 10 percent deposit requirement should not be waived. State and Defense disagreed on transfer of 400 M-48 tanks, funding of fighter and training aircraft, and a T-53 helicopter engine assembly program. Froebe suggested that Kissinger ask Rogers to provide a "coordinated State-Defense memorandum giving their views on these items for the President's consideration." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: "Can't we [do this] informally without rubbing his [Rogers'] nose in it?" An undated covering note attached to the memorandum from Holdridge to Kennedy noted: "Dick: Looking at HAK's comment, he seems to have missed the point. Far from any intention of rubbing it in, we only want to assert his policy primacy as regards to military assistance. Our concern, of course, is that Tarr may try to move in on this area, indicated here by the statement in State's memorandum that 'he will resolve the State/Defense differences' on the three assistance items for the ROC."

Ambassador Shen also asked the prospects for the transfer of F-4 fighter aircraft. Mr. Kissinger suggested that we first take care of the list of items Ambassador Shen had just given him, and then turn to the question of F-4s. Ambassador Shen asked why the sensitivity over F-4s. Mr. Kissinger replied that Phantoms invariably raise sensitivities, and asked Ambassador Shen if his government had ever made a formal request for these aircraft. Ambassador Shen said that the Vice President had been asked about the transfer of F-4s when he was in Taipei in August 1970, and added that Congress had considered the matter in late 1969 and early 1970. Mr. Kissinger mentioned that Senator Goldwater had on occasion mentioned the matter of F-4s for the ROC, and added that he would check into the matter.

Current North Vietnamese Offensive

Asked about the current situation in Vietnam, Mr. Kissinger said the crux of the matter now involves the offensives of three to four North Vietnamese divisions. The question is how long these forces can maintain the momentum of their present drive. If the South Vietnamese can establish a defense around Hue, the North Vietnamese can probably be punished so badly that the steam can be taken out of their offensive. Ambassador Shen said that he had been encouraged by the President's television statement on Vietnam last week, but asked if the North Vietnamese can still be stopped. Mr. Kissinger replied that they could.

Mr. Kissinger's Japan Trip

Ambassador Shen asked Mr. Kissinger when he was departing for Japan. Mr. Kissinger said that the timing of the visit depends upon the Vietnam situation. Ambassador Shen asked if Mr. Kissinger would be able to visit other countries in East Asia after Japan. Mr. Kissinger replied that he planned to visit only Japan. Asked what the content of his discussions in Japan would include, Mr. Kissinger said that he would rule out economics, except in terms of general principles. When Ambassador Shen returned to the possibility of Mr. Kissinger's including other countries in his trip, Mr. Kissinger thanked him for his thoughtfulness and noted that Korea had already been suggested. Asked if the Japan visit would come before the President's Moscow trip, Mr. Kissinger said he hoped this would be the case, or, if not, certainly immediately thereafter. In response to Ambassador Shen's question, Mr. Kissinger said he had visited Japan before—in 1962 when, he recalled, the ROC Ambassador had given him a dinner.

Ambassador Shen, noting that President Chiang would be inaugurated for his fifth term on May 20, asked if the United States Government planned to announce soon the fact that Ambassador Eisenhower would represent the President at that event. Mr. Froebe said that an announcement was planned for probably tomorrow.

Prospects for U.S.–PRC Relations

Ambassador Shen asked if there was anything else the ROC could do to contribute to its relationship with the United States at this point. Mr. Kissinger said the two governments should stay in close touch, and again assured Ambassador Shen the U.S. was moving forward slowly in its efforts to improve relations with Peking. Ambassador Shen said that much of this problem would seem to depend on how far the U.S. has decided to move in its relationship with Peking. Mr. Kissinger replied that the U.S. had no intention of going much beyond where it is now, and, responding to Ambassador Shen's question, affirmed this would hold true for the foreseeable future.

226. Letter From President Nixon to the Premier of the People's Republic of China Chou En-lai¹

Washington, May 8, 1972.

Dear Mr. Premier:

I want to inform you personally of a major decision I have made concerning Southeast Asia which I am announcing tonight.²

In recent weeks we have intensified our efforts to find a just peace in Indochina. We have resumed negotiations with the North Vietnamese in public and private forums and have offered to discuss either mutual de-escalation or a settlement of military issues alone or a comprehensive settlement. At the same time we have used all available means to point out the consequences of Hanoi's trying to impose a military solution.

The response to our efforts has been North Vietnam's massive escalation of the war and complete intransigence in public and private negotiations. In these circumstances, I have ordered certain military actions in order to bring this conflict to a close. Effective immediately, all entrances to North Vietnamese ports are being mined and United States forces have been directed to take appropriate measures to prevent ships from delivering supplies to North Vietnam. Rail and other communications within North Vietnam will be interrupted to the maximum extent possible.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 114, Geopolitical Files, China, Nixon, Richard M., Letters to Mao and Chou. No classification marking.

² Nixon announced his decision to mine North Vietnamese harbors at 9 p.m., Eastern Standard Time. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 583–587.

These actions are not directed at any other nation. Special care has been taken that all foreign vessels currently in North Vietnamese ports will be able to depart safely within three daylight periods. After that time any ships attempting to leave or enter these ports will do so at their own risk. It is my hope that there will be no incidents involving third countries.

These operations are designed to bring the conflict to a rapid end on a basis just to both sides. They will stop when American prisoners of war are returned and there is an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina. When these conditions are met, we will stop all of our military acts of force throughout Indochina and proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam within four months.

We understand that the People's Republic of China must take certain formal positions in response to these developments. At the same time, in the spirit of frankness that has characterized our conversations thus far, we would hope that you would understand the imperatives that have forced this decision upon us.

It is easy to employ phrases like "imperialism." Such slogans will not stand the test of the reasonable proposal I am setting forth this evening to end the war. Our terms provide for the United States to withdraw with honor. They would end the suffering and bring prisoners home. They would not require surrender and humiliation on the part of either side. They would allow negotiation on a political settlement that reflects the popular will. They would permit all the nations which have suffered in this long war to turn at last to the urgent works of healing and peace. They deserve immediate acceptance by North Vietnam.

You know our position from our exchanges ever since last July. We have assured you—as we have assured the North Vietnamese—that we do not seek a victory in any sense. We do not seek territory or bases or a permanent force or an American-sponsored government in South Vietnam. As part of either a military settlement or a comprehensive settlement we remain prepared to withdraw all American forces, without leaving any residual force behind. We have only one objective—to let the South Vietnamese determine their political future free from outside interference.

On the other hand, we have also told you of the serious consequences that could ensue if North Vietnam were to launch the massive assault which is now taking place and is designed to embarrass the United States.

It should be clear that it is not the United States which represents a long-term threat to the People's Republic of China. It is not the United States which seeks a long term presence in Indochina.

During the past three years the People's Republic of China and the United States have been patiently opening a new relationship based on the profound interests of both countries. We now face an important decision. We must consider whether the short term perspectives of a smaller nation—all of whose own reasonable objectives could so clearly be achieved—can be allowed to threaten all the progress that we have made. I would hope that after the immediate passions have cooled, we will concentrate on longer term interests.

I have no higher goal in my foreign policy than to build upon the positive beginning that together we made in February. It would be a deep disappointment to me if North Vietnamese actions were to jeopardize this beginning. There is no need for this to happen.

This is an opportunity for statesmanship. It is an opportunity for a decisive turn toward peace. We are willing to cooperate with any country to bring about an immediate settlement without the sacrificing of principles. There can be an early peace in Indochina that will meet the concerns of all parties, including both North Vietnam and the People's Republic of China. And such a solution will allow our two countries to make further progress in our bilateral relations, for the sake of our two peoples and the peoples of the world.³

Yours sincerely,

Richard Nixon

³ The letter was delivered by Rodman to Huang Hua in New York on the morning of May 8. A memorandum of conversation between Rodman and Huang Hua, May 8, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 128.

227. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

My May 16 Meeting with the Chinese

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. The memorandum is marked "not forwarded" and was not initialed by Kissinger.

I met with Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua in New York for an hour in the evening, on May 16, to outline for his Government the prospects for the Moscow Summit. We also discussed the Indochina situation, in a somber but restrained fashion. The full transcript is at Tab 1,² and highlights follow.

The Moscow Summit

Noting that we were not giving this information to any other government, I proceeded to outline for the Ambassador the major agreements and issues that we expected in Moscow:

—First, I handed a paper summarizing the various bilateral agreements we expect to sign in Moscow, such as SALT, space cooperation, environmental cooperation, etc. (Tab A)³

—Then, I verbally outlined the statement of principles on US–Soviet relations which we are in the process of drafting. (Talking points on these principles at Tab B.)⁴ I pointed out that in some respects these principles were similar to those in the Shanghai Communiqué and I added that we had inserted a couple of points which were designed to prevent implications for third countries and counter the Brezhnev Doctrine.

—In response to a Soviet suggestion for a bilateral nuclear non-aggression pact, I said that we would not agree to their formulation which could be interpreted as sanctifying nuclear weapons against third countries, and said that any agreement in this area would express a general attitude on nuclear weapons rather than specific obligations.

—I reaffirmed the enormous importance we placed in our relations with the PRC. We would sign no agreements knowingly that would be against their interests, were prepared to conclude any agreements with Peking that we did with Moscow, and welcomed their comments on negotiations that caused them concern.

Comment: The Ambassador, as usual, listened impassively to this presentation. I think that discussion, on top of all the previous briefings we have given them, should prepare the Chinese for the impressive set of agreements we will sign in Moscow.

² The 9-page memorandum of conversation is attached but not printed. Lord accompanied Kissinger to New York. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 129.

³ Attached at Tab A but not printed is a paper detailing the three agreements mentioned by Kissinger and additional agreements concerning Health, Science and Technology, Maritime, Incidents at Sea, and a Joint Commercial Commission. See *ibid.*

⁴ Attached at Tab B but not printed are the talking points listing the 12 principles. See *ibid.*

Indochina

In addition to Europe, I cited Indochina as a logical agenda item for your talks with the Soviet leaders. I informed the Ambassador about the proposal from “various sources” (i.e., the Russians) that we resume the Paris plenary sessions. I said that we believed a private meeting was necessary first in order to determine whether there would be progress, and that we had proposed a secret meeting in Paris on May 21. There followed a brief, moderate exchange on Indochina along the following lines:

—Referring to press reports that day of Chou’s saying that we had strayed from the Shanghai Communiqué with our military actions, I reminded the Ambassador that we had warned the PRC a half-dozen times since your Peking trip about our intention to react strongly if Hanoi attempted to impose a military solution. In any event, we had kept, and would keep, all the promises we made, whether in the Shanghai Communiqué or informally.

—Ambassador Huang referred to the PRC public statements a few days ago as the authoritative Chinese position.⁵ He added that the Chinese would support the Vietnamese people against our aggression and for national salvation until the end.

—He then asked whether we had any more facts about the alleged damage done by US forces to Chinese merchant ships earlier this month.⁶ I told him that an investigation was underway but that preliminary reports indicated that US forces had inadvertently caused damage to Chinese ships while attacking North Vietnamese barges. I expressed regrets on your behalf and said that if they would give us an estimate of damage, we would look into the question of compensation. (We had already conveyed this position to the Chinese as soon as they published their protest so as to forestall any heightening of the rhetoric.)

—I then made a general pitch on Indochina along familiar lines, underlining that we did not represent the long-term threat in the region and that it served no country’s interests for Hanoi to attempt to solve the question by force.

Comment: The Ambassador, though he seemed somewhat more solemn than usual, was restrained on Indochina and seemed to go through the motions. This was still further evidence of moderate Chinese response to your military actions.

⁵ See “Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China,” *Peking Review*, 20 (May 19, 1972), p. 6.

⁶ The PRC publicly made its displeasure known with a statement on May 9. See *Peking Review*, 19 (May 12, 1972), p. 4.

Miscellaneous

Other topics included:

—I told the Ambassador that Senators Mansfield and Scott had come back with a positive report to you on their trip.

—I proposed that my June 21–25 trip to the PRC be announced June 13 and gave the Ambassador a suggested text (Tab C).⁷

—I informed him that I would probably be going to Japan in early June.

⁷ Tab C is attached but not printed. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 129. In a June 3 memorandum to Kissinger, Lord reported on his brief meeting with Huang in New York. The PRC representative suggested that Kissinger's visit be changed to June 19–23 because "there is another important visit to China beginning June 24 which cannot be put off." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 130. The White House announced the trip at 11 a.m. on June 14. (News Conference #1468; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Far East, U.S. China Policy, 1969–1972)

228. National Security Decision Memorandum 170¹

Washington, June 8, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

US–PRC Trade

The President has reviewed the memorandum submitted by the Department of State, with the Department of Commerce, on April 24 and the response to NSSM 149 submitted by the Ad Hoc Group on

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT 1 CHICOM–US. Secret; Nodis; Homer. The typewritten date on this memorandum, June 10, was changed by hand. Also issued as a Council on International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum.

March 24 on the above subject.² Based on these, he has approved the recommendations for actions over the next three months contained in the April 24 memorandum for proceeding to implement the statement on trade in the Shanghai communiqué with the following modifications:

—The memorandum for Ambassador Huang should indicate that we recognize the PRC's interest in MFN but view this as a subject for later discussion.³

—The matter of alleged PRC failure to repay Export-Import Bank debt should not be raised by the PRC at this time. An interagency committee chaired by Treasury should examine this question and its effect on PRC eligibility for Export-Import Bank financing, and submit a report to the President by July 3.

—The memorandum for Ambassador Huang should place greater stress on the necessity of beginning discussions in the near future on the settlement of the claims issue.

—References to the cotton textile issue and to US anti-dumping regulations and US prohibitions on imports of "certain endangered animal species" should be removed from the memorandum for Ambassador Huang. These matters should be dealt with in separate memoranda to be presented to Ambassador Huang within the next several weeks. In his oral presentation, Ambassador Watson should indicate that we intend to provide the PRC with such memoranda shortly. Memoranda on these subjects together with recommendations as to the timing of their presentation should be submitted to the President by June 23.⁴

—No mention should be made to the PRC at this time of possible US changes in transportation regulations. The Department of State, in cooperation with other appropriate agencies, should submit to the President as soon as possible documents necessary to revise US regulations regarding reciprocal visits by ships and aircraft. A draft statement announcing such decisions as well as a statement indicating that eventual establishment of scheduled air services would be subject to US–PRC inter-Governmental discussions should also be submitted.

As to recommendations for longer term steps, the President has deferred his decision and requests that they be resubmitted with

² On April 24 Brown forwarded to Kissinger a covering memorandum and an 8-page report on recommendations for implementing NSSM 149. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT 1 CHICOM–US) Regarding the March 24 response to NSSM 149, see Documents 217 and 219. NSSM 149 is printed as Document 208.

³ See Document 242.

⁴ Approved by Haig in the White House and sent as telegram 150506 to Paris, August 17. (Memorandum from Hormats to Haig, August 14, with attached telegram; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 529, Country Files, Far East, Homer, US–PRC Negotiations, Paris)

proposed memoranda, where appropriate, and specific recommendations as to timing.⁵

Henry A. Kissinger
PMF

⁵ On June 12 Kissinger and Flanigan sent a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Peterson, and NASA Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher announcing that “in the review taking place on COCOM the United States should adopt as a general principle the termination of differential treatment for the PRC as the basis for development of the United States negotiating position. In the event that there are particular items which we and other COCOM countries agree should be treated on a differential basis, we should endeavor to apply the concept of ‘disguised differential.’” (Ibid., Box 525, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. IV)

229. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 9, 1972.

SUBJECT

Possible Next Steps in Sino-US Relations

Following is an analysis of possible next steps in Sino-American relations. It has been worked out in close coordination with a Department of State paper.² As the State analysis is somewhat less inclusive than this version, but with an otherwise substantial degree of overlap, we will cable only this version to avoid redundancy.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1317, Harold Saunders Files, Richard Solomon Chron Files, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent through Haig.

² A June 9 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon is attached but not printed. Included with Rogers’ memorandum are two attachments: Joint US–PRC Trade Commission and U.S. Representation in Peking, and Air Travel.

³ This memorandum was apparently sent as a telegram to Kissinger, who was in Japan June 8–12.

I—Where We Stand—PRC Actions since the Peking Summit

Since the signing of the February 28 Shanghai Communiqué, there have been a number of solid indications that the Chinese are living up to the spirit of that document and wish to sustain the momentum of our developing relationship.

In the field of official exchanges, the Chinese again proved to be superb hosts during the April 18–May 3 visit of Senators Mansfield and Scott, despite the increasing tension in Indochina at that time. In addition, plans are moving ahead smoothly for the June 26–July 5 visit of Congressmen Boggs and Ford.

Little progress has been made in establishing a formal framework for other exchanges, but Ambassador Watson has met three times with PRC Ambassador Huang Chen and, in Huang's extended absence, once with the PRC Chargé. Working-level contact has also been established between the two Paris embassies on a routine basis. At a non-governmental level, a PRC table tennis team made a successful tour of the United States in April—which included a meeting with the President—and a group of Chinese physicians will probably visit the US in late June or July under the auspices of the National Institute of Health and the AMA. The PRC also recently played host to Dr. Wang Chi of the Library of Congress, to Professor John K. Fairbank of Harvard, and to a group from the Federation of American Scientists.

Consistent with its pledge to facilitate trade, Peking invited 40 American businessmen to the Canton Fair in April/May for the first time and accorded them preferential treatment. Contracts were concluded for about \$5 million worth of Chinese exports. Although no US export contracts were concluded at the Fair itself, Peking has reportedly made a firm offer to buy several Boeing 707 aircraft, is negotiating other purchases from Lockheed, and has asked Hughes Aircraft Corporation to submit a proposal for a domestic communications satellite system.⁴ RCA

⁴ In a May 19 memorandum to Flanigan and Kissinger, Harold B. Scott, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business, noted that Boeing sought "approval and appropriate guidance for further negotiations with the PRC." He added that a committee of representatives from Defense, State, Commerce, and NASA agreed that Boeing should negotiate with the PRC "subject to obtaining an export license and prior CoCom clearance and provided that Boeing can satisfy the U.S. Government and (a) The end-use of the aircraft is for regularly-scheduled civilian service; and (b) The only equipment requested would be normal for such regularly-scheduled civilian service." On May 23 Hormats and Holdridge summarized Scott's memorandum for Haig and suggested that the NSC approve Boeing's negotiations. A May 26 note from Jim Hackett of the NSC staff to Jon Howe reads in part: "Commerce needs a decision urgently (the Boeing negotiators are now in Peking)." A handwritten notation reads: "Heavy pressure on this." A May 29 memorandum to Secretary of Commerce Peter Peterson, signed by Haig for Kissinger, noted that Flanigan and Kissinger approved the negotiations, subject to the two requirements mentioned in Scott's memorandum. (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 525, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. IV)

has also been asked to upgrade its temporary earth satellite station at Shanghai to permanent status and to construct an additional satellite station in Peking.⁵

It should be emphasized that these developments have occurred in a political context—particularly the situation in Vietnam—which under other circumstances might have been expected to elicit a hostile response from the PRC. The nature of Peking's behavior seems to be a firm indication of a genuine desire to further improve its relationship with the United States. Consistent with its general approach to Indochina since shortly before the President's China trip, Peking has muted its comments on the US mining of the DRV coast and its pledges of support to Hanoi.⁶ Peking also has dragged its feet in responding to Soviet and East European efforts to reroute cargoes through China. These responses may stem in part from PRC displeasure with the North Vietnamese offensive which triggered the US response. Refusal to cooperate with the Soviets also has other obvious motivations.

More importantly from our perspective, however, the Chinese low-key approach appears to be the product of a PRC assessment that the President seriously intends to disengage from Vietnam and Peking's desire not to take any action which would pose a challenge to that plan. Even in an area of extreme sensitivity in our bilateral relations—the US military presence in Taiwan—Peking has remained silent over the recent deployment of two squadrons of C-130 aircraft to CCK airbase. PRC propagandists also have foregone any derisive comment on the Moscow summit meeting, in sharp contrast to Soviet behavior during the Peking summit.

II—Possible Further Areas for Initiative

Peking's behavior suggests that the Chinese leadership may be responsive to further US initiatives in the areas of political contact, cultural exchange, and trade. Following are a series of concrete steps that might be taken in each of these general areas.

A. *Political.* It is assumed that developments in Vietnam and in US-Soviet relations following the Moscow summit are of intense con-

⁵ This equipment had been installed for Nixon's visit. In a March 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Laird recommended approval of the earth station in Shanghai but denial of a license to sell 18 additional "videovoice" terminals. In a March 14 memorandum to Laird, Rogers, and Peterson, Kissinger approved the sale of the equipment already in the PRC and deferred a decision on the other equipment, stating that "these should be considered within the USG anew on their own merits." He concluded: "we should reject any effort to interpret the U.S. sale of the RCA satellite earth station and related equipment to the PRC as a basic change in the U.S. policy on the embargo of strategic communications generally." (Both *ibid.*, Box 1349, NSC Files, 2 of 2, 1971)

⁶ See Document 226 and footnote 5, Document 227.

cern to the Chinese leadership (even—or particularly—if they appear indifferent or noncommittal). Beyond these issues, however, are a number of political areas relevant to progress in Sino-American relations:

1) *Korea and the UN*. While Chinese Foreign Ministry officials have expressed the view that debate on the Korean issue is unavoidable at the coming 27th UNGA, we might seek a coordinated position with Peking (and Moscow) to avoid an acrimonious public debate which would likely polarize positions just at a time when, in the light of the growing yet fragile contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang, deferment of a GA debate would be of greatest interest to the major parties concerned.

2) *A Chou En-lai Appearance at the 27th UNGA, and Meeting with President Nixon*. The Chinese may be interested in emphasizing their re-entrance onto the world political stage through a Chou En-lai appearance at the UNGA session this fall. If progress in such areas as Vietnam and Korea permits, a Chou visit to New York in the fall might be coordinated with a meeting with President Nixon which would enable him to reciprocate the hospitality of the Chinese leader and to provide an opportunity for further talks.

3) *US Prisoners in China*. During his discussions with Senators Scott and Mansfield, Chou En-lai cryptically noted that the case of John Downey was being given “added consideration”. Downey’s release in the late summer or fall would obviously be timely.⁷

4) *Narcotics Control*. We might comment to the Chinese on our gratification at the remarks of their delegate regarding the drug problem at the May 16th session of ECOSOC, and indicate our interest in working with them to solve this major world problem.⁸

5) *Ocean Laws*. We might indicate to the Chinese our satisfaction that their most recent protest over possible intrusion by US craft into areas they claim in the Paracel Islands was conveyed privately. We

⁷ See Document 223.

⁸ In a June 16 memorandum to Kissinger, Eliot noted that Nelson Gross, Senior Adviser to the Secretary and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, had been advised by Holdridge “that it might now be appropriate to raise several topics concerning international narcotics with the People’s Republic of China. (Egil Krogh, Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Matters, agrees.)” According to the memorandum, Gross felt that two important issues were PRC assistance in interdicting narcotics traffic around Hong Kong and efforts to control opium production and traffic in Burma. He suggested discussing these issues through the UN and pointed out two specific actions that could be taken. First was to encourage “PRC accession to the Single Convention and to the Amending Protocol opened for signature on March 25.” Second was to encourage PRC membership in the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 529, Country Files, Far East, Homer, US–PRC Negotiations, Paris)

could indicate US efforts to prevent reoccurrences, but explain that we are uncertain of the rules under which the PRC delimits its territorial waters. We could then suggest that experts from both our countries convene to discuss delineation of boundaries as well as to review the range of issues likely to come up at the 1973 UN Conference of the Law of the Seas.

B. *Economic*. We have received a number of CAS and State reports which indicate that PRC officials are concerned about several legal and financial barriers to the development of trade with the US, and that they would like to purchase a range of American products (particularly those embodying advanced technology). Thus we might take a number of concrete steps to facilitate the expansion of trade.

1) *Propose the establishment of a Joint US–PRC Trade Commission (perhaps based in Peking)*. Such a Commission would be devoted to the resolution of bilateral trade problems and the promotion of Sino–American trade in the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué. This would follow the precedent of the binational trade commissions recently established with the USSR and Poland. As well, such a Commission—if based in Peking—would provide continuous US representation in the Chinese capital. While unilateral “official” US representation almost certainly remains unacceptable to Peking, the time may be ripe for detailed exploration of alternative forms of representation which would enable us to deal with impediments to Sino–American trade such as private claims against the PRC and the related frozen assets problem, the issue of MFN status and tariff barriers, and additional regulatory constraints.

1-a) *Propose that a Joint Congressional Commercial Delegation Visit the PRC*. If a formal PRC–US Trade Commission is unacceptable to the Chinese, we could suggest the visit to the PRC of a more informal, but authoritative Congressional group to discuss matters of mutual interest. It might be noted that Chou En-lai proposed to Senators Scott and Mansfield that the Senate Commerce Committee organize a delegation to come to the PRC for wide-ranging discussions. Senator Magnuson is in the process of following up on Chou’s lead. As well, Congressman Boggs plans to discuss commercial matters with the Chinese in late June. We suspect that PRC officials may not fully appreciate the Congressional and bureaucratic lay of the land involved in dealing with such problems as MFN and blocked assets. As matters now stand they are being exposed to US commerce in bits and pieces. Hence it would seem to be in our mutual interest to propose a unified and authoritative forum for discussing these issues.

2) *Private US Claims Against the PRC*. Seek an explicit agreement in principle to negotiate a settlement of the claims issue, either through a Joint Commission as proposed above, via talks at Paris, or in the context of a visit of a senior U.S. representative to Peking.

As emphasized in U/SM-91, NSSM-149, and the follow-up memorandum to NSSM-149,⁹ a claims settlement is a first-priority issue in the development of Sino-American trade. A settlement is essential to forestall disruption of US-PRC trade by lawsuits and attachments of PRC commercial property by private US claimants. During informal conversation with Secretary Rogers in Peking on February 23, Foreign Minister Chi indicated that the claims question was one which could be discussed between the US and PRC.

3) *Air and Ship Travel*. Seek an explicit agreement in principle to discuss reciprocal shipping and air service between the US and the PRC, either through the Joint Commission proposed above or at Paris.

This issue should be approached in accordance with the recommendations of NSSM-149 and its follow-up memorandum.

4) *Trade Exhibitions*. Seek an agreement to exchange trade exhibitions during the fall, or at least to have an American trade exhibition in China, perhaps in Shanghai before the fall Canton Trade Fair.

C. *Exchanges*. The successful tour of the US by the PRC ping pong team, and an imminent visit to this country of a group of Chinese doctors, indicates that the PRC intends to facilitate exchanges in a sustained and orderly manner. NSSM-148 and its follow-up memorandum suggest initiating discussions at Paris to regularize procedures for promoting exchanges.¹⁰ Sino-American contact at the senior level can be used to advance the progress of discussions at Paris.

1) *Propose "Regularization" of Procedures for Managing Exchanges*. Express to the PRC our pleasure at the progress made to date in the development of exchange programs. Indicate that we think it would be helpful to both sides to regularize procedures for selecting and managing exchange programs. On the assumption that they wish to continue the quasi-people-to-people approach utilized thus far, indicate that there are two private groups which the USG feels are worthy of confidence in managing exchanges: Scientific and scholarly programs would be facilitated by the Joint Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, a group that links the National Academy of Science, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Council of Learned Societies. Cultural programs would be facilitated by the National Committee on US-China Relations.

⁹ The follow-up memorandum was requested by Kissinger at the March 31 Senior Review Group meeting. See Document 218. Regarding the April 24 paper, see footnote 2, Document 228.

¹⁰ On April 24 Eliot sent the follow-up memorandum to NSSM 148 to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 529, Country Files, Far East, Homer, US-PRC Negotiations, Paris)

Indicate that we understand the PRC has had experience in dealing with both groups in connection with the ping pong and doctors' visits, and suggest that our embassies at Paris proceed to work out the details for processing exchange proposals on the assumption that the above two groups will be facilitating organizations on our side, with the Department of State providing authoritative communication and security where necessary.

2) *Propose Specific Exchange Programs.* If PRC authorities are reluctant to regularize a procedure for managing exchanges, propose a set of specific programs in such areas as education (exchanges of advanced students), scientific research (agronomy, medicine, etc.), sports (basketball, gymnastics), or the arts (Peking opera, dance groups, etc.)

230. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 12, 1972.

SUBJECT

PRC Foreign Ministry Statement Attacks U.S. on Vietnam Bombings

Two days after another official protest from Hanoi of June 10 in response to U.S. air raids of June 6 and 8, the Foreign Ministry in Peking has now issued a strongly worded statement supporting Hanoi and suggesting in terms not heard for some time that China's security is being threatened by the U.S. bombing. While Peking's statement toned down much of the political invective in the Hanoi version (for instance, Peking did not attack the President by name, only "U.S. imperialism"), the bombing was described as a "grave provocation against the Chinese people."

In the first interlinking of the matter of China's security with the Indochina war since the Lam Son 719 exercise in early 1971, Peking asserted that the U.S. "has steadily expanded the sphere of bombing up to areas close to the Sino-Vietnamese borders, threatening the security

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 525, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. Kissinger and Haig initialed the document.

of China." And for the first time in months it was noted that China and Vietnam are "closely related like the lips and the teeth."

In a most unusual final paragraph, which seems directly addressed to high Administration officials, the statement asserts that "U.S. imperialism should know that the heroic peoples of Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries are by no means alone in their struggle."

Despite the verbal escalation in this statement, it does not imply that the PRC will take any action against the U.S. or challenge our evolving relationship.

The timing and tone of the official protest can be accounted for at a number of levels of interpretation:

—It may very well reflect PRC concern about our interdiction campaign, which has U.S. planes bombing only minutes away from their border, if that far.²

—Hanoi may have needled the Chinese for a stronger statement, given the low-key nature of recent PRC protests.

—The Chinese almost certainly feel that they have been put into an embarrassing predicament now that their efforts to normalize relations with us are so clearly contrasted with our interdiction campaign against Hanoi. As with the Chinese blast at the U.S. delivered at the Stockholm conference—where perhaps they did not want to appear less militant than the Swedish Foreign Minister—PRC officials may have felt the time was overdue for a statement reaffirming their anti-imperialist credentials.

—Finally, this statement and the Stockholm attack may be seen as an effort to "set the record straight" for all parties concerned in advance of the coming visitation.

The PRC Foreign Ministry statement is at Tab A.³

² On June 5, 10, and 11, NSC staff members traveled to New York to receive PRC protests about the intrusion of U.S. aircraft into their airspace on June 4 and 9 and the bombing of a border town on June 10. Memoranda of conversation are *ibid.*, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 131–133. In a June 9 memorandum to Kissinger, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Murphy responded to the June 5 allegations, ascertaining that "all available evidence indicates that the claimed border violation did not occur, and that Chinese radar tracking error was the most likely cause of this incident." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) On June 11 Haig telephoned the PRC representatives in New York to affirm that the U.S. Government was investigating these complaints. A June 12 message for the PRC declared that an investigation of the June 5 allegation was "inconclusive" and the June 10 allegation was under investigation. Concerning the June 11 allegation, the message apologized for "this inexcusable incident" and promised to "take disciplinary action against the personnel responsible for this flagrant violation, however inadvertent, of strict standing orders." Haig's memorandum of record, June 11, and message dated June 12, are *ibid.*, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, China, PRC Allegations of Hostile Acts. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 134–135.

³ Attached but not printed.

231. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, June 20, 1972, 2:05–6:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister (second part only)
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Two notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger: I read over the conversation between Chairman Mao and the President, and it sounded when I read it after I knew everything that happened. . . . it was like an overture to an opera.² Every theme that was later discussed was mentioned in that hour.

Prime Minister Chou: Mr. Lord also was very familiar with that talk.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Lord disappeared from every picture. I requested it.

Prime Minister Chou: It was said that on arriving in Moscow your President also was immediately received in the Kremlin by Mr. Brezhnev. Was Mr. Lord also there, and you yourself there, but disappeared from the pictures?

Dr. Kissinger: At the first one, yes.

Prime Minister Chou: That was also my belief, but the picture came out to be a large table with only an interpreter in between.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files—Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's Visit June 1972, Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People. Kissinger sent a brief synopsis of this meeting to Haig on June 20. Haig then prepared a 1-page memorandum for the President. (Ibid.) The first meeting was held the evening of June 19. In a June 19 telegram to Haig, Kissinger described this meeting as "inconclusive." The 11-page memorandum of conversation is *ibid.* In addition to the Kissinger–Chou meetings, counterpart talks were held among Jenkins, Holdridge, Solomon, Chang Wen-chin, Tsien Ta-yung, and Chao Ch'i-hua. They discussed trade and exchanges. Memoranda of conversation for the June 21 and 22 meetings are *ibid.*, Box 87, Country Files—Near East, PRC Counterpart Talks, 1971–1973. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 140–144.

² Document 194.

Dr. Kissinger: But after that we announced the participants. I participated in every meeting between the President and Mr. Brezhnev.

Prime Minister Chou: At the beginning it was kept secret.

Dr. Kissinger: We have learned our lessons.

Prime Minister Chou: They were probably trying to copy our way of doing things.

Dr. Kissinger: They were very interested. They wanted a list of all the gifts you had given to our party before we came.

Prime Minister Chou: So that they could exceed it slightly. Including the times on which they would present presents and the amount and so forth. The only thing they could not manage was the Ilyushin-62, the airplane. Perhaps because China was using the more backward Ilyushin-18.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister knows Kosygin and knows he is very serious, so when the Ilyushin-62 was delayed in taking off he came back on the airplane to talk to the President. I said this proves objects are basically malevolent. He said, what does this mean? I said, if you drop a coin it always rolls away from you. And Kosygin said, that isn't always true—I have dropped coins that rolled toward me.

Prime Minister Chou: [laughs]³ So would you like to begin?

Dr. Kissinger: Which subject should we discuss first? The Soviets?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: What aspect would be of the most interest to the Prime Minister?

Prime Minister Chou: Because before this you had already said you would like to come and inform us after your visit to Moscow, you can do it as you feel proper. We don't have any special request. And as for the brief information that Mr. Lord gave Ambassador Huanghua, we have already received that.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps it might be most useful for the Prime Minister for me to describe our general approach to the Soviet Union, what we are trying to accomplish; then describe my visit at the end of April, the President's visit and some general impressions. I am sure that the Prime Minister knows that we do not do reciprocal things in Moscow. The reason we do it with you is because of our evaluation of the relative intentions of the two allied communist countries.

³ All brackets and ellipses in the source text.

⁴ Lord reported briefly on the Moscow summit at his June 3 meeting with PRC representatives in New York. See footnote 7, Document 227.

Prime Minister Chou: But that alliance has gone with papers.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no question that one of the results of my visit to Peking last year, as the Prime Minister foresaw, was a considerable speeding up of our relationship with the Soviet Union. This was not a case that we particularly sought. In fact we thought there was a possibility that after my visit to Peking we would confront a period of extreme hostility, and when we informed the Soviet Embassy one hour before the announcement we had decided that if their reaction was one of hostility, we would be prepared to deal with all consequences.

Prime Minister Chou: So that was your estimate beforehand.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I remember it very well. But it did not seem to us to be right.

Prime Minister Chou: That shows that we don't take a petty attitude toward such things, and we thought that if it was necessary for the President to visit the Soviet Union first it would perhaps have been better. And that happened . . . that was proved to be the truth because after you made the announcement of your President's decision to visit China . . . after the announcement they expressed extreme concern. And during your President's visit to China the Moscow newspapers were full of a lot of things.

Dr. Kissinger: You were much more relaxed when we were in Moscow.

Prime Minister Chou: We were quite relaxed. We had turned our attention to other things.

Dr. Kissinger: It wouldn't have made any difference because now we have been in Moscow. And when I announced our visit here I received urgent visits from the Soviet Ambassador in any event. In fact, I have found, Mr. Prime Minister, that if I want to see the Soviet Ambassador without asking him to come, I can put some item in the newspapers about China and he will surely come.

But in any event, whatever the reason, our relations with the Soviet Union speeded up considerably after the announcement, and at Soviet initiative, not at ours. As I told you when I was here in July, we had planned a summit meeting with the Soviet Union, but for a variety of reasons we felt that a number of concrete issues had to be settled since we were in a different objective position with respect to the Soviet Union than with the People's Republic. We thought with you we were at the beginning of a historical process, and it was therefore important that it be started with the top people. With the Soviet Union we were involved in a series of concrete problems and there was no sense in involving the top people unless a solution could be reached.

The concrete issues are familiar to you because we have kept you informed scrupulously since our first meeting. But all of them acceler-

ated since our first contact, such as the Berlin Agreement, and took a broader scope than we had first asked for. After the completion of the Berlin agreement, and progress in the strategic arms limitations talks, we agreed to the summit. The announcement was in October, but we actually agreed to it in August, as I told your Ambassador in Paris at the time.⁵

At that time it seemed to us that the Soviet Union was pursuing two policies that were sometimes contradictory at the same time, which we have found is not an unusual phenomenon in Moscow. On the one hand, they wanted to make progress in their bilateral relations with us. On the other hand, they wanted to show, to demonstrate your impotence, and your impotence even combined with us, and therefore they pursued the policy in the Indian Subcontinent. And secondly, they greatly accelerated their arms into Indochina as a result of the first Podgorny visit. This is our analysis—your interpretation may be different. Actually, what happens in Indochina would not demonstrate your impotence, but would create one other Soviet dependent state around your borders. We discussed that previously—I am just summing it up.

And we also believe that they would have liked the offensive to start before the visit to Peking because that would have created the maximum amount of complications in our relationship. I am just giving you our assessment. I am sure you do not agree with every last analysis we have made.

As you know, we reacted extremely strongly to the situation in South Asia. And on one morning when we received a message that you had a message to deliver to us which was, we thought, that you had sent your troops in, we had decided that if you were attacked by the Soviet Union as a result of it, we would support you and take military measures if necessary to prevent that attack. We received that message in early December—I think it was December 11, our time, in the morning. We received word, and when we picked up that message in the afternoon, it had a different content. We also, as you remember, threatened to . . .

Prime Minister Chou: By that time East Pakistan was already unable to be saved.

Dr. Kissinger: No, no, you made the correct decision. It would have been too late, but I had had a talk with your Ambassador.

Prime Minister Chou: Because when they were in the UN at that time they were not clear about that situation. Because Mr. Bhutto himself also was not a military man and Yahya Khan had boasted about the military situation, so I believe Mr. Bhutto arrived on the 11th, and

⁵ See Document 155.

he thought that the military situation in Pakistan at that time was indeed very well. He didn't know about the coup at home.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it was about December 11. Bhutto arrived in New York on Friday the 10th our time, 11th your time. I met Huang Hua on the 10th. I first met Huang Hua the evening of Friday the 10th, then I met Huang Hua the morning of the 11th—no, I met Huang Hua the evening of the 10th and then I met . . . and then you sent us a message which we received. You called us the morning of the 12th, and we were going to the meeting with Pompidou so we sent General Haig.⁶

But between the time we got the phone call and picked up the message we didn't know what it was. And since Huang Hua had taken a very tough line, not knowing the situation, I thought your message to us was that you were taking military measures. And since we were going to the Azores before we met with you we had to give instructions. If your message was you were taking military measures, our instructions were that if the Soviet Union moved against you we would move against the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: Why was it that your newspapers later on published the full minutes it seemed, or parts of the minutes, of meetings held by the Washington Special Actions Group?

Dr. Kissinger: This part of the decision was never in the Washington Special Actions Group because it was much too sensitive. This sort of decision had been made in a much smaller group.

Prime Minister Chou: I know about that. But why did the newspapers publish what had been discussed step by step in the Washington Special Actions Group with respect to the East Pakistan situation?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, first the Prime Minister has to understand the Washington Special Actions Group is a group which implements decisions—it does not make decisions. The reason that I had to take such a strong stand in this group was because the vast majority of our bureaucracy was pro-Indian and pro-Soviet.

Prime Minister Chou: Pro-Soviet?

Dr. Kissinger: More pro-Soviet than pro-Chinese in any event. I came under the most violent attack after I threatened to cancel the Moscow summit. That was when you [to Ch'iao] were there probably, the most violent attack. But what happened was a disloyal member of our bureaucracy gave these documents to the newspapers, and they printed them in order to destroy us, and they came very close. They will not be given a second opportunity.

⁶ See Documents 176 and 177.

Prime Minister Chou: But after reading the records that were published it seemed to me the members of that group came from quite a lot of quarters.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they were almost unanimously against our policy.

Prime Minister Chou: Especially toward India.

Dr. Kissinger: They didn't understand our overall strategy. If they had understood we were getting ready to take on the Soviet Union then what happened was mild compared to what would have happened. The reason we moved our fleet into the Indian Ocean was not because of India primarily—it was as pressure on the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union did what I mentioned before.

Prime Minister Chou: And they also closely followed you down into the Indian Ocean.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but what they had there we could have taken care of very easily.

Prime Minister Chou: What they were trying to do was to create more noise in East Bengal. They openly passed through the Tsushima Straits and then through the Malacca Straits.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but not with a force that could have fought ours.

Prime Minister Chou: But you know they could surface in such a way their support to East Bengal.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh yes, it was used for that purpose. Actually, the Pakistani army in the east surrendered five days later, so it would have been too late for you to do anything.

Prime Minister Chou: Also, Yahya Khan had already sent his order in preparation for such a measure on the 11th or the 12th.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would like to add a word. On the morning of Friday, the 10th, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. U Thant, had already informed us that East Pakistan had informed the Secretariat through their personnel in East Pakistan . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Oh yes, the Vice Foreign Minister is absolutely correct. Speaking very confidentially, we urged them then not to do this until we had an opportunity to talk to you, and to assess the situation, and I believe your advice was the same.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That happened on the day that Mr. Bhutto arrived in New York, and on his arrival we told him about this news. He had originally prepared to meet U Thant, but we had a luncheon engagement with U Thant. So we went, but Mr. Bhutto upon going to the hotel immediately called Yahya Khan and advised him not to do so. That happened on the day of his arrival in New York.

Prime Minister Chou: But we must say that Yahya Khan made his efforts and contribution toward our countries, and we still mention this

when we see him. But he was a general who did not know how to fight a war. He not only was useless in war, but he did things that worsened the situation. This was something we had not expected. We had expected he would not be able to improve the situation, but we didn't know he could have done things so badly. Because he had four divisions that had not been thrown into battle, but before any fighting they began to crumble. Actually, according to our knowledge, these armed forces were able to fight in battle.

Dr. Kissinger: But he scattered them around the frontier—he put too many forces into East Pakistan. They would have done him more good if he had used them in West Pakistan in an offensive. Secondly, he should have ignored the Indians and concentrated on one place, and tried to defeat them somewhere.

Prime Minister Chou: On such things Ayub Khan was more capable than Yahya Khan.

Dr. Kissinger: Yahya Khan was a decent man, but not very intelligent, and, it turned out, not a very good general. And we are very grateful to him on our side for having arranged our contacts. I think it was the last joy in his public career—he loved secret missions. He worked on it with great passion. When I visited him just before I came here, he was beside himself with conspiratorial maneuvers. He also gave me great advice on how to deal with the Prime Minister, all of which turned out to be wrong. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

But I didn't mention it in order to go into details of this, or to discuss the Chinese aspect of the policy, but to explain our general strategy toward the Soviet Union.

After the war in South Asia and before the summit in Peking the Soviet Union began to become more conciliatory toward us again, but still very hostile toward you. But they did not take any specific steps except in atmosphere until we returned from Peking. After we returned from Peking all negotiations speeded up, similar to the time in August, in all the fields which we gave you in New York.

I had been invited in December to pay a secret trip to Moscow, and we rejected that on the ground that we had sufficient diplomatic contact to make that unnecessary. This invitation was repeated again after the Peking summit, and we rejected it again. I believe we informed you of some of this when we were here. (Prime Minister Chou nods.)

Then when the offensive in Vietnam started . . . you can generally assume that when we informed you of our readiness to take drastic steps we also informed Moscow, because we do not want you to be in a separate position in that situation. And we made a number of public comments about the degree to which arms deliveries had made the situation possible, the degree to which Soviet arms deliveries had produced that situation. It was at this point that they repeated their re-

quest for me to come to Moscow to discuss both Vietnam and preparations for the summit, and at this point, as I told your Ambassador in New York, we felt obliged to accept.⁷

Prime Minister Chou: Was that on the 20th of April?

Dr. Kissinger: April 20 to 24, if I remember correctly. Yes, 20 to 24.

Prime Minister Chou: That was when your press was saying you were resting in Camp David.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister is keeping good track of me. But I had told your Ambassador ahead of time, not the Japanese Ambassador. (Laughter)

On this occasion we had a long discussion about Vietnam. The Soviet view was that you had planned the offensive on the occasion of your visit after the Peking summit.

Prime Minister Chou: We have never interfered in either their military actions nor their political negotiations. We only get notifications from them and have often received them only after events have occurred, because that's their business. How can we intervene in their affairs?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, the Soviets made their case with great passion on the grounds that there was no offensive before the Peking summit and there was one before the Moscow summit. The Prime Minister, according to them, had been in Hanoi before the Peking summit and there was no offensive. He went to Hanoi after the Peking summit and there was immediately an offensive.

Prime Minister Chou: But I didn't go before the President's visit. I went there after your secret visit, but I didn't go before the meeting in Peking. But it was only after your President's visit to Peking that I went there the second time. I only went twice.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, officially I never knew about any of your visits. I thought you went before the Peking summit, but I never knew you went after the Peking summit. But I am only telling you about the Soviet argument.

Prime Minister Chou: How could we give our opinions or suggestions about whether it was beneficial to fight at a certain time or not? And I would like to do something here—perhaps you might agree, perhaps not. But Senator Mansfield, after leaving China recently, gave me a text of a speech he made in his hometown in Montana in May of 1968.⁸ But he gave it to me after he left China. Have you read it?

⁷ See Document 222.

⁸ Apparent reference to a speech by Mansfield published as *China: Retrospect and Prospect* (Missoula, MT: University of Montana, 1968).

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: And he mentioned two things that drew our attention. The first is it should be recognized there is only one China and Taiwan is a province . . .

Interpreter Chi: Part!

Prime Minister Chou: *Part* of China. That's what Senator Mansfield said.

Dr. Kissinger: It only took me two nights to get the word "province" out of the communiqué (laughter).

Prime Minister Chou: But it proved now that Senator Mansfield had already foreseen that in 1968—it seemed you borrowed from his words, but you also added that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits recognize there is only one China. That is your masterpiece, and we must recognize that.

And the second point he made was to say China's being aggressive could only be said in accordance with China's words, but China's deeds did not say that. And as Chairman Mao also said to President Nixon, what we did was to fire empty cannons. What we did was not to commit aggression, but we supported the movements of national liberation which Senator Mansfield also mentioned.

And the third point he made was that with respect to Vietnam the assistance the United States had given to the Republic of Vietnam greatly exceeded the assistance China had given to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Of course, I do not agree with all of his definitions, but in his capacity of being the Democratic leader of the Senate it was not easy for him to say that at that time, and it seems that his views on these matters have not changed. So we believe your President's assessment of that man was quite correct.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, he's a fine person.

Prime Minister Chou: Honest.

Dr. Kissinger: Very honest and very sincere.

Prime Minister Chou: He has a British flavor, a gentleman's style.

Dr. Kissinger: He's of Irish stock.

Prime Minister Chou: He doesn't look very much like an Irishman.

Dr. Kissinger: He looks like a member of a monastic order, which you cannot say of Senator Scott.

Prime Minister Chou: No, they were two different characters, and it was interesting to talk to them together.

Dr. Kissinger: But I must say, Mr. Prime Minister, you managed to do one thing with Senator Scott we have not managed to do—you got him to keep confidences. They were both very much impressed by their visit to the People's Republic, and I think after their return they made

a number of constructive speeches. You will find that the Majority Leader in the House is a different person.

Prime Minister Chou: So by your advice I will have to make a bit of preparation?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I would say if he's exposed to too much mao-tai I don't know what might happen. I recommend seeing him in the morning.

Our analysis of the situation is . . . we will talk about it longer when we talk about Indochina . . . that we see no Chinese interest served by an intensification of the war in Indochina because I believe you take us seriously when we said we would react strongly. This drags us back in when we want to get out.

So, we do not believe that this is your strategy.

We discussed, as I said, Vietnam at some length along lines which I will discuss with you when we discuss Indochina.

To return, however, to one point. It's not only the Soviet leaders, but East European leaders who maintain that you have been the primary moving force in this offensive, and who got this thought into many channels so it reaches us in many ways. And it would be very persuasive if we had not had this chance to talk previously.

Now, with regard to other issues, we spent . . .

Prime Minister Chou: And I had beforehand foreseen and predicted that the Soviet Union would try to tell you that. And it has been . . . the facts are that between last year and the present, the Soviet Union has sent four delegations to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, two of which were led by Podgorny and Katushev went himself once and then Mazurov.

Dr. Kissinger: And then a general.

Mr. Negro Ponte: Batitsky.⁹

Prime Minister Chou: (To Negro Ponte) Thank you. You have a better memory than I have. He was the Vice Minister of National Defense.

Dr. Kissinger: On bilateral issues, the discussion was somewhat similar to the discussions we had here in October, that is, preparation of a communiqué, and the Soviet Union for the first time submitted a declaration of principles.

Prime Minister Chou: Because we included that in our communiqué so they had to have something like that.

⁹ Konstantin Fyodorovich Katushev, Deputy to the Supreme Soviet and member of the Central Committee; Kiril Tofimovich Mazurov, members of the Politburo and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Marshal Pavel Fyodorovich Batitsky, Deputy to the Supreme Soviet.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, which had a different character, which I will explain to you in a minute. And then some precise negotiations on all the agreements which were signed in Moscow including a specific proposal on how to deal with the inclusion of submarines in the Strategic Arms Limitation talks. Incidentally, Mr. Prime Minister, if you want, some of the provisions of that agreement are somewhat technical and complex, and if you want, I will be glad to explain them to some technical person, or to you if you have time. But if you don't want it, I would be glad to explain the technical provisions of the agreements to any person you designate.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, I don't think technical matters need to be mentioned here.

Dr. Kissinger: If you are interested.

Prime Minister Chou: If you would like we can get some of our specialists. It's up to you.

Dr. Kissinger: It's up to you.

Prime Minister Chou: You also wanted to discuss something like that with the Vice Chairman of our Military Commission and his assistant. But that was one side of what you would like to say. I would like to ask one question. Of course, you already know about the things I mentioned publicly.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that you considered it partial.

Prime Minister Chou: No, I said that this is a bilateral matter and then I said "but it won't solve the problem." Because you cannot cut down your budget. Of course, if it continued without any limitation at all the budget would increase in even a greater way. Of course, now that you have a possibility of five years, then perhaps you can limit your budget in a certain way. And perhaps it will also make people feel it will be more difficult for a nuclear war to break out in the next five years.

Dr. Kissinger: It will stop the increase in the budget. Our Secretary of Defense gives the impression that we will increase the budget dramatically, but he's given to dramatic statements, as the Prime Minister remembers.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, at precisely the time when you were signing those agreements, he was thinking about what would be going on five years after, about new submarines completed by that time.

Dr. Kissinger: But the problem is if one doesn't plan now, in five years . . . I don't think it is in anybody's interest that the Soviet Union is able to work for five years and we do nothing. So he was not wrong in speaking of that—he was not wrong in thinking of that, he *was* wrong in speaking.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but I appreciate that man very much because he says some true words. For instance, while you were here

engaging in secret talks in July last year he was in Japan making public statements; and also at that time your President was making his Kansas City speech on the sixth of July at the same time Secretary Laird made his speech in Japan, and they both appeared at the same time, which I appreciated very much, which made the situation clear. Perhaps this is part of the American character.

Dr. Kissinger: It made it clear what the forces were, not necessarily what our policy was.

Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily. I think you can see things from there. The Soviet Union is fearful people will get to know about their doings. Actually, people know their doings. The only thing people may not know is the quantity of what they are doing. So if it is said the Strategic Arms Agreement made some advance, then it can be said in the sense that in the coming five years the danger of outbreak of nuclear war will be less but the competition will not be less.

Dr. Kissinger: The numerical competition will stop; the technical competition will not stop.

Prime Minister Chou: Because it is allowable to change old with the new.

Dr. Kissinger: If the characteristics do not change. With respect to secrecy, we achieve secrecy by saying so much that no one knows what is true.

Prime Minister Chou: But people can see a tendency.

Dr. Kissinger: Thoughtful people can see a tendency. Literal people just see the words and ask for explanations.

Prime Minister Chou: That is why I asked the five families of American friends when I met them that Senator McGovern, if he is elected, is saying he will be able to cut the military budget by one-third. I asked them whether they thought this were possible, and they could not reply.¹⁰

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I honestly believe the worst thing that could happen to you would be if this were to happen.

Prime Minister Chou: What I do not believe is that it would be really possible to cut the budget by one-third. Of course, you probably know the majority I met were in support of Senator McGovern. I asked them that question, but they could not answer.

Dr. Kissinger: In fact, they were unanimously in support as I look over that list.

Prime Minister Chou: Fairbank wavered.

Dr. Kissinger: Fairbank, yes.

¹⁰ John K. Fairbank, Harvard University professor and China scholar, led a small group of American academics to the PRC in June 1972.

Prime Minister Chou: So I asked them to answer that question, but they couldn't. It's impossible.

Dr. Kissinger: One problem with McGovern is that he is very professorial and he . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Was he a professor before?

Dr. Kissinger: He was a professor at one time. But he is likely to try to do what he says, and the attempt to do it would have very serious consequences for everybody.

Prime Minister Chou: I don't believe that.

Dr. Kissinger: That he would do it?

Prime Minister Chou: If he is elected, it will be impossible for him to do so. Otherwise, he will have to change that slogan in the course of his election campaign.

Dr. Kissinger: It may be objectively impossible for him to do so, but the education of finding that out is what would produce the damage.

Prime Minister Chou: Your Pentagon wouldn't agree, wouldn't be able to pass what he said he will try to do.

Dr. Kissinger: That's not the major problem. The impact on the international situation of a dramatic effort by the United States to weaken itself would lead to a chaotic situation which would have a high probability of producing a war, because I do not believe your northern neighbors would resist that temptation.

Prime Minister Chou: Anyway, they always want to try to exceed you.

Dr. Kissinger: But not when we are going down. They don't compete in that direction, in reductions with us.

Prime Minister Chou: Never, never.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. There's in addition the problem that apart from whether it's possible to cut the budget, the sort of policy I describe in South Asia, for example, would be totally impossible.

Prime Minister Chou: To the word "never" I would like to add a condition. That is, if the type of leadership the Soviet Union now has would continue, that would never happen. The policies they are pursuing now, if it continues, will exceed the former policies of the Czars in old Russia. I believe it was Harrison Salisbury who said our description of the new Soviet leaders as being new Czars was exact. The Soviet leaders are dissatisfied with that description.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they have certain reservations with respect to the People's Republic of China.

Prime Minister Chou: And the greatest headache comes from the use of that term, "the new Czars," and we were the first to use it. As for "social imperialism," Lenin began the use of that term, and we are continuing.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think the Prime Minister would be elected to the Politburo from what I was told. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: They probably hate us to death. Of course, the number one target of hatred is Chairman Mao, and I who implement his policies . . .

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister is coming up in that regard. He's still number two, but gaining.

Prime Minister Chou: Very happy to hear that. Because how will it do if no one opposes a person?

Dr. Kissinger: When I was in Shanghai I was with a member of the Shanghai People's Revolutionary Committee, and he congratulated me on the communiqué. I said I will have enormous difficulties with my opponents when I get back to America. He said Chairman Mao says you should worry only if your enemies do not attack you.

Prime Minister Chou: That's true.

Dr. Kissinger: But to return to my visit at the end of April. I won't go into the agreements which are really self-explanatory—we have brought you the texts, and we can give them to you—except for the Strategic Arms Limitation talks, where the Vice Chairman can ask me questions, and I will explain it to him.

There were a number of aspects that I wanted to mention to the Prime Minister. One, the Soviet strategy was obviously to create the impression, and the reality, that one would go to Peking for banquets and to Moscow for agreements. And therefore, they were trying for the absolute maximum number of agreements. And we found it much easier to agree with them than the Vice Foreign Minister did on the border question.

Second, in the communiqué and especially in the Declaration of Principles, there were a number of aspects that we eliminated because we thought the objective import was directed at you—also against Britain and France, but I think objectively against you. For example, there was a joint appeal to other nuclear countries to join the accidental war agreement. Now France wants to do this, and we have refused. We have refused on grounds that France is an ally, and we don't need an agreement with an ally, and if it wants to make one with the Soviet Union, we don't object. They wanted to make a general agreement between all nations possessing nuclear weapons against accidental war. They wanted us to make a joint appeal that other countries should join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And they wanted to resurrect their proposal for a conference of nuclear countries that they had made last summer. And they wanted us to make an appeal together to other members of the Security Council on a number of issues which we also refused. This is in line with our general policy that we will not join

other countries in any dealings that we have with you. If we have a request, we will make it directly.

Thus at the summit, but also at the meeting I had in Moscow, they made two other proposals, one that there should be special consultations between the United States and Soviet Union about the nuclear capabilities of other nations that are not part of the nuclear limitations agreement, and whose capacities are growing. They also made a proposal, which we have not told anybody else about, as we have not almost everything I have said to you—of course, this is all very confidential. The proposal is that we agree not to use nuclear weapons against each other. We have said that we could consider something like this only if there were some assurance that this would not . . . that they were not free to attack either our allies or other countries with nuclear weapons. Because this would not be banned. In that proposal that would not be banned.

Prime Minister Chou: Would that mean in effect that all countries should guarantee not to be the first to use nuclear weapons?

Dr. Kissinger: I know this is your proposal. The problem we have with that is we have to reserve the right, if there is a massive attack either on a major ally such as Europe, or on a country whose independence we consider vital, we have to reserve the right to use nuclear weapons. So in other words, there are some areas of the world where we cannot accept their being overrun by conventional armies. We can renounce the use of force, but we have great difficulty signing an agreement where a country is free to launch an attack on regions whose security we consider vital to peace in the world and ourselves. If conventional means are not enough, we cannot consider renouncing the use of nuclear weapons. We cannot accept a Czechoslovakia in every part of the world.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, in a certain sense, there are only a few possibilities of such an event happening.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. Those are the ones that worry us most. In most foreseeable circumstances we would not have to worry about nuclear weapons, but I can think of two places where it would have to be considered.

Prime Minister Chou: Which two?

Dr. Kissinger: One is an attack on Europe, and the other is an attack that would put all of Asia under one European center of control.

Prime Minister Chou: There possibly would exist that ambition, but the question is whether or not it could be realized.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the problem. But speaking in this small group, I would not exclude that this intention may exist. I am not saying that it does—but it could.

Prime Minister Chou: The ambitions, of course, exist. The question is how or whether it will appear, and of course, we must closely watch the development of events.

So they only proposed that your two countries should mutually agree not to use nuclear weapons against each other, but it said nothing about consultations on a worldwide scale leading to prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons?

Dr. Kissinger: No, explicitly not. Now this is not known by anybody, Mr. Prime Minister, and it is a sign of our special confidence in you.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course we won't discuss that. We only . . . what we say is only the principles that we repeat every time we carry out an experiment. You probably already have memorized them.

Dr. Kissinger: We have never had any difficulty. If there is any further discussion of this we will tell you. At the moment there is no further discussion, but my experience tells me that your allies are very persistent, and it is certain to be resurrected. And if it is, I will discuss it with your Ambassador in New York, and we will not make any moves without discussing it with you. If you had asked your dinner guests on Friday night whether they had been in favor of such a project I think they all would be in favor of it on sentimental terms, the five Americans, with the exception of Fairbank. They would have favored it for US-Soviet bilateral relations; they would not necessarily have seen the implications of this for other countries. But you can make that experiment yourself.

Prime Minister Chou: I wouldn't do that experiment because when these questions are discussed certain people proceed completely out of naive illusions.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, and it's too sensitive anyway.

About the summit. The summit proceeded in the same way as my meeting, and we discussed essentially the same subjects except that the Soviet leaders made exactly the same proposals to the President they had made to me in April and received exactly the same answers.

We made agreements in three general areas, that is first, technical areas where we and the Soviets, as advanced industrial countries, have common interests—environment, space, health. Secondly, we spent a great deal of time on the strategic arms limitation agreement which is a technical and extremely complex issue. And, as the Prime Minister pointed out, it involves qualitative implications that will not be significant now but which should be terribly important five years from now. Thirdly, we agreed on those principles and the communiqué

which are really self-explanatory.¹¹ Fourth, there were discussions about commercial matters. We created a commercial commission, and the Soviets leaders are extremely interested in receiving credits and Most Favored Nation treatment.

Prime Minister Chou: But they don't repay their debts.

Dr. Kissinger: No, although they are very willing to do that to get credit.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but they take a rather long-range view of that, and it seems their view on this matter . . . there is still some distance between their view and yours.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but that will be solved because what they want in credit is so much more than their debt that we are really paying them to pay their debt (laughter). But I will sum this up . . .

Prime Minister Chou: But they would have to buy your equipment with the credit they got from you, with most of the credit.

Dr. Kissinger: Probably. But that I consider unimportant because what they want they can probably only get from us. And so, and this has not yet been made public, or not very much, they are extremely interested in getting us involved in a very massive development of Siberia. Our approach . . . the sums involved are very large—\$8 billion. And they want us to do it jointly with the Japanese, or alone; they are not particular. They will take it from us alone if we are willing to do it.

Now, before I give our reaction to this economic thing let me give you . . . well, let me give you first our formal reaction to this economic thing. I know at least some of your associates seem to think we are driven very much by economic considerations. This is not true, in this Administration anyway. We have . . . I remember very vividly my first conversation with the Prime Minister almost a year ago when he asked me what we had really produced by our economic assistance. On strictly economic grounds it is easy to put money into a country. It is very hard to get it back. But that I consider second order. The more important question is what do you produce objectively when you develop an area; it is not always what people tell you their intentions are, as the Prime Minister has told me often with regard to Japan.

So we are looking at these projects with great care. And we do not want to be in a position where these projects can be used either to blackmail us or to create the basis for blackmailing others. Let me sum up what our basic approach is . . . oh, two other issues we discussed—European Security Conference and mutual force reductions. With respect

¹¹ For text of the final U.S.-Soviet communiqué, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, p. 635.

to the European Security Conference, the Soviet Union has been very passionate in pushing it, but very vague in what they want to discuss once they get there.

Prime Minister Chou: Is that so?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Without a prospect how can you enter into discussions?

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister will soon have an opportunity to meet some leading European statesmen, and he will then be able to judge for himself the degree to which precision of thinking is their outstanding attribute. As I understand the European leaders, most who are not distinguished by their capacity to see things long-range, there is the paradox that they first advocated a conference on mutual balanced force reduction for the amazing reason that they thought this would force us to keep our forces in there until this conference had taken place. They proposed mutual reductions to prevent unilateral reduction. So then when their own project assumed reality, they accepted the idea of a European Security Conference in order to stop the mutual balanced force reductions.

So they produced two conferences they don't want in order to prevent something they could have stopped by saying "no", but didn't want to for domestic reasons. I think the Prime Minister would have found that most European leaders today would not have been very good candidates for the Long March (laughter).

Our strategy with respect to these two conferences is to answer the question that the Prime Minister put to me—simply, we will go, but we will insist that there is a very concrete agenda and very concrete criteria which enable us to measure success or failure. So we sometimes appear dilatory, but in any event we will be very concrete, and we will emphasize also those elements of the European Security Conference that enhance the sovereignty of the participants, east or west.

And to sum up our evaluation of the situation, there are three possibilities in Soviet policy. One is that there will be a more peaceful evolution. If there is a more peaceful evolution, then the agreements we have signed will promote a possibility for constructive policies. And we will attempt to give every opportunity for all parties to live up to the principles we have agreed to.

But it is also possible that it is their intention to neutralize Europe and to concentrate on Asia, and to get their rear free for dealing with one problem at a time. That cannot be excluded.

And it's not impossible that their strategy is to isolate each of their principal enemies or opponents and to defeat them separately, even

though these principal opponents may not have any formal relationship with each other.

Our assessment is as follows. We have no interest in your quarrel with the Soviet Union, as I have said to you and as I have said publicly. We have never asked you to do anything against the Soviet Union, and we never shall. And you have never asked us to do anything against the Soviet Union—in fact, you have encouraged us to deal with the Soviet Union. But our assessment is, we would prefer the Soviet Union to take the first course of changing its policy in a more peaceful direction, and we will give it every incentive to do this. If it should move in the second direction, we shall pursue the same policy more strongly than we did last December.

In terms of our relations, the principal significance I see in whatever visible bilateral things we have done is not in their own terms, but to create the objective conditions to permit decisions like this to be made quickly if it should become necessary against anybody's will or intention. Leaving aside this particular aspect which is a tactical question and not decisive, we shall continue to move along the lines we have described, and we shall continue it as long as the Soviet Union pursues a peaceful policy. If the Soviet Union should move aggressively, even not against you but against countries whose independence we consider important, then we will draw the appropriate conclusions and we will not be deterred by any agreements we have made. That will be the policy of this Administration in the next term, even more strongly than now.

I should add, at the summit there was also a long discussion of Vietnam, but I am saving that for the other discussion. I am sorry I have talked so very long.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you. I would like to ask whether the European Security Conference will be held as a meeting between two blocs, or a meeting between individual countries, or both.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it will in any event not be held before 1973 when our freedom of movement will be somewhat greater. Secondly, it will be held as a meeting between countries, though I have the impression that on the Soviet side it is being given a bloc character. It is in our interest, that is in the U.S. interest, to emphasize the sovereignty of the participants. Incidentally, I may say, we evaluate positively what we take to be the low-key Chinese encouragement of European community efforts.

Prime Minister Chou: At the same time they have a lot of internal disputes.

Dr. Kissinger: The Europeans?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: It's not their heroic age.

Prime Minister Chou: But they believe that collectively they will have power, but how to lead that power is a question. Quite a number wish to be the leadership of that power.

Dr. Kissinger: And no one wants to make the sacrifices necessary to get it.

Prime Minister Chou: That's where the question lies. What is your assessment of the tendency of the development of the policy in your motherland, of the country where you were born?

Dr. Kissinger: It's always easy to start a policy, but if one starts it one has to think through where one will be after a few years. And speaking as a historian, the Germans have brought disaster upon themselves for the last 50 years—more than that, for this century—because they have not had any far-sighted statesmen since Bismarck, except perhaps for Adenauer.

Prime Minister Chou: It's a century since Bismarck.

Dr. Kissinger: The German problem has been that when they had a choice between two policies, they did them both. The risk they run, what they are doing now, is to belong to the western community, that is to the European community, but to run the risk of winding up like Finland. That is one risk.

Also in Germany there is a very strong nationalistic tendency similar to Japan, although the German social structure does not have the cohesion nor the strength nor the self-confidence of the Japanese. So it is not excluded that in Germany . . . Germany can go three ways. It can become part of the European community fully; it can become a Finland and objectively an outpost of eastern Europe; or it can become extremely nationalistic. And I do not exclude that when that happens the German communists may join their other colleagues on the basis of nationalism, but that would be a long time in the future. But I do not exclude that happening. But these are the three possibilities.

Prime Minister Chou: Do you believe that East Germany at this time would be even more weakened?

Dr. Kissinger: East Germany can become strong only through a very nationalistic policy. It has no objective basis except by becoming the heir of old Prussia.

Prime Minister Chou: But quite a part of the former East Prussians have now gone into West Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it's not the population; it's the spirit. I have had old Prussians in West Germany tell me that when they want to be reminded of their Prussian heritage they go to East Germany. That was said to me by the son of the former head of the Foreign Ministry under the Nazis, Weiszacher, who is now a professor, and who himself is a fine man and is not at all of this type.

Prime Minister Chou: Since Germany has developed her economy to its present degree do you think it could be that Germany is also at a crossroads?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but not primarily for economic reasons.

Prime Minister Chou: Also for nationalistic reasons?

Dr. Kissinger: The countries that were defeated during the war could spend 20 years on economic recovery, and could find in that a substitute for their lack of military achievement. But now economic recovery is no longer enough and creates psychic and psychological problems.

Prime Minister Chou: Right.

(There was a thirteen minute break at this point, 4:30 p.m. The meeting resumed with the addition of Chang Wen-chin on the Chinese side.)

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you for your notification concerning the US–Soviet talks. There are not many more questions I would like to ask, because they are generally all in the documents. Only on the general Declaration of Principles there is one case which the Third World was quite displeased with—they said, “the superpowers” such and such. You know about that?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

Prime Minister Chou: The main objection is with respect to the third principle (reading): “The U.S.A. and USSR have a special responsibility . . . in their internal affairs.”

Dr. Kissinger: What is the objection?

Prime Minister Chou: It appears from that principle as if world affairs will be monopolized by you two big powers. It has that feeling. I note that from the press.

Dr. Kissinger: I have not had the opportunity to pay attention to that particular . . . or it has not come to my attention. That was not the intention on our side. This is a paragraph which in its original form we thought was directed against you. Our intention is to use it to prevent such situations as the South Asia one. And when we apply it, it will be intended to be used to prevent a situation where when tensions arise a big country will not exacerbate them by military supplies and/or by diplomatic pressures. That was our intention.

Prime Minister Chou: India seems somewhat unhappy about that. Do you have any feelings there?

Dr. Kissinger: Whether India is unhappy about it? (Prime Minister Chou nods.)

Since December India has been unhappy with us about so many things it is not easy to tell what is a special cause of unhappiness and what is a general condition.

Prime Minister Chou: But this time they were displeased not just with you but with both of you. They consider the United States and Soviet Union want to manipulate matters. That is their feeling—I don't know their reason for this.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not our intention. We have no intention of forming a condominium—it would take an extraordinary circumstance for us to do this. It is not our intention to create a condominium. We do have the intention of building walls against expansionism, either political ones or physical ones. Our primary concern with local conflicts is when a big power attempts to exploit them for its own ends.

Prime Minister Chou: In the Soviet objections to our communiqué with you it appears that they particularly expressed objection to this common principle: "Neither should seek hegemony . . ." Do they think that was directed against them?

Dr. Kissinger: They didn't say, but they seem to think it might be directed against them. We took the position it was directed only against countries that want to establish hegemony. I had an interesting query from India—I don't know whether you did. They said that since the Asia-Pacific area didn't include India, what we were saying was that we agreed to Chinese hegemony over India (laughter).

So I told them this was not true. I hope you are not offended.

Prime Minister Chou: India is a highly suspicious country. It is quite a big country. Sometimes it puts on airs of a big country, but sometimes it has an inferiority complex.

Dr. Kissinger: It's been governed by foreigners through most of its history.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, that might be one of the historical factors. And an additional one that there are such big competitions in the world.

Now let's go on to the Indochina question—I would like to hear from you.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister said he had some observations he would like to make to me. Maybe we should reverse the places and let him talk first.

Prime Minister Chou: These are questions on which there are disputes, and we would like to listen to you first to see your solutions of the problem.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the Prime Minister's suggestion that after he's heard me I will be so convincing the disputes will have disappeared, and there will be no further need for him to make observations?

Prime Minister Chou: I have no such expectations, but I do hope the disputes will be lessened.

Dr. Kissinger: I will make our candid assessment. I know it doesn't agree with yours, but I think it is useful for you at any rate to understand how we see the situation. And I will take the situation from the start of the North Vietnamese offensive on March 30.

I believe that I have explained to the Prime Minister what our general objectives in Indochina are. It is obvious that it cannot be the policy of this Administration to maintain permanent bases in Indochina, or to continue in Indochina the policies that were originated by the Secretary of State who refused to shake hands with the Prime Minister. It isn't . . . we are in a different historical phase. We believe that the future of our relationship with Peking is infinitely more important for the future of Asia than what happens in Phnom Penh, in Hanoi or in Saigon.

When President Johnson put American troops into Vietnam you will remember that he justified it in part on the ground that what happened in Indochina was masterminded in Peking and was part of a plot to take over the world. Dean Rusk said this in a statement. You were then engaged in the Cultural Revolution and not, from my reading of it, emphasizing foreign adventures.

So that the mere fact that we are sitting in this room changes the objective basis of the original intervention in Indochina. For us who inherited the war our problem has been how to liquidate it in a way that does not affect our entire international position and—this is not your primary concern—the domestic stability in the United States. So we have genuinely attempted to end the war, and as you may or may not know, I personally started negotiations with the North Vietnamese in 1967 when I was only at the very periphery of the government, at a time when it was very unpopular, because I believed there had to be a political end to the war.

So from the time we came into office we have attempted to end the war. And we have understood, as I told you before, that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is a permanent factor on the Indochinese peninsula and probably the strongest entity. And we have had no interest in destroying it or even in defeating it. After the end of the war we will have withdrawn 12,000 miles. The Democratic Republic will still be 300 miles from Saigon. That is a reality which they don't seem to understand.

Prime Minister Chou: What they are paying attention to is your so-called Vietnamization of the war.

Dr. Kissinger: But they have a curious lack of self-confidence. What have we tried to do? Let's forget . . . they are masters at analyzing various points and forgetting the overall concepts. We have attempted to separate the military outcome from the political outcome so that we can disengage from the area and permit the local forces to shape their

future. Curiously enough, the North Vietnamese have tried to keep us in there so that we would do their political work for them.

Last May 30, for example, we proposed that we would withdraw all our forces if there were a ceasefire and the return of prisoners. May 31 it was, not 30. Where would the North Vietnamese be today if they had accepted this? In a much better position than they are. But they didn't accept it. Why? Because they want us to overthrow the government and put their government in. We are not negotiating. I am trying to explain our thinking. The practical consequences of our proposals have been to get us out; the practical consequence of their proposals have been to keep us in.

They have asked us . . . there's only one demand they have made we have not met and cannot meet and will not meet, no matter what the price to our other relationships, and that is that we overthrow ourselves the people with whom we have been dealing and who, in reliance on us, have taken certain actions. This isn't because of any particular personal liking for any of the individuals concerned. It isn't because we want a pro-American government in Saigon. Why in the name of God would we want a pro-American government in Saigon when we can live with governments that are not pro-American in much bigger countries of Asia? It is because a country cannot be asked to engage in major acts of betrayal as a basis of its foreign policy.

Prime Minister Chou: You say withdrawal of forces. You mean total withdrawal of Army, Navy, Air Forces, bases and everything?

Dr. Kissinger: When I was here last year the Prime Minister asked me that question. I told him we wanted to leave some advisors behind. The Prime Minister then made a very eloquent statement on the consequences of what he called "leaving a tail behind." Largely as a result of that, we, within a month, changed our proposal so it now involves a total withdrawal of all our advisors in all of the categories which the Prime Minister now mentioned. We are prepared to withdraw all our forces.

Prime Minister Chou: How about your armed forces in Thailand?

Dr. Kissinger: We are not prepared to remove our armed forces from Thailand, but under the conditions of ceasefire we would agree not to use these forces in Vietnam. And they would certainly be reduced to the level they had before this offensive started if peace is made.

To explain what I mean by this act of betrayal, even though I know this is somewhat painful, Mr. Prime Minister, but I want to explain: If when I first came here in July the Prime Minister had said, "we will not talk to you until you overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and put someone in there we can accept," then, dedicated as I am to Sino-American friendship, we could not have done it. It would have been impossible.

The secret to our relationship is we were prepared to start an evolution in which the Prime Minister has expressed great confidence. Such an act would totally dishonor us and make us a useless friend of yours, because if we would do this to one associate we would do it to anybody.

But to return to the question about Thailand. In every important decision, as we discussed, there are at least two aspects, the decision and the trend. At the dinner the other day with those five Americans the Prime Minister referred to the 1954 situation. And in 1954, whatever happened, whatever document we signed, the reality was that Secretary Dulles was looking for excuses to intervene, because he was convinced there was a Chinese communist conspiracy to take over Asia. We are looking for the opposite excuses.

Prime Minister Chou: The outcome of Dulles' policy was the conclusion of a number of pacts and treaties, but now you want to abide by them. Isn't that a continuation of his policy?

Dr. Kissinger: It is on one level. But on the other, when we make an agreement in Indochina, it will be to make a new relationship. If we can make it with Peking why can we not do it with Hanoi? What has Hanoi done to us that would make it impossible to, say in ten years, establish a new relationship?

Prime Minister Chou: If after you withdraw and the prisoners of war are repatriated, if after that, civil war again breaks out in Vietnam, what will you do? It will probably be difficult for you to answer that.

Dr. Kissinger: It is difficult for me to answer partly because I don't want to give encouragement for this to happen. But let me answer it according to my best judgment. For example, if our May 8 proposal¹² were accepted, which has a four-month withdrawal and four months for exchange of prisoners, if in the fifth month the war starts again, it is quite possible we would say this was just a trick to get us out and we cannot accept this.

If the North Vietnamese, on the other hand, engage in a serious negotiation with the South Vietnamese, and if after a longer period it starts again after we were all disengaged, my personal judgment is that it is much less likely that we will go back again, *much* less likely.

Prime Minister Chou: You said this last year too.

Dr. Kissinger: Last year if they had accepted our proposal it would now have been a year. If the North Vietnamese could transform this . . .

¹² See Document 226.

Prime Minister Chou: You said last year after you have withdrawn and the prisoners of war have been returned then as to what happens then, that is their affair. In principle you mentioned that.

Dr. Kissinger: In principle we are attempting to turn . . . it, of course, depends on the extent to which outside countries intervene. If one can transform this from an international conflict in which major world powers are involved, to a local conflict, then I think what the Prime Minister said is very possible. But this is our intention and since we will be making that policy, it is some guarantee.

Now, the difficulty has been that, for very understandable reasons, the North Vietnamese—for whom as I have said to the Prime Minister many times, I have great respect—are acting out the epic poem of their struggle for independence through the centuries and particularly re-enacting their experiences of 20 years ago.

Prime Minister Chou: If we counted from the end of the Second World War, 27 years, and President Ho Chi Minh died for this cause before it was completed. President Ho Chi Minh was a revolutionary, but also a humanitarian and a patriot. I was well acquainted with President Ho Chi Minh. I had known him for 50 years. I have joined the Communist Party now for 50 years and knew him 50 years.

Dr. Kissinger: I never met him, but I knew a Frenchman in whose house Ho Chi Minh lived. In fact, I sent that Frenchman to talk to Ho Chi Minh in 1967—that's how I became involved in Indochinese affairs.

Prime Minister Chou: Mr. Salisbury¹³ has also been to Hanoi. But he being a correspondent is in a different position from you.

Dr. Kissinger: It is the one place I have not been secretly.

Prime Minister Chou: That shortcoming might be the reason it hasn't been solved yet. Maybe if you had been there you might be more clear about the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: I am clear about the situation. It's the solution I am not clear about.

Prime Minister Chou: You have a new expert. Mr. Smyser had intestinal troubles.

Dr. Kissinger: But he recovered just before you served Peking Duck. (laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: He is still with you?

Dr. Kissinger: No, he went back to the university for a year, but he will come back after the year.

¹³ Harrison Salisbury, journalist and editor at *The New York Times*.

Prime Minister Chou: This system of yours is good, to have your staff go away to a university for a year and then come back.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think Smyser will work again on Vietnam problems. Maybe there won't be Vietnam problems to work on any more.

Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily. The Saigon problem is really too much of a headache. And this is one of the bitter fruits left over by Dulles which is not yet solved. It was a tragedy created by Dulles and you are even now tasting the bitter fruits of that.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with the Prime Minister that what we face now in Vietnam is a tragedy.

Prime Minister Chou: You could shake yourselves free from it.

Dr. Kissinger: No. It depends on what the Prime Minister means by shaking ourselves free. The withdrawal we can do; the other demands we cannot do. Let me complete my analysis of the situation.

I recognize the problem is objectively extremely difficult, and I admit we have demonstrated for 20 years that we do not understand Vietnamese conditions very well, but the North Vietnamese Government has also made a solution extremely complicated.

First, I have negotiated 13 times now . . . eight times with Le Duc Tho; five times with Xuan Thuy. What is the primary use when I negotiate? My primary use is to be able to go to the essence of the problem and to get a big decision made—that is my primary use in these negotiations. I am useful for big decisions, not for a series of little moves. The little moves should be done by the diplomats.

In the 13 meetings I have had with them they have engaged me in a petty guerrilla war in which we were acting on the level of middle-level lawyers in which we were looking for escape clauses in particular phrases. Time and again I have said to Le Duc Tho—I know this is painful for you incidentally, Mr. Prime Minister, and I know you are a man of principle who will stick to his allies, but I am trying to explain—let us set an objective, say in six months we will do this and that, and then we will find a tactical solution. And time and again they have rejected this. Time and again they have done so for essentially two reasons. One is that their fear of trickery is such that they spend more time working on the escape clauses than on the principal provisions of any agreement. And it forces them to demand immediately what we might be prepared to have happen over a period of years.

And secondly, the nature of their strategy. What is their strategy? Their strategy is to pursue a military campaign designed, on the one hand, to undermine the Saigon government, which I understand, and on the other hand, a combination of a military and psychological campaign designed to undermine the American government, and that we

can never accept. They have never been able to make up their mind whether they want to settle with us or to destroy us, or at least to put us in a position where we lose all public support. And therefore, they will make no concession, or have up to now made no concession, to me or any other American negotiator, because they are afraid that if there is the solution of even the most minimal problem, we will then gain the public support and therefore they will not gain their principal objective of undermining our public support to paralyze us.

This is the real reason that the May 2 meeting between me and Le Duc Tho failed. When they thought they were winning, their real strategy was to show the American people that there was no hope, and therefore to force us into a dilemma where we had no choice but to yield to their demands. This is why they deal with us about the prisoners, not through the government or the Red Cross, but through American opposition groups whose significance they don't understand at all.

Prime Minister Chou: But it wasn't right for you either to raid their prisoner of war camp.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, first of all, I think that's a different proposition, and I would be glad to debate this with the Prime Minister, but I am not saying every move we have made in the war has necessarily been right. I am saying we are facing a situation now which needs solution. But I admit—thought I don't in this case—but we have made mistakes. This is why now they are making a tremendous issue about resuming plenary sessions, and yet any thoughtful person realizes that it doesn't make any difference whether there are plenary sessions when we have nothing to talk about. Until there is a program to negotiate at the plenary sessions, they are pure propaganda and mean nothing.

We are prepared to resume plenary sessions just to finish that particular issue, but they will fail certainly if we do not get a new basis for negotiating, and if they do not change their tactics. We attempt—and the Prime Minister will have his own judgment on this—we believe that in dealing with other countries if one does not deal with a country morally and honorably, even if one gains tactical advantage, one loses in the long run. But it is difficult to negotiate if one is engaged with a country which is subverting your authority.

Now, let us talk about the North Vietnamese offensive. Without that offensive we would have withdrawn more and more troops, and more and more aircraft. We had no intention whatever of increasing the scale of our military activities. On the contrary, we would progressively have reduced them. But the North Vietnamese offensive put us in a position in which they wanted to use the fact of an election in the United States to blackmail us into meeting a demand which we cannot meet. We can meet all others, but not that.

Now, what is the situation today? I know what has to be said in propaganda, but it is my judgment that the North Vietnamese offensive is effectively stopped and has no military prospects this year. They have not succeeded in generating this tremendous protest movement in the United States, despite the people who walk around with Vietnamese flags, which is not many. At the time of Cambodia there were 200,000 protesters in Washington, and they couldn't stop what we were doing. After May 8 they tried to get 200,000 and they got 5,000.

So where are we? The only hope for the North Vietnamese is a victory for McGovern in November. We do not believe that this will happen. The latest polls show the President 20 points ahead of McGovern.

Prime Minister Chou: Even if McGovern were to be elected, could he get rid of Thieu?

Dr. Kissinger: I am not sure.

Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily.

Dr. Kissinger: Not necessarily.

Prime Minister Chou: My view is the same as yours.

Dr. Kissinger: And don't forget we will be in office seven more months.

Prime Minister Chou: That is another matter. Even if he were to be elected would it be possible for him to give up supporting the Saigon regime?

Dr. Kissinger: It is easier to talk about it than to do it.

Prime Minister Chou: It is a pitfall which was created by you which is difficult for you to get out of.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true.

Prime Minister Chou: Whether it be President Nixon or McGovern or Ed Kennedy. Even if you were to be President it would be difficult. But it is a great pity you are not qualified.

Dr. Kissinger: Let us run Miss Tang.

Prime Minister Chou: Even she could not get out.

Dr. Kissinger: If she ran and made me her advisor maybe we could do something together.

Prime Minister Chou: One knot tied into another, and most disadvantageous.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. But the forces that would elect McGovern would bring about a reorientation of American policy not only on Vietnam, but certainly on the subjects of the Soviet Union, India, Japan, as you can read in the *New York Times* editorial. I don't have to explain. If you read the tendency of the *New York Times*, when I threatened to cancel the Moscow summit, for example, or during the India situation when it was impossible to get them to print any other point

of view, even in the news columns, you will get some feeling for the reality of what would happen if that happened. I will speak realistically. Everyone is in favor of a Sino-American relationship. There is no fundamental opposition to this any more. But the practical consequences that people are prepared to draw from it and the actual decisions they are willing to make other than sentimental affirmations or cultural exchange, that will differ enormously.

And therefore, any intervention in our domestic politics has two consequences. First, it forces us to react much more violently than we would have in normal circumstances, and second, it has consequences which go far beyond Vietnam and therefore make it a much more general problem than just the Vietnam problem.

And therefore, we believe that the war must now be ended for everybody's sake. If the war continues, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will surely lose more than it can possibly gain. Its military offensive has stopped; its domestic situation is difficult; and we are forced to do things to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that go beyond anything that is commensurate with our objective. We don't want them to be weak. And I see no prospect for them to reverse the situation. And we want to end the war because it requires now an effort out of proportion to the objectives and because it involves us in discussions with countries with whom we have much more important business.

If we could talk to them the way we talk to you, Mr. Prime Minister—I don't mean in words but in attitude—I think we could settle the war. As a practical matter, we think the quickest way to end it now is on the basis of ceasefire, withdrawal, and return of prisoners. That's the least complicated and leaves the future open. We are prepared in addition to declare our neutrality in any political contest that develops and in terms of foreign policy we are prepared to see South Vietnam adopt a neutral foreign policy.

We can also go back to our proposal the President made last January 25 and which was formally presented on January 27, and perhaps modify this or that provision and that involved political discussions also. But in practice, political discussions take forever. And the practical consequence of any political solution is either it will confirm the existing government in Saigon, which is unacceptable to Hanoi, or it will overthrow the existing government in Saigon, which is unacceptable to us. And it is almost impossible to think of a possible compromise between these two.

So we should find a way to end the war, to stop it from being an international situation, and then permit a situation to develop in which the future of Indochina can be returned to the Indochinese people. And I can assure you that this is the only object we have in Indochina, and I do not believe this can be so different from yours. We want nothing

for ourselves there. And while we cannot bring a communist government to power, if, as a result of historical evolution it should happen over a period of time, if we can live with a communist government in China, we ought to be able to accept it in Indochina.

The Prime Minister caught me on a particularly loquacious day. (Laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: So let us conclude today. As for tomorrow morning, I will first consult our Vice Chairman, Yeh Chien-ying, and then maybe tomorrow morning you will have some discussions with him. I heard that you would like to have a picnic at the Summer Palace.

Dr. Kissinger: I was asked what I wanted to see in addition to the Forbidden City. I said I thought the Summer Palace was so beautiful I would like to see it again. But the idea of a picnic is an addition which is charming but was not suggested by me. It is an idea of your protocol department. But work comes before picnics.

232. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, June 21, 1972, 3:25–6:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff

Prime Minister Chou: You saw John Fairbank this afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. He gave a very enthusiastic report about China—the interesting comparisons between the new and the old China.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files—Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's Visit June 1972, Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People. Kissinger sent a brief synopsis of this meeting to Haig on June 21. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1139, Jon Howe—Trip Files, HAK's China Trip, June 1972) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 143.

Prime Minister Chou: And I especially asked him to mention both the good points and the bad points when he spoke about his visit to China, because I said it would not do to mention only the good points.

Dr. Kissinger: The only bad point he mentioned was that you were not yet sending people to Harvard (laughter).

Prime Minister Chou: We are willing to go but we would not like to stay for a long period as the first step. But he wants us to station permanently people there as the first step.

Dr. Kissinger: I have scolded him about this. We have suggested the best way to start would be to invite some Chinese scholars for a week and see how that works out, at some conference at some guest house. There we have the least danger of some incidents. And then they go home and a few months later other people can come.

Prime Minister Chou: One or two weeks?

Dr. Kissinger: Or two weeks.

Prime Minister Chou: That is a good way. And we can begin to use that method to get to know things. And then you will find that there might be some topics that are worth deeper research. And perhaps there might be some fields in which it might be worthy to exchange material or data about. And it may be finally we would be able to find out in that way whom it seems to be worthy to let to remain to study what problems. Otherwise, I could only let your student go there, but he is not very familiar about Chinese conditions.

Dr. Kissinger: Which student is that? (Prime Minister Chou points to Chi (Laughter)).

I would not recommend as a friend that you start by sending people for a year. Harvard has too many complicated influences. This procedure is much better.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, it seems that the President's Assistant has higher designs than ordinary men.

Dr. Kissinger: Professor Fairbank has designs on the Vice Foreign Minister. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

If he fires too many empty cannons that may be the place to send him. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Two points of information about yesterday's discussion. When we were in Moscow, the Soviet leaders urged the President that he send me on a visit in the fall, and we have up to now avoided an answer, but I have no doubt that the invitation will now be renewed. We will not make a decision for several months. I just wanted to tell you where it stands, and if we do it, we will let you know well in advance.

With respect to Vietnam, I told the Prime Minister yesterday that we had proposed a private meeting for June 28 and that we had not yet received their reply. We have now received their reply to the effect

that Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy will not return to Paris until the end of the first week of July. They propose a plenary session on July 13 and a private meeting on July 15 and (at this point Prime Minister Chou sends Wang Hai-jung out of the room and she returns in about two minutes) we will consider this, but I think it is reasonable to assume that some negotiations will start—if not then, in that general period. But the important thing, of course, is not the start of negotiations but the substance.

(Prime Minister Chou and Miss Tang have exchange in Chinese)

These are the items . . .²

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps you have already read the news reports to the effect that your Secretary of Defense has spoken in the Congress as a witness about the approval and the ratification of your treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union. He spoke in the Senate. And he also mentioned that in order to get the treaties and agreements ratified, it was necessary to increase the U.S. defense budget.³ And therefore I found that your words were quite right yesterday, and we appreciate the straightforwardness of your Secretary of Defense in putting all the things on the table.

And there is also news that the Soviet Union has engaged in quite a number of experiments on nuclear weapons in order to raise their knowledge of the subject, since the signing of the agreement and the present day.⁴ And therefore it seems that there are at the same time limitations of strategic armaments and the continuation of experiments and development in nuclear arms.

And you also mentioned when you met with Ambassador Huang Hua the words I said during one of our meetings about these things. Actually when we met for the first time I said something about such matters. The thought which I expressed belonged to Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and therefore your burdens are still very heavy it seems.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, the agreement does stop numerical competition but not technological competition, and it would be extremely dangerous for everybody if we stop while the others continue.

The Prime Minister undoubtedly understands also that the Foreign Relations Committee has to approve the treaty, but the Armed Services Committee approves the military budget, and while the majority

² All ellipses are in the source text.

³ In June 1972, *The New York Times* published articles almost daily on arms control and the defense budget. See Bernard Gwertzman, "Senators Indicate Support at Arms-Accords Hearings," *The New York Times*, June 20, 1972, p. A-3.

⁴ Apparent reference to Laird's secret testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, as reported in Bernard Gwertzman, "Laird Discloses Soviet MIRV Test to Senate Panel," *ibid.*, June 9, 1972, p. A-12.

of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee are critical of Secretary Laird, the majority of the Armed Services Committee support Secretary Laird and he will have no difficulty passing his budget.

Prime Minister Chou: But Senator Fulbright, I believe, is Chairman of your Foreign Relations Committee, and he is in favor of the treaty.

Dr. Kissinger: He is in favor of the treaty and opposed to the budget.

Prime Minister Chou: But your Armed Services Committee will support the budget.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. It is already supported in the House and will most certainly be supported in the Senate.

Prime Minister Chou: And that is why he said that he doubted very much if Senator McGovern were elected he could cut the military budget of the U.S. by one-third. How could he do so?

Dr. Kissinger: A President could do so if he was absolutely determined to do it, but it would create enormous imbalances in the world.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and we are just reaffirming what we said yesterday. So perhaps by then if he wants to do that he will have to ask you to be his Assistant or adviser in such affairs so that you can explain to him that it won't do.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, it is extremely unlikely that such a thing would happen. It would require extraordinary mismanagement during the next three months to bring it about.

Prime Minister Chou: General Wheeler, your Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has already been in office for two terms, I think. Is that office affected by the Presidential election?

Dr. Kissinger: It is Admiral Moorer. He has been in office only one term, which is two years. That term is up at the end of this month. We are re-appointing him, and we will submit his name either during this week or early next week, and he will be re-appointed for two years regardless of who the President is. (Prime Minister Chou nods)

Prime Minister Chou: It already is in the papers that he was nominated.

Dr. Kissinger: It was supposed to be approved by the President on Monday. I did not know. My office sent it forward to the President on Friday, and I just did not know how quickly it would be acted upon. He will be appointed. I did not see our papers. The Prime Minister is ahead of me.

Prime Minister Chou: We probably give our press release excerpts from the foreign press very late to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I did not see it.

If I may tell the Prime Minister something in strictest confidence about personnel changes. We will appoint my Deputy as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in September, and he will also be in office effective late in October, and he will be our link to the military.

Prime Minister Chou: Who?

Dr. Kissinger: General Haig.

Prime Minister Chou: I don't think your present Chief of Staff's term is yet up.

Dr. Kissinger: The present Chief of Staff Westmoreland is retiring July 1, and we will appoint General Abrams from Vietnam as the Chief of Staff, but speaking frankly, since General Haig has direct access to us, he will be the decisive person.

So quite a few people who have been involved in the normalization of relations are winding up in key positions—General Walters and General Haig.

Prime Minister Chou: Walters?

Dr. Kissinger: Walters in Paris.

Prime Minister Chou: As for the U.S.-Soviet talks, we don't have much to say because we have all along held the position that we are in favor of your being able to relax your relations with the Soviet Union if possible, and we think that if possible it would be a good thing.

Because you remember that upon your first visit Chairman Mao had asked me to tell you that we hoped that your President would visit the Soviet Union first so that the Russians would not get the feeling that if China and the U.S. were coming closer it would be impossible for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to come closer. Because they are extremely hysterical about such matters. That is one point. That, you might say, could be the main point.

But as for disarmament, we have always said that would be impossible. The utmost that could be achieved would be to have some limitations on certain points while others went up and became inflated, and it now seems that our views were correct.

And since it has now been declared that there must be a race in the world on long distance nuclear submarines and long range bombers, etc. and also certain products that would be turned out in 1978 must begin to be prepared now, it seems that others will be compelled to go forward.

Ch'iao: Impelled to go forward.

Prime Minister Chou: And in speaking in this sense, I doubt whether the Soviet economy will be able to shoulder the burden that is increasing in an unlimited way. And, of course, under these circumstances the credit becomes a very important thing for them. And I believe that on such matters you know much more than we do, be-

cause you have been to the Soviet Union and also studied economic matters and therefore in this field you have a more profound knowledge than we do.

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to the weapons in 1978, the Soviet Union has increased—has doubled—its capacity to produce submarines, and we had actually stopped for four years producing any. But we are now producing an entirely new type so that if we were not to do this we would be overwhelmed with numbers.

We must convince the Soviet leaders that it is too dangerous for them and indeed beyond their capacity to challenge us to a race in both quantity or quality, since our productive capacity is at least three times theirs.

With respect to credits it is a very difficult problem. Because on the one hand we would like to strengthen the peaceful elements in the Soviet Union. On the other hand there is the danger that we are making possible for them the sort of competition they could not otherwise sustain (Prime Minister Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: It is a dilemma.

Dr. Kissinger: To some extent we can regulate this if we give credits by the kind of projects to which we give credits, but this is not particularly effective because if you free these resources from one area they can use their own resources for others. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

We are now studying the problem, and we are trying to find the way if we give credit to do it in a way where we can control the rate and where we can turn it off if their political behavior becomes threatening either against us or against countries whose survival we consider essential.

We will approach this, Mr. Prime Minister, entirely as a political problem and not as a commercial problem.

Prime Minister Chou: I understand that. But it seems that with the increase of inflation throughout the world there are certain countries that will want to try to float loans in a way of gaining interest. And there is no way to stop them from doing this.

Dr. Kissinger: But you don't get much interest from the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: But we do not want to have any relations like that. We have repaid all our debts, and we will never want to ask for debts from the Soviet Union again. But only I will have to add the condition to it that I added yesterday—to the word "never." That is, the condition I added yesterday was, as long as the present type of leadership continues in the Soviet Union. But with regard to this question perhaps I shouldn't add that condition.

Dr. Kissinger: The preferred rate of the leaders of the Soviet Union is below the rate of inflation so they are getting the money for better

than nothing. They are making a profit even on the capital, not to speak of the interest. (Prime Minister Chou laughs and nods.)

Prime Minister Chou: How can things that are only in the interest of one side be done?

Dr. Kissinger: It won't be done. If that doesn't change, it won't be done.

Prime Minister Chou: We only have to see and to watch the present manner in which the Soviet Union is conducting its affairs so that you can see that when one wants to both compete and to ask for loans and get profits all at the same time—when one wants to get all the good things into one's hands at the same time—one cannot avoid crises at the end. Only I am not speaking about crisis immediately.

Dr. Kissinger: Nor can this inspire confidence.

Prime Minister Chou: And it seems that from your experience in your work and your dealings with the Soviet Union you perhaps find that it is better to have the documents prepared beforehand—before you begin to discuss this matter with them or to have a meeting with them. Is that so?

Dr. Kissinger: My experience is that it is essential to have the documents prepared and that it is essential to have the agreed documents checked several times. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and it was only because you had prepared all the documents beforehand that you were able to sign so many agreements with them this time.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that is so. You remember we gave you the outline before we went to Moscow.

Prime Minister Chou: But it seems that there are three documents that could not avoid small alterations at the time of the meeting: the declaration of principles, the SALT agreement, and the communiqué. You could not avoid small alterations when . . . I don't believe you could have every final word all hammered down before the meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: No. The declaration of principles was substantially composed . . . no, the declaration of principles was in outline completed before the meeting, and I gave the outline to your Ambassador. We then had to adjust it in Moscow.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and you also mentioned yesterday that when they first put it forward there were certain points on which you did not agree.

Dr. Kissinger: When they put it forward on my visit it included many features that would have involved an indirect form of pressure. I would think, especially on the People's Republic, along the lines that I described to you yesterday.

And it was true also of the communiqué that there was a section urging signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We rejected this already in April, but they raised it again in Moscow and we rejected it again which is, as your Vice Foreign Minister knows, a very physically exhausting process. (Prime Minister Chou nods.)

On the agreement on the limitation of strategic armaments there was a very prolonged discussion, even in Moscow, in which we went through agreements in the evening and they were withdrawn the next morning; and which contained a number of unilateral proposals; and which ended only when at 4:00 o'clock on the morning of Friday I said that there would not be an agreement, and at 11:30 they accepted our proposals.⁵ You see, it was a very rational discussion (laughter).

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the unilateral statements?

Dr. Kissinger: No, there were a number of issues.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the unilateral statements, not the limitations?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to bore the Prime Minister, but they wanted to cut certain missiles . . . certain missiles they wanted to keep and therefore they said they were not strategic missiles and were outside the agreement. But since they could turn in old missiles for new ones they keep them . . . so that for missiles that were not counted in the inventory to begin with they could then build new missiles when they scrapped them. (Laughter) And we obviously could not accept this.

And so there were very many discussions, and there was another issue in which they said the size of a silo could not be significantly increased but they would not tell us what they meant by the word "significantly." So we insisted that a fixed percentage be given, 10 to 15%, because otherwise they could have put big missiles . . . replaced smaller missiles with big missiles and not violated the agreement. They finally agreed to this but it was a very long discussion. It was finally settled.

We had foreseen the agreement would be signed Friday night; then I said it could not be signed under the conditions; and then at 11:30 they accepted our proposals on these issues.

Prime Minister Chou: Was it only then when the representatives of your two countries came to Moscow from Helsinki?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I did not let the people come from Helsinki to Moscow until we had achieved an agreement in principle, because I did not want our experts running around Moscow negotiating with the

⁵ Documentation on these negotiations is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXII.

Russian experts and creating total confusion. (PM Chou laughs.) I did not want our experts to give away our position in their desire to win the Nobel Prize. (Laughter.)

Prime Minister Chou: Would you like to take off your coats—it is so warm. Is it all right with the American lady?⁶ (All take off coats.)

And in one word, you will understand why it is that the Chinese–Soviet boundary negotiations which began on 11 September 1969 and have been continuing for almost three years now still haven't been able to reach an agreement on the provisional agreement that had already been formally agreed to.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand it very well.

Prime Minister Chou: As for the concrete terms of that, we have discussed it when your President came, so it is now still hanging in the air.

I would like to say something about the war in Vietnam and the question of Indochina.

This is the question that was unfortunately left down from history and is being very difficult to resolve. And the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples have undertaken something that has now become a test for them. But this is at the same time something that is also a test to both your present Administration and also the next.

And probably Mr. John Fairbank has already told you that I have on more than one occasion openly said that we believe that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 were not honest agreements and that we were taken in at that time. We admit our mistakes and would want to be able to rectify them.

And that is why there is a certain clause in the U.S. statement that is contained in the Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqué that draws my attention. It probably was ratified by your President, but also it might have been the masterpiece of Dr. Kissinger—that is, that no country should claim infallibility and each country should be able to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. And we would want to implement that and to do that faithfully. We have on more than one occasion admitted our mistakes to the Vietnamese. Perhaps it might be said at that time among the socialist countries the role played by the Soviet Union was the greatest, but China was the one that was the closest to Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. And that is why this time we are showing complete respect for the sovereignty of Vietnam, whether it be on their positions on the battlefield or towards their positions at the

⁶ Apparent reference to one of the American notetakers.

negotiating table. In other words we only have the obligation to support them but not the right to interfere in their affairs.

But, however, the quantity of our assistance to Vietnam cannot be compared to your assistance to Saigon, and that is also a fact that was noted by Senator Mansfield back in 1968. And he was already by that time the leader of the ruling party in the Senate, of the majority party, and therefore it cannot be said that his words were exaggerated at that time. And you also admit that this has been our consistent stand.

Dr. Kissinger: I know it is true that your support has been less than ours. I don't dispute that.

Prime Minister Chou: And it now seems that your present Administration is determined to withdraw from Vietnam and the rest of Indochina and to try to create an environment in which policies of neutrality are practiced. And such an outcome can only come off the negotiation table and not out of the battlefield. Because if you try to settle the matter on the battlefield that will inevitably give rise to resistance. Because the situation is one in which the U.S. first sent in military advisers and then raised the situation to the level of special warfare and then escalated to regional warfare; this whole escalation was the result of actions done by previous, former U.S. administrations.

And with regard to the war in Vietnam, no matter what treaty you may cite, this sending of troops has been unjust and these are actions which no one can defend. And this situation can in no way be compared to your treaty obligations with other countries or other areas into which you have not yet sent troops, unless you view all the areas or countries with which you have treaties as being relations which are entirely the same as your relations with Saigon. And even if you view all those treaties as official treaties, if mistakes have been committed, then you should be prepared to reexamine your own attitudes and to rectify the mistakes.

And you have always been expressing your praise for the attitude taken by the Chinese government in taking the negotiations step by step. That is not wrong, but that is because the state of war does not exist between our two countries.

You mentioned the day before yesterday that you read later on the records of Chairman Mao's talk with President Nixon, and he had mentioned in the talk in the beginning on the items that were later discussed during the next five or six days, and this was also a point that was mentioned by our Chairman. And following the advice of your words I re-read the records this morning, and it was your President that first mentioned this matter. Of course, Chairman Mao first mentioned that no state of war existed between our two countries and it was not necessary to have a state of war exist between our two countries.

And your President also mentioned that China was not a threat to the U.S. and the U.S. was neither a threat to China. Chairman Mao also mentioned that we neither threatened Japan nor South Korea, and I added a word there that we did not want to threaten any other country. And proof of this point can be found in the fact that we have only done little nuclear experiments on the basis of self-reliance. We do not want to compete in this field.

Therefore I think that President Nixon and also Prime Minister Heath have been correct in pointing out that China is only a potential strength and it cannot be known yet whenever that strength will appear, and we know our own age and you also probably have pointed out that we probably will not be here in the 21st Century. You have the hope of being here at that time. We do not. Those seated at this side of the table have the hope. Those on the other side I cannot be sure about, but on your side all of you have the hope.

So the matter is very clear. We will not be a threat to you. And not only are we not a threat to you—take the case of Indochina. If an end can be put to the war then in Cambodia, Sihanouk will ultimately be the head of state. And in Laos the head will be King Vattana. That is the man of prestige in Laos. Perhaps you have not seen the King of Laos. I have met him. He is a very honest man.

And in both these two countries their characteristic of neutrality will be more pronounced and in South Vietnam at least for a time it will be neutral. As for the outcome of the election I cannot vouch for that, but the situation will not change very quickly. And you know that we will not reach our hands out to that area. You are very clear on that. And that area will become in a certain sense a kind of a buffer.

As for countries like Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines and so on, these countries would like to embark on a road of neutrality. They have asked our opinion on such matters, and we support them in doing so. Of course, there will also be the problem of mutual respect. All other countries must also respect them and not interfere in their internal affairs. We believe that this is a good tendency that is also beneficial to the relaxation of tension in the Far East. If this is to be achieved, not only our two countries but also the other two big countries in this area and the other countries in the west must not try to seek domination in this area. Only this is a complicated issue. But at least, if our two countries can have common comprehension of the matter then that will be beneficial towards relaxing the tension in the Far East.

So what is the question that we now face? The question is that the U.S. Government now feels that if it should let loose of the situation there and discontinue to pay attention to that area, then that would be losing face. And what will be the result? We have to come back to our

discussion during your first visit—that is, if such kind of face worries are to be maintained then the war will not be able to be stopped. And then the result will not be what you want nor be what we want. The war will continue along its own laws of development; there are certain things that cannot be decided by human will. But the result will be that there are certain people who will be happy about this. I believe that in one of my messages I mentioned that point, and those were true words.

Although you have heard from certain people that we are the ones who are commanding affairs in that area, how is it possible that we should be doing that? And to be honest and frank, if we were the commanders we would not fight in such a way. You are clear about how the war in Korea was conducted. And your President Eisenhower, after just being elected, went to Korea to see the situation with his own eyes, and he understood the situation. You know that finally in June 1953 we wiped out four divisions of Syngman Rhee, and we broke through in the center of the line. At that time the U.S. agreed to put its signature to the ceasefire. And by that time Stalin had already passed away and Khrushchev also agreed to the ceasefire. Since both these two sides agreed to a ceasefire, we also put our signature to the agreement.

You will recall that during your President's visit we had a discussion in the guest house in Villa 18, where your President was staying, in which I mentioned the question of the Chinese volunteers in the Korean war and how they were maltreated and the disgraceful role that India played.⁷ I will not say anything more about that today because it makes me too sad to mention such matters.

So the present situation is one in which with the turn of one's hand the matter could be settled. But you are continuing to stay now, and you are pegged down to a point that you say that you cannot give up a certain government. Actually that government was set up by yourself. It was also mentioned in the Sino-U.S. communiqué by the U.S. side that in the absence of a negotiated settlement the U.S. envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all the U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for the countries of Indochina. Your attitude at the time of the drawing up of this document—that was in October last year—seemed to be more pronounced than your present one. Do you have to insist on drawing the strings of the bow so tightly and to persist in continuing the war?

And also you continue your bombing and blockade of the northern part of Vietnam. There is an old Chinese saying, "since the people are not afraid of death, how can you try to scare them with the thought

⁷ Chou mentioned the Chinese prisoners of war at the February 24 meeting held in the Great Hall of the People. See Document 199.

of death?" I would not want to engage in emotional discussions. But what you are doing now is an equivalent to a provocation against us because you now only leave the continental route as the only remaining route to Vietnam. Do you think we can watch people dying without trying to save them? If a country sent its forces to Canada or Mexico, and the situation developed into a similar stage, would you be able to sit there with your hands folded and refuse to try to save them?

Both your President and yourself are very clear, especially yourself who has come to China now four times, that our country is not a country that wants to expand abroad. We cannot even finish our own things . . . what should be done in our own country. And, of course, our strength at the present time cannot be compared to that of the Soviet Union. But do you think that in giving assistance to Vietnam we would not be able to grit our teeth and to use all our strength to assist them? And you should attach importance to the fact that it is not easy for our two countries to establish certain relations . . .

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Attaching importance to the relations which has paved the way . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Because your bombing and your blockade are not directed against the Soviet Union. They are directed against China, because you are bombing us. I would like to show you some pictures later on. We have photographs of the two bomb shells that fell onto our territory. It is marked in English that they are anti-tank bomb clusters, that have a cluster of smaller bombs inside. It includes nearly 200 small bombs inside. There is no question that those were U.S. Navy bombs. It can be seen very clearly that from the various routes that were taken by those airplanes that the flight routes all finally ended in the sea. They finally went back towards the sea. But you will know that we have exercised extreme restraint on these matters. The incidents that occurred on the 4th, 9th and 10th of June, we all dealt with them in the way of giving you internal private notification. And General Haig's reply to the incidents of the 10th and 11th was extremely quick. He telephoned us in the afternoon.⁸

Dr. Kissinger: At my instructions from Tokyo.

Prime Minister Chou: And you probably also could foresee by that time that something would also happen on the 11th and that is why we haven't yet raised the incident that occurred on the 11th.

And before that, before your President's announcement of May 8, on the 7th, your airplanes also bombed two Chinese merchant ships that were at that time anchored near the island of Hon Ngu of the Dem-

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 230.

ocratic Republic of Vietnam. You said that you had already launched an investigation with regard to this but perhaps the final result will be given to us at a later time.

So why isn't the Soviet Union a target? Because they ran away. (Dr. Kissinger laughs.) One of their boats was damaged by your armed forces, but the Soviet Union did not make that public. The DRV made it public for them. Therefore we feel that such a course of action will not win the sympathy of the people of the world.

And that is why I posed the question yesterday that if you withdrew your armed forces and no political resolution could be found to the issues, and hostilities broke out again, what could you do? Of course, not hostilities between the U.S. and regional forces but hostilities between the liberation forces in Vietnam and the Saigon government. I asked what you would do in that event, and you found it very difficult to reply.

That is why the Vietnamese envisage a settlement that includes both the military aspect and the political aspect at once. We believe there is reason in their seeking such a solution and therefore we support them. Therefore, if the question of the government, no matter whether it be called a coalition government or a government of harmony, is not settled, and discussions on this do not bear results, then a peaceful situation will not be able to be brought about in the southern part of Vietnam, and therefore in the event of your withdrawal from that part of Indochina, hostilities between the two Vietnamese sides would break out again. On the other hand, if political agreement can be reached, then that would have a binding force on all. And that is also to say that the attitude that that government would take towards the U.S. would be more friendly because the political agreement would be an agreement in which you also had made a contribution. You also mentioned last July that it was easy to solve all the other points of the 7-point proposal put forward by Madame Binh, and you even expressed your appreciation of certain points of her proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: We even accepted most of them . . . which did not keep her from publicly demanding for six months after we had already accepted five of her seven points that we respond to her seven points.

Prime Minister Chou: Because your proposal did not answer the fundamental question and therefore it was a proposal that could not be realized.

Dr. Kissinger: But it was a response.

Prime Minister Chou: Because you said that there could be two governments, and the present government was one that Vietnam would not accept and a government that would be proposed by the Vietnamese would be a government that you would not accept, and therefore your two positions were opposed to each other. That is why a

means should be found and a solution should be found that could be agreeable to both sides. This should be a government that could be accepted by both sides and that also would include the forces of all sides . . . of various sides; and also a government that would not be antagonistic to the U.S. and would take a comparatively friendly attitude toward the U.S.

As to the future, that is looking a few years ahead for a period that might be agreed upon, that might be defined, if after a period of a certain time through general elections Vietnam would choose to take the socialist road, that would be something else. As for socialism in the present world, there are many various kinds of socialism. From the point of view of philosophy you have long seen that point as a point that John Foster Dulles did not see. As to what kind of socialism that South Vietnam would choose if it would turn to socialism in the future, I cannot say, and yet you are so afraid of that. Anyway, I won't see that, because they have already declared that it will be only after a certain period of time that Vietnam would seek to be reunified. Yet you are so fearful and so sure that the government that would emerge would be a communist government. And through your contacts with us you would know that it is not an easy task at all for a country to truly build up socialism and to thoroughly eliminate exploitation and to also eliminate the ideology of the exploiting classes. Chairman Mao has mentioned that the Cultural Revolution will have to be carried out many times.

I do not agree with your prediction for Germany. How could Germany be turned into a country like Finland? It is impossible. I seem to have more confidence in the Germans than you do. They wouldn't want to be a Finland. As for the other two possibilities, there might even be a different, third possibility. That is why I said that Germany was at the crossroads.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the third possibility?

Prime Minister Chou: To continue to remain split.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes. I start from that assumption. I was talking about West Germany alone.

Prime Minister Chou: It is impossible for West Germany to become a Finland. I have been to Germany for only one year and Mr. Ch'iao has been to Germany for three years. And we all of us seem to have more confidence in Germany than you, the American sitting across from us who was born in Germany. And as for East Germany, it is more than Finland—it has already become a kind of dependency, but it is impossible for West Germany to become that. As for the other two possibilities, they exist. Therefore as to the future development and prospects, why should you take so much care about that?

Dr. Kissinger: What country are we talking about? (Laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: We are turning back to Indochina.

So what is bad in relaxing the tension in the Far East for a time and to having a period of neutrality in this area? I am tempted more to agree to the attitude you took when you were drawing up the communiqué. Because otherwise there are things that would not be able to be realized. And therefore we might as well solve the military and the political aspects together and to set up a good relation that would be able to continue for a certain period of time—for several years. And perhaps in the words of your President, you might be able to attain a generation of peace, or in my words, a generation of relaxation.

Otherwise, if the issue of Indochina is not resolved, then that will affect the settlement of the Taiwan issue. It would also affect the two sides in Korea that wish to co-exist peacefully. That will also inevitably affect the direction of Japan. And Southeast Asia will continue in an upheaval, and relaxation will not be able to be realized in that area either. I don't know whether you noted that or not, but there can be seen a tendency towards relaxation—it can be seen from the recent meeting that was held of the Asian Pacific Council in Seoul. I don't think South Vietnam participated in that. I believe there were nine countries that formally took part. I believe the nine units that participated were—officially—South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. And there were three that might be called observers. They included South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

They especially applauded the visit of your President to China and the Soviet Union which was conducive towards the relaxation of tension. I was greatly taken aback upon reading that report because I wondered how they could have put in the matter of your President's visit to China. So finally I decided that it must have come out of the hands of Aichi and the Foreign Minister of South Korea and perhaps Mr. Romulo might have taken part too. They said that your President had visited Peking and Moscow; I said that was illogical because the communiqué itself was issued in Shanghai. They had no other way to say it than that. They had to make some conciliations. They could only write it that way. And because Taiwan has now changed its so-called Foreign Minister,⁹ and he knew it would not have been easy to oppose that issue, he probably kept comparatively quiet and if Chow Shu-kai had taken part, he probably would have created a scene and the others would not have listened to him. So the present Foreign Minister thought it would be more intelligent to keep quiet. That does not mean

⁹ Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming was replaced by Chow Shu-kai in 1971, who was replaced by Shen Ch'ang-huan in 1972.

that I appreciated the statement issued by those nine units. I only mean that this tendency has drawn our attention.

So why is it that one should get tangled up in the single knot of Indochina? Especially in view of the fact that all these nine units have expressed appreciation for your President's visit to China, although Taiwan probably did not appreciate it, but it probably could not refrain from acquiescing.

Dr. Kissinger: I had the pleasure of talking to their Ambassador, and they would not have recommended it if we had asked them to. (Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: Of course. And therefore, with regard to the issue of Indochina, we feel it would be better if you adopted an attitude that was more directed towards a settlement of the issue. Otherwise you will be placing a difficult question before us. Because you know that we would like to see a relaxation in the tension, and by doing that you are delighting the Soviet Union. You are giving them an opportunity to heap abuse upon us. They already are doing that.

After you completed your visit to the Soviet Union we kept quiet because we did not think it was necessary to create a commotion, and we also were not opposed to that. Even after the visit we only issued a very short news report—an objective report. We issued no comment.

Dr. Kissinger: We noticed that with appreciation.

Prime Minister Chou: But after your visit here they heaped abuse upon us, saying that we did not assist the Soviet Union in assisting Vietnam. There is no such thing. They are trying to pile all the burdens and the responsibilities of assistance onto our shoulders; including the things that they want to send into Vietnam, they also send them to us.

Therefore I do not understand your policy, and, according to what you told us during your visit last July, your subjective desire was to settle the issue, but it seems as if the objective tendency is to follow the laws of development that govern the war. So what are you going to do about that? What can we do about this situation? I can only ask for your opinion.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me make a number of observations, Mr. Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Chou: I wanted to get your comments. That is why I said all this. Otherwise, how can we have a discussion and for what other purpose would we welcome you to come to China? Because you know this is one of the steps that must be taken to normalize relations between the U.S. and China.

Dr. Kissinger: I am fully aware of that. First, in connection with incursions into Chinese territory. We have investigated them all, and I have this book here of the investigation. As you know, since we had

to make these investigations through military channels and since the military are not eager to admit a mistake, I have to confess that the results are sometimes inconclusive. Our military claim, and I don't say this to be vague with you, that perhaps there is some inadequacy in your radar, and I mention it only so that if this were true, and I don't ask for a reply today, it might have some consequences to you in other areas and therefore might be important for you to look into. (Chou laughs.) I am not saying this for a defense.¹⁰

Prime Minister Chou: I know.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no doubt that if bombs fell on your territory it was not caused by the imperfection of your radars. And if you could let me have the pictures, I would want them, not because I question you but so that we can take appropriate disciplinary measures when we return. At any rate it cannot be the intention of our government, in the light of all of our discussions, to challenge the sovereignty of the People's Republic or to engage in provocations against the People's Republic.

And therefore we have issued new instructions which would avoid the possibility of mistakes by keeping our planes further from your territory.

Prime Minister Chou: We can make a present of those pictures to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you. Give me the coordinates also, where these bombs fell and the time and the date.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the bombs that fell in the morning of the 10th?

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, and the exact place.

Prime Minister Chou: It was just south of the town of Ping Hsiang, near a railway station.

Dr. Kissinger: How many bombs?

Prime Minister Chou: Two anti-tank bomb clusters.

Dr. Kissinger: We can only extend our apologies. There is no excuse. There is no explanation. (Prime Minister Chou is handed maps.)

¹⁰ Moorer reported to Laird in a July 9 memorandum that a second investigation had been conducted, but concluded again that no U.S. aircraft entered PRC airspace and "The only plausible explanation for the few MK-118 bombs to have been dropped in the vicinity of the PRC village of Aikou, if in fact the PRC facts are accurate, is that one of the aircraft had a high altitude inadvertent release." Laird forwarded Moorer's memorandum to Kissinger on July 11. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 330 75 0155, Comm. China 1972, 000.1) On July 11 Laird also informed Kissinger that he had met with the JCS to work out procedures to ensure that U.S. aircraft did not penetrate PRC airspace. (Ibid.) This information was given to the PRC on July 26; see Document 243.

Prime Minister Chou: This is the map of the intrusion.¹¹ The coordinates are not here, but I can give them to you later. I will get the English also marked on it in the future. (Points to map.) This was the route which the aircraft incursion on the 4th of June took. It came in like that and went out. You know there is some difficulty with our boundary because it moves out—it protrudes a bit, so perhaps it is difficult for people to remember. That is Ping Hsiang and that is the Aikou railway station. So this is the road in Vietnam that you bombed and you went up to [town]¹² which is nearer and that is the reason for the first intrusion on the 4th. On the 9th there were three groups of intrusions. One came in here and went out there. One came in first here, went out, and then came in again and went out there.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no possibility that any of these were North Vietnamese planes? If they are fighting up there.

Prime Minister Chou: We have the type. I think maybe perhaps all of them are F-4s. This was the bomb of the plane that bombed our territory on the 10th.

Dr. Kissinger: Where did the bomb drop?

Prime Minister Chou: (Points) Here. (Chou takes pictures.) That is the panorama of the Aikou area. This is where one of the bombs fell. We will mark the place. That is what was marked on the bomb. That was a whole picture of the shell.

Dr. Kissinger: Which is the 4th of June? Can I have these pictures?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but I will ask them to put some marks on them where exactly the bombs fell. We will give the whole thing to you later after we get the coordinates in English. So we will leave it at that.

Dr. Kissinger: I have all these reports from our military people about these. Of course they deny everything, and I can read them to you, but I don't know what good it would do.

Prime Minister Chou: Maybe you could read a paragraph. For instance, what do they say about the 10th?

Dr. Kissinger: Bombs on PRC structures. The PRC charged that two planes entered into the PRC airspace with guns in the area of Ping-shan (?). They just refute the charge. CINCPAC Air Force has confirmed that the 7th Air Force had no aircraft operating above 21 degrees north latitude in North Vietnam within four hours of either side of the time period in question. Why don't you read it yourself (to the interpreter)

¹¹ Not found. Documentation on alleged intrusions and communications between the White House and the Department of Defense is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 75 0155, 373.5, Communist China.

¹² All brackets are in the source text.

to the Prime Minister? That would be easier. If you can understand his English you are better off.

Mr. Negroponte is shocked. He doesn't understand my method of operation. They don't teach this in the Foreign Service Institute. (Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: This is a more convenient way of conducting things.

Dr. Kissinger: Here. This is all of it.

(Miss Tang reads document at Tab A to Prime Minister Chou.)¹³

Prime Minister Chou: There are a lot of small bombs that were included in the cluster.

Dr. Kissinger: Well since they have denied that they have dropped a cluster it is not very fruitful to discuss what was in it. (Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: Maybe they would like to see it.

(Miss Tang continues reading.)

Dr. Kissinger: (To other interpreter who is copying from document) If you could avoid making a word for word record of it, it would help me.

(Interrupting Miss Tang:) This is a very long military report. Here is the Laird version of it. (Dr. Kissinger hands over sanitized Secretary Laird report, attached at Tab B.)

Miss Tang: *Long Beach* radar?

Dr. Kissinger: That is the cruiser from which these planes are launched. That is an American cruiser that keeps track of all our planes.

(Miss Tang reads more, then stops, puzzled.)

Dr. Kissinger: What is it in English?

Miss Tang: None of the aircraft identified above are operated at a speed of 192 knots, which is the speed indicated by the time and distance factors resulting from the unidentified *Long Beach* radar fixes.

Dr. Kissinger: The *Long Beach* picked up some airplanes that were moving at a speed of 192 miles, and the argument is that none of our planes fly that slowly.

¹³ Tabs A or B are probably an undated report entitled "10 June Allegations (Bombs on PRC Structures" and a copy of a June 16 memorandum from Laird to Kissinger subject: "PRC Allegations and Possible Airspace Intrusions." Both are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 851, President's File—China Trip, Memcons, HAK China Visit, 19–23 June 1972. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 136 and 137. Messages and memoranda concerning alleged intrusions into PRC airspace or territorial waters are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files—Far East, China, PRC Allegations of Hostile Acts (ca. 1972).

(Miss Tang continues reading.)

Miss Tang: What is POWT?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know. I just noticed that myself. I will ask Commander Howe. But at any rate it is after the event. I will find out and let you know. (*Note: It was misprint that should have read "post" for "post-strike."*)

Dr. Kissinger: (After Miss Tang finishes reading document) I won't argue this point. I also have longer reports on them by the Secretary of Defense. The major point is it is not authorized. It is not encouraged, and we have given new orders which in our judgment should prevent it by keeping the airplanes a further distance from your territory.

Secondly, the purpose of our actions was not to provoke the People's Republic. As a matter of fact, before we took the decision on May 8 we foresaw that one objective result of that decision might be to strengthen the influence of the People's Republic in Hanoi, and we did not consider that a disadvantage.

As we have told you on previous occasions, we have no interest in encouraging the spread of Soviet military presence all around your borders and therefore to the degree that the Soviet Union has withdrawn some of its influence from North Vietnam and you have increased yours, we did not intend that as a provocation to you.

Third, I am not sure whether I understood the Prime Minister correctly when he spoke about "gritting your teeth" and giving assistance. I remember that the Prime Minister told the President that unless the People's Republic was attacked, was directly attacked, it would not use its military forces in Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: But we must continue the transportation and our people will die in that course.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Prime Minister Chou: Transportation by ships, by cars, and even by shoulder poles or train. Since you have cut off all other routes we still have to send things. Because you know that our two countries, that China and Vietnam are linked by both land and water and sea, and you know that we cannot just sit here and see them lacking food, because you know that you are now attacking even their food supplies. The two boats—more than two—that you attacked that went to the [name] Island and another the [name].

Dr. Kissinger: I know what you mean.

Prime Minister Chou: The Honshi ships including the ships that were attacked, all the [name] ships that went to those two islands were carrying grain and you could see the grain being carried off the ships. The new island and the Honla Island. So this will inevitably incur the death of large numbers of people.

Of course, the Soviet Union will not go there to try to send supplies in (Chou laughs). It is very clear. What you meant by saying that our influence had increased in North Vietnam could only be that our assistance had increased. But originally before that our assistance was already greater than that given by the Soviet Union because they only gave certain military assistance while we gave all-round assistance including all kinds of commodities. Anyway, if you continue the bombing that will inevitably incur more deaths. And to try to solve the question by killing people will not bring about a settlement.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, this gets me to the most important problem. It is in a sense absurd that you and we should have tension over an area from which we are attempting to withdraw and which you are not attempting to enter.

Prime Minister Chou: It is absurd.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree also with the basic objective of the Prime Minister that we should try to create an area of relaxation of tension. I also agree with the Prime Minister that neutrality of many of these countries can be achieved through an understanding between our two countries at least. Because if we both showed a strength and if we both oppose outside intervention, it will be very difficult to have outside intervention.

So we are in the curious situation, and finally I agree with the Prime Minister that a continuation of the war will have the consequence in Southeast Asia, in Korea, in Japan and unfortunately on our relationship, that he predicts and for no sensible objective. What then is the problem? In our view the problem is the inability of a government that has fought 30 years, or 27 years, to think in political terms, and its impatience to settle everything in one negotiation and in one time period. And couple that with a certain pride that they want to be able to say that they can defeat the U.S.

Prime Minister Chou: It cannot be put that way. It is you that has compelled them to fight like that.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it is our different interpretation.

Prime Minister Chou: Because you imposed armed forces into that area, and then you armed the Saigon regime.

Dr. Kissinger: But we are talking about the current situation. We have withdrawn 500,000 troops.

Prime Minister Chou: That I admit.

Dr. Kissinger: And we want to withdraw the remainder.

Prime Minister Chou: And since you have withdrawn your troops to its final remainder, then why do you want to leave that "tail" there and try to expand the war with the tail?

Dr. Kissinger: But the Prime Minister knows, because I told him yesterday, that we are prepared to withdraw the tail. If the North

Vietnamese accept a ceasefire we will withdraw all our forces in return for our prisoners.

Prime Minister Chou: Does that mean that your air and naval forces would also withdraw?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: So then since you will have by that time withdrawn all your forces and have all your prisoners of war repatriated, then if the political issue cannot be solved and a civil war breaks out again, you shouldn't go back to take care of that. Because we wouldn't take care of that, so what reason is it for you to go back to take care of that situation?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, you have more experience in international affairs than I so you know there are certain situations in which it is very difficult to give a formal answer, because one does not want to create a legal obligation for what may be taken care of by reality. I believe if a sufficient interval is placed between our withdrawal and what happens afterward that the issue can almost certainly be confined to an Indochina affair; and if there is no other outside intervention. From your own analysis of the American situation it should be self-evident that in a second term we would not be looking for excuses to re-enter Indochina. But still it is important that there is a reasonable interval between the agreement on the ceasefire, and a reasonable opportunity for a political negotiation.

Prime Minister Chou: The present regime in Saigon is receiving large quantities of U.S. armed military assistance, and therefore it is not possible that the Saigon government will recognize a reasonable settlement that might be the outcome of negotiations between the Vietnamese people.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not certain that in the absence of American forces and of the American air and naval power the Saigon government might not prove to be more reasonable in negotiations.

Prime Minister Chou: They have their own armed forces, and they have blind confidence in their own armed forces. And they also are convinced that although you have left, if even you may not go back in, you would not resist giving them the military assistance that they wanted.

Dr. Kissinger: We offered last year to limit military assistance to South Vietnam in the same proportion that North Vietnam limited assistance it received in the military field.

Prime Minister Chou: So the outcome of your logic is that the war will continue?

Dr. Kissinger: No, the outcome of my logic is that for the time period . . . I am not trying to win debating points because I agree with

the Prime Minister that we have a difficult problem to settle. The outcome of my logic is that we are putting a time interval between the military outcome and the political outcome. No one can imagine that history will cease on the Indochina peninsula with a ceasefire. And I believe that if the North Vietnamese had confidence in themselves they should have a better chance this way than through a continuation of the war.

The Prime Minister referred to what President Eisenhower did in Korea. If we had that opportunity, we would settle the war very quickly.

Prime Minister Chou: The situation was different.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course.

Prime Minister Chou: Because at that time the people in South Korea had not arisen. So there was only the two sides. North Korea was the one side and South Korea was the other. So there was a tie between the strength of the two sides and that settled the issue. And as a result we withdrew all our Chinese peoples' volunteers in 1958, but you haven't responded to this yet. The situation that prevailed in that time was different.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister also said that the issue is that we do not want to give up a certain government. That is not correct. What we will not do is ourselves to overthrow the government. We will agree to an historical process or a political process in which the real forces in Vietnam will assert themselves, whatever these forces are.

Why should we be afraid of socialism in Vietnam when we can live with communism in China? (Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: That is the point that I don't understand.

Dr. Kissinger: And therefore what we are trying to do, Mr. Prime Minister, and what is not against your own interests, is not to end this war with an act of betrayal. We do not want to overthrow this government. We will agree to a process in which the people of South Vietnam have an opportunity to express themselves. That we can agree. But we cannot agree to ourselves overthrowing them.

Now we have made some political proposals. I have not mentioned them only because they will lead to very complex and therefore very time-consuming negotiations. We have offered elections which would be supervised and run by commissions in which all three parties are represented. And we have offered that President Thieu would resign a month before the election and if extending this period somewhat would make the problem of the Democratic Republic somewhat easier we can do that probably.

So there is a possibility for a political negotiation. The reason we cannot accept this government of national conciliation is because its

objective consequence will be to overthrow the existing government and bring into power—it is a very thinly disguised formula for bringing into power the DRV. And therefore we believe that the most rapid way of ending the war would be to concentrate on the military issues and permit us to disengage from Indochina, and after that permit the local forces to work it out, either through negotiations or other means.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the local forces in Vietnam?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: But if the issue cannot be solved at the present existing negotiation table then the local forces will continue in conflict. This can almost be said to be certain.

Dr. Kissinger: Then at least the outside forces will be disengaged.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean there should be a ceasefire during the period of time in which the negotiations are being held?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: I think that that probably could not be done. Would the Saigon government—regime—agree to that?

Dr. Kissinger: At this moment with great reluctance, because they believe they are winning, but we would see to that.

Prime Minister Chou: You could only see to that by continuing to give them arms and assistance.

Dr. Kissinger: We would certainly not increase our arms and assistance during a ceasefire, and we would almost certainly reduce the quantity during the ceasefire. Since less equipment would be destroyed, we would almost certainly reduce it . . .

Prime Minister Chou: For a time.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not . . . it is senseless to believe that we are looking for an excuse to be permanently involved in Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: But according to our experience in China, although a ceasefire may have been signed before the civil war broke out again in China, we had documents and usually even had agreements and both sides signed the agreements, but later on when Chiang Kai-shek felt that he had strength to launch a civil war he went on.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister explained to me once that if Chiang Kai-shek had observed the ceasefire in 1946 he might have lasted six years longer.

Prime Minister Chou: The question was that his subjective desire would not allow him to abide by its agreements. He thought that he could do it. That is the same case with you.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe that the danger of Thieu breaking the agreement is much smaller than the danger of the Democratic Republic

breaking the agreement. Because if Thieu broke a ceasefire there would be a good chance that he would lose American support.

Prime Minister Chou: It is very difficult to say that. I cannot answer for them.

Anyway, in a word, why is it that the DRV insists on having a political settlement at the same time as a military settlement? It is because they believe that if the political side can be resolved, that would be better, truly towards relaxing the tension in Indochina, and also better towards solving the question for the time being.

Dr. Kissinger: If I may make one suggestion for the Democratic Republic, and in which your advice to them could be helpful since they are so suspicious of us. They should look not just at the words of the agreement but at the trend. No matter what the words of the agreement in 1954 would have been, Secretary Dulles was determined to go into Indochina. No matter what the words of the agreement in 1972, or whenever this Administration makes it, there is no reason for us who are seeking to normalize relations with you to remain in a position of tension with Hanoi. When we were attempting to build barriers against you, there was one policy. But now that we believe that your vitality is a factor to peace in the Pacific, why should we build barriers to you in Indochina, and if not building barriers in Indochina what is our interest there either one way or the other? So after the agreement is signed the value will be that there will be an increasing American disinterest in Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: That is to say that there should be a political solution to the question. But as for your proposal, what the DRV believes your proposal to be is an attempt to set up a Thieu government without Thieu. Because you remember that they held so-called elections a year before, and if elections of a similar type are still to be held then he will be the outcome again. And therefore the question of political settlement will have to be discussed between your two sides, because we are not very clear about the concrete details and specific organization matters, and therefore we do not wish to enter into any detailed discussion on this. I expect that you will say that the new government you propose is not a new edition of Thieu. But they will say that what will be the outcome of an election that is held in a situation in which Thieu's military forces are in control of the areas in which the elections are held; and also in their having superior forces in that area it will not be possible for a true coalition government that includes the three sides to be elected.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand their point.

Prime Minister Chou: And the country of Laos is a precedent, because in that country we even had an international agreement at that time. But finally if they wanted to phase certain people out they still phased them out and the situation turned into a civil war.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe a political solution will be much easier 18 months from today than today if we can get the war stopped. But we are prepared to discuss political negotiations also, but I predict it will end as badly as all previous negotiations for the reasons I gave you yesterday.

Prime Minister Chou: Oh. Did not you say there was a bit of hope?

Dr. Kissinger: In the negotiations? It depends. We are prepared, and we have offered, to go systematically through all of their points if they are willing to go systematically through ours to see if we can find a reconciliation. That will be our attitude. We believe that the war should be ended this year, because a continuation of the war runs counter to all the positive tendencies that we have described; and it will involve a degree of interference in our domestic politics which is becoming intolerable; and which will strengthen those forces whose practical convictions are against the policies I have . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Your previous sentence was illogical.

Dr. Kissinger: Why?

Prime Minister Chou: First of all, what strength of force does North Vietnam have to interfere in your domestic politics? You have interfered in their domestic politics to such a degree that it is becoming disgraceful, and they have no way of interfering in your domestic politics. For instance, I don't believe that if McGovern would come to office he would be able to solve the question. Did not you read the interview between Chairman Mao and the President?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Prime Minister Chou: I also read it. And it seems to me that if you were willing to settle the issue then, it would be comparatively easier for you to do it than for McGovern.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but why should we not be willing to settle it? We have accepted every proposal. There is one we cannot accept, and I have told you we will not accept. But we will accept . . .

Prime Minister Chou: So things will remain in a stalemate and the war will continue.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we will try to find a way of dealing with it.

Prime Minister Chou: (laughs) But you just now said that your next meeting would be the same as the previous meetings were.

Dr. Kissinger: It depends with what attitude the North Vietnamese approach us. They have never yet dealt with us on any other basis except through ultimatum.

Prime Minister Chou: You say that they don't understand you. I think that you don't understand them either.

Dr. Kissinger: It is probably true. I agree with you.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe you entered political life from a previous position of carrying out research on issues, not like us who began to take part in the revolution from our youthful days. And if you can understand that, then you perhaps will be able to understand how Vietnam which has been fighting for nearly 30 years, 27, from out of such bitter experiences have been tempered to the extent that if the issue is not settled the only thing that remains for them is to resist and to resist to the end. Because their environment, the land on which they live, is a long strip, and if you are going to cut it in two how can they agree to that?

The situation is different with regard to Taiwan. They are boasting they have a population of 15 million. If it is counted as being 15 million, then on the mainland we have 750 million so we can afford to wait and to wait to persuade those 15 million. Isn't that so? So it is easier for us to . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Prime Minister Chou: For this it is easier for our two sides, for our minds to meet on this matter. But you cannot ask the Vietnamese to do that. To ask for that would be unfair. You have a population of 220 million, maybe 230 million, but they only have something a bit more than 30 million, and since you admit that your predecessors did commit political errors, why could you want to take a bit of the responsibility? You said that in your part of the communiqué.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I remember.

Prime Minister Chou: That no country should claim infallibility. And you should be familiar with the spirit in which Chairman Mao conducts affairs, and I would never say that we would claim infallibility. Never have I heard him say that.

Dr. Kissinger: No, but we are not claiming infallibility either.

Prime Minister Chou: That is why . . . the mistake was not begun by you—why are you not willing to take a bit of the responsibility?

Dr. Kissinger: We are taking a great deal of the responsibility; we have withdrawn a lot of our forces.

Prime Minister Chou: Algeria was a problem of France, but finally since Algeria should be allowed to become free, France did that. Since you are seeking a generation of peace, why do you obstinately remain in this place and are so unwilling to let it go? You also know that we have no ambition whatsoever in Vietnam, and you also know that we do not wish to dominate Vietnam; they would not accept that nor do we have such a desire at all. Since you consider them to be a heroic people, then you should assist to fulfill their desire to be independent. It seems to me that the honor that would result from doing this would be much greater than what would result in continuing to

destroy their land until they were finally torn to tatters, but still remain to resist.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I think we are getting off the basic issue because there is no sense in attempting to persuade us that we should not stay in Vietnam, since I have told the Prime Minister that we intend to leave Vietnam. The only issue is whether the change should result from a political process or from American decision. We would like to start a political process by which the Vietnam people are finally free to determine their own fate. That is the only issue. The North Vietnamese have asked us to set up their government by political action. That is the one thing we cannot do. That is the only issue. We want to leave. We do not want to stay. We do not want to tear apart North Vietnam. We were forced into it this year. We are not obstinately staying in Vietnam. It is contrary to what we want to do. We should not spend most of our time in Peking talking about Vietnam. (Chou laughs) It is contrary to what we really want.

Prime Minister Chou: But if we say nothing about this here and you go back and implement your old policy then the war will continue.

Dr. Kissinger: No. I appreciate the discussion, but we would like to have a situation in which it became unnecessary.

Prime Minister Chou: So let us leave that situation alone for a time. So the question will arise if the war will continue, then our two countries should try to attempt to still maintain relaxation in our relations.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Prime Minister Chou: So we must try to find the means to do so. If you continue your bombing like you have, that will become very dangerous. You were saying that Vietnam is interfering in your internal domestic politics while you are bombing their country—do you not consider that to be interference in their internal politics? It is interference to such an extent that it cannot but give rise to sympathy in the other countries of the world.

It is time we know each other's basic policy. Before coming you read the records of the meeting between Chairman Mao and the President. And this morning I specially took it out to read it twice. I also re-read our communiqué. These documents should be considered to be our basic stance, and both our common points and our differences come out very clearly in them. And the tendency is to seek relaxation of the general situation, and first of all, in the Far East, isn't that so?

Dr. Kissinger: That is right, and that is our basic settled policy.

Prime Minister Chou: And the possibility of this happening is greater than otherwise. And during your present trip to Japan you also have been persuading your Japanese friends that a relaxation would be better for them too.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. That was partly a result of our discussion.

Prime Minister Chou: And so if the Soviet Union itself all alone wants to create a tense situation how can they do that? That is why they are now trying to create a great atmosphere of relaxation in Moscow. In Moscow they are saying to their people that China is doing this or that, but in our country they are trying it by stories of relaxation and . . . That is not what we do. If there is tension, there is tension. If there is not, there is not. We don't mix it up.

233. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, June 22, 1972, 3:58–6:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister (4:40 p.m. to conclusion)
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

Prime Minister Chou: I read your President's article which was published recently in the *U.S. News and World Report*.² Have you read it?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files–Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's Visit June 1972 Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at a "Guest House (near Villa #5)." Kissinger and Chou also met from 7:10 to 7:35 p.m. on a boat near the Summer Palace. They discussed the first Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the history of imperialism, and the Communist Party in China. A final meeting was held from 11:03 p.m. on June 22 to 12:55 a.m., June 23. During this meeting, Kissinger and Chou largely reiterated the points made in their earlier meetings. These memoranda of conversation are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 145 and 146.

² Reference is to Richard M. Nixon, "The Real Road to Peace," *U.S. News and World Report*, June 26, 1972, pp. 32–41.

Prime Minister Chou: So you have come for your discussion in accordance with this article of your President. Isn't that so?

Dr. Kissinger: More or less. Do you read these articles in English, Mr. Prime Minister, or do you get them translated?

Prime Minister Chou: Chinese. We got it in English originally, and then it was translated into Chinese. Also I read the draft of the announcement which you drew up.³

Dr. Kissinger: It is just a tentative proposal.

Prime Minister Chou: I will discuss that with you after we get to the Summer Palace.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

Prime Minister Chou: There is another question which I originally planned to discuss—the question of the Subcontinent. We will first go into that. We believe we should do this rather quickly because there is still some more about Vietnam we want to discuss.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. Also I want to say a word about Germany to the Prime Minister. Let's talk about the Subcontinent first.

Our assessment is that India is pursuing at the moment a quite aggressive foreign policy. (Prime Minister questions translator's translation.) And it is in some respects becoming obviously, whatever its own intentions, an extension of some aspects of Soviet foreign policy.

For example, the Prime Minister no doubt knows that India has offered to both Indonesia and even to Japan treaties which are word for word the same as its own treaties with the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right.

Dr. Kissinger: So that if this came to be, it would be in effect an alliance with India which in turn would be linked to the Soviet Union.

And I believe also that Indian interests extend as well to Southeast Asia.

Prime Minister Chou: That is so. Mrs. Gandhi has taken over the legacy of her father in his work, *The Discovery of India*.⁴ That was the ambition of Nehru—the ambition of discovery.

Dr. Kissinger: He did not have the energy to carry it out. He was more theoretical.

Prime Minister Chou: Anyway he showed the direction of his ambitions.

³ Apparent reference to a draft statement on Kissinger's visit to the People's Republic of China. The memorandum of conversation for the short meeting between Kissinger and Chou En-lai on the evening of June 22 (see footnote 1 above) contains no reference to an "announcement."

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 197.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And when we spoke yesterday of a zone of relaxation in Southeast Asia, I want to say to the Prime Minister as far as we are concerned, we would also look with disfavor on an attempt by India to establish hegemony in that area. The Prime Minister may also be aware that when I was asked in Japan about the various proposals for Asian collective security arrangements I stated—not publicly, but since there is no such thing as a private conversation in Japan, I suppose it became public—that we would join no arrangement which objectively was directed against the PRC. If he is not aware, I am telling him now.

I think we agree in our analysis of the situation. The immediate problem is that the ability of India to pursue these policies depends to some extent on its ability to gain freedom of action on the Indian Subcontinent. We believe that the strategy of India is to do to West Pakistan what it has already done to East Pakistan by disintegrating it, by bringing about the succession of the Northwestern frontier and Baluchistan. Indeed, when Mrs. Gandhi was in Washington in November and talked with the President she stressed that she did not even talk much about East Pakistan any more.⁵ She talked about the betrayal that was involved in West Pakistan. Therefore the problem is whether it is possible to save West Pakistan and thereby absorb some of India's energies on the Subcontinent rather than free them all for expansion. I'm saying this cold-bloodedly; it's our analysis.

To preserve West Pakistan there are two aspects—one is economic; the other is military. On the economic side we have been able to do quite a bit. We have given \$150 million in direct aid and about \$180 million through international institutions—that is, the U.S. share of it.

Prime Minister Chou: That is recently—after the war.

Dr. Kissinger: I am talking about since the war, and we are somewhat handicapped because we refused to give any economic assistance to India so we have a complicated Congressional problem with which I will not bore the Prime Minister. But we have not given any aid to India. This is not so much of a punishment because India owes us \$3.5 billion and it will simply refuse to repay. (Chou and Ch'iao laugh.)

Now the big problem is military assistance to the Pakistanis. We have been prevented by the Democratic Congress from giving aid directly. I wanted to tell the Prime Minister in strictest confidence that when we were in Iran we asked the Shah to organize a consortium of Greece, Iran, Turkey, maybe Jordan, to establish military assistance to Pakistan with American weapons. We did some of this illegally

⁵ Memorandum of conversation printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XI, Document 179.

during the war, as the Prime Minister knows. To do it legally we will have to start a small arms program to Pakistan because there is a provision in our law that American weapons can be transferred to third countries only if those countries are eligible to receive American weapons directly. (Chou asks Mr. Chi a question. He answers. Miss Tang also speaks.) We think we can solve that in the next few months.

Prime Minister Chou: I don't want at all to interfere in internal affairs. However, I want to make a suggestion. I think it would be best that Jordan does not take part in this.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. That will not happen.

Prime Minister Chou: Because Iran and Turkey are somewhat different; there is the question of CENTO. But Jordan is not quite in the Arab world.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Prime Minister Chou: In December when you went to give them 12 planes by Jordan it was not easy nor did it give any good influence, impression.

Dr. Kissinger: But at that time we had to do it because the Soviet Union was bringing so much pressure on Iran. There was a complicated arrangement. We flew Iranian planes to Jordan and Jordan planes to Pakistan. It was an emergency. This won't happen again.

So in this I wanted to tell the Prime Minister our intention, but something depends on what your intentions are, because if you should have come to the conclusion nothing can be done for Pakistan in the military field then it will be very difficult for us to do it all. But we can and we are prepared to give certain types of equipment that you will find it difficult to supply, and to see whether there can be a combination of Iranian and Turkish tanks and modern airplanes. And we have also encouraged France to sell airplanes to Pakistan, and they are doing it now.

Prime Minister Chou: We have not stopped our aid to Pakistan. Our aid to Pakistan is continuing. As for our tanks to Pakistan, they are, of course, light tanks. The planes we supply Pakistan are renovated versions of MIG-19s. In fact, to be very honest with you, the renovated MIG-19s we have been giving Pakistan are greater in numbers than those we have been giving Vietnam. We haven't been giving so many MIG-19s to Vietnam. So what is there so bad about stopping the war in Indochina? Why must we test our weapons on the Indochina battlefield?

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. We don't want to continue the war in Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: We will discuss it later. And once the war in Vietnam comes to a stop then we can supply Pakistan even more quickly with our weaponry. We have already agreed to give so many things to

them, but we are not able to complete their orders to us. Because East Pakistan lost two divisions of equipment without even fighting.

Dr. Kissinger: That was a very stupid deployment.

Prime Minister Chou: But we said nothing. Because we have made it clear that once we have given those weapons to them they have full freedom to make use of them as they like. We have no right to interfere in their affairs. We have not a single adviser there. We don't want any such prerogatives of interfering in their sovereignty.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no interest in Pakistan except to maintain its independence. We have no other purposes there.

Prime Minister Chou: It is not possible for you not to mind yourself about the Subcontinent because the Soviet Union is attempting to exercise hegemony.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, this is what we are trying to . . .⁶

Prime Minister Chou: Britain is already expressing her dissatisfaction.

Dr. Kissinger: But Britain contributed to this in December.

Prime Minister Chou: To Secretary Home we say, why do you come to realize these things afterwards? And also Foreign Minister Schuman.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be very interesting if you would tell the Europeans about your situation because the Vice Foreign Minister knows last December they made our life very difficult.

Prime Minister Chou: Of the 104 votes in the General Assembly Britain and France were not included, and the Vice Minister openly criticized them about that. But only on 20, 21 December at the Security Council meeting they agreed on the rules of ceasefire after Dacca had fallen, but that was too late already. The General Assembly also voted on December 7. Actually if action was taken at that time, then Dacca would have been saved.

Mr. Ch'iao: The greatest procrastinations came about in the Security Council on the 11th and 12th.

Dr. Kissinger: I was just going to say that. The British were particularly bad, as the Vice Foreign Minister knows.

Prime Minister Chou: Then the situation was rather clear to some, but it was already too late.

Dr. Kissinger: The art in foreign policy is to be right before it is self-evident.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right. You need foresight.

Dr. Kissinger: So if I may say so, I think a clear analysis of your point of view to both Schuman, who is less steady, and to the British

⁶ All ellipses are in the source text.

would be very important when they come here. Because Britain is no better off with India for having tried to curry the favor of India than we for having opposed India (Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: The British think they are still in the days of Lord Mountbatten, but those are days long gone.

Dr. Kissinger: And they try to substitute maneuver for substance. And that can't be done. But I believe our government, at least this Administration, believes that the Indian extension of Soviet foreign policy can be very grave throughout Southeast Asia. In the last five years India received one billion two hundred million dollars of military equipment from the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: So very expensive.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And produced \$1 billion worth of its own. During that same period Pakistan received not quite \$500 million, of which most came from you. That includes the domestic production which isn't great. That explains . . .

Prime Minister Chou: India gets her military aid in the form of loans from the Soviet Union?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Very low interest loans. I have promised the Vice Chairman to give him some further details, and I will do that if you tell me where I should do it.

Prime Minister Chou: You think it will be all right to have it conveyed through Ambassador Huang Hua?

Dr. Kissinger: I will do that next week. As you know they have given India—they plan to produce MIG-21s in India.

Prime Minister Chou: The characteristics of the MIG-21 actually are not very good. Their maneuverability is even worse than that of the MIG-19 and inferior to planes of the same calibre of your country.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. We are speeding up giving Iran more modern planes so that some of their planes can be free to go to Pakistan. They will still be very good. But they are producing some F-14s and F-15s. And we are speeding that up so that they can give some of their F-4s to Pakistan. That is what I wanted to tell you about our attitude on the Subcontinent.

Prime Minister Chou: What is the Soviet attitude towards Iran?

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union is trying to surround Iran, partly with the pressures on Baluchistan—if India succeeds in creating a Baluchistan insurrection then this will bring pressures on the eastern front of Iran. You will remember, Mr. Prime Minister, that there are Soviet moves towards Iraq so that they are attempting to bring the Kurds in the northern part of Iraq under their influence so that the Kurds can begin organizing the Kurds in Iran. So they are beginning to bring pressure on Iran from three sides.

The Shah—I don't know whether the Prime Minister had an opportunity to deal with the Shah—the Shah is a very far-sighted leader. Very energetic.

Interpreter (Mr. Chi): No, the Premier hasn't seen him before.

Prime Minister Chou: No, I haven't seen the Shah himself. I have seen his two sisters and the Queen, and the Prime Minister is coming to China this year.

Dr. Kissinger: The Empress.

Interpreter: The Empress.

Dr. Kissinger: He is attempting to gain a much greater degree of popular support by major reforms, especially the distribution of land to the peasants. On the military side he has a very effective army and a very substantial air force. And none of his neighbors would be capable of defeating him except the Soviet Union. He would easily defeat the Iraqi army, even with Soviet equipment. And the Soviet Union could not attack him without a major fight. And, of course, he has an alliance with us which we would honor in such a case. Iran is an essential pivot for this area.

Prime Minister Chou: How about Turkey?

Dr. Kissinger: Turkey is also important, but it has some significant domestic difficulties right now.

Prime Minister Chou: And the Soviet Union has some influence in Turkey?

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union has attempted to gain some influence in Turkey but there is an historical distrust so that when Podgorny was in Ankara he proposed a treaty of consultation, and the Turks refused him. The Turks are prepared to pursue the same policy as the Iranians, but they do not have the same freedom of maneuver.

Prime Minister Chou: Well, Turkey has a dual relationship of alliance with you.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Prime Minister Chou: They are in NATO also.

Dr. Kissinger: In case of attack there is no question that we would support Turkey, but their capacity to influence other countries and bring pressure on other countries that may not come under Soviet influence is less than that of the Shah. But after the election it will be our strategy to link these two closer together.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean Turkey and Iran?

Dr. Kissinger: Turkey and Iran.

Prime Minister Chou: And Pakistan is still remaining a member of CENTO?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is still technically a member of CENTO. But the major strategy is to give Pakistan enough strength so that India will

not be able to attack it; or that it turns itself into a vassal of India and therefore frees India to move into Southeast Asia or other parts.

Prime Minister Chou: Has your diplomatic representative gone to East Pakistan?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: The situation in East Pakistan is not good.

Dr. Kissinger: The situation in East Pakistan is very bad. In the long term I think this will be a cancer for India.

Prime Minister Chou: I think so.

Dr. Kissinger: Because if the situation remains chaotic, it will absorb Indian resources and if the situation improves it will be a magnet for West Bengal (Chou laughs). But our impression is that the government in Dacca is so incompetent that the effective administration is in the hands of the Indians.

Prime Minister Chou: It really has the flavor of a colonial regime.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: And actually some Indian forces are still remaining in Pakistan.

Dr. Kissinger: As police.

Prime Minister Chou: And officers.

Dr. Kissinger: And also it is surrounded by Indian forces.

(At this point, 4:40 p.m., Chang enters.)

Prime Minister Chou: And so that is about the Subcontinent. As for the Subcontinent we will continue to support the independence of West Pakistan. That is a responsibility that we will continue to carry out. At the same time we shall say West Pakistan is a friendly country to us. And in fact the period of friendship is longer than that with India. But the Pakistanis are rather worried because Mrs. Gandhi has been over the past three months saying everywhere she wants to improve relations with China. Naturally, we haven't paid any attention to her. As for exchange of Ambassadors with India, we think even that we can wait somewhat. In fact up till now that is the only country with which we have relations but have no Ambassadors. Just petty maneuvers on the part of the Indians.

Dr. Kissinger: Their freedom of action is circumscribed by their dependence on Soviet military aid.

Prime Minister Chou: The Indians also have tremendous domestic difficulties. As President Nixon said on his visit here, all the loans to India, including those by the World Bank, amount to \$10 billion. So India adopts the policy of not repaying.

Dr. Kissinger: Not yet, but I am sure that is what she is going to do. (Chou laughs.) So far they have only made difficulty about repaying \$100 million. (Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: But don't you have in your hands some of the rupees—the Indian rupees?

Dr. Kissinger: In counterpart funds.

Prime Minister Chou: They buy grains from you with Indian rupees.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they do. But we can't take them out of the country. We can spend them only in India.

Prime Minister Chou: I have probably told you about the history of the story about the situation of my visit to India in 1960 for talks with Nehru, my final visit and my last talk with Nehru. Did I tell you that?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't remember. Perhaps the Prime Minister can tell me again.

Prime Minister Chou: That is, in 1960 for the last time I went to New Delhi to have negotiations with Nehru on the Sino-Indian border question. After a week of negotiations, towards the end, I just copied principles cited by Nehru at various periods in the past and said, "let's agree on those principles." And even this Nehru refused to agree to. Not a single word of agreement was reached.

And then after the breakdown of the negotiations I went to Nepal the next day. On the eve of my departure from Delhi I received some foreign correspondents. At that press conference an American correspondent reminded me, "do you not know the Indian Minister of Food is now in Washington." I said, "Now I know. Thank you for reminding me of that fact." And then on the next day in Nepal I saw in the papers that an agreement of a loan on food grains to India, in the amount of 15 million tons of food grains, was signed in Washington to supply India two or three times a year, which was to be repayed in rupees. That was the encouragement on your side to Nehru.

And on the other side was encouragement given to him by Khrushchev. That is, Khrushchev in order to obtain the so-called Spirit of Camp David—a spirit which you never recognized—Khrushchev tore up in 1959 a treaty he entered into with us on cooperation in the economic field.

At that time, in October 1959, the Indians made a military provocation against us at the Natula Pass on the border with India. The Pass is on the top of the plateau. The Indians when they went up to the Pass they had more casualties, and because the Indians suffered more casualties they [the Russians] said it was China which launched the attack against India. And from that time the Indians believed what Khrushchev told them. Afterwards Neville, the British correspondent, made that clear.⁷

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 197. All brackets are in the source text.

Dr. Kissinger: I read that. I must say from my experience of Soviet leaders I don't think they need our encouragement to be anti-Chinese. (Chou laughs.) It comes naturally.

Prime Minister Chou: But at least at that time it was something, because at that time they wanted to curry favor with you. You know the atmosphere at that time was quite different.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: For instance, at the banquet that night, you said that Chancellor Adenauer told President Kennedy that Dr. Kissinger agreed with him, and President Kennedy was quite surprised. That was in 1961.

Dr. Kissinger: 1961.

Prime Minister Chou: The situation at that time was different.

Dr. Kissinger: Totally different.

Prime Minister Chou: So from this we can see that you have a point when you praise Adenauer. I remember you said in 1957 Adenauer told you the U.S. was going to improve relations with China, but at that time you couldn't agree.

Dr. Kissinger: I did not believe that the People's Republic and the Soviet Union would ever split. I was wrong.

Prime Minister Chou: I told what you told me to Chairman Mao, and he immediately recalled it and said that Adenauer had a point there; he had grounds for thinking so. Because it was in 1955 when the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with West Germany and Khrushchev told Adenauer the Chinese are very fearful people—the Yellow Horde is about to come again.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. That is why Adenauer believed it.

Prime Minister Chou: The Chairman immediately recalled that. At that time I was Foreign Minister. So Chairman Mao, who remembers very accurately every crucial moment in history . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I did not believe it in 1957, but by 1961 I did believe it.

Prime Minister Chou: But it shows Adenauer had his grounds for saying that in 1957.

Dr. Kissinger: I did not believe that two communist countries could split so completely.

Prime Minister Chou: Because at that time you were still a professor and not a Presidential Adviser. If you did not take part in Presidential affairs it is not easy to understand this.

There is not so much difference between us on the question of Pakistan. But there is one thing. On the one hand, we do consider it is necessary that we should help them, but on the other hand, they should

be able to solve their own problems by themselves. Only then can they be tempered.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I think it would be helpful, Mr. Prime Minister, if we kept each other informed if one of us had a radical change of policy so that neither of us would be too exposed there.

Prime Minister Chou: Looking at it from now over quite a long period from now to the future, I don't think we will change our policy of helping Pakistan unless something changes in Pakistan itself; for instance, they come out openly to oppose China. But I don't think that is foreseeable in the future because the friendship between the peoples of Pakistan and China is quite deep. All of our Pakistani friends blame us for not giving them more advice with regard to their domestic and political affairs, but that is our principle not to interfere in the internal affairs, and that is the principle which Chairman Mao has taught us and which we are persisting in.

Dr. Kissinger: We will not change our policy as long as President Nixon is in office.

Prime Minister Chou: That I understand.

Dr. Kissinger: There may be tactical moves towards India, but we will always keep you informed and get your opinion. But we do not plan any now.

Prime Minister Chou: Nepal appears to be also in some difficulties now. Isn't that so?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: And Sri Lanka too.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Indians make use of the Tamils to make trouble, just like the Bengalis. And the Prime Minister made several overtures towards us, and we are very sympathetic toward her to maintain her independence, and we will support her as much as we can.

Prime Minister Chou: Good.

Dr. Kissinger: She has wanted units of our fleet to visit in Ceylon, and we will do that from time to time.

Prime Minister Chou: Has your fleet already visited Sri Lanka?

Dr. Kissinger: Once. We will increase our fleet in that area in any event, especially after the war in Indochina is over.

But Germany—I wanted to make a comment about the observation of the Prime Minister yesterday. I believe that the recollection of the Prime Minister and of his two colleagues of Germany is of a Germany which no longer exists. I believe that Japan remained, emerged psychologically unimpaired from the Second World War and only physically destroyed. And therefore I have tended to agree with the Prime Minister that certain tendencies in Japan are quite possible, even though they are not now visible.

I told the Chancellor the other day about the observations which Chancellor Adenauer made to me about one of his colleagues when he deplored the fact there were no strong men left in Germany, and I said, what about Mr. so-and-so, and he said, "my dear Professor, you are confusing energy with strength." I think this is true of many of the current German leaders and of Germany, and when I say that Finlandization is one of three possibilities, it is particularly so if the Socialist Party remains in office for an extended period of time. The policy of the Social Democratic Party is so dependent on the good will of Moscow that after some time Moscow may achieve a considerable veto over its actions. Even today the Soviet Union could bring about the destruction of Brandt by adopting a policy of coolness towards him. Therefore for domestic German reasons, if this party continues for a long time, which I don't happen to believe, then I believe Finlandization is a possibility, even though the German people are economically in good shape.

Prime Minister Chou: But even Finland herself is not so pro-Soviet—I mean the people.

Dr. Kissinger: The people are anti-Soviet. But my definition of Finlandization is if the Soviet Union has a veto over major elements of domestic and foreign policy and that is, I believe, the case in Finland, even though it is a very brave people.

I must say the possibility is reduced to the degree that German leaders feel they have others for freedom of maneuver in the world, and therefore I believe the visit which the Prime Minister mentioned to me [Scheel] is a very positive step. That party in any event is in a more independent position.

Prime Minister Chou: But the so-called vetos which the Soviet Union may exercise with regard to actions taken by the Social Democratic Party are not taken to bring pressure on the Social Democratic Party but to make concessions to the SDP. For instance, the fact that the West Berlin question was resolved so quickly was because of China and the U.S. coming closer. Immediately after the announcement of July 16 last year—immediately after the announcement was made public—Gromyko went to East Berlin to talk about the negotiations and made such quick concessions, which even you did not expect.

Dr. Kissinger: There were two treaties—the treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, and also the treaty on relations between Germany and Poland, and then the treaty about Berlin. In the treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union all the concessions came from the German side, and it is very difficult to find *quid pro quos* from the Russian side. On the other treaty they, the Soviet Union, made many concessions because we made it a condition for the summit, and therefore it was a symptom of our strength and perhaps

our discussions, although the negotiations had started before. But the German government had nothing to do with it.

Prime Minister Chou: The treaty with the FRG was before the treaty with West Berlin?

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

Prime Minister Chou: But it couldn't have been put in that way. Because one effect of the Berlin Agreement is that henceforth it will be easier for West and East Germans to make contact with each other, and that is a tremendous change because the Soviet Union had made it hard. And which Germany will have the greater influence—West Germany or East Germany? That is one aspect.

The second thing is about the ratification of the treaty this year. If the opposition party in West Germany wanted to veto that treaty they could have done it, but as you said yourself, it would not have been approved by the mass of the people because the people of West Europe want to see a relaxation. East Europeans, too, would like to see a ratification of this treaty because they feel quite terrorized about the possibility of another big war. So it would not be to the benefit of the opposition party to veto that treaty. But in the very end it was still proclaimed a common declaration, and that common declaration was the result of the proposition of the opposition party. When Brandt signed the treaty with the Soviet Union in Moscow it was before that memorandum, but they had to agree to a memorandum too. So that gives the Germans the consideration that there will really come the time in the future when Germany will be unified even if the two Germanys would both join the UN. Do you approve or not of the two Germanys joining the UN?

Dr. Kissinger: I will tell you directly. As a government, we have no objections to the two Germanys joining the UN. As a tactical question, we will not express an opinion until the Federal Republic has indicated that it is willing to do so. As soon as they say they are prepared to have both Germanys join, we will support it, and we believe this will happen in the next six months. But that is a tactical question.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the Socialist Democratic Government in Germany?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I think so.

Prime Minister Chou: When Schroeder comes do you think he will express to me true views?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I think so. He is very vain, and he thinks he is excessively intelligent, but eventually he will express to you his true views, yes.

Prime Minister Chou: As you see it at the present state, what is the thinking in Germany? They must think about their future.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, you will find that clarity of thinking is not the outstanding attribute of present German political leaders, and that what they say is not necessarily what they will do.

The great strength of Adenauer was that he had a great concept and he did not deviate or maneuver, and he kept steadily on his course. Almost all of the present German political leaders have the tendency to believe there is some magic trick by which they can solve all their problems. The one with the clearest views—not necessarily that I agree with him—but the one with the clearest views is Strauss. But he has an inadequate political base, and he would not have been the best man for you to talk to. So after him, Schroeder in terms of political views, but Schroeder is better because he has a better base.

Prime Minister Chou: Is Strauss representative of Prussian thought?

Dr. Kissinger: No, Strauss is a Bavarian and he has more of the South German. He is less nationalistic in the sense he can live with a divided Germany, and he is more pro-European. But he is more nationalistic in the sense that whatever country he represents, even if it is only half a Germany, he wants to be very powerful and influential. Schroeder wants to unify Germany.

Prime Minister Chou: And Schroeder is from what part of Germany?

Dr. Kissinger: Schroeder is from the Rhineland, the old Prussian part of the Rhineland. You asked me what does Germany want. Their national disease is that even when they were unified they did not know exactly what they wanted except that it was big.

Mr. Ch'iao: Deutschland Uber Alles.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, Schroeder would like Germany unified.

Prime Minister Chou: In history Germany has not remained a unified nation for a long period except the Bismarck state.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

Prime Minister Chou: So there is probably a historical reason. During the Thirty Years War Germany was divided up into many states.

Dr. Kissinger: And it has lost a great deal of what really should be part of Germany: Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria should be theirs. So there is really no separate Italian-speaking state or French-speaking state, but Germany is at a cross-roads because it has to make up its mind between its national ambitions and its European interests.

Prime Minister Chou: When the Rhineland area was being developed, East Prussia was still economically undeveloped. In the 18 and 19th centuries. So the development of different parts of Germany was uneven.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it also proves that the economically successful part does not necessarily take over the poorer part. It is a matter of discipline and direction.

Prime Minister Chou: That is a question of policy, the question of direction and line. But during their period of Bismarck, and Germany was divided under Adenauer. Of course, it is unfortunate that after the First World War there appeared Hitler. But if there appeared a Bismarck, if there appeared an Adenauer, why is it not possible for some talented Germans to appear in the arena? How can you estimate them so low? And I don't believe that when a nation has developed an economy to such an extent that a person who can represent his people will not emerge—it is a matter of possibility.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't exclude the possibility, Mr. Prime Minister. I know all the German leaders very well, not because I was born there but because I had many activities there. I don't see anybody of such stature now, not among the present leaders or in the next generation. And speaking as a philosopher, if I may, it may be true as the Prime Minister pointed out to me, unless you have had some experience of suffering and of hardship you cannot produce great men.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true.

Dr. Kissinger: Precisely because the Germany economy is so advanced they can no longer produce great men. All the great men in Europe since the war, DeGaulle and Adenauer, had their formative experiences before the war.

Prime Minister Chou: You have a point there. I am not against that way of thinking. Germany, being close to you, is quite far from us, while Japan is a country with whom both of us have concern. And the Japanese nation wants to maintain their unity and that is decided by their geographical position. And it is true that in Japan's history they were never fully occupied by an outsider. Japan was a defensive power too. After the war her economy developed very rapidly. It was you who flattened them. But what great men are emerging in Japan?

Dr. Kissinger: Japan is a different phenomena. Japan does not produce great men. You look at their leaders. It is like asking whether an ant is impressive by looking at one ant.

Prime Minister Chou: But if you look at the ants as a collective, that is quite formidable.

Dr. Kissinger: The strength of Japan is in its social cohesion.

PM Chou: The ants in southern China are formidable. They create even mountains. They make their homes in the root of a tree. I don't know whether you have such ants in your country. They are called white ants. They eat their way into trees and they also dig their hills. That is where they store their food.

Dr. Kissinger: I am saying the Japanese are very impressive, but not because their leaders are impressive. Any one Japanese I talk to I

find quite unimpressive. I don't know what your experience is. But it is an impressive people as a group.

PM Chou: You know ants have queens (Chou laughs). But any nation must have its leaders.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but they change their queens quite frequently (laughter).

PM Chou: I wonder whether your feeling towards the Germans is maybe because you yourself had a period of persecution there.

Dr. Kissinger: I did, but I look at things cold-bloodedly.

PM Chou: Maybe that is why you look upon the Germans as you do now.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: Karl Marx discovered scientific socialism but his teachings are not in German.

Dr. Kissinger: I can't afford sentimentality in one direction or another. But I think the Germans are well worth your attention, Mr. Prime Minister, because they will be one of the key factors, and I believe they are the most dynamic people in Europe despite what I have said.

PM Chou: (Nods) But are there still some differences—or do you look upon the whole of Germany as a Finland? East Germany is not a Finland. It is more than that, a dependency. But look on the whole of Germany. East Germany is actually a Czechoslovakia—a vassal. But for the whole of Germany to be a Finland—I doubt it.

Dr. Kissinger: I said there are three possibilities.

I don't say a Finland is their most likely outcome. It depends. If the U.S. were to withdraw from Europe; if the McGovern policies were carried out, if European unity would not work; if we withdraw from Germany—then the two Germans feeling abandoned, could move in the direction of Finland. If we remain in Europe, if European unity continues—then I think Finlandization is unlikely, and it will be either nationalism or European community.

PM Chou: That is what I was about to say—is the U.S. planning to abandon Europe?

Dr. Kissinger: In this Administration, as long as President Nixon is President, it is inconceivable.

PM Chou: Nor do I conceive it possible if the Democratic Party would take power that they could really abandon Europe. Even Mansfield says they will not withdraw from Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: They may withdraw from Europe and think this is not abandoning it.

PM Chou: How is that possible? And once they really—if they are really to take office—I don't think they can do that. We won't go too much into that.

Dr. Kissinger: I know all the leading Democrats, and my own political position has been that of an Independent rather than as a Republican. I did not know President Nixon when he appointed me. I had never met him. My assessment is that any Democratic candidate would say the same thing, but that only McGovern would try to do it because he has a professorial nature. He is somewhat doctrinaire. (Chou laughs).

Ch'iao: Woodrow Wilson was also professorial, wasn't he?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: But in the Senate his 14 points fell through.

Dr. Kissinger: It required Congressional action. But withdrawing forces from Europe requires no Congressional action. That can be done by a Presidential decision.

PM Chou: The President has such great power?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he can determine the deployment of troops. He may not be able to send them to Europe . . . he can even send them if he can get the money. But he can certainly withdraw them.

But as I said to the Prime Minister, it is a very improbable event that this will come to pass. So for the next five years there is no possibility of withdrawal of forces from Europe.

PM Chou: That is also my view. I also look at it this way.

Let's come back to the East. Because our knowledge of Western Europe cannot be compared to your knowledge.

Dr. Kissinger: I am very impressed by the Prime Minister's knowledge and insight into the European situation.

PM Chou: Please do not commend me. What are your own views toward the trend in Korea?

Dr. Kissinger: I believe the talks which have started between the two sides of Korea are very positive. We are encouraging the South Koreans to continue them.

As I told the Assistant Minister in the car this morning informally, some of the tactics of the North Koreans are sometimes self-defeating. They made a rather bad impression on the American journalists over there. I tell you this in confidence because I think to some extent we have similar objectives there. I spoke to some Japanese leaders who had visited both Peking and Pyongyang who had been very impressed by being in Peking and who before they went to North Korea were in favor of withdrawal of American forces from South Korea. After they went to North Korea, they changed their minds and were in favor of keeping our forces in South Korea.

I say this for your information. This is not an Administration view. The Administration view is that we will encourage political contacts

between North and South Korea and that we will go along with any agreement that the two Koreas make with each other.

PM Chou: In the end North and South Korea should have a peaceful reunification, but this is not the time. The time is not yet ripe.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: What should be done now is that it should be that the relations between North and South Korea should not be saber rattling but there should be somewhat more conciliatory contacts between the two.

Dr. Kissinger: We will be prepared to use our influence in this direction.

PM Chou: With regard to these three divided states: East and West Germany; North and South Korea; and North and South Vietnam, we must not treat them as if out of the same mold. That would not be fair nor in accordance with developments of history.

And the most split is Germany. Even Berlin itself is split. So, so far as Germany is concerned, under present circumstances, we don't think it is possible for you to withdraw from West Germany. So the question of the proportionate reduction of forces in East and West Europe is a matter for negotiations now.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I can tell the Prime Minister for his information in our thinking, this will be a very small proportion of our forces. We are not thinking of any large withdrawal.

PM Chou: I believe that. As you said, the Soviet Union is very close to East Germany. And now Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Dr. Kissinger: Our studies show the maximum we can do on both sides is something like ten percent in that area. It could be 15 percent but it is not going to be very more than a small fraction of the forces.

PM Chou: As for the situation in Korea, that was something produced by another set of events through the Korean War. That was something after the Second World War. There was an armistice agreement, but there was no peace treaty, and that was most disadvantageous. And that is so in this respect we support the proposal put forward by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea that a peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea should take the place of the present armistice agreement. The two sides are meeting two times a month just for the sake of quarreling. The inevitable consequence is that there is a constant quarrel. So far as our side is concerned, our People's Volunteers withdrew in 1958.

You have read again the note of the proceedings of the discussions between Chairman Mao and President Nixon.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: After Chairman Mao said neither China nor the U.S. should engage in a war with each other and threaten each other, then Chairman Mao said nor will China threaten Japan, nor South Korea. The actual situation was the Chairman first said China and the U.S. should not engage in a war with each other. President Nixon said the two countries should not threaten each other. Then Chairman Mao said China will not threaten Japan nor Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: I remember that.

PM Chou: So it is very clear we will not encourage a military reunification of Korea. So we say to you, as a matter of principle, your armed forces should be withdrawn from Korea. By withdrawing you should also guarantee that after you withdraw from South Korea you should not let the Japanese go into South Korea soon. A period of time is required. On this point alone it is similar to that of Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ch'iao: But according to reports from the Japanese press, it is said that on the Joint Communiqué between President Nixon and Sato stipulating that the situation of Korea involves Japan's security, after President Nixon's visit to China the Taiwan clause should no longer be valid. That was when you were visiting Japan. But the Japanese paper said Dr. Kissinger—it did not directly quote from you but it had something to do with you . . . indirectly—said that the South Korean clause remained in effect.

Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese said that to me. I did not say it to them. They said to me, almost every faction I spoke to, the view that while on Taiwan they are confused, on Korea they expressed the view to me that their security was very closely bound up with the security of Korea and that therefore this was a very special case. I expressed no view to them. And as I told the Prime Minister, we will not encourage the Japanese to play a military role in Korea. Indeed, we will oppose it. For that reason it is also important that, while we can accept the principle of an ultimate withdrawal from Korea, the Prime Minister's formulation is understood, that there should be a period of time, because otherwise the Japanese will almost certainly move in.

But we will keep our understandings. We will not encourage the Japanese into a military role outside their territory.

PM Chou: And at the same time you should not encourage the South Korean authorities to make military provocations against North Korea but encourage the peaceful contacts.

Dr. Kissinger: We will discourage military provocations and encourage peaceful contacts.

PM Chou: So far as we know, South Korea is quite strong militarily now. And they are tempered in battle. You have withdrawn 20,000 forces but leave your weapons behind; thus they are becoming further

strengthened. And so is it not possible for you not to give them too much arms? Because if you were to do so the result would be we would also have to give more weapons to the Democratic Republic of Korea and wouldn't that result in arms competition then?

Dr. Kissinger: I will look into that question. We have a current program which is difficult to change. There is two more years to go. But we can avoid making new commitments, particularly if we have an informal understanding of mutual restraint in giving arms.

PM Chou: Yes, and in that way we could encourage them in their peaceful contacts. And then about—we discussed the question of the UNCURK. That Commission could be abolished because every time it appears in the General Assembly we have a quarrel, and if it appears in the Security Council we veto it.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the Prime Minister's idea with respect to Korea in the UN this year?

PM Chou: I think it would be best if the UNCURK could be abolished this year. Because otherwise the Republic of Korea observer comes.

Dr. Kissinger: What is your position if the Korea question would appear this year on the agenda?

PM Chou: It is on the agenda every year?

Dr. Kissinger: Last year it was postponed, and we believe actually it would be useful to postpone it for another year because it would work counter to encouraging a peaceful contact if the two Koreas engage in a tremendous brawl at the UN, as well as if you and we did. And we could look after the election into the question of abolishing UNCURK.

PM Chou: Our tendency is to abolish the UNCURK this year. Is that possible?

Dr. Kissinger: It would be very difficult especially if the debate is . . . I think it would be very difficult.

PM Chou: Because with that UNCURK existing it is an object of hostility toward one side. And countries who sympathize with the Democratic Republic of Korea will put forth resolutions to oppose it.

Dr. Kissinger: If it appears before our election, we will have no choice except to make a major opposition.

PM Chou: We will stand on opposite sides.

Dr. Kissinger: The Assembly goes until Christmas so the item could be postponed until November. (laughter) Or it could be after November 10 (Chou laughs). I suspect he [Ch'iao] is going to fire a lot of empty cannons (laughter).

PM Chou: It is good to know about your intentions. But it does prove that from last year until now it is beneficial to see to it that the atmosphere of Korea is not so tense.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that is one of the good results of our encounter.

PM Chou: So you shouldn't give too much encouragement to Taiwan to be so arrogant.

Dr. Kissinger: Where?

PM Chou: The authorities on Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: How are we giving them encouragement?

PM Chou: Because in your various pronouncements when you mention the so-called Republic of China.

Dr. Kissinger: I personally?

PM Chou: No, not you personally. For instance, when Chiang Kai-shek was re-elected so-called President and your President sent a message of congratulations. We have no objection to that. We do not mind your President sending a cable of congratulations. That is not the same as in the Soviet and Hungarian press with the publication of that election and having photos and press. That is utterly absurd. But in pronouncements by your President or in reports by your Administration you mention the Republic of China in one breath and the People's Republic of China in the other. Then the state of two Chinas appear. Maybe we can ignore it on one occasion, but if it constantly appears, then we cannot.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you point out one specific occasion to me?

PM Chou: It was in your President's article.

Dr. Kissinger: That is what I suspected.

PM Chou: You knew that I was going to cite this example. You have it.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't actually have the text.

PM Chou: The part on the summit conferences, President Nixon said this is even more important because this part is under the subtitle *Summit Conferences*. President Nixon said it was most important that we obtain common views on the basic principles of national conduct. These principles will reduce the danger of confrontation or war in Asia and the Pacific. We are opposed to hegemony in the Pacific region. We agree that international disputes should not be solved by the use or the threat of armed forces. "In obtaining such understandings between our two sides we did not give up any obligations which we had undertaken before with regard to the Republic of China or our other friends."⁸

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

⁸ See footnote 2 above. The actual text on page 33 of Nixon's article reads: "We agreed that international disputes should be settled without the use or the threat of force, and we agreed to apply this principle to our relations with one another. And we reached these understandings without giving up any of our previous commitments to the Republic of China or to our other friends."

PM Chou: In Shanghai you said that to the press as well, but in a more diplomatic way.

Dr. Kissinger: I told you that in advance and we have to say this, Mr. Prime Minister, and we have said it with great restraint in documents which I control closely. This was more public relations.

In any event, I understand your point and it will be taken very seriously, Mr. Prime Minister. We understand what we have agreed upon, and one of them is that we will not encourage in any way the two-China solution, and we will take special care on this.

We cannot avoid these particular statements on occasion, but we can avoid speaking of you and the Republic of China in closely approximate sentences and in the same general context, and that we will do.

PM Chou: But you know in this, this reference was made under the general heading of our summit meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your point and this document was prepared at a time when there were many other pressures on us, and I must be quite honest with you, it did not have the detailed attention from me that a normal Presidential statement receives. (Chou nods) But I understand your point very well, and there is no disagreement. It is also important for you to know that in many ways that are not apparent to you, such as in deliveries of arms, we have shown very great restraint and resisted many pressures.

PM Chou: And those are points on which they complain to you?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and publicly too. Their supporters also.

PM Chou: (laughs) Well, they can well try to come to the Mainland and test it for themselves. But they don't want to. So they, too, are only firing empty cannons. They just want you to give them more things.

Dr. Kissinger: Couldn't you keep him [Ch'iao] home until November 15? There will be nothing but trouble during our election campaign. (Laughter)

PM Chou: I am not so clear about Taiwan. After the Taiwan authorities get weapons from you, do they engage in some smuggling?

Dr. Kissinger: On the Mainland?

PM Chou: On the Mainland or some other place. We do have information to the effect that in arms supplies you give to other countries they engage in smuggling.

Dr. Kissinger: Which countries?

PM Chou: That is most frequently in Indochina, the arms smuggling; not only in Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: They are not smuggling arms with our permission. (Chou laughs)

PM Chou: Certainly not with your permission.

Dr. Kissinger: It could be they are doing something for some intelligence reasons with our permission that would look like smuggling to you. But that is not the case. Let me check what we know about this, and I will tell your Ambassador in New York. It has never come to my attention, but that doesn't prove anything because unless it was very large, it wouldn't come to my attention.

PM Chou: What I mean is that under Chiang Kai-shek's rule the arms smuggling there might be even less than in some other places.

Dr. Kissinger: I think much less. That is my impression.

PM Chou: That is so.

Here I would like to say that in the UN just recently there was a good result of our mutual consultations, that is on the mutual position on hijacking of planes. Your Ambassador consulted on this matter with ours.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: And it has already been passed in the Security Council, yesterday. That is a good result. And I would like to take this opportunity to say something related to this matter. Because you just inferred that on some occasions the CIA might be engaged in some arms transactions which might look like smuggling, which might look like intelligence work. But there is some matter that you must not do, that is the hijacking of planes.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't.

PM Chou: Particularly with relation to our country.

Dr. Kissinger: I can assure you that we have never hijacked a plane, and I can give you total assurance that this cannot happen with any authority of the U.S. Government, official or secret. I can give you a flat assurance.

PM Chou: But still I would like to have you check on this when you get back. And also for you to make this formal announcement to us here.

Dr. Kissinger: I can make that now. I don't have to check this in Washington. I will reaffirm it to your Ambassador, but I know I speak for the President.

PM Chou: Because you know Prince Sihanouk is on a state tour of various countries riding our special plane.

Dr. Kissinger: I can give you a flat assurance we will make absolutely no effort to interfere with the movements of Prince Sihanouk.

PM Chou: Because that is a matter of mutual confidence.

Dr. Kissinger: I can absolutely guarantee this.

PM Chou: Prince Sihanouk is just going to five countries: Romania, Albania, Algeria, Mauritania, Yugoslavia . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I will go further than this. When I go back I will instruct our intelligence agents in each place he visits to collect any information they may be able to get about any attempt at interference with Prince Sihanouk, and I will pass it on to your Ambassador.

PM Chou: Thank you. I mentioned the five countries, Romania, Albania, Algeria . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Our capabilities in Algeria are very limited.

PM Chou: Mauritania, and then finally Yugoslavia. And then the Prince will come back to China via various countries from Yugoslavia to Romania to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and then China. Just the route you took during your first visit.

Dr. Kissinger: We can be particularly helpful in places like Iran and Turkey.

PM Chou: Thank you.

Dr. Kissinger: But we will in every country instruct our people to let us know what information they have, which probably will be none.

PM Chou: Thank you. And then about the charts showing the American plane intrusions. We have it drawn and we would like to show it to you. The purpose of us doing that is to enable you to see that it indeed happened.

Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate it. These are our charts.⁹ This is our chart for the 9th of June (shows chart). This is our chart for the 10th of June. This is the boundary line. (Chinese look at map and interpreter points out boundary and highway to Chou.)

Dr. Kissinger (to Howe): What is the red?

Cmdr. Howe: This indicates the target area they were hitting along the route. And this indicates the northernmost delivery point.

Dr. Kissinger: They claim this was the northernmost delivery point.

PM Chou: But that was bombed very heavily. That is Long Son. Let's show you our map.

Dr. Kissinger: I tell you honestly I believe you because if you wanted to provoke us you would do it publicly.¹⁰

PM Chou: That is right.

Dr. Kissinger: I see no point in your making a private protest about your being bombed.

PM Chou: And you bombed there, but also over here.

⁹ Not found.

¹⁰ The PRC publicly criticized U.S. bombing of North Vietnam near its border but did not directly address the alleged intrusions. See "China Calls Raids Threat to Border," *The New York Times*, June 13, 1972, pp. A-1, 9. See also Document 230.

Miss Tang: You have one spot left on the map. You should have another red spot over there.

Dr. Kissinger: This is the 9th. (to Howe): What is this green?

Cmdr. Howe: This indicates an unidentified aircraft which was seen twice on radar close to the time of the incident. (Miss Tang explains to PM Chou.)

PM Chou: That is the 9th?

Dr. Kissinger: This is the 9th. These are the MIG planes, and these indicate all the planes that were opposite ours.

PM Chou: That is the bombed area.

Cmdr. Howe: This is the bombed area.

Dr. Kissinger: And that is how they flew.

PM Chou: They were further south then. But Long Son and _____¹¹ (another town near North Vietnamese border) were indeed heavily bombed. Not only the 9th or 10th—but other times as well. Constantly bombed. It was not bombed after the 12th, but now maybe they are back there now.

Dr. Kissinger: Certainly not since the 12th. Has there been any bombing that close to China since the 12th?

PM Chou: No. There were none after the 12th.

Dr. Kissinger: After we sent the message we established procedures which make it absolutely impossible to bomb that close to China. Has there been any bombing?

Interpreter: We have no information up to this point.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't believe there has been because we have established new procedures.

(Party adjourns to nearby room where charts are.)

Dr. Kissinger: Can I take these back to America with me?

PM Chou: They were drawn up for you. Because the former one did not have coordinates or latitudes. It has them now.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's wait for Howe. Take a look at these, Jon.

PM Chou: That was June 4. You saw last time we had a bad map. It was very badly bombed. The bridge there was also bombed. Of course it was repaired. This is where the two main areas of the bombing were.

Dr. Kissinger: Once, Mr. Prime Minister, when General Haig first worked for me, he was a Colonel, and when he was promoted to General, I told him I have known very many intelligent colonels and very

¹¹ As on the source text.

few intelligent generals and I was going to watch for his deterioration. (Chou laughs) He is not responsible for this.

PM Chou: You see how close this is to the border. That is how the planes went on the 4th. On the 9th there were two different ones: that is one; and that is the other.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't have any tracks near that one.

PM Chou: and this was the bombing on the 10th. One plane went that way. The other went that way.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't show it. This was where they bombed Aikou.

PM Chou: Yes. This is Aikou. This was the different times at which the two planes came in on the 10th. They bombed Aikou, and there was also the incursion on the 11th. Because we had already received the telephone call from General Haig, we did not mention the intrusion on the 11th. These are where the bombs dropped on Aikou.

(Showing bomb cannisters.) This is what it looked like in the morning. We recovered the shell—the container. A fragment of the container. Half of it. You know it split open. This was where the smaller bombs inside the others fell. That was what it looked like. One small bomb did not explode and sunk into the ground. This is the small one with its tail on it. That was the writing outside the container. This was the name.

Dr. Kissinger: Show Howe.

PM Chou: This was one of the small bombs. That was the writing on the small bomb.

Dr. Kissinger: We will take this back. I think we have new procedures that make this impossible.

PM Chou: The large view that shows the smaller one, this is the largest one of Aikou.

Dr. Kissinger: Where were the bombs dropped?

PM Chou: There were about 400 small ones. This is the state boundary.

Dr. Kissinger: And this is the road?

PM Chou: Yes. And that is the railway.

Dr. Kissinger: All I can say, Mr. Prime Minister, it was totally against orders and not intentional. I think we have taken . . .

PM Chou: This is the bomb. Commander Howe probably has seen this thing certainly before. Dr. Kissinger probably has not seen such things before.

Dr. Kissinger: Would it do any good to take these?

PM Chou: You could.

Dr. Kissinger: I was wondering if it had any marks that would enable us to trace it. (to Howe): Why don't you take some of these?

Cmdr. Howe: The stock number would be the same.

[Following are markings taken off the bombs:

MK 20 MOD 2 ANTI-TANK	MER 7
Bomb Cluster DL 2603379 Rev. D	TER 4
FSN 1325–133–9266–E173	TER 7
P.O. 1–2044 NADC	AERO 3A
LOT NO 34–C–71	MK 51
INSP. DATE 3/71	AERO 20A
AERO 14	AERO 7A
MER 4	MAU 9A

Second bomb was same as first until Lot #

LOT NO 48–C–71

INSP DATE 5/71

AERO 14	MER 4	MK 51	AERO 20A
	MER 7		AERO 7A
	TER 4		MAU 9A
	TER 7		
	AERO 3A]

Fuze

MK 339 Mod O Ser 36731

LD 549439 Lot 23

General Tire Corporation

Space and Systems Division

234. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 27, 1972.

SUBJECT

Atmospherics of My Visit to Peking

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files–Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's June 1972 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. The President wrote on the first page: "K—an excellent account. In the long run this is more important than day to day substance." Kissinger also forwarded to Nixon a June 27 16-page memorandum that reviewed the substance of the trip. (Ibid.) Nixon wrote on that memorandum, "Superb job—covers all the bases with expert tactics." He also underlined much of the text. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 147. Summary memoranda by Holdridge and others who accompanied Kissinger on the June trip are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files–Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's June 1972 Visit.

The mood of our Chinese hosts throughout the visit was extraordinarily warm and friendly—especially considering the circumstances. It was very apparent that the Chinese were determined not to let the Vietnam situation stand in the way of an improvement in US–PRC relations; it was obvious that the rapport established during the past year was intact and that they wanted to build it.

We could tell the attitude of the Chinese from the very beginning. As before, Assistant Foreign Minister Chang Wen-chin and others met us in Shanghai and flew in our plane. At Peking we were greeted by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, Deputy Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua plus several other ranking Foreign Ministry officials, all wearing broad smiles of welcome. When I emerged they briefly formed a semi-circle and started applauding. (This group was essentially the same one with which you dealt in February.) To underscore the Government's support of our visit the names of those meeting us were meticulously listed in the *People's Daily* the following day.

Following the drive to the guest house area and the first of many outstanding Chinese meals, the tone of the visit was firmly set when Prime Minister Chou En-lai called on us within an hour of my arrival. He chatted informally and very pleasantly with me and my staff for some forty-five minutes, recalling those who had been in Peking before and expressing pleasure at meeting new arrivals. He also asked us for suggestions on what we wanted to see. In the course of the conversation he extended Chairman Mao Tse-tung's personal regards to you, suggesting that the Chairman remains on the political scene. Later that same evening Chou and I began the first of many hours of substantive discussions.²

In the ensuing days there was no variation from the courteous, and genuinely friendly treatment which we received. The Chinese went to some lengths to show us parts of the Forbidden City which we had not seen before and maintained their aplomb when some of us asked to revisit other parts which we had previously visited, causing them to change arrangements. Because one of my staff members had ex-

² The President and Kissinger met on June 23 and discussed the trip to the PRC, and Kissinger reiterated many of the remarks he would include in his June 27 memorandum. Kissinger described how Chou En-lai "met with my whole team for about half an hour, just greeting them, saying a friendly word, you know how he is." Nixon responded: "He's a helluva guy." In discussing Vietnam, Kissinger observed, "He [Chou] said, these are his direct words, the People's Republic of China, if we asked, would approve the course of action of the President's May 8 speech. The Chinese understand and approve this policy, but Vietnam is reluctant to rely upon it. Now, it's enough for people to say that that's further than the Russians went." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation Between Nixon and Kissinger, June 23, 1972, 6:48–8:40 p.m., Camp David, Conversation No. 194–1)

pressed an interest to Prime Minister Chou in seeing Chinese acrobats, our whole party was taken one morning to the Institute of Physical Culture outside Peking, where, accompanied by the Minister of Sports, the Director of the Institute and the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, we watched youthful acrobats, gymnasts, swimmers, and ping-pong players perform. The students applauded warmly upon our arrival, with no signs of reservation or animosity. Two of my staff members played ping-pong with the Chinese, and this gesture was very well received.

Chinese Attitude and Approach

In my judgment there were three particular highlights of the visit which were indicative not only of the friendly attitude of the Chinese but of their political intent:

—At the banquet he gave on the evening of the day after our arrival, Chou in his toast expressed the belief that the goal of normalization of US–PRC relations would be attained, though gradually, on the basis of the Shanghai Joint Communiqué. This toast was significant in that it was made before senior officials of the PRC, and contained no reference to Vietnam. Thus he was telling them that the Vietnam war would not be allowed to detract from the goal of normalization, at least under present circumstances. (Incidentally, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, who had met me at the airport on previous occasions, was present at this banquet; as you know, he is in effect Minister of Defense. The Chinese also printed a photo of us all, which was taken just prior to the banquet, on the front page of the *People's Daily*.)

—The Chinese put on a cultural presentation for us the next evening, a “revolutionary” Peking opera, which, as was the case in my October visit, turned out to be a command performance. The hall was filled with some 500 or so cadres, or people in leadership positions, drawn not only from the Government but from farms, enterprises, and factories around Peking. As my associates and I appeared, accompanied by the Foreign Minister and other senior PRC officials, the audience clapped loudly. We, of course, joined in. The same thing occurred after the performance. The applause lasted for a much longer period than on the first such occasion in October. This incident was indicative of a Chinese desire to get the message out to selected middle-echelon political leaders that US–PRC relations will grow warmer despite recent events in Vietnam.

—Finally, on our last evening, Chou En-lai made what I consider an extraordinary gesture of friendship by inviting my whole party to a picnic at the Summer Palace. The evening began with our boarding boats for a ride on the lake before the startled eyes of several hundred Chinese bystanders who applauded vigorously and with every sign of enthusiasm when they saw the Prime Minister and me. Later we landed

and dined at a pavilion where the Empress Dowager had watched the Peking Opera. We then strolled to our cars for the return to Peking with Chinese and American officials intermixed, again in front of Chinese bystanders. Knowledge of these events must then have spread fairly widely via the Chinese who watched us, ordinary people to whom the Summer Palace is a popular place to visit, and who must have had some idea of the nature of Chou's guests from the items carried in the *People's Daily*. I doubt that the Chinese bystanders knew in advance that we were coming, or that their applause was rehearsed.

US–PRC Relationship

There were a number of other indications that an extraordinary relationship has built up between our two countries:

—Chou En-lai spent a great deal of time asking my advice about various personalities around the world—especially West European leaders.

—Chou ran over a list of American personalities to be invited to the PRC—again showing a degree of confidence rare in state-to-state relations.

—They even asked my advice on Robert Williams, a radical black, on whom an official of a Republican Administration should not be considered a good witness.

—Chou engaged in extraordinarily candid discussions about their views on Vietnam.

—At the banquet, newly-promoted Assistant Foreign Minister Chang Wen-chin, who had helped draft the Shanghai Joint Communiqué, remarked that the Chinese people felt the Communiqué was largely drafted by the Americans. This, he said, was due to the use of expressions and formulations not typically Chinese. Two inferences may be drawn from Chang's words: first, the Chinese went to great lengths to meet our needs, which they in fact did; and second, there is evidently some feeling among the leaders that we got the better of the deal, especially in the Taiwan section.

—Our visit ended on the same note of cordiality on which it had begun. We were seen off by the same group which had met us, and there were many remarks—apparently genuine—that they hoped they would see us again soon.

The Chinese attitude can perhaps best be summed up in comments to me by Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying along the following lines at the conclusion of our special session:

—This meeting is of great help to us and very important. Even more important it demonstrates the friendship of our two peoples. The friendship of our two peoples is more weighty than all this material. This also indicates further progress toward the normalization of our state relations.

—If we say the world faces dangers, it is not due to our two countries (US and PRC). You (US) on the east side of the Pacific, we (PRC) on the west side of the Pacific, separated by 10,000 miles, can live in peace together. We can become a strong stable force for world peace.

—In making such great efforts in Europe and Asia, Dr. Kissinger is making great efforts to normalize state relations, and not just for our countries alone.

—On behalf of the Chinese armed forces I would like to thank Dr. Kissinger again for this discussion. As I understand that President Nixon asked Dr. Kissinger to discuss this with us. I would like also to thank President Nixon.

—When you go back please express our thanks to President Nixon and wish him good health and long life. Also congratulate him in advance on his victory in the election because that also involves the world. The re-election of President Nixon is of major importance not only for relations between our two countries but for the world as a whole.

—I would like to say further that not only is there no conflict of interests between us but rather a history of long-standing friendship between our two peoples. Peace on the two coasts of the Pacific will guarantee world peace.

The Political Atmosphere

The following is relevant to the condition of Mao Tse-tung, and the general mood in Peking:

—After Chou's reference to Mao's greetings to you on the first night, Mao's name did not enter the conversation as frequently as had been the case on my earlier trips. There have, of course, been rumors about Mao being in ill health or even dying, and the decrease in references to him could have been a case in point. However, during the Summer Palace picnic Chou restored the balance somewhat by giving an eloquent and moving account of how Mao had come to write a certain poem, and referred to Mao very much in the present tense. He also invoked Mao frequently in the course of our last private meeting, insisting that the final announcement had to be cleared by him.

—Chou asked that our meetings be conducted with significantly fewer participants than before, perhaps on the grounds of political sensitivities. This could reflect some high-level political tension. On the Chinese side, Chou was generally accompanied only by Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua and an interpreter, and I, at his insistent request, limited my party to one or two staff members. I found this situation puzzling, and can account for it only on the grounds that Chou was unusually reluctant to have too many people on his side fully aware of the nature of our talks, especially on the Soviet Union and Indochina. Perhaps policy differences still exist at top PRC echelons, especially on the topic of Vietnam. But, as noted below, there are no visible signs of tension in Peking, nor are there any obvious grounds for assuming our relationship will not progress.

—Life in Peking seems more relaxed now than it seemed in February or on my previous visits. The army was largely off the streets, and the numerous traffic policemen were now wearing a distinctive white jacket and peaked hat which was quite different from an army

uniform. The people in general, especially the young, were much more colorfully dressed. They did not appear to be under as many constraints as before, and a common sight in the evenings was family groups sitting on the curb of the main street to watch the passing show. From what we saw from our motorcades, they were under no injunctions to keep from looking our way when we passed, or to avoid showing curiosity. We received many stares, none unfriendly. (Being the only show in town at the time, we were probably known for what we were when we traveled.)

In conclusion, this latest visit to Peking has reinforced the conviction I reached following your visit to the PRC four months ago: we have established a unique bond between ourselves and the Chinese which both sides highly regard and want to strengthen further. For our part we have been able to do this because we have cut out many of the diplomatic niceties and subtleties and have spoken our minds to the Chinese as equals. We have made it plain that we are willing to listen to their points of view in the same spirit, and that to the extent the differences between us will permit, will do everything we can to find common ground. For the Chinese, who are a proud people with a rich culture and enormous historical continuity, any other approach would have been unacceptable.

No other country today has either the strength or the will to treat the Chinese as equals. Our having done so has wiped out much of the Chinese ill-feeling toward us of the past two decades. It has made it possible for both parties to focus upon the common ground between us and, as in the case of Vietnam, to play down our contradictions. I see no reason why this situation cannot continue, provided we avoid the kinds of minor but insensitive acts which inevitably generate Chinese resentment and continue our basic approach.

235. Memorandum From John A. Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

Recent NIE Study of Taiwan's Prospects and State Analysis of Recent Governmental Changes There

At Tab A is a recent NIE study on Taiwan's prospects,² the chief conclusions of which are:

—Taiwan is likely to preserve a separate existence well into the 1970s, provided that it not lose confidence in continuing U.S. support, especially as regards the defense commitment.

—Taiwan's economy should remain prosperous, Mainlander-Taiwanese collaboration should increase in the face of the danger from Peking (and this collaboration in turn depends heavily on the confidence in U.S. support), and internal stability should continue during and after the succession—with President Chiang's elder son, Chiang Ching-kuo, being somewhat more flexible, but no less committed to preserving the Republic of China's separate identity than his father. [The speculation in paragraphs 10–11 postulating a limited Taiwanese interest in a deal with Peking outruns any evidence we have seen. Given their deep-seated distrust of Mainlanders—on the mainland and on Taiwan—and their appreciation of the situation on the mainland—politically, economically, and socially—the Taiwanese would almost certainly want to observe a decided moderation of the political situation on the mainland (and probably be stimulated by a deterioration of their relationship with Mainlanders on Taiwan or a withdrawal of U.S. support) before they would move in the direction of a deal with Peking.]³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 361, National Intelligence Estimates—part 3. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum indicating he had seen it.

² Attached but not printed is National Intelligence Estimate 43–72, May 11, entitled "Prospects for Taiwan and the Chinese Nationalists." According to an April 12 memorandum from Moser to Green, the "CIA began on this NIE in late 1971 in the hopes of putting it into the hopper for the Presidential trip." He added that earlier drafts of the paper were out of date, but that "CIA is anxious to get the paper on its way." (*Ibid.*, RG 59, EA Files: Lot 74 D 471, Memoranda for Mr. Green, April 1972)

³ Brackets in the source text.

—The Government, while continuing with its present formal identity, will probably gradually mute its claims to the mainland, and concentrate more on matters directly related to Taiwan.

—As regards the Peking–Taipei relationship, there is no evidence that Peking will try a military solution of the Taiwan problem; Peking will undoubtedly continue to push toward the diplomatic and economic isolation of Taiwan; and Taipei is unlikely to show interest in negotiating a political solution with Peking, even after President Chiang goes.

At Tab B is a memorandum to you from State commenting on the late May reshuffle of top leadership in Taipei.⁴ The highlights are:

—The changes can be expected to mollify somewhat the Taiwanese and younger educated elements, while leaving fundamental political control firmly in the hands of the same mainlander group. The number of Taiwanese in the 18-man cabinet was doubled from three to six (including the Vice Premier), and a Taiwanese was appointed Governor of Taiwan Province—long a basic Taiwanese demand.

—The shifts presage no policy changes, and do support Chiang Ching-kuo's commitment to policies associated with Taiwan's economic development.

—A surprising change among Mainlander leaders was the ousting of Chow Shu-kai as Foreign Minister (until a year ago the ROC Ambassador here, he has now apparently been put on the shelf as Minister without Portfolio). He was replaced by Shen Chang-huan, who had previously served in this post from 1960–1966, and since then has been the ROC Ambassador to the Vatican. Chow may have been penalized for some of the ROC's serious diplomatic reverses of the past year, as well as for his advocacy earlier this year of increased ties with East European countries.

⁴ Apparent reference to "The Republic of China's New Cabinet—New Faces and a New Image," a 2-page report with a list of all cabinet members, which Eliot forwarded on June 1 under a covering memorandum to Kissinger. (National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, POL 15–1 (a), Cabinet Members) In addition, INR produced Intelligence Note REAN-46, June 21, "Republic of China: Chiang Ching-Kuo's Taiwanese." (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 CHINAT)

236. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, June 28, 1972, 6:45–8:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

Ambassador Huang: Did you just arrive?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. The People's Republic is the only country where there are no technical breakdowns.

Ambassador Huang: You are lucky. (laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: At least the airplanes take off in your country.

The President has written a letter to the Prime Minister thanking him for the reception that we were given. It is in his own handwriting. (He hands it to Ambassador Huang attached at Tab A.)²

Ambassador Huang: We will forward it.

Dr. Kissinger: His calligraphy is not exactly the same.

We had a number of items I promised the Prime Minister to let you know about, and since I am going to the West Coast I thought we should meet today. I wanted to thank you on behalf of all my colleagues for the really courteous reception that we received. It added to the warm feelings we already had towards your country.

The Prime Minister raised with me the safety of Prince Sihanouk when he travels and asked me whether we could see whether there is any information on plots to kidnap him. I promised him to do so. Here is an interim report which I received from the Central Intelligence Agency which you can read and I have to have back. (He hands over

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No summary memorandum for the President has been found.

² A copy of the 2-page handwritten letter is attached but not printed. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 148.

the memorandum at Tab B.) It is only a preliminary report. (Ambassador Huang and Mrs. Shih read the memorandum.)³

We have instructed our people that if they find anything, first, to inform us and then to use all their influence to prevent it from happening. Your Ambassador in Paris will remember him (referring to General Walters who signed the memorandum).

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to infiltrate a few pro-PRC people in our government.

Secondly, your Prime Minister told me that German Christian Democratic Union leader Schroeder had been invited to the People's Republic. Because I know him very well I told the Prime Minister I would establish contact with him and advise him to be as honest as possible when he talks to the Prime Minister. I have been in contact and I will see him. I have to do it somewhat delicately so that he requests the appointment with me rather than my inviting him. But it's been done. I just wanted the Prime Minister to know.

Ambassador Huang: You have not met him yet?

Dr. Kissinger: I will inform you when I meet him. I will meet him in the next couple of weeks, and in any event before he comes to the People's Republic.

When we were in the People's Republic, we went to see again some treasures in the Forbidden City which you showed us.

On my last day Assistant Minister Chang mentioned to me that you were concerned about the listings for the ground stations by Intelsat.

Apparently they are listing the Taiwan station as the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Shanghai station as the People's Republic of China (Shanghai). You know the problem. He asked me if there is something I can do to change this to China (Taiwan) and China (Shanghai). Officially we can do nothing since it is an international organization, but unofficially we can do something. It may take a month or two so that it looks like an administrative decision and not a government action, but it will be done in the very near future.

³ Attached but not printed is an undated memorandum from Walters to Kissinger that reads in its entirety: "Reference is made to Prince Sihanouk's present trip to eastern Europe and Africa. A thorough search reveals no information of any sort, not even rumor, that anyone is planning to initiate hostile action against the Prince or interfere with the progress of his trip. A requirement has been sent abroad to areas where such information might become available to report intelligence or rumor that might reflect hostile intent against the Prince or an immediate precedence. Any information received will be passed on to you immediately."

Then you have a visit this week from Congressmen Boggs and Ford. You will have a merry time with one of them when you serve a lot of mao tai.

Ambassador Huang: They are already in Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We gave some very general information about my trip. They may imply that they know a lot, particularly if you treat them as well as you did us. They don't know anything of any consequence. We told them nothing. In fact we told them less than what I said in my press conference (June 24). Do you have it?

Ambassador Huang: No.

Dr. Kissinger: I said nothing in a half an hour. (He hands over a transcript of the June 24 press conference.)⁴ They were told less by far than what is in this.

The Prime Minister raised with us the question of arms smuggling, including from Taiwan. We are checking into that. We don't have any report yet.

(For the next 15 minutes there was a discussion of some special matters which are reported in a separate memorandum of conversation. The discussion then picked up as follows.)⁵

Dr. Kissinger: I want to go over two other things before I leave. Could I interrupt this discussion for a minute?

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: One, we understand that there are some negotiations going on between the Boeing Company and your government for the sale of airplanes. It requires some export licenses. We have done this and are doing it quietly without a public announcement. But the licenses will be published in a register and we cannot exclude that someone going through the register will find it, and I wanted you to be aware of this. This is not done in order to create an embarrassment to you, if it does happen, and I am not sure that it will happen.⁶

⁴ Not found.

⁵ The supplemental memorandum of conversation has not been found. Kissinger's talking points for this meeting, attached but not printed, contain a short entry: "6. J. Howe Material (separate)".

⁶ In an undated attached memorandum, Hormats informed Haig that the Commerce Department would publish information on the export license. In a June 27 memorandum to Haig, Hormats reported on a meeting attended by himself, Froebe, and three representatives of Boeing. Boeing was negotiating with the PRC to sell 10 707 aircraft, with delivery scheduled to begin in August 1973. The Boeing representatives were also meeting with Representatives Ford and Boggs. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 525, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. IV)

Secondly, we . . . a member of the Rockefeller organization, has been approached by Henry Liu.⁷ Henry Liu has approached the Rockefeller organization and said that your government might look with some favor on an enterprise between him (Liu) and the Rockefeller interests in China. Before the Rockefeller people do anything, they asked me whether Liu was operating on his own or whether he is being encouraged by you. If you tell me that you have no interest we will tell the Rockefeller people to ignore him. If you do have an interest we will then go ahead, and they will deal with it by their own criteria.

Ambassador Huang: We have no information on this question.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no hurry. Would you like to check into it?

Ambassador Huang: Yes, we will check it.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not dealing as the government, but simply as a personal friend of the Rockefeller family. We just didn't want to embarrass you or him.

Ambassador Huang: What was Mr. Liu's suggestion?

Dr. Kissinger: He didn't make any suggestions except to say that he has approached a Mr. Warren Lindquist. Here, you can read this. (He hands over the memorandum at Tab C. Ambassador Huang and Mrs. Shih study it carefully and write down notes.)⁸

I am not raising this as a governmental matter. (Mr. Lord signals Dr. Kissinger that they are also reading the telcon attached to the memo.) What is this? (He takes back the memo.) That's just my conversation.

Ambassador Huang: Well, we will check it.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no need to give me an answer. You can let nature take its course. We are not interested. But if you want to say something to me or to let Mr. Marshall know, either way.

Ambassador Huang: Up to now we know nothing about this, I personally.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no interest. We'll just leave it alone. The only reason I raised it is on the off chance that you are interested and then we will encourage it.

There are two other things.

The evening before I left, looking through my notes, while we were on the boat ride with the Prime Minister at the Summer Palace, he made some remarks about the need to accelerate the normalization of our relations.⁹ Since it was in a social context it didn't permit discus-

⁷ Ellipsis in the source text.

⁸ Attached but not printed is a June 24 memorandum from Lord and Rodman to Kissinger that discusses Henry Liu and Rockefeller.

⁹ In the memorandum of conversation of Chou and Kissinger's June 22 meeting at the Summer Palace, Kissinger stated: "After the election actually would be a good

sion. When I thought about it, frankly I don't know what he was talking about. If he has any specific proposal we will look at it very sympathetically. We have made all the proposals that we can think of, but if the Chinese side has any specific project we will be willing to discuss it.

The second problem has to do with Vietnam.

Ambassador Huang: The other matter came up on the boat trip?

Dr. Kissinger: In a general discussion. It had nothing to do with Vietnam.

We had a full discussion on Vietnam, and I can add nothing to our general position. Since my return there was an enigmatic broadcast from Hanoi that new forces were entering their country. What that means we don't know.

Ambassador Huang: New American forces?

Dr. Kissinger: No, new allied forces. And I feel duty bound to point out that we understand the requirement that you feel to give support and we have never raised any question about that. But if any organized Chinese units appeared in Vietnam, even if only support units, that would put us in a very difficult position in terms of our relationship. We have no evidence that this is the case, nor did the Prime Minister indicate this could happen. I raise it only because of what Hanoi said, not what you said, and they were not referring to you.

(To Mrs. Shih) You don't have to translate it.

Ambassador Huang: No.

Dr. Kissinger: Finally, again with respect to Vietnam, you might tell the Prime Minister we are checking the evidence he gave us very carefully and are tracing the fragments of the bombs. We have traced one as far as the Philippines. Now the next step is to see what carrier it was on. If we find responsible people then they will be punished.

I might also call the Prime Minister's attention to the *New York Times* yesterday which called attention to the specific regulations on operations in proximity to the Chinese border that our planes now fly

time to have more talks. Prime Minister Chou: Yes, that will depend on your efforts. Dr. Kissinger: In the election? Prime Minister Chou: Including that. I had a double meaning. One is that you should make your efforts to get your President re-elected. The second is your efforts to normalize relations between China and the United States. Because if you consistently refuse to normalize relations and then if I follow you at the Palace, the masses will be cursing me—they won't applaud me when I come if that happens. You understand, of course, the sentiments of the people. Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes, but I think we are making major efforts to normalize relations. Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but they haven't been enough yet." A bracketed note indicates that Prime Minister Chou then switched the discussion to the scenery there and in Hangchow. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files—Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's Visit July 1972 Memcons Originals))

in order to avoid unfortunate events.¹⁰ And that is the result of the phone call we made to you. I didn't give him the exact details, but you might call his attention to it. That is all I have. (He indicates that Commander Howe will continue the discussions.)

We will be on the West Coast for two weeks, but Commander Howe will be in Washington. General Haig will be with me. You can call Commander Howe. If there is any urgent reason simply call the White House and you can reach Mr. Lord, or General Haig or me on the West Coast. They are in direct contact with us.

One final Vietnam matter I wanted the Prime Minister to know about. We have agreed after internal study to resume the plenary sessions with North Vietnam on July 13 and the private meetings a few days afterwards. We will do so on our side with a constructive spirit and an attitude of bringing the war to an end. Our discussions in Peking were one factor leading us to this decision.

Ambassador Huang: I will relay all this.

Dr. Kissinger: Certainly. At this point only North Vietnam knows about this decision though it may be public in the next few days.

I can tell you again that we all have the warmest memories of our visit in the People's Republic. They made us all feel very comfortable as always. Will you be able to go back on vacation?

Ambassador Huang: I am still waiting for instructions from Peking.

(Dr. Kissinger then left the meeting and Messrs. Howe/Lord remained behind to continue the discussion.)

¹⁰ Craig R. Whitney, "Hanoi Said to Make Use of U.S. Bomb-Free Zone," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1972, pp. 1, 15.

237. Memorandum From John Holdridge, Mel Levin, and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 30, 1972.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the International Financial Institutions

The immediate policy problem is trying to preserve continued participation by the Republic of China in the International Financial Institutions (IFI's) through avoiding or parrying a challenge to its position in the IFI's at the annual meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund late next September.²

Under Secretary Johnson and Treasury Under Secretary Volcker sent you a memorandum³ recommending (a) that we support World Bank President McNamara's study committee proposal on this question, and (b) that you approve detailed strategy and tactics covering contingencies both under which the study committee was formed and under which it was not formed. The McNamara proposal would create a Study Group in the Bank's Executive Board of Directors within the next month to study the Chirep question in the Bank and the Fund. Prior to broaching his proposal formally in the Board, McNamara would (a) canvass its members to be sure he had the requisite support,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret. Sent for action.

² This issue was discussed briefly in NSSM 141. See Documents 171 and 175. In December 1971 the Departments of State and Treasury provided Embassies in the capitals of major U.S. allies background information on the U.S. position on Chinese participation in IFIs to enable them to respond to inquiries on U.S. policy. The message instructed diplomats to "undertake no initiative unless further instructed." (Telegram 225181 to selected diplomatic posts, December 15, 1971, approved by Hormats and Holdridge; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) On January 22, 1972, Samuels and Volcker sent a memorandum to Haig requesting approval of instructions to selected diplomatic posts on supporting the ROC's continued membership in IFIs. (Ibid.) On the first page of a summary of this February 11 memorandum prepared by Wright and Holdridge, Kissinger wrote: "Take up as soon after we return as possible. HAK." (Ibid.) On March 1 Wright asked Kissinger to clear the telegram, noting that "the attached cable for which your approval is being sought, is addressed only to those three organizations [IBRD, IMF, and ADB], and does nothing but authorize our Embassies quietly and in a non-pressuring way to ascertain views of the principal member governments of those organizations." Wright concluded, "the attached cable is nothing but an authorization for our Embassies to enter into quiet palaver." (Ibid.) Kissinger approved the draft telegram. (Ibid.)

³ Attached but not printed is the June 23 memorandum.

and (b) attempt to secure IMF Managing Director Schweitzer's agreement to the proposal.

Attitudes Toward Continued ROC Participation in the IFI's

McNamara. McNamara's principal concern is that of the prudent banker: he feels vulnerable to criticism that on his own responsibility he has been continuing disbursements on outstanding loans to the ROC. He would therefore like to clarify the ROC's status, but believes this should not be left to the highly political atmosphere of the September meeting.

IFI Members. All of the 20 key members whom we have recently surveyed strongly hope that a public debate and a vote on the ROC question can be avoided.

ROC Position. Taipei has decided to go along with the McNamara proposal, although it is motivated in part by a reluctance to oppose Mr. McNamara.

PRC. Peking has expressed no interest in assuming the obligations of membership in the IFI's, which would include the free convertibility of its currency, something it is most unlikely to accept. Its objective in seeing the issue raised would therefore be to see the ROC expelled. Peking so far has not indicated it will mount an effort in this direction. That it did not try to stimulate a challenge in last April's Asian Development Bank meeting is encouraging, but gives no assurance as regards its intentions toward the September meeting.

Our Recommendations

1. *McNamara proposal.* Given the real chance of a challenge to the ROC position at the September meeting, we believe we should support the McNamara Study Group proposal as involving fewer risks than trying to counter a challenge if it arose at the meeting or shortly before. The Study Group once formed should help deter a challenge and meet any challenge procedurally and substantively that might be raised. It is also low-profile and unprovocative as regards the PRC and its supporters, both in the manner of its being established and in that it does not outwardly prejudge the outcome. We believe that we will be able to influence the Study Group toward a favorable report, as well as the IFI's toward a satisfactory disposition of the report.

2. *Detailed strategy and tactical guidance for the September meeting.* We do not believe that a need exists at this point for such detailed guidance, the annual meeting still being three months off. Further, we do not believe that the situation we will face in September is now sufficiently clear to chart such strategy and tactics in detail. We would suggest that State and Treasury come back with further recommendations in August, by which time we will know the fate of the McNamara pro-

posal, which in itself will have a substantial bearing on the situation in September.

The urgency in a decision on this matter results from Marshall Green's wanting to discuss the question with ROC officials in Taipei July 4,⁴ and from Mr. Volcker's wanting to give Mr. McNamara a response following up the preliminary views given McNamara by Marshall Green on June 15.

At Tab A is a proposed memorandum from you to Under Secretaries Volcker and Johnson embodying our recommendations as stated above.⁵

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Under Secretaries Volcker and Johnson at Tab A.

⁴ Green met with Foreign Minister Shen and Vice President Yen on July 4. (Reported in telegrams 3369, 3436, and 3472 from Taipei, July 5, 7, and 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 EA) Green and Chiang Ching-kuo met on the morning of July 5 to discuss the ROC's military equipment requirements, U.S. policy toward East Asia, tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and Taiwan's economic development. Green noted that ROC "attendance at meeting late this year in U.S. on foregoing subject [wildlife conservation and endangered species] could well result in key countries like Kenya and Tanzania deciding not to attend which would undermine the conference and GRC would be blamed." According to a report on the meeting, "On the other hand, Green reiterated our strong desire to do that which was effective in retaining GRC membership in international financial institutions. This was obviously far more important to GRC and its friends than an issue like participation in conservation of wildlife and endangered species issues. CCK nodded understanding but made no comment." (Telegram 3434 from Taipei, July 7; *ibid.*, POL 15–1 CHINAT)

⁵ According to a July 10 memorandum to Kennedy from Davis, Kissinger sent the drafts back from San Clemente. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) The final memorandum to Johnson and Volcker, signed by Kissinger on July 11, reflected the recommendations detailed in this memorandum. (*Ibid.*)

238. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, July 7, 1972, 8:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Mrs. Shih

As instructed, I called Mrs. Shih and informed her that because of the urgency and seriousness of the matter concerned we would like them to take a message by telephone and assist us in transmitting it as fast as possible to another party. The reason for the urgency and our concern would become obvious from the text of the message.

We were also asking our regular contact to inform the North Vietnamese but we were not confident that our man would be able to get through or be received. We were asking their assistance because of the time sensitivity. I then read the following text which we were asking be transmitted to the North Vietnamese.

Begin Text:

“We have learned from absolutely trustworthy battlefield reports that the 284th Artillery Regiment of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces operating in Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam has been ordered to execute 10 American prisoners on July 8. The U.S. Government urgently demands that this order be immediately countermanded. NVA field commanders must be ordered to escort these and any other American prisoners to safe areas and treat them humanely, as required by international law and as promised by the DRV. The Hanoi authorities and NVA commanders will be held responsible for the execution or mistreatment of these or any other American prisoners.”

End Text.

I emphasized the date and the matter of lives as being the factors requiring immediate transmission of the message. I also stated that we were not making this matter public because of our desire not to do anything that would impede progress in negotiations in Paris. Mrs. Shih insured that she had transcribed the text properly and stated that they

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Howe.

would transmit our message to their government and then we would see what would happen.²

JT Howe

² A note in the files dated July 8, 8:30 p.m. reads in its entirety: "The matter alleged in the U.S. telephone message of July 7 is a matter which involves the Vietnamese and U.S. sides. The Chinese position in such affairs is total non-interference. Therefore, the Chinese side will not undertake to convey the U.S. message." A notation at the bottom of the note reads: "(Rec'd in San Clemente via Secure Voice phone from Howe, 7/9/72, 10:10 a.m.)" (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 110 Geopolitical Files, China, Chronological Files)

239. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 17, 1972.

SUBJECT

Export-Import Bank Financing for the Republic of China

Alex Johnson (Tab A)² comments that it is his understanding that some concerns have been expressed, especially by Treasury, at the additional Ex–Im Bank financing for the Republic of China that is now under consideration: \$57.4 million for steel mill equipment, \$300 million for equipment for two nuclear power plants on Taiwan. Johnson strongly feels that this financing should be approved for the following reasons:³

—Refusal of the USG to approve the loans—the application for which has already been approved by the Ex–Im Bank Board—would be interpreted as a dramatic expression of a lack of confidence in the economic future of Taiwan, thus undermining Taiwan's economic

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum bears a handwritten comment: "Thru Haig" in unknown handwriting and "ASAP" in Kissinger's handwriting.

² Attached but not printed is a July 7 memorandum to Kissinger from Acting Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson.

³ The following four points are taken from Johnson's memorandum.

strength. It would also undermine our ability to maintain the position of Taiwan in international financial institutions.⁴

—The Republic of China has ample financial capability to service the loans.

—A reasonable degree of internal political stability for some time to come seems assured.

—It does not seem likely that Taiwan will be incorporated into the PRC by force during the 15-year period of the loans. If Taiwan were incorporated by agreement between the two entities, it is not a foregone conclusion that the Republic of China's international obligations would not be honored.

Treasury's earlier concern, since withdrawn, was that a steel mill will increase Taiwan's steel capacity resulting in increased exports to the US to the detriment of US steel producers. (*Comment*: However, Austria will proceed with the project with or without US participation. In the latter case, the US would probably lose those exports which were to have been financed by the Ex-Im credits.)

We have two concerns:

—That the announcement of these loans not be handled in a way which would call undue attention to the issue of US financial support for the ROC and thereby cause us problems in keeping her in the IMF/World Bank.

—That we not jeopardize the Administration's efforts to improve relations with the PRC. We believe that these dual concerns can be met by *announcing the two atomic power loans* individually, with an appropriate interval between the two announcements. The steel mill need not be announced at all. This would minimize the publicity given to these loans and lower our posture with regard to financial support for the ROC.⁵

Therefore, we share Johnson's view that although these loans are not free of risk, failure at this stage to make the loans would present greater risks. Accordingly, if you approve, we plan to inform the agencies involved that we have no objection to these loans, but ensure that they are given minimum publicity and separately announced.

Recommendation

That the Ex-Im Bank loans to Taiwan be approved on the basis of the above scenario.⁶

⁴ See Documents 237 and 245.

⁵ A handwritten correction changed the incorrect "PRC" to "ROC."

⁶ Kissinger initialed his approval. In an August 2 memorandum, Davis informed Eliot that the Ex-Im Bank financing had been approved. She noted: "However, if a public announcement is required, the two atomic power loans should be announced individually, in a low-key manner, with appropriate interval between the two announcements. We believe the steel mill loan need not be announced at all." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI)

240. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–3–72

Washington, July 20, 1972.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

CHINA'S MILITARY POLICY AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Note

This is the first estimate on Chinese theater forces to appear in the enlarged format for military estimates. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

Optimism regarding our knowledge of Chinese military affairs, however, is tempered by the fact that the circumstances surrounding the 1971 purge of the top military leadership and many of its implications remain obscure. The purge has obviously altered the prospects for the succession to Mao Tse-tung and it has produced at least a temporary return to the pre-Cultural Revolution norm of the Party “controlling the gun”. It may have important consequences for military morale, for military priorities, and for military policy.

The Problem

To assess Communist China's general military policy and to estimate the strength and capabilities of the Chinese Communist general purpose and air defense forces through 1977.

Conclusions

Policy and Strategy

A. Chinese military policy has been strongly influenced by Peking's aspirations to reclaim a leading role in Asia and to gain recognition as a major world power, and by acute concern to deter attack or invasion by the great powers. Taken together, these considerations have caused China to maintain a substantial military establishment and to bear the heavy costs of modernizing its general purpose forces and of developing an independent strategic nuclear capability. Nonetheless, Mao's insistence on a basic policy of self-reliance and China's limited technical and industrial base have insured that the process of modernizing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would be a protracted one.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 361, National Intelligence Estimates—part 3. Top Secret; [codewords not declassified]. Also available in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIC Files. Representatives of the CIA, the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The representative of the FBI abstained, as the subject was outside his jurisdiction. The full text of NIE 13–3–72 is printed in *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678

B. Mao's primary concerns have been with the progress of the revolution in China, and the long-term development of modern military forces has taken place within the context of this overriding goal. Mao's willingness to subordinate defense and purely military considerations to the higher priority goals of politics and the continuing revolution—as in the Cultural Revolution—has had an impact on military professionalism, on combat readiness and morale, and even on military production programs. The PLA, in playing a "vanguard role" in the revolution, has been drawn deeply into politics and has been exposed to the inevitable rewards and penalties. The purge of Lin Biao and the top military leadership in 1971 is only the latest, if most dramatic manifestation of the PLA's continuing involvement in vital issues of national policy.

C. The policy of the People's Republic of China with respect to the use of force has been generally cautious. It has limited the use of combat forces beyond China's borders to circumstances where Peking has seen real and imminent threats to Chinese territory or to vital Chinese interests. In the 1960s, the increasingly hostile nature of Sino-Soviet relations radically altered China's strategic problems. Although the Chinese were careful not to show any sign of weakness, they were at pains behind this brave front to control the risks of direct military confrontation with either of the two superpowers, and, as might be expected, their military stance remained essentially defensive.

D. China's strategy for defense against a possible Soviet invasion follows Mao's principles of "luring deep" and "people's war". In the face of the much superior firepower, air support, and mechanized mobility of the Soviet Union, the Chinese have chosen not to position large forces close to the border where they might easily be cut off. The Chinese strategy seems to be to hold back their key main force units until the invading forces are overextended and weakened by the resistance of local defense forces and guerrilla harassment. In contrast to the northern border regions, the coastal areas of China have important concentrations of population and industry, and in these areas the Chinese are prepared for a forward defense employing air and naval forces. If an enemy force landed, it would be met at once by both local defense and main force army units.

E. Another example of Peking's defense-mindedness and awareness of China's vulnerability to attack from the air is the immense effort that has gone into passive defense. The Chinese are building a large portion of their new factories—especially those for military-related industries—in interior regions and have dispersed some of them in out-of-the-way valleys and canyons. Perhaps to a degree unmatched elsewhere in the world, the Chinese are building civil defense facilities, ranging from simple shelter trenches and bunkers to large tunnels with sophisticated life-support equipment in some large cities. Large tun-

nels now in existence or under construction at 75 or so of China's airfields will be able to shelter most of China's fighter force, and other underground facilities built or under construction will be able to shelter all of the navy's existing submarines and missile boats.

F. While the main focus of China's strategy is defensive, this is not to say that Peking has given no thought to contingencies involving offensive operations. In any case, a military force which has been developed to defend against the superpowers inevitably has a considerable offensive capability against lesser foes. China could, for example, conquer all of Southeast Asia if opposed only by indigenous forces. If Peking decided to take Taiwan, a considerable redeployment of its forces would be required, as well as extensive amphibious and airborne training. Once these preparations were made, China could almost certainly take Taiwan in the absence of US military intervention. If the Chinese were to participate in a major attack against South Korea, which we think unlikely, they could effectively commit as many as 35 divisions in the narrow peninsula. In the case of South Asia, the Himalayas and the vast reaches of the Tibetan Plateau would severely limit China's offensive capabilities; long and difficult supply lines would prevent the Chinese from sustaining any offensive into India beyond the Himalayan foothills. But in any of these contingencies, Peking would be constrained by the necessity of providing for defense needs elsewhere, particularly vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and by the requirements of internal security.

The Forces

G. The greatest relative weakness of the Chinese vis-à-vis the US and the USSR is in the field of strategic weapons, and Peking has assigned first priority to ambitious and costly programs aimed at providing China with a credible deterrent against nuclear attack. After strategic programs, air and naval modernization has had the higher claim on resources; modernization of the army seems to have received a somewhat lower priority.

H. Even so, the ground forces remain the dominant element. The size of the force (at 3.0 million men, the Chinese Army is the largest ground force in the world), the toughness and discipline of the Chinese soldier and the quality of small arms with which he is equipped are impressive. The Chinese Army for its size and by US and Soviet standards, however, has relatively little armor, and is only moderately well equipped with artillery. Tactical air support for ground troops is limited, and shortages of vehicles and transport aircraft restrict mobility and logistic support. In a non-nuclear war on its own ground against any invader the Chinese Army would be a most formidable force. In these circumstances it would be able to capitalize upon its vast manpower reserves, its ability to mount a large-scale guerrilla effort, and

its ability to use China's terrain and territory to advantage in fighting a prolonged war. In contrast, the Chinese Army would experience great difficulty in trying to push very far beyond China's borders against the opposition of a modern force. Here the weakness in transport, logistics, firepower, and air support could become critical.

I. While its inventory of some 4,000 combat aircraft is the third largest in the world, China's equipment is far below the standards of US or Soviet aircraft. Air defense is the primary mission of this force, with 37 of the 53 Chinese air divisions assigned to this role. The air defense system suffers from serious weaknesses because of its reliance on relatively outmoded aircraft, a very modest level of surface-to-air missile (SAM) deployment, limited air surveillance capabilities, and the lack of automatic data-handling equipment.

J. China's ground attack fighter force consists of Mig-15/17 jet fighters and a growing number (currently about 185) of F-9 fighter-bombers (a Chinese-designed aircraft somewhat larger than but resembling the Mig-19). About three-quarters of China's 540 or so bombers are obsolescent Il-28s. The Chinese also have deployed about 43 Tu-16 jet medium bombers, but we believe Peking intends to use the Tu-16s mainly as part of China's force for peripheral nuclear attack.

K. The Chinese have invested heavily in naval programs, and this effort is beginning to pay off. The fleet now includes about 53 attack submarines, 16 destroyer escorts (including 8 that are equipped with cruise missiles), about 55 missile patrol boats, and several hundred motor gunboats and torpedo boats. The coastal patrol type vessels are prepared to play a significant defensive role; the larger ships and submarines further enhance Chinese defensive capabilities but have not yet ventured any extended operations into deep waters. The Chinese Navy has only a limited air defense capability, and its antisubmarine warfare capability is rudimentary. The Chinese have only a limited sealift potential, have no amphibious shipbuilding program and have conducted no large-scale amphibious training.

Prospects

L. Peking's cautious attitude respecting the use of force seems likely to continue for some time, partly because the Chinese see no advantage in risking a military confrontation with the vastly stronger superpowers, and partly because Maoist doctrine continues to hold that revolution cannot be sustained by external forces. We do not rule out a shift in this generally defensive and cautious policy on the use of force as China's conventional and strategic power grows and in circumstances in which nationalist sentiments may have gained ground at the expense of Maoism. But there is little in the current situation to suggest that such a shift would be likely in the next few years.

M. We cannot foresee any weakening in the basic drive to develop China as a major military power. As in the past, however, progress in modernization and in developing military professionalism is likely to come into conflict with Maoist political and ideological goals. Moreover, because of China's limited technical base, the modernization of the PLA will necessarily be protracted, and the process will undoubtedly require numerous compromises concerning the balance of effort between strategic and conventional forces, and between near-term results and longer-term progress. While the Chinese could probably step up their efforts at military modernization somewhat, they are much nearer the margin of their capabilities than either the US or USSR.

N. Thus the outlook for the next five years is one of continuing improvement along current lines based on programs now underway. A continuation of this persistent effort to build a formidable military establishment is unlikely to produce any spectacular breakthroughs or developments in the PLA. It will, however, permit Peking gradually to operate in the international arena with somewhat less concern for China's military weaknesses and shortcomings.

O. The Chinese Army is receiving newer and better equipment—including improved light and medium artillery, light amphibious and medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, more modern communications equipment, and increasing numbers of trucks—that will gradually upgrade its firepower and mobility. Training is being conducted on a larger and more elaborate scale, and there may be other changes in process—e.g., more attention to arming and training paramilitary forces—that will enhance the military usefulness of China's virtually unlimited manpower. While these improvements will not be sufficient to enable Peking to project its forces much beyond China's borders against first class opposition, the PLA should be able increasingly to contest an invasion more effectively and in somewhat more forward positions than is now the case, especially on the northern and northwestern frontiers. In short, the already formidable defensive capabilities of the Chinese Army will increase, and the prospect of engaging this force will become a more and more unattractive proposition for any potential adversary.

P. The outlook for air and air defense forces is one of substantial increases in size with qualitative improvement proceeding at a more modest pace. Peking may decide to phase out production of Mig-19 fighters in favor of Mig-21s. Chinese-produced Mig-21s evidently have not yet entered the force, but we expect this to occur in the near future. The availability of this aircraft would mark the beginning of major improvements in intercept capability, particularly as the Mig-21s would probably be armed with air-to-air missiles and be equipped for all-weather operations. The Hsian-A interceptor, a native-designed

follow-on to the Mig-21 currently being tested, may be available for deployment in the mid-1970s.

Q. SAM deployment will probably proceed at a faster rate than in years past, and deployment of the Chinese version of the SA-2 may be supplemented by a low-altitude weapon during the period of this Estimate. Radar coverage will improve and expand, and new communications equipment now becoming available will improve the command and control of China's air defense system. Despite this growth and improvement, however, China will continue to be vulnerable to a large-scale attack by planes employing the latest equipment and technology.

R. The new F-9 fighter-bomber represents a significant improvement in China's ground attack capability and is likely to be deployed in fairly substantial numbers. Peking may soon conclude that the cost of building and deploying the outmoded Il-28 jet light bomber is not warranted and that production should cease. Although the Chinese will probably use the Tu-16 bomber primarily as a strategic weapon carrier, some will probably be assigned to reconnaissance and other nonstrategic roles.

S. China's naval programs clearly attest to an ambition to become an important naval power. Production of attack submarines, destroyers, destroyer escorts and guided-missile patrol boats is likely to continue to be substantial. The evidence suggests that China now has one nuclear-powered attack submarine; if so, several more will probably enter the fleet during the period of this Estimate. At this point, however, the Chinese Navy's level of operational experience has not kept pace with additions of new units and advances in technology. Given the complexity of learning to operate as a deepwater navy, this situation is likely to persist throughout the period of this Estimate. Although there is a good chance that the Chinese will begin to "show the flag" in foreign waters with some of their newer units, there is little likelihood of their establishing a major naval presence in waters distant from China for some years.

T. China's nuclear program has given first priority to the development of high-yield thermonuclear weapons for strategic attack. But the Chinese have an obvious requirement for tactical nuclear weapons, and Chic-13, which was tested in January 1972, could have been a step in filling this requirement. [6 lines of source text not declassified] Thus we feel that it is too early to conclude that China has developed a nuclear weapon for delivery by fighter aircraft. Nevertheless, we think it likely that the Chinese will acquire a tactical nuclear capability during the period of this Estimate. A bomb is the best candidate for an early capability. Somewhat later, toward the end of the period of this Estimate, the Chinese will probably be capable of deploying tactical nuclear missiles or rockets.

[Omitted here are the 103-page Discussion section which was divided into the following sections: I. China's Military Policy; II. The Armed Forces; III. Strategy, Capabilities, and Prospects; Annex A: The Ground Forces; Annex B: Chinese Communist Air Force; Annex C: Chinese Communist Navy; and Annex D: Military Research and Development and Production Programs.]

241. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 25, 1972, noon.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador James C.H. Shen, Republic of China
Mr. Henry Chen, Political Counselor, Chinese Embassy
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. John A. Froebe, NSC Staff

Ambassador Shen said that he had three things to take up with Dr. Kissinger on instruction from Taipei. The first was what the U.S. can do to slow down Japan's efforts to normalize relations with Peking.²

Dr. Kissinger said that during his June visit to Tokyo he had advised Sato, Fukuda and Tanaka that Japan should not become separated from the United States on this question.³ Tanaka in response said that Japan would stay in step with the United States. Dr. Kissinger noted that Japan has, as a matter of fact, stayed with the U.S. on this problem. He said he also told Tanaka that the United States does not want to see its rights to use of bases in Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty compromised. Dr. Kissinger said he could not predict just

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. No classification marking. Drafted by Froebe on July 26. Kissinger and Shen met from 12:12 to 12:40 p.m. in Kissinger's office. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² On July 19 Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Tanaka publicly announced his willingness to modify his nation's relationship with the PRC. On August 11 the PRC and Japanese Governments announced that Tanaka would visit the PRC in the near future. The two governments announced on September 21 that Tanaka would visit September 25–30. During this visit, Chou En-lai and Tanaka announced the impending restoration of normal diplomatic relations, causing the ROC on September 29 to announce that it would break relations with Japan.

³ The record of the conversation among Kissinger, Fukuda, and Tanaka is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIX.

what Prime Minister Tanaka would do in the immediate future on relations with Peking, but thought he would probably visit Peking. He noted that the President would be meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka on August 31, at which time the U.S. plans to take a strong line.

Ambassador Shen said that his government was quite fearful that Japan would abrogate its 1952 peace treaty with the ROC, and that this would start a chain reaction in Asia that would undermine the ROC's diplomatic position. Dr. Kissinger said that the U.S. has heard nothing officially as to Japan's intentions regarding the treaty, but added that Ambassador Shen could be assured that the U.S. would try to persuade Japan to move carefully on this problem. Ambassador Shen asked Dr. Kissinger if it was his understanding that Chou En-lai might not insist that Japan abrogate the 1952 treaty as a pre-condition for beginning normalization talks, leaving this question to be resolved during the negotiations. Dr. Kissinger replied that this was his impression. He added that the U.S. would take this question up during the President's discussions with Prime Minister Tanaka late next month. Ambassador Shen asked if Japan was unlikely to do anything on the treaty in the meantime. Dr. Kissinger said that Japan was unlikely to do anything on the treaty that the U.S. might be able to affect, and reiterated that the U.S. would be taking a strong position with Japan as regards use of bases in Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty.

Ambassador Shen said that the second problem Taipei had asked him to raise was that of the ROC's position in the International Financial Institutions (IFI's). Dr. Kissinger said that the United States was supporting the ROC's continued participation in the IFI's very strongly. Ambassador Shen said that the problem now was to work out contingency plans for the September annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Dr. Kissinger said that he thought that Mr. McNamara's study committee proposal seemed to be an effective way of meeting that aspect of the problem.⁴ Mr. Froebe noted, however, that Mr. McNamara has recently had decided second thoughts about the advisability of this approach because of a lack of support in the Board of Executive Directors and from the IMF.⁵

Ambassador Shen said that his government's basic concern was that it not see a replay of the Chirep defeat in the case of the IFI's. Dr. Kissinger responded that the two were quite dissimilar, adding that we do not expect the same outcome in the case of the IFI's. Dr. Kissinger said that he thought the best approach to this problem was for the ROC to continue to maintain a low profile in order to avoid any challenge

⁴ See Document 237.

⁵ See Document 245.

to its position in the IFI's. Ambassador Shen asked what U.S. agencies were following this situation, to which Dr. Kissinger said that Mr. Holdridge was the responsible officer on the NSC Staff. Dr. Kissinger stressed that the U.S. intends to avoid a repetition of the Chirep experience. He mentioned that he would also discuss this with Treasury Secretary Shultz since Treasury has much to say about this problem, and asked Mr. Froebe to check into the situation for him.⁶

Turning to his third question, Ambassador Shen asked if there was some reason for the seeming delay in the approval of the Ex-Im Bank loans for the ROC's planned third and fourth nuclear power plants.⁷

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Froebe to check into this also, and said that he saw no reason for the delay and intended to expedite the matter.

Dr. Kissinger said that he had not seen Ambassador Shen following his June trip to Peking, given the fact that the Taiwan question had not really come up. Ambassador Shen expressed some surprise that the Taiwan question seemed to have been avoided, and asked if this had been because the Taiwan question was now considered settled. Dr. Kissinger said that this was not the case, and that as a matter of fact Chou En-lai had at one point commented that further progress remained to be made on the Taiwan question.

Ambassador Shen asked if Peking is still worried about the Soviets. Dr. Kissinger said that he thought that there had been no major change in Peking's view on that problem. Dr. Kissinger reminded Ambassador Shen after the President's China visit that the Taiwan issue had given rise to considerably more consternation in some quarters than had been justified. Ambassador Shen interjected that Chou En-lai, however, has suggested that Peking will not agree to any large exchanges with the United States so long as there is a GRC Embassy in Washington. Dr. Kissinger replied that this is of little consequence to the United States.

Ambassador Shen suggested that if Chou does not get the movement he wants on the Taiwan question he may stop Americans from going to the mainland. Dr. Kissinger said that he was highly skeptical of this, explaining that Chou would act in accord with Peking's basic national interests. He noted, for example, that Peking has not reacted against

⁶ Froebe forwarded a memorandum through Holdridge to Kissinger on August 2. He noted: "As regards the question of protecting Taiwan's continued participation in the IFI's, World Bank President McNamara has decided not to try to proceed, in advance of the Bank and IMF annual meeting next month, with his plan to set up an ad hoc study committee in the Bank's Board of Executive Directors." Froebe also noted that the Departments of State and Treasury would be forwarding further recommendations shortly. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI)

⁷ See Document 239.

the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam. Responding to Ambassador Shen's query about the prospects for U.S. trade expansion with the mainland, Dr. Kissinger said he believed the same basic consideration would apply. Applying the same concept to Peking relations with Japan, Dr. Kissinger said that the maximum that Peking could do for Japan in the trade field would be less than Japan was already doing with Taiwan.

Ambassador Shen asked Dr. Kissinger his opinion as to why the Japanese were acting the way they were on the China issue. Dr. Kissinger said that it seemed to be in the Japanese character to do things in a somewhat unbalanced way. He said that he himself as a basic principle did not believe it efficacious to acquiesce in pre-conditions to negotiations. He said he could tell Ambassador Shen in the strictest of confidence that he was thinking of sending Mr. Holdridge to Tokyo to talk to the Japanese about the whole problem.

Ambassador Shen again stressed that if Japan abrogates its 1952 treaty with the ROC, all of Southeast Asia will take another look at its relationship with Taiwan. Considering what his country had done for Japan at the end of World War II, the present Japanese actions were nothing less than gross ingratitude. Dr. Kissinger commented that unfortunately gratitude is not a dominant factor in foreign relations.

Dr. Kissinger asked what had happened in Taipei's recent Cabinet reshuffle to Ambassador Shen's predecessor, Chow Shu-kai. Ambassador Shen said that he was now a Minister without Portfolio, noting that this made him the second former Foreign Minister to occupy that position in the Cabinet, the other being George Yeh, who also is a former Ambassador to Washington. Dr. Kissinger observed that no one has had such a difficult job to perform as Ambassador Shen had in the year that he had been here.

Ambassador Shen asked Dr. Kissinger's evaluation of the general situation in Asia and particularly that in Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger said that the U.S. is in a strong military position and that that of the North Vietnamese would get worse. The U.S. therefore can afford to wait. Answering Ambassador Shen's question as to what Hanoi is waiting for, Dr. Kissinger said he thought Hanoi probably wanted to see how the U.S. election campaign would go in the next month or two. Asked if Hanoi might try to hold out until after the November elections, Dr. Kissinger said that North Vietnam could only get worse terms after the election, assuming the President is re-elected. Asked if he thought the U.S. could end the war before November, Dr. Kissinger said it was impossible to tell at this point.

John A. Froebe⁸

⁸ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, July 26, 1972, 0033Z.

134912. For Ambassador Only. Subj: US–PRC Trade—Memorandum to be Left With Ambassador Huang. Ref: State 134911.² The United States notes that there are a number of highly technical and specialized subjects relating to the facilitation of trade between the United States and the People’s Republic of China which could be the topic of discussion in Paris at times to be determined by mutual agreement.

We would welcome an opportunity for early discussion of the following subjects in particular:

1. Settlement of outstanding claims between the US and the PRC. There are many issues regarding claims which the US wishes to discuss with the PRC. It may be that the PRC will wish to raise issues of its own with the USG. For example, we are aware that China may wish to assert claims for assets blocked in the US since 1950. In the spirit of raising at this stage those issues which are capable of solution at present, we suggest that the problem of the claims of US private citizens be resolved in the near future by meetings between expert teams of the two sides. (US claims have been adjudicated as to validity and amount by the US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission pursuant to US law. The findings of the commission are a matter of public record and we will supply a copy to your Embassy in approximately one week.)

2. We recall that Secretary of State Rogers raised the problem of private claims in informal conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs Chi P’eng-fei in Peking and that the Minister indicated that this was a matter which could be discussed by the two sides.³ It was also

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT 1 CHICOM–US. Secret; Nodis; Homer; Immediate. Drafted by Freeman and W. G. Metson, and approved by Brown, Hummel (EA), J. L. Katz (E), and Kissinger.

² In telegram 134911 to Paris, July 26, the Department instructed Watson to “seek an early appointment with Ambassador Huang to inform the PRC of a number of concrete actions the US has taken or is taking to implement the trade sections of the Shanghai Communiqué.” These actions included a Sino-American trade organization and lists of items with “the greatest potential for US–PRC trade.” It also instructed Watson to pass telegram 134912 on to the PRC representatives. (Ibid., POL CHICOM–US) In telegram 232422 to Paris, December 27, the Department informed Chargé Jack B. Kubisch of its intention of organizing the non-governmental trade council. In telegram 24970 from Paris, December 29, Kubisch reported that he had informed the PRC representatives on December 29. (Both telegrams are *ibid.*, FT CHICOM–US) Watson left post on October 30; his successor, John N. Irwin II, was not appointed until February 2, 1973.

³ Apparent reference to the February 22 meeting between Rogers and Chi. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 91, Country Files–Far East, China, Memoranda of Conversation between Secretary Rogers and PRC Officials, February 1972)

raised in the more recent “counterpart” conversations in Peking this June.⁴ We remain concerned that private claimants may attempt to attach by means of lawsuits Chinese commercial property or ships which come within the jurisdiction of US courts. We would be unable to prevent such suits despite the adverse impact that they would have on the progressive development of mutually beneficial trade between the US and China. We believe, therefore, that it is important for our two countries to begin negotiations soon to reach an equitable settlement of private claims. We propose that the two sides agree to hold meetings between expert teams to discuss these matters, either in Paris or Peking, starting September 15, 1972.

3. Scheduled air service between the two countries. One obvious way of facilitating trade might be to inaugurate scheduled air service between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Action by the US Civil Aviation Board would be necessary to determine which US airlines would be authorized to serve air routes which might be established by mutual agreement between our two countries. We would welcome an expression of the Chinese view of inauguration of reciprocal scheduled air service at an appropriate time.

4. In the talks in Peking the Chinese side raised the issue of Most Favored Nation status and the effect that the lack of it would have on the development of trade relations between our two countries. The US side has agreed that the question of Most Favored Nation status can be taken up as a matter of principle at an appropriate stage in the development of our economic relations.

5. The problem of industrial protection. We note that the People’s Republic of China is not a signatory of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Union). Nevertheless, we are prepared to facilitate Chinese registration of trademarks and patents in accordance with our laws and regulations. We would welcome reciprocal treatment for our citizens by the People’s Republic of China.⁵

Rogers

⁴ See footnote 1, Document 231.

⁵ As reported by Watson in telegram 14499 from Paris, July 28, he met with Huang on July 28 and passed along this message, along with lists of proposed trade items. “Huang listened but did not comment” on Watson’s presentation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) The PRC response was presented in a September 12 meeting between Watson and Huang in Paris. Watson reported: “Meeting was held at PRC request and strikes me as intense effort to be responsive to our proposals, moving ahead on simpler steps, such as expanding attendance at Canton Fair, while deferring for further study more complex issues.” The PRC response is in telegram 17171 from Paris, September 12; Watson’s report is telegram 17209 from Paris, September 12. (Both *ibid.*) PRC officials met with Watson on October 14 to request more detailed information on private claims against the PRC. (Telegram 19630 from Paris, October 16; *ibid.*)

243. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, July 26, 1972, 4:15–7:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

There was a brief exchange of amenities at the beginning of the conversation.

Dr. Kissinger: I have a number of items I would like to discuss with you, and Commander Howe has some answers to questions that were asked during earlier sessions. The Ambassador's English is getting so good that you get a double chance in these conversations.

Ambassador Huang: It is said that is supposed to be the advantage of an interpreter. You can bring an interpreter next time [said jokingly].²

Dr. Kissinger: It wouldn't do me any good since I still wouldn't be able to understand the Chinese.

I will discuss one major thing, but first I want to discuss items of somewhat lesser importance.

Secretary Peterson is in the Soviet Union now meeting on commercial matters. The U.S. side wants to keep the Chinese side informed of what they are doing in Moscow. In essence, there are three subjects being discussed: settlement of lend-lease; finding the Soviets eligible for credits, which depends on settlement of lend-lease; and the possibility of Most Favored Nation status. These subjects were discussed at Moscow [Summit] and therefore, in that sense, they represent nothing new.

The Soviet Union is extremely interested in a large-scale American investment in Siberia, particularly to support natural gas development. The U.S. policy is that if the lend-lease is settled we will find the Soviet Union eligible in principle for credit but reserve a determination on each individual item. Therefore we will maintain control. We will not give a flat sum. We will require individual requests. On the natural gas issue it is not our present intention to extend government credit. We will leave this to private companies.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Talking points for this meeting are *ibid*.

² All brackets are in the source text.

The U.S. is prepared—I have said this before—to put the PRC on the exact same footing as the Soviet Union. So anything we do for the Soviets, that opportunity remains for the PRC.

On the question of natural gas we constantly receive inquiries from American companies concerning drilling offshore. We want you to know that we would be willing to put you in touch with recognized operators, including some companies that are not so well known, if this is of interest. This is entirely up to you. This is all I have on the Peterson visit. Do you have any questions or comments?

Ambassador Huang: No questions.

Dr. Kissinger: Secondly, I have been asked by Senator Mansfield to intercede on his behalf concerning a possible return visit to China. He would like to leave on our election day and get there three or four days later, I guess, for an individual visit. This will give you some idea of his estimate of the outcome of the election. But I wanted you to know that we do not insist that it be matched by a Republican, and if you don't do it we would understand it.

Mrs. Shih: You said, "not insist that this visit be matched by a Republican"?

Dr. Kissinger: We believe that there are recognized reasons why he should want to go and therefore we would not insist as in the past that both political parties be represented. It might be best if discussion about Senator Mansfield is kept in this channel. He doesn't want to be embarrassed about publicity concerning his plans during this campaign.

Ambassador Huang: Well, we will convey this.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course.

Another matter concerning visits—Congressmen Boggs and Ford were very happy about their visit to China.³ I understand they have talked too much on their return. But I warned you before they left that they are not as discreet as Senators Mansfield and Scott.

With respect to Mr. Schroeder, as it turned out, I didn't see him because his visit here was canceled. I want your authorities to know that we are still going to carry out what I indicated to the Prime Minister concerning a cooperative spirit. This was mentioned in Peking. I'll see him in September and I will encourage him in the direction that the Prime Minister and I discussed.⁴

³ Congressmen Hale Boggs (D-Louisiana) and Gerald Ford (R-Michigan) visited the PRC for 10 days in late June and early July. See Document 223.

⁴ At an August 4 meeting in New York, Huang Hua read the following message to Kissinger: "First, the Chinese side appreciates Dr. Kissinger's indication of a desire to

On Vietnam matters there are three items. First, with respect to the intrusions on Chinese territory we have a number of reports and I will ask Commander Howe to go over them with you. There is one covering memorandum from the Secretary of Defense which I wanted to read to you. [Dr. Kissinger then read the sanitized memo from the Secretary of Defense at Tab A.⁵ In reading the memo, he explained that CINCPAC meant Commander in Chief Pacific and also explained that he was reading what Secretary Laird said in his report. He also noted that the attached report was from the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs since the Chairman was up in Alaska. Dr. Kissinger also noted that Commander Howe should read the follow-up report on the June 10 incident.]

This will not satisfy you but it will let you know that we will make a very serious effort to find out as well. At any rate, I believe these new measures will make it impossible for these incidents to occur. None has occurred since July 10 except one which I will mention to you in a minute.

With respect to the so-called buffer zone we do reserve the right if important military targets develop to penetrate it, without of course going into PRC territory. But we will not approach the PRC borders. Our normal procedures are not to approach PRC territory within a certain distance.

Ambassador Huang: Have you now doubled that distance?

Dr. Kissinger: It was 10 miles. Now we have gone to a greater distance.

You have not mentioned it, but I wanted to inform you about an incident which occurred on July 15. [Dr. Kissinger explained that a pilot had intruded into Hainan Island at 150006Z. He asked Commander Howe to explain what Zulu time was.]

As soon as the pilot saw land he turned and exited the area. I apologize for this incident. We are reporting it based on the new procedures.

promote contact between China and West Germany. During Mr. Schroeder's visit to China, he conducted useful talks with the Chinese side. Mr. Schroeder expressed the desire of various quarters concerned in West Germany for the establishment of diplomatic relations with China at an early date, and the Chinese side responded positively to this. As the West German government has no relations with the Chiang Kai-shek clique, it is possible for China to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany." The memorandum of conversation, August 4, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 148. Schroeder was in the PRC July 14–28. West Germany and the PRC announced the establishment of diplomatic relations during a visit to China by Foreign Minister Walter Scheel October 10–14, 1972.

⁵ Attached but not printed is Laird's July 16 memorandum. He noted: "The alleged incidents have been investigated by CINCPAC and the component commanders. As in previous cases, no evidence has been found so far to support either allegation [June 20 bombing of a PRC fishing vessel and July 5 violation of PRC airspace]." See *ibid.*, Document 149.

It was not a military plane, or I mean not a combat plane. It was a tanker.

We have a difficulty about your ships off Vietnam which we wanted to mention to you. We have given strict orders not to damage your ships but, as you know, we are going to attempt to prevent the transfer of their cargoes. There have been four incidents in the last month where your ships fired their weapons at our planes without being attacked. Your ships apparently have machine guns. I can show you pictures. It does make it difficult for us not to respond if our planes are shot at. Commander Howe will give you details of the firings and the times.

With respect to a recent article carried by NCNA commenting on the bombing of dikes, I understand you are under certain necessities to support your ally publicly, but I want your government to understand it is not our policy. If it was our policy the damage would be much more extensive. We do not exclude that occasionally a bomb has hit a dike. We think that probably has happened but no dike has been breached by American bombs and it is not our policy to bomb dikes. We can survive occasional press attacks, but I wanted you to be aware of the facts in making your judgment. I wanted you to know what the facts were; for your own information I wanted you to know the facts. (This sentence was in answer to the interpreter's request for a clarification of the last phrase of the previous sentence.)

I have two other points. One concerns Korea. For many reasons we prefer to avoid a Korean debate in this year's General Assembly. We do not think it is helpful to have a direct confrontation between our two countries if it can be avoided, particularly if your eloquent Vice Foreign Minister comes to head your delegation to the General Assembly, [The Ambassador smiles] although Mr. Bush's boiling point is higher than that of Mr. Malik.

Secondly, we want the negotiations between North and South Korea, which we believe are a good result of our relationship, to have a good opportunity to develop.

Ambassador Huang: Do you mean our bilateral relations?

Dr. Kissinger: I think that relations between Peking and Washington helped start negotiations between Pyongyang and Seoul.

Thirdly, I wanted to tell you if we avoided a debate in the UN this time we would use our influence to bring about a dismantling of UNCURK. This would have to be an understanding.

How is the senior Vice Foreign Minister? He and I spent many nights together. If he comes you and he will have to come to a dinner with me [Ambassador Huang smiles]. He has already agreed.

Ambassador Huang: Well, as to whether our Foreign Minister comes, we haven't received any instructions. If he comes he will be very glad to meet you.

Dr. Kissinger: Our two ambassadors will talk in Paris. They can discuss these other issues. [To Commander Howe:] I don't see what we can contribute here on this. (Referring to suggested item on trade and exchanges.)⁶

One other matter concerns our relations with the Soviet Union. I want to discuss it on a particularly confidential basis. You are the only government with which we have discussed it and in our government only the President and I and my close associates know about it. You remember, I believe, it was you I told that the Soviet Union proposed to us a nuclear non-aggression treaty. This is a treaty containing an obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the other. We avoided this with the argument that it did not cover other countries and did not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons by super-powers against other countries. They have now made a new proposal to us on a very confidential basis, so we must again point that out. Now it has a provision—actually three major provisions—the rest is technical:

—The first is that the U.S. and the Soviet Union will not use nuclear weapons against each other.

—If others use nuclear weapons the U.S. and the Soviet Union should avoid using them against each other.

—Third, that this treaty does not affect existing alliance obligations of the Soviet Union and the U.S. In other words, nuclear weapons can be used in defense of allies.

When this was presented to me, I asked the Soviet Ambassador if we attacked India would it bar the Soviet Union from using nuclear weapons in defense of India. He said yes. We obviously have no intention of attacking India. I was only raising a hypothetical point. The Soviet interpretation is that if a super-power attacks a third country not covered by the treaty, others can't use nuclear weapons in defense of the country not covered by the treaty.

Ambassador Huang: What you said was that if the U.S. attacks India the Soviet Union will not use nuclear weapons because India is not covered by a treaty of alliance.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right, it is not covered by a treaty of alliance.

Ambassador Huang: What is the U.S. attitude?

Dr. Kissinger: First, as I have told you, you know of course what I was really saying, India is of no strategic value to us. In case of an attack on the PRC we want to reserve our freedom of action, not because we have an obligation but because we are convinced that international peace requires it. We will not accept the distinction between countries covered by the treaty and countries not. We will not have

⁶ See Document 242.

two different categories of military conflict. We are looking for a formulation that expresses nuclear non-use as an objective rather than as an obligation. We would appreciate having your reactions before we reply to the Soviets.

Ambassador Huang: We will report this back.⁷

I have another question. Is it the U.S. intention to extend the treaty to include other nuclear powers?

Dr. Kissinger: So far we have not agreed there would be a treaty at all. We would like to have it in a form that would include other powers.

Ambassador Huang: Is that all about this question?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. That is all about this.

Ambassador Huang: I ask you this because this involves disarmament at the 27th General Assembly. These two items remain on the agenda for the 27th General Assembly. It seems that the Soviet side is ready to fix a date and set up a preparatory organ. We don't agree to such a proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: What forum are you talking about?

Ambassador Huang: The World Disarmament Conference proposed by the Soviet Union.⁸

Dr. Kissinger: We are in no hurry.

Ambassador Huang: How would the U.S. deal with the question in the General Assembly?

Dr. Kissinger: We will treat it in a most dilatory fashion. We will do our best to prevent any concrete results without opposing it directly. This is our general strategy, but I have not looked into our tactics. Our

⁷ At their August 4 meeting in New York, Huang Hua read the following message to Kissinger: "First, the Chinese side considers the Soviet proposal to be nakedly aimed at the establishment of nuclear world hegemony. Secondly, the Soviet proposal only stipulates that the Soviet Union and the United States should not use nuclear weapons against each other or allies. This is obviously an attempt, following the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to go a step further and monopolize nuclear weapons, maintaining nuclear superiority and make nuclear threats against countries with few nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapons, and countries in which the production of nuclear weapons is barred, and force them into spheres of influence of either this or that hegemony so that the two hegemonies may have a free hand in dividing up the world and manipulating the destinies of countries of the world at will." Other points in the message emphasized that U.S. acceptance of the Soviet proposal would violate the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué and that the problem of nuclear weapons could only be solved through an agreement to ban the use of such weapons. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 148.

⁸ For information on the non-use of force and permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons and the World Disarmament Conference, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972*, vol. 26 (New York: Office of Public Information, 1975), pp. 1–20; and *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume V.

general policy is not to participate in any move to isolate you and to avoid disagreements with you if possible. It really depends on how many empty cannons the Vice Foreign Minister has. This is all I have. Do you have anything for me?

Ambassador Huang: I appreciate what you have told me and I will put it to my government. I suppose you know our stand on the question of Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We are talking about this.

Ambassador Huang: We welcome the new developments in Korea. We consider it a good beginning. The Korean side hopes the UN will create favorable conditions for an independent Korea. That is why we participate in inscription as a co-sponsor of the item on the agenda for the General Assembly. After such a long time since the armistice the UN ought to terminate the role of intervention in Korea. The presence of UNCURK in Korea is increasingly an irony of the UN. If the UN can extract itself from this embarrassment it will be favorable overall.

Dr. Kissinger: But not necessarily in 1972, from our point of view.⁹

Ambassador Huang: I have exchanged views with Ambassador Bush on this question.

Dr. Kissinger: Did Ambassador Bush initiate this?

Ambassador Huang: We had a general discussion of the agenda of the 27th session. We touched upon this question.

Dr. Kissinger: What did you conclude?

Ambassador Huang: Ambassador Bush said we could discuss this at a later period.

Dr. Kissinger: That's what he is supposed to do. I am glad we have one ambassador who carries out his instructions. You don't have this problem.

I left Washington early this morning and I have not seen the Ambassador's report. [Turning to Commander Howe]: Have you seen it?

Commander Howe: Yes. I have a copy.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me see it. [Dr. Kissinger then read the reporting cable to himself.]¹⁰

I hope you will consider this question—you probably know, in fact I know you do, that I met with the North Vietnamese last week and will meet with them next week. I am sure they will keep you informed, but if the Prime Minister has any questions on the negotiations we will

⁹ At their August 4 meeting in New York, Huang Hua informed Kissinger that "we hope the U.S. side will reconsider its idea of postponing discussion of the Korea question until the 28th Session of the United Nations General Assembly."

¹⁰ Not found.

be happy to answer them for you.

Ambassador Huang: Do you have anything to convey to the Prime Minister?

Dr. Kissinger: We are approaching the negotiations with an attitude to bring an end to the war. We have taken seriously many of the things the Prime Minister said to us in Peking. We will make some proposals, including political proposals, but we have not yet gotten them in final form.¹¹

Ambassador Huang: Is there any progress?

Dr. Kissinger: I thought I detected some Chinese advice as to the method of proceeding. Their behavior this time was much more polite than at any previous period [said lightly]. Their initial discussions were substantially procedural. We took the first step toward negotiations. The two positions were laid side by side and explained, and so it could be said we made procedural progress. This had never been done before. We will know in two more meetings; I will be able to tell better then how it will go.

[Mr. Kissinger then excused himself and asked Commander Howe to go over the additional information. Mr. Kissinger remarked that the Ambassador would be having some very interesting newspaper reading over the next three months and the Ambassador responded that he had had some interesting evenings recently watching television.]

Commander Howe then proceeded to review the following documents:

—Sanitized version of the July 12 report of the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense concerning allegations contained in the Chinese note of July 10, 1972 (Tab B).¹²

—Secretary of Defense's covering memo and follow-up report from the Chairman, JCS, to the Secretary of Defense, concerning the June 10, 1972 bombing incident (Tab C).¹³

Commander Howe reiterated what Dr. Kissinger had said, that the Chinese might not be entirely satisfied with the findings and noted that Dr. Kissinger had directed that further investigation be made into the June 10 incident as a result of the report. In reading portions of the re-

¹¹ At their August 4 meeting in New York, Kissinger provided Huang Hua with a 12-point proposal from the United States to the DRV and a 12-page opening statement for talks in Paris. Copies were attached to the August 4 memorandum of conversation. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 152.

¹² Attached but not printed. A complete set of PRC protests and DOD responses from mid-1972 is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, China, PRC Allegations of Hostile Acts (ca. 1972). See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 153.

¹³ Attached but not printed. See *ibid.*

ports, Commander Howe explained some of the military terms and clarified that these were reports to the Secretary of Defense from the military commanders.

—Detailed information on the four incidents in which Chinese ships fired at U.S. aircraft (Tab D).¹⁴ [Commander Howe omitted any reference to the fact that no damage was caused to U.S. aircraft.]

Around 7:15 the meeting concluded and Commander Howe apologized for the length of the session, but indicated that each of the very detailed explanations in the reports was relevant to those investigating the incidents.

¹⁴ Attached but not printed. See *ibid.* Murphy provided this information to Kissinger in a July 13 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. V)

244. Memorandum of Conversation¹

I-26378/72

Washington, August 10, 1972, 12:20–12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Call by Ambassador Shen, Republic of China, on the Secretary of Defense

PARTICIPANTS

Republic of China Side

James Shen, ROC Ambassador to the United States
S. K. Hu, Minister, Special Assistant to the Ambassador
MGen Pat Wen, Head of the GRC Purchasing Commission

United States Side

Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense
G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Dennis J. Doolin, DepAsst Secretary of Defense (EAPA)

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 330 75 0125, China, Rep. of., 1972, 333. Secret. The meeting was held in Laird's office at the Pentagon. Prepared by Doolin and approved by Nutter on August 15.

Letter from MND

Ambassador Shen handed Secretary Laird a letter from the Minister of National Defense Ch'en Ta-ch'ing.² After reading the letter the Secretary stated that it covered the items that he had discussed recently with the Chief of the General Staff, adding that most of these items are moving forward.³ The Secretary said that he hopes we won't have to make our military assistance allocations by country this year. He complimented the Ambassador on the ROC's utilization of LS&E and said we had been able to make some very good transfers via this program.

The Chinese Air Force (CAF)

The Ambassador expressed great concern over the state of the CAF, adding that the GRC was "hoping against hope" for F4Ds. He noted that his government would like to see F5Es co-produced on Taiwan. Mr. Nutter noted that we have enough F5E sales to keep the program going for quite a while. The Secretary added that Iran has placed a big order, and both Holland and Saudi Arabia are also interested in the aircraft. The Ambassador inquired whether the F5Es can be made available under MAP in toto. The Secretary replied that the funds currently available do not permit this and that if the F5Es are to move rapidly and in any large numbers, the matter must be handled as a FMS case. He noted that the level of funding granted by Congress has meant that the MAP program for Taiwan is almost all eaten up by O&M costs. The Ambassador said that the operational readiness rate of the ROC armed forces is reduced due to the large amounts of new equipment being produced in the PRC. The

² The July 14 letter from Ch'en requested a wide array of military equipment. He asked that the CAF's 13-year-old F-100As and 10-year old F-5As be replaced by F-5Bs and F-5Es, either purchased from the United States or coproduced in Taiwan. For the navy, Ch'en requested replacement destroyers and two submarines with surface-to-air missiles. He also asked to replace the army's World War II and Korean War era equipment with 415 M-48 tanks, 152 M-42 40 mm. self-propelled automatic weapons, 48 TOW missiles, and 272 Red Eye missiles. Finally he added that the ROC hoped to use MAP support to upgrade its communication and ECM capabilities. (National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Pol 17(c), Ambassador Shen's Calls on White House and State Officials) According to an August 28 memorandum from Moser to Green, the Department of Defense reply "(1) congratulates Ch'en on his new office; (2) states that the Secretary of Defense is in favor of doing what is possible to maintain the present defense posture of the ROC; and (3) reminds the ROC that U.S. support will also be limited by the fiscal restraints of available resources." (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, POL CHINAT-US)

³ No record of this discussion has been found. In telegram 2599 from Taipei, May 26, McConaughy reported: "CHMAAG has received written request dated 15 May from Chief of General Staff Lai Ming-ting for grant MAP assistance to coproduce 45 F-5Bs and 100 F-5Es in Taiwan." McConaughy noted that although staff at the Embassy could evaluate the ROC's ability to undertake coproduction, they could not judge "potential congressional reaction" to the ROC proposal, which was "to some extent competing with US domestic industry." He added: "we doubt very much that they expect full grant coverage and assume that they have in mind FMS support." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Secret Files: FRC 330 77 0094, China (Nats), 400.137-800, 1972)

Secretary acknowledged that aircraft production on the mainland is proceeding very rapidly but pointed out that the Foxbat is not a good attack aircraft but more a recon vehicle like the SR-71. He noted that the Foxbat cannot be used as justification for production of F-15s as our present aircraft can handle the Foxbat. The F-15 has to be ready to deal with an even more capable enemy aircraft in the 1980 time-frame.

GOJ/PRC Relations

The Secretary asked for the Ambassador's views as to the current state of GOJ/PRC relations. Ambassador Shen said that Mr. Tanaka will not listen to the GRC and the GOJ is moving "too fast for our comfort." He noted that the GOJ has said that the timing on this question must be left to Tokyo. He said that Chou En-lai has been very astute in extending an invitation to Tanaka to visit Peking and that the meeting will probably take place after Tanaka's meeting in Honolulu with President Nixon.

F5E Funding and MAP

Ambassador Shen returned to the question of the F5E, asking again whether there was any other way to handle the purchase than as a FMS case. Mr. Laird said that there was not because the GRC is presently using almost all of the MAP just to maintain its present capability. When the visitors mentioned the size of our program for Korea, the Secretary responded that we cannot reduce the five-year program just because talks are going on; that would be the best way to work against the negotiated settlement in Korea. Talks do not necessarily mean agreement, the Secretary noted, and said that this is not the time to back away from any of our programs including our program for the ROC. He urged Ambassador Shen to compare our present assistance to the ROC with our assistance during the 1965–68 timeframe and not the 1953–1960 period. Ambassador Shen said that he was glad to hear the Air Force briefing team on the F5E will be coming to Taiwan in September.⁴ The Secretary said the reason for the visit is to provide the GRC with as much information as possible. The meeting concluded with a final request from the Ambassador that we continue to explore alternative ways to fund purchase of the F5E aircraft.

⁴ In a July 19 memorandum to Kissinger, Laird requested permission to send a "USAF team to the Republic of China to discuss F-5E performance data and production thresholds." He noted that the Department of State concurred with this visit. In an August 7 memorandum to Kissinger, sent through Haig, Holdridge summarized the ROC's military equipment requests. He noted that the problem was not whether to provide the aircraft to the ROC, but the "financing, phasing, and public affairs treatment of the transfer of F-5E's, primarily in order to minimize the political costs to our evolving relationship with Peking." Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: "Don't refer to July 19 request, just do it blankly." He also noted: "I phoned approval to Col. T. L. Ridge, DOD/ISA/EAPR on 8/28/72. HAK" Both memoranda are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI.

245. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) and the Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 10, 1972.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the International Financial Institutions

In your memorandum of July 11, 1972,² you advised us that the United States Government could support Mr. McNamara's proposal to convene, prior to the annual meetings (September 25–29), an ad hoc committee to study the Chinese representation question in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. U.S. support was subject to the provisos that Mr. McNamara's preliminary inquiries indicate key country support for the proposal, and that Mr. Schweitzer³ concur as well. Because he was unable to obtain support from several key countries, Mr. McNamara decided not to take this initiative.

At this point, there is general agreement among the ROC, Bank and Fund managements, Executive Directors of several key countries, and ourselves, that any further pre-emptive action with respect to the China question before the annual meetings is inadvisable. Our attention, therefore, is focused on possible responses to the tabling of a resolution at the annual meetings which would have the effect of expelling the Republic of China (ROC). We do not have any further information that such a challenge will in fact be made, but the general consensus remains that it is a possibility. However, contacts with Executive Directors of key member countries, as well as responses from our Embassies on continued contacts in capitals, indicate the strong desire among the major developed countries and several lesser developed countries to avoid any debate or vote on the China question at the annual meetings.

In light of this background, Mr. McNamara currently believes that the best way to avoid a substantive vote on China representation would be to respond to any challenge resolution at the annual meetings with a proposal to establish a committee to study the problem. The committee would be given a general mandate to study legal and financial implications of the question, with its report scheduled for late spring of 1973.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Secret.

² See footnote 5, Document 237.

³ Pierre Paul Schweitzer, former Deputy Governor of the Banque de France, was Managing Director and Chairman of the Executive Board of the IMF from 1963 to 1973.

The committee could conclude that the status quo should remain unchanged in the absence of an expressed PRC intention to assume the obligations of Fund and/or Bank membership. The committee could also reach conclusions about the financial implications of the problem, which avoid the representation issue and permit the ROC to continue its participation in the Fund and the Bank. The committee could also conclude that the Bank and the Fund have been dealing with a member which in effect is a currency area in which the New Taiwan dollar is the legal tender, and that this member should continue to participate in the Fund and the Bank. Ideally, under any of the foregoing possibilities, the report of the committee would be presented in a way which would not require any vote. It is, of course, also possible that the committee will be pressured to expel the ROC, which is why its composition is crucial and a low key report desirable. In any event, formation of a committee would buy time.

The study committee proposal is favored by the ROC. Several Executive Directors, including the French, Belgian, British, Canadian and New Zealand, have initially responded favorably to the idea of forming a study committee, but need to check with their capitals to confirm their reactions. The German ED indicated that his Governor would probably abstain if the study proposal were put to a vote. The Japanese ED personally is inclined to favor the idea, but doubts whether a decision will be forthcoming at this time from the new government. In the next few weeks, we hope to have a clearer picture of the degree of support for this idea.

We understand that Mr. McNamara is currently concentrating on a strategy whereby the study committee would be created by a resolution which would be offered immediately after submission of an exclusion resolution. This resolution could take the form of an amendment to the exclusion resolution or it could be presented as a separate resolution coupled with a motion for priority in voting. Assuming majority support for this resolution, we would not anticipate a serious procedural problem over such issues as voting priority.

We intend to support this strategy.

We are also considering other strategies which could result in the creation of a study committee without public debate or a vote on the question. One such strategy would have the Chairman of the annual meetings, Mr. Ali Wardhana of Indonesia, rule, provided there was no objection from the floor, that the complexity of the representation question requires it to be submitted to a study committee. Alternatively, he could refer the matter to the Joint Procedures Committee, which might then recommend creation of a study committee. The Chairman would then attempt to have the Committee's report accepted without objection. Of course, a PRC supporter could challenge either the ruling of

the Chairman or the report of the Procedures Committee, and thus precipitate a vote on the question.

Although it is possible that circumstances may change by the time of the annual meetings, our soundings lead us to believe currently that an alternative form of counter-resolution, proposing that the question be shelved until the PRC expresses an intention to assume the obligations of membership, would have significantly less chance of success than the study committee proposal.

Against this background, we intend to take the following specific actions in the coming weeks before the annual meetings:

1. We will maintain close contact with Mr. McNamara and Mr. Schweitzer to learn the results of their further discussions with Executive Directors.

2. We will follow on our already established contacts in key capitals to ascertain the exact degree of support of these governments for the various proposals.

3. We will approach Chairman Wardhana to explore his own feelings and discuss procedural tactics.

4. In the event a counter-resolution is required, we would prepare for this and, if necessary, the U.S. would offer it, although we would support Mr. McNamara's efforts to get a "neutral" country to take on this task.

5. Assuming success in forming a committee, we would be prepared in advance to deal with the question of its composition.

We will continue to keep you apprised of the situation as it develops.⁴

U. Alexis Johnson
Paul A. Volcker

⁴ Froebe prepared an action memorandum on this issue for Kissinger on August 31, which included a memorandum to the President for Kissinger's signature. Apparently the memorandum was not forwarded to Nixon. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI) The attached NSC Correspondence Profile sheet contains the notation: "No further action necessary," dated September 21. On October 19 Rogers wrote to the President that "To the surprise of many observers, no challenge was raised to the Republic of China at the World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings on September 25–29." Rogers noted that they had persuaded the ROC to "lower its profile in the World Bank and IMF." He added that the Department of State had contacted key member governments and obtained support for a counter-resolution to refer the China issue to the Executive Directors. He concluded: "Knowledge of our strength may have discouraged Peking and its friends from raising the issue." (Ibid.) In an October 25 memorandum to Davis, Hormats noted that the President was already aware of these facts through other memoranda, and that the Rogers memorandum need not be forwarded to him. (Ibid.)

246. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, August 21, 1972, 6:05–6:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Mr. Kuo, Notetaker

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, you are getting no vacation at all.
Ambassador Huang: It will come after the summer.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to have you tired for the General Assembly. Your Delegation has not been selected yet?

Ambassador Huang: It has not yet been finally decided.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to see you because I am going away tomorrow, and I have a number of items. They are not of world-shaking importance. Since I won't be able to see you for several weeks, I wanted to bring you up to date. I am going to Miami tomorrow; from there to San Clemente and from there to Hawaii for the meeting with the Japanese; and I will be back in Washington on September 4. All of your other contacts will be either on leave or with me in San Clemente. If you have any message to deliver, you should call the White House operator; that is connected with me in San Clemente. Mr. Lord and Mr. Rodman will be with me there. We will then arrange to pick up any message. We will send somebody up from Washington, and we have very good communications. So you do not have to hold up the delivery of any message.

So much on the technical side. I wanted to tell you about my Japanese visit and where we stand on this proposal with the Soviet Union. Before that I want to tell you something else.

When we were in Moscow for the Summit, it was agreed between the President and the Soviet leadership that some months after the Summit I would go back there for a general review of the situation, just as I did in Peking. The Soviets have been urging this meeting, and we have now accepted it for the period September 10 through 13. We will make this announcement on September 5. (He hands over the text

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

of the draft announcement at Tab A.)² And we agreed on this only today. No other government knows about this, and therefore we ask you to treat this with your customary discretion.

There will not be any significant decisions taken there. We will have some further discussions on economic problems, on preparations for the European Security Conference, and we will probably delay our answer to this nuclear treaty proposal until then.

Ambassador Huang: When you are in Moscow you will give them a reply?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we will tell you ahead of time. I will plan to see you either on September 5 or 6 before I leave. And I will give you a detailed agenda of what we plan to discuss. It is not worked out yet, but we do not foresee any new major departures. We will do as in the past, and I don't think you have ever had any surprises on our dealings with the Soviet Union.

With respect to the nuclear treaty, we gave you the text last time.³ I can tell you that we cannot accept a treaty and cannot accept a reciprocal obligation not to use nuclear weapons or anything that defines specific obligations for the nuclear superpowers. What are we exploring, within our own government, is whether we can find a general formula which constitutes what you told me about the general abstention by all countries from using nuclear weapons. But we have not made a decision, and we will show you our specific answer before we deliver it. But it will not be in treaty form. (Ambassador Huang taps his hands on his knee.) I can assure you now there will be no treaty and no reciprocal obligation.

Now with respect to my trip to Japan. As you will find out when you deal with the Japanese seriously, you will read everything in the newspapers, including things you did not say. (Ambassador Huang smiles.) So I wanted to tell you what our attitude is, and what I told them.

² Attached but not printed is a note entitled "Visit of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to Moscow," which reads in its entirety: "In accordance with a previous agreement, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs, will visit the Soviet Union between September 10 to 13 for an exchange of opinions on matters of mutual interest to the Soviet Union and the United States."

³ On August 14 Howe traveled to New York to deliver the following message to Huang Hua: "1. The U.S. side has considered carefully the Chinese comments, conveyed on August 4, 1972, concerning the Soviet proposal for an agreement on nuclear weapons. Enclosed for the confidential information of the Chinese side is a copy of the text of the recent Soviet proposal. The U.S. side will not accept this proposal. It will fully inform the Chinese side of the U.S. response which will certainly reflect all the considerations raised by the Chinese." Attached to this was a draft treaty on the "non-use of nuclear weapons." The note also discussed Kissinger's forthcoming trip to Saigon and Tokyo. (Memorandum of conversation and message for the PRC, August 14; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's Files—China Trip, China Exchanges) At this meeting Ambassador Huang Hua read a statement on Sino-German relations, Sino-Japanese relations, and the Soviet-American nuclear treaty. (Ibid.) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 151.

First—I did not tell this to them, but I wanted you to know—we appreciated the Prime Minister’s message to us with respect to U.S.–Japanese relations. Based on this, we told them that we had no objection to an early visit by the Japanese Prime Minister to Peking at a time which is mutually convenient to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government. Specifically, we have no objection to their visiting Peking during the American election period. There is some advantage in their beginning to talk simultaneously, or before they start talking to the Soviet Union about their peace treaty.

The other subject discussed concerns bilateral U.S.–Japanese relations in the economic field and are of no direct relevance to your relationship with us.

On my way to Russia, I will stop in Munich and on September 8 or 9 I will meet with Chancellor Brandt and also with the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, Barzel. I will talk to both of them in the sense I previously indicated to you.

As a subsidiary issue, when I was in Peking I was asked about the listing of the Shanghai earth station and the Taipei station in the Intelsat directory. We have now arranged it so that next time the directory appears it will be listed as you requested. But we have to do this indirectly, and we will not tell it to the Ambassador from Taiwan until a few days before it happens. So it might be useful if you made no further formal efforts until we have it accomplished.

Ambassador Huang: At what time will this take place?

Dr. Kissinger: I will let you know. I will have Mr. Lord call you, just to say the time period is two months, one month, or whatever. My recollection is that they appear every two months, but I may be wrong. But it is not a long time anyway.

One word about my Paris meeting, simply for the information of the Prime Minister without any request for action. The North Vietnamese have made a ten point proposal to us now of which we have accepted nine in principle, and we are trying to find a formulation for the political proposal which would cover neutral ground between our two positions. They are in the position that they would like to present the impression of stalemate in order to maximize pressure on us at home. They would like to make progress in private meetings and continue to lacerate us in public meetings. (Ambassador Huang smiles.)

I am sure you will understand that there is a limitation beyond which this cannot go. And the great danger is that they will once again miss the opportunity for a favorable settlement. After we have presented our new proposal, we will let you have it for your information. But I wanted the Prime Minister to know that we are very serious about finding a solution on a just basis.

The only other item I have concerns Senator Mansfield. You remember I mentioned to you some weeks ago his desire to come to China again. Can he submit a formal letter or how should we handle it? (Pause.) Perhaps you can let me know about this.

Ambassador Huang: We haven't gotten any reply from our government yet.

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps you could . . .⁴

Ambassador Huang: So he still intends to leave on election day? That is what you told us last time.

Dr. Kissinger: If you make the condition that he can come only if he votes Republican or doesn't vote at all. (Laughter.) But I don't think we need his vote. (Laughter.)

Ambassador Huang: I won't interfere in your internal affairs.

Dr. Kissinger: I wish your allies to the south of you adopted the same policy.

These are all the items that I have.

Ambassador Huang: Well about Mr. Mansfield's visit to China, we will make some inquiries. How do we communicate the answer to you?

Dr. Kissinger: Then we will send somebody here. He will only be authorized to receive messages. He will not be able to discuss them with you.

Ambassador Huang: Well, you have talked about the treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on the non-use of nuclear weapons, and you mentioned that you would not accept to sign the treaty; neither would you accept a reciprocal obligation on nuclear weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: Nor will we sign a treaty on any formulation.

Ambassador Huang: You talked about the non-use of nuclear weapons, but you didn't mention in your formulation your attitude toward other questions, such as non-nuclear countries and non-nuclear zones.

Dr. Kissinger: The only thing . . . We are against the use of nuclear weapons by nuclear countries against non-nuclear countries. We will not make an agreement with the Soviet Union to establish non-nuclear zones. In any event, I will not make any agreements in Moscow. I will come back here, and we will have a chance to discuss them. But our intention is to make a negative answer in a non-insulting form.

Mrs. Shih: What?

Dr. Kissinger: In a form that is not offending, and to turn it into something quite different. (Ambassador Huang and Mrs. Shih discuss in Chinese.)

⁴ All ellipses are in the source text.

Ambassador Huang: Do you have a suggestion in what channel we should discuss the visit of Senator Mansfield—at Paris or elsewhere?

Dr. Kissinger: If you let me know in principle what your reaction is, then perhaps we should let him write a letter to Paris. But it would be better not to let him write a letter unless we know the answer will be positive.

Ambassador Huang: Yes. I understand this.

Dr. Kissinger: To get back to the nuclear treaty for a minute. Our approach is not to make it significant, but to make it insignificant. And not to express a specific position for two countries, but to speak of a general set of principles for all countries—if we can find [a formulation] at all.⁵ Nor will we move with extraordinary speed. And we will show you once we have agreed among ourselves, once we have developed an answer, we will discuss it with you. But now there is not much that will happen until September 10, and then there will only be a general discussion.

Ambassador Huang: Today I don't have any message to convey to you. I will immediately convey what you said to the Prime Minister.

Dr. Kissinger: I will see you either on September 5 or 6, and then again within a day or two of my return from Moscow. And you will remember that this trip is not going to be announced until September 5.

Ambassador Huang: Yesterday we received a call from General Haig concerning the press story in Miami.⁶ What was the news?

Dr. Kissinger: Secretary Rogers delivered himself of various opinions on the Vietnamese war, one of which was that he thought the Chinese Government also favored a negotiated settlement. Normally, when one says a statement is not authorized, it is not believed. We wanted you to know that we were surprised by the statement, and it won't be repeated.

Ambassador Huang: It was not authorized?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Sometimes our people get carried away with enthusiasm, which is not true for your foreign service. We have no intention of embarrassing you. At any rate it will not happen again. The press didn't cover it widely. I didn't see it in any newspapers. (To Mr. Kuo): Did you see it in the papers?

⁵ Brackets in the source text.

⁶ Reference is to statements by Rogers (originally reported in the *Miami Herald*) that both the PRC and Soviet Union favored a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. The White House quickly disavowed Rogers' prediction of a rapid settlement with Chinese or Soviet backing. See Hedley Burrell, "Rogers Predicts Peace Near Election," *Washington Post*, August 21, 1972, p. 1, 20.

Mr. Kuo: Yes, I saw it in the *Washington Post*. Also the *Christian Science Monitor*. There was no *New York Times* today. They are on strike.

Dr. Kissinger: I read the morning paper in the evening. I have a special perspective, that is only to find out which of my associates have leaked what to the press. (Laughter.)

(The meeting then broke up. Mr. Lord gave Mrs. Shih the White House switchboard number and explained the procedure; she confirmed that she already had this White House number. Mr. Lord also gave her a copy of a letter from Bob Hope to the PRC Ambassador in Ottawa, Canada, asking for assistance in filming scenes of China for television shows. Mr. Lord explained that this was not an official government request, but only a courtesy. The U.S. Government did not take a position on the matter, but would appreciate Mr. Hope's receiving a personal reply.)⁷

⁷ Attached but not printed is an August 17 note from American entertainer Bob Hope to Kissinger, to which Hope attached a letter intended for the PRC Ambassador in Canada.

247. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Key Biscayne, Florida, August 24, 1972, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Shen
Henry A. Kissinger
R. P. Campbell (Notetaker)

Ambassador Shen: I understand that you have very little time so I will be brief. What happened in Tokyo?²

Dr. Kissinger: Not much happened. They talked about the arrangements for the President's trip. They were not eager to tell me what they are going to do.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 30.

² Documentation on Kissinger's conversations in Japan is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIX.

Ambassador Shen: Did you talk about us?

Dr. Kissinger: Obviously, they are going to sever relationships with you but it is not yet clear whether they are going to modify the security treaty.³

Ambassador Shen: With you?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they would risk their whole relationship with us if they do it. We told them we would stand by what we told them last year.

Ambassador Shen: Did they want to change the security treaty?

Dr. Kissinger: They wanted to set up a confrontation with us. I won't give them the satisfaction. The talks will continue between the President and Tanaka.

Ambassador Shen: Will the President talk again on the matter?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, absolutely.

Ambassador Shen: Even within the ruling party itself there is some controversy over whether to sever relations with them.

Dr. Kissinger: In June, they said that they would not sever relations without our approval but it is obvious they are going ahead.

Ambassador Shen: They are going to sever relations anyway?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Shen: You can do nothing?

Dr. Kissinger: No, but they want to keep commercial ties open.

Ambassador Shen: Yes, they want to have their cake and eat it too. The balance of trade has always been in their favor.

Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn't break off trade relations. You will have done everything if you do.

Ambassador Shen: What was the atmosphere?

³ ROC leaders had also expressed opposition to Japan's possible recognition of the PRC through Ray Cline, former CIA Station Chief in Taipei and Director of INR since 1969. On August 9 Cline forwarded to Holdridge an August 1 letter from Chiang Ching-kuo detailing concerns over Japanese policy. Holdridge then summarized the letter for Kissinger on August 11, noting the ROC's fears that "Japanese recognition of the PRC would set off a chain reaction in which other Asian nations would follow suit. This would result in an acceleration of PRC infiltration and subversion in Asia. The basic consequence would be to destabilize the situation in Asia—precisely the opposite of what Tokyo is claiming its move would have. The ROC's more basic concern, of course, is that Tokyo's recognition of Peking could lead not only to a quickening of Taipei's diplomatic isolation, but also to a contraction of its economic ties to Asia as well." Chiang's letter and Holdridge's memorandum are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Chiang Ching-kuo sent an August 7 letter to Nixon, reiterating these concerns. (Ibid.)

Dr. Kissinger: I think we are partly responsible because of last year.

Ambassador Shen: Recently a representative of our state traveled to Southeast Asia and found that it would be the beginning of an unraveling of relations if they break relations with us.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not unreasonable.

Ambassador Shen: Is there anything you can do?

Dr. Kissinger: I talked with Tanaka. You know the Japanese, they do everything in extremes. We can't stop them from recognizing the PRC, but maybe we can stop them from turning against you.

Ambassador Shen: Is there anything Asian countries can do?

Dr. Kissinger: I'll have to check that. Those countries your Minister has visited we would be in favor of. I told the Vietnamese "don't give up old friends." They can't afford to do that. I've not talked to Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines or Korea.

[Ambassador Shen called after the meeting asking that Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia be added to the list of countries to be contacted.]⁴

Ambassador Shen: It will be a serious thing for us and a very emotional issue for us.

Dr. Kissinger: This has been one of the most brutal things I have seen. I understand the political maneuvering. In the next five years Mao and Chou will die. We must be prepared to carry on at that time.

Ambassador Shen: How much of this is out of spite to show their independence from your government?

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, very little.

Ambassador Shen: The President will talk more on this?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Shen: Will it stop them?

Dr. Kissinger: I doubt it.

Ambassador Shen: Two weeks ago I was instructed to see the President. You were away and I found that it did not get to the President until just last week.⁵

Dr. Kissinger: The President was at Camp David and was not seeing anyone, not even Cabinet members.

⁴ All brackets are in the source text.

⁵ In an August 11 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge noted that Shen had requested a meeting with the President. Holdridge concluded that "I believe that it is important for the President to receive Shen in order to reassure his Government that we understand their concerns on this score." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI) Shen did not meet with the President.

Ambassador Shen: What do I tell my government?

Dr. Kissinger: It was not a reflexion on your government. He was not using anger. He never sees Ambassadors. In fact, he sees you far more than any other.

Ambassador Shen: Yes, I know.

Dr. Kissinger: He will see you the week of Labor Day after his return.⁶

Ambassador Shen: You would advise continuing trade relations?

Dr. Kissinger: I would be tough now. I think the Japanese would like to get in on domestic Taipei economics. I would not ruin that thought.

Ambassador Shen: You advise us to be as tough as we can?

Dr. Kissinger: Before they announce.

Ambassador Shen: Why?

Dr. Kissinger: You want to be in the best bargaining position at the announcement. Until then, I would be tough.

Ambassador Shen: This will be tough.

Dr. Kissinger: You have been Ambassador here for some time and it is a tragedy that you have been so mistreated.

Ambassador Shen: Some of our friends have said that we should become an independent state.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think you should do that. After the election, things will change. That would cause a massive problem here. I would wait. The PRC may change their position. There may be a Sino–Soviet war. I'm just talking history now. This is just between you and me.

Ambassador Shen: We are always quiet. We have never leaked anything. Even when things are the roughest, we are quiet.

Dr. Kissinger: You have always been reliable.

Ambassador Shen: Even when DeGaulle was here, we never exchanged harsh words with them.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, we will do what we can in Hawaii.

Ambassador Shen: Whatever the joint communiqué says, please make it not seem that Japan is proceeding with your full endorsement.

Dr. Kissinger: We will.

Ambassador Shen: Can you see that Taiwan is kept informed of progress.

⁶ In an August 31 memorandum to Kissinger, Froebe wrote: "I understand that during your meeting with Ambassador James Shen August 23 [*sic*] you told him that a call on the President for him might be arranged for sometime in the week of September 4–8 after Labor Day. At Tab A is a draft memorandum from you to the President recommending a call on him by Shen during that week." Kissinger wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "Nonsense—I said no such thing." (*Ibid.*)

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I will that it is done.

[Meeting broke up. At the door:]

Ambassador Shen: Any movement in Paris?

Dr. Kissinger: Nothing significant. I really don't want to talk about it.

248. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

Some Areas of Concern Regarding the Trend of PRC–U.S. Exchanges

A number of recent developments impel us to raise with you the matter of the current direction in which “people-to-people” exchanges with the Chinese are developing. The key issue is whether we should leave all initiative to Peking to control the participants and channels as exchange programs develop, or whether we should take certain low-key initiatives which will encourage the PRC to rely at least to some degree on facilitating organizations that we already have recommended to them and to urge them to give greater “balance” to the Americans involved in contacts with China. The present situation indicates several trends in the development of exchanges which we do not feel are favorable to our interests of having responsible, mainstream groups and individuals involved, and in the Chinese interest of developing a public image in the U.S. of being hands-off involvement in our domestic politics.

The Current Situation Regarding Exchanges

It is clear that at present the Chinese exercise almost complete control over the pattern of exchanges. This is done by their picking and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Initialed by Holdridge and Solomon. Kissinger wrote on the top of the first page: “Let me take letter of Academy to Burkhardt. See note.” No note was attached. Frederick Burkhardt was Chairman of the American Council of Learned Societies.

choosing among various American individuals and groups to invite to visit the PRC, and then—once a “friendly relationship” has been established by a visit—they suggest to preferred individuals or groups that they “reciprocate” by inviting a Chinese group to the U.S.

We have recently reviewed the list of American individuals and groups that have visited the PRC since the “ping pong” visit of April 1971. The Chinese appear to be keying in on three groups, at least as far as numbers and frequency of visits are concerned: Chinese-Americans, Black groups, and the “left” in the intellectual community—both students and established academics. At the same time the PRC has hosted representatives of the “establishment” in the form of the Presidential party and Congressional leaderships, certain representatives of the major media, and some science and business groups. Their objectives appear to be to undercut support for the Chinese Nationalists among Chinese-Americans, maintain their credibility (to “revolutionaries” in the PRC and abroad) as an anti-imperialist power by hosting such groups as the Black Panthers and Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, and at the same time gain access to the mass media and to advanced American technology.

At an official level, as you know, we have suggested to Peking two non-governmental and non-exclusive channels for promoting exchanges which we have confidence in and which will avoid political problems. One is the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC; the other is the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. The Chinese have on several occasions “acknowledged” these two groups.

Most recently, in the Paris exchanges, the Chinese told Ambassador Watson’s staff that they would give favorable consideration to these two groups—even as in fact they are working to promote a press exchange and a scientific visit through other organizations (see the most recent report from Ambassador Watson at Tab A).² The media group is being handled by Thomas Manton’s America-China Relations Society, and Manton is definitely not one in whom we could have confidence. The scientific delegation is likely to be hosted by an organization formed recently by the Federation of American Scientists at the initiative of Jeremy Stone. While this latter group is more acceptable than the Manton organization, the Chinese, by encouraging Stone, are

² Attached at Tab A is telegram 15834 from Paris, August 21, describing a meeting between the PRC’s First Secretary to the Embassy in France, Ts’ao, and Watson, at which the PRC responded to a series of suggestions made by Watson on August 3 (telegram 14856 from Paris), based on instructions he received on August 2 (telegram 140058 to Paris). These messages described general approaches to exchanges between the U.S. and PRC, as well as the activities of specific delegations. (Both *ibid.*, Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, China—Paris Channel, March 10, 1972–April 1973)

effectively undercutting the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, a group we have recommended to Peking. As well, Stone is lacking in staff, funds, and experience in handling visits.

We suspect that there may be divergencies of opinion with the Chinese leadership over how to promote exchanges with the U.S. While the present pattern of contacts may only reflect a desire by Peking to push as far as official U.S. sentiment will allow in dealing with “anti-establishment” groups, we do get indications of changes of mind by Chinese officials over decisions about who to deal with, and these may be a result of pressures from “leftist” elements in the leadership, or at least of the desire of Chou En-lai’s Foreign Ministry staff to avoid criticism at home that they are too “establishment oriented.”

A recent example of Chinese behavior regarding exchanges quite at variance with the Chou line is a letter received by Frederick Burkhardt, Chairman of the American Council of Learned Societies. Burkhardt had invited Kuo Mo-jo to send a Chinese delegation to an international conference on Taoism to be held in Japan this fall. Burkhardt recently received a reply to his invitation (at Tab B)³ from a Red Guard group in the Chinese Academy of Sciences which threatened to “smash his dog head” if he persisted in an alleged scheme of trying to poison the minds of the Chinese people with feudal Taoist thought. Such a letter would be laughable if it did not work against the spirit of the Shanghai communiqué in this country, and perhaps reflect the continuing influence of groups in China who are hostile to the Sino–American rapprochement.

What Might Be Done

We are still at a stage in the matter of exchanges where the present pattern has not fully hardened into precedent for the future. It seems likely that a number of official, low-key initiatives on our part could indicate to the Chinese that we have some concerns about the manner in which exchanges are developing, and perhaps stiffen the spines of those in the Peking leadership who are more inclined to promote relations with us in a balanced manner.

³ Tab B was attached to another copy of Holdridge’s memorandum. The July 25 1-page letter to “Burkheart” begins “We have received the two letters you sent us on behalf of the American Council of Learned Societies. We the Chinese people are very dubious about your purpose and intention of you sending the two letters to us.” The letter concludes, “The aggressive ambitions and schemes of the United States can never be concealed before the devil-finding mirror of Mao Tsetung thought. Here we would solemnly warn you that if you dare to play any schemes or tricks, we will certainly smash your dog head. Long live down with U.S. imperialism! Long live Mao Tsetung Thought!” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1317, Richard H. Solomon Chronological Files, February 1972)

—We might remain aloof from Jeremy Stone's current efforts to gain USG backing for his new organization. (He recently went to State in an attempt to get a guarantee on paper that the government would provide security if his organization hosted a visit by the Chinese scientists. He was given a non-committal reply. You now have before you a request from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for your judgment on whether Stone should be given financial support.)

—You might receive sometime during the fall a small group of leaders from the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the PRC and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. They have already requested an opportunity to meet with you. A "laying on of hands" would probably strengthen their ability to operate as effective intermediaries between the USG and private groups and individuals in promoting exchanges. (You now have before you proposed replies to the request from these two organizations for a meeting.)⁴

—You might, through your own channels, express to the Chinese in a low-key way our concern about the present trend of events relating to exchanges, and perhaps raise a question about the usefulness of the Burkhardt letter in promoting the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué. You could also note that the Chinese, via the Paris channel, recently indicated that they are planning exchanges in the areas of science, medicine, and journalism, and also that they may send an acrobatic team to the U.S. this coming winter. You might then express the hope that at least some of these programs will be facilitated through organizations in which we have already expressed our confidence.⁵

⁴ Kissinger wrote "OK" beside this paragraph.

⁵ In a September 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge noted: "We have *just* learned that PRC authorities, after much waffling, have agreed to have the Committee on Scholarly Communication, the American Medical Association, and the Institute of Health of the National Academy of Science, host the visit to the U.S. later this year of a group of Chinese doctors." He added that Huang Hua had written recently to Burkhardt, stating that the letter to him was a "fake." He concluded, "these two recent developments suggest a Chinese effort to develop 'people-to-people' contacts more along the lines we have been hoping than earlier indications implied." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges)

249. National Security Decision Memorandum 188¹

Washington, August 30, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

SUBJECT

PRC Blocked Assets and Private Claims

The President has approved the Under Secretaries Committee recommendation contained in its memorandum of January 13, 1972² concerning the settlement of PRC blocked assets and private claims. Specifically, the President directs:

—That the United States should explore first, with the People's Republic of China, a lump sum settlement of the claims of American citizens for property nationalized by the PRC, to be paid either as a single payment in full or in annual installments over a period of years, in return for which the U.S. would unblock all PRC assets.

—That if the foregoing course proves non-negotiable, the U.S. should propose a settlement under which it would retain the blocked assets now under its control using them to compensate U.S. citizens for properties nationalized by the PRC.³

The President has directed that the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury, should prepare a negotiating

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0094, China (Reds) 092, 1972. Secret; Nodis; Homer. Copies were sent to Laird and Helms.

² Document 185.

³ The administration issued one more NSDM related to China in 1972. NSDM 195, October 30, reads in part "The President has considered recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee in its memorandum of January 13, 1972 and decided that Transportation Order T-2 should be amended to permit U.S. flag-vessels and U.S.-registered civil aircraft having a validated license from the Department of Commerce to visit the People's Republic of China." (National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters: Lot 73 D 288, NSC-U/SM Memoranda, 1972) This information was passed to Watson in telegram 209488 to Paris, November 16. (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US)

scenario based upon the foregoing decision which should be submitted for his approval by September 15, 1972.⁴

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ In a September 29 memorandum to Nixon, U. Alexis Johnson, signing for Rogers, provided both negotiating instructions, which he noted had been approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, and a list of potential members of a delegation to meet with PRC representatives. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 5) In an October 26 memorandum to Kissinger, Hormats and Holdridge suggested that he approve a cable to Watson instructing the Ambassador to approach Huang Chen about holding "a general exchange of views on this problem." The United States hoped to avoid discussing individual cases early in the negotiations. (Ibid., Box 529, Homer, US-PRC Negotiations, Paris) After being approved without change by Kissinger, telegram 198579, November 1, relayed the instructions to Watson. After presenting the U.S. proposal to Huang Chen, Watson reported in telegram 21031 from Paris, November 8, that the "PRC appears in no hurry for early meeting and may ask for more information before agreeing to face-to-face discussions." (Both ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US)

250. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 7, 1972.

SUBJECT

Impending Chinese Wheat Purchase from the U.S. and Possible Snags

The Chinese seem to be actively buying foreign wheat at this time for their own domestic use, and one nearly-consummated purchase consists of 400,000 tons of U.S. wheat via a French trading firm. The Chinese have indicated to the French firm, however, that they are very concerned about possible publicity surrounding the purchase. The present memo reviews this particular transaction on the assumption that you might wish to raise the matter of publicity about the sale with the Chinese via your own channels in order to minimize misunderstanding.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Secret. Initialed by Holdridge and Solomon and concurred in by Hormats.

The Sale

Representatives of the U.S. firm of Louis Dreyfus Corporation of New York met with Secretary of Agriculture Butz and Dick Solomon of your staff on Thursday September 7.² They said that the Chinese had approached their sister firm in France, Louis Dreyfus et Cie., Paris, about a wheat purchase of up to a million tons. Representatives of the French firm went to Peking (where they have now been for three weeks) and indicated to the Chinese that a purchase of that magnitude would mean buying wheat from the U.S. The Chinese said that they wanted to buy the wheat, but indicated in a variety of ways that they wish to sweep under the rug the fact that it was produced in America. They have requested more costly shipping arrangements and unusual procedures in documenting the sale which would tend to obscure the fact that the wheat was shipped from the U.S.

At the point at which the negotiation was near consummation, a Chinese political official entered the discussions in Peking and complained to the French trading representatives that, 1) the PRC is annoyed at the recent change in U.S. subsidy policy, which they claim was done purposefully to harm their interests; 2) they are upset at what they claim was an August 20 statement by Secretary Butz circulated in the press impugning the veracity of Chinese claims about their level of grain production; and 3) PRC authorities are concerned that President Nixon will give highly visible publicity to a grain sale to the PRC for domestic political purposes.

Subsequent to this political intervention, a sale of 400,000 tons was nevertheless consummated with the French firm, which through its American sister firm has now purchased most of the volume of wheat in the U.S. Representatives of the French firm have been asked by the Chinese to remain in Peking, apparently because additional purchases are desired. According to Department of Agriculture procedures, the sale—to be eligible for governmental subsidy—must be registered at the USDA within 5 business days after its conclusion. Such registration, which will take place next Monday (September 11), will make the deal public information, although it is not certain that the press will pick up the fact of the transaction right away.

Raising the Matter with the Chinese

On the basis of the fragmentary information available to us about this sale and the negotiations associated with it, it is difficult to gauge PRC concerns about publicity. Perhaps they are hypersensitive about the impact of such a transaction on their friends and allies; perhaps

² No other record of this conversation has been found.

they don't want to appear to be "me-too-ers" with a wheat purchase so shortly after the Soviet grain sale; or perhaps they fear the implication that American wheat is saving starving Chinese. You may wish to explore with PRC authorities a number of options regarding managing the publicity about the sale. (The utility of some understanding on this matter with the Chinese is heightened by current interest on the domestic side of the White House in publicizing the wheat sale for political purposes. See the memo from John Whitaker to the President at Tab A.)³

1) Do not raise the matter with PRC authorities; let the Chinese work out their own press arrangements with the private firms involved. [*Comment:* The representatives of Dreyfus Corp. are fearful that an approach by USG officials to the PRC may sabotage the grain sale, inasmuch as formally the Chinese are negotiating with a French firm, and because they have shown great sensitivity to the publicity issue. While this concern of the American trader is understandable, we think it is naive to assume that the PRC does not believe the USG is aware of the purchase. Perhaps the various complaints which Chinese officials raised with the representatives of Dreyfus et Cie. were intended to reach USG ears. Your *not* raising the issue with the Chinese might lead to uncontrolled and offensive publicity which would damage future trade prospects.⁴

2) Work out with PRC authorities a mutually agreeable press position on the transaction. This could involve a commonly agreed upon statement at various levels of formality:

—A description of the purchase is to be issued by low-level USG authorities only if the sale becomes a visible press item. [*Comment:* Given the magnitude of the sale, and public interest in such an event in an election year, it is most unlikely that the sale would not become headline news. You might take this opportunity to educate the Chinese about the difficulties of working with our press, and urge them to be reasonably open about the purchase.]

—A low-key statement which could be issued either unilaterally in the U.S. or by both governments at a common time and at a mutually agreed-upon level.

—A Presidential statement about the sale, identifying it as a further indication of the progress being made in normalizing Sino–American relations. [In the September 7 meeting Secretary Butz expressed a preference for a Presidential statement. In view of apparent Chinese sensitivities about the matter, however, you may wish to weigh the immediate domestic advantages of such an announcement against our longer-term commercial and political relations with the PRC.]⁵

³ Attached at Tab A is an August 30 memorandum from John C. Whitaker, through John D. Ehlichman, to the President. It described the possible wheat purchase and its domestic economic and political impact.

⁴ All brackets are in the source text.

⁵ See Document 252.

251. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 8, 1972.

PARTICIPANTS

James C. H. Shen, Republic of China Ambassador to the United States
Hengli Chen, Counselor, Republic of China Embassy

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

SUBJECT

Mr. Kissinger's Conversation with Ambassador Shen Concerning President Nixon's Meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka in Hawaii²

Mr. Kissinger explained that he was pressed for time and couldn't tell Ambassador Shen a great deal. As the Ambassador could see from the newspaper accounts of the Hawaii meeting, we had made a very strong case about our relations with Taiwan. As Mr. Tanaka had said publicly afterwards, we considered our defense treaty with the ROC as important as NATO. Mr. Kissinger commented at this point on the dubious nature of the Japanese motives, observing that the Japanese were polite but went their own way.

Ambassador Shen asked, were the Japanese polite enough to listen to what the U.S. side had to say? Mr. Kissinger replied affirmatively. What the Japanese wanted was for the U.S. to defend Taiwan, which we were happy enough to do, so that they themselves would be left alone with Peking. In that way they got the best of everything, and their investments on Taiwan would be protected. We had urged them to keep economic and cultural ties with Taiwan even if diplomatic relations were severed.

Mr. Kissinger again questioned Japanese motives in seeking to normalize relations with Peking. What they were doing was immoral. The Chinese would use them, but at the same time despise them. Also, the more they kept their connection with Taiwan, the more their reputation for unreliability would be encouraged. Mr. Kissinger indicated that he didn't know what the ROC itself wanted out of this. As for us, we had made a strong case with the Japanese on their retaining ties with Taiwan.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger and Shen met from 3:30 to 3:44 p.m. in Kissinger's office. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² The President met with the Japanese Prime Minister on August 31. Documentation on the meetings in Hawaii is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIX.

Ambassador Shen commented that the U.S. had evidently not tried to tell the Japanese *not* to go ahead with normalization, and had not said enough to discourage them on this score. Mr. Kissinger declared that we had, in fact, said that they were going too fast. We had tried very hard to slow them down—Secretary Rogers and the President had both brought this aspect up—but they (the Japanese) were going all out.

Ambassador Shen raised the question of whether or not the Taiwan clause had been discussed. Mr. Kissinger said that the Japanese hadn't raised it, and we ourselves had thought that we shouldn't raise it either. There had been no discussion of this subject. We felt that the Taiwan clause remained in force, and did not believe that it was a good idea to raise a question about something which was not challenged.

Ambassador Shen asked, could U.S. bases in Japan be used to defend Taiwan in an emergency? Mr. Kissinger replied that he didn't want to lie to the Ambassador and did not know the answer to this question. However, we could defend Taiwan without Japan from our aircraft carriers and from our bases on Taiwan. It was not impossible, either, that we would be able to defend Taiwan from Japan. Legally, we certainly could, and as a practical matter probably could also.

Mr. Kissinger stated that he didn't believe there would be an attack on Taiwan within the next three to five years. He did not wish to set any particular time frame; it was just that if one looked beyond five years it was impossible to predict anything. Mao would certainly die within that time span, and Chou, was who 74, would be likely to die too. Mao's death would create the most tremendous confusion, which the ROC knew very well. Chou might now be running the government, but he did not have Mao's prestige.

Ambassador Shen wondered just what kind of game it was that the Japanese were playing with Peking. Would the two work together in the nuclear field? Or by going to Peking, was Tanaka trying to improve his bargaining position with the Soviets on negotiating a peace treaty? Mr. Kissinger replied affirmatively on the latter question, but added that Tanaka was asking for something which the Soviets would not give him. Ambassador Shen asked, and Mr. Kissinger confirmed, that by this he meant the four islands to the north of Japan which the Soviets had taken after World War II.

Ambassador Shen questioned Mr. Kissinger as to whether any other countries would recognize Peking when the Japanese did so. Mr. Kissinger noted that we had even told them the concerns of leaders such as Thanom and Marcos, and had even read to the Japanese their letters expressing this concern.

Ambassador Shen wondered, had Tanaka given the impression that by having relations with Peking, Japan was absolved from its Treaty obligations with respect to the U.S.? Mr. Kissinger said no,

Tanaka had conveyed just the opposite impression. Tanaka had stressed that he would maintain Japan's treaty relationship with the U.S. But we ourselves had to be realistic, for if Japan could treat one ally in this way (the ROC), it could treat another ally similarly.

However, Mr. Kissinger continued, the Japanese had assured us that their treaty obligations would be maintained. There was no reason to doubt their words. Mr. Kissinger added that in his experience the Japanese never had anything long-range in mind—they would tell you what they wanted to do now, but didn't know what they would want to do next year.

Ambassador Shen asked, would Tanaka accept Chou En-lai's terms for normalizing relations with Japan? Mr. Kissinger expressed the opinion that Tanaka would not accept Chou's terms the first time. He would keep his cool. When Ambassador Shen surmised that the Chinese in Peking might frighten Tanaka away, Mr. Kissinger declared that it would take a lot to frighten Tanaka. He, Mr. Kissinger, wanted to assure Ambassador Shen that whatever the Japanese did, though, we would stand by the ROC.

Ambassador Shen asked, why was Tanaka plunging ahead? Mr. Kissinger speculated in reply that it was partly due to the Japanese feeling that China was their territory and partly a matter of domestic politics. The Japanese were also trying to take advantage of a commercial possibility. He felt, though, that in a few years the Japanese would surely become disenchanted with Peking.

Ambassador Shen remarked that by this time the harm would already have been done. Moreover, Tanaka was telling the Japanese people that he was going ahead without any weakening in the ties with the U.S.—that is, with the understanding if not the exact endorsement of the United States. This was his way of pacifying the disobedient elements in his own Party.

Mr. Kissinger stressed that we were not happy with the way the Japanese were treating this matter, as we had made very clear to them. They carried accounts in their press of events which never happened. Some distortions were to be expected, nothing like those which came from the Japanese. For example, in his press conference after the Hawaii meeting, Ohira had said that we had maintained Taiwan could not be defended without our bases in Japan, but nothing like this had actually happened.

The conversation closed when Mr. Kissinger was obliged to leave for another appointment.

252. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 8, 1972, 6:15–7:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Mission to the UN
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Chinese Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger: You won't believe this, but our car broke down at the airport.

Mr. Rodman insists on coming up here so he can see Mrs. Shih. [laughter]²

Ambassador Huang: He is one of your good students.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to review with you a number of things and also to review your latest communication, if that is agreeable to you.

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: First, I plan to tell you what I plan to discuss in Moscow.

I'm sure your allies will raise this issue of the *nuclear treaty*. I want to inform you of where we stand and what I know will happen.

When they submitted this draft to me, I asked a number of questions, which were frankly very sarcastic. To my astonishment they handed me a reply yesterday, preparatory to my visit. My questions were:

—What if there is an attack on our allies in Europe? What is the effect of this treaty?

—Second, what is the effect of this treaty if there is a war among other countries with which there is no treaty obligation but which involve a US or Soviet interest?

—Third, what is the effect of the treaty in case of an attack by the Soviet Union or the US on a country whose defeat would affect the global balance of power?

Sarcastically I said, what if we wanted to move US troops into India?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Attached but not printed are talking points for this meeting.

² All brackets and ellipses are in the source text.

You remember I mentioned this to you.

With respect to the first question, in the case of an attack on our allies, nuclear weapons could be used in their defense but not on the territory of the Soviet Union! I suppose this means that on the territory of allies of the Soviet Union they can be used. It was stated in a neutral form: “If such a situation arises, then both the US and USSR should proceed from the necessity to localize the use of nuclear weapons and undertake nothing that would increase the danger of our two countries mutually becoming objects of the use of nuclear weapons.”

In the second situation, with respect to the defense of countries towards which neither the Soviet Union nor the US has a direct treaty obligation, the use of nuclear weapons would be totally excluded.

With respect to the third situation, and I am quoting, “which the American side termed as seriously upsetting the global balance and to illustrate which a most hypothetical. . . .”

Mrs. Shih: Slowly please.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t want you to get the precise words [laughter], because I’m doing something irregular [laughter].

No, I’ll repeat: “In the third situation, which the American side termed as seriously upsetting the global balance and to illustrate which a most hypothetical example of introduction of Soviet or US troops into India was used—if we assume that nuclear weapons might be used, this would devalue our treaty. The treaty should exclude this possibility. Otherwise it would be totally pointless.”

They give a fourth example which we didn’t ask about: when one of our allies attacks one of the Soviet Union’s allies—in which case the argument will be they can use nuclear weapons against our ally!

What I will say is, we will undertake no mutual obligations. We will not make an agreement that implies a condominium. We will make no agreement which implies that only nuclear war is wrong but conventional war is acceptable. We will make no agreement which permits an attack by a major nuclear country against any other country or which limits our actions in that respect. But we are prepared to discuss universal measures to prevent war, which apply to all countries.

I do not expect that anything will occur, except a dilatory general discussion.

So I think your Government can know that the considerations you put before us have been taken seriously, and there will be no counterproposal by us of a specific nature.

I’m covering the topics that will be discussed there. Or do you have any questions?

Ambassador Huang: Last time you mentioned that the US side is considering a “general formula” as an answer to the Soviet Union. I

wonder if what you said just now constitutes your answer, or will there be another formula?

Dr. Kissinger: This will generally be our answer.

Ambassador Huang: And what is the implication of “universal measures to prevent war, that will apply to all countries”?

Dr. Kissinger: The implication is that one cannot consider a bilateral agreement not to use nuclear weapons unless there are conditions in which there can be no attacks by major countries against smaller countries, by nuclear countries against non-nuclear countries—in short unless there are conditions that guarantee universal peace.

My personal judgment is that this is now going to end the discussion. But if they want to pursue it, we will steer it in the direction of general principles like the Shanghai Communiqué.

But in any event I will discuss it with you after I return. We will not agree to anything there.

We cannot agree to the implication of this formulation that was handed to us under any circumstances, because it would in effect give complete immunity to the chief aggressor in every circumstance that concerns us—an attack on Europe, an attack on the Middle East, or an attack on China.

The reason for the formulation about which you asked me is to have a delaying method for the discussion; it may not be heroic but it will be effective. And it will shift the subject away from what we’ve talked about here. And indeed in view of this explanation there is no need for us to make a counterproposal.

Ambassador Huang: This is all I want to ask.

Dr. Kissinger: The next subject I will discuss is *SALT*.

We will discuss on this occasion the procedures and approximate timing for the next sessions of *SALT*: we are aiming for the middle of November.

On substance, the only subject that is likely to come up is how to make the interim agreement permanent, what measures would be required.

We will also discuss the *European Security Conference* and *mutual force reduction* in Europe, primarily from the procedural point of view. And the degree to which the two should be related to each other. I think I explained it to the Prime Minister once before. We are using these negotiations on mutual force reductions primarily as a device to keep the Senate from cutting our forces unilaterally. So we are thinking of a preparatory meeting at the end of January next year, to be followed by a conference in September, which we estimate to last at least two years.

Ambassador Huang: Two years.

Dr. Kissinger: The Conference. And if your Foreign Minister comes here for the UN General Assembly he can give me advice on dilatory tactics and we can perhaps stretch it out to three years. [laughter] Two years I can do on my own!

So we do not expect any major changes in our forces in Europe until late '74 or early '75, at the earliest. And as I told the Prime Minister, we are thinking in terms of ten to fifteen percent as the maximum.

We will also discuss the *trade* issues. The Soviet Union has now made a new proposal to us on settlement of its World War II debts which is more acceptable than the previous discussion. This will make it possible to negotiate other trade arrangements, and will make it possible to find the Soviet Union eligible for some credits. If this eligibility is achieved, it will still enable us to approve individual projects, as I explained to you once before. These issues are very technical and complex, and if you are interested I will explain them to you when I return. I don't think they involve matters of high policy.

Each side of course is free to raise topics it wishes.

On *Indochina*—I think you know our views on this, and we will repeat the same views in Moscow.

This is all on our side on the Soviet trip. When I return here—I will return the evening of the 15th. I have to be in New York on the evening of the 19th, and I will be prepared to meet with you then to give you details. [He nods.]

I am going to Munich tomorrow. I had intended to attend the Olympics, but cannot now. But I will meet with the German leaders. I will see Brandt, Bahr, Barzel, Scheel, and Strauss. I will recommend to Brandt, whom I know very well, and to Scheel, what I told you—what our experiences with the People's Republic have been and that from our point of view normalization of relations would be desirable.

I understand that Scheel is coming to Peking early in October.

Ambassador Huang: I've got information that the negotiations will start very soon, but as to the specific time I am not informed. The negotiations will start in the near future.

Dr. Kissinger: Knowing Scheel and knowing your side, I do not think he will tax your abilities excessively. [The Chinese laugh, and make comments to each other.]

Ambassador Huang: "Tax your abilities"—it is difficult to translate.

Dr. Kissinger: But you understand. [They nod.]

It is not yet announced, but I wanted to tell you I will stop in London on the way back for one day, to see Heath and Home. The next day I will go to Paris to meet with the North Vietnamese. And after the meeting with the North Vietnamese I will meet with President Pompidou and then I will return home.

On Vietnam, I have read your communication with great care.³ And I personally believe that your account of the events is correct, and we regret it. Our difficulty is we have found no way of making our investigation except by asking the culprits to do the investigating. We also have to point out that—we understand the location of your ships—but it is a different situation from what is found on your borders. And an inherently more dangerous one. But we have explained this before.

With respect to the general comment at the end of your paper, we agree with the Chinese view and we are prepared to withdraw all our forces. The obstacle is not the refusal to withdraw our forces but that the North Vietnamese are demanding that we solve their political problem for them. We will make another proposal to them when I meet with them next week, on which we have worked very hard and which we have had a great difficulty in getting agreement. I will give it to you on the 19th—for your information, without any request for doing anything. We do believe that the North Vietnamese are taking a very narrow view and that this is the best time for them to settle the war. And that continuing the war can only be in the interests of countries with expansionist desires. And in that sense it is not a purely Indochinese problem.⁴

Have you any questions?

³ Huang Hua gave Peter Rodman two short messages on the evening of September 6. One message was a short inquiry about a possible visit from Senator Mansfield. The longer message reads in part: "From the U.S. messages [of August 28 and 30] it seems that the U.S. side thinks it has the right to blockade and bomb the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and attack vessels or vehicles of all kinds transporting supplies to Viet Nam. This stand cannot possibly be accepted by China." The message continued: "We recognize that the U.S. Government has made investigations on all the incidents raised in the charges and protests lodged by us. But the answers have generally been words of regret from above but allegations from below that there was cause for raising the matters but no conclusive evidence after investigations." The August 28 and 30 messages for the PRC and the message attached to Rodman's memorandum of conversation with Huang Hua, September 6, are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 152–154.

⁴ Attached but not printed is a message delivered by Kennedy to Ambassador Huang in New York on August 28:

"I have been asked to convey to you the following message for the Prime Minister in addition to our written note. There comes a time in international events when the long view must be taken. The United States side questions seriously whether it is in the Chinese interest to see the Indochina conflict seriously complicate the position of the United States Administration in light of all that it has done and is prepared to do in a global context. There are more fundamental considerations involved given this Administration's constant awareness of the dangers of modern imperialism. Accordingly, the United States side hopes that the Prime Minister would carefully consider the problem of Indochina in a broader framework. The United States will continue its earnest search for a rapid conclusion of the war on a just basis for all parties. It is clear at this point that other countries, too, have a responsibility to help speed the end of the conflict whose continuation only serves to distort the international situation."

Ambassador Huang: No.

Dr. Kissinger: The next issue is our meeting with the Japanese in Hawaii.

I have read with interest and astonishment some of the newspaper accounts which came from the Japanese side.

Ambassador Huang: You mean Prime Minister Tanaka's press conference?

Dr. Kissinger: And Ohira's. Both. You will soon have the pleasure of experiencing it yourselves.

We did not raise the issue of the Mutual Security Treaty's application to Taiwan—at all. Nor did they. We did not raise the Sato communiqué of 1969—at all. And neither did they. So all the news stories that explained that we said Taiwan is as important to us as Europe—as NATO—and that they did not agree with us, are pure invention.

Given our experience with the Japanese press, we will explain our views on Taiwan to you, and not through third parties. And they will be consistent with the Shanghai Communiqué, and with the private understandings we have.

Our position—on which you can rely—is that we will place no obstacle in the way of normalization of relations between Japan and the People's Republic. We have not asked them to delay their visit or the conclusions they want to draw from their visit. Our view is, within the framework of the communications you have sent us, we will not place any obstacle in the way of the policy that is developing unless it should take an anti-American direction—which we do not believe it has now. We believe that you conduct a long-range policy, and so do we. And we are not interested in the tactical moves that so fascinate the Japanese press.

There was also a news report that when I was in Japan I raised the issue of Korea. When I met the Foreign Minister there were ten other officials there, and when there are ten officials I say nothing.

But I shall watch the evolution of your relations with interest, especially the press relations.

Do you have any questions on this subject?

Ambassador Huang: No.

Dr. Kissinger: As a general proposition, I think in relations between us and Japan, I think it is important for both of us to not take advantage of tactical situations. We didn't, you didn't. This isn't a comment on you. It's our attitude.

I have only a few more items.

With respect to Senator Mansfield . . .

Ambassador Huang: Regarding relations between China and Japan, our side has expressed its views in former messages.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and they are satisfactory to us.

With respect to Senator Mansfield, we understand the question which was asked from Peking. And looking into the longer future, we can see the advantage of not having individual leaders come at your invitation. On the other hand, Senator Mansfield is one of the leaders of the Senate, and very well disposed towards Chinese policy. We would therefore be prepared to send him on an official mission, so it would not be your invitation but on a mission that we could define. We would have to define the subject in such a way that it does not concern immediate foreign policy decisions.

With respect to his seeing Sihanouk, I have talked to Senator Mansfield. He will leave it up to you whether there should be a meeting with Sihanouk. He will not request it. And if he were to see Samdech Sihanouk, he would not raise the subject of his talk. Which he could not do in any event in an official capacity, since it is not our official policy.

On a similar level, a Harvard friend of mine, Professor Galbraith,⁵ is now in China. And while he is a fanatical supporter of Senator McGovern and I do not share his political views, he is a very intelligent and good man, and I would appreciate any courtesies that could be shown. And if it could be mentioned to him that I mentioned his name, it would be a courtesy.

We will replace Ambassador Watson in Paris with a good man, after the election, and a man we can rely upon.

One other rather complex problem. We hear indirectly that there are some purchases of wheat from an American corporation in France which result in increased purchases here.⁶ We welcome this. But we have a concern about the publicity. We have the following choices:

—We could leave it in the hands of the private companies and not treat it as a governmental concern—but this leaves us with no control over the publicity.

—Or we could respond in a governmental capacity. But then there is the question of what to say and at what level. We will respect your wishes in this.

[To Rodman]: Make sure no cables on this go out. Tell Butz to keep his Department shut up. Have Haig do this.

I repeat: We have no interest in this except to be sure there is correct treatment of your concerns.

⁵ Harvard University economist and former Ambassador to India (1961–1963) John Kenneth Galbraith.

⁶ See Document 250.

Ambassador Huang: On this question I have no instructions from Peking. I doubt whether the said trade item would be carried on.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not recommending it or the opposite. We are only concerned with [what happens] if it occurs. If it does and it is an indirect purchase, we will not volunteer anything in any event.

We will do nothing further if we hear nothing from you. There is no particular need for a response unless you need to.

While I'm gone, Mr. Lord and Commander Howe are with me on the trip. Peter Rodman and General Haig are in Washington. And we have immediate communications.

I'm keeping Peter home from Moscow so the next time I go to Peking he can go with me.

Ambassador Huang: I hear that General Haig is promoted.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he will be made Vice-Chief of the Army.

Ambassador Huang: At the same time he will still be your assistant?

Dr. Kissinger: No, for two more months he will be my assistant. It will be a terrible loss to me. But I was instrumental in obtaining this for him. So it is for the good of the country.

Ambassador Huang: Please convey my personal congratulations to him.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you. It will leave a big hole in my staff.

Those are all the items I have for you today.

Ambassador Huang: Do you leave today?

Dr. Kissinger: I leave tomorrow morning.

Ambassador Huang: I will report what you said to Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

I know how busy you are, so I won't keep you any longer.

Dr. Kissinger: When is your UN delegation coming?

Ambassador Huang: In a couple of weeks.

Dr. Kissinger: You'll have a vacation afterwards?

Ambassador Huang: I hope so. Will you?

Dr. Kissinger: We will be organizing a new administration.

Ambassador Huang: Are there any new developments in the Middle East?

Dr. Kissinger: I think until the election things will be fairly quiet.

I don't think the Soviet Union knows exactly what to do. In fact I think precision of thought is not an attribute of anyone in the Middle East.

[The meeting adjourned with warm handshakes.]

253. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 19, 1972, 6:17–7:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the UN
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman, NSC

Dr. Kissinger: I thought, as I indicated to you, I would give you a brief summary of my trip to your ally.

Ambassador Huang: Ally!

Dr. Kissinger: First, you have seen the communiqué, I'm sure. It was printed in the *New York Times*. You must have read it. But I have a copy here for you. [Tab A]²

Ambassador Huang: I have read it.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me talk about the major item first, that is not in the communiqué. First, on that nuclear treaty we have been discussing, I handed over a paper which listed all our objections—of which this is a copy. [Hands over paper at Tab B.]³ It says we will do nothing that creates a condominium. We will do nothing that creates a right to attack others with nuclear weapons. We will do nothing to legitimize

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Attached but not printed were Kissinger's talking points.

² Attached at Tab A but not printed is the joint announcement made at the conclusion of Kissinger's September 10–14 visit to the USSR. The text is in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 9, 1972, p. 398. All brackets and ellipses are in the source text.

³ Attached at Tab B but not printed is an undated paper entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War," as well as a copy of a September 13 "Soviet note" discussing a resolution for the "non-use of force in international relations and on the prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons." See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-13, Documents 155 and 156. The PRC responded in a message given to V. James Fazio, Deputy Director of the White House Situation Room, on September 26. The four-part statement reads in part: "1. The Soviet proposal is a hoax aimed at hoodwinking public opinion and masking its policy of nuclear monopoly and nuclear threat. 2. The Chinese side has always stood for strict differentiation between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, and opposed sweeping generalization on the non-use of force." Point three declared that the Soviet goal was to "keep nuclear weapons permanently in their hands and develop them continuously." Point four noted that the PRC intended to "expose and refute" the Soviet proposal in the United Nations General Assembly. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-13, Document 159.

conventional war. And we will do nothing to undermine existing security arrangements.

They had given me answers to some questions, which I gave you last time. This led to a very passionate discussion on their part. And at the end, on my last day there, Gromyko told me they would submit to the UN a proposal in this field, and that they hoped we would not join you in opposing it. We said we didn't know your position, and didn't know what you would do, but we would almost certainly oppose it. And we would not agree at the UN to something we wouldn't agree to bilaterally. But we only received the formal proposal yesterday, as you did.

I don't know what position you will take, but we will not support it. That is where we stand on this nuclear discussion with the Soviet Union. As far as we are concerned, we will take no further steps.

On a European Security Conference and mutual balanced force reductions: As you know, we had taken the position that a European Security Conference should not take place in isolation from mutual balanced force reductions. We took this position because we did not want to take the position that tension in Europe could be dealt with by mere abstract discussion, and because we thought focusing attention on actual Soviet forces in Europe would bring home to our allies the extent of their danger.

The Soviet leaders then handed me a note in which they made a concrete proposal:

—that a preparatory conference for a European Security Conference begin in Helsinki November 22 and that the Conference itself begin work in Helsinki in late June 1973.

—that a preparatory conference on Mutual Force Reduction should begin in late January 1973 and that the Conference itself should start in September or October 1973.

We are now discussing that with our allies. We are disposed to accept it, because it has the practical consequence that there will be discussions on force reductions not before September 1973 and therefore it will keep our Congress from making unilateral reductions throughout 1973. And we don't anticipate that the Conference will have results in less than one or two years.

And in any event, as I told the Prime Minister and as I told you last time, the maximum we are considering is 10 or 15%.

[At this point Dr. Kissinger asked that additional cups be provided so that tea could be served. Mr. Rodman brought the cups and hors d'oeuvres, and Dr. Kissinger poured.]

We also had some discussions on strategic arms limitations, and we agreed tentatively that this conference starts on November 15. That date will not be announced until about October 15. So don't tell it to

the Japanese before then. [The Ambassador chuckled.] Because they always talk to the press; you don't.

The first phase of the conference will discuss general principles, and no precise proposals. The general problem we will discuss—which we have not yet decided in our own government—is whether to concentrate on numerical limits or whether to include limits on technological improvements. But frankly, we did not think they were very well prepared.

And as our own thinking progresses, we will keep you informed on how our attitude develops. We have not yet decided whether to concentrate on numerical limits or whether to include qualitative limitations.

On trade, we settled in principle the issue of Soviet wartime debts. We agreed in principle on a figure of \$500 million plus interest of about 3%, which will bring it to a figure of about \$725 million—to be paid by the year 2001. It will not reduce our national debt significantly! There are many other technical provisions which I don't think are of any interest to the Ambassador.

In the field of trade, we will find the Soviet Union eligible for Export-Import credits and Most Favored Nation status, and they will grant us business facilities and normal international machinery for arbitration of disputed claims, and some provision against market disruption.

Some Soviet journalist said we will give credits of \$5 billion. That is total nonsense. The first credit will be \$150 million, and no significant increase is planned. But I think we both know who Victor Louis works for.

They expressed very great interest in investment in their natural gas fields and other resources. We will set up a mechanism to study this problem, but we will not invest any substantial governmental funds.

This is an outline of the trade agreement which I think we will conclude within the next month.

There was some discussion on the admission of the two Germanies to the United Nations. Our position is that if the two German states make an agreement with each other to settle their relationships, then after the signature of the treaty we will agree to observer status for the German Democratic Republic, and then after the treaty is ratified we will agree to the membership of the two German States. This is the position of the Bonn Government, and we are supporting that.

We also discussed Vietnam, which followed familiar lines.

There was a discussion on the last day on our relationship with China, initiated by the Soviet Union. They asked us whether we were

cooperating with you against them, and what our position was on the border question. We said that you had never raised the border question with us, and therefore we had no occasion to take a position on the border question. And secondly, that our relationships concerned primarily bilateral issues.

They expressed some concern that you and Japan might concert together against white people. We said we had no evidence of that, and indeed evidence of the contrary, and that with respect to Japan existing relationships should be maintained. They said that if they increased their activity in Japan, it would not be directed against the United States. And they also engaged in a long discussion of the Mongolian air accident of last year, and that you wanted them and us to engage in conflict.

That was the extent of that conversation.

We said we had no news about your internal situation because we dealt only with one group of leaders and didn't know about anybody else. And that you had never urged us to be in the position of conflict with the Soviet Union. On the contrary.

The discussion didn't have any particular point. I mean, they didn't ask us to do anything.

Now, leaving Moscow, I talked with German leaders about their relation with you. But I gather that is in good shape and requires no extensive discussion with us.

On Vietnam, as you know, I had another meeting with the Vietnamese in Paris. As I told you last time, I am giving you my opening statement as well as our formal proposal we made to them. [Tab C]⁴ For the information of the Prime Minister.

Now we believe this proposal goes to the absolute limit of what we can do. You probably have your own judgment of our domestic situation and you will be able to report it to Peking, but we are not under the impression that we are under any domestic pressure on this issue.

You will see from this proposal we are prepared to withdraw very rapidly all our forces, that we agree to the creation of committees to supervise elections in which the NLF has equal representation with the Saigon Government, and that this same committee can review the Constitution, and revise it.

This is one way of approaching it. Of course, the simplest way of approaching it would be a ceasefire, which they tell us is only a military act—but in fact it would create de facto control by the NLF in their

⁴ Attached at Tab C but not printed is the 8-page opening statement and the 10-point proposal. See *ibid.*, Document 161.

areas and by the Saigon Government in its areas, and would constitute a de facto allocation of political power. What we cannot do and in no circumstances will do is for us to destroy the people we have been associated with. We will agree on a natural evolution but we will not engage in such an immoral act.

We are now beginning a very intensive period of discussions. I am meeting with them next week. If they were Chinese I am certain we would reach an agreement. I'm quite serious. When we settled with you, we agreed on things that could be settled immediately and on things that could happen over a period of time. And we're prepared to do the same with them. I shall meet, as I said, next week, and maybe for two days. And if they would accept some approach like this, we would settle very quickly.

The only other issue I have is, you have asked us about keeping Bangladesh off the agenda of the UN. We will reply to you formally, but we cannot do that because of our position of favoring the admission of Bangladesh. But we will handle it in a low key, with a minimum of drama, and we will work to keep it from being a very active issue. During the debate, first, we will stress that it should be handled routinely, and secondly, we will emphasize the great importance we attach to prompt implementation of last year's Security Council resolutions.

That is all I have.

Ambassador Huang: Thank you for what you have told us. We will convey this.

[The Ambassador took out a paper and began to read.]

In our past conversations, the Chinese side dwelt on the question of Korea. The Chinese side understands the complexity of the Korean question, as well as the peculiar situation in which the United States finds itself this year, and does not intend to embarrass the United States. It is China's policy and wish to see the situation in the Far East as a whole, and move towards relaxation. The US side may note that there are essential differences between the 28-nation draft resolution and previous similar draft resolutions, and that the present draft resolution takes into account the new situation that has emerged in the Far East and on the Korean peninsula, and strives to bring the two different sides closer.

If there are any questions that are not clear, the US may raise them at any time.

The Chinese side believes that discussion of the new draft resolution on the Korean question at the current session of the UN General Assembly would help to ease the atmosphere and promote mutual understanding between the parties concerned. However, if there should be insistent opposition to the inclusion of the new draft resolution on

the Korean question in the agenda, it would most probably give rise to controversy right at the beginning of this session, and thus benefit a certain big power which is unwilling to see the easing of the situation in Asia.

As for concrete arrangements, the Chinese side takes a flexible attitude. If discussion at an early date should cause certain inconveniences to the US side, arrangements for the discussion to be held at a time after November could also be considered. By then, the worries on the US side would no longer exist, and it would be able to take the initiative in advancing its positive propositions. It is hoped that the US side will give earnest consideration to the above views and take the necessary corresponding actions.

I am instructed to tell the US side . . .

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask a question? Concretely, what does it mean? Does it mean you would agree to a postponement of the discussion only if we agree to a discussion? Or does it mean you would agree to postpone the discussion and we would remain free to take any position we wanted?

Ambassador Huang: Our consideration is that if an early discussion will cause inconvenience to the US side, then arrangements can be made to hold the discussion after the November election.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Ambassador Huang: By then the worries on the US side will no longer exist, and you would be able to take the initiative in advancing positive propositions.

Dr. Kissinger: I won't embarrass you. I understand.

If there is a discussion now, we will take the position that the whole discussion should be deferred to next year. If the discussion is postponed to November, we might still take the position that it should be deferred. This of course we would prefer.

Ambassador Huang: We have told you our position.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Let me take this up with our Ambassador. I will not take it up with anyone other than the Ambassador and he will be in touch with you. We understand your point, and we appreciate the spirit in which it is advanced.

Ambassador Huang: Our view is that discussion of this question should no longer be deferred.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Ambassador Huang: The timing of the discussion, it can be held until after November. If the US side has positive proposals, you can raise them.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand. We will have to consider.

Ambassador Huang: The above is the first item I'm instructed to convey.

The second item: Not long ago, Prasit Kanchanawat, Deputy Director of the Thai Division of Economics and Finance, accompanied . . . [Mrs. Shih stops and spells the name again slowly.]

Dr. Kissinger: I was afraid our planes had flown over a Chinese town named that!

Ambassador Huang: . . . accompanied the Thai table tennis delegation to Peking, where he met Premier Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials. Both sides expressed the hope that relations between China and Thailand could be somewhat improved. Although it is not possible to restore state relations at the moment, trade contacts may start first. The Chinese side welcomes people from Thai economic circles to visit China, and holds that this is not only in the interests of the peoples of China and Thailand but also conducive to the relaxation of the situation in Southeast Asia.

The third item: The small amount of wheat recently purchased from a French company is for the adjustment of our grain varieties, and we had not thought of making it public. It is reported that there are some in the United States who have utilized and played up the matter, and deliberately put the agricultural situation in China on a par with that of the Soviet Union. This will only bring harm to such normal trade contacts. It is hoped that Dr. Kissinger would use his influence to forestall or minimize recurrences of such things. We also have trade contacts with American businessmen. We still believe that with the progressive development towards normalization of Sino-US relations there will be corresponding development in trade between the two countries.⁵

Fourth . . .

Dr. Kissinger: May I make a comment? The first time I heard about this agricultural deal was the day before I took it up with you. It is not our governmental judgment to make your agricultural situation on a par with that of the Soviet Union. It is not, however, our governmental situation to know about these matters. If you can let us know in advance, it will help prevent such in the future. It is not a formal request. Just in order for us to be helpful. It is not in our interest to give publicity to these matters.

Ambassador Huang: The fourth item: Having been kindly notified that Senator Mansfield would come to China for a formal visit in an official capacity, we still hope to be informed in concrete terms of the tasks for Senator Mansfield's visit.

⁵ See Document 250.

The above are the four items I am instructed to convey to you.

Now I would like to tell you in a personal capacity about the exchanges between our two countries—the people-to-people exchanges. The Chinese side has informed the US side through the Paris channel that the Chinese medical delegation intends to visit the United States in October. The Chinese scientists' delegation plans to visit this country in the latter part of November or the beginning of December. And the Chinese acrobatic troupe may visit the United States by the end of December.⁶

Dr. Kissinger: Have we been notified of all these?

Ambassador Huang: Yes, already. Well, when I got the information, I knew you were already informed through the Paris channel. At the beginning, probably Ambassador Watson was absent.

Dr. Kissinger: I will catch up with this.

Ambassador Huang: We will continue to contact the US side through the Paris channel on the concrete details for the visit of the three delegations to the US, and the US Government is again requested to assist in insuring their security during their visit.

And Dr. Kissinger might know that the visit to the United States of the Chinese scientists' delegation was agreed upon between the two sides when the delegation of the Federation of American Scientists extended an invitation to the Chinese scientists during the visit of the Federation delegation to China last summer. The Federation has already made some preparations. However, as the US side has recommended the US Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC as an organization for regular reception of visiting Chinese science and scholarly delegations, the Chinese side will not get involved in the internal relations between various US organizations. The Chinese side wishes to know if it is practicable for the Federation and the Committee to collaborate in receiving the Chinese scientists' delegation, or if it is convenient to the US side for the Federation alone to receive the delegation. For the Chinese side, both ways are acceptable. The Chinese side hopes to hear the views of the US side as soon as possible, either in Paris or in New York, so as to give a formal reply to the Federation of American Scientists.

Dr. Kissinger: We appreciate this personal information, Mr. Ambassador.

First, with respect to security, we will make the maximum effort, and in addition we will make every effort to see that every courtesy is extended.

⁶ See Document 248.

I would appreciate it as a personal courtesy if the Ambassador could let me know any recommendations he may have for how to make our Chinese visitors more comfortable here. This is not an official request, but on a personal basis. But we will take it extremely seriously.

Ambassador Huang: We will respect the arrangements by the US side for the visit, for the reception of the visit.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have an answer on the scientists' visit within a week and we will let you know through this channel.

Ambassador Huang: Just now we discussed the Korean question and I'd like to give you a copy of the draft resolution sponsored by 28 nations. [Tab D]⁷ This is just for your information.

Dr. Kissinger: [reads it] I don't think we will agree to every paragraph.

Ambassador Huang: Just now you mentioned Gromyko's proposal for inclusion in the agenda for renunciation of force and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We also received it very late and have not made a study of it. They have a very bad habit—always a surprise attack!

Dr. Kissinger: We will keep you informed but I can tell you now we will not support it. We have not decided on our tactical procedure but we will not agree to the substance.

Ambassador Huang: That's all.

Dr. Kissinger: Two things. You know that everything we do bilaterally with the Soviet Union we are prepared to do with you. We are not requesting it, but you should know there is no discrimination. We are prepared to do exactly the same thing with you. After the election we would be prepared to have a long range discussion of what we see as the problems over the next three-to-four years, before we freeze our policy.

Secondly, speaking of Gromyko, he will come to Washington as he does every year, for one day, on October 2.

You have a standing invitation too, but you won't come!

Ambassador Huang: It is not very convenient.

Dr. Kissinger: I was at a press party the other night and someone said to me, don't you speak kindly of anyone except the Chinese?

Ambassador Huang: On Bangladesh—tomorrow at 3:00 p.m. will be a meeting of the General Committee.

⁷ Attached at Tab D but not printed is the "Draft Resolution: Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea." See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 158.

Dr. Kissinger: My people tell me you'll lose the vote. But my people told me last year we would win a certain vote!

Ambassador Huang: If it loses in the General Committee, it will come up again in the plenary meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Before or after November?

Ambassador Huang: On the 22nd, immediately after.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you fire many cannons?

Ambassador Huang: Not many.

Dr. Kissinger: We will tell our Ambassador not to use any adjectives. [Laughter]

You will not have reinforcements in the first part of the General Assembly?

Ambassador Huang: I want to tell you that Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua will arrive in New York either the 30th of September or October 1. The information we've got now is he will arrive the 30th of September.

Dr. Kissinger: I will not mention it.

Ambassador Huang: We've already informed the US delegation.

Dr. Kissinger: I hope I can invite him to dinner when he's here, on some occasion, and of course, the Ambassador as well.

Ambassador Huang: I will certainly convey this to him.

Dr. Kissinger: We can renegotiate the Shanghai Communiqué! We spent many nights together.

[Word was received that the Ambassador's car had arrived. The group got up and shook hands.]

Dr. Kissinger: I wish I could wish you a productive session. Let us hope for an amicable session.

Ambassador Huang: There will be controversy.

[The meeting ended.]

254. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 3, 1972, 8:30–9:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Huang Hua
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua
Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman

Dr. Kissinger: Did you give us hell today in the General Assembly? [Laughter]² Please give my best regards to your Vice Foreign Minister.

Ambassador Huang: I have already conveyed your regards to him.

Dr. Kissinger: He was very kind to my friend Professor Galbraith.

If he is free sometime while he is here, I'd be glad to invite him to dinner.

Ambassador Huang: On the 5th, the Vice Foreign Minister will have an informal dinner on the invitation of Secretary Rogers.³ Ambassador Bush will also take part. Tentatively, he'll stay here 10 days or 2 weeks.

Dr. Kissinger: So he won't be here very long.

Ambassador Huang: He appreciates your invitation very much. As to the concrete time, we can discuss.

Dr. Kissinger: We have not fully normalized relations with the State Department, so I may not be able to attend that dinner. But we will have our Cultural Revolution after the election. [Laughter] And we will not let 100 flowers bloom before then! [Laughter]

I am sorry I made you come at a bad time for you. But I'm going to Paris soon, so it's very busy for me.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Attached but not printed were Kissinger's talking points.

² All brackets except those indicating declassification decisions are in the source text.

³ A record of the October 5 dinner for Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua is in telegram 3725/Secto 65 from USUN, October 6. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 160.

Ambassador Huang: We have a message. It's nothing particular. It's about the visit by Prime Minister Tanaka.⁴ The message is [reading]:

"The results of the Sino-Japanese high-level meeting can be seen from the September 29 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement and the Foreign Minister's interview with the press. The Foreign Minister wanted to hold an interview as Dr. Kissinger had done in Shanghai. As pointed out in the Joint Statement, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations is not directed against third countries. Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. It not only is in the interests of the two peoples but is also conducive to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace. We trust that the U.S. side holds the same view.

"The Sino-Japanese talks embodied the spirit of the August 14 message sent by the Chinese side to Dr. Kissinger. The Chinese side expressed that it respected the relations between Japan and the United States. Although the Chinese side has its own views about the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, it did not make any demands.

"In his September 19 message, Dr. Kissinger mentioned the Soviet side's concerns over Sino-Japanese relations. Actually that was merely a pretext used by the Soviet Union to sow discord between Sino-U.S., U.S.-Japanese, and Sino-Japanese relations. The U.S. side has probably noted these Soviet intentions.

"With regard to the question of Taiwan, besides severing its diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Japanese side pledged that it would not support the Taiwan independence movement and that it had no ambitions towards Taiwan. The Chinese side expressed appreciation for this. The Japanese side expressed the hope that its economic links with Taiwan would not be cut immediately, and the Chinese side answered that allowance could be made on the matter but that there should be advance consultations.

"The Chinese side wishes to point out here that under the new circumstances of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, it appears that the Chiang Kai-shek clique may not dare to create major troubles but there will be minor ones. We believe that since the U.S. troops in Taiwan have not yet been withdrawn, the

⁴ A September 28 memorandum for the record by Lord reads in full: "At 10:50 p.m. this evening, Mrs. Shih called me from New York and read me the following message: 'The Chinese and Japanese sides have already reached an agreement on the normalization of relations between the two countries, and the ceremony for the signing of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement was held at 10:00 a.m. Peking time, September 29, in Peking. The full text will be published immediately thereafter. Neither the agreement nor the statement is directed against 3rd countries.' I thanked Mrs. Shih for her message and said I would transmit it immediately to my leader." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges)

United States will still be responsible for actions taken by Taiwan. The Chinese side has noted that during the September 8 meeting Dr. Kissinger reaffirmed the pledges the U.S. side has made on the Taiwan question.

“Besides, the Japanese side expressed concern over the Soviet attempt to expand its spheres of influence into this region. The Chinese side pointed out that Taiwan Province belongs to China, that China will liberate Taiwan, and that of course the Soviet Union cannot be allowed to reach out its hands.”

That’s all of the message I am entrusted to convey.

Dr. Kissinger: We appreciate the message and the spirit which it reflects. As I told you before, we have placed no obstacles in the way of normalization. And in the spirit of understanding of each other’s requirements, we see no long-term danger to us in this normalization. Indeed, Japan is traveling on a road which it is our intention to take ourselves.

Now, as long as we are here, let me raise a few additional matters.

First, about the visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko. We have had a number of formal requests to inform the Soviet leaders what we know about the Tanaka conversations in Peking. And what attitude we would take in case of a Sino-Japanese alliance. We have answered that the second issue does not arise, that is, the alliance, and that with respect to the first, we thought the communiqué covered the subject.

Secondly, Gromyko brought yet another version of this nuclear treaty. Every time we turn it down we get another version. It’s the same as the old one except that it includes a phrase that there should be no attack on third countries. I’m assuming your position remains the same. We have not replied.

We expect to conclude a Maritime Treaty with the Soviet Union this week, and a trade agreement next week or the week after, but it will contain the provisions I’ve already told you. I think I gave you the package—it’s a combination of Lend-Lease, technical facilities, and certain credit arrangements.

I want to make a comment at the end about Vietnam, but let me first raise a few other items.

We have some very sensitive intelligence information in which a very senior Indian official made the following comment: “China should not forget that the Tibetan question has not been resolved and that dissident movements in this vast plateau are still numerous. The refugees we have welcomed from these icy and inhospitable highlands adjust poorly to the heat of the large tropical valleys of India.”

This is an extremely sensitive comment of a very high Indian official.

Ambassador Huang: That is like the language of a writer.

Dr. Kissinger: I give it to you exactly as we received it.

I had a talk with Sir Alec Douglas-Home and he is looking forward to his visit to the Prime Minister. I've explained to him what I believe Chinese concerns are about maintaining the strength and unity of Europe and he is prepared to talk to you in a forthcoming spirit.

With respect to Senator Mansfield: If we send him to the People's Republic, we'd like him to discuss our longer-term relationship, from a philosophical point of view, especially the field of exchanges and the general atmosphere of our relations. We believe it would be useful on the other hand that we conduct a more detailed exchange of views on concrete aspects of our relationship in our channel, by whatever method you would prefer. Because as we begin a second term we want to discuss the long term issues—relations with the Soviets, and so forth. And we wouldn't want Mansfield to get into that.

Ambassador Huang: Do you have any views on the manner in which we would exchange views in this channel?

Dr. Kissinger: We're prepared to send another mission to China—or any other proposal you might care to make.

Ambassador Huang: Do you have any concrete ideas of that mission?

Dr. Kissinger: This is informal now. I think that the first set of talks we had, except the last one, really dealt with the immediate issue of normalization. This time, as we think longer ahead, as we see Soviet moves and other things taking place, before we settle our policy we would like to exchange views with the Prime Minister or whomever he designates. I think in early January—or any time before the inauguration—we would send a group of the same nature as the previous groups—except that Peter Rodman will be part of the group!

Ambassador Huang: So you will go there personally?

Dr. Kissinger: I'd be prepared to go there, yes. Assuming I'm reappointed. [Laughter] I would be prepared to go there personally, yes.

Ambassador Huang: We will convey this back.⁵

⁵ On October 12 the PRC representatives in New York handed over the following message. "1. The Chinese side agrees in principle to the idea put forward by Dr. Kissinger on October 3 about the U.S. side sending a mission to China to discuss the prospects of the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations. Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to come personally again on this mission to China. The specific date of the visit can be discussed and decided upon through this channel after being suggested by the U.S. side. 2. The U.S. side is aware of the position of the Chinese side on the Viet Nam question. The Chinese side hopes that the U.S. and Vietnamese sides will be able to reach an agreement on the settlement of the Viet Nam question." The message is attached to James Fazio's memorandum for the record, October, 13, *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 161.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Prime Minister has other ideas, we will of course examine them carefully.

Ambassador Huang: What is Inauguration Day?

Dr. Kissinger: January 20. It doesn't absolutely have to be before then but there are certain advantages.

Now a word about Vietnam. We have had a two-day meeting last week. I'm returning for a three-day meeting next Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday. And as you know, my deputy General Haig is in Saigon now. We will make, on this occasion, the most generous offer of which we are capable. But it is absolutely our last offer. And if this offer is rejected then we have to conclude, reluctantly, that a political solution is impossible.

We will maintain all the proposals with which you are already familiar, and expand some portions of them.

On Sunday we will convey our proposal to you after we have conveyed it to Hanoi, so you will see it.⁶

Mrs. Shih: On Sunday?

Dr. Kissinger: On Sunday we'll call.

We're seriously interested to end the war. Not because of the elections—we do not need it for elections. But we have also our principles. And it cannot be in anybody's interest that we adopt the position that we will betray our friends or other countries completely, or at all. We have in our relations started a process the implications of which were quite clear to us when I visited Peking in 1971. But you gave us an opportunity to maintain our honor and our principles.

I do not know what your relationships are with North Vietnam, and as I told the Prime Minister, we prefer closer relations between you and North Vietnam than for the Soviet Union to have a major influence there. But this is the decisive moment for peace. They have made some proposals which go in a positive direction, though not far enough. If this opportunity is now missed, I can only see expanded conflict. And after the elections, you know as well as I do that we are domestically in a very strong position.

I go there in a constructive spirit, in order to end the war and to start a new relationship. And you are in a position to judge what advice if any you may want to offer in these circumstances.

We will call you Saturday to fix a time for delivering this document.

⁶ Fazio delivered a message to New York on Sunday, October 8. The materials delivered to PRC diplomats have not been found. The message is attached to Fazio's memorandum for the record, October 9, in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 165.

Ambassador Huang: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: That is all that I have, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Huang: Will you return back to the U.S. on the 10th of October?

Dr. Kissinger: About the 10th.

If there should be a very important development, I might go on to Saigon. But my plan is to return here the 10th. In my absence, you can call Commander Howe, because I have Mr. Lord with me. And I may take General Haig with me this time too.

Ambassador Huang: I appreciate that you have arranged this meeting, and we will certainly convey what you gave us, and we will convey your regards to the Vice Foreign Minister.

We will have to arrange a time after you return, for a meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: I call him "Mr. X" because I can't pronounce his name.

Ambassador Huang: The sounds in it are like German!

Dr. Kissinger: I always confuse the nuance between his name [Chiao] and the Prime Minister's [Chou]!

A word about your meeting with the Secretary of State. For a number of reasons he knows nothing at all about our exchanges, nor about the details of the Vietnam negotiations. So if there should be a discrepancy between what I have said and what you may hear, you should guide yourselves by what I have said. But you have experience with this situation already.

Ambassador Huang: There's no fixed item for the talks. The two sides haven't raised any questions to talk about.

Dr. Kissinger: I will look into it.

Good. Can we call the car? [The car is called.]

Were there any films made of my June visit?

Ambassador Huang: I don't know. I will check.

Dr. Kissinger: I showed the film of my July visit to the Soviet Ambassador. It was not one of his best moments!

We have found it impossible to turn down this treaty. We have had four versions now! I thought when we turned it down in Moscow we would end it.

With respect to their proposal at the UN, by the way, we will oppose it.

Ambassador Huang: In today's speech by our Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua, he made a clear exposition of our position.

Dr. Kissinger: How did Mr. Malik behave? Was he calm?

Ambassador Huang: We'll see his reaction tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: He will speak tomorrow?

Ambassador Huang: He has not entered his name yet.

Dr. Kissinger: The Vice Foreign Minister has the ability to raise the blood pressure of the Soviet Ambassador.

Mrs. Shih, is your husband here in New York?

Mrs. Shih: Yes. He speaks French.

Dr. Kissinger: Your mission is getting larger.

Ambassador Huang: We need many interpreters, because many comrades, colleagues, don't speak a foreign language.

Dr. Kissinger: When we arrange a meeting with the Vice Foreign Minister, let us know whether we should have other people there or just have a small working group.

Ambassador Huang: Who would you have in mind?

Dr. Kissinger: It is up to you. We could invite my friend Governor Rockefeller. I would check with you first. I would not invite anyone without checking with you first.⁷

[The Ambassador's car then arrived and the meeting ended with friendly handshakes.]

⁷ Kissinger and Nelson Rockefeller hosted a dinner for Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Huang Hua, and other PRC diplomats on the evening of November 13 in New York. A memorandum of conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 166.

255. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

Transfer of Submarine to the Republic of China

Secretary Laird has asked your approval of the transfer of two submarines to the Republic of China (Tab B).² Secretary Laird refers to your

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Concurred in by Pinckney. Written by hand above Kissinger's name are the words "Haig for."

² Attached at Tab B but not printed is Laird's September 13 memorandum.

memorandum of July 10, 1972 asking him to bring the question up again in September (Tab C).³

You told Ambassador Kennedy in your memorandum of last July 24 that we intended to honor the commitment which he made, on the President's authority, to the ROC a year ago to transfer a submarine (Tab D).⁴ Secretary Laird, we understand, committed us to the Congress to transfer a total of two submarines to the ROC.

Secretary Laird states that the U.S. Navy has earmarked two active fleet submarines which would otherwise be retired for transfer to the ROC: the first for formal transfer on December 31, 1972 (although it would be available for ROC use in October), and the second on June 30, 1973. Although the first ROC submarine crew will be ready to begin training on the first craft this month, Secretary Laird states that the crew's training in the current classroom phase of its course could be extended until late November. This extension would also require that we ask the ROC to delay the arrival of its second crew until late November, given the limited classroom facilities at the submarine school.

I recommend that we delay beginning the on-board phase of the first crew's training until late November.

I also recommend we stipulate as a condition of the transfer that the ROC agree that the submarines are to be used for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training only—the only military purpose for which ei-

³ Attached at Tab C but not printed is Kissinger's July 10 memorandum to Laird, in which Kissinger noted that the President "appreciates the problems involved in not proceeding at this time. He continues to believe, however, that the transfer should be deferred for a period of several more months, during which an evaluation could be made of additional political and military factors which might have a bearing on the matter." The July 10 memorandum was in response to Laird's June 16 memorandum to Kissinger requesting that the submarine transfer go forward. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI) Laird was acting on the advice of Nutter, who outlined conflicts over obtaining approval for the submarine transfer, and recommended that Laird sign the June 16 memorandum. This memorandum and other documentation on the Department of Defense effort to supply the submarines, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0094, China (Nats), 400.137–800, 1972. See also Document 224.

⁴ In a July 18 memorandum to Kissinger, Kennedy remarked that he had been asked about the commitment made to the ROC Government during the textile negotiations in 1971 to provide a submarine. See Documents 133 and 134. Kennedy noted: "As it turned out, the only item we made a firm commitment on to Taiwan was the submarine. As you recall, I cleared this explicitly with the President and was authorized to notify Chiang Ching-kuo which I subsequently did personally." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) Tab D, the attached memorandum from Kissinger to Kennedy, is dated July 27, not July 24. In it, Kissinger wrote, "You may be assured that the United States does intend to honor the commitment in this regard you made to then Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo last year." He added that this will occur in the "near future."

ther the ROC or State and Defense have justified the transfer. (State's memorandum at Tab C strongly recommends that we include this understanding.)⁵ If the Chinese agree to this stipulation but then go ahead to use the subs for other purposes, we will at least have on the record our word to them not to do so.

I believe we should ask State and Defense for draft press guidance to cover both the commencement of the on-board phase of the training as well as the formal transfers.

To derive maximum political benefit in the ROC, we could have Ambassador McConaughy upon his return to Taipei October 10⁶ convey the news of the transfer to the ROC leadership, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. To avoid the risk of a leak within our own bureaucracy, I suggest that we inform Defense and State of our decision at the time that we instruct Ambassador McConaughy to deliver this message in Taipei.

At Tab A is a draft memorandum from you to Secretary Laird approving the transfer of two submarines under the conditions mentioned above.⁷

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Secretary Laird at Tab A, the memorandum to be transmitted to Defense (with a copy to State) at the same time that Ambassador McConaughy is instructed to inform the ROC.

⁵ Also attached at Tab C but not printed is a September 28 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to the President.

⁶ McConaughy did not discuss submarines in the October 13 meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo, as the decision on their transfer had not yet been made. (Telegram 5181 from Taipei, October 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CHINAT–JAPAN)

⁷ Attached at Tab A but not printed is an October 16 memorandum from Kissinger to Laird.

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, October 20, 1972, 0045Z.

192357. Subject: Enhance Plus. Strictly Eyes Only Ambassador.

1. You should immediately² approach highest available level GRC which we assume to be Prime Minister, and in the name of the President seek his immediate agreement for the transfer to USG, which will immediately transfer to GVN, all F-5A's in possession of ROCAF. As GRC is aware, USG is now engaged in all-out effort to achieve settlement in VN consistent with the principles that have previously been announced by the President. It is too early to say whether this effort can or will be successful. However, in event it is successful, we want to place GVN in strongest possible military position prior to coming into effect of any agreement. As part of this effort we desire immediately to deliver to GVN maximum possible number of F-5 aircraft (which is type of aircraft for which VNAF is trained and equipped). In order to achieve this we are asking ROC and some other countries which hold F-5A's for this major contribution to achievement of peace and strengthening of GVN military capabilities. We recognize unprecedented nature of this request which is done only for reasons of unparalleled importance.

2. We will, of course, credit GRC with value of aircraft and will be prepared promptly and on extraordinary basis to work out method of replacements, including possibility of F-5E co-production scheme. In meanwhile, we will, if GRC desires, be prepared to discuss deployment of US F-4's and US pilots to Taiwan to fill gap this creates GRC defense.³

¹ National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US–CHINAT. Top Secret; Nodis; Flash. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by Eliot. Repeated to Saigon strictly eyes only for the Ambassador.

² Telegram 191868 to Taipei, October 20, strictly eyes only for the Ambassador, reads in its entirety: "Pending further instructions, you should keep yourself immediately available to carry out urgent instructions which will require your seeing highest available GRC official, whose whereabouts you should seek to determine without in any way alerting GRC or any member of your staff." (Ibid.)

³ In telegram 5209 from Taipei, October 21, McConaughy reported that he met with Chiang Ching-kuo that morning. "His [Chiang's] reaction was essentially favorable with certain qualifications based on questions which could not be fully answered at the first meeting." Chiang wanted to know when the F-5's could be transferred to the ROC, when the United States would deploy F-4's to Taiwan, and would the F-4's stay on the island until the F-5's were provided. (Ibid.) The Department responded in telegram 192705 to Taipei, October 21, that the United States hoped to supply the F-5E's in FY 1974 and would try to deploy the F-4's with U.S. pilots within 90 days. "We would do our best to cover gap but would have to be able to respond to unexpected emergencies elsewhere." (Ibid.)

3. We very much need reply during course of Saturday, October 21, Washington time.

4. Request you stress importance of tightest security on this matter, at least up to time of delivery of aircraft.

FYI. In event subject comes up or you feel it would be useful, you may inform Prime Minister that US is prepared to make transfer to GRC of two ASW configured diesel submarines and the 60 M-48 tanks which we have had under review. Also it may be necessary to request help of some GRC pilots to deliver aircraft.⁴ End FYI.

5. Taipei also repeat response to Saigon.

⁴ In telegram 5218 from Taipei, October 22, McConaughy reported that he informed Chiang Ching-kuo at their October 21 meeting that the United States was willing to transfer two ASW submarines and 60 M-48 tanks. (Ibid.)

257. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee¹

Washington, October 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

China Covert Action Program

CIA has finally come up with a proposal for its China covert action program which accommodates the “new look” in U.S.–Sino relations.² It has been three years since the 40 Committee approved a program which included “black” and “grey” radio broadcasts from Taipei and Seoul, propaganda sent to the China mainland via balloons, media operations in Hong Kong and Tokyo, and activities worldwide to denigrate and obstruct the People’s Republic of China (PRC).³

¹ Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files, China. Secret; Eyes Only. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Holdridge initialed his concurrence.

² Attached but not printed is a 10-page CIA report to the 40 Committee, October 10, 1972. A handwritten notation on the bottom of page 1 of this report reads: “Telephonically approved by the 40 Committee on 26 October 1972.” In a December 1, 1971, memorandum to Kissinger, Helms noted: “We have attempted to draft a China Covert Action program but found it most difficult to do so in the absence of more specific guidance.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086R Executive Registry Files)

³ See Document 30.

Broadcasts from the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] facility were terminated in mid-1972 as were two of the three “black” radio legends broadcast from Taipei. With attention to avoiding a reaction from Taiwan which would endanger continued [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] activities, it is proposed that other blatant anti-mainland China operations be terminated.⁴

All support to Taiwan’s propaganda and psychological warfare against the PRC will be terminated during FY 1973. Selective support to Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its position overseas will continue. The unilateral radio facility in [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will be maintained on a standby basis. Media capabilities in [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will be maintained. The primary goal will be to support the initiative toward better relations with the PRC with priority to operations which put covert action assets into direct contact with individuals who might persuade the PRC to improve relations with us.

Funds budgeted for this phase-out year total [*dollar amount not declassified*]. This contrasts with [*dollar amount not declassified*] budgeted for last year and the [*dollar amount not declassified*] approved for FY 1969.⁵

⁴ In a September 7 meeting with Nelson, Green stated that “he wished to see us move as fast as possible to get out of any connection with GRC activities directed against the PRC. Such association was inconsistent with our policy of improving relations with both powers. It was perfectly appropriate and indeed desirable to support GRC attempts to bolster its image with the rest of the world, particularly overseas Chinese.” The minutes of the meeting continue: “Mr. Nelson said that rigorous pursuit of this approach would reduce our [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] activities against the GRC itself.” (Memorandum from James R. Gardner of INR to Cline, September 8; Department of State, INR Historical Files, Subject Files, China, 1971–1977) On September 12 Gleysteen wrote that he agreed with the need to terminate these activities: “However, to cut off all or almost all activities immediately, would seem unnecessary, and to make the cut precisely at the moment the GRC is uptight over the Japanese issue might prove ill-advised.” He suggested informing the ROC Government “between the completion of the Tanaka visit and the end of this calendar year.” (Ibid.)

⁵ The CIA was considering other changes to its operations on Taiwan in late 1972. During in a November 6 meeting with Green, Nelson divulged that “it would be necessary to close the Air America headquarters on Taiwan for reasons of economy, move some of the functions to the Washington office and disperse others to other East Asian locations.” He and Green agreed that McConaughy would inform Chiang Ching-kuo of this immediately, and defer notice of changes to the propaganda programs until early December. (Memorandum from Richard K. Stuart of INR to Cline, November 6; *ibid.*) McConaughy met with Chiang Ching-kuo on December 13 and stated that the change was “a logical consequence of the previously announced U.S. policy aimed at improving relations with the PRC and lowering tensions in the Far East.” McConaughy added that the activities would terminate by March 31, 1973, but offered several “palliatives,” such as a subsidy payment and spare parts for radios. “According to the Ambassador, the Premier seemed somewhat taken aback by the suddenness of this termination date but did not argue the point.” (Memorandum from Nelson to Green, December 14; *ibid.*)

258. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 24, 1972, 6:55–7:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Mr. Kuo, Notetaker

Ambassador Huang: You must be tired. You spend half the time on the ground and half the time in the air.

Dr. Kissinger: After my last stop, I enjoy being in the air more than being on the ground. (Ambassador Huang smiles slightly.)

I have achieved the unity of the Vietnamese—both of them dislike me, North and South. (Ambassador Huang laughs.)

I haven't had the opportunity to follow the Ambassador's and Vice Foreign Minister's speeches in the United Nations as much as usual. Is the Vice Foreign Minister still here?

Ambassador Huang: Yes. Yesterday evening he met with Senators Mansfield and Scott and Senate Secretary Valeo.

Dr. Kissinger: Was that here or in Washington?

Ambassador Huang: Here.

Dr. Kissinger: Because if they had come to Washington, my feelings would have been hurt. Did Senator Mansfield have a chance to discuss our problem with you?

Ambassador Huang: No, he didn't go into details. He indicated in general terms that he would like to have a chance to visit China.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we have done all we can on our side.

I don't want to take too much of your time, but I asked to see you shortly after my return because I want to ask something which we have not asked before—and that is whether the Prime Minister might be willing to use his good offices in the rather complicated state that our negotiations have reached with the Vietnamese. And I believe it is in their interest. We are really not asking this for ourselves.

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Attached but not printed were Kissinger's talking points.

As you probably know from both us and Hanoi, the North Vietnamese and I reached substantial agreement in Paris in the middle of October.² I told them at the time, after getting the approval of the President, that I would go to Saigon and after I had the approval of Saigon I would go to Hanoi, and we would complete the agreement. And I said I would do this by October 30.

Now I have to say on behalf of your allies that they have behaved very correctly and they have made significant concessions. I went to Saigon, but it has not proven possible to obtain agreement in every respect. The Vietnamese people have not survived for 2,000 years under foreign pressures by being easy to deal with. We can make our influence felt over a period of time, but not in three days.

And secondly there are some aspects of the agreement that have to be slightly adjusted without major changes, partly because of different nuances in the Vietnamese and English languages, partly because the agreement has to be adjusted for four party signature, and similar matters.

To give you an example of nuances in the language, we agreed in the text on a body which should be called with a certain name in English, an "administrative structure," something other than a political body or a bureaucratic body. In Vietnamese this has a somewhat governmental meaning, so we would like to restore the original meaning. I would just like to give an example of the problems.

We propose that Le Duc Tho return to Paris, but also we are prepared to meet in any other place, and this would take two days, I think three days at the most.

We have also told him that once we have revised the text it would be considered final, and no additional changes would be required, and we would make ourselves responsible for our allies. This may still require, in order to get an agreement with our allies, some weeks after the agreement is approved.

² On October 16 Fazio delivered a message to the PRC's representatives in New York that reads in part: "The U.S. side considers that an agreement is near in its negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with respect to the conflict in Southeast Asia. The one remaining issue in the effort to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict relates to the question of restricting military supplies to both North and South Vietnam by outside powers." The note concluded, "the U.S. side would welcome some indication from the Government of the People's Republic of China as to what policies it will pursue in regard to military supplies to North Vietnam in case a rapid peace settlement is arrived at. Such an indication from the Government of the People's Republic of China would do much to accelerate agreement between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As soon as a settlement is arrived at, Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to explore other outstanding issues of Indochina, especially the problem of Cambodia." The message is attached to Fazio's memorandum for the record, October 17, *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 167.

The North Vietnamese take the position that we must sign the agreement by October 30. But this is insanity. We cannot sign an agreement on behalf of an ally who disapproves and the only result of that would be a total impasse.

Mr. Ambassador, you know the United States. You know that between now and elections we cannot have a public confrontation with Saigon. This I say to you personally. So we have also told Hanoi that we will stop bombing north of the 20th parallel while these negotiations go on.

Ambassador Huang: The 20th parallel.

Dr. Kissinger: I mean all the Red River Delta where 90 percent of the population lives. Here is a note that we have sent them today, which sums up our position. It is the exact text. (He hands over the message to the DRV at Tab A.)³

What we would like to ask the assistance of the Prime Minister is to convince Hanoi that this is not a trick. We have kept every promise we have made to you, and we would keep a promise made to them, but it must be a realistic promise. (Ambassador Huang begins reading the message.) If they agree to this procedure there would certainly be peace during the month of November, and we would make an obligation towards them, but also towards you, whose relations we value so highly. And we would undertake that obligation not only towards them but towards you. If they insist that we sign on October 30 an agreement whose first article says the U.S. with the concurrence of South Vietnam, whose concurrence we don't have, then we are engaging in an empty exercise which cannot succeed.

Now this is the situation in which we find ourselves. All issues are settled in principle. The changes we shall propose will be mostly on language and one of some symbolic importance. It would enable us to return to Saigon and claim we have taken their views into account. It would certainly be considered a very important gesture by us if the Prime Minister would indicate his experience with our reliability. Because it is obvious that the war is nearly concluded, it would be tragic if negotiations broke down now. Perhaps I made a promise somewhat too optimistically which we cannot fulfill for reasons which are out of our control.

I am sure that you have no instructions on this subject, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Huang: No. I have gotten this information firsthand from you.

³ Attached at Tab A but not printed is a 4-page message to the DRV. See *ibid.*, Document 168.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not asking for any comments, but there is some urgency because I think there is great excitement in Hanoi. They are feeling perhaps that they were tricked, and I want to assure you that this was not the case.

One trouble with Vietnam is that one side always thinks it is winning and the side that thinks it is winning absolutely refuses to negotiate. That is a personal comment. (Meanwhile Ambassador Huang keeps reading the message. Dr. Kissinger pours the Ambassador tea.)

Ambassador Huang: We will promptly convey your oral information as well as your note to the DRV to Premier Chou En-lai. Certainly I cannot make any comment here.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course not. I understand.

Ambassador Huang: It seems to be the last one in a series of exchanges and communications.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but they all say more or less the same thing. They always say that we must sign October 30. They do not explain how we can sign a document whose first paragraph says that the United States, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, etc.; they don't explain how we can sign such a document when we don't have the concurrence.

Ambassador Huang: What is the position of the Saigon side?

Dr. Kissinger: I will be frank with you. I should not have agreed to this procedure to begin with. I did it to show my good will. I did not think the DRV would take it so absolutely literally, and I did it to speed up the procedure. Many of the changes that they want are very technical—when it lists the names of the four parties they simply want to say the four parties of the Paris Conference—but they are prepared to sign the document. They don't want the names of all the parties in the document. I am not asking you to support the changes—I want to give you examples.

Ambassador Huang: You mean the Saigon side . . .⁴

Dr. Kissinger: Wants this. Many changes are of the same type that I discussed with the Vice Foreign Minister in Hangchow on the last night, when our bureaucracy raised objections after we had already completed the agreement, and he was generous enough to discuss them with me, and we agreed to 80 percent of them. Many of these changes will be forgotten a week after the agreement is signed. It is merely a question of face. (To Mr. Kuo and Mrs. Shih who do not understand the word, Ambassador Huang repeats "face.") Someone once told me that westerners are conscious about face.

⁴ Ellipsis in the source text.

There are two questions of substance, one of which I think is quite easily solvable. We have agreed that the two parties of Vietnam should negotiate to create something called a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. We have said an “administrative structure.” In English, as you know, “administrative structure” is below the governmental level. In Vietnamese the translation is something like a political structure. So I would like to find a word that translates differently with the same English meaning, or a different English word.

The other point is more difficult, and I always raise it with them. It is the question of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam (Ambassador Huang indicates understanding and looks at the text.) I have expressed it a little bit more delicately in this note, but they will understand it. They take the position that (a) they don’t have any forces, and (b) they won’t withdraw them. We have offered a practical proposal which is not to mention it in the agreement at all, but that prior to an agreement being signed, they should withdraw some forces from the northernmost part of the country, 20 kilometers to North Vietnam, which we would pick up through intelligence sources. They wouldn’t have to admit their forces are in the South nor change the military situation very much, because it is very close, but it would satisfy the political requirements of the situation. This would not be written into the agreement. It would be a unilateral gesture.

So we will not reopen the agreement. The issues are not major ones. Psychologically they are extremely important because they would give Saigon a psychological feeling of having participated.

Now if Hanoi makes a public issue of it, we will be forced to emphasize all our differences and a settlement would be delayed indefinitely. (Ambassador Huang drops his matches.) And that would be a pity when most of the issues have been settled. It is really a question now of procedure, a little bit a question of prestige, and somewhat a feeling of confidence. We thought that if someone could make clear that our tendency is to keep our promises this would have a helpful influence. And you would be helping to bring peace and not interfere when war is going on. (Mr. Kuo explained to Ambassador Huang.)

Ambassador Huang: If there is nothing else you would like to tell us, we will take our leave.

Dr. Kissinger: We will make a proposal to you about my visit after the elections, but we appreciate the invitation. It guarantees that Mr. Lord won’t resign until after the visit.

Ambassador Huang (to Mr. Lord): Are you going back to scholastic life?

Dr. Kissinger: I hope he doesn’t leave at all.

Mr. Lord: I have no firm plans.

Ambassador Huang: The last time you mentioned the film from your June visit. I have word that they are already making efforts on your film.⁵

Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate that. Is the Vice Minister free next week or is he leaving?

Ambassador Huang: He is not leaving next week.

Dr. Kissinger: Can I propose some engagement by phone?

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I would be delighted to see him again. What would be his feeling with my inviting one or two other people, or would he rather do it alone?

Ambassador Huang: He won't reject your friends.

Dr. Kissinger: Alright, I will make a proposal in the next few days and perhaps we will do it at my club, or do you go to a restaurant? (Ambassador Huang indicates with his hands that it is up to Dr. Kissinger.)

Dr. Kissinger: It's up to me.

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I will make a proposal next week. Then we can start negotiating the Shanghai communiqué all over again (laughter). He (referring to Vice Minister Chiao) was the toughest negotiator I ever dealt with, but also very honorable.

(There was then some discussion standing up while the Chinese were waiting for their car. Ambassador Huang noted that the quicker the war was over the better. Dr. Kissinger replied that this should happen by the end of November, if we could get over the present situation of hurt feelings. Hanoi thought that the U.S. was trying to trick them by getting by the elections and then attacking them. We had told Le Duc Tho we would settle before the elections, but we needed two to three weeks afterwards. Ambassador Huang inquired if there couldn't be a complete settlement before the elections. Dr. Kissinger responded that in a blow-up before the elections the U.S. would have to choose Saigon over Hanoi. After elections it would be just the opposite. Furthermore a blow-up would make people think the opponents of the Administration were right all along, and in western countries at least this was not a good thing before an election. Ambassador Huang said that by "opponents" Dr. Kissinger meant Mr. McGovern. Dr. Kissinger confirmed that this was the case. The car then arrived and the Chinese departed.)

⁵ Reference is to a request made by Kissinger at the end of his October 3 meeting with Huang Hua. See Document 254.

259. Message From the Government of the People's Republic of China to the Government of the United States¹

New York, October 25, 1972.

It is learned that complete agreement has been reached at the Vietnam-U.S. Paris talks on the settlement of the Vietnam question, and that it will soon be signed by the two sides. The Vietnamese side has made maximum efforts and exercised the utmost patience for this.

Now is an extremely opportune time to end the Vietnam war. Obstructions from Saigon were expected, but in the evening of October 24 (Saigon time) just after Dr. Kissinger had left, Nguyen Van Thieu went to the extent of making a public speech through the networks, in which he poured out torrents of vicious abuse against northern Vietnam, and even cast reflections on Dr. Kissinger. His aim is obviously to sabotage the ceasefire, troop withdrawal, P.O.W. repatriation and the return of Indochina to the status of non-alignment, that is to say, to oppose the Vietnam-U.S. negotiations. Thus it may be asked why then did the Saigon authorities participate in the Paris talks and permit the Vietnamese and U.S. sides to hold the secret talks on behalf of the two sides of southern Vietnam respectively?

The Chinese side believes that so long as the U.S. side is determined to effect a ceasefire and troop withdrawal, it is fully capable of halting Saigon's sabotage schemes. Otherwise, failure to resolve at the right moment, to maintain consistency in its stand and to abide by the agreements already reached with the Vietnamese side would not only result in losing credence before the world, but may also lead to unforeseeable consequences.

Although the Chinese side could trust that the difficulties and sabotage come from Saigon, how can the world be forbidden to have its doubts?! Since the U.S. side has been representative of one side in the bilateral negotiations, why can't the United States manage the actions of that side on its own?

We deeply believe that this is the crucial moment and hope that the U.S. side will consider the problem in a broader framework, take the long view and act resolutely.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. A typewritten notation on the first page reads: "Handed to J. Fazio by Mrs. Shih, October 25, 1972, New York." At this meeting, Fazio handed over a copy of a 3-page note entitled "Message to the Government of the DRV on Behalf of the President of the United States," which was a response to a DRV message of October 24. Fazio also extended an invitation from Kissinger to Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Huang Hua for dinner in New York on November 1. Fazio's memorandum for the record of the October 25 meeting and the U.S. message are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 165.

As for the questions of the three countries of Indochina, only by solving them separately can progress be made according to order. We will not elaborate on this point as there is an identity of views here.

260. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, October 27, 1972.

The U.S. side has studied most carefully the Chinese message of October 25, 1972, and respects its motivations. At the same time, the Chinese side will understand that the U.S. side must adhere to its principles. The U.S. position was explained by Dr. Kissinger on October 26, 1972: "We will not be stampeded into an agreement until its provisions are right. We will not be deflected from an agreement when its provisions are right."

The current situation arose from the U.S. side's attempt to accommodate the DRV side by accepting an accelerated and arbitrary schedule which proved to be unworkable. The U.S. side is now earnestly engaged in bringing about the rapid conclusion of a settlement that can be signed and implemented. It shall use its maximum influence to this end, but the task requires as well the cooperation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The changes that are necessary in the agreement do not touch its essence and can all be accommodated within its present framework. In this regard, Dr. Kissinger in his October 26, 1972, press conference publicly reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to its essential provisions.²

The need now is for the immediate end of public harassment, one final negotiating session in Paris, and then a brief interval to enable the U.S. side to accomplish the objectives mentioned in the Chinese note.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the first page reads: "Handed to Mrs. Shih by Fazio, 8:45 p.m., 10/27/72." This meeting was held in New York. Fazio also gave the PRC representatives a 2-page message responding to a DRV message of October 26. The U.S. message reads in part: "The U.S. side wishes to point out that Dr. Kissinger will not be available between November 4 and November 9." (The Presidential election was November 8.) This message and Fazio's undated memorandum of record are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 166.

² Kissinger's October 26 press conference is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 13, 1972, pp. 549–558.

The cooperation of the DRV is essential in this effort. Public pressure must have the opposite consequence and indefinitely delay a solution.

Attached is a message which the U.S. side has sent to the DRV side on October 27, 1972, proposing a concrete schedule to complete the agreement and reaffirming unilateral U.S. undertakings with respect to that schedule.³ With mutual good will and a cooperative attitude the remaining obstacles to a settlement can certainly be surmounted in a matter of weeks.

It would be greatly appreciated if the Chinese side would use its considerable influence in a positive direction so as to help bring about the peace that now is so near.

³ See footnote 1 above.

261. Message From the Government of the People's Republic of China to the Government of the United States¹

New York, October 31, 1972.

The Chinese side has on many occasions made clear its consistent stand on the Viet Nam question. It has been closely following and seriously studying the recent developments and the public documents of the various sides. Now it further has the following comments to make on Dr. Kissinger's conversation of October 24 (EST), the U.S. message of October 27 and the three messages of the U.S. side to the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam that were delivered to us:²

The nine-point agreement made public by the Vietnamese side has been confirmed by Dr. Kissinger. After repeated consultations and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the first page reads: "Handed to J. Fazio by Mrs. Shih, 10/31/72, NYC." According to Fazio's memorandum for the record, at the October 31 meeting Mrs. Shih announced that Ch'iao and Huang would not be able to attend the November 1 dinner, "Since the invitation came on short notice, the Vice Foreign Minister had made other plans." (Ibid.) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 167. Ch'iao and Huang attended a dinner with Kissinger and Rockefeller on November 13. (See footnote 6, Document 254)

² See Documents 258, 259, and 260.

amendments, the Vietnamese and U.S. sides had reached agreement on all the provisions of the agreement and mutually agreed on the schedule for its signing. However, on October 24 Nguyen Van Thieu came out with violent abuse and refused to accept the agreement. The U.S. side followed with further demands for amendments in the provisions and unilaterally upset the original schedule, so that the already worked-out agreement cannot be signed. This is the root cause of the present state of affairs.

The U.S. side says that the changes that are necessary in the agreement are “minor”, “procedural”, and “do not touch its essence, and can all be accommodated within its present framework.” But in fact this is by no means the case. For example, what is termed the demand that northern Viet Nam withdraw its “troops” from southern Viet Nam, that the ceasefire in Viet Nam be made more nearly simultaneous with ceasefires in other parts of Indochina, etc., are all pretexts deliberately created by the Saigon authorities to disrupt the agreement. The U.S. side has taken over these unreasonable demands and is trying to make people believe that such changes do not touch the essence of the agreement. This can in no way hold water.

The U.S. side stresses that it must adhere to its principles, and that any agreement must be discussed with and approved by Saigon before it can be signed. But Saigon has made statements openly rejecting the nine-point agreement. Then how can the U.S. side guarantee that the final text can be completed in only three or four more days of negotiation and make itself responsible for the fact that no additional changes will be raised? If the U.S. guarantee is not empty words, it can only serve as proof that the U.S. side was able to negotiate and sign an agreement on behalf of Saigon in the first place, but it did not wish to do so.

Although we are willing to believe that the U.S. side has the tendency to keep its promises, we cannot but note that the U.S. side twice proposed on October 24 and 25 that a meeting be held on any day of the Vietnamese side’s choosing during the week of October 30, yet only two days afterwards, it changed to say that the meeting should be held beginning on November 1 and would last as long as required, but Dr. Kissinger would not be available between November 4 and 9. Dr. Kissinger will naturally understand that such practice is of no help to the increase of mutual trust.

The issue is quite clear. As Dr. Kissinger has said, the Vietnamese side has made very significant concessions. According to statements by the Vietnamese side, President Nixon also expressed that the agreement had solved all outstanding problems. The Vietnamese side has abided by the agreement already reached, but the U.S. side has gone back on its own word, created offshoot issues, reached out for a yard

after taking an inch and continued to put forward new demands. It is only natural for the Vietnamese side to express indignation at this.

The Saigon authorities are wantonly pouring out abuse, openly creating trouble and bent on sabotaging the agreement. If the U.S. side does not put a firm stop to this, but on the contrary exerts pressure on the Vietnamese side, prolongs the war and consequently sacrifices all that has been achieved in the negotiations, then how are people to view the U.S. statements about its preparedness to make efforts for the relaxation of tension in the Far East?

Please give earnest consideration to the above views.

262. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, November 1, 1972.

The U.S. side, as always, has given earnest consideration to the views of the Chinese side as conveyed in the message of October 31, 1972. It wishes to state its position once again.

The record is absolutely clear that the U.S. side told the DRV side on many occasions that it could not proceed without consultations with the Republic of Vietnam. The transcripts of the meetings fully testify to this fact. The U.S. side, while constantly pointing out the possibilities for delay, agreed to the accelerated schedule proposed by the DRV because of its interest in achieving a peaceful settlement as rapidly as possible.

The U.S. side made maximum efforts to adhere to the schedule, but its task was greatly complicated by many actions on the DRV side. These included the interview given to an American journalist by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister while the most sensitive consultations were underway in Saigon which claimed an agreement and the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the first page reads: "Handed to Mrs. Shih by J. Fazio, 4 PM, 11/1/72, NYC." Attached but not printed is Fazio's undated memorandum of record, which reads in full: "Following is a report of a meeting with Mrs. Shih at the Chinese Mission in New York on November 1, 1972. I entered the Mission at 3:45 p.m., was greeted by Mrs. Shih, and escorted to the second floor. Tea was served and pleasantries exchanged. I presented the note to Mrs. Shih (attached), which she read very carefully. She had no questions and said she would pass it on. Mrs. Shih immediately changed the subject and small talk followed. I departed the Mission at 4:10 p.m."

intent to overthrow the government with which negotiations were being conducted; the obvious preparations made by the DRV side to have the ceasefire coincide with maximum military activity in South Vietnam; and the North Vietnamese exploitation of its translation—never agreed to by the U.S. side—of the English phrase “administrative structure” which the DRV side itself proposed. The Vietnamese term suggests a governmental body which is totally inconsistent with the meaning of the agreement as recognized by both sides. This represents an ambiguity that must be rectified and provides a clear illustration of the need for another meeting.

But no point is served in cataloging accusations. Only two explanations are possible for recent events. Either the US is seriously engaged in attempting to bring about peace. Or it is engaged in a trick to thwart an agreement. The U.S. side recognizes that the DRV side may suspect that the U.S. is undertaking a maneuver designed to renege on the agreement after the elections. The U.S. side wishes to reiterate that it wishes to bring about peace in the most rapid manner, that its policy will not change after the elections and that it will maintain all its commitments. Therefore, if temporary obstacles are encountered, whatever the reason, there is a need for understanding and not the constant reiteration of one-sided charges. All countries have an interest in ending the war in Vietnam.

As for the specific allegations in the Chinese note, Dr. Kissinger is unavailable between November 4 and 9 because of longstanding commitments, the nature of which cannot be hard to understand. This, of course, in no way changes the undertaking to meet promptly and for as long as necessary with the DRV to complete the agreement.

With respect to the argument that if it is possible to gain the acquiescence of Saigon after another session this proves that this has always been possible, surely the Chinese side must know the difference between presenting a plan without consultation in three days and a program worked out over a period of weeks after intensive consultation and sense of participation.

There is a more fundamental point with respect to U.S. relations with the Republic of Vietnam. The Chinese side, considering all the conversations it has had with the U.S. side about respecting basic principles, must surely understand that the U.S. cannot treat an ally as a puppet. This would accord neither with reality nor principle. The constant assumption and public reiteration by the DRV that the U.S. has complete mastery over its friends has been one of the root causes of present difficulties. The U.S. side would like to remind the Chinese side of the many conversations between Dr. Kissinger and the Prime Minister in which Dr. Kissinger expressed understanding and respect for the Chinese meticulous treatment of Prince Sihanouk, a friendly leader

who was a guest on Chinese soil. The U.S. side points out that its problems with its friends are no easier and its principles no different.

In any event it is not true that the U.S. side has adopted all its ally's objections as its own positions. This was made amply clear in Dr. Kissinger's October 26, 1972 press conference and is obvious as well from the list of unresolved questions that the U.S. has outlined to the DRV side.

With reference to the question of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam, the U.S., as a very great concession, agreed that this issue would not be mentioned in the agreement. The U.S. will continue to respect this point. Nor is the U.S. endorsing the Republic of Vietnam's position that all North Vietnamese troops be withdrawn from the South. The U.S. is simply reiterating its previous proposal, made at every private meeting and never withdrawn, for a practical solution, namely that some North Vietnamese divisions in the northernmost part of South Vietnam be moved relatively short distances across the demilitarized zone. This would be done as a unilateral North Vietnamese action, would not be part of the agreement, and would thus fully take account of DRV principle. Rather than being criticized, the U.S. side believes that it should receive understanding for its very flexible approach.

With respect to more nearly simultaneous ceasefires in Indochina, the U.S. side is certain that with good will this issue will be resolved. The other changes being proposed are essentially technical and procedural and should present little difficulty.

The U.S. side wishes to reemphasize that once these issues have been resolved, the United States will assert itself fully to consummate the agreement and ask for no further substantive changes.

The U.S. side informs the Chinese side as solemnly as possible that if the DRV side resumes negotiations in Paris with its serious attitude of the October sessions, the final agreement will be rapidly settled. With understanding for the ensuing process of U.S. consultations with its ally to prepare for implementation, there would be a final signature of the agreement no more than two to three weeks later. In the interval the U.S. would stop the bombing of DRV territory.

If in this process the U.S. side fails to gain the concurrence of its ally, which it considers improbable, the U.S. side would then be prepared to discuss implementation of a bilateral agreement.

The U.S. side is willing to undertake as an obligation to the Chinese side the schedule and commitments with respect to the bombing of North Vietnam that it has proposed to the DRV side. The Chinese side surely knows the value that the U.S. side attaches to its relationship with the PRC toward whom the U.S. side has never violated the letter or spirit of its commitments.

The Chinese side must now decide the best road to peace. The U.S. side has made, and will continue to make, maximum efforts to complete the agreement. The urgent task now is to follow a program which will enable the parties to move as rapidly as possible toward the ending of the war and the restoration of peace.

With mutual good will and understanding all difficulties will be surmounted. The alternative is continuation of the conflict with all its consequences. If current pressure tactics continue the US will have no choice but to continue the war which can then only grow in violence. The US side reiterates that it far prefers a solution which will establish a new relationship with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and accelerate the improvement in its relationship with the People's Republic of China.

263. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, November 3, 1972, 6:55–7:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations

Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

Mr. Kuo, Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Winston Lord, NSC Staff

(While waiting for Dr. Kissinger, the Chinese party and Mr. Lord engaged in amiable small talk. Topics covered included the General Assembly session at the United Nations which the Ambassador called quieter and duller than the previous year; the social demands on the Ambassador; the families of Mrs. Shih and Mr. Kuo; and the various Chinese groups that were visiting or were about to visit the United States. This lasted for 20 minutes until Dr. Kissinger arrived and the meeting began.)

Dr. Kissinger: I am sorry to keep you waiting. They never take into account New York traffic. My apologies.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Attached but not printed were Kissinger's talking points.

I wanted to see you because I am going away tomorrow and because we noticed some of the references in the Chinese press to the present state of affairs and also some of the adjectives that were used in relation to our action which did not meet our full agreement. So we wanted to take this opportunity to tell you once more what our policy is so that if there should be a strain in our relationship we will know exactly the reasons and this strain is not caused by misunderstanding.

First, we admit that we made a mistake in accepting too optimistic a time schedule. We did that in good faith and with every intent of maintaining it. If we had wanted to delay we could have found innumerable excuses for delay in going through the text. We wanted to make a rapid settlement so we took a chance. It's one thing to say it was a mistake. It's another thing to assume that there was "foul play" and "crooked dealings."

Now we also believe that the North Vietnamese side contributed to the present impasse, but I don't see much sense in going through that list again. (Ambassador Huang interrupted the translation, and there was clarification of the word "impasse." Dr. Kissinger said, "difficulties".)

I want to read you two statements I made on October 17 when I saw them last so that you can see that I warned them. When I left Minister Xuan Thuy I said: (reading almost verbatim from the excerpt from the transcript) "Well there are two problems. I will have to consult the President, and I will have to see what the possibilities are in Saigon. Our most important objective now is to settle this war, the quicker the better. We maintain every agreement we have made here. We should not tie ourselves to one particular time schedule. I am certain that if we cannot do it this week we will settle it in a matter of weeks." (Ambassador Huang again helps with the translation.)

And there was another statement I read to him. This was on October 17. (Again reading from the transcript excerpt.) "We had agreed to the schedule—which was perhaps unwise because of the impatience to make peace. We maintain our offer to finish the document in the most rapid time possible and to meet the Special Advisor in some neutral place to complete the document. We are not talking of the delay of a long time. We are talking about a brief delay. It is not unreasonable to want to discuss with our allies the making of the peace, to get an agreed document."

But we are not engaged in trying a legal case. We are engaged in a very practical problem now. The North Vietnamese believe that we have done all of this as a trick to maneuver with Thieu to gain time until after the election. And they are afraid that if we come to another meeting we will overthrow the whole agreement. Our intention is exactly the opposite. It is one thing for us not to insist on the present

agreement, which our ally had never seen, in a period of three days. It is another to insist on an agreement which follows a procedure which we can morally justify. (Dr. Kissinger pours tea for the Ambassador.)

After November 7 we will have freedom of action, not against Hanoi because we have that now, but against Saigon. On the other hand, the changes we are seeking, it is not correct to say that we are making Saigon changes our own. We have accepted maybe 10 percent of their proposals and none of their most important ones.

There are four changes of substance that we want in the agreement. There may be eight other technical ones, but they are unimportant and won't be crucial. The four substantive ones are as follows.

First, we want the section on ceasefire to be independent of other provisions of the agreement. This is now implied. We want to have it stated explicitly. (Mr. Kuo indicated he didn't fully understand.) This agreement is in chapters. There is a chapter on ceasefire, and we want the chapter on ceasefire unconditional and not related to other provisions of the agreement. This is now implied. We want it explicit. This works both ways. It means we cannot use the excuse of other sections to come back in.

Second, in the section on political conditions, in paragraph 9(f), the word "administrative structure" was given to us by the Vietnamese in English. It is not our translation. We want them to use the Vietnamese term that uses the word "administrative" as we understand it. We would never have accepted their word. That was an unresolved issue.

And paragraph 9(g) of the agreement . . .²

Mrs. Shih: 9(g)?

Dr. Kissinger: Also in paragraph 9(f) we want to put in a sentence that says that the members of the Council are appointed by the two parties. This is now an understanding. We want it as an explicit provision. They agree with this. It's just an understanding now. I'm giving you only the important changes.

In paragraph 9(h) there is now a provision that the two sides should demobilize some forces. We want to add a sentence that these forces are to be demobilized on the basis of equality of the two sides and that the demobilized forces should return to their homes.

In another section on the reunification of Vietnam, where we mention a number of paragraphs of the Geneva Agreements³ that are ap-

² All ellipses are in the source text. Apparent reference to a draft of what would become the Paris Peace Accords on Vietnam.

³ The text of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 is in *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. XVI, Part 2, pp. 1505–1520.

plicable, we also want to mention Article 24 which is against military pressures of one side against the other. It is now there in language. We just want to say "consistent with Article 24."

The only other thing we want . . . there are two other things. One is that the international inspection machinery to which they have already agreed should operate on the day that the agreement is signed. This just requires the signing of a protocol which is not in dispute.

And secondly, a position that we have never given up; that is, outside the agreement prior to the signing, North Vietnam should withdraw some of their troops from South Vietnam. After all, it is not easy to tell an ally that its neighbor has the right to keep its entire field army on its territory. What we want is the withdrawal of a few divisions in the northernmost part of the country.

If these conditions are met there are a number of technical changes that are really not important or substantive. They are almost entirely a question of form, such as turning the agreement into a four-party agreement. But they would bring about sufficient changes so that we could have discharged our obligations toward our ally. In these circumstances we would take a very flexible view on the proposal of simultaneous ceasefires in Laos and Cambodia. This is the framework now.

The situation is getting very serious on two levels. One, by the constant repeating of the same charges the North Vietnamese are making it a matter of prestige. And to the extent the Chinese side repeats these charges this will in time affect our relations which as you know have been one of the central elements of our foreign policy.

And we simply wanted you to know that we genuinely want to make an agreement with the Vietnamese. We would like to do so as soon after the election as possible. We have no interest in humiliating the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. On the contrary, we would like to normalize our relations to prevent other big countries further away from having a foothold. We are prepared to help reconstruct the DRV. We consider this present misunderstanding as an interlude.

We are embarrassed by some of the things that have happened; and we will move with great determination to bring about peace within the framework already agreed. If we are pushed against the wall, we will have to resist, and then we will resist immediately and decisively.

I wanted to assure the Prime Minister, and we will assure the North Vietnamese, that after the election we will return to making peace. We have no interest in stepping up the war unless absolutely forced to do so. We want peace. We maintain the essential agreement. We need some assistance. We are caught in a dilemma between our honor and our intention. There is no sense trying to force us into acting dishonorably. Our interest is to normalize relations in Indochina and to accelerate dramatically the normalization of our relations with the

People's Republic, and we know the two are linked. (Mr. Kuo indicated he didn't fully understand.) We know the two are related.

This is nothing new. I have told you only what we said before. I wanted to say it personally because I believe you know how interested I am in relations with the People's Republic and how much we would like to accelerate that. And now that we are heading into a new term we don't want to have to begin it with a war in Vietnam and with disagreements between us. I am saying this in a spirit of understanding, not in a spirit of criticism. I know you have no instructions to reply to me.

Ambassador Huang: We are prepared to convey the message.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you.

Ambassador Huang: The attitude of the Chinese side has been stated in the recent two messages.

Dr. Kissinger: I know.

Ambassador Huang: And the Chinese government has also issued a statement on the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: That's what I was talking about.

Ambassador Huang: And apart from this I have nothing to add.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: I have one other thing I wanted to inform you of, which concerns Taiwan. As the result of a number of developments we have borrowed from the Taiwanese some airplanes that we have given them, F-5A's.⁵ And while we are borrowing these planes we have put two American squadrons of F-4's on Taiwan. These are only temporary, and they will be removed as soon as we can replace the airplanes that we have borrowed. I again wanted to inform your government that all the understandings that we have with respect to Taiwan will be rigorously carried out as soon as the war in Vietnam is concluded.

⁴ On November 14 Kissinger discussed with the President the previous evening's dinner with Rockefeller, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, and Huang Hua in New York. Kissinger observed, "Then they talked about Vietnam and said of course we won't interfere and we are in favor of a quick settlement without the humiliation of either side, and we'll use our influence in that direction. And it's the softest I've ever heard them on Vietnam, no particular support for the North Vietnamese." Kissinger added, "They as much as said they would use their influence to keep things quiet in Cambodia." Kissinger also noted that he emphasized to the Chinese that "we may have to make some tough decisions in resisting hegemony around the world in the next four years. And it cannot be in anybody's interest that the United States is put into a difficult position in Southeast Asia after the war ends." Nixon replied: "As a matter of fact, sucked into a peripheral war anywhere, Henry, that's the real thing, Africa or anywhere." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, November 14, 1972, 9:00–9:36 p.m., Camp David Study Table, Conversation No. 153–5)

⁵ See Documents 256 and 264.

(Mrs. Shih has some difficulties translating “F-5A’s” and Ambassador Huang helps her.)

There are 36 airplanes. But we will be removing within the next few weeks other American planes put there. We will give you the details. We will let you know. They have to do with the war in Indochina and will be removed in the next few weeks. They are related to the war in Indochina, and they will be removed regardless of the peace negotiations. We will let you have a list of those planes.

We will do our utmost to conclude a Vietnam settlement by December 1. That is really all I wanted to see you about.

You must know the reason I didn’t meet the Vietnamese [November 4–November 9]⁶ is that I long since promised to accompany the President who is leaving tomorrow for the West Coast. I have avoided participating in the campaign but I must do something in the last three days. This is the reason. This is simply for the information of Peking, because you had referred to it in your last message.

(While the Chinese were waiting for the car Mr. Lord reminded Dr. Kissinger of the new communications set-up. Dr. Kissinger then explained to the Chinese that we have set up a new system in which we can send a message to deliver and pick up messages from the Chinese Mission, and they would be put in a teletype code which can only be read by us. This would be faster and save time. If the Chinese would call us we would send somebody to pick up the message. He was talking about messages that did not require a personal communication. Mr. Lord pointed out that the couriers would be people with whom the Chinese are already familiar. Ambassador Huang said it would be helpful if they were told the name of the messengers. Dr. Kissinger said this would be done in each case. He added that, of course, any time that the Ambassador wanted to see him personally he would come up for that. Ambassador Huang indicated agreement with the new system. There was then brief small talk until the car arrived and the Chinese departed.)

⁶ Brackets in the source text.

264. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 3, 1972.

SUBJECT

U.S. Air Deployments to Taiwan in Connection with Operation ENHANCE

As you know, as part of our efforts to provide South Vietnam with F-5A aircraft under Operation ENHANCE, we have requested the Republic of China (ROC) to provide 48 F-5A's by November 10. In return, and in order to assure that the air defense of Taiwan is not weakened, we are sending in two U.S. squadrons of F-4's and loaning the ROC 28 T-38 training aircraft to maintain the flying proficiency of the ROC pilots. The agreement is as follows:²

—GRC to provide 48 F-5A's.

—As temporary replacements to fill air defense gap, U.S. to provide:

—Two U.S. F-4 squadrons to be based on Taiwan.

—Up to 28 T-38 aircraft on loan, in good condition, as soon as possible.

—U.S. F-4's can be withdrawn to meet U.S. worldwide defense commitments.

—First 20 GRC F-5A's will be subject to replacement by returning like number of similar aircraft from Vietnam as soon as available.

—Next up to 28 GRC F-5A's to be "eventually" replaced by F-5E's subject to appropriations of funds by U.S. Congress.

—U.S. to give sympathetic consideration to co-production/co-assembly of F-5E's in Taiwan, from which source F-5E replacements in preceding paragraph may be manufactured.³

—The two U.S. F-4 squadrons will under normal circumstances remain in Taiwan, with first to withdraw when first 20 F-5A's returned, second to withdraw when next up to 28 F-5A's replaced as agreed. Similarly, loan of T-38's will terminate when second F-4 squadron is withdrawn.

This augmentation of U.S. air strength on Taiwan is against a back-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Entirely Out of System. Sent for information.

² The agreement is in telegram 5424 from Taipei, November 4. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-CHINAT) Telegrams between Taipei and Washington detailing the course of the negotiations with ROC officials are *ibid.*

³ See Document 268.

ground of an earlier increase of two C-130 transport squadrons and 22–24 KC-135's which were relocated from Clark Field due to the floods in the Philippines. However, the KC-135's will be withdrawn very shortly once a movement of A-7 aircraft from the U.S. to Thailand in connection with our buildup there is completed. This should be in a matter of only a few days, following which the KC-135's will return to Clark Field. The two C-130 squadrons of course can be removed once a Vietnam settlement is achieved.

The authorized figure for U.S. military personnel on Taiwan at the end of June 1972 was 7900 in round numbers. This is down from 8950 as of June 1971. There may be some variations in the actual number of military personnel present under the authorized strength. The 7900 figure does not include the temporary stationing of the two C-130 squadrons and the KC-135's. Personnel included in these units amount to 650 and 540 respectively.

The personnel augmentation in connection with the movement of the F-4 squadrons to Taiwan is 850,⁴ including a wing headquarters, 36 aircraft will be involved.⁵

⁴ A handwritten correction in the source text changed 600 to 850.

⁵ A handwritten comment written below this paragraph reads "+ two submarines in press."

265. Memorandum from Richard K. Stuart of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline)

Washington, November 6, 1972.

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, EA Weekly Meetings, 1971–1974. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

266. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 43–1–72

Washington, November 16, 1972.

TAIPEI'S CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT²

The Estimate

Background

1. Late in the 1960s, the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) initiated an ambitious program for the procurement and operation of nuclear power facilities on Taiwan. Foreign sources have extended over half a billion dollars in loans and guarantees for this power program, and two reactors are now under construction on the island.

2. The evidence suggests that the generation of electric power is not the only serious interest that the GRC has in the nuclear field. Most of this evidence involves activities at the Chung-shan Science Institute (CSSI), established by order of Chiang Kai-shek shortly after the People's Republic of China (PRC) detonated its first nuclear device in October 1964.

I. Activities at the Chung-shan Science Institute

3. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the Institute's charter called for military research in nuclear, electronics, chemical, and missile areas. The Institute is funded largely by the military, but there are ties to the government's Committee for Science Development, to its Atomic Energy Council, and to Tsing-hua University. From the beginning, there has been a careful effort at CSSI to maintain security and secrecy, to the degree that our information on activities there is far from complete. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] however, indicates that experimental projects at the Institutes have applications to a nuclear weapons program.

4. In 1969, the GRC signed an agreement with the Canadian Government for the purchase of a 40 megawatt (MW) research reactor. This

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 361, National Intelligence Estimates, part 4. Secret; Sensitive. Representatives of the CIA, the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The representative of the FBI abstained, as the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

² A handwritten note on the first page reads: "An accumulation of intelligence reporting has made it appropriate to examine the intentions of the Government of the Republic of China with respect to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The evidence bearing on this subject is discussed in the following paragraphs and is offered in paragraphs 20–21."

Taiwan Research Reactor was placed under the control of the CSSI where its installation is nearly complete, and it should become operational in early 1973. Similar in design to the CIRUS reactor supplied earlier to India, it is heavy water-moderated and fueled with natural uranium.

5. The significance of a heavy water reactor is, of course, its particular suitability for the production of plutonium, using natural uranium as the fuel. As a result, and in view of the other evidence available, we interpret the GRC's procurement of this CIRUS-type reactor as an indication that its interests extend beyond nuclear power and other peaceful-use applications.

6. The Taiwan Research Reactor can probably produce about 10 kilograms of plutonium a year once it becomes operational. The reactor is still nominally subject to safeguard inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an agency of the UN. But the future of such inspections is in doubt because Peking has already demanded that the IAEA sever all ties to Taiwan,³ and the Canadians do not have a bilateral safeguards agreement with the GRC to serve as a fallback. Since Canada no longer officially recognizes the GRC, the chances that a bilateral safeguards agreement will be negotiated are essentially nil. Thus, assuming that unsafeguarded supplies of natural uranium and heavy water can be purchased from foreign sources, the GRC may be able to operate this reactor entirely free of safeguard restrictions.

7. The GRC has purchased sufficient fuel from Canada to operate the reactor for peaceful research purposes for about four years. It has also received some 12 tons of natural uranium (or the equivalent in uranium concentrate) from South Africa, which would provide fuel for another year or so. If the reactor were operated for the production of weapons-grade plutonium, the fuel presently available would last only for about 18 months. But it seems likely that the GRC will have access to additional supplies of natural uranium—either safeguarded or unsafeguarded—particularly so long as it does not actually detonate a nuclear device. The GRC could even build its own plants to process uranium ore, thus avoiding all problems of safeguards on uranium metal. The same judgments apply to the heavy water needed to moderate the reactor.

8. To extract the plutonium from the irradiated fuel of its research reactor, the GRC would need a chemical separation plant. Taipei will

³ We note that IAEA did make inspection of this reactor in October 1972 and that IAEA has made a unique arrangement to provide for inspections in another non-member state, East Germany. [Footnote in the source text.]

probably not encounter great difficulty in purchasing, without safeguard restrictions, the necessary facilities and technology from foreign sources to build at least a small plant. Chemical separation plants are normal components of any nuclear power program, and the technology is openly available. Negotiations between the GRC and a French firm for such a plant are in an advanced stage. If these are not successful, other possibilities include West Germany, Belgium and the UK.

9. *Timing.* Assuming the GRC is bent on fabricating a nuclear device, it is still some years away from the attainment of this objective. While the Canadian-built 40 MW reactor will be producing plutonium next year, it may require as long as three or four years to build a plant that can successfully extract the plutonium from the spent fuel of the reactor. Assuming that design work on a nuclear device proceeds during construction of the chemical separation plant, it might be possible for the GRC to fabricate a nuclear device as early as 1976. Testing and weaponization could require another two or three years. Thus, we see little prospect that the GRC could achieve a weaponized nuclear device earlier than 1978. Foreign technical assistance might facilitate the achievement of results on the illustrative timetable outlined above, but there seems to be practically no chance that the GRC could get the kind of restricted information that would be necessary to compress this timetable. Indeed, these dates are quite optimistic considering all the problems that remain to be solved.

10. *Size of the Program.* Taiwan is now in the process of negotiating for additional power reactors. It appears that military authorities have been applying pressure on Taiwan's commercial power company to procure reactors which are optimal for the production of plutonium from natural uranium. These pressures appear not to have prevailed in the case of negotiations for the purchase of Taiwan's third and fourth power reactors during this past year. There are plans for procurement of two more reactors; if the decision once more goes against the heavy water type, it would suggest that the GRC is interested at most in a small weapons program; i.e., about two weapons a year based on the output of the Taiwan Research Reactor.

11. *Delivery Capabilities.* At this stage, there is no evidence of GRC efforts to develop a nuclear delivery system which would pose a credible threat to mainland targets. The GRC has purchased a short-range, surface-to-surface missile (the Israeli Gabriel Mark II), but this program would have little application to the development of a strategic missile. Jet fighter-bombers on Taiwan could reach the mainland with bombs weighing up to 2,000 pounds, but it is uncertain that the GRC could achieve a weapon this small in the early stages of a weapons program. Payload constraints might also rule out arming the Nikes on Taiwan with nuclear warheads for use as a surface-to-surface weapon against invasion forces in the Taiwan Strait. (This missile has a surface range

of about 110 miles with a 1,000-pound warhead.) There are a few Boeing 707s and 727s in commercial use on Taiwan which might conceivably be used to deliver nuclear weapons. These aircraft would naturally be vulnerable to the PRC's air defense system.

II. Intentions

12. We have no reliable information on the military and political calculations behind the GRC's activities in the nuclear field. What we do know points to a relatively ambitious nuclear power program and a smaller effort to develop a capability to design and produce nuclear weapons. There is no evidence that Taipei has a firm scenario on how to use such a nuclear weapons option, assuming it can be developed. We can only speculate about how Taipei expects to use any such capability.

13. *What Taipei May Hope to Achieve.* Chiang Kai-shek's initial reaction to the PRC's nuclear test in 1964 may have been only an expression of his determination not to be left behind by Peking's technological achievement. He may also have felt an urgent need to counter the new potential for nuclear blackmail from Peking. Perhaps he also felt a need to demonstrate—if only for his military leaders—a determination to resist the communists independently if necessary.

14. Certainly, in the eight years since the Gimo made his decision, Taipei's concern over standing alone has grown. While the nuclear umbrella of the US is still implied by the Mutual Defense Treaty, some on Taiwan may be questioning how long they can count on all-out US support. In this perspective, a nuclear weapons option may be seen by the GRC as one of the few feasible deterrents to communist attack in an uncertain future.

15. It seems doubtful, however, that Taipei has worked out any detailed plan on how such an option might be exercised. More likely, Chiang Kai-shek's initial stimulus has probably gathered momentum as the military-scientific bureaucracy expanded to meet his request, and it is unlikely anyone would suggest cutting back what now looks like a feasible enterprise. Moreover, the cost for the kind of modest program now underway is readily manageable.

16. *Arguments Against Fabricating and Testing Nuclear Weapons.* While we know of no opposition within the GRC to developing a capability for producing nuclear weapons, we believe there is an awareness in Taipei of the risks involved in moving on to actual tests, which could not be concealed from world-wide attention. This attitude is indicated in part by the GRC's continuing care to preserve secrecy, in the first instance to deny information to the PRC. Taipei can not help being concerned over Peking's reactions to a weapons test. In its propaganda, Peking would no doubt treat such evidence of a nuclear weapons capability on Taiwan as a threat to peace, not only in East Asia but in global terms. The GRC's eviction from the UN has reduced

its opportunities to answer any such charges effectively, or to muster any substantial support from its few remaining friends. It could anticipate further alienation from them, a particularly serious development in the case of Japan.

17. Taipei's secrecy is also rooted in concern regarding US reactions. Almost certainly there is fear that exercising a nuclear weapons option might endanger the further support of the US. Taiwan's security is so heavily dependent on the continued adherence of the US to the Mutual Defense Treaty, that any move on Taipei's part which might imperil that relationship would not likely be taken without long and careful study.

18. Moreover, before Taipei actually decided to test a nuclear device it would have to consider the almost certain consequence that disclosure of this fact would lead to world-wide pressure to cut off fuel supplies and technical support for its nuclear power program which, the GRC is acutely aware, cannot be pursued with its own resources.

19. Perhaps most important, Taipei would have to consider whether the existence of a small number of nuclear weapons would really serve to deter Peking, rather than provoke it to action. Moreover, the GRC can be under no illusions about the cost of developing an effective delivery system for nuclear weapons. It clearly lacks the resources to compete with Peking in the area of nuclear weapons.

III. Conclusions

20. We estimate that the GRC will continue to work toward the capability to design and produce nuclear weapons. At this point, Taipei may see such a capability as a potentially useful hedge for the unknown exigencies of the future, when Taiwan may be alone and facing great risks. We believe, however, that Taipei will take pains to conceal its intentions, and will cover activities which are necessarily overt by associating them with research in the generation of nuclear power for peaceful uses.

21. We believe Taipei's present intention is to develop the capability to fabricate and test a nuclear device. This capability could be attained by 1976; two or three years later is a more likely timeframe. The GRC is likely to establish this foundation in order to be able to proceed with the fabrication and stockpiling of nuclear weapons should that seem advisable. In particular, further decisions would depend on such considerations as the state of relations with the US, the posture of the PRC, and conditions on Taiwan itself. So far, Taipei's prudent and cautious response to its series of international upsets over the past few years suggests no intent to risk provoking Peking or alienating the US and Japan. Thus, from our present perspective, Taipei does seem determined to keep its weapons option open, but we would doubt that a decision would be made to proceed with testing or with the fabrication and stockpiling of untested devices.

**267. Joint State–Defense Department Memorandum for
President Nixon**

Washington, November 16, 1972.

[Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0095, China (Nats), 471.61, 1972. Top Secret. 8 pages of source text not declassified.]

**268. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Security
Assistance (Tarr) to the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget (Weinberger)¹**

Washington, November 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

F-5B/E Aircraft Proposal for the Republic of China

The GRC under project "Enhance Plus" provided 48 F-5A's to South Vietnam. We agreed to return 20 of these aircraft and replace the other 28 F-5A's with 28 F-5E's. We also agreed that: "The United States will give sympathetic consideration to the coproduction/coassembly of F-5E aircraft in Taiwan, from which the F-5E replacements mentioned above . . . may be manufactured."²

Since a coproduction/coassembly aircraft capability is something President Chiang has long sought and since we stated we would give "sympathetic consideration" to the F-5E project, we have examined a proposal for direct procurement of 15 F-5B's (trainers) and the coproduction/coassembly in Taiwan of 100 F-5E's (memorandum at Tab A).³ After taking into account our relations with the PRC, the costs of the proposal and its effects on US and ROC economies, likely Congressional reaction, and our understanding with the GRC under Enhance Plus, we have concluded that coproduction/coassembly of F-5E

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

² See Document 264.

³ Attached but not printed is a 7-page review of ROC requests for F-5 aircraft, Congressional and economic issues, financing, and recommendations.

aircraft in Taiwan would be a reasonable and sound project and would fulfill our obligations to the GRC under Enhance Plus.

Accordingly, I propose to:

—Approve the 100 F–5E coproduction/coassembly project, limiting eventual fabrication/subassembly in Taiwan to the nose and tail sections, and the procurement of 15 F–5B’s in the US.

—Limit total financing of this project to no more than it would cost to purchase 15 F–5B’s and 100 F–5E’s direct from US production (\$225.3 million).

—Finance the F–5E coproduction/coassembly project with \$45.9 million in US grant funds (the flyaway cost of 28 F–5E’s from US production) and the balance—\$179.3 million—through FMS credits to be negotiated and disbursed over the production period.

—Approve the obligation of grant funds of not less than \$17.6 million this year from FY 1973 MAP funds as a temporary financing measure to be reimbursed from the \$45.9 million to be sought in an overall supplemental request for funding the entire Enhance Plus program.

Unless you have objections, I intend to approve this project in time to meet our oral commitment to the GRC to provide a response to them by December 1, 1972. I would of course be grateful for your reactions and comment.

The Department of Defense concurs in this proposal. Ambassador McConaughy has been consulted and also concurs.⁴

Curtis Tarr

⁴ Documentation on the Department Defense’s position is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA General Files: FRC 330 75 0155, China, Rep. of, 1972, 0001; and *ibid.*, OSD Secret Files: FRC 330 77 0094, China (Nats), 400–137–800, 1972. In telegram 5684 from Taipei, November 22, McConaughy wrote: “[W]e had virtually committed ourselves to the program during our negotiations with the Premier and there is considerable urgency to achieve a preliminary understanding. I am also confident that the proposal you are about to send to Under Secretary Tarr is very fair and will prove acceptable to the GRC.” (Telegram 5684 from Taipei; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12 CHINAT) In a December 15 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge and Kennedy suggested that Kissinger approve the recommendations in the Tarr memorandum. A December 15 memorandum signed by Kissinger to Tarr reads in its entirety: “The F–5 aircraft proposal contained in your memorandum of November 24 is approved. Our representatives should make clear to the GRC that this is not an initial step toward development of an independent jet aircraft production capability on Taiwan. Please arrange the necessary advance notification of Congress.” (Both memoranda are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI) Telegram 230192 to Taipei, December 21, informed McConaughy that he could notify ROC officials of this decision. (*Ibid.*)

269. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, December 7–8, 1972, 11:25 p.m.–12:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General Alexander M. Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
John Negroponte, NSC Staff
Huang Chen, PRC Ambassador to France
Mr. Tsao, Political Counsellor, PRC Embassy
Mr. Wei, PRC Embassy
Mr. Lin, PRC Embassy

Dr. Kissinger: (Looking at the Chinese snacks) You are going to destroy me.

Ambassador Huang: You have just finished your conversations?

Dr. Kissinger: There are always two sets of conversations, one with the North Vietnamese and after that with the South Vietnamese. And they are unanimous, both of them, in disagreeing with me. I have united them.

Ambassador Huang: It is very important. That's the way to resolve the problem.

Dr. Kissinger: I have asked, Mr. Ambassador, to see you, even though you are not our normal channel for this sort of conversation, because matters are at a very critical point. You were our original contact but not the normal one now for Vietnam matters. Because the consequences will be extremely serious, I want to talk to you frankly and not diplomatically. I have even brought a General [Haig]² in order to impress you.

Ambassador Huang: We are alike.

Dr. Kissinger [to Haig]: You know the Ambassador is a General.

The situation is as follows. I will not bore you with all the details. I am certain you have no instructions to debate with me so I will understand if you say nothing. [Ambassador Huang nods slightly]

In October when the North Vietnamese made certain proposals to us, we agreed to accelerate the procedure, perhaps unwisely. We have explained all this to Peking and there is no sense in repeating it here. The basic problem was we had no opportunity to consult our allies

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the PRC Embassy.

² All brackets and ellipses are in the source text.

before these negotiations. Our allies violently objected to the agreement as you know. We have accepted only a very small percentage of their criticisms. At the same time, we told them, the President told them, last week we would make an agreement alone if necessary and that we would apply all pressures to bring about such an agreement, pressures on South Vietnam. That included even threatening with respect to economic and military assistance. This is a very serious decision for us and a very painful one. And we can do that vis-à-vis our own people only if we can demonstrate that Saigon refused a minimal reasonable program.

Last time I was here [in November] there were some changes and there were only four issues left. We agreed on certain changes.³ We had proposed what we considered a very generous solution. We conceded everything that it is in American power to concede, for America to concede. The rest is in the control of South Vietnam. Today Mr. Le Duc Tho has refused every proposal and withdrawn every change that was agreed to last time. And he has demanded that we return to the old agreement without change or to a new agreement in which he proposes so many significant changes that it will be worse than the old one. We cannot accept either. After two months of additional negotiations we cannot return to what was already considered inadequate then and what the North Vietnamese even admitted needed change by the fact that they were negotiating with us. And we can, of course, not accept a worse agreement. The President cannot begin a new term after he has been elected with a majority of 61 percent by surrendering his principles. The consequences are very great. We are four issues away from an agreement. If North Vietnam maintains its position, we will certainly break off the negotiations and we will take whatever action is necessary to defend our principles. If we agree with North Vietnam it will mean the end of any strong American foreign policy.

The Interpreter: You mean a policy of force.

Dr. Kissinger: No. I mean a long-range, anti-hegemonial policy.

The Interpreter: Please repeat in English.

Dr. Kissinger: Anti-hegemonial. With respect to the last sentence—if we agree to this position of the North Vietnamese it will destroy any possibility for a long-term anti-hegemonial policy for the U.S., and it will destroy the policy and the personalities.

³ Kissinger and Huang met on November 25 from 12:35 to 1:30 a.m. in the PRC Embassy. At this meeting, Kissinger reviewed recent developments in Sino-American relations and U.S. talks in Paris with the Chinese and Vietnamese. The memorandum of conversation, November 25, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's Files—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 169.

What is at stake now is not a few clauses in a treaty but the whole orientation of our policy. And therefore before we take the grave steps that will be taken we wanted to put the issue before the Prime Minister.

The Interpreter: The Prime Minister?

Dr. Kissinger: Your Prime Minister. I am assuming that the Ambassador will report to the Prime Minister. I came here with absolute instructions from the President to settle. We were prepared to settle even without the agreement of Saigon. But we will never give up our honor. And therefore we have delayed the meeting tomorrow until the afternoon, and I will probably postpone it until Saturday morning.⁴

Mr. Tsao: Saturday morning?

Dr. Kissinger: It will be the first time that we are the hosts. We intend for the Vietnamese to come to our place tomorrow. We were going to give them some Chinese food. It will give me an excuse to eat Chinese food. [Ambassador Huang laughs.]

So very often when one talks about ordinary policy problems one uses standard phrases. This is not an ordinary problem. It will lead to a disastrous course. It will not help Vietnam because we have conceded everything possible to concede. If you read the newspapers you will find that even our opponents on the left criticize us for conceding too much. And it must affect not only our relationship as a result of our actions but our ability to do the things we promised to do, and even more important, the things events will probably force us to do.

Let me repeat that in short sentences. It will affect first our ability to carry out many things we promised and wanted to do. More importantly, it will affect our ability to do those things which the hegemonial desires of others should require us to do over the next few years.

So this is the situation we now face. And therefore we wanted to see whether it was possible for the friends of Hanoi to convince it that we have no designs in Indochina except a decent way to end the war. [Mr. Tsao and the Ambassador discuss among themselves.]

If this opportunity is missed, we will face a very grave situation. This is not a maneuver. This is not a trick. We have proposed a schedule whereby the treaty could be signed by December 22.

Interpreter: A schedule?

Dr. Kissinger: December 22. I am authorized to agree to settle while I am here, today or tomorrow. We are asking nothing new or unfamiliar to North Vietnam.

[At this point more food was brought in, and Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Huang laughed.]

⁴ Saturday, December 9.

So this is the situation. I will propose a postponement of tomorrow's meeting. I do not expect a reply, but you can reach me at the Embassy. But it is one of those moments where there is a choice, a very brief time between peace and a war that can have no quick ending.

Ambassador Huang: Are you going to have another talk tomorrow?

Dr. Kissinger: I will cancel tomorrow in order to permit . . . If we have talks tomorrow it will break up.

Ambassador Huang: Your intention is to have another talk on Saturday?

Dr. Kissinger: I will postpone tomorrow's talk until Saturday.

Ambassador Huang: The next meeting starts Saturday morning, or is it limited to Saturday morning?

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. If the North Vietnamese do not change their position on Saturday morning, I will have to break off the talks.

Ambassador Huang: So we understand that if North Vietnam rests on the same position on Saturday you will break off the talks.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. We are not asking for them to accept our position. We made very significant concessions today. This is the situation, Mr. Ambassador, and I am sorry to have disturbed you. [Ambassador Huang shrugs.] It was a personal pleasure to see you.

Ambassador Huang: I am also happy to see the Doctor and General Haig.

Dr. Kissinger: He was in China.

Ambassador Huang: Thank you for the information on the negotiations between you and Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm like the Ambassador. I understand everything.

Ambassador Huang: Like I said last time, the position of China is clear to you, and I won't repeat that. We have said that the world's people watch closely the evolution of the Vietnam problem and wait only for a peaceful solution to come soon. As you know, the solution of the problem would not only conform with the wishes of the U.S. and the Vietnamese people but also contribute to the relaxation of tensions in Asia. We hope still that this can lead to good results and there will be a try to find a peaceful solution and an agreement. I must repeat that we hope you will find a peaceful solution through negotiations on this problem.

Dr. Kissinger: We know your sentiments, and we respect them. This is one of those critical moments where the standard approach will not help, and therefore before something irrevocable happens, I wanted to have an opportunity to talk to our Chinese friends.

Ambassador Huang: Like I said last time, sincerely and completely frankly, if one cannot have an agreement that can only help the one who seeks hegemony.

Dr. Kissinger: I am in complete agreement with you. That we are trying to prevent not only in Indochina, but on a global basis.

We will postpone tomorrow's meeting to permit some calm thought to develop. [Ambassador Huang nods.]

Ambassador Huang: I hope that Dr. Kissinger and the General will continue to make efforts. All the world's people follow closely the negotiations on Vietnam and hope that you will arrive at a peaceful solution by negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: That's our hope also.

I always see you very late in the evening.

Ambassador Huang: You are always welcome no matter what the hour.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don't you negotiate for the North Vietnamese? We would settle the problem in one afternoon.

Ambassador Huang: It is the business of North Vietnam. It is a sovereign country.

Dr. Kissinger: I keep my staff by promising trips to China.

Ambassador Huang: You're thinking of a trip to China?

Dr. Kissinger: I am planning one very soon. Will you come again?

Ambassador Huang: It's possible.

I will see Ambassador Watson tomorrow evening.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he is a great admirer of yours.

Ambassador Huang: I will give him his visa personally.

[Dr. Kissinger then explained how the Chinese had delicately turned down visa applications in the Ottawa Embassy and he called this "très elegant." The Ambassador laughed and said it was very diplomatic.]

Ambassador Huang: You will invite the Vietnamese to a meal at your place?

Dr. Kissinger: We have been meeting at a Vietnamese home. So Saturday we will meet in an American home but will serve them Chinese food because they are more used to it than American food.

Ambassador Huang: You have a cook who can do Chinese cooking?

Dr. Kissinger: Not as good as here, but we will find somebody.

Ambassador Huang: When you get a peaceful solution of the problem, I will invite you here to celebrate.

Dr. Kissinger: I am very pessimistic now. I don't think it will succeed.

Ambassador Huang: I have always said that the Doctor is always optimistic. Why this new pessimism?

Dr. Kissinger: But today I became pessimistic and for that reason I came to see you.

Ambassador Huang: We only hope that the two parties can bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations and try to sign an accord as soon as possible.

Dr. Kissinger: We will make one more effort. That is all we can do. We have gone beyond the limits.

Mr. Ambassador, please give my warm regards to our friends in Peking.

[There were then mutual declarations of stronger friendship between the Chinese and American peoples and cordial small talk as the Ambassador escorted Dr. Kissinger and his party to the door. He and his staff remained on the steps and waved goodbye as the Americans drove away.]

270. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, December 16, 1972, 6–7 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Mr. Kuo, Notetaker
Mrs. Shih Yen Hua, Interpreter
Mr. Winston Lord, NSC Staff

(Mrs. Shih met Mr. Lord at the entrance to the Mission, took him to the elevator and they went to the second floor reception room where meetings are usually held. Mr. Kuo was there as well. The Ambassador came in shortly and there was brief small talk. Mr. Lord noted the attractiveness of the new front to the building and explained the reasons for his delay in getting to the meeting because of airplane difficulties. Mr. Lord then noted that the Ambassador must be busy and immediately began the business discussion.)

Mr. Lord: As our note to you said we have reason to believe that the North Vietnamese have been giving other governments an inaccurate version of the negotiations in Paris.² We wanted you to have a cor-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the PRC Mission to the UN.

² A message with the handwritten notation, "12/15/72, China Exchanges," reads in its entirety: "The U.S. side has reason to believe that the Democratic Republic of Viet-

rect, updated account. Dr. Kissinger would have liked to come personally but he must remain in Washington today with the President.

Ambassador Huang: I saw that he had a press conference today.

Mr. Lord: Yes, I brought a copy of the transcript for you. Here it is. (He hands over transcript of Dr. Kissinger's December 16 press conference.)³

We want your government to have a true picture of the negotiations and the North Vietnamese tactics which represent bad faith and have prevented an agreement.

I am giving you two documents which help explain the situation. At Dr. Kissinger's press conference this morning he explained the situation in general terms to give the trend and the pattern of the negotiations and to let the American people know where these negotiations stood. He purposely did not get into specific matters of substance. I have as well for you a summary paper which gives in specific terms the remaining issues in the negotiations. (Mr. Lord hands over the paper at Tab A)⁴

You can read these documents later. You will see that there are very few specific issues left. But this is highly misleading. The central problem is not any particular issue but the obvious North Vietnamese intent to stall and delay a settlement.

The remaining issues in the negotiations could have been solved in one session any of these few days. But the attitude of the DRV during this last round was not serious. Whenever we got down to one or two issues, they would reopen ones that were already solved, or they would raise new ones, or they would take an issue that had been resolved in the Agreement in exchange for concessions on our part and try to make it part of an understanding which would carry equally binding obligations.

Let me give you a general rundown of the December negotiations to indicate the pattern. I will give you some examples, which are important not primarily for their substance but as a reflection of the tactics that the North Vietnamese were using.

nam has been giving inaccurate accounts of the recent negotiations in Paris to other governments. If the Chinese side so desires, Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to provide an updated, correct version of these negotiations to Ambassador Huang. It is the U.S. side's view that the North Vietnamese have been deliberately delaying negotiations by raising technical objections of an occasionally even frivolous nature. These negotiations could certainly have been concluded this past week if there had been reciprocal good will and serious intent." (Ibid.) The message in telegram form from Haig to Hood, December 16, is *ibid.*

³ Printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 8, 1973, pp. 33–40.

⁴ Not found.

We had made good progress in the negotiations in November, and we were down to a few issues. At the beginning of this last round, they withdrew all the changes of November. So we spent several days getting back to where we were on November 25. We finally got down to one issue, concerning the Demilitarized Zone. On this issue we were only asking them to agree to language they had accepted in November. They had agreed to a sentence which said that North and South Vietnam should respect the Demilitarized Zone. However, in this round they were trying to add additional language which would take away this concession and in our view effectively abolish the present status of the DMZ. We were only asking them to go back to where we had been in November.

Ambassador Huang: What language were they trying to add?

Mr. Lord: They wanted to add a sentence along the lines of among the issues to be negotiated between South and North Vietnam are modalities or regulations for movement across the Demilitarized Zone. We believe this would effectively abolish the present status of the zone.

When we were down to this one issue, Dr. Kissinger sent General Haig back to Washington to stand by with Vice President Agnew, who had already been waiting for several days in order to undertake a trip to Saigon to present the completed Agreement to our allies. Vice President Agnew had been waiting for some time and the North Vietnamese knew it. This was an intolerable procedure.

Another issue arose in the last couple of days, concerning the procedure for signing. In October, the North Vietnamese had proposed that there be a two-party signature and we had reserved on whether to make it a two party or four party signature, depending on the views of our ally. Now the North Vietnamese wanted a four party signature. We are prepared to have the agreement equally binding on all four parties with identical obligations, but there is a problem with respect to mentioning the titles of the two South Vietnamese parties in the preamble, thus implying recognition.

On December 11, the North Vietnamese suggested a compromise which we thought could be workable. They suggested that the US and the DRV jointly sign one document including the preamble which mentions the titles of the government, and that the two South Vietnamese parties each sign a separate document which would include all the obligations. If the North Vietnamese proposal meant that the documents to be signed by the two South Vietnamese parties would not include the preamble and, therefore, the titles of the two parties, we thought this would be a workable solution. It would mean that all four parties would be equally bound by the agreement, and we would get around the problem of implied recognition through the titles. However, on December 12, the North Vietnamese withdrew their proposal of the pre-

vious day. Thus instead of being down to one issue there were two issues remaining of substance.

Again I am giving you the specifics on these issues, but the primary problem was the North Vietnamese attitude and tactics. Whenever we got down to just the one or two issues, they would continually raise new issues or reopen ones that had already been solved. Let me give you some examples.

On the morning of the final day, before the principals met, the two sides' experts met to go over once again the Vietnamese and English texts. This was designed merely to conform the two texts and reconfirm mutually agreed changes that had been made of a technical nature by the experts in two other sessions that week. However, the North Vietnamese introduced several new issues, some of them of substantive importance. And this was on the final day when we thought we were down to just two issues.

Another example concerns the membership of Indonesia on the International Control and Supervisory Body. Without getting into the merits of their being a participant, the fact is that both sides had agreed that Indonesia would be on the Commission in October. No objections had been raised since then. During the November round of negotiations, Dr. Kissinger went to Brussels to see President Suharto, and the North Vietnamese knew this. Indonesia had agreed to serve and, as I said, there had been exchanges on the Presidential level. In the last two or three days of our negotiations this time, the North Vietnamese suddenly raised objections to Indonesia's participation. This, of course, puts us in an impossible position.

Another example has to do with Article I. This article calls for respect for the Geneva agreements of 1954.⁵ There had been original language which singled out the US, which we considered highly invidious. However, we agreed to return to language which included both the US and other countries on Saturday in exchange for their dropping one of their demands, namely that all US civilians associated with military tasks be withdrawn in a specific period. After we had agreed to go back to the unfortunate language of Article I, the next day, the North Vietnamese proposed the withdrawal of US civilians in an understanding which would be equally as binding as in the agreement. Thus they cancelled out effectively the concession they had made in return for the Article I language the previous day.

Still another example of the North Vietnamese tactics concerns the protocols. These are supposed to be technical documents which would help implement the provisions of the agreement, such as ceasefire. We

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 263.

gave the North Vietnamese our drafts of the protocols several weeks ago. They did not give us their drafts until the second to last day and there had been no discussion on the protocols at all up to that time, despite our constant request for their documents.

We found their drafts, instead of being technical documents reflecting the substance of the agreement, instead reopened issues already settled or tried to introduce obligations that had been left out of the Agreement itself. For example, the North Vietnamese had agreed in November that the National Council would have no role in implementing the ceasefire. In their protocol, however, the Council was given a major role in implementing the ceasefire. Also, as I have indicated, they had agreed to leave out of the agreement itself the obligation that we withdraw all US civilians in military tasks. In one of their protocols they reintroduced this obligation and said that it had to be completed within six months.

I want to emphasize again the important thing is not so much the substance of these various issues, but the unacceptable North Vietnamese tactics, of which these are examples.

Let me conclude by just commenting on two issues of concern to the North Vietnamese that are now being discussed in the framework of understanding.

First, there is the question of withdrawing US civilians that I have mentioned. We offered to write into the agreement that there would be no civilians working on military operations or operational military training, and that civilians would not perform tasks that they were not already performing on October 15. We would also undertake to gradually withdraw our civilians from South Vietnam. This would meet whatever legitimate concern the North Vietnamese might have with regard to civilians performing roles that the military personnel that we were withdrawing used to perform. However, the North Vietnamese would not accept our proposals. They continued to demand that we withdraw all civilians connected with military tasks totally in a specific period. This would lead to the collapse of our ally's defense establishment, and this we will not do.

The other issue of concern to the North Vietnamese is that of the civilian prisoners in South Vietnam. We are prepared to use our influence on this question, and it would be easy to settle if they would give us assurances on a schedule for demobilization and redeployment. But they can't expect us to allow them to keep 150,000 of their troops in the south and then add 35,000 more in the prisoners being released.

I want to thank the Ambassador for listening so patiently to my long explanation, but of course this is an extremely important question. We wanted to give you a specific rundown so as to show you the tactics and the attitude and the techniques of the North Vietnamese.

As I said we could have solved the remaining issues with mutual good will in a very short period. But we were unable to do so because of the North Vietnamese approach which we consider frivolous and unacceptable. Therefore, we wanted your government to have the true picture as we see it. Thank you.⁶

Ambassador Huang: Thank you for your briefing us. I have another question. During the past negotiations the US side proposed that there be some military movement in the northernmost part of South Vietnam in the framework of an understanding.

Mr. Lord: It was left that redeployment and demobilization would greatly ease our problems and make the question of civilian prisoners easier to resolve. (There was brief discussion among the Chinese.)

Ambassador Huang: In the past you once proposed that the North Vietnamese make some token troop movements in northern part of South Vietnam.

Mr. Lord: I do not believe that “token” is the correct word. We have always wanted a significant number to be redeployed. There is no firm understanding on this as yet, and we were not able to have a discussion of figures. We have indicated that movement in this area would be very helpful concerning South Vietnamese civilian prisoners.

Thus, we remain very interested in redeployment and we think it would be very important.

⁶ On December 18 Kissinger ordered William Hood to deliver to the PRC representatives in New York a copy of a U.S. message to the DRV. (Message from Kissinger to Hood, December 18; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges) On December 22 Haig instructed Hood to deliver to the Chinese a message of that date for the DRV. An attached message for the Chinese began: “The President would like to bring to the personal attention of the Chinese leadership the latest US proposal to the DRV. The US side wishes again to reiterate its readiness to settle rapidly and its conviction that this is a major contribution to easing tensions all over Asia.” (Haig’s instructions and message for the DRV, December 22; *ibid.*) Also on December 22 Fazio gave the PRC representatives a transcript of Kissinger’s December 13 meeting with DRV representatives in Paris. (Fazio’s memorandum for the record, December 29; *ibid.*) On December 23 McManis provided to the Chinese a transcript of Kissinger’s December 11 meeting with DRV representatives. (Memorandum for the record, December 29; *ibid.*) On December 28 McManis delivered to the Chinese a copy of a message for the DRV which would be given to the Vietnamese on December 29 at 9:30 a.m., which reads in part: “The U.S. accepts the following propositions: 1. Experts of the two sides will resume meetings on January 2, 1973. 2. A private meeting of Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy with Dr. Kissinger will take place on January 8, 1973 in Paris.” According to a handwritten note, this message was also given to the Soviets on December 28. (*Ibid.*) The final exchange of messages in 1972 included a December 29 complaint from the PRC about a U.S. missile hitting Chinese territory and a December 30 U.S. expression of “regret” over the incident. Both messages, relayed through Hood and Haig, December 29, are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 172–175.

Ambassador Huang: Thank you for your explanation.

Obviously the Vietnamese people and the American people hope that the Agreement on a ceasefire and restoration of peace in Vietnam will be signed at an early date. The present delay is disappointing. I will report your explanations and send your documents to our government.

Thank you for coming today at our request. We know that Dr. Kissinger has just gotten back and is very busy, and we understand that he could not make it. We have finished our conversation now.

(There was then brief small talk, during which Ambassador Huang apologized that there were no refreshments beyond the tea being served and said that this was impolite. Mr. Lord rejoined that the Chinese are never impolite. Mr. Lord then said that he had to leave to get back to his Chinese wife. Ambassador Huang asked whether Mrs. Lord spoke Chinese, and Mr. Lord replied that she spoke Mandarin fluently. She had forgotten how to read and write Chinese and was in the process of relearning this. Ambassador Huang offered some text books but noted that they were elementary. Mr. Lord thanked the Ambassador and said that his wife was beyond that stage, but that it was an extremely thoughtful offer on the part of the Ambassador.)

The Ambassador, Mr. Kuo, and Mrs. Shih then took Mr. Lord down the elevator and to the front door where there was a cordial exchange of farewells.)

Mongolia, 1969–1972

271. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

Proposed Recognition of Mongolian People's Republic

Secretary Rogers has proposed that we recognize Mongolia (Tab A).² Mr. Helms and the Department of Defense have concurred in the recommendation.

The U.S. Government has several times in the past few years considered the recognition of Mongolia, and has refrained from doing so largely because of questions of timing.³

In recent informal contacts, Mongolian representatives have indicated an interest in U.S. recognition of their country.⁴ In the past, Outer Mongolia considered the Vietnam war as a barrier to relations with the U.S.

Mongolia is more completely under Soviet domination than any other small Communist state. Nevertheless, it is a member of the UN and other international organizations, and it participates in a moderate range of international activities. It undoubtedly wishes to establish its identity as a sovereign state. It is recognized by all Communist and many non-Communist states.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 553, Country Files, Far East, Mongolia, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed is a 2-page memorandum from Rogers to the President, April 10, and a 4-page report, March 26, prepared by Bundy and Hillenbrand concerning the recognition of Mongolia. The March 26 report includes telegrams from Moscow, New Delhi, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Taipei on possible reaction to recognition.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Documents 344–347.

⁴ Kissinger's March 18 daily briefing memorandum for the President noted that "Within the past few weeks, the chief Mongolian representative to the Intelsat Conference in Washington and the Mongol Ambassador to New Delhi have sought out US representatives to express an interest in close US/Mongol ties." Kissinger concluded: "I think this idea has merit. Relations would provide us with a good listening post. The Soviets would probably welcome it as a strengthening of their buffer between China and I do not believe that this action would have any particular effect on our relations with Communist China." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 3, President's Daily Briefs)

The arguments for and against U.S. recognition, from the standpoint of U.S. interests, are as follows:

Pro:

- [2½ lines of source text not declassified]
- Opportunity to station political observers in a vital zone of Soviet/Chinese interaction.
- Political utility of recognizing an Asian Communist state for the first time, and blunting charges of applying different yardsticks to Europe and Asia.
- A small contribution to the development of Mongolia's independent contacts with the outside world, which may strengthen its sense of national identity and a national viewpoint, and may contribute to the fractioning of the Communist world.

Con:

- Both Chinas would see recognition as an “anti-Chinese” gesture.
- Possible misinterpretation at this juncture as an effort to meddle in Sino/Soviet border tensions resulting from the incidents on the Ussuri. (It is proposed to meet this objection by waiting for a short period before proceeding, on the assumption that attention to the incidents will die down.)

On balance, I believe that we are justified in going ahead with the recognition of Mongolia. The advantages are real if limited. The Taipei reaction will be loud and unfavorable. However, it has long anticipated such a move, and its objections should not determine our decision. (The Chinese Communists of course recognize Mongolia, though perhaps somewhat grudgingly, and the Republic of China once recognized Mongolia and then “withdrew” the recognition. Neither has a very strong case that U.S. recognition is aimed at them.) There are even advantages at this time in demonstrating to both Chinas that we can and will take independent actions in pursuit of our own interests.

Most other countries would show little concern one way or the other. We assume that the Mongols would not invite us to establish diplomatic relations, and we could not establish a mission in Ulan Bator, without Soviet acquiescence. Our Mongol contacts have told us that they do not think the Soviets would be opposed; a Soviet Embassy officer in Washington recently expressed no concern over the possibility, and Embassy Moscow believes that the Soviets would be in favor. Japan simply wants sufficient advance notice to set its own house in order; it has actually explored the possibility of recognition with the Mongols and might wish to resume the negotiations. India would be delighted.

If we were to recognize Mongolia, there might be a flurry of speculation that our East Asian policy was somehow softening, but this would probably be short-lived, since informed opinion will recognize that the action is anything but a move toward China.

We do not anticipate Congressional opposition, and some Congressmen will favor the move. The Department of State intends, however, to sound out Congressional opinion and to stop for stock-taking if serious Congressional opposition should appear.

Recommendation

That you authorize the Department of State to undertake discussions with the Mongolian People's Republic for the purpose of extending diplomatic recognition and exchanging diplomatic missions.⁵

Approve

Disapprove

Other

⁵ The President initialed his approval. Telegram 64797 to Taipei, April 25, ordered McConaughy to inform the ROC of this initiative. (Ibid., Box 518, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. I)

272. Editorial Note

Republic of China and U.S. domestic reaction to proposed recognition of Mongolia was stronger than most policymakers had anticipated. At a May 9, 1969, meeting, Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming informed Ambassador Walter McConaughy that recognition would be "interpreted as 'appeasement' and might influence other countries who are wavering in attitude towards communist regimes. He made a strong plea for us to reconsider and reverse this decision." (Telegram 1563 from Taipei, May 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US) McConaughy was summoned to a meeting with President Chiang Kai-shek on May 10. He reported that "Gimo expressed surprise and shock that President Nixon, who understood situation well, and with whom he had extremely friendly relationship, would make decision to move toward recognition Mongolia. He said Presidents Kennedy and Johnson whom he did not know well and who were not as well informed on Asian developments had repeatedly considered recognition Outer Mongolia but had held off primarily because of ROC's strong opposition." (Telegram 1570 from Taipei, May 10; *ibid*) An almost verbatim record of the meeting is in telegram 1630 from Taipei, May 14; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 519, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. II.

Kissinger passed a copy of telegram 1570 and a summary to President Nixon on May 13. Nixon's handwritten comment beside the summary reads: "K. It is not worth doing over his objections. Tell State to knock off feelers." (Ibid., Box 6, President's Daily Briefs) A May 15 note for Acting Secretary of State Elliot Richardson from Kissinger, reads in its entirety: "The President has read of Chiang Kai-shek's strong reaction to our proposal to recognize Mongolia. In light of that reaction, he has asked me to tell you to go no further with our recognition plans. He feels that the move is not worth taking over Chiang Kai-shek's objections." Attached was a note from Kissinger reading "Elliot: If you feel the attached should be appealed, perhaps you and I can talk about how best to proceed. In the meantime, I think it would be best to hold up on any diplomatic moves. Henry." (Both *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US)

Richardson wrote a memorandum for the President, undated, which was summarized and passed to Nixon under a covering memorandum from Kissinger on May 23. Richardson noted that "For us to be in a position, or even to appear to be in a position, in which Chiang Kai-shek has a veto over actions which we consider to be in our national interest, particularly when we think his fears of the consequences of our proposed action are exaggerated, would make our relations with him very difficult in the future." Nixon wrote on the bottom of Kissinger's memorandum, "Delay. I want to see McConaughy's personal appraisal of this (not State conclusions)." (Both *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 553, Country Files, Far East, Mongolia, Vol. I)

Kissinger sent a message via special channels to McConaughy on May 27 and received a reply the next day. McConaughy noted that "If the President determines that overall considerations require us to go ahead with the recognition effort, the damage to our position here in my estimation will be painful, even grievous, but short of disastrous." (Both telegrams *ibid.*, Box 519, China, Vol. II) In a May 28 "Action" memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, the President indicated that he wished to "Disapprove action [recognition] for the time being." (*Ibid.*, Box 553, Far East, Mongolia, Vol. I) The decision was relayed to McConaughy on June 5 in telegram 90858 to Taipei. (*Ibid.*, Box 519, China, Vol. II) McConaughy relayed this information to Chiang Kai-shek on June 6, as reported in telegram 2041 from Taipei, June 6. (*Ibid.*)

There were also objections to recognition within the United States. In a May 12 memorandum to H. R. Haldeman, Patrick Buchanan wrote: "Understand we are on the verge of recognizing Outer Mongolia. If this is the case, can you give us some justification we can use on those of our friends who think this is some kind of sell-out—rather, can you get one of Kissinger's people to brief us on what good we can get out of it that we can relay to the Right. Thanks." According to a May 12

covering note from Haldeman, he passed this message to Henry Kissinger. A handwritten notation reads: "Mr. Sneider discussed with Buchanan, 5/15." (Both *ibid.*)

The Department of State raised the issue of Mongolian recognition several more times during the first Nixon administration. In 1972 Rogers sent a memorandum to Nixon that was summarized by Kissinger on May 8. The President indicated that he did not want to move forward on recognition, but informed the Department of State through the NSC that the issue "will be reconsidered later in the year." (Memoranda from Rogers to Nixon, from Kissinger to Nixon, and from Davis to Eliot *ibid.*) On November 21 Rogers sent a memorandum to the President raising the issue once again. Kissinger apparently did not forward this memorandum to the President, but did note on Holdridge's December 13 summary memorandum: "I want to wait till Dobrynin is back and also till I can talk to Chinese." (*Ibid.*) The United States and the People's Republic of Mongolia did not establish diplomatic relations until January 27, 1987.

Questions Pertaining to Tibet, 1969–1972

273. Editorial Note

On August 1, 1969, the CIA prepared for the 303 Committee a 14-page update on regional intelligence activities that included information and recommendations concerning the Tibetan operations. The report stated in part:

“Since 1958, CIA has been supporting guerrillas of the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan resistance movement, the bulk of whom are now located in a safehaven in Nepal just across the Tibet/Nepal border. They are conducting intelligence collections and minor paramilitary operations against Tibet and constitute a force which could be employed in strength in the event of hostilities [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], or in the event of a partial collapse of Chinese control of Tibet resulting from other causes. The above combined [Tibetan and other regional paramilitary] programs were approved by the 303 Committee for a three-year period in 1966 at a cost of [*dollar amount not declassified*]. The Fiscal Year 1969 expenditure was, however, only \$2,500,000 and it is proposed to continue the program at this level in Fiscal Year 1970.”

The report noted that the CIA had provided military equipment, training, communications, and money to Tibetan resistance guerrillas in the Mustang area of Nepal. Approximately 1.5 million [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was spent on the Tibetan force during the 1966–1969 period, often passed to leaders in local currencies to purchase food or animals. The current force had 1,800 men, “well above the optimum size considering the current targets and the increased Chinese control of Tibetan territory opposite Mustang.” The CIA noted that it had been discussing with the Dalai Lama’s representatives, guerrilla leaders, and others a plan to reduce the force to “300 well-equipped and combat ready men, the remainder being resettled as civilian ‘reserves.’” The CIA requested \$500,000 per year for the Tibetan program, with the expectation that the force reduction “might involve a termination and resettlement payment of \$2,500,000, spread over a number of years, but the eventual effect would be to cut our annual cost to under \$100,000.” In considering alternatives, the report stated: “In light of current conditions in South Asia it is not deemed necessary to discuss the alternative of more extensive support than that outlined in the ‘Proposal’. Should current indications of Soviet plans for subversion in Sinkiang and Tibet sharply increase, a plan to augment the present proposals could be quickly developed.”

The CIA stated that there were few risks involved with these programs. The U.S. Ambassadors to India and Nepal, as well as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, had been kept apprised of this program. The report concluded by requesting \$2.5 million for the Tibetan and a related paramilitary program for Fiscal Year 1970, while the CIA explored “ways to reduce the force level of the Tibetan guerillas, and to resettle them as appropriate.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303/40 Committee, 1969 Minutes)

In a September 12 memorandum to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco noted “reservations” about the CIA claims that the force could be used in the event of a conflict with China or the weakening of Chinese control over Tibet stemming from “other causes.” (Ibid.) In a subsequent September 15 memorandum to Johnson, Sisco raised other concerns related to the possible use of these forces “given the state of Sino-Soviet relations.” He predicted that the Soviets would encourage an internal uprising in Tibet in the event of hostilities with China and urged that “The Committee make clear that it would reserve its judgment on any use of the Kampa Force [Tibetan guerrillas in the Mustang Valley in Nepal] in Tibet pending an extremely careful analysis of the circumstances existing at the time the issue comes up.” Sisco also suggested that the CIA emphasize to other governments in the region that the Tibetan border force was “defensive” in nature and that caution should be exercised before its use. (Ibid.) These memoranda were forwarded to the 303 Committee for a September 23 meeting.

Tibet was not discussed until the September 30 meeting of the 303 Committee, when Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms, John Mitchell, David Packard, and George C. Denney, Jr., Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research, concluded that “the operation is well worthwhile, [*1 line of source text not declassified*].” The recommendations for reducing the Tibetan and related regional paramilitary programs in the August 1 CIA paper were approved. (Memorandum for the Record by Frank Chapin, 303 Committee Meeting of September 30; National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files, 1969 Minutes)

274. Editorial Note

During the first Nixon administration (1969–1972), the U.S. Government continued its decade-long support of the Dalai Lama and his followers, including political action, propaganda, and paramilitary

activity. Weapons and assistance were provided to Tibetan guerrillas in areas of Nepal located near the border with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Funds also were provided to the Dalai Lama for his propaganda efforts among exiled Tibetans in the United States and elsewhere. This operation began during the second Eisenhower administration (1957–1961) and continued through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

During the first Nixon administration, the value of direct U.S. support of 1,800 Tibetan refugee guerrillas was examined and a consensus was reached that the force was generally ineffective and that intelligence and potential stay-behind functions of the Tibetan exile paramilitary forces could be accomplished by a much smaller number of men. Therefore, in 1971, the 40 Committee accepted the recommendation of the CIA that the paramilitary forces be reduced from around 1,800 men to 300. This was accomplished by a reduction in financial support. The total cost of the Tibetan program until this decision was approximately \$2.5 million per year with \$500,000 of that figure for non-guerrilla political, propaganda, and intelligence operations. Under the revised plan, after a resettlement payment of \$2.5 million spread over a number of years, the costs of maintaining 300 guerrillas would be \$100,000 per year and non-guerrilla operations would be reduced from \$500,000 in FY 1970 to \$363,000 in FY 1971 and \$263,000 in FY 1972.

President Nixon, Henry Kissinger and the NSC staff, the Department of State, and the CIA all agreed that the Tibetan operation was an unsuccessful irritant to the PRC that was unlikely to influence that nation's policy, except by hampering rapprochement with the United States. This operation was reduced during the first Nixon administration, as the President sought to improve relations with the PRC Government.

275. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

Visit of the Dalai Lama to the United States

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, India, Box 600, Dalai Lama (possible 1971). Secret. Sent for action. Initialed by Kissinger. A notation on the first page reads: "To HAK."

Tibetan representatives have informed us that the Dalai Lama wishes to visit the United States and Europe this coming Autumn.² The trip will be a “private” one but the Dalai Lama would hope to call upon U.S. public officials. The Dalai Lama’s visit to the United States would be intended to focus attention on the Tibetan issue in the Human Rights Commission.

State opposes the visit on the grounds that it would generate support for and attention to the Tibetan cause and “would create, gratuitously and without a compensating gain, a further point of friction between us and Communist China.” State seeks clearance on a telegram to our Embassy in New Delhi asking how to forestall the visit. (Tab A)³

There is no doubt that the timing is unfortunate, coming as it does when we are in the midst of an effort to improve relations with Communist China. On the other hand, the Chinese have hardly abandoned their basic positions in order to talk with us and we should perhaps avoid precipitate decisions to abandon points of principle to accommodate them. We have for years supported resolutions in the United Nations pointing to denial of human rights to the Tibetans. We have endorsed the principle that they should have the right of self-determination (while making clear that we believe Tibet has traditionally been under Chinese suzerainty) and we have made substantial contributions to ease the problem of Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal.

The Dalai Lama’s previous performances abroad suggest that he would handle himself discreetly during a U.S. visit and would not seek to embarrass us if the ground rules of the visit were made clear.

Rather than simply turning off the proposed visit in the cursory manner proposed, I believe that it would be more in keeping with our

² Gyalo Thondup, brother of the Dalai Lama, raised the idea of a visit during his meeting with Rostow on December 6, 1968. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Document 343. Rostow emphasized to Gyalo that the incoming administration would have to consider this issue. The problem of the Dalai Lama’s visit lay dormant during 1969. Embassy officials met with the Dalai Lama’s representative in New Delhi, Thupten Ningee, in early January 1970. Thupten suggested a “private, informal” visit to meet Tibetan communities in the United States and scholars interested in Tibet during the autumn of 1970. (Telegram 162 from New Delhi, January 6 and telegram 294 from New Delhi, January 9; both in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 TIBET) The Department of State’s initial reaction was to seek an opportunity to “subtly” discourage the visit. (Telegram 3304 to New Delhi, January 8; *ibid.*) Phintso Thonden, the Dalai Lama’s representative in the United States, also asked that the Dalai Lama meet with high-level United States officials during his visit. (Telegram 54 from USUN, January 15, and telegram 7917 to USUN and New Delhi, January 17; both *ibid.*)

³ Attached at Tab A but not printed was a February 19 memorandum to Kissinger from Eliot, outlining the Department of State position and reviewing previous requests by representatives of the Dalai Lama for a visit to the United States, and a draft cable.

past positions to keep the prospect of a private visit open. As a practical matter, we hardly wish to be exposed to the charge of acting on the basis of expediency to woo the Chinese Communists. Moreover, in our present euphoria concerning Sino/U.S. relations, we should not lose sight of the likelihood that we may yet have reasons to want good working relations with the Dalai Lama and his entourage.

In fairness to State's position, I would emphasize that too close an identification with Tibetan separatist aspirations would rank with our Taiwan policy as key road-blocks to any improvement with relations with Communist China.

To resolve the conflicting U.S. interests, I propose that, instead of flatly opposing the concept of a visit we indicate a willingness to look forward to such a visit on the following terms:

1. It would be a private visit.
2. The Dalai Lama would not expect to see officials higher than Ambassador Yost or Under Secretary Johnson. (This is about the level which we usually deal with the Dalai Lama's elder brother and personal representative. This is also the top career as opposed to political level.)
3. The Dalai Lama and his entourage would be given to understand that we would not expect the question of the political status of Tibet to come up during the visit. If it did, we would go no farther than to repeat our present position.
4. The visit would be inconvenient this year but we would wish to consider it seriously in 1971 (after the UNGA session is over).

Recommendation

That you authorize me to tell State that the position on the Dalai Lama's visit should be as described in the numbered points above.⁴

⁴ Haig initialed the approval option for the President on March 28. The four points listed above were included verbatim in an April 1 memorandum from Kissinger (signed by Haig in his absence) to Rogers. This memorandum concluded: "I should appreciate it if the proposed outgoing telegram to New Delhi could be revised to make it somewhat less negative, in line with the four points above." The instructions were forwarded to New Delhi in telegram 50041, April 6. Both the telegram and memorandum are in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 TIBET.

276. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, April 8, 1970, 1427Z.

4018. Subject: Dalai Lama Visit to US. Ref: State 050041.²

1. I am aware that reftel had been cleared at White House level and I appreciate Washington's concern over possibility that the Dalai Lama's visit might become additional point of friction with Peking with whom we are attempting to develop useful dialogue. But there are other factors which in my view strongly militate against a flat rejection of the trip this year:

A. The Department should be aware that historically for past several years [*1 line of source text not declassified*] actively encouraged the Dalai Lama to make a trip to the US. Given the operating style of the Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thondup, it is possible that certain offices of the GOI are aware of this background, although we have no such evidence.

B. CAS is currently reducing its contribution to certain sensitive Tibetan programs [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*].³

C. There is a strong likelihood, therefore, that taken together with our recent gestures toward Peking a total rejection of even a private visit at this juncture would be interpreted by the Tibetan leadership and the GOI not only as an insult to the Dalai Lama but also evidence that Washington has really gone soft on the Chicom issue to the point of "appeasing" Peking. As suggested by FonSec T.N. Kaul's remarks during last year's Indo-US bilaterals,⁴ there are those in the GOI who are increasingly prone to ask where shifting US position on China leaves India. I do not wish to dramatize this point, but as Indians examine the Nixon Doctrine it is a problem which we must handle with extreme care. (This, of course, is not to suggest that the GOI wants the Dalai Lama to make the trip. Indians have their own sensitivities re keeping the door open for dialogue with Peking.)

D. I realize that our free press and what might be characterized as a Tibetan lobby in the US would make it difficult to avoid USG attention to the Dalai Lama during his visit. Nevertheless, I believe that this problem can be resolved tactfully yet firmly, without unduly

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 TIBET. Secret; Exdis. Also sent for the White House.

² See footnote 4, Document 275.

³ See Documents 273 and 274.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–7, Documents 29 and 30.

upsetting Peking (certainly not as much as recent revelations of US arms supply to Taiwan).

2. Therefore, I urge that:

A. The Department revise its position to permit at least a private visit this year.

B. Both Department and Embassy make it clear to Tibetans that while USG will quietly provide appropriate security protection, we wish the visit be kept private with courtesy calls on USG officials limited to level stated reftel, and that we would expect the Dalai Lama and his entourage to refrain from using US as a forum for attacking Peking or generally engaging in politicking.

3. Pending reply this message, I am deferring approach to Tibetans.

Keating

277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, April 14, 1970, 2102Z.

54905. Subject: Visit of Dalai Lama. For Ambassador From the Secretary. Ref: (A) New Delhi 04018;² (B) State 50041.³

1. I value your forthright discussion of Dalai Lama visit and have reexamined question in light of your recommendations. However, I must reaffirm decision, which was made by President, that we do not wish to have Dalai Lama come to U.S. this year and ask that you arrange to inform Tibetans of this as soon as possible, following guidance ref B.

2. In considering pros and cons of 1970 visit, we have carefully weighed all factors, including those highlighted by your message, in our relations with both GOI and Tibetans against factors pertaining to Communist China. Regarding past USG encouragement of such a visit,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 TIBET. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thayer on April 10; cleared by Kreisberg, Brown, Schneider (NEA/INC), and Getz (J); and approved by Rogers. This telegram reflects the advice of Green and Christopher Van Hollen (NEA), as explained in their April 10 memorandum to Rogers. (Ibid.)

² Document 276.

³ See footnote 4, Document 275.

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has been able to turn up any oral or written confirmation that we have given such encouragement in recent years.

3. In conveying our attitude about visit to Tibetans, we would make clear, pursuant ref B, that we would want to consider visit seriously next year and that we have not altered our traditional sympathetic attitude toward people of Tibet or our plans to continue substantial financial aid to refugees. (No specific U.S. commitment for visit should, however, be implied.)

4. Both Dalai Lama and GOI presumably have been aware for some years that relations with Communist China have inevitably been an element in our approach to Tibetan question. We believe that both parties will understand—even if Tibetans do not approve—that USG must give this weight. This aspect of course is of growing concern to us not only because of our developing dialogue in Warsaw but now because of increasingly explicit Peking involvement in politically complicated and vexing situation in SEA. These current significant problems involving both USG and PRC militate against a visit this year from which we would derive no counterbalancing gain. We hope that situation may be different next year.

5. We would not want to schedule visit later this year because of coincidence of UNGA, including celebration of 25th anniversary of UN which will witness procession of visiting dignitaries.⁴

Rogers

⁴ This message was followed up by telegram 55544 to New Delhi, April 15, which reads in full: "In conveying U.S. views on Dalai Lama visit, you of course should not mention Presidential involvement in decision." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 TIBET)

278. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee¹

Washington, January 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

Status Report on Support to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Operations

1. *Summary*

CIA Tibetan activities, utilizing followers of the Dalai Lama, have included in addition to guerrilla support a program of political, propaganda, and intelligence operations. These activities are designed to impair the international influence of Communist China by support to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exiles in maintaining the concept of an autonomous Tibet, [4 lines of source text not declassified].

From its inception the Tibetan operations program has been coordinated with the Department of State and appropriate U.S. Ambassadors. Since 1959 these activities have been approved and reviewed by predecessor bodies of the 40 Committee and were most recently endorsed by the 303 Committee in March 1968.²

Funds programmed for these Tibetan operations (other than guerrilla resistance support) have been gradually reduced from over \$500,000 yearly before 1969 to \$363,000 proposed for FY 1971.³

¹ Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Tibet. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten note on the first page reads: "Approved by the 40 Committee on 31 March 1971." This issue was discussed briefly at the March 31 meeting of the 40 Committee held in San Clemente, California. According to the minutes of the meeting, Kissinger asked, "Does this have any direct benefit to us?" U. Alexis Johnson replied, "It keeps him [the Dalai Lama] alive." David Blee of CIA added, "It helps in Buddhist countries." Kissinger then asked what would happen if the Dalai Lama died. Blee replied that a committee of lamas would meet to find a new Dalai Lama. Kissinger asked, "He will be one of the people outside Tibet?" Blee replied, "Yes, They have lots of people outside. The program this year amounts to \$363,000. It will go down to \$263,000 in FY 72." Johnson, representing the Department of State, said, "We have no problem with this." Kissinger asked if everyone agreed on this item, and the minutes indicate that "All agreed." The 40 Committee also discussed Tibetan paramilitary forces at this meeting and approved a CIA proposal to continue to reduce the forces from 1,800 to 300 over the next 3 years (see Document 273). (Minutes of the 40 Committee meeting, March 31; National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files, 1971 Minutes) The CIA report on U.S.-supported paramilitary activities in the region is in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files, 1971.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXX, Document 342.

³ In an April 6 memorandum to Van Hollen, David T. Schneider wrote that the reduction in the Tibetan operation would not be as fast or as extensive as he and others in the Department of State had recommended. "I am distressed at his outcome and will be discussing with EA what, if anything, we can do to pick up the pieces." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 TIBET)

2. Status Report

(a) Background

Following up earlier U.S. support to his followers in Tibet, upon the Dalai Lama's escape to India in 1959 we instituted a covert subsidy to him and his immediate entourage, and funds and guidance to maintain Tibetan social and political institutions in India and abroad. With Indian asylum and U.S. support, the idea of Tibet as an ethnic and cultural entity with a widely-acknowledged claim to freedom from Chinese Communist rule has survived. The figure of the Dalai Lama, still revered as the spiritual leader of his people, has been effective as a reminder of the threat Communist China represents to its neighbors and to non-Chinese minorities. The existence of a free Tibet in exile has also helped to expose the hollowness of Communist China's pretensions to sponsoring "national liberation" movements around the world.

In the years after the Dalai Lama's escape, our Tibetan political operations have been built round efforts to gain support for the Tibetan cause [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Propaganda operations have aimed to enlarge world awareness of and sympathy for the Tibetans. Intelligence operations have aimed to place reporting agents within Tibet to gather political and military information. [*6½ lines of source text not declassified*]

(b) Policy Approvals

In April 1959 the Special Group (5412) approved CIA support to the Tibetan resistance movement, and in May 1959 approved our covert support to the Dalai Lama. Status reports on Tibetan political, psychological and intelligence operations were reviewed and endorsed by the Committee in February 1964 and March 1968.⁴

(c) Developments During Fiscal Year 1970

During the past year our efforts to foster the continued existence of a Tibetan entity and exploit it against Communist China have been abetted by significant developments in both Indian and Soviet attitudes. Resolutions favoring Tibetan rights, which succeeded in the United Nations in 1959, 1961 and 1965, had been opposed by the USSR and India either abstained or withheld active support. The persistent efforts of the Dalai Lama and his brother Gyalo Thondup have lately been rewarded by growing support from Indian officials. Perhaps more significant has been the approach of senior Soviet diplomats to Gyalo Thondup proposing joint Soviet-Tibetan intelligence operations into

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXX, Document 337.

Sinkiang and Tibet. The Soviets also stated that the USSR would consider abstaining from voting against any resolution in the United Nations censuring China on human rights in Tibet. Thondup has remained interested but non-committal to Soviet overtures for joint operations.

We have continued to pay a [*dollar amount not declassified*] yearly direct subsidy to the Dalai Lama and his entourage to maintain him in India where he strives to keep alive the will, the culture, and the religious traditions of his people in exile. He does not account to us for this sum and it is not used in our Tibetan operations. In addition to the Dalai Lama's subsidy, we have funded political and propaganda activities of the Tibetans. [*3½ lines of source text not declassified*]

The first class of young Tibetans graduated from a training course in administration which we sponsored [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] last year. Some are administering the Tibetan Bureau in New Delhi, which conducts the Dalai Lama's business with the Indian Government. Others are working for its cultural center in New Delhi which serves Tibetologists and has become an important tourist attraction. The Tibetan Bureau also publishes an English language newspaper which has been distributed internationally to institutions to publicize the Tibetan cause abroad.

The New York Office of Tibet has continued to keep the Tibetan cause before international leaders, and to treat with organizations interested in refugees and relief. A well-known international lawyer, formerly a member of the U.S. United Nations delegation, continues to assist the Tibetans in New York [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. An Office of Tibet in Geneva serves Tibetan refugees in Europe, arranges scholarships and vocational training, and treats with international refugee agencies.

For intelligence collection on the Chinese presence in Tibet we have worked [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] independently with Tibetan leaders [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. Our independent operations with Tibetans [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] have concentrated on attempts to place resident agents in Tibet. Chinese security in the border area and travel controls within Tibet have made such agent operations extremely hazardous. CIA-trained radio teams of Tibetans along the Nepal border of Tibet have continued to report [*3 lines of source text not declassified*] continues in radio contact with these teams as well as the paramilitary resistance force in the Mustang valley of Nepal.

(d) Planned Continuation of Program

The Tibetans will continue to seek Government of India support for a new resolution in the United Nations in the hope of recording a Soviet abstention against China. [*9½ lines of source text not declassified*] We shall continue the subsidy to the Dalai Lama at its past level, but

shall somewhat reduce funds for other activities. Intelligence collection costs are being reduced [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] by eliminating unproductive agent personnel.

3. *Alternatives*

At the present time the effectiveness of the Dalai Lama's presence in exile is maintained by [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] U.S. subsidy [*7½ lines of source text not declassified*]. The U.S. alone provides all the costs of promoting the Tibetan cause internationally [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. A withdrawal of U.S. support to the Tibetans would reduce but not eliminate the effectiveness of the Dalai Lama's presence in exile; however, the Tibetan cause as a world issue would probably fade rapidly because the Indian Government, as the only reasonable alternative source of support, would not likely undertake the foreign exchange costs involved. The Tibetans would no longer willingly provide the personnel and expertise required by our unilateral and joint intelligence efforts [*1 line of source text not declassified*].

Elimination of the intelligence collection operations would not seriously diminish coverage of Western China for U.S. needs, [*3 lines of source text not declassified*].

4. *Risks and Contingency Planning*

[*8½ lines of source text not declassified*] The risk of public disclosure of CIA subsidy to the Dalai Lama is small. CIA support to the Dalai Lama is assumed by the Chinese, and there is some evidence that the Chinese have tried to put pressure on the King of Nepal to inhibit U.S. and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] operations. However, the King has not found these operations to be intolerable, and therefore we do not regard them as jeopardizing U.S.-Nepal relations.

5. *Coordination*

This proposal was coordinated in September 1970 with State Department officials Messrs. Christopher Van Hollen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, David Schneider, Country Director for India, and Alfred Jenkins, Director for Asian Communist Affairs. They agreed to its submission to the Committee.

6. *Costs*

The total cost of the proposed Tibetan operations for Fiscal Year 1971 will be \$363,000 [*4 lines of source text not declassified*] These funds have been programmed by CIA for Fiscal Year 1971.

7. *Recommendation*

It is recommended that the 40 Committee endorse the continuation of the subsidy to the Dalai Lama and support to other Tibetan operations, and approve the funding level.

279. Editorial Note

From late 1970 through late 1972, the Nixon administration and the Department of State tentatively accepted, then postponed, a visit by the Dalai Lama. In a December 26, 1970, memorandum sent through Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson to Secretary of State William Rogers, Marshall Green and Joseph Sisco wrote that “We believe that notwithstanding the risk of irritating Peking we should approve a private, strictly non-political visit to the United States by the Dalai Lama next spring. Our concerns regarding possible politicking by the Dalai Lama during a US visit are less than they were last year, when an October visit was proposed.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 TIBET) On January 13, 1971, Rogers suggested that President Nixon approve a visit in the spring of 1972 “solely for educational and cultural purposes.” (Ibid.) Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama’s brother, and Ernest Gross, a lobbyist for the Tibetans, spearheaded the effort to arrange a visit. (Memorandum from Jenkins to Green, January 26; *ibid.*)

While no action was taken on Rogers’ January 13 memorandum, Executive Secretary of the Department of State Theodore Eliot sent a February 18 memorandum to Henry Kissinger, noting that Gyalo Thondup had visited the Department of State and “indicated that the Dalai Lama did not plan to visit the United States this spring and perhaps not at all this year.” Eliot suggested that, if the Dalai Lama did renew his request, that it be approved, subject to three conditions: “a) it should be a private visit, b) we expected the issue of Tibet’s political status would not arise, and c) the Dalai Lama could not expect to make courtesy calls on USG officials higher than Under Secretary Alexis Johnson, i.e., our highest Foreign Service career official.” He concluded: “We realize that Peking may register some irritation at a visit at any time, but we believe that it can be handled so as to avoid a major adverse impact on the Sino-US dialogue.” (Ibid.) After reviewing a February 23 memorandum by John Holdridge of the NSC staff summarizing the plan for a proposed visit, Kissinger wrote to Eliot on March 1 that “A visit under the conditions specified in the memorandum would be acceptable.” (Both *ibid.*, NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, India, Box 600, Dalai Lama (possible 1971)) On March 9 Johnson wrote to Gross: “As I stated the other day over the telephone, we would be happy to discuss arrangements for a private visit by His Holiness The Dalai Lama to the United States early next year after the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 TIBET)

In a July 22 meeting with Kissinger and President Nixon to discuss Sino-American relations, Rogers stated: “We have the Dalai Lama scheduled for the spring sometime, we ought to postpone that, I’ll take

care of that." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation among Nixon, Rogers, and Kissinger, July 22, 1971, 3:49–5:05 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 543–1) On August 27 Green wrote to Johnson that "We believe that the PRC might take offense at a Dalai Lama visit to the U.S. prior to or immediately following President Nixon's trip to Peking." On the same day, Green drafted a memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, suggesting that the visit be postponed until late 1972 or early 1973. (Both *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 TIBET) Jeanne W. Davis of the NSC staff replied to Eliot on September 21: "Dr. Kissinger concurs in your recommendation that Under Secretary Johnson take the steps necessary to postpone the Dalai Lama's visit to the U.S. The trip should now be considered for early 1973." (Ibid.) Johnson reported that "In September 22 telecon between Under Secretary Johnson and Ernest Gross, it was agreed that recent developments have created situation in which visit to U.S. by Dalai Lama could be misinterpreted from political point of view and will, therefore, be postponed." (Telegram 178762 to New Delhi, September 28; *ibid.*, POL 30 TIBET)

In an October 5, 1972, memorandum to Kissinger, Eliot reported that "We have just received an inquiry from Mr. Ernest Gross, our former Ambassador to the UN, and Chairman of the Tibetan Foundation, whether we are agreeable to a non-political visit to the U.S. by His Holiness the Dalai Lama during the spring of 1973." Eliot suggested approval of the visit, noting that "Given the fact that we have already twice put off such plans, a further postponement, in the absence of some overriding reason, would be viewed as a slight by the Tibetans and could create a harmful impression on Buddhists elsewhere." (Ibid., POL 7 TIBET) Holdridge forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under an October 10 covering memorandum. He recommended that the visit be approved, but no action was taken. According to a November 14 memorandum to Haig from Holdridge, Haig had suggested that a decision be delayed until mid-November. Holdridge again recommended approval of the visit and noted that U. Alexis Johnson urged an affirmative response. Although the November 14 memorandum was addressed to Haig, Kissinger initialed the disapproval line. A handwritten comment by Haig reads: "This could drive our New York friends wild." (Both *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, India, Box 600, Dalai Lama (possible 1971)) On November 18 James Hackett of the NSC staff sent the following memorandum to Eliot: "The proposed visit to the United States by the Dalai Lama for non-political purposes has been given careful consideration and, in light of the current world situation, has been disapproved at this time." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 TIBET)

280. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Washington, September 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

CIA Program of Support to the Dalai Lama, Tibetan Operations, and the Tibetan Forces in Nepal

In the attached memorandum² CIA reports on its Tibetan activities and asks 40 Committee approval to continue the program, in a reduced form, for FY 73. The program, begun in 1959, was last considered by the Committee in March 1971. Expenditures amounted to \$557,000 in FY 72; \$437,000 is budgeted for FY 73.

During the past year CIA has: provided the usual subsidy for the Dalai Lama and his entourage; continued to maintain, at a reduced level, a Tibetan contingency force in Nepal; and supported press activities; a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], administrative training, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and unilateral intelligence activities, and Tibetan offices [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] New York. Support for a Tibetan office in Geneva ceased in 1970. During FY 1972 expenditures for the Tibetan contingency force were further reduced in accordance with a plan for the gradual phasing out of the force approved by the Committee in 1969. Maintenance of the force will come to an end in FY 74; current funds provide for the training and resettlement of approximately 500 men per year of the original 1800 man force.

For FY 73 CIA proposes to continue the subsidy to the Dalai Lama [*dollar amount not declassified*], again reduce support for the contingency force [*dollar amount not declassified*], and fund intelligence activities and the New York office [*dollar amount not declassified*]. Support would cease for press activities, a political party, administrative training, and the Tibetan office [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

At the Department's instance, CIA has agreed to put the Tibetans on notice that support for the New York office will be phased out over the next three years, beginning with the current fiscal year. The New

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tibet, 1969–1976. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent through McAfee (INR). Concurred in by Van Hollen and Schneider (NEA) and Hummel and Jenkins (EA).

² Attached but not printed is a 10-page report, September 6, which is similar in format to Document 278.

York office is the only part of the program which the Peoples Republic of China might assume to be US rather than Indian sponsored. This will leave a program which supports the Dalai Lama's efforts to preserve Tibetan cultural, ethnic, and religious identity, but without involving the US in aggressive propaganda activities or political action.

There is little political risk in the program. [3 lines of source text not declassified] International refugee programs provide an additional shield.

Recommendation

We recommend that you support continuation of the Tibetan program for FY 73 at a projected cost of \$437,000.³

³ A handwritten notation on another copy of the September 6 CIA report reads: "Approved by the 40 Committee on 5 October 1972." (National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Tibet)

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