Zeng Qinghong 曾庆红
First Secretary of Secretariat of the Communist Party
In office 15 November 2002 – 22 October 2007
General Secretary	Hu Jintao
Preceded by	Hu Jintao
Succeeded by	Xi Jinping
7th Vice President of the People's Republic of China
In office 15 March 2003 – 15 March 2008
President	Hu Jintao
Preceded by	Hu Jintao
Succeeded by	Xi Jinping
Personal details
Born	July 1939 (age 72) Ji'an, China
Political party	Communist Party
Spouse(s)	Wang Fengqing
Children	Zeng Wei
Alma mater	Beijing Institute of Technology

Zeng Qinghong (born July 1939) was a prominent Chinese politician. He served as the Vice-President of the People's Republic of China from 2003 to 2008. He was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, China's highest leadership council, and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee during between 2002 and 2007.

During the 1990s, Zeng was a close ally of then-President Jiang Zemin, and was instrumental in consolidating Jiang's power. For years, Zeng was the primary force behind the party's organization and personnel. During his term in the PSC, although he was formally ranked fifth, Zeng was seen as a 'power broker' in the party, believed to possess power that was second only to President Hu Jintao.^[1] Initially seen as a rival to President Hu Jintao, Zeng showed a willingness to work towards consensus with Hu following Jiang's retirement. Zeng left public life in 2008. However there are hints that he is still active behind the scenes^{[citation needed]}. His son, Zeng Wei used over millions of dollars to purchase an Australian property alarmed the whole world.This incidence caused the Chinese retired leaders raise doubt on his credibility. As a result Zeng had to cut off all his relationships with his son to maintain his innocence.

Early life[link]

A Hakka native of Ji'an, Jiangxi, Zeng was born in July 1939. He was the son of Zeng Shan, a revolutionary and the Minister of the Interior. He graduated from Beijing 101 Middle School and the Automatic Control Department at the Beijing Institute of Technology. Like the eight other members of the 16th Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee, Zeng is an engineer, a specialist in automatic control systems. He joined the Communist Party of China (CPC) in April 1960. Zeng belongs to the elite group of China's so-called Communist "Crown Prince Party", the children of veteran revolutionaries.

Zeng spent the early part of his career as a technician in the military defense industry in Beijing. He was sent down to do manual labor on People's Liberation Army bases in Hunan and Guangdong during the Cultural Revolution. With the opening of the reform era, Zeng joined the State Development and Reform Commission in 1979 and then held a series of management positions in the state petroleum sector, including a series of foreign liaison positions with the China National Offshore Oil Corporation.

Climbing the ranks[link]

In 1984, Zeng moved to the Shanghai Municipal Government, where he became a key ally of then-mayor Jiang Zemin. When Jiang was elevated to national leadership in Beijing following the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, he brought Zeng Qinghong along as his trusted adviser.^[2]

As the Deputy chief of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee from 1989 to 1993, Zeng guided Jiang, an outsider to national politics, through the inner workings of the party, military and bureaucratic structure in Beijing. He promoted Jiang's leadership and thinking, broadened Jiang's network, and became Jiang's right-hand-man. Over the 1990s, Zeng consolidated control of party organs responsible for the appointment of cadres to important political positions. As head of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee from 1999–2002, he strengthened Jiang's position by promoting members of the president's "Shanghai clique" to leading central and regional posts. He also helped advanced Jiang's guiding political philosophy the Three Represents.^[3]

Over the next decade, he acquired a fearsome reputation as Jiang's hatchet against rivals. In 1992 he helped bring down the powerful, elder PLA Generals Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing,^{[citation needed]} who threatened Jiang's support within the military. Then, he used an anti-corruption campaign to orchestrate the downfall of Beijing party secretary and Jiang's foe Chen Xitong.^[4] Because he was seen to represent highly partisan interests, many of Jiang's factional opponents in party prevented Zeng from joining the Politburo as a full member for years.^[4] However, Jiang made it clear that a 'pre-condition' for his stepping down at the 16th Party Congress was for Zeng to become a member of the elite Politburo Standing Committee.^[4]

National politics[link]

After the 16th Party Congress in 2002, he has been a member of the 16th CPC Central Committee, a member of its Politburo and of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the Party's central decision making body, and a member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee.

On 6 June 2003, Zeng issued an order "not to play or sing 'The Internationale' in any provincial, city or county level party or party member meetings." The move further characterized China's movement away from the traditional norms of communist doctrine.^[5]

Although Jiang stepped down from the PSC to make way for a younger "fourth generation" of leadership led by Hu Jintao, Jiang continued to wield significant influence with the help of Zeng. Due in large measure to Zeng's efforts, six out of the nine new members of the Standing Committee, Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, and Li Changchun, and Zeng himself, were linked to Jiang's "Shanghai Clique" and considered his allies. The 22-member Politburo was elected by the Party's central committee. Real power in Communist China lies with this committee, which works as a kind of inner cabinet and groups together the country’s most influential leaders. At the 2002 16th Party Congress, the Standing Committee was expanded to include nine members.

As Jiang Zemin reached the end of his term, many observers speculated that Jiang preferred Zeng Qinghong over Hu Jintao as his successor. But Hu prevailed in succeeding Jiang, ostensibly because Hu had the support of former leader Deng Xiaoping. Zeng subsequently became Vice-President in March 2003. During the SARS outbreak, Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao took very strong and assertive action while Zeng and other Jiang loyalists receded to the background. Zeng was also expected to succeed Hu as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission as a condition of Jiang's resignation from the chairmanship in favor of Hu. However, when Jiang stepped down on 19 September 2004, Xu Caihou, and not Zeng, became Vice-chairman.^[6]

Shifting loyalties[link]

Although initially seen as a Jiang loyalist, most observers speculated that Zeng was more liberal than his mentor, and interested in more reforms towarsd transparency, institutionalization, and greater specification of powers in government, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of party and state operations. In addition, Zeng was said to be a believer in 'inner-party democracy'. In his capacity as a 'people manager', Zeng was an important figure within the highest ranks of party leadership. Zeng was said to be a crucial player in pushing Jiang headed towards full retirement in 2004, when Jiang relinquished his final title, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Observers saw the push for Jiang's retirement as an indication of consensus between Zeng and Hu.^[7]

In the following years, Zeng then became a 'point-man' for Hu to manage crises situations. After the death of Zhao Ziyang, the former party secretary who lost power following the Tiananmen Square protests, Zeng worked as the intermediary between the Zhao's family and the senior party leadership. Zeng also worked with Hu to manage the potential effects on China of the ouster of authoritarian regimes in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine.^[7] Zeng Qinghong has the head of the Ministry of State Security, known as China's top intelligence gathering bureau, report directly to him as his father was the former director of this agency. When Shanghai party chief Chen Liangyu was dismissed in September 2006, Zeng led the anti-corruption task force against the staunch Jiang ally.^[1] The move was seen as a mild rebuke to his links with Jiang.^[1]

In August 2007, Zeng headed a delegation of several high-ranking Central Government representatives at the celebrations at the 60th Anniversary of the founding of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.^[8]

Departure[link]

During the 17th Party Congress Zeng departed from the Central Committee, its Politburo, and the Politburo Standing Committee.^[2] His departure, which was seen as his retirement because of age, meant that he could no longer serve on the Communist Party's secretariat nor oversee the party's organization. His Vice-presidency ended in March 2008 at the 2008 National People's Congress. Before his retirement, however, Zeng used his political strength to secure the elevation of Xi Jinping into the Politburo Standing Committee.^[9] Xi then became the heir apparent to succeed Hu Jintao as China's paramount leader.^[10] Since then Zeng has made public appearances only on a few ceremonial occasions, such as the 30th anniversary of the Third plenum of the 11th Party Congress.^[11]

See also[link]

• Politics of the People's Republic of China
• History of the People's Republic of China (2002–present)

References[link]

External links[link]

• Zeng Qinghong and his CCP organization – World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong
• Zeng Qinghong biography @ China Vitae, online database of China VIPs
• Zeng Qinghong – People's Daily biography
• Zeng Qinghong: A Man to Watch – Jamestown Foundation
• Zeng Qinghong: A Potential Challenger to China's Heir Apparent – Jamestown Foundation
• Zeng Qinghong: An Heir To Power – MSNBC

v t e Members of the 16th Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China General Secretary 1. Hu Jintao Other members 2. Wu Bangguo 3. Wen Jiabao 4. Jia Qinglin 5. Zeng Qinghong 6. Huang Ju 7. Wu Guanzheng 8. Li Changchun 9. Luo Gan

v t e Members of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China 12th CPC Central Committee Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun, Deng Liqun, Yang Yong, Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, Chen Pixian, Hu Qili, Yao Yilin Alternate secretaries: Qiao Shi, Hao Jianxiu 13th CPC Central Committee Hu Qili, Qiao Shi, Rui Xingwen, Yan Mingfu Alternate secretaries: Wen Jiabao 14th CPC Central Committee Hu Jintao, Ding Guangen, Wei Jianxing, Wen Jiabao, Ren Jianxin 15th CPC Central Committee Hu Jintao, Wei Jianxing, Ding Guangen, Ding Guangen, Luo Gan, Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong 16th CPC Central Committee Zeng Qinghong, Liu Yunshan, Zhou Yongkang, He Guoqiang, Wang Gang, Xu Caihou, He Yong 17th CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping, Liu Yunshan, Li Yuanchao, He Yong, Ling Jihua, Wang Huning

v t e Vice President of the People's Republic of China Common Program (1949–1954) Vice Chairmen of the Central People's Government: Zhu, Liu, Song, Zhang, Li, Gao 1954 Constitution (1954–1975) Vice Chairman: Zhu · Song and Dong  · Dong 1975 Constitution (1975–1978) Post abolished see NPCSC 1st vice-chairperson (Dong · Song) 1978 Constitution (1978–1982) Post abolished see NPCSC 1st vice-chairperson (Song · Nie) 1982 Constitution (1982–present) Vice President: Ulanhu · Wang · Rong · Hu · Zeng · Xi List of Vice Presidents of the People's Republic of China

This biographical article needs additional citations for verification. Please help by adding reliable sources. Contentious material about living persons that is unsourced or poorly sourced must be removed immediately, especially if potentially libelous or harmful. (March 2011)

Jiang Zemin 江泽民
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
In office 24 June 1989 – 15 November 2002 (&1000000000000001300000013 years, &10000000000000144000000144 days)
Deputy	Li Peng Zhu Rongji Li Ruihuan Hu Jintao
Preceded by	Zhao Ziyang
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
President of the People's Republic of China
In office 27 March 1993 – 15 March 2003 (9 years 353 days)
Premier	Li Peng Zhu Rongji
Vice President	Rong Yiren Hu Jintao
Preceded by	Yang Shangkun
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission
In office 9 November 1989 – 19 September 2004
Preceded by	Deng Xiaoping
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission
In office 19 March 1990 – 8 March 2005
Preceded by	Deng Xiaoping
Succeeded by	Hu Jintao
Member of the 13,14,15 th CPC Politburo Standing Committee
In office 24 June 1989 – 15 November 2002
General Secretary	Himself
Member of the National People's Congress
In office 25 March 1988 – 5 March 2008
Constituency	Shanghai At-large
Personal details
Born	(1926-08-17) 17 August 1926 (age 85) Yangzhou, Jiangsu
Nationality	Chinese
Political party	Communist Party of China
Spouse(s)	Wang Yeping
Alma mater	Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Profession	Electrical engineer
Signature

This article contains Chinese text. Without proper rendering support, you may see question marks, boxes, or other symbols instead of Chinese characters.

Jiang Zemin (born 17 August 1926) is a former Chinese politician, who served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 1989 to 2002, as President of the People's Republic of China from 1993 to 2003, and as Chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1989 to 2005. His long career and political prominence have led to him being described as the "core of the third generation" of Communist Party leaders.

Jiang Zemin came to power following Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, replacing Zhao Ziyang as CPC General Secretary. With the waning influence of Deng Xiaoping and the other members of Eight Elders due to old age,and with the help of old and powerful party and state leaders, former President Li Xiannian and Chen Yun Jiang effectively became the "Paramount Leader" in the 1990s. Under his leadership, China experienced substantial developmental growth with reforms, saw the peaceful return of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom and Macau from Portugal, and improved its relations with the outside world while the Communist Party maintained its tight control over the government. Jiang has been criticized for being too concerned about his personal image at home, and too conciliatory towards Russia and the United States abroad.^[1]

Background and ascendancy[link]

Jiang was born in the city of Yangzhou, Jiangsu. His ancestral home was the Jiangwan Village (江湾村), Wuyuan County (婺源县) of the old Huizhou (徽州) in northern Jiangxi Province. This was also the hometown of a number of prominent figures in Chinese academic and intellectual establishments. Jiang grew up during the years of Japanese occupation. His uncle, Jiang Shangqing, had died fighting the Japanese in World War II and was considered to be a national hero. Jiang attended the Department of Electrical Engineering at the National Central University in Japanese-occupied Nanjing before being transferred to Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He graduated there in 1947 with a Bachelor's degree in electrical engineering.

Jiang married^[when?] Wang Yeping (Chinese: 王冶坪; pinyin: Wáng Yěpíng, born 1928), a native of Yangzhou, China. She graduated from Shanghai International Studies University.^[2] They have two sons, Jiang Mianheng and Jiang Miankang.^[2]

He claimed that he joined the Communist Party of China when he was in college^{[citation needed]}. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Jiang received his training at the Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow in the 1950s. He also worked for Changchun's First Automobile Works. He eventually got transferred to government services, where he began to rise in prominence and rank, eventually becoming a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Minister of Electronic Industries in 1983.

In 1985 he became Mayor of Shanghai, and subsequently the Party Chief of Shanghai. Jiang received mixed reviews as mayor. Many of his critics dismissed him as a "flower vase", a Chinese term used to describe a decorative but useless person.^[3] Many credited Shanghai's growth during the period to Zhu Rongji^{[citation needed]}. Jiang was an ardent believer, during this period, in Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms. In an attempt of curbing student discontent in 1986, Jiang recited the Gettysburg Address in English in front of a group of student protesters.^[4][5]

Jiang was described as having a passable command of several foreign languages,^[6] including Romanian, Russian, and English. One of his favorite activities was to engage foreign visitors in small talks on art and literature in their native language, in addition to singing foreign songs in the original language.^[6] He became friends with Allen Broussard, the African American judge who visited Shanghai in 1987 and Brazilian actress Lucelia Santos^{[citation needed]}.

Jiang was elevated to national politics in 1987, automatically becoming a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee because it is customarily dictated that the Party Chief of Shanghai would also have a seat in the Politburo. In 1989, China was in crisis over the Tiananmen Square protest, and the Central Government was in conflict on how to handle the protesters. (The opening policy, brought out by Deng Xiaoping, has been proved as a crucial and brilliant turning point in China's modern history, causing the economy to grow at an astonishing rate during the past decades.) In June, Deng Xiaoping dismissed liberal Zhao Ziyang, who was considered too conciliatory to student protestors. Jiang, at the time, was the Shanghai Party Chief, the top figure in China's new economic center. In an incident with the World Economic Herald, Jiang closed down the newspaper, deeming it harmful. The handling of the crisis in Shanghai was noticed by Beijing, and then paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping. As the protests escalated and then Party-chief Zhao Ziyang was removed from office, Jiang was selected by the Party leaders as a compromise candidate over Tianjin's Li Ruihuan, Premier Li Peng, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and the retired elders to become the new General Secretary. At the time he was considered to be an unlikely candidate^{[citation needed]}. Within three years Deng had transferred most power in the state, party and military to Jiang.

Early leadership[link]

Jiang was elevated to the country's top job in 1989 with a fairly small power base inside the party, and thus, very little actual power^{[citation needed]}.His most reliable allies were the powerful party elders - Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. He was believed as simply a transitional figure until a more stable successor government to Deng could be put in place. Other prominent Party and military figures like Yang Shangkun and brother Yang Baibing were believed to be planning a coup. Jiang used Deng Xiaoping as a back-up to his leadership in the first few years. Jiang, who was believed^{[citation needed]} to have a neo-conservative slant, warned against "bourgeois liberalization". Deng's belief, however, stipulated that the only solution to keeping the legitimacy of Communist rule over China was to continue the drive for modernization and economic reform, and therefore placed himself at odds with Jiang.

At the first meeting of the new Standing Committee of the Politburo, after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, Jiang criticized the previous period as "hard on the economy, soft on politics" and advocated increasing political thought work.^[7] Anne-Marie Brady writes that "Jiang Zemin was a long time political cadre with a nose for ideological work and its importance. This meeting marked the beginning of a new era in propaganda and political thought work in China." Soon after, the Central Propaganda Department was given more resources and power, "including the power to go in to the propaganda-related work units and cleanse the ranks of those who had been supportive of the democracy movement."^[7]

Deng grew critical of Jiang's leadership in 1992. During Deng's southern tours, he subtly suggested that the pace of reform was not fast enough, and the "central leadership" (i.e. Jiang) had most responsibility. Jiang grew ever more cautious, and rallied behind Deng's reforms completely. In 1993, Jiang coined the new term "socialist market economy" to move China's centrally-planned socialist economy into essentially a government-regulated capitalist market economy. It was a huge step to take in the realization of Deng's "Socialism with Chinese characteristics". At the same time, Jiang elevated many of his supporters from Shanghai to high government positions, after regaining Deng's confidence. He abolished the outdated Central Advisory Committee, an advisory body composed of revolutionary party elders. He became Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989, followed by his election to the Presidency in March 1993.

Secretaryship and Presidency[link]

Deng Xiaoping died in early 1997, and China, emerging gradually out of the Deng-era reforms and the relative stability of the early 1990s, faced a myriad of economic and social problems. At Deng's funeral, Jiang delivered his eulogy. He had inherited a China rampant with government corruption, and regional economies growing too rapidly for the stability of the entire country. Deng's idea that "some areas can get rich before others" gave rise to an opening wealth gap between coastal regions and the hinterlands. The unprecedented economic growth had inevitably led to the closing of many state-owned enterprises (SOE's), and a staggering unemployment rate that hit 40% in some urban areas. Stock markets fluctuated greatly. The scale of rural migration into urban areas was unprecedented anywhere in the world^{[citation needed]}, and little was being done to address an ever-increasing urban-rural wealth gap. Official reports put the figure on the percentage of China's GDP being moved and abused by corrupt officials at 10%.^{[citation needed]} A chaotic environment of illegal bonds issued from civil and military officials resulted in much of the corrupted wealth to end up in foreign countries. Corruption levels had replicated, if not exceeded that of the Republican era in the 1940s. A surge in crime rates and the re-emergence of organized crime began to plague cities. A careless stance on the destruction of the environment furthered concerns voiced by intellectuals. Jiang's biggest aim in the economy was stability, and he believed that a stable government with highly centralised power would be a prerequisite, choosing to postpone political reform, which in many facets of governance exacerbated the on-going problems.^[3] Jiang continued pouring funds to develop the Special Economic Zones and coastal regions.

Jiang is believed to be the first Chinese leader to truly manipulate the medium of television to enhance his own image, gaining a reputation for charisma.^{[citation needed]} Beginning in 1996, Jiang began a series of reforms in the state-controlled media aimed at promoting the "core of leadership" under himself, and at the same time crushing some of his political opponents. The personality enhancements in the media were largely frowned upon during the Deng era, and had not been seen since Mao and Hua Guofeng's time in office in the late 1970s. The People's Daily and CCTV-1's 7 pm national news each had Jiang-related events as the front-page or top stories, a fact that remained until Hu Jintao's media administrative changes in 2006. He appeared casual in front of Western media, and gave an unprecedented interview with Mike Wallace of CBS in 2000 at Beidaihe. He would often use foreign languages in front of the camera, albeit not always comprehensible. In an encounter with a Hong Kong reporter in 2000 regarding the central government's apparent "imperial order" of supporting Tung Chee-hwa to seek a second term as Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Jiang branded the Hong Kong journalists as "too simple, sometimes naive" in English.^[8] The event was shown on Hong Kong television that night, an event regarded to be in poor taste outside China.

Among the main features of Jiang’s domestic policy was his campaign against the Falun Gong spiritual practice, which once had tens of millions of followers in China. On 25 April 1999 upwards of 10,000 Falun Gong adherents protested outside the Zhongnanhai government compound to request official recognition.^[9][10] In response, Jiang declared Falun Gong to be an unprecedented threat, and declared it must be defeated.^[9][11] According to Human Rights Watch, Communist Party leaders and ruling elite were far from unified in their support for the crackdown.^[12] In June 1999, Jiang established an extralegal 6-10 Office to oversee the suppression of Falun Gong,^[13] which began in earnest on July 20 with the arrest and abduction of hundreds of Falun Gong adherents.^[12] The campaign that followed was characterized by Amnesty International as a "massive propaganda campaign" intended to discredit Falun Gong, as well as arbitrary imprisonment and coercive reeducation of adherents, sometimes resulting in death.^[14][15] Under Jiang's leadership, the crackdown on Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of "upholding stability" – much the same rhetoric employed by the party during Tiananmen in 1989.^[12] The scope and intensity of the campaign has been described as "unrivaled" in recent history,^[16] and as being reminiscent of the extremes of the Cultural Revolution.^[17][18] Falun Gong Practitioners outside China have filed dozens of largely symbolic lawsuits against Jiang Zemin and other Chinese officials alleging genocide and crimes against humanity.^[17][19] In many instances, courts have refused to adjudicate the cases on the grounds of sovereign immunity. In late 2009, separate courts in Spain and Argentina indicted Jiang and other officials on the charge of torture and genocide, and asked for their arrest, although the ruling is acknowledged to be largely symbolic and unlikely to be carried out.^[20][21]

Foreign policy[link]

Jiang Zemin with Bill Clinton in 1999.

Jiang went on a groundbreaking state visit to the United States in 1997, drawing various crowds in protest from the Tibet Independence Movement to the supporters of chinese democracy movement. He made a speech at Harvard University, part of it in passable English, but could not escape questions on democracy and freedom. In the official summit meeting with US President Bill Clinton, the tone was relaxed as Jiang and Clinton sought common ground while largely ignoring areas of disagreement. Clinton would visit China in June 1998, and vowed that China and the United States were partners in the world, and not adversaries. When American-led NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, Jiang seemed to have put up a harsh stance for show at home, but in reality only performed symbolic gestures of protest, and no solid action. Much of Jiang's foreign policy was focused on international trade and economic integration. A personal friend of former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien,^[22] Jiang strengthened China's economic stature abroad, attempting to establish cordial relations with countries whose trade is largely confined to the American economic sphere.

Economic development[link]

Jiang did not specialize in economics, and in 1997 handed a most of the economic governance of the country to Zhu Rongji, who became Premier, and remained in office through the Asian financial crisis^{[citation needed]}. Under their joint leadership, Mainland China has sustained an average of 8% GDP growth annually, achieving the highest rate of per capita economic growth in major world economies, raising eyebrows around the world with its astonishing speed. This was mostly achieved by continuing the process of a transition to a market economy^{[citation needed]}. Strong party control over China was cemented by the PRC's successful bid to join the World Trade Organization and Beijing winning the bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics.

Entrenching Three Represents[link]

Before he transferred power to a younger generation of leaders, Jiang had his theory of Three Represents written into the Party's constitution, alongside Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory at the 16th CPC Congress in 2002. Although contradictory to Marxism and Maoism in many facets^[which?], it was also written into China's Constitution. Critics^[who?] believe this is just another piece added to Jiang's cult of personality, others have seen practical applications of the theory as a guiding ideology in the future direction of the CPC. Largely speculated to step down from all positions by international media, rival Li Ruihuan's resignation in 2002 prompted analysts to rethink the man. The theory of Three Represents was believed by many political analysts to be Jiang's effort at extending his vision to Marxist–Leninist principles, and therefore elevating himself alongside previous Chinese Marxist philosophers Mao and Deng.

Gradual retirement[link]

Jiang Zemin with wife Wang Yeping and George W. Bush with wife Laura Bush in Crawford, Texas in 2002.

In 2002, Jiang stepped down from the powerful CPC Politburo Standing Committee and CPC General Secretary to make way for a "fourth generation" of leadership headed by Hu Jintao, marking the beginning of a transition of power that would last several years. Hu assumed Jiang's title as party chief, becoming the new general secretary of the Communist Party. Six out of the nine new members of Standing Committee at the time were considered part of Jiang's so-called "Shanghai Clique", the most prominent being Vice President Zeng Qinghong and First Vice Premier Huang Ju.

Although Jiang retained the chairmanship of the powerful Central Military Commission, most members of the commission are professional military men. Liberation Army Daily, a publication thought to represent the views of the CMC majority, printed an article on 11 March 2003 which quotes two army delegates as saying, "Having one center is called 'loyalty', while having two centers will result in 'problems.'"^[23] This was widely interpreted as a criticism of Jiang's attempt to exercise dual leadership with Hu on the model of Deng Xiaoping.

Hu succeeded Jiang as President of the People's Republic of China on 15 March 2003. To the surprise of many observers, evidence of Jiang's continuing influence on public policy abruptly disappeared from the official media. Jiang was conspicuously silent during the SARS crisis, especially when compared to the very public profile of Hu and Wen Jiabao. It has been argued that the institutional arrangements created by the 16th Congress have left Jiang in a position where he cannot exercise much influence.^{[citation needed]} Although many of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee are associated with him, the Standing Committee does not have command authority over the civilian bureaucracy.^{[citation needed]}

On 19 September 2004, after a four-day meeting of the 198-member Central Committee, Jiang resigned as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, his last party post. Six months later he resigned his last significant post, chairman of the State CMC. This followed weeks of speculation that Hu Jintao's supporters in the Communist Party leadership were pressing Jiang to step aside. Jiang's term was supposed to have lasted until 2007. Hu also succeeded Jiang as the CMC chairman, but, in an apparent political defeat for Jiang, Xu Caihou, and not Zeng Qinghong was appointed to succeed Hu as vice chairman. This power transition officially marks the end of Jiang's era in China, which roughly lasted from 1993^{[citation needed]} to 2004.

Although Jiang has been seldom seen in public since giving up his last official title in 2004, he was with Hu Jintao on stage at a ceremony celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army,^[24] and toured the Military Museum of the Chinese Peoples Revolution with Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, and other former senior officials.^[25] On 8 August 2008, Jiang appeared at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics Games. He also stood beside Hu Jintao during 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China mass parade in October 2009.

In 2011, Jiang has been subject to internet rumors of his death,^[26] as he was absent from public events such as the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. As a response, Chinese censors to block searches for the words "Jiang Zemin", or even simply "Jiang". On July 6 Hong Kong media carried headlines that Jiang was "critically ill", while TV station ATV reported that Jiang had died in Beijing.^[27] State news agency Xinhua, quoting "authoritative sources", declared that overseas media reports of Jiang's death were "pure rumor".^[28][29]

On 9 October 2011, Jiang made his first public appearance since his premature obituary in Beijing at a celebration to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution.^[30]

Legacy[link]

Historians and biographers have disputed what can be accounted into "Jiang Zemin's legacy". Jiang himself had wanted his Three Represents theory, called an "important thought" on the mainland, to become his ideological legacy. Although the theory has been codified into both the State and Party constitutions alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, its actual effect has yet to be assessed, and it seems to be losing ground to Hu Jintao's Scientific Development Concept and Harmonious Society ideologies within the party. Jiang has come under quiet criticism from within the Communist Party of China for focusing on economic growth at all costs while ignoring the resulting environmental damage of the growth, the widening gap between rich and poor in China and the social costs absorbed by those whom economic reform has left behind.^{[citation needed]} By contrast, the policies of his successors, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have widely been seen as efforts to address these imbalances and move away from a sole focus on economic growth toward a broader view of development which incorporates non economic factors such as health and the environment.^[31]

Domestically, Jiang's legacy and reputation is mixed. While some^{[citation needed]} people attributed the period of relative stability and growth in the 1990s to Jiang's term, others argue that Jiang did little to correct mistakes resulting from Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, leaving the next administration facing innumerable problems, some of which it is too late to solve.^{[citation needed]} The fact he arose to power as the direct beneficiary of the turmoils of 4 June has not been forgotten by many in China. Indeed, he is in many circles regarded as a political opportunist; the very model of a new breed of party members directly associated with the widespread corruption and cronyism that flourished during his tenure. His interference with high profile corruption investigations since stepping down from power, such as those involving Shanghai tycoon Zhou Zhengyi, has only served to reinforce this perception.

Jiang's obsession with image has also spurred a trend of face projects around the country, with local governments lending enormous funds to large and mostly unnecessary construction projects^{[citation needed]}. While his showy nature has often been considered charming and even charismatic by the west,^[32] in the relatively more conservative Chinese society it is often perceived as frivolous, pompous and lacking in character and substance. Jiang's Theory of Three Represents justified the incorporation of the new capitalist business class into the party, and changed the founding ideology of the CPC from protection of the peasantry and workers to that of the "overwhelming majority of the people", a euphemism aimed at including the growing entrepreneurial class. Conservative critics within the party have quietly denounced this as betrayal of the communist ideology, while reformers have praised Jiang as a visionary.^{[citation needed]} Such a move, however, increasingly justified a newly found correlation between the business and ruling elites, thus significantly linking bureaucracy and financial gain, which critics argued fosters more corruption. Some have suggested this is the part of Jiang's legacy that will last, at least in name, as long as the communists remain in power.^{[citation needed]}

Many biographers of Jiang have noted his government resembled an oligarchy as opposed to an autocratic dictatorship.^[33] Many of his policies have been attributed to others in government^{[citation needed]}, notably Premier Zhu Rongji, whose tense relationship with Jiang caused widespread speculation, especially following Jiang's decision to suppress the Falun Gong movement.^{[citation needed]} Jiang is often credited with the improvement in foreign relations during his term,^[34] but at the same time many Chinese have criticized him for being too conciliatory towards the United States and Russia. The issue of Chinese reunification between the mainland and Taiwan gained ground during Jiang's term,^{[citation needed]} as Cross-Strait talks led to the eventual Three Links after Jiang stepped down as Party general secretary. The construction of the Qinghai-Tibet railway began under Jiang.

See also[link]

• Politics of the People's Republic of China
• History of the People's Republic of China (1989–2002)
• Song Zuying, Famous folk singer and former mistress
• The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin, Jiang's controversial biography by Robert Lawrence Kuhn

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• Gilley, Bruce. "Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite." Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 395pp. This was the first biography of Jiang to appear in the West. A comprehensive and highly readable journalistic account of Jiang's early years, his ascendancy within the Party bureaucracy, and his ultimate rise to power as Deng Xiaoping's successor in the wake of Tiananmen.
• Kuhn, Robert Lawrence = The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin, Random House (English edition) 2005. Century Publishing Group, Shanghai (Chinese edition) 2005. The book is a general biography of Jiang with a more favorable stance towards him.
  • China Daily = English language review of biography by Dr. Kuhn.
• Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. "The Era of Jiang Zemin"; Prentice Hall, Singapore: 1999. General Jiang-era background information and analysis, not comprehensive biography.

External links[link]

Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Jiang Zemin

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Jiang Zemin

• Swedes to sue ex Chinese president The Local Europe AB
• China rejects Spain's 'genocide' claims Posted by Independent Minds
• China warns Spain over Tibet lawsuit The New York Times
• Biography at China Vitae, the web's largest online database of China VIPs
• Falun Gong accuse Chinese leaders of genocide Expatica Communications
• ...investigation to proceed against China's ex-president, Jiang Zemin, and Luo Gan... The American Society of International Law
• Landmark Genocide Lawsuit Against Jiang Zemin on Firm Ground Friends of Falun Gong USA January 2004

v t e Leaders of the People's Republic of China Mao Hua Deng Jiang Hu

v t e Leaders of the Communist Party of China Leaders Chen Duxiu Xiang Zhongfa Li Lisan Xiang Zhongfa Wang Ming Bo Gu Zhang Wentian Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao General Secretaries Chen Duxiu vacant (1922–25) Chen Duxiu Xiang Zhongfa Bo Gu Zhang Wentian vacant (1943–82) Hu Yaobang Zhao Ziyang Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Chairmen Chen Duxiu vacant (1925–43) Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Hu Yaobang abolished from 1982 CMC Chairmen Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao

v t e Presidents of the People's Republic of China Common Program (1949–1954) Chairman of the Central People's Government Mao 1954 Constitution (1954–1975) Chairman Mao Liu Song and Dong (acting) Dong (acting) 1975 Constitution (1975–1978) NPCSC Chairman Zhu Song (acting) Ye 1978 Constitution (1978–1982) NPCSC Chairman Ye Song (honorary president) 1982 Constitution (1982–present) President Li Yang Jiang Hu List of Presidents of the People's Republic of China

v t e Chairmen of the Central Military Commission Party CMC Chairmen Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao State CMC Chairmen Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao

v t e Members of the 15th Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China General Secretary 1. Jiang Zemin Other members 2. Li Peng 3. Zhu Rongji 4. Li Ruihuan 5. Hu Jintao 6. Wei Jianxing 7. Li Lanqing

v t e Members of the 14th Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China General Secretary 1. Jiang Zemin Other members 2. Li Peng 3. Qiao Shi 4. Li Ruihuan 5. Zhu Rongji 6. Liu Huaqing 7. Hu Jintao

Bo Xilai 薄熙来
CPC Chongqing Committee Secretary
In office November 2007 – March 2012
Deputy (Mayor)	Wang Hongju (2007–2009) Huang Qifan (2009–)
Preceded by	Wang Yang
Succeeded by	Zhang Dejiang
Minister of Commerce of the PRC
In office February 2004 – December 2007
Premier	Wen Jiabao
Preceded by	Lü Fuyuan
Succeeded by	Chen Deming
Personal details
Born	(1949-07-03) 3 July 1949 (age 62) Beijing, Republic Of China
Political party	Communist Party of China
Spouse(s)	Li Danyu (divorced) Gu Kailai
Relations	Bo Yibo (father)
Children	Li Wangzhi Bo Guagua
Alma mater	Peking University Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Bo Xilai (born 3 July 1949) is a Chinese politician. He came to prominence through his tenures as the mayor of the coastal economic hub of Dalian and then governor of Liaoning province. From 2004 to November 2007, he served as Minister of Commerce. Between 2007 and 2012 he served as a member of the Politburo and head of the Communist Party's Chongqing branch.

The son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the Communist Party of China, Bo Xilai is identified as one of the "princelings" of Chinese politics. He cultivated a casual and charismatic image in the media that marked a departure from the normally staid nature of Chinese politics.

In Chongqing, Bo became known for heavy-handed populism. He initiated a campaign against organized crime, increased spending on welfare programs, maintained consistent double-digit percentage GDP growth, and campaigned to revive Cultural Revolution-era "red culture." Bo's promotion of egalitarian values and the achievements of his "Chongqing model" made him the champion of the Chinese New Left, composed of both Maoists and social democrats disillusioned with the country's market-based economic reforms and increasing economic inequality.^[1] However, the perceived lawlessness of Bo's anti-corruption campaigns, coupled with concerns about his outsized personality, made him a controversial figure.

Bo was considered a likely candidate for promotion to the elite Politburo Standing Committee in CPC 18th National Congress in 2012. His political fortunes came to an abrupt end following the Wang Lijun incident, in which his top lieutenant and police chief sought asylum at the American consulate in Chengdu and revealed details of Bo's alleged involvement in a homicide plot. In the fallout, Bo was removed as Chongqing party chief in March 2012 and suspended from the politburo the following month. Bo's dismissal was notable for exposing disunity within Communist Party ranks shortly before a leadership transition.

Early life[link]

Bo Xilai was the fourth child of prominent Communist Party leader Bo Yibo, who served as Minister of Finance in the early years of the People's Republic of China but who fell from favor in 1965 for supporting more open trade relations with the West^{[citation needed]}. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Bo Yibo was labeled a "rightist" and a "counterrevolutionary" and purged from his posts.^[2] He spent the ensuing twelve years in prison, where he was reportedly tortured. His wife, Hu Ming, was abducted by Red Guard in Guangzhou, and was either beaten to death or committed suicide.^[3]

Bo Xilai was 17 years old when the Cultural Revolution began, and at the time attended the prestigious No. 4 High School in Beijing — one of the best in the country.^[3][4] In the early years of the Cultural Revolution, Bo is reported to have been an active member of the liandong Red Guard organization^[4][5] and may have at one point denounced his father.^[6]

As the political winds of the Cultural Revolution shifted, Bo and his siblings were either imprisoned or sent to the countryside, and Bo Xilai was locked up for five years.^[7] After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the members of the Gang of Four were officially blamed for the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and Bo's family was released. Bo Yibo was politically rehabilitated, and in 1979 became vice premier.^[2]

After his release, Bo Xilai worked at the Hardware Repair Factory for the Beijing Second Light Industry Bureau.^[8] He was admitted to the Peking University by public examination in 1977. Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Chinese leadership who studied engineering, Bo majored in world history.^[9] In his sophomore year, Bo enlisted in a Master's program in international journalism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,^[4] graduating with a Master's degree in 1982.^[10] He joined the Communist Party in October 1980.^[10]

Early political career[link]

During the 1980s, the Bo family regained its political influence. Bo Yibo served successively as vice premier and vice-chairman of the Central Advisory Commission. The elder Bo came to be known as one of the “eight elders” (sometimes referred to as the “eight immortals”) of the Communist Party and was instrumental in the implementation of market reforms in the 1980s. Although he favored more liberal economic policies, the elder Bo was politically conservative, and endorsed the use of military force against demonstrators during the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests.^[2] After the 1989 crackdown, Bo Yibo helped ensure the ascent of Jiang Zemin to succeed Deng Xiaoping as the leader of the Party and helped Jiang consolidate power in the 1990s.^[9] Bo Yibo remained a prominent figure in the party until his death in 2007^[2] and was influential in shaping his son's career.^[11]

After graduating from university, Bo was assigned to Zhongnanhai^[9] – the headquarters of the Communist Party – where he worked with the research office of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat and CPC Central Committee General Office.^[4] He soon requested a transfer to the provinces, and in 1984 was appointed deputy party secretary of Jin County, near Dalian in the northeastern province of Liaoning.^[9][10] In an interview with People’s Daily, Bo said that his family name created career obstacles. "For quite a long time people had reservations about me," he said.^[11] Bo subsequently became deputy secretary and then secretary of the party committee of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone and secretary of the Jinzhou party committee.^[10]

Rising again in rank within the party, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Dalian Municipal CPC Committee, the city's top decision-making body, and became the Vice-mayor of Dalian in 1990.^[10] In 1993, Bo became deputy Party secretary and mayor of Dalian.^[9]

Liaoning[link]

Mayor of Dalian[link]

Dalian saw significant development under Bo's leadership.

Bo became acting mayor of Dalian in 1992 and formally assumed the post in 1993. He remained mayor until 2000. Bo served as Dalian's deputy party secretary from 1995.^[10] Bo was promoted to party chief in 1999 and served in that position until 2000.

Bo's tenure in Dalian was marked by the city's phenomenal transformation from a drab port city to a modern metropolis, a 'showcase' of China's rapid economic growth.^[12] In the early 1990s, Bo took some credit for the construction of the Shenyang-Dalian Expressway, China's first controlled-access freeway, winning accolades for the rapid expansion of infrastructure and for environmental work.^[13] Since Bo's time in office, Dalian became known as one of the cleanest cities in China, having won the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour Award in 1999. In addition, Bo was an advocate for free enterprise and small businesses, and successfully courted foreign investment from South Korea, Japan, and Western countries.^[12] In contrast to his colleagues, he held press conferences at Chinese New Year, and developed a reputation among foreign investors for 'getting things done'.^[13]

Bo spent seventeen years in the city of Dalian, a lengthy term in comparison to colleagues of the same rank, who are often transferred to different locales throughout their careers. Despite the accompanying economic growth and rise in living standards, Bo's tenure in Dalian has sometimes been criticized as having been too focused on aesthetic development projects such as expansive boulevards, monuments, and large public parks.^[13] To make way for his large-scale projects, Bo's administration moved large numbers of local residents from downtown areas into new homes in the city's outskirts. Dalian's greenery was dubbed "Xilai Grass".^[14] He also reputedly had a remote control in the Mayor's office for the fountains on the city's main square.^[15] In addition, he spearheaded the construction of a huabiao in the city.^[16] In 2000, Bo was frontrunner for the post of Mayor of Shenzhen, based on his success in making Dalian the "Hong Kong of the North". However it was suggested that Bo was too independent and outspoken for the post. The post went to Yu Youjun instead.^[17]

15th Party Congress[link]

During the 15th Party Congress in 1997, Bo Xilai’s family launched an unsuccessful campaign to secure his promotion to become a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. Although nepotism was generally frowned upon in China, Bo Yibo’s ambitions for his son were well-known.^[14] Bo Yibo advanced the idea that revolutionary elders should 'nominate' their children to become high officials, and Bo Xilai was selected as his family’s 'representative' over his older brother Bo Xicheng,^[14] ostensibly because of Xilai’s superior academic credentials, which included attendance at the elite Peking University and a master’s degree.

In order to secure Bo Xilai’s selection for promotion during the 15th Party Congress, the family launched a nationwide campaign to publicize his son’s "achievements" as mayor of Dalian.^[14] They commissioned author Chen Zufeng to pen a report portraying Bo as a man who is "as statesman-like as Henry Kissinger, as environmentally conscious as Al Gore, and almost as beloved by the public as Princess Diana."^[14] Despite the publicity campaign, Bo Xilai failed even to gain a seat in the Liaoning provincial delegation to the Party Congress. Ultimately, Bo Yibo helped him gain a seat with the Shanxi delegation, but the younger Bo was unable to secure a promotion.^[14]

In addition, Bo placed second-last in the confirmation vote for membership in the 15th Central Committee. As he placed in the bottom 5% of candidates, Bo was denied entry into the elite council, suffering a major political embarrassment.^[4] Bo's failure to get elected was attributed to a general opposition to nepotism within the Party.^[14] Moreover, during his tenure in Dalian, Bo caused resentment for the amount of 'special favours' that he procured for the coastal city at the expense of the rest of the province.^[14] His perceived partisan interests locked Bo's kin in a factional struggle against Li Tieying, one of China's central leadership figures, who may have created obstacles to his promotion.^[14]

Provincial Governor[link]

In 2001, a corruption scandal involving former Liaoning governor Zhang Guoguang provided an opportunity for Bo's advancement.^[13] Prior to the 15th Party Congress, Bo Yibo and Bo Xilai assisted then-President Jiang Zemin in preparing to force political rival Qiao Shi into retirement. The Bo family also supported Jiang's lacklustre "Three Stresses" (San Jiang) campaign in 1997.^[9] Such unwavering support for Jiang was said to have worked in Bo Xilai's favour when the vacancy for Governor of Liaoning opened. Bo became acting Governor in 2001 after the dismissal and arrest of Zhang Guoguang,^[9] and was officially confirmed as Governor in 2003.^[10] In his position as governor, which he held until 2004, Bo gained membership to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.^[4]

During his tenure in Liaoning, Bo played a critical role in the promotion of the Northeast Area Revitalization Plan. Adopted in 2003 by party authorities, the policy aimed to strengthen economic development in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. Bo Xilai was particularly enthusiastic about the policy, stating his desire to see the northeast become "China's fourth economic engine" (the others being the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and the Bohai Economic Region).^[4]

The northeast region was at one time known as the "cradle of industrialization" of China. In 1980, industrial output for Liaoning province alone was twice that of the southern Guangdong province. However, the northeast was left behind amidst market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, while regions like Guangdong prospered. Its economy—still largely tied to state-owned enterprises—stagnated relative to other regions, with high unemployment rates.^[4] The revitalisation plan aimed to address this by reviving the region’s traditional industries, strengthening trade ties with and encouraging investment from South Korea and Japan, and experimenting with free trade zones in select cities.^[18] In 2004, official media reported that foreign direct investment in Liaoning had nearly doubled since the launch in 2003 of the northeastern rejuvenation strategy.^[19]

Although Bo established a reputation as a comparatively clean politician during his tenures in Dalian and as governor of Liaoning,^[20] he was not immune to corruption allegations. In particular, Bo was the subject of critical investigative reports by Liaoning journalist Jiang Weiping,^[21] the whistleblower in the Mu and Ma corruption case in Liaoning – a scandal that Bo benefited from politically. While Bo was not directly involved in the scandal, Jiang accused Bo of providing political cover for his friends and relatives.^[21] Jiang was initially sentenced to eight years in prison on trumped-up charges, for which Bo was criticized, but was released after five years under international pressure.^[13][22] Yang Rong, the former chief executive of Brilliance China Automotive who fled to the United States after getting embroiled in a dispute against state property authorities, accused Bo of interfering in his judicial proceedings in Beijing.^[13] In addition, Bo openly clashed with Wen Shizhen, then-party secretary in Liaoning who was technically Bo's superior.^[4][13] Wen reportedly criticized Bo for "developing China's cities like Europe and its countryside like Africa," and even held a party to celebrate Bo's departure from Liaoning in 2004.^[23]

Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters have accused Bo of leading an especially severe crackdown on the group during his tenure in Liaoning.^[24][25] They have filed lawsuits against Bo in over ten countries, alleging torture and crimes against humanity.^[26][27] In 2007 Bo was found liable for the torture of a Falun Gong practitioner in an uncontested civil suit in Australia.^[28]

16th Party Congress[link]

At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, Bo's age, regional tenures, and patronage links fit the profile for a potential candidate to be groomed for the "5th generation of leaders" that would assume power in 2012. His chief competitors were seen as Xi Jinping, then party chief in the coastal province of Zhejiang, and Li Keqiang, a populist Tuanpai candidate who was the Governor of the central province of Henan.^[9] As with the 15th Party Congress five years earlier, the elder Bo lobbied for his son's promotion.^[9] The Bo family enjoyed the patronage of Jiang Zemin. However, Bo Xilai's unequivocal support for Jiang strengthened the reluctance of his political opponents to support his nomination. Ultimately, although Bo remained a top contender for higher promotion, Xi and Li remained the main candidates to succeed Hu Jintao as Paramount leader.^[9]

Minister of Commerce[link]

Commerce Minister Bo meets his American counterpart, Carlos Gutierrez, during a visit to the United States in 2007

When Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as General Secretary in late 2002, Bo's career as a local official ended with his appointment to Minister of Commerce in Wen Jiabao's cabinet to replace Lü Fuyuan, who retired for health reasons. Bo concurrently served as a member of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Bo's stint as Minister of Commerce significantly raised his international profile and generated media attention both in China and abroad. Described as good-looking, articulate and open-minded in his approach to problems,^[29] Bo's rise from a municipal official to the central government generated great media fanfare and elevated his status to something of a 'political star.' Bo's political persona was considered a departure from the generally serious and conservative leadership in Beijing. With his youthful vigour, populism, and purported popularity with female reporters, Bo's political rise had been compared to that of John F. Kennedy.^[30]

Bo presided over a continued rise in foreign investment in China as Minister of Commerce. His daily schedule was dominated by receiving foreign guests and dignitaries. By the time that he became Minister, he spoke relatively fluent and colloquial English. During a meeting with American officials, Bo reputedly told a struggling interpreter to stop translating because the Chinese officials could understand English and it was wasting time. In May 2004 Bo was one of the few ministers hand-picked to accompany Premier Wen Jiabao on a five-country trip to Europe.^[30] The trade policy of the United States toward China also sparked significant controversy. Bo maintained a conciliatory but assertive attitude as he attended talks in Washington.^[30] On his trips to the United States, he conducted substantive discussions with his American counterparts and signed agreements on intellectual property, the services sector, agricultural products, food safety, and consumer protection.^[30]

Bo also oversaw the restructuring of the Ministry, formed from the amalgamation of the National Economics and Commerce Bureau and the Department of International Trade. Bo sought to balance the amount of attention given to foreign investors and domestic commercial institutions. He began tackling the imbalance from the retail sector, whose success up to that point was largely dependent on foreign companies.^[30] He drew up plans to protect Chinese industries' competitive position within a domestic market that was quickly being crowded out by foreign competition.^[31]

17th Party Congress[link]

At the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, Bo gained a seat on the 25-member Politburo, effectively China's ruling council. He was then tipped to leave the Ministry of Commerce and take over as party chief in the southwestern megalopolis of Chongqing. Bo’s predecessor, political rival Wang Yang, was reassigned as party chief of Guangdong province.

At the time, Chongqing was reeling from problems such as air and water pollution, unemployment, poor public health, and complications from the Three Gorges Dam.^[6] According to analysts, Hu wanted to transfer his ally Wang Yang out of Chongqing before these problems intensified.^[6] Bo was initially reluctant to go to Chongqing and was reportedly unhappy with his new assignment. He had hoped to become vice-premier instead,^[32] but Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice-premier Wu Yi argued against Bo's promotion to vice-premiership. In particular, Wu was critical of Bo’s penchant for self-promotion,^[23] and Wen cited international lawsuits against Bo by Falun Gong adherents as a barrier to his holding higher office.^[6]

Bo took up the Chongqing post on 30 November, a month following the conclusion of the Congress, even though Wang Yang had vacated the position on 13 November.^[32] Whilst some saw this transfer as a 'banishment' from the central government to the hinterlands to keep Bo's perceived arrogance and high-profile antics out of Beijing's view,^[6] others considered it a promotion since being the party chief in one of the four direct-controlled municipalities came with an ex officio seat on the Politburo.^[32][33]

Chongqing[link]

The Chongqing model[link]

Although Bo was initially unhappy about his re-assignment in Chongqing, he soon resolved to use his new position as a staging ground for a return to higher national office.^[34] Bo made no secret of his desire to enter the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) during the 18th Party Congress in autumn 2012,^[35] all but two of the PSC members—including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao—were expected to retire.^[29] The transition would be an opportunity for Bo to join the highest echelon of national leadership, likely as a replacement for ally Zhou Yongkang, secretary of the Central Political and Legislative Committee, serving as the head of the party's security apparatus.^[35][36]