BETWEEN TWO AGES

America's Role in the Technetronic Era

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THE VIKING PRESS / NEW YORK

First published in 1970 by The Viking Press, Inc. 625 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
Published simultaneously in Canada by The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited
ISBN 670-16041-5
Library of Congress catalog card number: 76-104162
Printed in U.S.Aby H. Wolff Book Mfg. Co.
Prepared under the auspices of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University
Portions of this book appeared in *Encounter* in different form

PART I

The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution

The paradox of our time is that humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and more fragmented. That is the principal thrust of contemporary change. Time and space have become so compressed that global politics manifest a tendency toward larger, more interwoven forms of cooperation as well as toward the dissolution of established institutional and ideological loyalties. Humanity is becoming more integral and intimate even as the differences in the condition of the separate societies are widening. Under these circumstances proximity, instead of promoting unity, gives rise to tensions prompted by a new sense of global congestion.

A new pattern of international politics is emerging. The world is ceasing to be an arena in which relatively self-contained, "sovereign," and homogeneous nations interact, collaborate, clash, or make war. International politics, in the original sense of the term, were born when groups of people began to identify themselves— and others—in mutually exclusive terms (territory, language, symbols, beliefs), and when that identification became in turn the dominant factor in relations between these groups. The concept of national interest—based on geographical factors, traditional animosities or friendships, economics, and security considerations—implied a degree of autonomy and specificity that was possible only so long as nations were sufficiently separated in time and space to have both the room to maneuver and the distance needed to maintain separate identity.

During the classical era of international politics, weapons, communications, economics, and ideology were all essentially national in scope. With the invention of modern artillery, weaponry required national arsenals and standing armies; in more recent times it could be effectively and rapidly deployed by one nation against the frontiers of another. Communications, especially since the invention of the steam engine and the resulting age of railroads, reinforced national integration by making it possible to move people and goods across most nations in a period of time rarely exceeding two days. National economies, frequently resting on autarkic principles, stimulated both the awareness and the development of collective vested interest, protected by tariff walls. Nationalism so personalized community feelings that the nation became an extension of the ego.*

All four factors mentioned above are now becoming global. Weapons of total destructive power can be applied at any point on the globe in a matter of minutes—in less time, in fact, than it takes for the police in a major city to respond to an emergency call. The entire globe is in closer reach and touch than a middle-sized European power was to its own capital fifty years ago. Transnational ties are gaining in importance, while the claims of nationalism, though still intense, are nonetheless becoming diluted. This change, naturally, has gone furthest in the most advanced countries, but no country is now immune to it. The consequence is a new era—an era of the global political process.

Yet though the process is global, real unity of mankind remains remote. The contemporary world is undergoing a change in many respects similar to that prompted by the earlier appearance of large population centers. The growth of such centers weakened intimate and direct lines of authority and contributed to the appearance of many conflicting and crosscutting allegiances. A typical city dweller identifies himself simultaneously with a variety of groups—occupational, religious, leisure, political— and only rarely operates in an environment that is exclusively dominated by a single system of values and a unilinear personal commitment. American metropolitan politics are typically messy: special-interest and pressure groups, ethnic communities, political organizations, religious institutions, major industrial or financial forces, and even the criminal underworld interact in a pattern that simultaneously includes continuous limited warfare and accommodation.

Global polities are acquiring some analogous characteristics. Nations of different sizes and developmentally in different historical epochs interact, creating friction, variable patterns of accommodation, and changing alignments. While the formal rules of the game maintain the illusion that it is played only by those players called "states"—and, when war breaks out, the states become the only significant players—short of war the game is truly played on a much more informal basis, with much more mixed participation. Some states possess overwhelming power; others, the "mini-states," are overshadowed by multimillion-dollar international corporations, major banks .and financial interests, transnational organizations of religious or ideological character, and the emerging international institutions that in some cases "represent" the interests of the minor players (for example, the UN) or in other cases mask the power of the major ones (for example, the Warsaw Pact or SEATO).

The methods for coping with international conflicts are hence becoming similar to those for dealing

* This was a major change from the earlier feudal age. At that time weapons were largely personal, communications were very limited and primarily oral, the economy was primitive and rural, and ideology stressed direct, religion-based obeisance to a personally known chief. These conditions thus reinforced and reflected a more fragmented "intranational" political process.

with urban discord. A characteristic feature of concentrated humanity is the routinization of conflict. Direct violence becomes increasingly regulated and restricted, and ultimately comes to be considered as a deviation from the norm. Organized mechanisms, in the form of uniformed, salaried personnel, are established to confine violence to socially tolerable limits. A certain measure of crime is accepted as unavoidable; for the sake of order, therefore, organized crime is generally preferred to anarchic violence, thus indirectly and informally becoming an extension of order.

The routinization of conflict on a global scale has been the goal of statesmen for many decades. Agreements, conventions, and pacts have sought to govern it. None of these could prove effective in a system of relatively distinctive and sovereign units; but the appearance of rapid communications, which created not only physical proximity but also instant awareness of distant events, and the onset of the nuclear age, which for the first time made truly destructive global power available to at least two states, fundamentally altered the pattern of international conflict. On the one hand these factors depressed its level, and on the other they heightened its potential and increased its scope.

Urban underworld wars do not give rise to much moral revulsion nor are they seen as major threats to social peace. Only outbreaks of violence directed at that peace, as represented by human life and major vested interests—banks, shops, or private property, for example—are resolutely combated. Similarly, in the more advanced portions of the world there is a tendency among the establishment and the middle class of the "global city" to be indifferent to Third World conflicts and to view them as necessary attributes of a low level of development—provided, of course, that such conflicts do not feed back into the relations among the more powerful states. Wars in the Third World thus seem tolerable as long as their international scale is contained at a level that does not seem to threaten major interests.*

In our time the routinization of conflict has also meant a shift from sustained warfare to sporadic outbreaks of violence. Sustained, prolonged warfare was made possible by the industrial age. In earlier times armies confronted each other, fought pitched, head-on battles, and, like gladiators of old, scored decisive victories or went down in defeat. The industrial age permitted societies to mobilize their manpower and resources for prolonged but indecisive struggles resembling classical wrestling and requiring both skill and endurance. Nuclear weapons—never used in conflict between nuclear powers—pose the possibility of such mutual annihilation that they tend to freeze their possessors into passive restraint, with sporadic outbreaks of Violence occurring on the peripheries of the confrontation. Though, in the past, violence tended to result in the use of maximum available power, today those states possessing maximum power strive to employ a minimum in the assertion of their interests.

Since the appearance of nuclear weapons, relations between the superpowers have been governed by a rudimentary code of restraint forged by trial and error in the course of confrontations ranging from Korea through Berlin to Cuba. It is likely that in the absence of these weapons war would long since have broken out between the United States and the Soviet Union. Their destructive power has thus had a basic effect on the degree to which force is applied in the relations among states, compelling an unprecedented degree of prudence in the behaviour of the most powerful states. Within the fragile framework in which the contemporary transformation of our reality occurs, nuclear weapons have thus created an entirely novel system of deterrence from the reliance on overwhelming power.

In the case of urban politics, the weakness of accepted and respected immediate authority is compensated for by the sense of higher allegiance to the nation, as represented by the institutional expression of state power. The global city lacks that higher dimension—and much of the contemporary search for order is an attempt to create it, or to find some equilibrium short of it. Otherwise, however, global politics are similarly characterized by the confusing pattern of involvement, congestion, and interaction, which cumulatively, though gradually, undermines the exclusive-ness and the primacy of those hitherto relatively watertight compartments, the nation-states. In the process, international politics gradually become a much more intimate and overlapping process.

Eras are historical abstractions. They are also an intellectual convenience: they are meant to be milestones on a road that over a period of time changes imperceptibly and yet quite profoundly. It is a matter of arbitrary judgment when one era ends and a new one begins; neither the end nor the beginning can be clearly and sharply defined. On the formal plane, politics as a global process operate much as they did in the past, but the inner reality of that process is increasingly shaped by forces whose influence or scope transcend national lines.

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* during the post-1945 years, the development of nuclear weapons, the formation of power blocs and multilateral alliance systems, and the in creasing financial cost of modern warfare, have all been factors inhibiting the outbreak of formal warfare between the advanced, industrial nations. The majority of 'conflicts' during these years have taken place in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, the so-called Third World. And a large number of them have followed on or been associated with the break-up of colonial empires, whether Ottoman, British, French or Japanese, and the subsequent emergence of new states which are often small, poor and insecure" (David Wood, "Conflict in the Twentieth Century," Adelphi Papers, June 1968, p. 19). The above study contains a list of eighty conflicts that have occurred in the years 1945-1967. All but eight of these conflicts involved Third World participants on both sides.

The analogy with metropolitan politics is also made by Theodore H. Von Laue in his thoughtful book The Global City (New York, 1969). Von Laue js particularly stimulating in his analysis of the impact of the Western "metropolitan" system on world politics during the last century.

1. The Onset of the Technetronic Age

The impact of science and technology on man and his society, especially in the more advanced countries of the world, is becoming the major source of contemporary change. Recent years have seen a proliferation of exciting and challenging literature on the future. In the United States, in Western Europe, and, to a lesser degree, in Japan and in the Soviet Union, a number of systematic, scholarly efforts have been made to project, predict, and grasp what the future holds for us.

The transformation that is now taking place, especially in America, is already creating a society increasingly unlike its industrial predecessor.[1] The post-industrial society is becoming a "technetronic" society:[*] a society that is shaped culturally, psychologically, socially, and economically by the impact of technology and electronics—particularly in the area of computers and communications. The industrial process is no longer the principal determinant of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, and the values of society. In the industrial society technical knowledge was applied primarily to one specific end: the acceleration and improvement of production techniques. Social consequences were a later by-product of this paramount concern. In the technetronic society scientific and technical knowledge, in addition to enhancing production capabilities, quickly spills over to affect almost all aspects of life directly. Accordingly, both the growing capacity for the instant calculation of the most complex interactions and the increasing availability of biochemical means of human control augment the potential scope of consciously chosen direction, and thereby also the pressures to direct, to choose, and to change.

Reliance on these new techniques of calculation and communication enhances the social importance of human intelligence and the immediate relevance of learning. The need to integrate social change is heightened by the increased ability to decipher the patterns of change; this in turn increases the significance of basic assumptions concerning the nature of man and the desirability of one or another form of social organization. Science thereby intensifies rather than diminishes the relevance of values, but it de-mands that they be cast in terms that go beyond the more crude ideologies of the industrial age. (This theme is developed further in Part II.)

New Social Patterns

For Norbert Wiener, "the locus of an earlier industrial revolution before the main industrial revolution" is to be found in the fifteenth-century research pertaining to navigation (the nautical compass), as well as in the development of gunpowder and printing.[2] Today the functional equivalent of navigation is the thrust into space, which requires a rapid computing capacity beyond the means of the human brain; the equivalent of gunpowder is modern nuclear physics, and that of printing is television and long-range instant communications. The consequence of this new tech-netronic revolution is the progressive emergence of a society that increasingly differs from the industrial one in a variety of economic, political, and social aspects. The following examples may be briefly cited to summarize some of the contrasts:

(1) In an industrial society the mode of production shifts from agriculture to industry, with the use of human and animal muscle supplanted by machine operation. In the technetronic society industrial employment yields to services, with automation and cybernetics replacing the operation of machines by individuals.

(2) Problems of employment and unemployment—to say nothing of the prior urbanization of the post-rural labor force—dominate the relationship between employers, labor, and the market in the industrial society, and the assurance of minimum welfare to the new industrial masses is a source of major concern. In the emerging new society questions relating to the obsolescence of skills, security, vacations, leisure, and profit sharing dominate the relationship, and the psychic well-being of millions of relatively secure but potentially aimless lower-middle-class blue-collar workers becomes a growing problem.

(3) Breaking down traditional barriers to education, and thus creating the basic point of departure for social advancement, is a major goal of social reformers in the industrial society. Education, available for limited and specific periods of time, is initially concerned with overcoming illiteracy and subsequently with technical training, based largely on written, sequential reasoning. In the technetronic society not only is education universal but advanced training is available to almost all who have the basic talents, and there is far greater emphasis on quality selection. The essential problem is to discover the most effective techniques for the rational exploitation of social talent. The latest communication and calculating techniques are employed in this task. The educational process becomes a lengthier one and is increasingly reliant on audio-visual aids. In addition, the flow of new knowledge necessitates more and more frequent refresher studies.

(4) In the industrial society social leadership shifts from the traditional rural-aristocratic to an urban-plutocratic elite. Newly acquired wealth is its foundation, and intense competition the outlet—as well as the stimulus—for its energy. In the technetronic society plutocratic pre-eminence is challenged by the political leadership, which is itself increasingly permeated by individuals

[*] The term "post-industrial" is used by Daniel Bell, who has done much of the pioneering thinking on the subject. However, I prefer to use the neologism "technetronic," because it conveys more directly the character of the principal impulses for change in our time. Similarly, the term "industrial" described what otherwise could have been called the "post-agricultural" age.

possessing special skills and intellectual talents. Knowledge becomes a tool of power and the effective mobilization of talent an important way to acquire power.
(5) The university in an industrial society—in contrast to the situation in medieval times—is an aloof ivory tower, the repository of irrelevant, even if respected, wisdom, and for a brief time the fountainhead for budding members of the established social elite. In the technetronic society the university becomes an intensely involved "think tank," the source of much sustained political planning and social innovation.
(6) The turmoil inherent in the shift from a rigidly traditional rural society to an urban one engenders an inclination to seek total answers to social dilemmas, thus causing ideologies to thrive in the industrializing society. (The American exception to this rule was due to the absence of a feudal tradition, a point well developed by Louis Hartz.) In the industrial age literacy makes for static interrelated conceptual thinking, congenial to ideological systems. In the technetronic society audio-visual communications prompt more changeable, disparate views of reality, not compressible into formal systems, even as the requirements of science and the new computative techniques place a premium on mathematical logic and systematic reasoning. The resulting tension is felt most acutely by scientists, with the consequence that some seek to confine reason to science while expressing their emotions through politics. Moreover, the increasing ability to reduce social conflicts to quantifiable and measurable dimensions reinforces the trend toward a more pragmatic approach to social problems, while it simultaneously stimulates new concerns with preserving "humane" values.
(7) In the industrial society, as the hitherto passive masses become active there are intense political conflicts over such matters as disenfranchisement and the right to vote. The issue of political participation is a crucial one. In the technetronic age the question is increasingly one of ensuring real participation in decisions that seem too complex and too far removed from the average citizen. Political alienation becomes a problem. Similarly, the issue of political eqaality of the sexes gives way to a struggle for the sexual equality of women. In the industrial society woman __the operator of machines—ceases to be physically inferior to the male, a consideration of some importance in rural life, and begins to demand her political rights. In the emerging technetronic society automation threatens both males and females, intellectual talent is computable, the "pill" encourages sexual equality, and women begin to claim complete equality.
(8) The newly enfranchised masses are organized in the industrial society by trade unions and political parties and unified by relatively simple and somewhat ideological programs. Moreover, political attitudes are influenced by appeals to nationalist sentiments, communicated through the massive increase of newspapers employing, naturally, the readers' national language. In the technetronic society the trend seems to be toward aggregating the individual support of millions of unorganized citizens, who are easily within the reach of magnetic and attractive personalities, and effectively exploiting the latest communication techniques to manipulate emotions and control reason. Reliance on television—and hence the tendency to replace language with imagery, which is international rather than national, and to include war coverage or scenes of hunger in places as distant as, for example, India—creates a somewhat more cosmopolitan, though highly impressionistic, involvement in global affairs.
(9) Economic power in the early phase of industrialization tends to be personalized, by either great entrepreneurs like Henry Ford or bureaucratic industrial officials like Kaganovich, or Mine (in Stalinist Poland). The tendency toward depersonalization economic power is stimulated in the next stage by the appearance of a highly complex interdependence between governmental institutions (including the military), scientific establishments, and industrial organizations. As economic power becomes inseparably linked with political power, it becomes more invisible and the sense of individual futility incfeases.
(10) In an industrial society the acquisition of goods and the accumulation of personal wealth become forms of social attainment for an unprecedentedly large number of people. In the technetronic society the adaptation of science to humane ends and a growing concern with the quality of life become both possible and increasingly a moral imperative for a large number of citizens, especially the young.

Eventually, these changes and many others, including some that more directly affect the personality and quality of the human being himself, will make the technetronic society as different from the industrial as the industrial was from the agrarian.* And just as the shift from an agrarian economy and feudal politics toward an industrial society and political systems based on the individual's emotional identification with the nation-state gave rise to contemporary international politics, so the appearance of the technetronic society reflects the onset of a new relationship between man and his expanded global reality.

Social Explosion/Implosion

This new relationship is a tense one: man has still to define it conceptually and thereby render it comprehensible to himself. Our expanded global reality is simultaneously fragmenting and thrusting itself in upon us. The result of the coincident explosion and implosion is not only insecurity and tension but also an entirely novel perception of what many still call international affairs.

* Bell defines the "five dimensions of the post-industrial society" as involving the following: (l) The creation of a service economy. (2) The pre-eminence of the professional and technical class. (3) The centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and policy formulation in the society. (4) The possibility of self-sustaining technological growth. (5) The creation of a new "intellectual technology." (Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," in Indicators of Social Change, Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert Moore, eds., New York, 1968, pp. 152-53.)

Life seems to lack cohesion as environment rapidly alters and human beings become increasingly manipulable and malleable. Everything seems more transitory and temporary: external reality more fluid than solid, the human being more synthetic than authentic. Even our senses perceive an entirely novel "reality"—one of our own making but nevertheless, in terms of our sensations, quite "real."* More important, there is already widespread concern about the possibility of biological and chemical tampering with what has until now been considered the immutable essence of man. Human conduct, some argue, can be predetermined and subjected to deliberate control. Man is increasingly acquiring the capacity to determine the sex of his children, to affect through drugs the extent of their intelligence, and to modify and control their personalities. Speaking of a future at most only decades away, an experimenter in intelligence control asserted, "I foresee the time when we shall have the means and therefore, inevitably, the temptation to manipulate the behaviour and intellectual functioning of all the people through environmental and biochemical manipulation of the brain." [3]

Thus it is an open question whether technology and science will in fact increase the options open to the individual. Under the headline "Study Terms Technology a Boon to Individualism," [4] *The New York Times* reported the preliminary conclusions of a Harvard project on the social significance of science. Its participants were quoted as concluding that "most Americans have a greater range of personal choice, wider experience and a more highly developed sense of self-worth than ever before." This may be so, but a judgment of this sort rests essentially on an intuitive and comparative—insight into the present and past states of mind of Americans. In this connection a word of warning from an acute observer is highly relevant: "It behaves us to examine carefully the degree of validity, as measured by actual behaviour, of the statement that a benefit of technology will be to increase the number of options and alternatives the individual can choose from. In principle, it could; in fact, the individual may use any number of psychological devices to avoid the discomfort of information overload, and thereby keep the range of alternatives to which he responds much narrower than that which technology in principle makes available to him." [5] In other words, the real questions are how the individual will exploit the options, to what extent he will be intellectually and psychologically prepared to exploit them, and in what way society as a whole will create a favorable setting for taking advantage of these options. Their avail-ability is not of itself proof of a greater sense of freedom or self-worth.

Instead of accepting himself as a spontaneous given, man in the most advanced societies may become more concerned with conscious self-analysis according to external, explicit criteria: What is my IQ? What are my aptitudes, personality traits, capabilities, attractions, and negative features? The "internal man"—spontaneously accepting his own spontaneity—will more and more be challenged by the "external man"—consciously seeking his self-conscious image; and the transition from one to the other may not be easy. It will also give rise to difficult problems in determining the legitimate scope of social control. The possibility of extensive chemical mind control, the danger of loss of individuality inherent in extensive transplantation, the feasibility of manipulating the genetic structure will call for the social definition of common criteria of use and restraint. As the previously cited, writer put it, ". . . while the chemical affects the individual, the person is significant to himself and to society in his *social* context —at work, at home, at play. The consequences are social consequences. In deciding how to deal with such alterers of the ego and of experience (and consequently alterers of the personality after the experience), and in deciding how to deal with the 'changed' human beings, we will have to face new questions such as 'Who am I?' 'When am I who?" 'Who are *they* in relation to me?'" [6]

Moreover, man will increasingly be living in man-made and rapidly man-altered environments. By the end of this century approximately two-thirds of the people in the advanced countries ill live in cities.†'" Urban growth has so far been primarily the by-product of accidental economic convenience, of the magnetic attraction of population centers, and of the flight of many from rural poverty and exploitation. It has not been deliberately designed to improve the quality of life. The impact of "accidental" cities is already contributing to the depersonalization of individual life as the kinship structure contracts and enduring relations of friendship become more difficult to maintain. Julian Huxley was perhaps guilty of only slight exaggeration when he warned that "overcrowding in animals leads to distorted neurotic and down-right pathological behaviour. We can be sure that the same is true in principle of people. City life today is definitely leading to mass mental disease, to growing vandalism and possible eruptions of mass violence." ‡ [7]

The problem of identity is likely to be complicated by a generation gap, intensified by the dissolution of traditional ties and values derived from extended family and enduring community relationships. The dialogue

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† In 1900 there were 10 cities with populations of one million or more; in 1955 the number had grown to 61; in 1965 there were over 100 cities with populations of one million or more. Today in Australia and Oceania three-quarters of the people live in cities; in America and Europe (the USSR included) one-half do; in Africa and Asia one-fifth live in cities.

‡ / G. N. Carstairs, in "Why Is Man Aggressive?" (Impact of Science on So-wty, April-June 1968, p. 90), argues that population growth, crowding, and social oppression all contribute to irrational and intensified aggression, experiments on rats seem to bear this out; observation of human behavior in large cities seems to warrant a similar conclusion. For a cri du cceur against this congested condition from a French sociologist, see Jacques Ellul, The 1 technological Society, New York, 1965, p. 321.

between the generations is becoming a dialogue of the deaf. It no longer operates within the conservative-liberal or nationalist-internationalist framework. The breakdown in communication between the generations—so vividly evident during the student revolts of 1968—was rooted in the irrelevance of the old symbols' to many younger people. Debate implies the acceptance of a common frame of reference and language; since these were lacking, debate became increasingly impossible!

Though currently the clash is over values—with many of the young rejecting those of their elders, who in turn contend that the young have evaded the responsibility of articulating theirs— in the future the clash between generations will be also over expertise. Within a few years the rebels in the more advanced countries who today have the most visibility will be joined by a new generation making its claim to power in government and business: a generation trained to reason logically; as accustomed to exploiting electronic aids to human reasoning as we have been to using machines to increase our own mobility; expressing itself in a language that functionally relates to these aids; accepting as routine managerial processes current innovations such as planning-programming-budgeting systems (PPBS) and the appearance in high business echelons of "top computer executives." [8] As the older elite defends what it considers not only its own vested interests but more basically its own way of life, the resulting clash could generate even more intense conceptual issues.

Global Absorption

But while our immediate reality is being fragmented, global reality increasingly absorbs the individual, involves him, and even occasionally overwhelms him. Communications are, the obvious, already much discussed, immediate cause. The changes wrought by communications and computers make for an extraordinarily interwoven society whose members are in continuous and close audio-visual contact—constantly interacting, instantly sharing the most intense social experiences, and prompted to increased personal involvement in even the most distant problems. The new generation no longer defines the world exclusively on the basis of reading, either of ideologically structured analyses or of extensive descriptions; it also experiences and senses it vicariously through audio-visual communications. This form of communicating reality is growing more rapidly—especially in the advanced countries* than the traditional written medium, and it provides the principal source of news for the masses (see Tables 1-3). "By 1985 distance will be no excuse for delayed information from any part of the world to the powerful urban nerve centers that will mark the major concentrations of the people on earth." [9] Global telephone dialing that in the more advanced states will include instant visual contact and a global television-satellite system that will enable some states to "invade" private homes in other countries* will create unprecedented-global intimacy.

The new reality, however, will not be that of a "global village." McLuhan's striking analogy overlooks the personal stability, interpersonal intimacy, implicitly shared values, and traditions that were important ingredients of the primitive village. A more appropriate analogy is that of the "global city"—a nervous, agitated, tense, and fragmented web of interdependent relations. That interdependence, however, is better characterized by interaction than by intimacy. Instant communications are already creating something akin to a global nervous system. Occasional malfunctions of this nervous system—because of blackouts or breakdowns —will be all the more unsettling, precisely because the mutual confidence and reciprocally reinforcing stability that are characteristic of village intimacy will be absent from the process of that "nervous" interaction.

Man's intensified involvement in global affairs is reflected in, and doubtless shaped by, the changing character of what has until now been considered local news. Television has joined newspapers in expanding the immediate horizons of the viewer or reader to the point where "local" increasingly means "national," and global affairs compete for attention on an unprecedented scale. Physical and moral immunity to "foreign" events cannot be

TABLE I. RADIO AND TELEVISION RECEIVERS PER 1000 POPULATION; ESTIMATED CIRCULATION OF DAILY NEWSPAPERS PER 1000 POPULATION

Source of Tables 1 and 2: *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook,* 1967, Tables 5.1; 8.2; 9.2. * Statistics from *UN Statistical Yearbook,* 1968.

	1960			1966		
	Radios	TV	Newspapers	Radios	TV	Newspapers
United States	941	310	326	1,334	376	312
Canada	452	219	222	602	286	212*
Sweden	367	156	(1962) 490	377	277	501
United Kingdom	289	211	514	300	254	488
West Germany	287	83	307	459	213	332
Czechoslovakia	259	58	236	269	167	288
France	241	41	(1962) 252	321	151	248*

* For example, Hermann Meyn, in his Massen-medien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin, 1966), provides data showing cumulatively that an average West German over the age of fifteen read each day for fifteen minutes, listened to the radio for one and one-half hours, and watched television tor one hour and ten minutes. it is estimated that within a decade television satellites will carry sufficient power to transmit programs directly to receivers, without the intermediary of receiving-transmitting stations.

USSR	205	22	172	329	81	274
Argentina	167	21	155	308	82	128[9]
Japan	133	73	396	251	192	465
Brazil	70	18	54	(1964) 95	30	33
Algeria	54	5	28	(1964) 129	(1965) 13	(1965) 15
India	5		11	13	—	13

TABLE 2. ABSOLUTE INCREASE PER 1000 POPULATION IN RADIO, TELEVISION, AND NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION, 1960-1966

	Radios	TV	Newspapers
United States	+ 393	+ 66	- 14
Canada	+ 150	+ 67	- 10
Sweden	+ 10	+ 121	+ 11
United Kingdom	+ 11	+ 43	- 26
West Germany	+ 172	+ 130	+ 25
Czechoslovakia	+ 1-0	+ 109	+ 52
France	+ 80	+ 110	- 4
USSR	+ 124	+ 59	+ 102
Argentina	+ 141	+ 61	- 27
Japan	+ 118	+ 119	+ 69
Brazil	+ 25	+ 12	- 21
Algeria	+ 75	+ 8	- 13
India	+ 8	—	+ 2

TABLE 3. APPROXIMATE USE OF MEDIA FOR EACH OF THE FOUR AUDIENCE GROUPS

Per cent of U.S. population	Mass	Peripheral	College	Elites
that:	Majority	Mass	Graduates	(less
	(50-60%)	(20—40%)	(10-25%)	than 1%)
Read any nonfiction books in the last year	5	15	30	50
Read one issue a month of *Harper's, National Review,* etc.	1/2	2	10	25
Read one issue a month of *Time, Newsweek,* or U.S. *News*	5	10	45	70
Read one issue a month of *Look, Life,* or *Post*	25	50	65	30
Read a daily newspaper	70	80	90	95
Read the *New York Times*	%	X	5	50
Read national or international news first in paper	10	20	30	50
Want more foreign news in paper	10	20	30	50
Listen to radio daily	60	70	85	?
Hear radio news daily	50	60	65	?
Use television daily	80	75	65	?
Watch TV News	45	45	45	?
Favor TV as news medium	60	35	20	?
Favor news as TV show	5	15	30	50

Source: *Television Quarterly,* Spring 1968, p. 47. These figures are for the most part derived from data in John Robinson, *Public Information about World Affairs,* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1967.

very effectively maintained under circumstances in which there are both a growing intellectual awareness of global interdependence and the electronic intrusion of global events into the home.

This condition also makes for a novel perception of foreign affairs. Even in the recent past one learned about international politics through the study of history and geography, as well as by reading newspapers. This contributed to a highly structured, even rigid, approach, in which it was convenient to categorize events or

nations in somewhat ideological terms. Today, however, foreign affairs intrude upon a child or adolescent in the advanced countries in the form of disparate, sporadic, isolated—but involving—events: catastrophes and acts of violence both abroad and at home become intermeshed, and though they may elicit either positive or negative reactions, these are no longer in the neatly compartmentalized categories of "We" and "they." Television in particular contributes to a "blurred," much more impressionistic —and also involved—attitude toward world affairs.[10] Anyone who teaches international politics senses a great change in the attitude of the young along these lines.

Such direct global intrusion and interaction, however, does not make for better "understanding" of our contemporary affairs. On the contrary, it can be argued that in some respects "understanding"—in the sense of possessing the subjective confidence that one can evaluate events on the basis of some organized principle —is today much more difficult for most people to attain. Instant but vicarious participation in events evokes uncertainty, especially as it becomes more and more apparent that established analytical categories no longer adequately encompass the new circumstances.*

The science explosion—the most rapidly expanding aspect of our entire reality, growing more rapidly than population, industry, and cities—intensifies, rather than reduces, these feelings of insecurity. It is simply impossible for the average citizen and even for men of intellect to assimilate and. meaningfully organize the flow of knowledge for themselves. In every scientific field complaints are mounting that the torrential outpouring of published reports, scientific papers, and scholarly articles and the proliferation of professional journals make it impossible for individuals to avoid becoming either narrow-gauged specialists or superficial generalists.† The sharing of new common perspectives thus becomes more difficult as knowledge expands; in addition, traditional perspectives such as those provided by primitive myths or, more recently, by certain historically conditioned ideologies can no longer be sustained.

The threat of intellectual fragmentation, posed by the gap between the pace in the expansion of knowledge and the rate of its assimilation; raises a perplexing question concerning the prospects -for mankind's intellectual unity. It has generally been assumed that the modern world, shaped increasingly by the industrial and urban revolutions, will become more homogeneous in its outlook. This may be so, but it could be the homogeneity of insecurity, of uncertainty, and of intellectual anarchy. The result, therefore, would not necessarily be a more stable environment.

2. The Ambivalent Disseminator

The United States is the principal global disseminator of the technetronic revolution. It is American society that is currently having the greatest impact on all other societies, prompting a far-reaching cumulative transformation in their outlook and mores. At various stages in history different societies have served as a catalyst for change by stimulating imitation and adaptation in others. What in the remote past Athens and Rome were to the Mediterranean world, or China to much of Asia, France has more recently been to Europe. French letters, arts, and political ideas exercised a magnetic attraction, and the French Revolution was perhaps the single most powerful stimulant to the rise of populist nationalism during the nineteenth century.

In spite of its domestic tensions—indeed, in some respects because of them (see Part IV)—the United States is the innovative and creative society of today. It is also a major disruptive influence on the world scene. In fact communism, which many Americans see as the principal cause of unrest, primarily capitalizes on frustrations and aspirations, whose major source is the American impact on the rest of the world. The United States is the focus of global attention, emulation, envy, admiration, and animosity. No other society evokes feelings of such intensity; no other so-ciety's internal affairs—including America's racial and urban violence—are scrutinized with such attention; no other society's politics are followed with such avid interest—so much so that to many foreign nationals United States domestic politics have become an essential extension of their own; no other society so massively disseminates its own way of life and its values by means of movies, television, multimillion-copy foreign editions of its national magazines, or simply by its products; no other society is the object of such contradictory assessments.

The American Impact

Initially, the impact of America on the world was largely idealistic: America was associated with freedom. Later the influence became more materialistic: America was seen as the land of opportunity, crassly defined in terms of dollars. Today similar material advantages can be sought elsewhere at lower personal risk,

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* To provide one simple example, for about twenty years anticommunism provided the grand organizational principle for many Americans. How then fit into that setting events such as the confrontation between Moscow and Peking, and, once one had become accustomed to think of Moscow as more "liberal," between Moscow and Prague?

† It is estimated, for example, that NASA employs some fifteen thousand special technical terms—all of which are compiled in its own thesaurus (CTN Bulletin [Centres d'etudes des consequences generates des grandes techniques nouvelles, Paris], June 1968, p. 6). It is also estimated that "the number of books published has about doubled every twenty years since 1450, and some 30 million have by now been published; the projected figure is 60 million by 1980" (Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, New York, 1966, p. 12) and that "science alone sees the publishing of 100,000 journals a year, in more than 60 languages, a figure doubling every 15 years" (Glenn T. Seaborg, "Uneasy World Gains Power over Destiny," The New York Times, January 6, 1969).

and the assassinations of the Kennedys and of Martin Luther King, as well as racial and social tensions, not to speak of Vietnam, have somewhat tarnished America's identification with freedom. Instead, America's influence is in the first instance scientific and technological, and it is a function of the scientific, technological, and educational lead of the United States.*

Scientific and technological development is a dynamic process. It depends in the first instance on the resources committed to it, the personnel available for it, the educational base that supports it, and—last but not least—the freedom of scientific innovation. In all four respects the American position is advantageous; contemporary America spends more on science and devotes greater resources to research than any other society.†

In addition, the American people enjoy access to education on a scale greater than that of most other advanced societies. (See Tables 4 and 5.) At the beginning of the 1960s the United States had more than 66 per cent of its 15-19 age group enrolled in educational institutions; comparable figures for France and West Germany were about 31 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively. The combined populations of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are equal to that of the United States—roughly two hundred million. But in the United States 43 per cent of college-age people are actually enrolled, whereas only 7 to 15 per cent are enrolled in the four countries (Italy having the low figure and France the high). The Soviet percentage was approximately half that of the American. In actual numbers there are close to seven million college students in the United States and only about one and a half million in the four European countries. At the more advanced level of the 20-24 age bracket, the American figure was 12 per cent while that for West Germany, the top Western European country, was about 5 per cent. For the 5-19 age bracket, the American and the Western European levels were roughly even (about 80 per cent), and the Soviet Union trailed with 57 per cent.[11]

TABLE 4. ACCESS TO HIGHER-LEVEL EDUCATION PER 100,000 OF TOTAL POPULATION (1950, 1965)

				Absolute Increase
	1950		1965	1950-1965
United States	1,508		2,840	+ 1,332
West Germany	256		632	+376
France	334		1,042	+708
Japan	471		1,140	4-669
USSB	693		1,674	+981
Poland	473		800	+327
India	113	(1963)	284	+171
Indonesia	8	(1963)	95	4-87
Brazil	98		189	+91
Algeria	52		68	+ 16

As a result, the United States possesses a pyramid of educated social talent whose wide base is capable of providing effective support to' the leading and creative apex. This is true even though in many respects American education is often intellectually deficient, especially in comparison with the more rigorous standards of Western European and Japanese secondary institutions. Nonetheless, the broad base of relatively trained people enables rapid adaptation, development, and social application of scientific innovation or discovery.‡

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* As a sweeping generalization, it can be said that Rome exported law; England, parliamentary party democracy; France, culture and republican nationalism; the contemporary United States, technological-scientific innovation and mass culture derived from high consumption.

† According to a 1968 congressional report, "Current spending on research and development in the United States amounts to some $24 billion annually —about two-thirds financed by the Federal Government—in contrast to a mere $6 billion in all of Western Europe." The Soviet figure has been estimated to be in the vicinity of 8 billion rubles, but, American costs being higher, one ruble buys approximately $3 of research. In 1962, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United States was spending $93.70 per capita on research and development; Britain $33.50; France $23.60; and Germany $20.10. As a percentage of gross national product, the United States' expenditure on research and development amounted to 3.1; Britain's to 2.2; France's to 1.5; Poland's to 1.6; Germany's to 1.3; and the Soviet Union's to 2.2. The number of scientists, engineers, and technicians engaged in research and development totaled 1,159,500 in the United States; 211,100 in Britain; 111,200 in France; 142,200 in Germany; 53,800 in Belgium and Holland; and somewhere over 1,000,000 in the Soviet Union (C. Freeman and A. Young, The Research and Development Effort in Western Europe, North America and the Soviet Union, OEGD, 1965, pp. 71-72, 124. Source for Poland: a speech by A. Werblan, published by Polish Press Agency, October 15, 1968. The Poles expect to reach 2.5 per cent only by 1975. For a higher estimate of Soviet scientific manpower, see Scientific Policy in the USSR, a special report by the OECD, 1969, especially pp. 642-47). On a global scale, the United States accounts for roughly one-third of the world's total supply of scientific manpower ("The Scientific Brain Drain from the Developing Countries to the United States," Twenty-third Report by the Committee on Government Operations, House of Bepresentatives, Washington, D.C., March 1968, p. 3; hereafter cited as Report . . .).

‡ America's scientific lead is particularly strong in the so-called frontier industries that involve the most advanced fields of science. It has been estimated that approximately 80 per cent of all scientific and technical discoveries made during the past few decades originated in the United States. About 79 per cent of the world's computers operate in the United States. America's lead in lasers is even more marked. The International Atomic Energy Agency has estimated (in its report Power and Research Reactors in Member States, Vienna, 1969) that by 1975 the United States will utilize more nuclear power for peaceful uses than the next eleven states combined (including Japan, all of Western Europe, Canada, and the Soviet Union).

While no precise estimates are possible,

United States	(1965) 349	Poland	81
West Germany	109	India	(1962) 45
France	96	Indonesia	—
Japan	233	Brazil	25
USSR	177	Algeria	—

TABLE 5. NUMBER OF GRADUATES FROM HIGHER-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS PER 100,000 OF TOTAL POPULATION (1964)
Source: *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook,* 1967, Table 2.1,4, pp. 259-68.
Source: *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook,* 1967, Table 2.10, pp. 185-99.

some experts have suggested that a present-day society would experience difficulties in rapid modernization if less than 10 per cent of its population in the appropriate age bracket had higher education and less than 30 per cent had lower education.

Moreover, both the organizational structure and the intellectual atmosphere in the American scientific world favour experimentation and rapid social adaptation. In a special report on American scientific policies, submitted in early 1968, a group of experts connected with OECD* concluded that America's scientific and technical enterprise is deeply rooted in American tradition and history.† Competitiveness and the emphasis on quick exploitation have resulted in a quick spin-off of the enormous defense and space research efforts into the economy as a whole, in contrast to the situation in the Soviet Union, where the economic by-products of almost as large-scale a research effort have so far been negligible. It is noteworthy that "the Russians themselves estimate that the productivity of their researchers is only about half the Americans' and that innovations take two or three times as long to be put into effect." [12]

This climate and the concomitant rewards for creative attainments result in a magnetic pull (the "brain drain") from which America clearly benefits. America offers to many trained scientists, even from advanced countries, not only greater material rewards but a unique opportunity for the maximum fulfillment of their talents. In the past Western writers and artists gravitated primarily toward Paris. More recently the Soviet Union and China have exercised some ideological attraction, but in neither case did it involve the movement of significant percentages of scientific elites. Though immigrating scientists initially think of America as a platform for creative work, and not as a national society to which they are transferring political allegiance, in most cases that allegiance is later obtained through assimilation. America's professional attraction for the global scientific elite is without historic precedent in either scale or scope.‡

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* To measure innovating performance, OECD analysts checked to see where one hundred and thirty-nine selected inventions were first used. Nine industrial sectors that depend heavily on innovation were surveyed (i.e., computers, semi-conductors, pharmaceuticals, plastics, iron and steel, machine tools, non-ferrous metals, scientific instruments, and synthetic fibers). The results showed that in the last twenty years the United States has had the highest rate of innovation, since approximately 60 per cent of the one hundred and thirty-nine inventions were first put to use in the United States (15 per cent in Great Britain, 9 per cent in Germany, 4 per cent in Switzerland, 3 per cent in Sweden). The United States collects 50-60 per cent of all OECD-area receipts for patents, licenses, etc.; the United States predominates in trade performance, accounting for about 30 per cent of the world's export in research-intensive product groups (J. Richardson and Ford Parks, "Why Europe Lags Behind," *Science Journal,* Vol. 4, August 1968, pp. 81-86).
It is striking to note, for example, that while Western Europe still slightly exceeds the United States in the number of patents registered annually, industrial application of patents is roughly eight times higher in the United States.
American leadership is also marked in pure science. In an unusually assertive—but not inaccurate—report, the National Academy of Sciences stated in late 1968 that the United States enjoys world leadership in mathematics, citing as evidence that 50 per cent of the prestigious Fields" Medals awarded since 1945 went to Americans, that American mathematicians play the leading role in international mathematics congresses (delivering more than 33 per cent of all scientific papers), and that American mathematical research is cited most frequently in foreign mathematics journals (*The New York Times,* November 24, 1968).
American preponderance in Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Medicine has also become more marked. Thus, between the years 1901 and 1939 the United States and Canada won 13 prizes, while France, Germany, Italy, Benelux, and the United Kingdom won a total of 82, Scandinavia won 8, the USSR won 4, and Japan won none. Between 1940 and 1967 the respective figures were 42, 50, 6, 8, and 2.

† "Since the first hours of the Republic, the right of citizens to the 'pursuit of happiness,' formulated in the Declaration of Independence, has been one of the mainsprings of American society; it is. also the foundation of a social policy inspired by the prospect of new benefits issued from the scientific and technical enterprise. How can one fail to hope that these benefits, which have in fact contributed so much to national defense or the race for world prestige, will make an essential contribution to the achievement of other great national goals? It is this propulsion which has given science, the mother of knowledge, the appearance of a veritable national resource. The enterprise is indissolubly linked to the goals of American society, which is trying to build its future on the progress of science and technology. In this capacity, this society as a whole is a consumer of scientific knowledge, which is used for diverse ends: in the last century, to increase agricultural productivity and to facilitate territorial development, and then to back the national defense effort, to safeguard public health and to explore space. These are activities which have an impact on the destiny of the whole nation, and it seems natural that all skills should be mobilized to cooperate. In this way industry and the universities and private organizations are associated with the Government project" (conclusion of a report prepared by the Secretariat of the OECD, January 1968, as quoted by The New York Times, January 13, 1968, p. 10).

‡ In the words of E. Piore, vice president and chief scientist of I.B.M., "The United States has become the intellectual center of the world—the center of the arts, the sciences, and economics" ("Towards the Year 2000," Daedalus, Summer 1967, p. 958). It is symptomatic that in the early 1960s, 44 per cent of the Pakistani students studying at institutions of higher education in fifteen foreign countries were studying in the United States; 59 per cent of the Indians; 32 per cent of the Indonesians; 56 per cent of the Burmese; 90 per cent of the Filipinos; 64 per cent of the Thais; and 26 percent of the Cey-lonese (Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, New York, 1968, p. 1773). In 1967 the United States granted 10,690 M.D.s at its own universities, and admitted in the same year as permanent immigrants 3457 physicians (Report. . . , p. 3). In that same year 10,506 scientific, engineering, and medical personnel from the developed countries emigrated to the United States ("The Brain-Drain of

Though this attraction is likely to decline for Europeans (particularly because of America's domestic problems and partially because of Europe's own scientific advance), the success of J. J. Servan-Schreiber's book, *The American Challenge,* reflects the basic inclination of concerned Europeans to accept the argument that the United States comes closest to being the only truly modern society in terms of the organization and scale of its economic market, business administration, research and development, and education. (In contrast, the structure of American government is viewed as strikingly antiquated.) European sensitivity in this area is conditioned not only by fear of a widening American technological lead but very much by the increasing presence on the European markets of large American firms that exploit their economic advantages of scale and superior organization to gradually acquire controlling interests in key frontier industries. The presence of these firms, the emergence under their aegis of something akin to a new international corporate elite, the stimulation given by their presence to the adoption of American business practices and training, the deepening awareness that the so-called technology gap is. in reality also a management and education gap[13]— all have contributed both to a positive appraisal of American "technostructure" by the European business and scientific elite and to the desire to adapt some of America's experience.

Less tangible but no less pervasive is the American impact on mass culture, youth mores, and life styles. The higher the level of per-capita income in a country, the more applicable seems the term "Americanization." This indicates that the external forms of characteristic contemporary American behavior are not so much culturally determined as they are an expression of a certain level of urban, technical, and economic development. Nonetheless, to the extent that these forms were first applied in America and then "exported" abroad, they became symbolic of the American impact and of the innovation-emulation relationship prevailing between America and the rest of the world.

What makes America unique in our time is that confrontation with the new is part of the daily American experience. For better or for worse, the rest of the world learns what is in store for it by observing what happens in the United States: whether it be the latest scientific discoveries in space and medicine or the electric toothbrush in the bathroom; pop art or LSD; air conditioning or air pollution; old-age problems or juvenile delinquency. The evidence is more elusive in such matters as style, music, values, and social mores, but there too the term "Americanization" obviously implies a specific source.

Similarly, foreign students returning from American universities have prompted an organizational and intellectual revolution in the academic life of their countries. Changes in the academic life of Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan; and more recently France, and to an even greater extent in the less developed countries, can be traced to the influence of American educational institutions. Given developments in modern communications, it is only a matter of time before students at Columbia University and, say, the University of Teheran will be watching the same lecturer simultaneously.

This is all the more likely because American society, more than any other, "communicates" with the entire globe.[14] Roughly sixty-five per cent of all world communications originate in this country. Moreover, the United States has been most active in the promotion of a global communications system by means of satellites, and it is pioneering the development of a world-wide information grid.* It is expected that such a grid will come into being by about 1975.[15] For the first time in history the cumulative knowledge of mankind will be made accessible on a global scale—and it will be almost instantaneously available in response to demand.

New Imperialism?

All of these factors make for a novel relationship between the United States and the world. There are imperial overtones to it, and yet in its essence the relationship is quite different from the traditional imperial structure. To be sure, the fact that in the aftermath of World War II a number of nations were directly dependent on the United States in matters of security, politics, and economics created a system that in many respects, including that of scale, superficially resembled the British, Roman, and Chinese empires of the past.[16] The more than a million American troops stationed on some four hundred major and almost three thousand minor United States military bases scattered all over the globe, the forty-two nations tied to the United States by security pacts, the American military missions training the officers and troops of many other national armies, and the approximately two hundred thousand United States civilian government employees in foreign posts all make for striking analogies to the great classical imperial systems.[17]

Nevertheless, the concept of "imperial" shields rather than reveals a relationship between America and the world that is both more complex and more intimate. The "imperial" aspect of the relationship was, in the first instance, a transitory and rather spontaneous response to the vacuum created by World War II and to the subsequent felt threat from communism. Moreover, it was neither formally structured nor explicitly legitimized. The "empire" was at most an informal system marked by the pretense of equality and non-interference. This made it easier for the "imperial" attributes to recede once conditions changed. By the late 1960s, with a few

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Scientists, Engineers and Physicians from the Developing Countries to the United States," Hearing before a Subcommittee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1968, pp. 2, 96; hereafter cited as Hearing . . .).

* It is estimated (by the Institute for Politics and Planning, Arlington, Virginia) that the volume of digital communication will shortly exceed human conversation across the Atlantic; it has already done so in the United States. Moreover, within the next decade the value of information export from the United States to Europe will exceed the value of material exports.

exceptions the earlier direct political-military dependence on the United States had declined (often in spite of political efforts by the United States to maintain it). Its place had been filled by the more pervasive but less tangible influence of American economic presence and innovation as they originated directly from the United States or were stimulated abroad by American foreign investment (the latter annually yielding a product considerably in excess of the gross national product of most major countries).[18] In effect, ". . . American influence has a porous and almost invisible quality. It works through the interpenetration of economic institutions, the sympathetic harmony of political leaders and parties, the shared concepts of sophisticated intellectuals, the mating of bureaucratic interests. It is, in other words, something new in the world, and not yet well understood." [19]

It is the novelty of America's relationship with the world— complex, intimate, and porous—that the more orthodox, especially Marxist, analyses of imperialism fail to encompass. To see that relationship merely as the expression of an imperial drive is to ignore the part played in it by the crucial dimension of the technological-scientific revolution. That revolution not only captivates the imagination of mankind (who can fail to be moved by the spectacle of man reaching the moon?) but inescapably compels imitation of the more advanced by the less advanced and stimulates the export of new techniques, methods, and organizational skills from the former to the latter. There is no doubt that this results in an asymmetrical relationship, but the content of that asymmetry must be examined before it is called imperialism. Like every society, America no doubt prefers to be more rather than less advanced; yet it is also striking that no other country has made so great an effort, governmentally and privately, through business and especially through foundations, to export its know-how, to make public its space findings, to promote new agricultural techniques, to improve educational facilities, to control population growth, to improve health care, and so on. All of this has imperial overtones, and yet it is misleading to label it as such.[20]

Indeed, unable to understand fully what is happening in then-own society, Americans find it difficult to comprehend the global impact that that society has had in its unique role as disseminator of the technetronic revolution. This impact is contradictory: it both promotes and undermines American interests as defined by American policymakers; it helps to advance the cause of cooperation on a larger scale even as it disrupts existing social or economic fabrics; it both lays the groundwork for well-being and stability and enhances the forces working for instability and revolution. Unlike traditional imperialistic powers, which relied heavily on the principle of *divide et impera* (practiced with striking similarity by the British in India and more recently by the Russians in Eastern Europe), America has striven to promote regionalism both in Europe and in Latin America. Yet in so doing, it is helping to create larger entities that are more capable of resisting its influence and of competing with it economically. Implicitly and often explicitly modelled on the American pattern, modernization makes for potentially greater economic well-being, but in the process it disrupts existing institutions, undermines prevailing mores, and stimulates resentment that focuses directly on the source of change—America. The result is an acute tension between the kind of global stability and order that America subjectively seeks and the instability, impatience, and frustration that America unconsciously promotes.

The United States has emerged as the first global society in history. It is a society increasingly difficult to delineate in terms of its outer Cultural and economic boundaries. Moreover, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future America will cease to exercise the innovative stimulus that is characteristic of its current relationship with the world. By the end of this century (extrapolating from current trends) only some thirteen countries are likely to reach the 1965 level of the per-capita gross national product of the United States.[21] Unless there is major scientific and economic stagnation or a political crisis (see Part IV), at the end of the century America will still be a significant force for global change, whether or not the dominant subjective mood is pro- or anti-American.

3. Global Ghettos

The Third" World is a victim of the technetronic revolution. Whether the less developed countries grow rapidly or slowly, or not at all, almost inevitably many of them will continue to be " dominated by intensifying feelings of psychological deprivation. In a world electronically intermeshed, absolute or relative under-development will be intolerable, especially as the more advanced countries begin to move beyond that industrial era into which the less developed countries have as yet to enter. It is thus no longer a matter of the "revolution of rising expectations." The Third World today confronts the specter of insatiable aspirations.

At one time in history seemingly insoluble problems prompted fatalism because they were thought to be part of a universal condition. Today similar problems stimulate frustration because they are seen as a particular phenomenon by which others, more fortunate, are not afflicted. The plight of the urban ghettos in the United States provides an appropriate analogy to the global position of the less developed countries, particularly in Africa and Asia. Their problem is not that of the absence of change.* In some cases it is not even that of

* "The growth rate of these countries during the Development Decade has not reached the annual figure of 5 per cent which was set as the minimum target. Actually the average rate for fifty-four countries, representing 87 per cent of the population of the developing world as a whole, was only 4.5 per cent per annum from i960 to 1965. . . . Among the fifty-four countries mentioned, there is a group of eighteen with an average growth rate of 7.3 per cent per annum, while the rate for fifteen countries was scarcely 2.7 per cent per annum. . . . Between these two extremes there were twenty-one countries whose average growth rate was 4.9 per cent" ("Towards a Global Strategy of Development," a report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York, 1968, p. 5).

insufficiently rapid change, because in recent years several underdeveloped countries have attained im-pressive and sustained rates of growth (South Korea, Taiwan, and Ghana, for example). Rather, their problem arises from an intensifying feeling of relative deprivation of which they are made more acutely aware by the spread of education and communications. As a result, passive resignation may give way to active explosions of undirected anger.

Prospects for Change

It is extremely difficult to predict the economic and political development of the underdeveloped countries. Some of them, es-pecially in Latin America, may make respectable progress and may, within the next two decades, reach the economic levels of the currently more advanced states. Islands of development may increasingly dot the maps of Asia and Africa, assuming that there is relative peace and political stability in the region as a whole. But the over-all prognosis is not hopeful. Medium projections for several of the more important underdeveloped countries point to a per-capita annual gross national product in 1985 of $107 for Nigeria, $134 for Pakistan, $112 for Indonesia, $169 for India, $185 for China, $295 for the United Arab Republic, and $372 for Brazil. (By way of contrast, the prospective per-capita figure for 1985 for the United States is $6510, for Japan $3080, for the USSR $2660, and for Israel $2978.)[22] What is even more striking is that while the per-capita GNP in the above advanced countries is likely to double during the years 1965-1985, for a single Nigerian the per-capita GNP will have increased by only $14, for a Pakistani by $43, for an Indonesian by $12, for an Indian by $70, for a Chinese by $88, for an Egyptian by $129, and for a Brazilian by $92 during the same two decades of development.

The threat of overpopulation to economic growth—indeed to existence itself-has been widely discussed in recent years. That threat, it should be added, involves a crucial social-political dimension. Overpopulation contributes to the break-up of land-holdings and thereby further stratifies and complicates the rural class structure, widening disparities and intensifying class conflicts. Staggering problems of unemployment are also highly probable. According to the International Labour Organization, by 1980 the labour force of Asia's developing nations will have increased from 663 million to 938 million. During this same period the number of new jobs in these countries will increase by only 142 million, according to projections of current growth rates.[23]

Even if it is assumed that the problem of overpopulation will be met by greater acceptance of birth control, the economic picture in terms of the per-capita GNP for underdeveloped countries becomes only marginally brighter when it is compared with the figures projected for the more advanced societies. For example, in the unlikely event that by 1985 Indonesia's population will not have increased since 1965, its per-capita GNP will be approximately $200 instead of the projected $112; under similar circumstances, for Pakistan it will be $250 instead of the projected $134, and for the United Arab Republic almost $500 instead of $295. Since some population growth is unavoidable, the above figures actually represent unattainable levels, even though they are in themselves singularly unimpressive when compared with the figures for the more advanced portions of the world.

To point to these figures is not to exclude the probability that progress will be made in some fields. It is probably true that "the picture of the world in 1985, despite the large pockets of poverty that will still exist, is far from grim. Indeed, by 1985 mass starvation, mass homelessness, and the rampant spread of diseases that have historically decimated entire populations will be generally eliminated. Although the underdeveloped countries will still be comparatively poor, they will have greater and more immediate access to worldwide transportation and communications systems and to the provision of drugs, medical care, food, shelter and clothing through international assistance in the event of disaster. The surplus commodity production of the United States will be an important element in the feeding of underprivileged nations." [24] One may assume that the appearance of greater international planning in terms of international commodity agreements, transport arrangements, health regulations, finance, and education will make for more orderly and deliberate approaches to the problems posed by backwardness, slow growth, and the widening disparity in standards of living. The increasing communications intimacy will permit instant responses to sudden emergencies and allow for continuous long-distance visual consultations by specialists. In the event of need, aid could be mobilized and ferried across the globe in no more time than is now needed to respond to an internal national calamity—or even an urban one.

The agricultural revolution in Asia is already challenging the recently fashionable predictions of mass hunger and starvation. Mass educational campaigns and the introduction of new cereals and fertilizers have prompted an impressive upsurge in productivity. Within the next few years Pakistan, the Philippines, and Turkey may become grain-exporting states; Thailand and Burma already have. The cumulative effect of such successes may well be to "bolster the confidence of national leaders in their ability to handle other seemingly insoluble problems. It may also strengthen the faith in modern technology and its potential for improving the well-being of their people." [25]

Yet even allowing for these more hopeful developments, the fact remains that though the material conditions of life in the Third World are in some respects improving, these improvements cannot keep pace with the factors that make for psychic change. The basic revolutionary change is being brought about by education and communications. That change, necessary and desirable to stimulate an attitude receptive to innovation (for example, the acceptance by peasants of fertilizers), also prompts an intense awareness of inadequacy and

backwardness.

In this regard, a comparison of the contemporary socio-economic transformation of the Third World with that of Russia at about the turn of the century is revealing. In Russia the industrial revolution outpaced mass education; literacy followed—rather than preceded—material change.* The revolutionary movements, particularly the Marxist one, strove to close the gap by politically educating—hence radicalizing—the masses. Today in the Third World a subjective revolution is preceding change in the objective environment and creating a state of unrest, uneasiness, anger, anguish, and outrage. Indeed, it has been observed that "the faster the enlightenment of the population, the more frequent the overthrow of the government."†

This gap between awakening mass consciousness and material reality appears to be widening. In the years 1958-1965 the income per capita of an Indian rose from $64 to $86‡ and that of an Indonesian from $81 to $85; the income of an Algerian declined from $236 to $195-[26] The percentage of the economically active population in fields other than agriculture grew substantially only in Algeria (from 10 per cent to 18 per cent). Housing, physicians per thousand inhabitants, and personal consumption did not show significant advances for the major backward areas. In some they even showed a decrease.[27] (SeeTable 6.)

The Subjective Transformation

Although objective conditions changed slowly, the subjective environment altered rapidly. Spectacular advances came primarily in two fields: communications and education. The number of radios in India quadrupled between 1958 and 1966 (from 1.5 million to 6.4 million); elsewhere in the Third World the figures have doubled or tripled. The television age is only beginning in these regions, but both transistor radios and television will no doubt become generally available there in the next two decades.§

Access to higher education has also grown rapidly: in India between 1958 and 1963 the increase was roughly 50 per cent (from 900,000 to 1.3 million students), and by 1968 there were about 1.9 million students in 2749 colleges and 80 universities; in Indonesia the increase was 30 per cent (from 50,000 to 65,000) between 1958 and 1964; and in the United Arab Republic it was more than 50 per cent (83,000 to 145,000) during the same half decade. Enrollment in India's primary schools jumped from 18.5 million in 1951 to 51.5 million in 1966, according to UNESCO statistics. (See Table 7.)

Increased access to education gives rise to its own specific problems. On the one hand, access to advanced training, particularly of a technical nature, is too limited to sustain extensive and intensive modernization.** The Third World is still woefully backward in intermediate technical education. On the other hand, the capacity of many of the less developed countries to absorb trained personnel is inadequate; the result is a class of dissatisfied college graduates, composed especially of those from the legal and liberal-arts faculties, who are unable to obtain gainful employment compatible with their expanded expectations. Although this problem is already acute in several countries,[28] it could be made worse by the introduction of automation into the overmanned factories and bureaucracies of the less developed countries.††

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* Between 1887 and 1904, Russian coal-mining output rose by 400 per cent (from 5 million to 21.5 million tons) and iron smelting by 500 per cent; between 1861 and 1870, 5833 miles of railway were constructed, and between 1891 and 1900, 13,920 miles. "Coal production in Russia rose 40 percent in the period 1909-1913, as against a growth rate of 24 percent in the United States, 28 percent! in Germany, 7 percent in Britain, and 9 percent in France in the same period. In the case of pig iron, Russian output rose by 61 percent in the period 1909-1913, while the rate of increase in the United States was 20 percent, in Germany 33 percent, in Britain 8 percent, and in France 46 percent. Although the economic backwardness of Russia had not disappeared on the eve of the war, it was clearly disappearing. The standard of living was not high, but it was rising. In the twenty years preceding the war the population of Russia increased by about 40' percent, while the domestic consumption of goods more than doubled" (S. Pushkarev, The Emergence of Modern Russia 1801-1917, New York, 1963, p. 280). Yet on the eve of World War I there were only 117,000 students in higher education in a country of some 160 million people, and 56 per cent of the people were illiterate (Push-karev, pp. 286, 292). Of the children in the 8-11 age bracket, 49 per cent were not receiving any education, while the percentage of literates among military inductees rose between 1874 and 1913 at a rate of only slightly more than one per cent per annum (A. G. Rashin, Formirovanie Rabochego Klassa Rossii, Moscow, 1958, p. 582).

† "For 66 nations, for example, the correlation between the proportion of children in primary schools and the frequency of revolution was -.84. In contrast, for 70 nations the correlation between the rate of change in primary enrollment and political instability was .61" (Samuel P. Huntington, •Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven and London, 1968, p. 47).

‡ It should be noted that these are average figures. "A survey for 1965-66 indicated that half of India's population was living on R14.6 or less per month (about 10c in U.S. currency per day). ... In short the very low average income does not begin to plumb the depths of misery in India" (Myrdal, p. 565).

§ The Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission estimated that community television for all the five hundred and sixty thousand villages in India could be transmitted by satellite in five years at a cost of only $200 million (The New York Times, August 15, 1968). In September 1969 the United States concluded an agreement with India for the creation by 1972 of a satellite that will provide television programs on agriculture and birth control for approximately five thousand villages in four Hindi-speaking states (see also our earlier discussion of the American impact).

** See the tables on page 27, as well as the more extensive comparisons between the Third World and the United States and Western Europe (both current figures and projections for the year 2000) contained in Higher Education, Committee on Higher Education, London, 1963, especially Appendixes I and V.

†† + "As the scientific processing of information will be under way in the urban centers of Asia, Africa and Latin America by 1985, large numbers of clerks, runners, sorters, and filers that today account for the weight of public and private bureaucracy in India, Nigeria or Brazil will begin to be threatened with displacement and the insecurities of unemployment" (*The United States and the World in the 1985 Era,* p. 91). It is estimated that by 1970 roughly one-half of Ceylon's expected one million unemployed will have certificates of higher education ("The International Report," *The Economist,* June 15, 1968, p.47).

TABLE 6

	PER APITA GNP IN U.S. DOLLARS			PER CENT OF POPULATION EMPLOYED OUTSIDE ACRICULTURE		
	1958	1966	Increase (in percentages)	1950	1960	Increase (in percentages)
United States	2,602	3,842	48	90.4	93-5	3-i
West Germany	1,077	2,004	86	74-2	86.6 (1961)	12.4
France	1,301	2,052	- 58	72.5 (1954)	80.2 (1962)	7-7
Italy	598	1,182	98	60.5 (1951)	71.8 (1962)	11.3
Soviet Union	1,100	1,500 (1965)	36	52.0	60.8 (1959)	8.8
Poland	800	l,10O (1905)	38	42.8	46.6	3-8
Czechoslovakia		I	—	61.4	80.5 ,(1965)	191
Japan	344	986	187	—	74.0	—
India	**72**	105	46	27.0 (1951)	27.1 (1961)	0.1
Indonesia	84	95 (1963)	13	—	32.0 (1961)	—
United Arab						
Republic	120	179 ' (1965)	49	37-3 (1947)	43-3	0.6
Brazil	310	333	7	51-9	48.4	-3-5

	PER CENT OF POPULATION IN LOCALITIES NUMBER OVER 20,000 INHABITANTS			AVERAGE OF PERSONS PER ROOM		
	1950	1960	Increase (in percentages)	1950	1960	Increase (in percentages)
United States	41.4	46.9	5-5	0.7	0.7	0.0
West Germany	4i-5	47.6	6.1	—	0.9	—
France	33-3 (1954)	—	—	1.0 (1954)	1.0 (1962)	0.0
Italy	41.2 (1950	'	--	1-3 (1951)	(1961)	— 0.2
Soviet Union		35-5 (1959)	--	—	1-5 (1956)	—
Poland	25-5	31-9	6.4	—	1-7 (1961)	—
Czechoslovakia	21.0 (1947)	25-3 (1961)	4-3	1-5	1-3 (i960	— 0.2
Japan		72.0	—	—	1.2 (1963)	—
India	12.0 (1951)	—	—	—	2.6	—
Indonesia	9-1 (1955)	—	—	—	—	—
United Arab						
Republic	29.1 (1947)	29.1 (1955)	0.0	—	1.6	—
Brazil	20.1	28.1	8.0	1-3	1-3	0.0

TABLE 7

	NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING			NUMBER OF RADIOS		
			Increase (in per-			Increase (in per-

	1958	1965	centages)	1958	1966	centages)
United States	3,042,200	5,526,325	81.6	161,000,000	262,700,000	63
West Germany	173,320	372,929	115	15,263,000	27,400,000	79
France	186,101	509,764	174	10,646,000	15,861,000	49
Italy	216,248	300,940	39	6,112,000	11,163,000	83
Soviet Union	2,178,900	3,860,500	77	36,667,000	76,800,000	109
Poland	111,820	251,864	125	4,465,000	5,593,ooo	25
Czechoslovakia	48,805	141,687	190	3,317,000	3,829,000	15
Japan	566,551	1,116,430	97	14,610,000	24,787,000	70
India	913,380	1,310,000 (1963)	43	1,560,000	6,485,000	316
Indonesia	49,557	65,635 (1964)	32	631,000	1,250,000	98
United Arab						
Republic	83,251	177,123	113	792,000	1,613,000	104
					(1965)	
Brazil	86,868	155,781	79	4,000,000	7,500,000	88
					(1964)	

NUMBER OF TELEVISION RECEIVERS				NUMBER OF TELEPHONES		
	1958	1966	Increase (in per-centages)	1958	1966	Increase (in per-centages)
United States	50,250,000	74,100,000	47	66,630,000	98,789,000	48
West Germany	2,125,000	12,720,000	499	5,090,102	9,532,417	87
France	989,000	7,471,000	655	3,703,578	6,554,441	77
Italy	1,098,000	6,855,000	524	2,988,465	6,467,597	116
Soviet Union	1,767,000	19,000,000	975	- 2,370,000	4.459,ooo	88
					(1965)	
Poland	85,000	2,540,000	2888	' 446,236	1,411,481	216
Czechoslovakia	328,000	2,375,ooo	624	789,679	1,582,852	100
Japan	1 ,600,000	19,002,000	1088	4,334,602	16,011,745	269
India	400 (1962)	4,000	900	367,000	926,617	153
Indonesia	—	4,600	—	90,968	116,332	28
United Arab	-					
Republic	128,000 (1962)	375,000	193	185,452	335,000	81
Brazil	700,000	2,500,000	257	928,117	1,431.653	54

Sources for Tables 6 and 7: *UN Statistical Yearbooks,* 1960-1967; *UNESCO Yearbook,* 1967.

The problem, is aggravated by the frequently low level of what is officially described as higher education. According to one admittedly impressionistic but perceptive account, "At a generous estimate, perhaps 5 per cent of the mass of Indian students in institutions of higher education are receiving decent training by recognizable world standards. ... In most places academic standards have fallen so low that they can hardly be said to have survived."[29] This condition is by no means limited to India. "Teaching in South Asian schools at all levels tends to discourage independent thinking and the growth of that inquisitive and experimental bent of mind that is so essential for development. . . . The South Asian peoples are not merely being insufficiently educated; they are being miseducated on a huge scale."[30] Similarly in Latin America:, "By now it is fully recognized that education

in Latin America has fundamental shortcomings, that there is a high illiteracy rate, and that the educational system bears no relation to the requirements of economic development, quite apart from the serious deficiencies that exist in other basic cultural respects"[31] "Education" of this sort contributes to the emergence of an inadequately trained class of younger people whose frustrations, increasing radicalism, and susceptibility to Utopian appeals have many parallels in those of the nineteenth-century intelligentsia of the more backward regions of Europe, particularly Russia and the Balkans.

To obtain quality education, a small percentage of the students —either because they are unusually gifted and can obtain scholarships, or because they come from wealthy families—go abroad. As a result, they are tempted to adapt to foreign styles and modes of life, and even to remain abroad; in effect, they opt out of their own society either by emigrating internally on their return, or simply by never returning. In 1967, for example, 26 per cent of the Chinese students studying sciences and engineering in the United States chose not to return to Taiwan; for India the percentage was 21, and for Korea and Pakistan it was 15 and 13, respectively.[32] It is a staggering fact that the underdeveloped countries supplied almost exactly one-half of the total number of engineers, scientists, and medical personnel who emigrated to the

United States in the year ending June 1967: 10,254 out of 20,760.[33] It is expected that this proportion will actually rise in the years to Come.[34] At the same time, many of those who do return to their native lands do so after having become "immersed in values and an educational system which prepares individuals to fit in an advanced country and may unfit them for developing an appropriate personality for an active life in their own community." [35]

The cumulative effect of these factors makes for a highly turbulent and extremely amorphous political pattern. Without allowing for specific differences among Third World countries, it can be said in general terms that the political pyramid in the less developed countries has at its base the peasant masses, still primarily engaged in manual labour and largely illiterate* but no longer parochially restricted to their immediate environment, since transistor radios establish intimate contact with the national society and help develop awareness of their material or national deprivation;† next in order is a rapidly increasing urban population,‡ composed to a large extent of first-generation post-peasant city dwellers searching for new sources of authority;[38] then comes a pseudo-intelligentsia, which accounts for roughly two to three per cent of the population and is composed of relatively young people who during the last decade have acquired some formal advanced education—often of very poor professional quality—and who, because they live badly and feel that society does not offer them the opportunity to which they are entitled, are highly susceptible to militant xenophobic causes; at the top of the pyramid is a relatively well-educated but narrow-gauged elite class, struggling to achieve both stability and progress (Iran), or sometimes to delay or prevent reforms (some Latin American countries), because, as a Brazilian scholar put it, they "want it that way. In order to maintain their privileges, they are dependent on the perpetuation of the status quo."[37] These privileges are either those of property or, more frequently in the case of the new nations, of bureaucratic position.

The ghettos of the global city have, accordingly, some parallels to the racial slums of the United States. In American cities the problem is not the absence of development or change; it stems from the perception by the poor that even rapid change will not change much for many in the near future, and from their growing realization that those who are richer are themselves becoming morally uneasy over the material gap. This combination of factors creates a sense of acute deprivation that results in intensified political hostility toward the outside world.[38] The mobilization of that hostility in the United States was made possible by the increase in the number of black Americans receiving higher education and therefore capable of providing on a socially significant scale the energizing leadership for the expression of hitherto suppressed grievances. Another factor was the rapid growth in the number of black Americans living in cities§ and therefore released from the lethargy of traditional, whfte-dominated rural existence and brought into direct contact with the white community, which, although essentially conservative, has become increasingly ambivalent in its values. Within this context, attempts at reform contributed to further tension and friction, prompting some, in the dominant community, to adopt a

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* As of 1960, approximately 70 per cent of the males over 15 and 90 per cent of the females over 15 in Pakistan were illiterate; in India the percentages were 60 per cent and 85 per cent, respectively; in Indonesia 40 per cent and 70 per cent; and in Burma 20 per cent and 60 per cent. In Latin America in 1960, 35.6 per cent of the males and 42.6 per cent of the females in Brazil were illiterate; in Argentina 7.5 per cent and 9.7 per cent; in Chile 15.1 per cent and 17.6 per cent; in Peru 25.6 per cent and 52.4 per cent; and in Venezuela 30.2 per cent and 38.3 per cent (Myrdal, pp. 540, 1672; UN Statistical Yearbook, 1965).

† It is therefore too late to suggest that since participation is running ahead of the effective institutionalization of political processes, it might be desirable —in order to prevent chaos—to either limit or delay programs that stimulate higher levels of participation—for instance, by slowing down drives against illiteracy so that literacy does not outpace economic and political development. Even if the latter were practicable, the dissemination of transistor radios (and soon television) is beginning to have the same politically activiz-ing effect that literacy had on the urban proletariat of the late nineteenth century. Thus, Frantz Fanoh quite correctly observed in his Studies in a Dying Colonialism (New York, 1965) that "since 1956 the purchase of a radio in Algeria has meant, not the adoption of a modern technique for getting news, but the obtaining of access to the only means of entering into communication with the Revolution, of living with it" (p. 83).

‡ Cities with populations of over a hundred thousand have been increasing in Asia at a rate three times that of the general population growth of the countries concerned (Myrdal, p. 469).

§ The proportion of all Negroes living in the North and West almost quadrupled from 1910 to 1960, when 73 per cent of all Negroes resided in urban areas and thus represented a more urbanized population than the whites, only 70 per cent of whom resided in urban areas (Philip M. Hauser, "Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro," in The Negro American, Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark, eds., Boston, 1965, pp. 74-75).

reactionary posture against change, and others, especially among the deprived, to argue that no change was meaningful within the framework of the existing "system.

American racial slums have grown in a pattern not unlike the expansion of the huge impoverished urban centers of Asia. Blacks from the South have tended to move to northern cities more in reaction to their poverty and felt injustice than because of the actual employment available there. The rate of, unemployment in large American cities is several times more than the national average. In Asia, cities inhabited by impoverished and unproductive masses have grown rapidly in recent years not because of employment opportunities but because of rural poverty and insecurity. "Instead of standing as a symptom of growth, as it was in the West, urbanization in South Asia is an aspect of continued poverty." [39]

The parallel between the ghettos of the global city and the racial slums of the United States can be extended to the problems faced by the intellectual political elite of the Third World. In the United States "integration" has so far tended to mean the selective assimilation of a few individuals who can conform to the prevailing norms of the dominant community; however, their assimilation also means, the loss of talent and expertise to the black community, in which the less educated' more militant "pseudo-intelligentsia" increasingly provides charismatic leadership to the masses by exploiting reverse racism. In like manner, the established social elites of the Third World have tended to emulate the life styles of the more advanced world, and to emigrate into it either directly or vicariously.

The Political Vacuum

The resulting vacuum is filled by an indigenous pseudo-intelligentsia, whose views are influenced by doctrines advocated by Frantz Fanon, Regis Debray, Che Guevara, and others. Nineteenth-century European Marxism, originally addressed to an urban proletariat only recently divorced from rural life, is romantically adapted to the conditions of industrially backward twentieth-century global ghettos. "The revolutionary intellectual is a virtually universal phenomenon in modernizing societies. 'No one is as inclined to foster violence as a disgruntled intellectual, at least within the Indian context,' Hoselitz and Weiner have observed. 'It is these persons who compose the cadres of the less responsible political parties, who make up the narrower entourage of demagogues and who become leaders of millenarian and messianic movements, all of which may, when the opportunity is ripe, threaten political stability.' In Iran extremists of both the left and the right were more likely than moderates to be products of the city, to come from the middle economic strata, and to be better educated."[40]

Given this emotional context, external aid, designed to overcome the specific condition of backwardness and poverty, becomes an additional point of friction, and—even when it helps to improve the objective situation—stimulates further subjective tension. In the urban ghettos of the United States, governmental and private aid programs administered by whites have been resented by the blacks; when administered by the blacks, however, they have often become targets of white charges that funds designed for specific development programs have been used to advance black militancy. On the global scale, "neo-colonialism" has been the formula used to stimulate suspicion by the masses of the political motives of economic aid from the advanced countries;* graft, corruption, and inefficiency have been the charges made by donor countries against the recipients of economic assistance.

The shift toward economic assistance on an international basis is a response to this danger—at least in part. It poses another danger, however. Aid can at best be only a partial response to a condition that has profoundly psychological as well as material roots. Economic assistance can be effective only if, in addition, the recipient country's emotional resources are mobilized and a sense of popular enthusiasm and purpose is created. This requires native leadership that knows both how to stir the masses and how to utilize foreign aid intelligently. Such leadership is rare; where it does exist it frequently tends to be unresponsive to foreign interests and advice, and thus stimulates foreign resentment. The difficulties faced by the United States in dealing with Nasser or Ayub Khan, who were not only promoting but also responding to the emotionalism of their own masses, are cases in point.

Moreover, even if those in authority are determined to promote social change, they are faced with the intractable fact that their reality can be changed only very gradually, while popular mobilization on behalf of change can be attained only by stimulating mass enthusiasm and emotion. The rulers thus confront a dilemma.

To admit the reality of the slowness of change is to deprive themselves of the support of the masses and to yield the political initiative to radical demagogues; to mobilize the masses on behalf of unattainable goals is to court an eventual explosion—unless that mobilization becomes a vehicle for subordinating the masses to

* On a more sophisticated level, the economic system of the advanced countries is condemned as inherently incapable of providing true assistance. "Thus, Furtado [the Latin American economist] points out, the corporation is designed to fit the needs of profit-making in an advanced economy, and when one tries to transplant its technology to impoverished, developing lands, furious contradictions result. The newest machines save manpower— a blessing in the US and a curse in a country with rampant underemployment. Mass produetion requires a huge market nonexistent in an archaic agricultural society. So, Furtado concludes, the very Structure of economic life in the new nations—forced upon them in the last century—makes it difficult for them to absorb the benefits of scientific and technical progress on those rare occasions where they might have the opportunity to do so. Thus, the rich nations specialize in activities which make work easier, goods more abundant, leisure more widespread, and living standards higher. The poor nations are left with the grubby tasks of primary production and with a stagnant or declining market; they must sell cheap and buy dear from the booming factories" (Michael Harrington, American Power in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1967, p. 9).

centralized, bureaucratic control of the sort that communist leaders provide most effectively. Furthermore, to obtain the support of the propertied and more educated groups, the reform planners often have to "tread most warily in order not to disrupt the traditional social order . . . they permit the laws to contain loopholes of all sorts and even let them remain unenforced."[41] The distance between promise and attainment thus tends to widen.

The prospect is that feelings of intensive resentment will most likely grow as the gap between the Third World and the developed world widens.* Indeed, they will probably intensify as by the year 2000 the spectrum expands and ranges from the few most advanced post-industrial technetronic states (the United States, Japan, Sweden, Canada), to the dozen or so mature industrial states (only then approaching the present levels of the United States), to the ten to fifteen currently underdeveloped states that by 2000 will have reached the levels of the currently less advanced early-industrial states, to the large group (about sixty) still in the pre-industrial stage, and finally to those remaining still in extremely primitive conditions. The third and fourth groups, those containing the majority of the world's population and experiencing at best only partially effective progress, will in all likelihood be the centers of volatile political activity, resentment, tension, and extremism.[42]

In that context, it is difficult to conceive how democratic institutions (derived largely from Western expterience but typical only of the more stable and wealthy Western nations) will endure in a country like India—or how they will develop elsewhere.† "Much will depend on the pace of economic development itself, and in this respect the omens are far from favorable."[43] The likely consequence is sporadic turbulence in individual countries and a turn toward personal dictatorships. The latter will be based on more internally oriented, though socially radical, unifying doctrines in the hope that the. combination of xenophobia and charisma may provide the minimum stability necessary for imposing social-economic modernization from above.

As in the case of urban ghettos in the United States, this may make for a tenser relationship with the more prosperous and advanced world. The latter has in recent years come to accept —at least as a general proposition, and still grudgingly—a moral obligation to assist materially the development of the Third World. This "new morality" was doubtless stimulated by Cold War rivalry, which made the two developed camps compete in providing assistance to the backward nations. It is far from certain that these feelings of conscience will persist if the Cold War wanes‡ they certainly will not if East-West rivalry is replaced by intensifying North-South animosity. The peoples of the developed world may well take refuge in the self-serving argument that the irrational fanaticism of the leaders of the global ghettos precludes cooperation. Such a negative posture will ensure both the further widening of the gulf and a more bitter split among mankind, which is for the first time beginning to five in subjective intimacy.

4. Global Fragmentation and Unification

The cumulative effect of the technetronic revolution is contradictory. On the one hand, this revolution marks the beginnings of a global community; on the other hand, it fragments humanity and detaches it from its traditional moorings. The technetronic revolution is widening the spectrum of the human condition. It intensifies the gulf in the material condition of mankind even as it contracts mankind's subjective tolerance of that disparity.

Though differences among societies gradually developed in the course of human history, it was not until the industrial revolution that these differences became sharp. Today some nations still live under conditions not unlike those of pre-Christian times, and many live in circumstances no better than those of the Middle Ages. Yet soon a few will live in ways so new that it is now difficult to imagine the social and personal ramifications. The result could be a profound three-way split in the attitudes and views of mankind. The coexistence of agrarian, industrial, and new technetronic societies, each providing different perspectives on life, would make understanding more difficult at the very time it becomes more possible, and it would render the global acceptance of certain norms less likely even as it becomes more imperative.

Fragmented Congestion

This three-way global split could further strain the already weak fabric of social and political order and result in domestic and, therefore, possibly international chaos. Growing anarchy in the Third World would very likely involve racist and nationalist passions. At the very least, this would create major pockets of disruption and chaos in the world; at worst, Third World instability could draw the more developed nations into potentially antagonistic forms of involvement that could have the same effect on American-Soviet relations as Balkan conflicts had on the European order prior to World War I.

In the most advanced world the tension between "internal" and "external" man—between man

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* In 1965 the per-capita production of the developed world exceeded that of the less developed by twelve times; it is estimated that by the year 2000 the proportion will be eighteen times greater (Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000, New York, 1967, p. 142). In 1965 Illinois alone had a larger gross product than all of Africa; California, more than all of China.

† "Like the states of seventeenth-century Europe the non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both" (Huntington, pp. 136-37).

‡ This has been duly noted by some Third World spokesmen. The Algerian delegate to the UN Economic and Social Council meeting in Geneva said in July 1966, "Even as the detente in the Cold War has permitted an attenuation of the conflict between blocs with different social systems, one must fear that the East-West opposition will revolve on its axis and become an antagonism of North against South" (cited by Harrington, p. 20).

preoccupied with his inner meaning and his relationship to the infinite, and man deeply involved in his environment and committed to shaping what he recognizes to be finite—prompts an acute crisis of philosophic, religious, and psychic identity; this crisis is aggravated by the fear that man's malleability may permit what was previously considered immutable in, man to be undermined. The explosion in scientific knowledge poses the danger of intellectual fragmentation, with uncertainty increasing in direct proportion to the expansion in what is known. The result, especially in the United States (see Part IV for more extended discussion), is an accelerating search for new social and political forms.

The impact of the United States as the first global society reflects these conflicting tendencies. Though the United States searches for global stability and devotes its enormous resources to preventing revolutionary upheavals, its social impact on the world is unsettling, innovative, and, creative. Even as it provokes violent antagonism to itself, it sets off expectations that are measured by American standards and that in most countries cannot be met until well into the next century. It accelerates the unification of other societies—not only because regionalism has since the 1960s become Washington's professed foreign-policy formula but also because other nations see in unification the best weapon for combating American influence. In its role as the first global society, it thus unifies, changes, stimulates, and challenges others—often against its own immediate interests. "Americanization" thus creates common aspirations and highly differentiated reactions.

In the Third World the effect of United States influence is to intensify social contradictions and conflict between the generations. Mass communications and education create expectations— for which the material wealth of America provides a vague standard—that simply cannot be met by most societies. Since neither communications nor education can be contained, it is to be expected that political tensions will mount as purely parochial, traditional attitudes yield to broader global perspectives. In the advanced world the contemporary challenge increasingly focuses on the identity of man, but in the Third World social fragmentation looms as the principal problem—one which is in a historic race with the advanced societies' only slowly maturing sense of their global responsibility for helping develop the Third World.

Even nationalism is subject to contradictory influences. Nationalism has never been stronger and has never before enjoyed such extensive, aroused, and conscious support from the popular masses as well as from the intelligentsia. The interaction of nation-states still determines matters affecting war and peace, and man's primary self-identification is still on the basis of nationalism. The non-Russian states in the Soviet Union are perhaps the only exception to nationalism's successful dissolution of colonial empires. Yet precisely because this is so, nationalism is ceasing to be the compelling force that determines the broad character of change in our time. Though still the source of many tensions, it is tempered by the growing recognition, shared even by the most nationalist elites, that today regional and continental cooperation is necessary to the fulfilment of many purely national goals. The success of nationalism makes the nation a principal object, but no longer the vital subject, of dynamic processes.-

Because he finds himself living in a congested, overlapping, confusing, and impersonal environment, man seeks solace in restricted and familiar intimacy. The national community is the obvious one to turn to, and a definition of what a national community is may well become more restrictive as broader transnational cooperation develops. For many peoples the nation-state was a compromise dictated by economics, by security, and by other factors. An optimum balance was eventually struck, often after centuries of conflict. Today the balance is becoming unsettled, because newer and larger frameworks of cooperation are emerging, and the effective integration of much smaller, more cohesive units into much larger wholes is becoming increasingly possible because of computers, cybernetics, communications, and so on.

As a consequence, the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium, the French and English Canadians in Canada, the Scots and the Welsh in the United Kingdom, the Basques in Spain, the Croats and the Slovenes in Yugoslavia, and the Czechs and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia are claiming—and some of the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union and the various linguistic-ethnic groups in India may soon claim—that their particular nation-state no longer corresponds to historical need. On a higher plane it has been rendered superfluous by Europe, or some other regional (Common Market) arrangement, while on a lower plane a more intimate linguistic and religious community is required to overcome the impact of the implosion-explosion characteristic of the global metropolis.

This development is thus not a return to the emotions or to the ecstatic style of nineteenth-century nationalism, even though there are many superficial analogies to it. It takes place, by and large, in a context that recognizes the current necessity for broader cooperation on a level above the national. It accepts as an ideal the functional integration of regions and even of whole continents. It is a reflection of the desire for a more defined sense of personality in an increasingly impersonal world, and of the changed utility of some of the existing state structures. This can even be said of Gaullism, which has often been described as a throwback to nineteenth-century nationalism. Nevertheless, Gaullism's major ambition was to construct a Europe that would be "European" and not dominated by an external hegemony, though, to be sure, France would exercise political leadership in it.

The "new" nationalism has many elements of the old nationalism, especially in some of the new nations. There nationalism is still a radical, changing force creatively mobilizing community feelings but also

prompting ethnic exclusiveness and conflicts.* Yet it is generally true, as the author of a suggestive paper notes, that "the vision and objectives of society [have] changed. Today a new concept of man and his world is challenging the concepts of the Renaissance which have guided man's behavior for the past five hundred years." The nation-state as a fundamental unit of man's organized life has ceased to be the principal creative force: "International banks and multinational corporations are acting and planning in terms that are far in advance of the political concepts of the nation-state."[44] But as the nation-state is gradually yielding its sovereignty, the psychological importance of the national community is rising, and the attempt to establish an equilibrium between the imperatives of the new internationalism and the need for a more intimate national community is the source of frictions and conflicts.

The achievement of that equilibrium is being made more difficult by the scientific and technological innovations in weaponry. It is ironic to recall that in 1878 Friedrich Engels, commenting on the Franco-Prussian War, proclaimed that "weapons used have reached such a stage of perfection that further progress which would have any revolutionizing influence is no longer, possible." [45] Not only have new weapons been developed but some of the basic concepts of geography and strategy have been fundamentally altered; space and weather control have replaced Suez or Gibraltar as key elements of strategy.

In addition to improved rocketry, multi-missiles, and more powerful and more accurate bombs, future developments may well include automated or manned space warships, deep-sea installations, chemical and biological weapons, death rays, and still other forms of warfare—even the weather may be tampered with.† These new weapons could either encourage expectations of one-sided, relatively "inexpensive" victory; permit proxy contests that will be decisive in their strategic political outcome but will be fought by only a few human beings (as in the Battle of Britain) or even by robots in outer space;[46] or simply create such mutual instability that the breakdown of peace will become inevitable, in spite of man's rational recognition of the futility of war.

In addition, it may be possible—and tempting—to exploit for strategic-political purposes the fruits of research on the brain and on human behavior. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, a geophysicist specializing in problems of warfare, has written that accurately timed, artificially excited electronic strokes "could lead to a pattern of oscillations that produce relatively high power levels over certain regions of the earth. ... In this way, one could develop a system that would seriously impair the brain performance of very large populations in selected regions over an extended period. . . . No matter how deeply disturbing the thought of using the environment to manipulate behavior for national advantages to some, the technology permitting such use will very probably develop within the next few decades." [47]

Such technology will be available primarily, and to begin with exclusively, to the most advanced countries.‡ But it is likely that in the coming decades some states in the Third World will have taken major steps toward acquiring—or will have acquired— highly destructive weaponry. Even if they are not capable of using it against the major powers without bringing about their own extinction, they may be able and tempted to use it in "underworld" wars among themselves. The question then arises whether such wars would be interpreted by the major powers as posing a direct threat to the fabric of peace, and whether a joint response by them would be effectively mounted and imposed. The absence of accepted global institutions could temporarily be overcome by *ad hoc* arrangements and agreements designed to meet specific threats, but it is conceivable that in some cases there will not be sufficient unanimity to permit joint reactions. The mutual annihilation of some lesser states thus remains at least a possibility.

Toward a Planetary Consciousness

Yet it would be wrong to conclude that fragmentation and chaos are the dominant realities of our time. A global human conscience is for the first time beginning to manifest itself. This conscience is a natural extension of the long process of widening man's personal horizons. In the course of time, man's self-identification expanded from his family to his village, to his tribe, to his region, to his nation; more recently it spread to his continent (before World War II it was not as customary as it is now for university students or intellectuals to describe themselves merely as Europeans or Asians).

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* ".... In spite of all the parallels to European nationalism, the new nationalism in South Asia is something very different. It differs in many more respects and for more fundamental reasons than appears from the qualifications just listed. The fundamental reason is that an historical process that in Europe spans centuries is telescoped within a few decades and that the order of the happenings is deranged. . . . Nationalism there is needed to provide the impulse for change—indeed, for all the necessary changes, and concurrently. The difficulties in this syncopation of policies, the historical necessity of which is seen by all the enlightened intellectual and political leaders in the region, are immense" (Myrdal, pp. 2118-19).

† As one specialist noted, "By the year 2018, technology will make available to the leaders of the major nations a variety of techniques for conducting secret warfare, of which only a bare minimum of the security forces need be appraised. One nation may attack a competitor covertly by bacteriological means, thoroughly weakening the population (though with a minimum of fatalities) before taking over with its own overt armed forces. Alternatively, techniques of weather modification could be employed to produce prolonged periods of drought or storm, thereby weakening a nation's capacity and forcing it to accept the demands of the competitor" (Gordon J. F. MacDonald, Space," in Toward the Year 2018, p. 34).

‡ This has led one concerned scholar to comment, "Whether it is used to kill, hurt, nauseate, paralyze, cause hallucination, or to terrify military personnel and civilians, the systematic use of biological and chemical warfare will require the resolution of major moral and ethical problems" (Donald N. Michael, "Some Speculations on the Social Impact of Technology," mimeographed text of address to the Columbia University Seminar on Technology and Social Change, p. 6).

During the last three centuries the fading of the essentially transnational European aristocracy and the successive nationalization of the Christian church, of socialism, and of communism have meant that in recent times most significant political activity has tended to be confined within national compartments. Today we are again witnessing the emergence of transnational elites, but now they are composed of international businessmen, scholars, professional men, and public officials. The ties of these new elites cut across national boundaries, their perspectives are not confined by national traditions, and their interests are more functional than national. These global communities are gaining in strength anck as was true in the Middle Ages, it is likely that before long the social elites of most of the more advanced countries will be highly internationalist or globalist in spirit and outlook. The creation of the global information grid, facilitating almost continuous intellectual interaction and the pooling of knowledge, will further enhance the present trend toward international professional elites and toward the emergence of a common scientific language (in effect, the functional equivalent of Latin). This, however, could create a dangerous gap between them and the politically activated masses, whose "nativism"—exploited by more nationalist political leaders—could work against the "cosmopolitan" elites.

Increasingly, the intellectual elites tend to think in terms of global problems. One significant aspect of this process is the way in which contemporary dilemmas are identified: the need to overcome technical backwardness, to eliminate poverty, to extend international cooperation in education and health, to prevent overpopulation, to develop effective peacekeeping machinery.* These are all global issues. Only thirty years ago they were simply not in the forefront of public attention, which was riveted at the time on much more specific regional, national, or territorial conflicts.

The technetronic revolution creates conditions that increasingly make possible global responses to these needs and to human suffering in general. Indeed, a rudimentary framework of global social and economic institutions has already taken shape.† The availability of the means to cooperate globally intensifies the sense of obligation to act. Conscience is easily pacified by a feeling of futility. An uneasy conscience is usually one that knows that it can act differently. The sense of proximity, the immediacy of suffering, the globally destructive character of modern weapons all help to stimulate an outlook that views mankind as a community.

It is a hopeful sign in this connection that the yardsticks by which the public measures international competition are undergoing a constructive change. In the recent past, and even in the present, territorial expansion, population, and vague national claims of cultural and ideological superiority, as well as military power in general and victory in direct contests in particular, have provided the criteria for measuring status and influence. Gradually these are giving way to rivalry in GNP figures, per-capita income and consumption data, educational opportunities, creative and scientific attainments, research and development, standards of health and nutrition, and even competitive national Olympic scores, to say nothing of the space race between the two superpowers. To anyone living in 1914 the current international rivalry in producing more impressive charts and in defining new indices for measuring national status would be well-nigh incomprehensible; at that time nationalist geopolitics provided a more direct appeal.

Today a different orientation is becoming dominant. Social problems are seen less as the consequence of deliberate evil and more as the unintended by-products of both complexity and ignorance; solutions are not sought in emotional simplifications but in the use of man's accumulated social and scientific knowledge. Increasingly, it is felt that the variations in both scientific development and the human psyche do not lend themselves to doctrinal solutions formulated in advance; in addition, the unanticipated consequences of the discoveries of science have produced, especially in the more advanced countries, an awareness that the basic issues facing man have a common significance for human survival, irrespective of international internal diversity.

The concern with ideology is yielding to a preoccupation with ecology. Its beginnings can be seen in the unprecedented' public preoccupation with matters such as air and water pollution, famine, overpopulation, radiation, and the control of disease, drugs, and weather, as well as in the increasingly non-nationalistic approaches to the exploration of space or of the ocean bed. There is already widespread consensus that functional planning is desirable and that it is the only way to cope with the various ecological threats.[48] Furthermore, given the continuing advances in computers and communications, there is reason to expect that modern technology will make such planning more feasible; in addition, multi-spectral analysis from earth satellites (a by-product of the space race) holds out the promise of more effective planning in regard to earth resources.

The new global consciousness, however, is only beginning to become an influential force. It still lacks identity, cohesion, and focus. Much of humanity—indeed, the majority of humanity— still neither shares nor is prepared to support it. Science and technology are still used to buttress ideological claims, to fortify national

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* "We are discovering the need for coordination at the world level, for looking ahead so that the pieces can be fitted together more precisely. This has brought us to the beginning of global planning. FAO is a pioneer: its Indicative World Plan is the first such attempt, the prototype version of which will be ready in 1969. The ILO is working hard on a World Employment Plan.
"The U.N.'s Center for Development Planning, Projections and Policies (CDPPP) is preparing what could well be called the framework for a master plan covering all such activities. This is part of the task imposed on it by assembly resolutions which request the secretary-general, in plain words, to prepare future development efforts which are an improvement on the present development decade" (Jan Tinbergen, "The Way Out of the Labyrinth," *Ceres* (FAO Review), Vol. 1, No. 3, May-June 1968, p. 20).

† To list but a few: a world health organization, a world food and agricultural organization, a world labor organization, a world educational and cultural organization, a world bank, a global meteorological organization, an international atomic-energy agency, an international civil-aviation organization, an international agency for the peaceful uses of outer space, an agency for tapping the ocean beds, etc.

aspirations, and to reward narrowly national interests. Most states are spending more on arms than on social services, and the foreign-aid allotment of the two most powerful states is highly disproportionate to their asserted global missions.* Indeed, it can be argued that in some respects the divided, isolated, and compartmentalized world of old had more inner cohesion and enjoyed greater harmony than the volatile global reality of today. Established cultures, deeply entrenched traditional religions, and distinctive national identities provided a stable framework and firm moorings; distance and time were the insulators against excessive friction between the compartments. Today the framework is disintegrating and the insulants are dissolving. The new global unity has yet to find its own structure, consensus, and harmony.

* It was estimated that in 1966 global arms spending was 40 per cent greater than the world's outlays for education and was more than three times greater than the world's public-health budget. In that same year the total foreign aid extended by the United States was approximately $4 billion, by the Soviet Union approximately $330 million (both sets of figures from "World Military Expenditures, 1966-1967," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1968, especially pp. 9-12).

PART V
America and the World

America's relationship with the world must reflect American domestic values and preoccupations. A profound discrepancy between the external conduct of a democratic society and its internal norms is no longer possible; mass communications quickly expose the gulf and undercut the support needed for its foreign policy. Just as a nation preoccupied with the communist threat at home can conduct a vigorously anti-communist policy abroad, or a nation fearful of revolution can become intensely involved in counterrevolutionary activity, so a nation concerned with social justice and technological adaptation cannot help but become similarly committed on an international level.

In his *Second Treatise on Government,* John Locke wrote, ". . . in the beginning, all the world was America." Today all the world is America, in the sense that America is the first to experience the social, psychological, political, and ideological dilemmas produced by man's sudden acquisition of altogether unprecedented power over his environment and over himself. The third American revolution, occurring in an era of volatile beliefs and of rapidly spreading technological change, thus clearly dictates America's role: that of the social innovator, exploiting science in the service of man but without dogmatically prescribing the destiny of man. The success of America in building a healthy democratic society would hold promise for a world still dominated by ideological and racial conflicts, by economic and social injustice. America's failure not only would be a setback for trends under way since the great revolutions of the late eighteenth century but could signify a more fundamental human failure: man's inability to overcome his baser instincts and his capitulation before the complexity and power of science.

1. The American Future

If the problems that confront America were neither recognized nor anticipated, the inherent dangers would be even greater. Such is not the case. Contemporary America is perhaps more candidly critical and more demanding of itself than any other society: national reports pinpointing the society's failures, devastating critiques of national shortcomings, elaborate efforts at social stocktaking—all reflect a more introspective and deliberately sober national mood. Studies of the future, organized on a large scale (both by special academic commissions and by well-endowed private institutes), indicate mounting national recognition that the future can and must be planned, that unless there is a modicum of deliberate choice, change will result in chaos.* This does not guarantee that a national response will actually be mounted, but it does indicate a more pervasive awareness among leading sectors of society of the need for a deliberate response.

The historical vitality of the United States system derives from the deeply rooted commitment of the American people to the idea of democratic change. The American tradition of free dialogue and of hierarchically unfettered expression of disagreement[1] has been an important factor in developing this responsiveness to change; it has made it possible to exploit protest movements (and thereby render them historically superfluous) by adapting and adopting their programs. This is to deny neither the element of violence in American history nor the oft-noted conservatism of the electorate. Nevertheless, the fundamental reality of American life has been the assimilation of the rapid change induced by the frontier, by immigration, and by industrial growth. A dynamic socio-economic reality has blended with a certain political conservatism and created a pluralist socio-political system that has in the past proven itself to be remarkably resilient in absorbing extraordinary change; it possesses a structural quality capable of generating and deciphering warning signals of mounting social stress.

Today's America has set higher standards for itself than has any other society: it aims at creating racial harmony on the basis of equality, at achieving social welfare while preserving personal liberty, at eliminating poverty without shackling individual freedom. Tensions in the United States might be less were it to seek less—but in its ambitious goals America retains its innovative character.

Though the New Left—and particularly the Violent Left—has temporarily served to fortify socially conservative or even reactionary trends, the impatience of the young is more and more likely to permeate the socio-political system, especially as they begin to occupy more influential positions and make it more responsive to the need for change and reform. Moreover, the increasingly international experience of the American intellectual and business elite has already prompted a greater inclination to consider contemporary problems within a larger framework, thereby drawing lessons for the United States from both the political evolution and

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* The concern is not limited to intellectuals but includes businessmen as well. Thus, in March 1969 *Fortune* unveiled a plan to remedy the condition of "a second-rate nation with a civilization only half-built," offering a pro gram for extensive rehabilitation of the nation. It would require a massive public and private effort.
See also a more extensive study by Leonard A. Lecht, *Goals, Priorities and Dollars: The Next Decade* (New York, 1966), which outlines in extraordinary detail a plan for allocating the GNP for various tasks of national renewal, with special concentration on the scientific-technological and ecological structure of society.

the social innovation of other advanced countries.* As a result, more Americans recognize that the two broad areas of needed and—it is to be hoped—developing change involve the institutional and the cultural aspects of American society. The former largely, though not exclusively, pertains to the political sphere, the latter to the educational domain, particularly as it concerns the content and the shaping of national values. More deliberate change in both realms would serve as a catalyst for reform in other areas of national life, providing both the framework and the motivation for- the timely adoption of needed remedies.

Participatory Pluralism

The approaching two-hundredth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence could justify the call for a national constitutional convention to re-examine the nation's formal institutional framework. Either 1976 or 1989—the two-hundredth anniversary of the Constitution—could serve as a suitable target date for culminating a national dialogue on the relevance of existing arrangements, the workings of the representative process, and the desirability of imitating the various European regionalization reforms and of streamlining the administrative structure. More important still, either date would provide a suitable occasion for redefining the meaning of modern democracy—a task admittedly challenging but not necessarily more so than when it was undertaken by the founding fathers—and for setting ambitious and concrete social goals.†

Realism, however, forces us to recognize that the necessary political innovation will not come from direct constitutional reform, desirable as that would be.‡ The needed change is more likely to develop incrementally and less overtly. Nonetheless, its eventual scope may be far-reaching, especially as the political process gradually assimilates scientific-technological change. Thus, in the political sphere the increased flow of information and the development of more efficient techniques of coordination may make possible greater devolution of authority and responsibility to the lower levels of government and society. In the past the division of power has traditionally caused problems of inefficiency, poor coordination, and dispersal of authority, but today the new communications and computation techniques make possible both increased authority at the lower levels and almost instant national coordination. § The rapid transferral of information, combined with highly advanced analytical methods, would also make possible broad national planning—in the looser French sense of target definition—not only concentrating on economic goals but more clearly defining ecological and cultural objectives.

Technological developments make it certain that modern society will require more and more planning. Deliberate management of the American future will become widespread, with the planner eventually displacing the lawyer as the key social legislator and manipulator. This will put a greater emphasis on defining goals and, by the same token, on a more self-conscious preoccupation with social ends. How to combine social planning with personal freedom is already emerging as the key dilemma of techne-tronic America, replacing the industrial age's preoccupation with balancing social needs against requirements of free enterprise.

The strengthening of local, especially metropolitan, government is already recognized as an urgent necessity for the democratic process in the United States. The devolution of financial responsibility to lower echelons of the political system may encourage both the flow of better talent and greater local participation in more important local decision-making. National coordination and local participation could thus be wedded by new systems of coordination. This has already been tried successfully by some large businesses.

The trend toward more coordination but less centralization would be in keeping with the American tradition of blurring sharp distinctions between public and private institutions. Institutions such as TVA or the Ford Foundation perform functions difficult for many Europeans to understand, since they are more accustomed either to differentiate sharply between the public sphere and the private (as has been typical of the industrial age or to subordinate the private to the public (as is favoured by the socialists and some liberals) or to absorb the private by the public (as has been the case in communist states).

At one time the question of ownership was the decisive social and political issue of a society undergoing modernization. The forms of land ownership customary in the feudal-agricultural age were extended through force of habit as well as historical accommodation into the industrial age; owning a factory was seen as being largely the same as owning a piece of land. This eventually led to a severe conflict between old forms and

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* For example, it is now more candidly admitted that America has much to learn from Western Europe in metropolitan planning, in local urban planning, in regionalization, in the development of new towns, and in social and legal innovation.

† For example, 1976 could provide a target date for a massive effort to terminate poverty as currently defined, or to bring Negro education up to the national average; 1989, for ecological targets.

‡ For example, one simple—though admittedly unattainable—constitutional reform would go a long way toward making Congress more responsive to social evolution: the passage of a congressional equivalent of the Twenty-second Amendment limiting the presidential term of office.

§ These techniques could also be used to improve electoral procedures and to provide for closer consultation between the public and its representatives. Existing electoral machinery in the United States—in regard to both registration and voting procedure—has simply not kept up with innovation in electronic communications and computation. Reforms (such as electronic home-voting consoles) to make it possible for representatives of the public to consult their constituents rapidly, and for these constituents to express their views easily, are both technically possible and likely to develop in view of growing dissatisfaction with present machinery. More intense consultation, not necessarily only on the national level or only in regard to political institutions, would further enhance the responsiveness of the American social and political system.

modes of evaluating individual rights and the new requirements of industrial organization, of collective employee rights, and of changed sociopolitical institutions. Socialism was one extreme solution; in the more advanced West depersonalized corporate ownership and the limited sharing of authority with organized labor was the general pattern of accommodation. The question of ownership was thus redefined into one of control and regulation, while the issue of exploitation associated with ownership was replaced by new problems concerning the economic participation and psychological well-being of the employed.

In the process, even in America the federal government emerged as the key institution for restructuring social relations, and the question of the extent of the state's role in economic affairs became crucial. Unlike the agricultural age, during which few state institutions were involved in organizing and assisting man's daily existence, the industrial age produced both greater opportunities for national direction and a greater social demand for government-imposed social justice. More centralized direction by the state seemed the only alternative to chaos and the only response to social injustice.

Our age has been moving toward a new pattern, blurring distinctions between public and private bodies and encouraging more cross-participation in both by their employees and members. In Europe co-determination not only has involved profit-sharing but has increasingly led to participation in policymaking; pressures in the same direction are clearly building up in the United States as well. At the same time, the widening social perspectives of the American business community are likely to increase the involvement of business executives in social problems, thereby merging private and public activity on both the local and the national levels. This might in turn make for more effective social application of the new management techniques, which, unlike bureaucratized governmental procedures, have proved both efficient and responsive to external stimuli.* Such participatory pluralism may prove reasonably effective in subordinating science and technology to social ends. In the past for some the introduction of the machine was the beginning of utopia; for others it meant the unleashing of evil. Similarly, today technology is seen by some modern conservatives as the beginning of a happy new age because it promises to free man from many social problems, while for the New Left technetronics is replacing property as the symbol of social evil.[2] Yet the crucial issue remains the ends to which science and technology are applied, and a society in which effective coordination is combined with decentralization is more likely to crystallize the necessary discussion and reflection. Scientific expertise can then be mobilized for social ends without granting scientists a dominating political role because of their scientific credentials.† Participatory pluralism will automatically ensure neither political wisdom nor social responsibility, but it might make for a society that more nearly approaches both.

Anticipation of the social effects of technological innovation offers a good example of the necessary forms of cross-institutional cooperation. One of the nation's most urgent needs is the creation of a variety of mechanisms that link national and local governments, academia, and the business community (there the example of NASA may be especially rewarding) in the task of evaluating not only the operational effects of the new technologies but their cultural and psychological effects. A series of national and local councils—not restricted to scientists but made up of various social groups, including the clergy—would be in keeping with both the need and the emerging pattern of social response to change‡ The trend toward the progressive breakdown of sharp

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* This is especially ironic since the government has sponsored the transfer of many technological innovations from defense to private industry (see R. Lester and G. Howick, *Assessing Technology Transfer,* NASA, Washington, D.C., 1966, especially pp. 42, 48, 76, and 79). At the same time, the *internal* bureaucratic procedures of many government agencies lag in technological innovation as compared with major banks or corporations. Bureaucratic rigidity appears to be a function of size and hierarchy. A study by sixteen leading research administrators reported in the spring of 1967 that small, independent companies have been much more innovative technologically than large companies (see Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity,* New York, 1969, p. 62.)

† On the complex question of the role of scientists in policymaking, comments by Don K. Price in *The Scientific Estate* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965) and by Sanford A. Lakoff and J. Stefan Dupre in *Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962) are especially pertinent.

There is no reason to believe that scientific competence is sufficient for relevant judgments concerning all areas of social existence or public policy. Indeed, though somewhat exaggerated, the observations of a French social thinker on the dangers of excessive deference to the nonscientific opinions of scientists have some merit:

"We are forced to conclude that our scientists are incapable of any but the emptiest platitudes when they stray from their specialties. It makes one think back on the collection of mediocrities accumulated by Einstein when he spoke of God, the state, peace, and the meaning of life. It is clear that Einstein, extraordinary mathematical genius that he was, was no Pascal; he knew nothing of political or human reality, or, in fact, anything at all outside his mathematical reach. The banality of Einstein's remarks in matters outside his specialty is as astonishing as his genius within it. It seems as though the specialized application of all one's faculties in a particular area inhibits the consideration of things in general. Even J. Robert Oppenheimer, who seems receptive to a general culture, is not outside this judgment. His political and social declarations, for example, scarcely go beyond the level of those of the man in the street. And the opinions of the scientists quoted by *L'Express* are not even on the level of Einstein or Oppenheimer. Their pomposities, in fact, do not rise to the level of the average. They are vague generalities inherited from the nineteenth century, and the fact that they represent the furthest limits of thought of our scientific worthies must be symptomatic of arrested development or of a mental block. Particularly disquieting is the gap between the enormous power they wield and their critical ability, which must be estimated as null" (Ellul, p. 435). For some suggestive analogies, see R. Todd, "George Wald: The Man, the Speech," *The New York Times Magazine,* August 17, 1967.

‡ This would go beyond the task set the National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, authorized by Congress in 1964, and also address itself to the issues with which, for example, the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science has been grappling.

An editorial in *Science* (August 1, 1969) on "The Control of Technology" errs in implying that the above matter should be restricted to scientists. Social scientists, the clergy, and humanists should also be involved, and the Special Commission on the Social Sciences, established in 1968 by the National Science Board, could well be drawn in.

distinctions between the political and social spheres, between public and private institutions, will not lend itself to easy classification as liberal, conservative, or socialist—all terms derived from a different historical context—but it will be a major step toward the participatory democracy advocated by some of the New Left in the late 1960s. Ironically, this participatory democracy is likely to emerge through a progressive symbiosis of the institutions of society and of government rather than through the remedies the New Left had been advocating: economic expropriation and political revolution, both distinctly anachronistic remedies of the earlier industrial era.

The evolutionary emergence of participatory pluralism may not seem a sufficient response to those sectors of American society that have become entirely alienated—and it may appear as too much change to those who have a vested interest in the *status quo*. But for that large body of Americans who accept the concept of gradual change and who value procedural order, multiple patterns of social involvement could provide the desired creative outlet for a society that is increasingly becoming more complex and expert-oriented. In that setting it is even possible that the political parties as traditionally known in America will further decline in importance; in their stead, organized local, regional, urban, professional, and other interests will provide the focus for political action, and shifting national coalitions will form on an *ad hoc* basis around specific issues of national import.*

In the immediate future, the politics of street protest are likely to dominate the visible dimensions of American political life. Less visible—indeed, sometimes totally obscured by the prevailing rhetoric about the "repressive society"—is the gradual progress toward a new democracy increasingly based on participatory pluralism in many areas of life. Assuming that short-term crises do not deflect the United States from redefining the substance of its democratic tradition, the long-range effect of the present transition and its turmoils will be to deepen and widen the scope of the democratic process in America.

Change in Cultural Formation

The evolutionary development of American democracy will have to be matched by changes in the processes of forming and shaping the content of its national culture. As in the case of political change, cultural reform is more likely to come about through evolution—in part deliberately encouraged and in part stimulated by over-all social change—than through programmatic engineering. The element of deliberate and conscious choice may be even more important here than in the transformation of complex institutional arrangements, because in modern society the educational system and the mass media have become the principal social means for defining the substance of a national culture. This is particularly true in American society, which has downgraded such alternative sources of culture as churches and traditional customs.

The educational system has a special social responsibility in regard to black Americans. Here the simultaneous needs are to enhance the black citizen's dignity and to enlarge his long-range opportunities. These needs have occasionally clashed, but perhaps the short-term remedy will be to combine the black American's quest for his separate identity (through such institutional devices as separate courses and residences) with massive and scientifically oriented remedial training. The challenge today—and probably for several decades to come—is to help the black American skip the late-industrial stage of America's development, and this cannot be done unless sensitivity to his psychological needs is matched by a recognition of the necessity for a disciplined, focused intellectual effort. The two will be hard to combine, but it is in this area that eventual progress or disaster in America's race relations will be shaped.

Racial calamity will be avoided only if society at large defines more clearly the values it seeks, is willing to create a responsive framework to promote them, and is prepared to insist on respect for orderly procedure. Nothing could be more destructive than wide swings from permissive and guilt-ridden acquiescence to any demand made by black extremists—such acquiescence merely stimulates an escalation of extremism—to insensitive passivity or opposition to black demands for a fair share of participation in American society. A massive educational effort is the crucial factor, but to be successful it must be geared to the long-range thrust of American society's developmental needs.

The unprecedented spread of mass education in America raises the more general question whether mechanically extending the duration of education will suffice to meet both the psychological and technical needs of the emerging society. The social scope and duration of current mass education differs from the early-industrial emphasis on minimum mass literacy for males (and from the even more elitist medieval pattern of very limited learning for very few). Contemporary programs aim at the education of a high proportion of both sexes and call for periods of schooling lasting anywhere from ten to almost twenty years (in the case of more advanced degrees). In America higher education is carried on within a relatively self-contained organizational and even social framework, making for a protracted period of semi-isolation from problems of social reality. As a result, both organizationally and in terms of content, a divorce between education and social existence has tended to develop, leading to the already noted emotional and psychic manifestations of student frustration and immaturity.

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* These coalitions are less likely to form along the traditional dividing line of Republicans and Democrats or—as more recently—of conservatives and liberals, but rather to divide according to basic philosophical attitudes toward the problems of modern life. In greatly simplified terms, the humanists and idealists on one side might be pitted against the pragmatists and modernizers on the other.

By extending education on an *intermittent* basis throughout the lifetime of the citizen, society would go a long way toward meeting this problem. The duration of the self-contained and relatively isolated phase of initial education could then be shortened. Taking into account the earlier physical and sexual maturation of young people today, it could be more generally pursued within a work-study framework, and it should be supplemented by periodic additional training throughout most of one's active life.

A good case can be made for ending initial education (more of which could be obtained in the home through electronic devices) somewhere around the age of eighteen. This formal initial period could be followed by two years of service in a socially desirable cause;* then by direct involvement in some professional activity and by advanced, systematic training within that area; and finally by regular periods of one and eventually even two years of broadening, "integrative" study at the beginning of every decade of one's life, somewhere up to the age of sixty.† For example, medical or legal training could begin after only two years of college, thus both shortening the time needed to complete the training and probably also increasing the number attracted into these professions. Regular and formally required retraining—as well as broadening—could ensue at regular intervals throughout most of one's professional career.

Combining initial specialization with a subsequent broadening of philosophical and scientific horizons would somewhat counteract the present trend, which makes increased specialization and rising professional standing go hand in hand. This encourages a narrowness of general outlook. The trend could be gradually reversed by a situation in which specialization at the age of greatest absorptive capability would be followed by more intellectual integration at a stage of increased personal maturity. Such an approach would encourage the gradual emergence of an integrative, modernizing elite that would show greater concern with society's underlying humane values in an age in which intensive scientific specialization is fraught with dangers of intellectual fragmentation.‡

The formal educational system has been relatively slow in exploiting the new opportunities for supplementary home-based education through television consoles and other electronic devices. It has also been suspicious of the growing inclination of nongovernmental organizations to develop their own learning and training programs. In different ways, however, both the black community and business are becoming more involved in education, for psychological as well as for professional reasons.§ Greater multiplicity in educational training will make for a more pluralistic national community, and the increasing involvement of business companies in education may lead to a more rapid adaptation of the latest techniques and scientific knowledge to the educational process. American business and, to a lesser extent, the government have already undertaken extensive programs of managerial "retooling" and retraining, thereby moving toward the intermittent educational pattern.

Change in educational procedures and philosophy should also be accompanied by parallel changes in the broader national processes by which values are generated and disseminated. Given America's role as a world disseminator of new values and techniques, this is both a national and a global obligation. Yet no other country has permitted its mass culture, taste, daily amusement, and, most important, the indirect education of its children to be almost exclusively the domain of private business and advertising, or permitted both standards of taste and the intellectual content of culture to be defined largely by a small group of entrepreneurs located in one metropolitan center. American television, in which a cultural monopoly is exercised by a relatively small group, reflects the insensitivity of the communications process to the tastes and philosophical values of much of America.**

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* This cause could be either national or international, publicly or privately tackled. It would be in keeping with the humanitarian idealism of the young not to limit such service to national causes. One good way to handle the matter would be to maintain a list of acceptable humanitarian activities, service on behalf of which would be an acceptable equivalent for military duty.

† This would go beyond the task set for the National Commission on Tech-integrative needs of the modern age. It would thus combine science with philosophy but no longer act as an intellectual cafeteria, offering studies ranging from physical education through classics, from "soul" courses to the latest specialized sciences. In effect, the roles of the "junior" college and of the university would become separate in time and place, probably to the advantage of both institutions. This would permit concentration on the larger social questions and keep higher education from being an aristocratic process; at the same time, it would allay some of the dangers inherent in the illusion that an educated citizenry is created by simply running a lot of people through the educational mill.
In addition, the traditional titles of learning, such as "doctor of philosophy," imply a terminal educational process and reflect the situation of an earlier stage in social history. Since learning will become a continuous, lifetime process that involves almost the entire community, degrees become a symbolic anachronism and should be drastically reclassified to indicate more accurately the various stages of specialized and generalized knowledge.

‡ "One of the paradoxes of the future is that while an increasing number of managerial decisions will be handled by automatic data processing, buttressed by clear and swift communications networks, the intelligent direction and coordination of large-scale systems will place an even greater premium than at present upon *the wise, artful, and broadly-experienced general manager* in organizations characterized by operational decentralization. In short, the proposition that effective decentralization can occur only where organizational centralization has become efficient will have become increasingly recognized, not as a paradox, but as a logical reality" (*The United States and the World in the* 1985 *Era,* p. 44).

§ For example, Olin Corporation, noting in an advertisement that "there is no growth potential in ignorance," has instituted literacy and high school training programs in three of its plants. Other major corporations have similar training programs.

** . . . broadcasting has imposed upon American society what in the supreme civic sense may be a fatal contradiction. The extension of communication should be an extension of democracy. Yet while the participatory base of democracy has been broadening, the ownership and control of the means of communication have narrowed.
"It could be said indeed that far from being an expression of majority desire, as the networks say, television programs are the imposition of a

Rising public dissatisfaction with this state of affairs indicates that perhaps some change has to come in this field as well. The geographical decentralization and dispersal of the television industry into more numerous units, the separation of broadcasting from program production, and the further extension of educational programming will probably be sharply opposed by existing interests; if past American experience can serve as a relevant guide, change will come by attrition and piecemeal reform, rather than by wholesale readjustment. Here, again, scientific and technological developments may become the handmaidens of constructive change; they may make possible (through home video tapes, home-operated lenses, closed-channel programming) far greater diversity than is today available, as well as more extensive exploitation of the audio-visual media by more institutions and organizations. Instead of limiting intellectual horizons, television could become a

Cultural change in our society may also be spurred by the growing female rebellion, accelerated by education and new sexual mores. The massive entrance of women into the professions, into executive positions, and into politics is probably only a generation away, and there is already abundant evidence of mounting restlessness because of current inequalities of opportunity. Such increased feminine assertiveness could spill over into American society's cultural front, enhancing somewhat the general social interest in cultural growth and standards.

Rational Humanism

The technological thrust and the economic wealth of the United States now make it possible to give the concept of liberty and equality a broader meaning, going beyond the procedural and external to the personal and inner spheres of man's social existence. By focusing more deliberately on these qualitative aspects of life, America may avoid the depersonalizing dangers inherent in the self-generating but philosophically meaningless mechanization of environment and build a social framework for a synthesis of man's external and inner dimensions.

Such a synthesis may eventually result from the current intense conflict between the irrational personalism of the "humanists" and the impersonal rationality of the "modernizers." The former group, source of much of the rhetoric of the literary community, the student activists, and the doctrinaire liberals, partakes of the tradition of skepticism and disbelief that played such a vital role in overthrowing the religious and philosophical hold of pre-industrial America on the values of industrial America; it seeks to fortify this tradition by a new emphasis on emotion and feeling. Given its Dadaist style and its Luddite-inspired historical posture, it is unlikely that this camp will long remain vital. The potential transformation of the New Left into the Violent Left will certainly not enhance its appeal to the American public. The latter group, more typical of the new business executives, the governmental-commercial establishment, and the scientific organization men, seeks to combine self-interest with a detached emphasis on rationalist innovation; since it fails to provide a satisfactory emotional or philosophical rationale for either, it alienates the more idealistic young people.*

The clash between these two orientations is destructive and threatening to American liberal democracy. It fragments the remnants of the consensus of the industrial age and polarizes articulate public opinion. Yet it also holds the promise of a new perspective that is better suited to the needs of the emerging American society, since it moves beyond the increasingly irrelevant framework that now confines modern man's outlook. This new perspective involves growing recognition that man's propensity for scientific innovation cannot be restrained—that as long as man's mind functions, scientific innovation will be one of its expressions. But it also involves a heightened awareness that as long as man conceives of himself as a distinctive being, idealism will be the central mode of expressing his spirit. The imperative need for both innovation and idealism is thus stimulating a rationalist humane outlook that is gradually supplanting both the liberal skepticism of some humanists and the conservative social indifference of some modernizers.

This rational humanism is expressed in several ways: first, in an emerging international consciousness that makes so many Americans and American institutions go beyond purely nationalistic concerns and become deeply involved in global problems of human growth and nourishment, and is prompting in American youth such a constructive preoccupation with problems of ecology; second, in a growing tendency—in spite of a still deeply ingrained anticommunism—to view international problems as human issues and not as political confrontations between good and evil; third, in a strong public idealism that is free of a Utopian, impatient, and often intolerant desire to resolve all outstanding dilemmas immediately. In addition, it can also be seen in the fact that Americans, instead of trying to flee the problems of science, are attempting to balance their fascination with science and their reliance on it as a tool for dealing with human problems by a more intense concern with the personal qualities of life and by a quest for more philosophical and religiously ecumenical definitions of human

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social minority on the majority, the minority consisting of the fifty top advertisers, the three networks, and a dozen or so advertising agencies" (Alexander Kendrick, *Prime Time: The Life of Edward R. Murrow,* Boston, 1969, pp. 12-13).

* Modern psychology increasingly recognizes that. the non-concrete, more abstract qualities of life, such as goodness, aesthetic beauty, and morality, are becoming more and more important in satisfying individual wants in modern society (see, for example, Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality,* New York, 1954, and *Toward a Psychology of Being,* Princeton, 196a). However, the quest for these more abstract and emotional satisfactions often takes ludicrous forms. The late sixties have seen in America a proliferation of various institutes and seminars in which businessmen and others engage in special "sensitivity" seances, expose themselves to "brainwave conditioning," undertake yoga exercises and sustained "meditation," and the like. These fads reflect the fracturing of the broader, more integrative frameworks of belief, as noted in our discussion in Part II.

nature. This suggests the likelihood of a revival of religiosity of a more personal, noninstitutional nature. Finally, the emerging rational humanism is historically contingent in the sense that it does not involve—as was the case with nineteenth-century ideology—universally prescriptive concepts of social organization but stresses cultural and economic global diversity. In so doing, rational humanism is likely to be historically more relevant than was the case with earlier responses to social dilemmas. Unlike the industrial age, when complexity and historical discontinuity induced ideological flights of the mind into atavism or futuristic Utopias, in the technetronic age the greater availability of means permits the definition of more attainable ends, thus making for a less doctrinaire and a more effective relationship between "what is" and "what ought to be."

The great revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries sought both liberty and equality, but even in the absence of racial conflict it was found that the two were difficult to combine in an age in which the traditional institutions of a religious, aristocratic, and agricultural era were clashing with the effects of skeptical rationalism, legalistic democracy, nascent social consciousness, and the needs of a developing urban-industrial society. In America the linkage of liberty and equality was especially hindered by deeply embedded fundamentalist religious values that were reinforced by the ever widening gap between the progressing white community and the artificially arrested black community. Inequality became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as well as an economic necessity to the industrially developing North.

The positive potential of the third American revolution lies in its promise to link liberty with equality. This linkage is a process, and will not be attained all at once. Indeed, during the next several decades reversals and even increased tensions are to be expected. Nevertheless, though frequently obscured by passionate polemics, the emerging rational humanism is part of the "cultural revolution" that America has been experiencing, a cultural revolution more enduring and deeper than the one that initiated the term. Linked to political reform, the current cultural revolution could gradually enlarge the scope of personal freedom by increasing the sense of self-fulfillment of an unprecedented number of citizens and give greater meaning to equality by making knowledge the basis for social and racial egalitarianism. It could create the preconditions for a socially creative and individually gratifying society that would inevitably have a constructive world role to play.

2. International Prospects

Tension is unavoidable as man strives to assimilate the new into the framework of the old. For a time the established framework resiliently integrates the new by adapting it in a more familiar shape. But at some point the old framework becomes overloaded. The new input can no longer be redefined into traditional forms, and eventually it asserts itself with compelling force. Today, though the old framework of international politics — with their spheres of influence, military alliances between nation-states, the fiction of sovereignty, doctrinal conflicts arising from nineteenth-century crises—is clearly no longer compatible with reality.

Indeed, it is remarkable how rapidly the dominant moods have changed during the last two decades. The 1950s were the era of certainty. The two sides—Communist and Western—faced each other in a setting that pitted conviction against conviction. Stalinist Manichaeans confronted Dulles's missionaries. That mood quickly gave way to another, with Khrushchev and Kennedy serving as transitions to an era of confusion. Dissension in the communist world prompted an ideological crisis, while the West increasingly began to question its own values and righteousness. Communist cynics confronted liberal skeptics.

There are indications that the 1970s will be dominated by growing awareness that the time has come for a common effort to shape a new framework for international politics, a framework that can serve as an effective channel for joint endeavors. Yet it must be recognized that there will be no real global cooperation until there is far greater consensus on its priorities and purposes:

Is it to enhance man's material well-being and his intellectual development? Is economic growth the answer, or is a massive international educational effort to be the point of departure? Should health have priority? How is personal well-being related to the perhaps less important but more easily measured gross national product? Is there a necessary connection between scientific advance and personal happiness?

There is already widespread agreement about the desirability of cutting arms budgets and developing international peace-keeping forces. There is also a more self-conscious awareness of man's inherent aggressiveness and of the need to control it.[3] Totally destructive weapons make the effects of conflict incalculable and thus reduce the likelihood of a major war. Here, again, an emerging global consciousness is forcing the abandonment of preoccupations with national supremacy and accentuating global interdependence. In the United States this growing international awareness has sometimes taken the form of greater sensitivity to the influence of the "military-industrial complex," [4] and it has effectively obstructed the unlimited development of biological-chemical weaponry and its use in combat. It has also stimulated pressures for a re-examination of defense requirements, while in other advanced countries, particularly in Japan and Western Europe, it has prompted strong pacifist movements.

Nonetheless, a realistic assessment compels the conclusion that there will be no global security arrangement in the foreseeable future. The most that can be expected and effectively sought is a widening of arms-control treaties, some unilateral restraints on defense spending, and some expansion in UN peace-keeping machinery. The conflicts between nations are still very real; readings of world change still differ sharply, and

national aspirations remain divergent. Moreover, unlike the situation in Japan, Western Europe, and the United States, neither in the Soviet Union nor in China is there any public discussion of weapons development and defense spending. Secrecy and censorship impose restraints on views that diverge from the official position, and thus limit the influence of a growing global consciousness on policy choices open to the leaders of these states.

The picture is somewhat more ambiguous in the fields of economic and educational-scientific development. All major countries now accept the principle that they ought to aid the less developed countries. This is a new moral position, and it is an important component of the new global consciousness. Though nations still assert their sovereignty in fixing the scale of aid extended (most make less than one per cent of their GNP available), they have in effect created a binding precedent: the extension of aid has become an imperative. It seems likely that in the years to come, despite persisting conflicts among states, economic aid will grow in scale and be used less and less as a vehicle of political influence. At the same time, however, short of a very major crisis, it seems unlikely that aid will be forthcoming in amounts sufficient to offset the threatening prospects discussed in Part I.

In some respects technological-scientific developments augur more promise for the rapid global spread of educational programs and of new techniques. Television satellites are already making regional educational programs possible (as in Central America), and there has been progress in setting up regional technological institutes (this might eventually reduce the brain drain, which is caused in part by the temptations inherent in resident studies in the more advanced countries). The Development Assistance Committee of OECD offers the potential for a systematic approach to meeting the educational needs of the less developed countries, and unlike UNESCO it is not subject to political pressures from them.[5] Such an approach would be consistent with the emergence of a more cooperative community of the developed nations, one able to adopt a common development strategy. The spread of English as a global scientific language is accelerating the formation of a global scientific family, increasingly mobile and interchangeable.

Yet this progress could be vitiated in many countries by a social incapacity to digest and absorb the positive potential inherent in educational and scientific growth. Their inadequate economic resources—only marginally augmented by reasonably foreseeable foreign aid—may even cause some positive changes to backfire, prompting not social advance but costly conflict, not policy innovation but political paralysis. Indeed, our still limited knowledge of the factors inducing social development, and of the role played in that development by religion, culture, and psychology, hinders the formulation of an effective strategy for the dissemination of technical know-how and for the application of material aid.*

In this setting, which combines rudiments of order and elements of chaos, two general prospects, both more immediately relevant to United States foreign policy, seem probable: first, the Third World, though it will obviously continue to experience turbulent changes, is not very likely to be swept by a common revolutionary wave; second, the Soviet Union will in the foreseeable future remain too strong externally not to be a global rival to the United States but too weak internally to be its global partner.

The Revolutionary Process

The concept of an international revolution inspired by a common ideology had some meaning when the industrial revolution seemed to indicate that certain forms of social organization and of social crisis had a general application. That view combined a universal intellectual perspective with a geographically historical parochialism. It assumed, in part because information about world processes was relatively limited, that a common global framework could be postulated on the basis of the historical experience of a few Western countries. It is now increasingly evident that social conditions, as well as the way in which science and technology are socially applied, vary enormously, and that this variety includes very subtle but important nuances of cultural, religious, and historic tradition, in addition to economic and technical factors.†

Moreover, in Russia and in China the revolutionary intelligentsia of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was itself in the forefront of the process of modernization. It represented the most advanced segments of society, and hence a political victory by it inherently involved a historical step forward for the society as a whole. This is no longer the case. The revolutionary intelligentsia in the less developed countries, to say nothing of its vicarious middle-class intellectual equivalents in the United States, often represents a social anachronism. As far as the modernization process is concerned, this intelligentsia has been left behind by developments in science and technology, in which it is largely "illiterate."

It is possible, therefore, that in some countries, perhaps even the more modern ones, these anachronistic intelligentsias may even succeed, by clinging to essentially aristocratic and anti-industrial values, in effectively blocking the modernization of their societies by insisting that it be postponed until after an ideological revolution has taken place. In this sense, the techne-tronic revolution could partially become a self-limiting phenomenon: disseminated by mass communications, it creates its own antithesis through the impact of mass communications

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* This is why there is special merit in the National Planning Association's proposal (1969) that a Technical Assistance and Development Research Institute be established in Washington to provide technical assistance to underdeveloped nations and to make a broad-gauged study of the problems connected with development.

† For earlier discussion of the prospects of revolutionary success, see pp. 48, 119, 188-191, and 248-249.

on some sectors of the intelligentsia. In some of the developing countries this might eventually pit the traditional humanist-legalist trained intelligentsia, who are more receptive to doctrinal appeals, against the younger, more socially concerned and innovative officers, engineers, and students, who have combined to effect a modernization that is indigenous and socially radical, though program-matically eclectic.

In Latin America the more extreme reforms may be more reminiscent of Peronism and fascism than of communism. By 1970 the student population will be approximately one million,[6] thus creating an ambitious and politically volatile base for reform. In addition, both the opposition of Latin American governments to United States economic and political influence[7] and their inclination to undertake radical domestic reforms may be expected to increase, but to do so within a framework that combines a more socially responsible Catholicism with nationalism, in a setting of considerable national diversity. This will produce a highly differentiated pattern of change, but even its radical manifestations are not likely to be modeled on communist countries, especially since the relative cultural sophistication of the Latin American elites reduces the appeal of the stodgy Eastern European or Soviet models. The officer corps, composed of socially radical and technologically innovative younger officers, is more likely to be the source of revolutionary change than the local communist parties, and Latin American discontent will be galvanized not by ideology but by continuing anti-Yankeeism—pure and simple.

In other parts of the globe similar social combinations probably will result in regimes that will compensate for the weakness of indigenous religious and intellectual traditions by being doc-trinally oriented. Iraqi and Sudanese coups of the late 1960s, carried out by alliances of officers and intellectuals, will probably be repeated elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East. There is, however, some reason for skepticism concerning the genuineness and depth of the ideological commitment of these new regimes. Some of their ideology is shaped by extraneous factors (the question of Israel and of the Soviet attitude); some is merely currently fashionable rhetoric; much of it is highly volatile and subject to drastic changes.* Doubtless, these regimes will be assisted and exploited by the Soviets and the Chinese. (The latter, for example, have already made political inroads into East Africa.) Even so, it will still be more a matter of tactical cooperation than of actual control and a common strategic policy.

Similarly, in South and Southeast Asia revolutionary patterns are likely to have an essentially indigenous and differentiated character. It is quite possible that the two large political units— India and Pakistan—which combine a variety of disparate economic and ethnic entities, may split up. This will be especially likely as the present elites, whose internal unity was forged by the struggle against the British, fade from the scene. The waning of the Congress Party in India has been accompanied by intensifying ethnic stresses and by the polarization of political opinions. Should the Indian Union break down, southern Tamil separatism, probably left-wing radical in orientation, would be contested by northern Hindu right radicalism, perhaps more religiously oriented; each would tend to intensify the doctrinal and indigenous distinctiveness of the other. As happened earlier in China, any tendency toward communism that might result from such a confrontation would soon be culturally absorbed and perhaps overwhelmed by the weight of economic backwardness.

In China the Sino-Soviet conflict has already accelerated the inescapable Sinification of Chinese communism. That conflict shattered the revolution's universal perspective and—perhaps even more important—detached Chinese modernization from its commitment to the Soviet model. Hence, whatever happens in the short run, in years to come Chinese development will probably increasingly share the experience of other nations in the process of modernization. This may both dilute the regime's ideological tenacity and lead to more eclectic experimentation in shaping the Chinese road to modernity. Many of the upheavals in the Third World will unavoidably have a strong anti-American bias. This is likely to be particularly true where American presence and power has traditionally been most visible. In areas near the Soviet Union and China, however, anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese attitudes are likely to predominate in the long run, irrespective of the character of the internal reforms and of the external complexion of the ruling regimes. This again highlights the point that the revolutionary process as such will not necessarily determine the foreign-policy stance of the new elites, which is more likely to be shaped by a combination of traditional antipathies, current fears, and domestic political needs.

Moreover, the basic orientation of the new elites will more and more respond to the intellectual impact of domestic changes in the more advanced world, changes directly and personally visible to these elites through travel, study, and global mass media. This intimacy with life abroad will further reduce the importance of integrative ideologies, which had previously provided a substitute for a clear vision of the future and the outside world. Ideological uniformity was the prescription for remaking a world that was both distant and largely unknown, but proximity and global congestion now dictate revolutionary diversity.

Accordingly, the real values—as distinguished from the rhetoric —of the aspiring elites of the developing nations will be shaped by tangible developments rather than by abstract generalizations. The success of the United States in shaping a workable, multiracial democracy while pioneering in science and technology, the ability of Europe and Japan to overcome the psychological and social stresses of mature modernity, and—

* Moreover, these regimes have difficulty in moving into what Huntington has called the second phase of a revolution: "A complete revolution, however, also involves a second phase: the creation and institutionalization of a new political order. The successful revolution combines rapid political mobilization and rapid political institutionalization. Not all revolutions pro duce a new political order. The measure of how revolutionary a revolution is is the rapidity and the scope of the expansion of political participation. The measure of how successful a revolution is is the authority and stability of the institutions to which it gives birth" (Huntington, p. 266).

last, but not least—the degree to which the Soviet Union breaks away from the doctrinal orthodoxy that inhibits its social development will be critically important in shaping the outlook of Third World leaders.

USA/USSR: Less Intensive, More Extensive Rivalry

The extent to which Americans view revolutionary changes abroad as automatically inimical to their interests reinforces the extent to which these seem beneficial to the Soviets and can be fitted into a global communist framework; conversely, the extent to which America views these changes in a neutral light diminishes the intrinsic attraction of the Soviet model for Third World revolutionaries and encourages indigenous factors to surface more rapidly. The Soviet attraction has already been weakened by the appearance of states more militant than the Soviet Union and of groups more activist than the pro-Soviet communist parties. The Soviet appeal has also declined because internal Soviet bureaucratization and dogmatic restraints on intellectual creativity and social innovation have made the Soviet Union the most conservative political and social order of the more advanced world.*

American-Soviet rivalry is hence likely to become less ideological in character, though it may become more extensive geographically and more dangerous in terms of the power involved. Increased direct contacts between the two nations, restraints imposed by mutual recognition of the destructiveness of present weapons systems, and lessened ideological expectations for the Third World could make American-Soviet relations more stable. Nevertheless, more and more areas on the globe could become the objects of moves and countermoves if the growth in long-range Soviet military forces, particularly conventional air- and sea-lift capabilities, extends American-Soviet rivalry to areas previously considered beyond the Soviet reach. Instability in the Third World could tempt either state to employ its power to offset or pre-empt the other, thereby creating situations analogous to the Fashoda incident, which at the end of the nineteenth century almost caused a war between France and Britain at a time when these powers were moving (and continued to move) toward a European accommodation.[8]

On the whole, close cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union seems a very unlikely prospect in the coming decade. This is only partially due to the different ideological and political character of the two countries. A communist America would in all probability remain a rival of the Soviet Union, just as Communist China soon became one. Given its size and power, a democratic and creative. Soviet Union might be an even more powerful competitor for the United States than is the present bu-reaucratically stagnant and doctrinally orthodox Soviet system. Moreover, democratic nations are not necessarily pacifist nations, as American history amply demonstrates. Rivalry between nations is inherent in an international system that functions without global consensus—the result of centuries of the conditioning of man's outlook by competitive nations that insisted on their individual superiority, and particular values. Such rivalry is not likely to be terminated by anything short of a fundamental reconstruction in the nature of relations between nations—and hence in the character of national sovereignty itself.

At present, the formation of a new cooperative international pattern is getting little help from the Soviet Union, in spite of the fact that it considers itself in the forefront of historical progress and was until recently the standard-bearer of an ideology that had cut across traditional national lines. The irony of history is such that today the Soviet Union has a foreign policy that is intensely nationalistic and a domestic policy that calls for the domination of non-Russian minorities; it actively campaigns against regional patterns of international cooperation, grants a disproportionately small amount of help to the less developed nations (roughly ten per cent of United States foreign aid), and rejects a joint exploration of space (cloaking its own efforts in utmost secrecy).

Indeed, one of the unanticipated effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute may be a hardening of the Soviet outlook and a more paranoid view of the world. Though Soviet leaders want to avoid a two-front confrontation and are hence pushed toward accommodation with either the West or the East, the very scale of the Chinese challenge intensifies their fears, puts a premium on military preparedness, and stimulates an intense preoccupation with the sacredness of frontiers.†

Equally important but less generally recognized as a factor in inhibiting the Soviet Union from seeking more binding forms of international cooperation is the domestic weakness and insecurity of Soviet leaders. Even fifty years after its inception, the political system they head still lacks elementary legitimacy: its ruling elite relies heavily on coercion and censorship to retain its power, which is acquired not by regular, constitutional procedures but through protracted, bureaucratic infighting. (The struggles for succession are a case in point.) Because of the doctrinal incapacity of the Soviet political system to respond to the internal needs of social innovation, broad accommodation with the West, carrying with it the acknowledgment that the Leninist dichotomic vision of the world—which in turn justifies the Leninist concept of the ruling party—is no longer

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* Some Soviet scientists (particularly Kapitsa and Sakharov) have already warned of the resulting long-run cost to Soviet scientific and intellectual growth.

† To appreciate Soviet fears, one would have to imagine a situation in which the United States was confronted by eight hundred million Mexicans who had nuclear arms and rockets and who were loudly insisting that the United States had seized vast expanses of Mexican territory, that the American system was inherently evil, and that the American government was their enemy. Such a situation would doubtless stimulate intense fears in the American public. Soviet apprehensiveness is further increased by the fact that Siberia —relatively undeveloped and uninhabited—serves as a magnet to the Chinese masses, and that Russo-Chinese territorial arrangements are of a historically dubious character.

relevant, would inevitably cause far-reaching internal political instability in the Soviet Union and in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe.

In large measure, this conservative Leninist attitude reflects Russia's delayed modernization and political development. In terms of the global city, the Soviet Union represents an archaic religious community that experiences modernity existentially but not quite yet normatively.[9]

Policy Implications

The foregoing general propositions point to several immediate implications for American foreign policy, in terms both of guiding assumptions and of the desirable foreign posture. Before elaborating, let us first posit these implications in their most succinct form: a posture based on ideological considerations has become dated; an American-Soviet axis is not likely to be the basis for a new international system; traditional spheres of influence are increasingly unviable; economic determinism in regard to the less developed countries or to the communist states does not provide a sound basis for policy; regional alliances against individual nations are becoming obsolescent; an extensive American military presence abroad is becoming counterproductive to American interests and to the growth of an international community; American diplomatic machinery—developed in the pre-global and pre-technetronic age —has become outmoded and requires extensive modernization.

Although American foreign policy has not been as undifferen-tiatedly anti-communist as its critics have found it convenient to assert,* there has been a strong rhetorical tendency in American official circles to reduce international problems to an ideological confrontation and to identify radical change as contrary to American interests. Henceforth, local transformations in various parts of the world are less likely to be seen as part of a universal threat; in addition, the gradual pluralization of the communist world will continue to accelerate differences among the communist systems. This will reduce reliance on active American intervention, making it imperative primarily in defence of concrete American interests or in response to an overt hostile act by a power with the potential to threaten the United States.† A less ideological perspective will reduce the American-Soviet relationship to its proper proportions. The principal threat the Soviet Union poses to the United States is military: a stronger Soviet Union therefore inescapably tends to threaten America; a weaker Soviet Union feels threatened by America. Since a war between the two superpowers would be mutually destructive, arms-control arrangements between the two countries are dictated by common sense. The continuing SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) between the United States and the Soviet Union can be seen as more than a negotiation between two rivals; inadvertently, precisely because they will be lengthy, the talks signify a *de facto* beginning of a joint commission on arms and strategy. Although limited in actual power, the "commission" gradually and perhaps increasingly will affect the way each side acts, stimulating greater mutual sensitivity to felt needs and fears.‡

In the meantime, until a binding agreement is reached, American technological sophistication is sufficient to provide the necessary degree of ambiguity to the qualitative and quantitative power relationship between the two states. In the current phase of destructive parity, this strategic and psychological posture is needed in order to replace earlier reliance on manifest and credible deterrence born of American superiority in destructive power. Parity deterrence requires some ambiguity, just as superiority deterrence demanded precise credibility.

But outside this relationship the opportunities for a wide-ranging settlement are relatively restricted.[10] An American-Soviet axis would be resented by too many states and therefore tempt both Washington and Moscow to exploit these resentments. In effect, the more successful the efforts to create such an axis, the stronger the impediment to it. In addition, as has already been argued, the Soviet Union does not represent a vital social alternative that offers the world an attractive and relevant model for handling either its old dilemmas or—particularly—the new ones posed by science and technology. As a result, the most that America can reasonably seek is a gradual increase in Soviet involvement in international cooperation through such projects as joint space

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* The charge that the United States has conducted its foreign policy on the assumption of a monolithic world communist conspiracy is dear to some scholarly critics. In point of fact, the United States pioneered in aid to Yugoslavia in the late 1940s; it was the first to initiate American-Soviet cultural exchanges, visits between heads of state, and so on.

† In more specific terms, it would be desirable and proper for the United States to aid Thailand with arms and equipment should that country be threatened by North Vietnam. The same response would apply to a North Korean threat against South Korea, or a threat by the Arab states against Israel. But in none of these cases should American forces be committed unless a major power, i.e., the USSR or China, becomes directly involved. Total American abstention would encourage aggression, but American aid should suffice to make the war either useless or very costly to the aggressor. To repeat—direct involvement should be reserved for situations in which a power with the capacity to threaten the United States is involved.

‡ Science and technology have already revolutionized the exercise of sovereignty by the two countries vis-a-vis each other. The utilization of the U-2S, and subsequently of reconnaissance satellites, vitiated the claim to unlimited sovereignty over national air space, somewhat undoing Soviet military secrecy. The acquiescence of the Soviet Union to the U-2 flights was necessitated by its inability to shoot these planes down; in spite of the May i960 incident, the precedent of unilateral inspection was thereby asserted and has since become a practice followed by both states.

The inherent complexity of reaching an arms-control agreement is suggested by the following conclusion by a specialist in the field: "There is basis for hope [of a possible agreement] if both sides can accept the fact that for some time the most they can expect to achieve is a strategic balance at quite high, but less rapidly escalating, force levels; and if both recognize that breaking the action-reaction cycle should be given first priority in any negotiations" (George W. Rathjens, *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race,* New York, 1969, p. 40).

exploration, undersea studies, and so forth. Cumulatively, these may help shape a pattern of collaborative involvement that will eventually embrace other spheres.

Meanwhile, it is likely that American and Russian influence will decrease in areas that both nations have traditionally considered their own special domains. In a modern city "staked out" areas are possible only in relations among criminal gangs; in the global city sealed spheres of influence are increasingly difficult—or at least costly—to maintain. Eastern Europe is bound to remain attracted to the West, and only direct Soviet coercion can impede what would otherwise happen quite rapidly: the linkage of Eastern Europe to a larger European entity. Even Soviet force will not be able to halt this process entirely; the traditional cultural attraction of the West is too strong, and it is currently reinforced by growing Eastern European recognition that, because of the technological gap between the East and the West, Russia cannot effectively help Eastern Europe to enter the post-industrial age. This attraction is healthy, for the gradual expansion of Eastern European links with Western Europe is bound to affect the Soviet Union as well and lessen its doctrinal orientation.

The notion of a special relationship between the United States and Latin America is also bound to decay. Latin American nationalism, more and more radical as it widens its popular base, will be directed with increasing animosity against the United States, unless the United States rapidly shifts its own posture. Accordingly, it would be wise for the United States to make an explicit move to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and to concede that in the new global age geographic or hemispheric contiguity no longer need be politically decisive. Nothing could be healthier for Pan-American relations than for the United States to place them on the same level as its relations with the rest of the world, confining itself to emphasis on cultural-political affinities (as it does with Western Europe) and economic-social obligations (as it does with the less developed countries).

It would also be advisable to view the question of the political development of both the communist and the developing countries with a great deal of patience. Just as the infusion of American power may not always be the solution, so reliance on economic growth is no guarantee of either democratization, political stability, or pro-Americanism. As has been pointed out, political change in the communist states is not a simple by-product of economic development, and the susceptibility of the less developed countries to radical appeals rises as they begin to develop. Foreign aid and closer economic contacts are not a palliative for deep-rooted crises or a remedy for the ills of deeply entrenched ideological institutions.

This argues for an approach to international economic relations and foreign aid that is increasingly depoliticized in form, even if the ultimate underlying purpose remains political. If that purpose is to promote the emergence of a more cooperative community of nations, irrespective of their individual internal systems, then it would be a step in the right direction to give international bodies a larger role in economic development and to start eliminating restrictions on trade. Such action is all the more likely to be eventually successful because it is less overtly political and is not geared to expectations of rapid and basic political change achieved through direct economic leverage.*

A more detached attitude toward world revolutionary processes and a less anxious preoccupation with the Soviet Union would also help the United States to develop a different posture toward China. China and South Asia are heavily populated areas that have inherited from, the past complex challenges to social organization, and are still struggling with these old problems at a time when the advanced world is beginning to confront problems of new dimensions. Until links are established with China—and these can initially be sought and directed through Japan and Western Europe—China will remain an excluded and a self-excluded portion of mankind, all the more threatening because its backwardness will increasingly be combined with massive nuclear power. Accordingly, the United States, instead of becoming an indirect Soviet ally against China—which is what Moscow obviously wants—should encourage efforts by other countries to seek ties with China. In addition, it should launch its own initiatives,[11] and avoid becoming entangled in overt anti-Chinese security arrangements. Indeed, in our age international security arrangements ought to resemble those of large metropolitan centers: such arrangements are directed not against specific organizations or individuals but against those who depart from established norms. Thus, an association based on a concept of cooperative nations linked for a variety of purposes, including security, ought gradually to replace existing alliances, which are usually formulated in terms of a potential aggressor, explicitly identified either in the treaty or in the accompanying rhetoric. Though initially this would be only a formalistic change—for the association of states would necessarily involve only those that share certain interests and fears—a deliberately open-ended structure, with the security elements only a partial and secondary aspect, would avoid perpetuating institutionally the inevitable but often transient conflicts of interests between states.†

Evolution in the forms of international security would facilitate the gradual restructuring of the American defense posture, particularly by concentrating American military presence abroad in a few key countries. Except in countries that feel themselves directly threatened, prolonged United States military presence

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* This need not exclude the concentration of effort on specific states when prospects for economic development coincide with more strictly political American interests. In other words, international economic aid for humanitarian purposes can go hand in hand with more selective and more intensive efforts in regard to specific countries.

† This may be especially relevant to efforts to construct a system of cooperation in the Pacific. By itself, it is unlikely that Southeast Asia, even with improved economic performance, can create the foundations for regional security. But enlarged through Japanese, Australian, and American participation —and *not* specifically directed against China—some forms of cooperation could gradually develop, and the system might eventually involve more and more nations.

tends to galvanize political hostility toward the United States even in traditionally friendly countries (like Turkey), and though that presence was once wanted by the countries concerned, it has tended to become an American vested interest. With the restraint imposed on the waging of an all-out war by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and with the likelihood that sporadic Third World violence will replace the previous preoccupation with a central war, American forces stationed abroad on the assumption that they will be needed to assure the security of different nations from a common threat are less and less required for that purpose. With some exceptions (for example, South Korea, Berlin, or West Germany), by and large both global stability and American interests would probably not be jeopardized if the American defense posture became territorially more confined (this has been true of the Soviet Union, with little apparent damage to its security), and relied increasingly on long-range mobility.* Finally, the opportunities and the dangers inherent in the scientific-technological age require subtle but important changes in American attitudes and organization. These changes will not come rapidly; they cannot be blueprinted in detail; they are unlikely to be achieved dramatically. Nonetheless, to play an effective world role America needs foreign-relations machinery that exploits the latest communications techniques and uses a style and organization responsive to the more congested pattern of our global existence.

This is hardly the case today. Our diplomatic machinery is still the product of the traditional arrangements that were contrived after 1815 and that were ritualistically preoccupied with protocol. It is predominantly geared to government-to-government relations, often neglecting the currently far more important role of social developments. It is no accident that newspapermen, less dependent on governmental contacts and more inclined to become absorbed in a given society's life, have often been more sensitive to the broad pattern of change in foreign countries than have the local American diplomats. Contemporary foreign relations increasingly require skills in intellectual-scientific communications, including the ability to communicate effectively with the creative segments of other societies, and it is precisely in these fields that the existing diplomatic training and procedure are most deficient.

Moreover, the entire tradition of secret dispatches and lengthy cables, which daily overwhelm State Department headquarters in Washington, has simply not taken into account the explosion in modern communications, the development of excellent foreign reporting in the leading American and foreign newspapers, and even the role of television.† In commenting on the 1969 Duncan report, which was similarly critical of the British foreign service, Canadian political scientist James Eayrs noted: "Too many people push too many pens across too many pieces of paper, filling them with worthless messages." [12] Thomas Jefferson once complained that he had not heard from one of his ambassadors for a year; the present Secretary of State could legitimately complain that he daily hears too much from too many unneeded ambassadors.

The United States is the country that most urgently needs to reform its foreign service and policymaking establishment, and it is best equipped to undertake such reform. It is the first society to become globally oriented, and it is the one with the most extensive and intensive communications involvement. Its business community, moreover, has also acquired extensive experience in foreign operations and has effectively mastered the arts of accurate reporting, foreign representation, and central control—without relying on enormous staffs and redundant operations. It has also pioneered in the adoption of the latest techniques, such as closed-circuit television conferences, shared-time computers, and other devices.

Though this is hardly the place to outline the needed reforms in detail, the point remains that, given the fundamental changes in the way nations interact, an extensive study and drastic reform of the existing, highly traditional structure and style of the American foreign service is long overdue. Wider diplomatic use of computers and direct sound-and-sight electronic communication should permit the reduction in the size and number of United States foreign missions, making them operationally similar to the more efficient international corporations. Washington's policymaking process needs to be similarly streamlined and freed from its tangle of bureaucratic red tape.[13]

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* Some stand-by facilities for international peace-keeping forces could be provided if, with the agreement of the host country, some vacated United States bases were taken over by the UN. It should in any case, be noted that American public opinion seems little disposed to back the use of American forces to protect foreign nations. In a mid-1969 public-opinion poll, which asked whether America ought to aid foreign states if these were invaded by outside communist military forces, those who were willing to rely on force were in the majority only with respect to Canada and Mexico (57 per cent and 52 per cent respectively); the figure for West Germany was 38 per cent, for Japan 27 per cent, for Israel 9 per cent (here the foreign aggression postulated was not necessarily communist), for Rumania 13 per cent; when combined with those willing to help short of force, the percentage for Canada was 79 per cent, for Mexico 76 per cent, for West Germany 59 per cent, for Israel 44 per cent, for Rumania 24 per cent, for Japan 42 per cent (Harris Poll, as cited by *Time,* May 2, 1969).
The national mood could easily change in the light of circumstances, but the above poll is significant in indicating a general attitude. It suggests a more selective approach toward military commitment and may have some bearing on the likely public response to the formation of a professional volunteer army. A large, conscript-based army was to some extent a reflection of the populist nationalism stimulated by the French Revolution, which saw every citizen as a soldier. This had greater meaning in an age of relatively unsophisticated weaponry and intense ideological motivation. With both factors changing drastically, the case for a more professional armed force, employed for more selective purposes, gains weight.

† This writer can state on the basis of personal experience while serving in the Department of State that in most cases a better or at least as good a picture of foreign developments can be obtained by reading the better newspapers—including, of course, the foreign ones—than by perusing the hundreds of daily telegrams, often reporting cocktail-party trivia.

3. A Community of the Developed Nations

These more immediately necessary changes must be reinforced by a broader effort to contain the global tendencies toward chaos. A community of the developed nations must eventually be formed if the world is to respond effectively to the increasingly serious crisis that in different ways now threatens both the advanced world and the Third World. Persistent divisions among the developed states, particularly those based on outmoded ideological concepts, will negate the efforts of individual states to aid the Third World; in the more advanced world they could even contribute to a resurgence of nationalism.

Western Europe and Japan

From an American standpoint, the more important and promising changes in the years to come will have to involve Western Europe and Japan. The ability of these areas to continue to grow economically and to maintain relatively democratic political forms will more crucially affect the gradual evolution of a new international system than will likely changes in American-Soviet relations. Western Europe and Japan offer greater possibilities for initiatives designed to weave a new fabric of international relations, and because, like America, they are in the forefront of scientific and technological innovation, they represent the most vital regions of the globe.

Though some scholars emphasize the vitality of European nationalism, the broad thrust of Western European development is toward increasing cooperation and—much more important—toward a European consciousness.* For the younger Europeans, Western Europe is already an entity in all but the political respect: though still anachronistically governed by a series of provincial chieftains (occasionally visited seriatim by the foreign potentate from Washington), their Europe is frontierless, open to unlimited tourism, to the almost unlimited movement of goods, and increasingly to the free flow of students and workers. To be sure, a positive regionalism is yet to mature, but the foregoing at least provides the needed psychological basis for a new Europe. The technetronic revolution has accelerated the appearance of this Europe, and the autarkic ideas of the industrial age have little or no hold on it today.

In Europe the impact of science and technology, though disruptive within some societies (particularly Italy, which is just completing the industrial phase of its development), has inspired increased cooperation; in Japan, however, which lacks the immediate external outlet that European unification provides for the Western Europeans and which is subject to a highly visible American military-political presence, it has had an internally aggravating effect. It tends to sharpen the nation's internal political conflicts, polarizing public opinion and rendering the future orientation of the country uncertain.† The conflicts between generations evident in most of the advanced world have special gravity in Japan, given the cultural upheaval produced by its defeat in World War II and the only recently achieved balance between its traditions and modern democratic institutions. A revival of Japanese nationalism or a turn toward ideological radicalism would seriously threaten the highly tenuous structure of peace in the Pacific and directly affect the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.

Accordingly, an effort must be made to forge a community of the developed nations that would embrace the Atlantic states, the more advanced European communist states, and Japan. These nations need not—and for a very long time could not—form a homogeneous community resembling EEC or the once hoped for Atlantic community. Nonetheless, progress in that direction would help to terminate the civil war that has dominated international politics among the developed nations for the last hundred and fifty years. Though the nationalist and ideological disputes among these nations have less and less relevance to mankind's real problems, their persistence has precluded a constructive response to dilemmas that both democratic and communist states increasingly recognize as being the key issues of our times. The absence of a unifying process of involvement has kept old disputes alive and has obscured the purposes of statesmanship.

To postulate the need for such a community and to define its creation as the coming decade's major task is not utopianism.Under the pressures of economics, science, and technology, mankind is moving steadily toward large-scale cooperation. Despite periodic reverses, all human history clearly indicates progress in that direction. The question is whether a spontaneous movement will suffice to counterbalance the dangers already noted. And since the answer is probably no, it follows that a realistic response calls for deliberate efforts to accelerate the process of international cooperation among the advanced nations.

Movement toward a larger community of the developed nations will necessarily have to be piecemeal, and it will not preclude more homogeneous relationships within the larger entity. Moreover, such a community

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* This has been dramatically illustrated in France by polls which show that French public opinion, long held to be strongly nationalist, supports the emergence of a European government that would have decisive powers over a local French government in such areas as scientific research (66 per cent for a European government, 15 per cent for a decisive French government) and foreign policy (61 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively). These polls indicate that most Frenchmen favored retaining the French government's decisive role only in purely internal affairs, such as social policy, vacations, education, and so forth (Alain Lancelot and Pierre Weill, "The French and the Political Unification of Europe," *Revue francaise de science politique,* February 1969, pp. 145-70).

† Thus, the center-right coalition that has governed Japan in the postwar period has gradually shrunk: in 1952 it obtained 66.1 per cent of the popular vote; in 1953, 65.7 per cent; in 1955, 63.2 per cent; in 1958, 57.8 per cent; in 1960, 57.6 per cent; in 1963, 54.7 per cent; in 1967, 48.8 per cent; and in 1969, 47.6 per cent.

cannot be achieved by fusing existing states into one larger entity. The desire to create one larger, formal state is itself an extension of reasoning derived from the age of nationalism. It makes much more sense to attempt to associate existing states through a variety of indirect ties and already developing limitations on national sovereignty.

In this process, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the one hand and Western Europe on the other will continue for a long time to enjoy more intimate relationships within their own areas. That is unavoidable. The point, however, is to develop a broader structure that links the foregoing in various regional or functional forms of cooperation. Such a structure would not sweep aside United States-Soviet nuclear rivalry, which would remain the axis of world military might. But in the broader cooperative setting, the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union could eventually resemble in form late-nineteenth-century Anglo-French colonial competition: Fashoda did not vitiate the emerging European entente.

Movement toward such a community will in all probability require two broad and overlapping phases. The first of these would involve the forging of community links among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, as well as with other more advanced countries (for example, Australia, Israel, Mexico). The second phase would include the extension of these links to more advanced communist countries. Some of them—for example, Yugoslavia or Rumania—may move toward closer international cooperation more rapidly than others, and hence the two phases need not necessarily be sharply demarcated.

Structure and Focus

The emerging community of developed nations would require some institutional expression, even though it would be unwise to seek to create too many binding integrated processes prematurely. A case can be made for initially setting up only a high-level consultative council for global cooperation, regularly bringing together the heads of governments of the developed world to discuss their common political-security, educational-scientific, and economic-technological problems, as well as to deal from that perspective with their moral obligations toward the developing nations. Some permanent supporting machinery could provide continuity to these consultations.

Accordingly, such a council for global cooperation would be something more than OECD in that it would operate on a higher level and would also be concerned with political strategy, but it would be more diffused than NATO in that it would not seek to forge integrated military-political structures. Nevertheless, a council of this sort—perhaps initially linking only the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, and thus bringing together the political leaders of states sharing certain common aspirations and problems of modernity—would be more effective in developing common programs than is the United Nations, whose efficacy is unavoidably limited by the Cold War and by north-south divisions.

The inclusion of Japan would be particularly important, both to the internal development of Japanese life and to the vitality of such a community. Japan is a world power, and in a world of electronic and supersonic communications it is a psychological and political error to think of it as primarily an Asian nation. Japan needs an outlet commensurate with its own advanced development, not one that places it in the position of a giant among pygmies and that excludes it *de facto* from the councils of the real world powers. The regular American-Japanese cabinet-level talks are a desirable bilateral arrangement, but Japan will become more fully and creatively involved in world affairs in a larger setting of equal partners.

Without such a larger setting, there is danger that the extraordinary pace of Japanese socio-economic development will become destructive. The automatic projections of Japanese growth into the future, made with increasing frequency in the late 1960s, are misleading; they do not make allowance for the destabilizing effect of the impact of change on Japanese traditions. There is a real possibility that in the 1970s Japan will undergo extremely upsetting internal conflicts unless in some way Japanese idealism is both stimulated and turned to goals larger than insular and personal hedonism. International cooperation, involving the sharing with Japan of responsibility as well as of power, could provide such an outlet.

Such a council would also provide a political-security framework in which the security concerns of each state could be viewed in a context that takes into account the inescapable connections between such matters as Soviet policy in Berlin and the Sino-Soviet crisis, Chinese nuclear development and its implications both for Japanese security and for East-West relations in Europe, and so on. Similarly, matters such as Japanese rearmament, possibly even Japan's acquisition of nuclear arms (thought by increasingly large numbers of Japanese to be likely during the second half of the 1970s),[14] could be viewed in terms of this broader significance rather than as a response to purely local considerations. Indeed, given the nature of modern scientific developments and communications, it is not too early to think of technological cooperation between Western Europe and Japan, as well as between both of them and the United States, in some fields of defense.

Political-security efforts would, however, in all probability be second in importance to efforts to broaden the scope of educational-scientific and economic-technological cooperation among the most advanced industrial nations that are becoming post-industrial and are in some regards moving into the post-national age. The projected world information grid, for which Japan, Western Europe, and the United States are most suited,*

* "Western Europe and Japan present the most immediate opportunities for the world-information-grid. The Europeans and the Japanese are

could create the basis for a common educational program, for the adoption of common academic standards, for the organized pooling of information, and for a more rational division of labor in research and development. Computers at M.I.T. have already been regularly "conversing" with Latin American universities, and there is no technical obstacle to permanent information linkage between, for example, the universities of New York, Moscow, Tokyo, Mexico City, and Milan.[15] Such scientific-informational linkage would be easier to set up than joint educational programs and would encourage an international educational system by providing an additional stimulus to an international division of academic labour, uniform academic standards, and a cross-national pooling of academic resources.

Steps in that direction could be accelerated by some symbolic joint actions. Space exploration is probably the most dramatic example of human adventure made possible by science, but currently it is almost entirely monopolized on a competitive basis by the United States and the Soviet Union. The pooling of Western European, Japanese, and American resources for a specific joint undertaking could do much to accelerate international cooperation.[16] In addition, it may be desirable to develop an international convention on the social consequences of applied science and technology. This not only would permit the ecological and social effects of new techniques to be weighed in advance but would also make it possible to outlaw the use of chemicals to limit and manipulate man and to prevent other scientific abuses to which some governments may be tempted.

In the economic-technological field some international cooperation has already been achieved, but further progress will require greater American sacrifices. More intensive efforts to shape a new world monetary structure will have to be undertaken, with some consequent risk to the present relatively favorable American position. Further progress would in all probability require the abandonment of restrictions, imposed by Congress in 1949 and 1954, on the international activities of American corporations and on their foreign subsidiaries and plants. The appearance of a truly international structure of production and financing would have to go hand in hand with the emergence of a "theory of international production," needed to supplement our present theories of international trade.* Progress along these lines would also facilitate the creation of a free-trade area, which could be targeted in progressive stages.

The Communist States

The Soviet Union may come to participate in such a larger framework of cooperation because of the inherent attraction of the West for the Eastern Europeans—whom the Soviet Union would have to follow lest it lose them altogether—and because of the Soviet Union's own felt need for increased collaboration in the technological and scientific revolution. That Eastern Europeans will move closer to Western Europe is certain. The events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia are merely an augury of what is to come, in spite of forcible Soviet efforts to the contrary. It is only a matter of time before individual communist states come knocking at the doors of EEC or OECD; hence, broader East-West arrangements may even become a way for Moscow to maintain effective links with the Eastern European capitals.

The evolution of Yugoslav thinking and behavior attests to the fact that the communist states are not immune to the process of change and to intelligent Western initiatives. Slightly more than twenty years ago, Yugoslav pronouncements were not unlike those of the Chinese today. Yet Yugoslavia now leads all communist states in economic reform, in the openness of its society, and in ideological moderation. In the late 1960s it joined GATT,† and Yugoslavia's association with EFTA‡—and perhaps eventually with the Common Market—is a probability. While still committed to the notion of "socialism," Yugoslavia's views on international politics are moderate, and they have had a significant impact on communism in Eastern Europe.

Similar trends are slowly developing elsewhere in the communist world. To be sure, they are opposed by entrenched bureaucrats, but in the long run the reactionaries are fighting a losing battle. Social forces are against them, and the conservative elites are on the defensive everywhere. It is doubtful whether they can

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both increasingly sensitive to the importance of information storage and transfer network, similar to the one now evolving in this country. "The Europeans' success in this project will depend, in part, on their ability to modify a number of present restrictive attitudes. One is the lingering tradition of secretiveness in their research-and-development work. Another is the nationalistic inhibition in sharing regional information resources. It would be unfortunate if these attitudes held up formation of the network, since Europeans, over the long run, cannot think in terms of 'Italian research' or 'Norwegian research' any more than they are able to make a distinction between research done in California or New Jersey.

"There is every reason to encourage the Europeans to overcome these problems. The American information-transfer network should be linked directly into their regional system, permitting a broader exchange of information" *(Television Quarterly,* Spring 1968, pp. 10-11).

* Judd Polk argues that "what we need is not a theory of international trade that abstracts from production, but a theory of an international production which, being specialized, presupposes trade." He goes on to note that "the question is not one of intruding into the economy of others; it is a matter of releasing the production capabilities of all nations. The problems of production seen from the standpoint of an economy vastly larger than that of the nation are new to everyone. The United States cannot abandon its concern for the national balance of payments, but, as noted, it is beginning to perceive the urgent need for a system of international accounts as comprehensive as the present national accounts. It particularly needs to follow the whole picture of the international movement of factors of production. Just to feel this need is to have made extraordinary progress in a short 20 years, for there cannot occur a dislodgment of the dollar from its international function without a crippling dislodgment of the production and trade it supports. Nor can there be a practical improvement in this function except in the context of the cash and credit requirements of the new world economy" ("The New World Economy," *Columbia Journal of World Business,* January-February 1968, p. 15).

† GATT: General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.

‡ EFTA: European Free Trade Association.

reverse, though they certainly can delay, the trend toward a more open, humanistic, and less ideological society. The resistance of those regimes dominated by entrenched conservative bureaucracies will be further weakened if the West views the Cold War as primarily due to the fading self-serving doctrines of the Communist rulers, if it approaches the Cold War more as an aberration and less as a mission.

Over the long run—and our earlier analysis indicates that it would be a long run—Soviet responsiveness could be stimulated through the deliberate opening of European cooperative ventures to the East and through the creation of new East-West bodies designed initially only to promote a dialogue, the exchange of information, and the encouragement of a cooperative ethos. The deliberate definition of certain common objectives in economic development, technological assistance, and East-West security arrangements could help stimulate a sense of common purpose and the growth of a rudimentary institutional framework. (For example, through formal links in the economic sphere between OECD and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA); in the security sphere between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and through United States-Soviet arms-control arrangements; or by the creation of an informal East-West political consultative body.)[*17]

A larger cooperative goal would also have other beneficial effects. For one thing, it is likely that the Soviet Union would initially demonstrate hesitancy or even hostility in the face of Western initiative. Therefore, an approach based on bilateral American-Soviet accommodation—as advocated by some Americans—might prove to be abortive and would consequently intensify tensions. But efforts to create a larger cooperative community need not be halted by initial Soviet reluctance, nor can they be easily exploited by Moscow to perpetuate the Cold War. On the contrary, Soviet resistance would only result in more costly Soviet isolation. By seeking to cut Eastern Europe off from the West, the Soviet Union would inevitably also deny itself the fruits of closer East-West technological cooperation. In 1985 the combined GNP of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan will be roughly somewhere around three trillion dollars, or four times that of the likely Soviet GNP (assuming a favorable growth rate for the Soviets); with some Eastern European states gradually shifting toward greater cooperation with EEC and OECD, the Soviet Union could abstain only at great cost to its own development and world position.

Risks and Advantages

The shaping of such a community may well provoke charges that its emergence would accentuate the divisions in a world already threatened by fragmentation. The answer to such objections is twofold: First, division already exists, and our present problem is how best to deal with it. As long as the advanced world is itself divided and in conflict, it will be unable to formulate coherent goals. The less developed countries may even be benefiting from the internal rivalries in the developed world, which incite it to compete in extending aid; but since such aid tends to be focused on short-term political advantages to the donor, it is subject to political fluctuations and may decline as the rivalry declines in intensity.

Second, the emergence of a more cooperative structure among the more developed nations is likely to increase the possibility of a long-range strategy for international development based on the emerging global consciousness rather than on old rivalries.

It could hence diminish the desire for immediate political payoffs and thus pave the way for more internationalized, mutilateral foreign aid. While the vexing problems of tariffs and trade with the Third World are not likely to disappear, they might become more manageable in a setting that reduces both the impediments to truly international production and, consequently, a given country's stake in this or that protective arrangement. The underlying motivation for such a community is, however, extremely important. If this community does not spring from fear and hatred but from a wider recognition that world affairs will have to be conducted on a different basis, it would not intensify world divisions—as have alliances in the past—but would be a step toward greater unity.

Its appearance would therefore assist and perhaps even accelerate the further development of present world bodies—such as the World Bank—which are in any case *de facto* institutions of the developed world geared to assisting the Third World. A greater sense of community within the developed world would help to strengthen these institutions by backing them with the support of public opinion; it might also eventually lead to the possibility of something along the lines of a global taxation system.[†]

More specifically, America would gain several advantages from its identification with a larger goal. Such a goal would tend to reduce the increasing danger of American isolation in the world; this isolation is unavoidably being intensified [18] by the problems associated with America's domestic leap into the future. Moreover, the United States cannot shape the world single-handed, even though it may be the only force capable of stimulating common efforts to do so. By encouraging and becoming associated with other major powers in a joint response to the problems confronting man's fife on this planet, and by jointly attempting to make deliberate use of the potential offered by science and technology, the United States would more effectively achieve its often

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[*] This is not only a matter of technological and multilateral determinism, as suggested by Pierre Hassner in his "Implications of Change in Eastern Europe for the Atlantic Alliance" *(Orbis,* Spring 1969, p. 246), but also a deliberate, though very long-range, strategy.

[†] In my view, such a community would also provide a base for implementing more far-reaching and visionary proposals for global cooperation; for example, those contained in the stimulating "Bulletin of Peace Proposals" prepared by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, in the autumn of 1969.

proclaimed goal.

The quest for that goal cannot, however, be geographically confined to the Atlantic world, nor should its motivation be even implicitly derived from security fears stimulated by a major outside power. One reason for the declining popular appeal of the Atlantic concept is the latter's association with the conditions of post-World War II Europe and with the fear of Soviet aggression. While such a concept was a bold idea at the time, it is now historically and geographically limited. A broader, more ambitious, and more relevant approach is called for by the recognition that the problems of the 1970s will be less overtly ideological, more diffuse—they will more widely reflect the malaise of a world that is still unstructured politically and highly inegalitarian economically.

Such an approach would also tend to end the debate over American globalism. The fact is that much of the initiative and impetus for an undertaking on so grand a scale will have to come from the United States. Given the old divisions in the advanced world—and the weaknesses and parochialism of the developing nations—the absence of constructive American initiative would at the very least perpetuate the present drift in world affairs. That drift cannot be halted if the United States follows the path which it is now fashionable to advocate—disengagement. Even if, despite the weight and momentum of its power, America could disengage itself, there is something quaintly old-fashioned in the eloquent denunciation of United States global involvement, especially when it comes from Europeans, who have shown a less than admirable ability to maintain world peace. Moreover, even the most brilliant indictment of United States policy cannot erase the fact that, despite its allegedly long record of errors and misconceptions, the United States has somehow become the only power that has begun to think in global terms and actively seek constructive world-wide arrangements. In this connection, it is revealing to note that initiatives such as the Test-Ban Treaty or the Non-Proliferation Treaty were opposed by governments habitually praised by some critics of United States global involvement. This country's commitment to international affairs on a global scale has been decided by history. It cannot be undone, and the only remaining relevant question is what its form and goals will be.

The debate on globalism did, however, perform one useful function. Though much of the criticism did not provide a meaningful policy program,* the debate prompted greater recognition of the need to redefine America's world role in the light of new historical circumstances. Thrust into the world by its own growth and by the cataclysms of two world wars, America first actively promoted and then guaranteed the West's economic recovery and military security. This posture—of necessity heavily marked by military preoccupations—has increasingly shifted toward a greater involvement with the less political and more basic problems that mankind will face in the remaining third of the century.

John Kennedy caught the essence of America's novel position in the world when he saw himself as "the first American President for whom the whole world was, in a sense, domestic politics." [19] Indeed, Kennedy was the first "globalist" president of the United States. Roosevelt, for all his internationalism, essentially believed in an 1815-like global arrangement in which the "Big Four" would have specific spheres of influence. Truman primarily responded to a specific communist challenge, and his policies indicated a clear regional priority. Eisenhower continued on the same course, occasionally applying European precedents to other regions. These shifts were symptomatic of the changing United States role. With Kennedy came a sense that every continent and every people had the right to expect leadership and inspiration from America, and that America owed an almost equal involvement to every continent and every people. Kennedy's evocative style which in some ways appealed more to emotion than to intellect, stressed the universal humanism of the American mission, while his romantic fascination with the conquest of space reflected his conviction that America's scientific leadership was necessary to its effective world role.

Global involvement is, however, qualitatively different from what has to date been known as foreign policy. It is inimical to clear-cut formulas and traditional preferences. But this intellectual complexity does not negate the fact that for better or for worse the United States is saddled with major esponsibility for shaping the framework for change. This point of view is subject to easy misrepresentation and is highly unpopular in some circles. World conditions do not call for a Pax Americana, nor is this the age of American omnipotence. Nevertheless, it is a fact that unless the United States, the first global society, uses its preponderant influence to give positive direction and expression to the accelerating pace of change, that change not only might become chaos—when linked to old conflicts and antipathies—but could eventually threaten the effort to improve the

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* Even a critic who identifies himself as sympathetic to the "isolationist or neo-isolationist" school concludes that the alternatives offered by the more traditional students of international politics, such as Lippmann or Morgen-thau, have relatively little of a constructive nature to offer (Charles Gati, "Another Grand Debate? The Limitationist Critique of American Foreign Policy," *World Politics,* October 1968, especially pp. 150—51). Moreover, the propensity of even some perceptive writers to concentrate almost entirely on the shortcomings of American foreign-policy performance makes it difficult for them to account for its relatively respectable performance during the last twenty years as compared with, for example, that of the European powers. Thus, Stanley Hoffmann's massive (556 pages) and in places stimulating book, *Gulliver's Troubles* (New York, 1968), focuses almost entirely on the impatience, wrongheadedness, misunderstanding, self-righteousness, gullibility, condescension, inflexibility, and paranoid style of American foreign policy. This leads him, on a more popular level, to say in a magazine article ("Policy for the Seventies," *Life,* March 21, 1969) that "Americans . . . have been prepared by history and instinct for a world in black and white, in which there is either harmony or an all-out contest." He does not explain why, in that case, the United States and the Soviet Union were successful in maintaining peace, whereas in the past the European powers had failed to do so.
At the same time, traditionalists who emphasize the continued vitality of nationalism are inherently inclined to postulate policies that are no longer in tune with the times. Thus, on the very eve of De Gaulle's repudiation by the French people, Hoffmann could speak of a "fundamental rapprochement" with De Gaulle ("America and France," *The New Republic,* April 12, 1969, p. 22).

nature and the character of American domestic life.

To sum up: Though the objective of shaping a community of the developed nations is less ambitious than the goal of world government, it is more attainable. It is more ambitious than the concept of an Atlantic community but historically more relevant to the new spatial revolution. Though cognizant of present divisions between communist and non-communist nations, it attempts to create a new framework for international affairs not by exploiting these divisions but rather by striving to preserve and create openings for eventual reconciliation. Finally, it recognizes that the world's developed nations have a certain affinity, and that only by nurturing a greater sense of communality among them can an effective response to the increasing threat of global fragmentation—which itself intensifies the growing world-wide impatience with human inequality—be mounted.

There is thus a close conjunction between the historic meaning of America's internal transition and America's role in the world. Earlier in this book, domestic priorities were reduced to three large areas: the need for an institutional realignment of American democracy to enhance social responsiveness and blur traditional distinctions between governmental and nongovernmental social processes; the need for anticipatory institutions to cope with the unintended consequences of technological-scientific change; the need for educational reforms to mitigate the effects of generational and racial conflicts and promote rational humanist values in the emerging new society.

The international equivalents of our domestic needs are similar: the gradual shaping of a community of the developed nations would be a realistic expression of our emerging global consciousness; concentration on disseminating scientific and technological knowledge would reflect a more functional approach to man's problems, emphasizing ecology rather than ideology; both the foregoing would help to encourage the spread of a more personalized rational humanist world outlook that would gradually replace the institutionalized religious, ideological, and intensely national perspectives that have dominated modern history.

But whatever the future may actually hold for America and for the world, the technetronic age—by making so much more technologically feasible and electronically accessible—make deliberate choice about more issues more imperative. Reason, belief, and values will interact intensely, putting a greater premium than ever before on the explicit definition of social purposes. To what ends should our power be directed, how should our social dialogue be promoted, in what way should the needed action be taken—these are both philosophical and political issues. In the technetronic era, philosophy and politics will be crucial.

Reference Notes

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution

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4. *The New York Times,* January 18, 1969.
5. Donald N. Michael, "Some Speculations on the Social Impact of Technology," mimeographed text of address to the Columbia Seminar on Technology and Social Change, 1966, p. 11.
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Ill: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

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