Who are Syria’s BIG FIVE Insurgent leaders?
by Joshua Landis (with help from the SC experts)
October 1, 2013

If we confine our choices to leaders with broad appeal in the Arab and Islamist mainstream — excluding both al-Qaida and Kurdish leaders — we get the following five, listed in order.

Hassan Abboud

1. Hassan Abboud, the general head of the Islamic movement of Ahrar Al-Sham, spearheaded the joint position of what some are calling the Islamic Alliance, but which is looser than an alliance of mainly northern-based militias. They have rejected the SNC and US backed exile groups. Al-Nusra was one of the groups that signed the alliance, along with #3 and #4 below.

2. Zahran Alloush, the general Commander of Jaysh al-Islam or Islam Army, a group of more than 50 brigades. He is the son of a Saudi-based religious scholar named sheikh Abdullah Mohammed Alloush. Syrian authorities released him from prison in mid-2011. He was incarcerated for his Salafist opposition activities in Sidnaya prison along with #1 and #3. He states that the external opposition does not represent him or his group and that there is no chance at negotiations with the regime. His Islam Army flies the black flag and not the Syrian flag.

3. Ahmad `Aisa al-Shaykh, or Abu Aissa, commander of Suqour al-Sham Brigade, Falcons of Syria Brigade, based in Idlib.

4. Abdul Qader Al-Salih, the high Commander of Liwa al-Tawhid, Unity Brigade, in Aleppo. (the formal top leader is Abdelaziz Salame)

5: Bashar Al-Zoubi, the Commander of Liwa al-Yarmouk in the south of Syria around Deraa. The Supreme Military Command (the US backed leadership of the Free Syrian Army) has named him the commander of the Southern Front. He is the only member of this top-five who has not expressed a wish to see an Islamist Syria.

Ahmed Abu Issa, Abdel Qader Saleh, Zahran Alloush

Taken together, these leaders represent not even half of the insurgency. The top five are not enough to run the rebellion, but they are either major actors in their core areas or very big nationally, or both. A small group on the national level can be a superpower in its own hometown. There are many more powerful leaders in Syria. We look forward to adding and correcting.

These are people who have significant influence over the insurgency. They are swing voters.

Over the last several months, the insurgency has undergone a “Darwinian” shakedown. Powerful leaders are emerging and smaller militias are lining up with the larger sharks. All the same, we are only at the beginning of this process. The opposition remains extremely fragmented and volatile.

Any discussion of Geneva II talks to end the Syrian conflict will be sterile without these commanders at the table. The top four say they are unwilling to sit at the negotiation table with the regime. In fact, their main issue with the National Coalition is that the NC is considering negotiating with the regime.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS, according to US gov.

It is hard to imagine any of them backtracking on this position in the near future.

Other Powerful Commanders

If one is considering military might alone, one must add the head of ISIS – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In military terms, he is stronger than Bashar al-Zoubi, our #5. But he doesn’t have appeal outside the Islamist hardline segment. So here we go:

• Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – al-Qaida.
• Abu Mohammad al-Golani of al-Nusra Front or Jabhat al-Nusra – al-Qaida
• 

  Sipan Hemo of YPG – Kurdish militia

  Salih Muslim Muhammad/Sipan Hemo, Hemo is commander of the Kurdish Peoples Defence Units (YPG) in Syria – See an interview with Hemo. The YPG is the military arm of the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat) the leader of which is Salih Muslim Muhammad. This is the Syrian branch of the PKK, which is kept under civilian control so Salih Muslim PYD and not Hemo is perhaps the correct listing. It has been battling Nusra and ISIS over the last several months for control of the North-east.
• Abu Sayeh Juneidi of Farouq Brigades, one of the largest and well-known units of the FSA (Homs). It placed itself under Suquor al-Sham commander Ahmed Abu Issa in Sept 2012. (Farouq seems weakened of late).
• 

  Jamal Maarouf

  Jamal Maarouf (Abu Khalid) of Shuhada Souria, Syrian Martyrs’ Brigade, Idlib governate, FSA. Jamal claims to have 18 ,000 fighters between Idlib and Aleppo, but like all troop estimates, this should be taken with a grain of salt. He’s a non-Islamist leader. He is both religious and conservative, but not Ikhwan and not salafi, just not ideological.

• Mohammed al-Khatib of Furqan Brigades, active west of Damascus down toward the Golan. also not irrelevant.
• Ziad Haj Obaid commands Ahfad Rasoul with two others. The name meaning Grandsons of the Prophet. He is on the Arms Committee for the Supreme Military Command. Much of Ahfad’s funding came from Qatar, which may explain its recent weakness.
• There are more who we lack info on.

Further Notes on Commanders:

Addendum (Oct 2, 2013): Hassan Hassan published an important article “The Army of Islam Is Winning in Syria” arguing that the Islamic Army led by Zahran Alloush is probably now stronger than Hassan Abboud’s Ahrar al-Sham. This is hard to tell, but it is worth quoting him at length.

But today, Salafi-leaning insurgents are the single most dominant force in liberated areas. Liwa al-Islam, which is the central player in the Army of Islam, now dwarfs both the FSA and radical militias such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra, which long played a prominent role in the region. These groups had coordinated with each other through a Damascus military council, but Ahrar al-Sham pulled out of the council shortly after the merger, issuing an angry statement that criticized “the hegemony of certain factions and the exclusion of [other] effective ones.”…

Saudi Arabia appears to be central to the merger of rebel groups around Damascus. Liwa al-Islam chief Zahran Alloush is backed by Riyadh, while both Ahrar al-Sham, which is supported by Qatar, and Jabhat al-Nusra have been excluded from the new grouping. Although Liwa al-Islam had been part of the Saudi-backed FSA, the spokesman of the new grouping told an Arabic television channel that the Army of Islam is not part of the FSA. This is likely because the FSA has lost the trust of many rebel groups, and adopting a religious language will be more effective in countering the appeal of radical groups — which is what happened after the announcement of the merger, as various Islamists and moderate groups welcomed the move.

Zahran Alloush, Liwa al-Islam, who founded the Islam Army a week ago. He peaks of the resurrection of the Omayyad Empire and cleansing of the Majous or crypto-Iranians: Rafida (Shiites) and Nusayri (Alawites) from Damascus (minute 5). He does not have much faith in democracy, claiming that a committee of Islamic scholars will decide on the form of government and the role that minorities will play in a future state. He calls for Muslims from the world over to come do their duty in Syria and fight Jihad. He claims that every insurgent commander is an Islamist and argues that the reason the Assad regime surrounded Damascus and suppressed its people is because the people’s natural inclination is to build an Islamic state following the spirit of the Ommayad state. For this reason, the Majousi regime was frightened of the people. In his interview with Aljazeera, he is asked about his relationship with Idriss, Commander in Chief of the FSA and SMC member; Alloush said

Idriss should be more serious and active in helping the mujahidiin and not listen to orders he gets from here and there to favor certain groups with aid in order to advance foreign agendas that are being promoted for our umma

Abdul Qadir al-Salih

Abdul Qader Saleh is powerful as things stand today, but should Aleppo fall entirely into rebel hands and should Liwa al-Tawhid remain dominant there, Abdul Qader will become powerful indeed. Aleppo is the capital of the North and it and its suburbs include about half the population under rebel control.

Bashar al-Zoubi

Bashar Zoubi, Liwa Yarmouk: This militia is not huge, Zoubi says around 5,000, but if you want a southern faction, it’s probably the biggest. He seems much less Islamist & more SMC/Western linked than the brigades that have linked up with Zahran Alloush’s Islam Army around Damascus. The Deraa front in general seems less Islamist, with weapons coming in from Jordan and Saudi. The US, Jordan and Saudi are working together to avoid building up Islamists. Although a Daraa source suggests that many of the Daraa militias are placing themselves under Zahran Alloush since his dramatic announcement of the formation of the Army of Islam, Liwa Yarmouk and several other power hitters around Deraa have not. See this list for those that have joined Islam Army http://justpaste.it/d81t – I think a few more have joined since.

Posted by Joshua Landis

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, released an audio recording Monday September 2013 to defend ISIS against recent attacks in the media.

Everyone has been waiting for this statement ever since the ISIS kicked the North Storm and FSA militias out of Azaz, north of Aleppo. The speculation was that ISIS was preparing to take over the border crossing with Turkey in order to capture the revenue and place a strategic chock-hold on goods moving to Aleppo. Turkey closed the border crossing in response.

An English translation has yet to be published. Here are a few quick points:

Reflections on the Syrian Chemical Weapons Issue and the Possibility of Ending the Civil War

by William R. Polk (Prof. emeritus, Univ of Chicago & ex-member of the Policy Planning Council of the United States Department of State)
September 15, 2013

Because so much of the information and comment in the media, particularly in America, is fragmentary, diffuse and even contradictory, I thought it might be useful to attempt to put together a more coherent account of how we interpret what we now know. Since most of the focus in government pronouncements and the media is on weapons and their use, I will here provide notes on (1) weapons’ variety, their characteristics, their cost and their availability; (2)  a short history of chemical weapons;  (3)  the Russian intervention;  (4)  why the Syrians have accepted the Russian proposal;  (5) the prospects for  ridding the area of the weapons of mass destruction; (6)  the possibility of ending the civil war;  (7)  who the Insurgents are and what they want;  and  (8)  predictable results of a collapse of the Syrian state.

1. The Variety of Weapons and Their characteristics

Three sorts of weapons figure in the Syrian conflict:  the first are  “conventional” light and heavy weapons:  rifles, machineguns, grenades and artillery.[1] They have done most of the killing in the civil war.  Of an estimated 100,000 casualties, they have killed over 99 in each 100.  Perhaps the best guess on who the casualties were comes from an Non-Governmental Organization based in London, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.  It finds that 21,850 rebels fighters, 27,654 regular army soldiers, 17,824 militia fighters and about 40,000 civilians have been killed as of September this year.[2]

So far unused but prominent in any political calculation are nuclear weapons which are known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  So far they are possessed only by Israel with which country Syria is at war.  The third category of weapons, also regarded as WMD are chemical weapons.  They figure in the inventory of several states including both Syria and Israel.    These weapons are made of various forms of gas (mustard,  which causes severe burns, and the nerve gases, Sarin, VX and perhaps others).

Weapons of Mass destruction are characterized by several common features.  The first is that there is no effective means of protection from them.  At the top end,  a nuclear weapon, delivered by rocket or jet airplane cannot be detected or reliably disabled before reaching its target.   Some chemical weapons do not even have to be delivered: they can be carried (as they were in the First World War) by wind or allowed simply to escape where they are to take effect.  Gas masks were fabricated to guard against them over a century ago, but they offer only limited protection.  Some gas compounds, particularly Sarin, can contaminate clothing and remain lethal long after the person removes the mask.  Against white phosphorous, a particularly horrible form of napalm,  there is no effective means of defense if the person is in the open.[3]

The second common feature of  chemical weapons of mass destruction is that their impact is dramatic.  Even threat of their use spreads terror not only among intended targets but among the population of wide areas.  This feature is heightened by the fact that unintended victims usually have no warning.    All weapons of mass destruction are horrible, but they vary widely in cost and effectiveness.  Nuclear weapons are the most expensive and not only can kill all life in a given area but also leave behind contamination that can kill or maim those who survived the initial attack for decades or more.   Even “lesser” nuclear weapons such as depleted uranium shell casing are believed to have resulted in greatly increased cases of cancer.  So far as I have been able to find out,  depleted uranium has not yet been used in Syria, but such shells are known to be in the inventory of some of the armies.

Chemical weapons have been described as “the poor nations’ weapons of mass destruction.”  Gas can be manufactured relatively cheaply and in what are relatively speaking rudimentary laboratories.   According to a Russian study, the only publically available investigation, gas has been used several times in the Syrian war, once, the Russians assert, by the rebels in or near Aleppo.  We do not yet, as of this writing, have the official UN study of the gas attacks near Damascus.  Indeed, we do not yet know precisely how many people were killed.  The numbers are variously reported:  by Médecins Sans Frontières (355),  French intelligence (281), British Intelligence (350), the insurgent “Syrian National Coalition” (650) and the American government (1,429).

Mention of the relatively small number of Syrian casualties caused by gas is not to excuse its use; on the contrary, it is to question why Western statesmen did not regard the death of the nearly 100,000 killed by convention weapons a cause for action.  But the gas issue at least gives us a place to start ridding the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction.

If chemical weapons are relatively unimportant in the Syrian Civil War, why did the Syrian Government manufacture and keep them?  The answer, of course, is that they were not intended to be used in a civil war; rather, they were intended to deter an Israeli attack and to balance against Israel’s own inventory of nuclear and chemical weapons.[4]     Like nuclear weapons,  those states that still have poison gas regard it as a means of deterrence rather than offense.[5]   This, of course, was the position of the United States on poison gas.  It is perhaps worth pausing on that point since the statements by American officials will have been considered by other nations in the light of American actions.  So a bit of history:

2.   A  Short History of Chemical Weapons

The only nation to use poison gas during the Second World War was Japan, but the United States and other Allied governments feared that the Nazi regime might opt to do so as its defeat neared.  Germany indeed developed and manufactured Sarin and other particularly lethal agents.  So the United States also began to develop and manufacture them.  In 1943, it shipped mustard gas to Europe.  The ship carrying the gas was bombed and sunk by the Luftwaffe in Bari on December 2.  Some 62 merchant seamen were killed by the escaping gas.  Then, after the war ended, the US Army began to experiment with captured German gas.  To gage its effect, the Army exposed hundreds of thousands of American soldiers.[6]  As I mentioned in a previous essay,[7]  when I was a member of the Policy Planning Council and was studying weapons in the Middle East, I was given a briefing on chemical weapons at Fort Meade.  I was so revolted by the videos I was shown that I wrote President Kennedy arguing that we must end the program and give up chemical weapons.  Nothing was done until November 1969 when President Nixon unilaterally renounced first use of them and ordered the destruction of the then huge US stockpile of some 31,500 tons.  In 1975 the US adhered to the Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological weapons.  Thereafter, it continued destroying weapons, but in 1986, President Reagan restarted Sarin gas production when he was advised that Soviet Union was moving toward gas warfare planning.  Nine years later, under President Clinton, the US Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.

This Chemical Weapons Convention  of 1997 remains the standard against which issues of potential gas warfare are to be judged.  As of September 2013, 190 states had ratified the convention; Syria is not a party to the Convention while Israel and Myanmar (Burma) have signed but not ratified it.

Ratifying the Convention legally obligated the United States to complete the destruction of its stockpile within a decade.  It did not do so and made use of an automatic extension of five years.  The extension ran out in April 2012.  Today, the United States is in violation of the treaty as it still has approximately 3,000 tons of Sarin, VX and Mustard Gas.  Presumably it has been delayed by strategic, safety, environmental and fiscal considerations.  The program will cost perhaps $35 billion.

Use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict has been a matter of much speculation and controversy.  The mandate of the UN inspectors does not require or perhaps even allow them to answer the question of who employed chemical weapons last month, but possibly they will be allowed to answer that question indirectly.  That is,  if the gas was of “military grade,” then presumably the rebels would not have had access to it although one allegation is that they may have received the gas that was used from a foreign military source;  if, on the other hand, the gas was “home made”  – and there have been several recent allegations of attempts to purchase from abroad[8]  the raw materials from which Sarin is made — then presumably it was not from the Syrian army depot. Thus, hopefully, at least some of the contention over who did what to whom may be resolved in the report of the UN inspectors.

3.   The Russian Intervention

Like the United States, Russia has a perceived national interest in the politics of the Middle East.  The American interest is usually seen as having five components – access to energy on acceptable terms, protection of the forces it has committed to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons into hostile hands, prevention of the spread of terrorism against America or American targets and the protection of Israel.

While I am not privy to the deliberations of this generation of Russian strategists, I twice lectured at the then Soviet Academy of Science’s premier “think tank” on world affairs, the Institute of World Economy and International Affairs and thus developed some sense of how Russian strategists see the world.  My hunch is that they would describe their national interests in the Middle East as having these components.

First, unlike the United States, Russia has a large indigenous Muslim population.   Leaving aside the Central Asian republics, which are almost entirely Muslim and in whose affairs the Russian state is and will remain heavily involved, about 1 in 6 Russians is a Muslim. Thus, Russia must be and is deeply concerned that events in the Middle East do not “infect” Russian domestic politics and specifically that the violent segment of the Middle Eastern Muslim community does not further inflame Muslim separatism in Russia.  This is a particular worry for the Russians in their Chechnya “federal subject.”

The Russian government, like all governments, is also concerned with prestige.  Particularly after the implosion of the Soviet Union following its defeat in Afghanistan,[9] prestige has dwindled and restoring it must be a serious concern.   (More pointedly, it is crucial in the survival of political leaders.)   Russia wants and will pursue the role of a major world power; it may never again be one of two, but it can aspire to being (along with China and India) one of four.

The Russians also have “security” and commercial  interests such as the port in Syria they are building for their Mediterranean naval operations and as an outlet to the Mediterranean for energy exports.

So Syria is both a danger and an opportunity for Russia;  it is foolish to write off its interests, as some have done, as merely an emotional “blowback” from its defeat in the Cold War.  No less than the United States, it has interests that will continue to guide its policy.  It is in this light that we should see the Russian proposal in Syria.

As President Vladimir Putin has written,[10]  “a strike [on Syria] will result in more innocent victims and escalation, potentially spreading the conflict far beyond Syria’s borders.  A strike would increase violence and unleash a new wave of terrorism.  It could undermine multilateral efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and further destabilize the Middle East and North Africa.  It could throw the entire system of international law out of balance.”

Mr. Putin went on to say that the forces opposed to the Syrian government include groups designated by the United States as terrorists and include “hundreds of militants from Western countries and even Russia [who] are an issue of our deep concern.  Might they not return to our countries with experience acquired in Syria.  After all, after fighting in Libya, extremists moved on to Mali.  This threatens us all…[But] If we can avoid force against Syria, this will improve the atmosphere in international affairs and strengthen mutual trust.  It will be our shared success and open the door to cooperation on other critical issues.”

As of this writing, we do not know precisely the dimensions of the Russian proposal.  The broad outline, however, appears clear and simple:   Syria would reveal and then in due course turn over to some recognized authority, under the supervision of either or both the United Nations or Russia, its chemical weapons inventory.  Since the inventory is presumably both large (to deter Israeli attack) and housed in many locations (to survive Israeli attack) “neutralizing” it will be a lengthy process.    Judging by the American experience, it may last 20 or more years and, by the terms of the Convention, would be legally allowed to take place  for at least 15 years.  Thus, implicit in the Russian proposal is a willingness to assume a long-term role in Syrian and, by extension, Middle Eastern affairs.

Playing this role would presumably require a large presence of both military and civilian Russian officials as well as UN staff and UN-designated contingents from other countries.  These groups would inevitably have to work together to accomplish the basic mission and to maintain themselves  in the midst of a dangerous civil war.   Moreover, they would have to create supply lines as many of their necessities are now and will continue to be severely restricted in many of the areas in which they will have to operate.  I would guess that the numbers are likely to be 5-10 thousand Russians and perhaps twice that number of UN-designated peacekeeping forces from third countries.   Estimates of the costs have not yet been publically revealed.  However, they are unlikely to be less than $20 billion.  Presumably the Russian General Staff and the Soviet Academy are now at work refining those estimates.

4.   Why the Syrians Have Accepted the Russian Proposal

President Asad informed  the United Nations on September 10 that Syria would sign the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention and forwarded to  New York the preliminary documents.  Then,  speaking on Russian television, he said that his government would begin providing information on its chemical weapons a month after adherence.  In what will probably, to judge from the history of US-Soviet arms control negotiations,  be a long series of points of disagreement among the three parties, US Secretary of State John Kerry immediately demanded faster action.  That may not be possible as is evident in America’s own performance to implement the terms of the Convention.  So rather than a sigh of relief, the Russian proposal and the Syrian acceptance have begun in controversy.

What is President Bashar al-Asad committing the Syrian government to do  and why did it accept the Russian proposal?

If the Russians have to put military or security forces into the country to protect their teams engaged in destroying nuclear stockpiles, as I assume they will have to do, the Syrian military could, conceivably, reduce its forces.  I doubt that this will seem attractive to the regime because it is both heavily dependent upon the military to maintain itself in power in the midst of the civil war and because the economy is not now able to absorb any significant infusion of job-seekers.   Regime policy will also, of course, continue to  be shaped by fear of hostilities with Israel.  So the government is unlikely to reduce its forces.  What the government could do is to concentrate its forces more effectively to deal with the rebels.  Thus, it seems reasonable to believe that the regime might welcome the Russian offer on this ground alone.

But there are other grounds for the Syrian government to accept the Russian offer.  The first, obviously, is that it is likely to have made an imminent and  devastating American attack unlikely or even impossible.   Press reports suggest that the mood in Damascus already reflects this new optimism.  There is, as yet, only a negative response from the titular leaders of the opposition, but since the opposition is internally deeply and bitterly divided, it seems likely that some of the more moderate or conservative of its hundreds of component groups, may reconsider their positions as the Russians, the UN and perhaps others begin to employ natives to assist in their arms control operations.

Another reason for the Syrian government to accept the Russian proposal is that it should lift external threats for a lengthy period, perhaps years.  Once the program gets under way, it would be difficult or impossible for the United States or Israel to intervene militarily.  It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this change:  Syrians governments have lived literally under the gun for half a century.  Periodically, Israel has violated Syrian air space and bombed Syrian installations.  With a Russian force in residence and forced to protect its widely scattered personnel and a significant UN peacekeeping force interspersed among the Russians,  the government can to some degree discount external aggression.

Covert subversive activities are likely, of course, to continue.  The government has not been able to stop them and is unlikely to do so in the future.  But the Syrians have learned to live with this threat, and it is probable that the Russian presence will bring the concomitant of security assistance.  This is almost certain to include training, provision of or stationing in Syria of more sophisticated weapons and some sharing of counterintelligence.

Yet another reason for the Syrian government to approve Russian involvement is less dramatic but perhaps  more crucial.  Syria is desperately short of food, particularly wheat,     If I were a Russian planner I would see augmenting the food supply of the Syrian people as a major opportunity and if I were a Syrian policy planner, I would see it as vital.  It will be limited and probably short-term. Russian farmers have suffered from drought in the last several years but expect to be able to export about 10 million metric tons of wheat this coming year; Syria has not been able to export any of its wheat crop, its major foreign exchange earner, since 2008. Syria still faces a strategic problem since water supplies are declining with no likelihood of improvement in the foreseeable future – but the value to the Syrian government of even short term – tactical — food aid in the next few years cannot be overestimated.

5.   The Prospects for  Ridding The Area of Weapons of Mass Destruction

If there is a “silver lining” in the Syrian crisis, it could be that it would awaken the world to the dangers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that serious moves will be taken at least to diminish them.  Let us be as precise as possible on both the dangers and the possible remedies.

As an “insider” in the Cuban Missile Crisis, I believe I can claim the right to say once again that the existence of WMD anywhere are a menace to people everywhere.  In the midst of the Missile Crisis and ever since I have thought of the words of  John Donne.  We cannot repeat them often enough:

No man is an island, 
Entire of itself, 
Every man is a piece of the continent, 
A part of the main.
 If a clod be washed away by the sea,
 Europe is the less.
 As well as if a promontory were.
 As well as if a manor of thy friend’s
 Or of thine own were: 
Any man’s death diminishes me, 
Because I am involved in mankind,
 And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; 
It tolls for thee.

We – Syrians of both camps, Russians, Americans, Israelis, Iranians and others – are part of the main.  In the Cuban Missile Crisis we knew that those distinctions were not operative.  Any use of WMD would have tolled the bell for all mankind.

There were then many reasons not to listen.  There always will be.  And the bell may not sound loudly enough to awaken us.  But we need to awaken and to keep searching for ways to effect its message.

Why do nations have WMD?  The simple answer is that they are afraid of one another.  That is immediately clear in the context of Syria:  the Syrians are afraid of the Israelis and the Israelis are afraid of the Syrians and other Arab states.  Fear is often irrational, but it can be subjected to reason.  Or, at least, can be fitted into a restraining matrix.  Is this conceivable in the Middle East?

I think it is.  Syria has moved to give up its piece of what one of our own “big  bomb” strategists called “the delicate balance of terror.”  If fully carried out, that will be a somewhat irrational move. Any Syrian government will seek compensation. Compensation can come in one of several ways.  Russia can provide Syria with guarantees.  If they are prudent, the Syrians will not place complete confidence in this or any other foreign guarantees.  This is because governments change and even the interests of existing governments change so that commitments made at one time may dissolve at another.  Russia may also provide Syria with advanced conventional arms.  But what are advanced today are soon obsolescent and eventually become obsolete.  So more permanent compensatory moves must be made if we wish to diminish our dangers over a long term.  What might they be?

The obvious answer is in moves that could be made by the Israeli government.   It is the major holder of WMD in the Middle East.  But why should Israel give up any advantage?  The only politically conceivable reason would be that it reckons such a move  would be in its own interest?  Would it?

Consider an answer to that question in this sequence:  when Israel moved to acquire WMD in the 1960s, its conventional forces were already stronger than those of its Arab neighbors, but, in the Israeli calculus, only marginally so.  Today they are very much stronger and, with American assistance,  getting technically more advanced.  But at least some of the Arab countries and Iran are moving toward sufficient technological skill and manufacturing capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Others, like Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf states may, potentially, be able to buy what they cannot now build.  So, while possession of WMD once gave Israel security, sooner or later emphasis on WMD could be a source of insecurity.  Feeling threatened by Israeli power, other states may accelerate their move to match it.  And the only feasible or proximate means to do so is by acquiring WMD. In short, more countries could acquire the capacity to destroy Israel.   So, while it maintains its overwhelming conventional military power, Israel would be wise to begin to consider some alternative to WMD, just as we have done vis-à-vis Russia.

6.   The Possibility of Ending the Civil War

While the destruction of chemical weapons will have little or no direct effect on the civil war, the indirect results can be significant.  As I mentioned above, the rebel leadership immediately condemned the Russian proposal.   Particularly the more radical groups take  President Putin at his word: Russia will throw its weight behind stopping the war by supporting the Syrian government.  As mentioned above, he warned of the spread of terrorism and tied it to the insurgents.  While supporting the insurgents, in general, President Obama in his September 10 “address to the Nation on Syria” acknowledged that “It’s true that some of Assad’s opponents are extremists.”  Thus, while the Western media has been almost wholly committed to the rebels and their causes, I think we will look back on these early moves as the beginning of a change in the perception of the insurgency.  The insurgents appear to share the same perception.

How significant will that change of perception be?  It is of course impossible to judge with any precision, but it should be noted that it began even before the Russian move.  Whereas until the last few weeks, almost all media reports have emphasized the brutality of the Asad regime and its henchmen, stories have begun to appear of acts of terror, murder and vandalism by some of the rebel groups.[11] The narrow terms of reference of the UN investigation will probably not add much to what is already known, but the lengthy documentation the Russians have gathered on actions by the insurgents may add to the momentum behind the trend.  And  some of the enthusiasts for the rebel cause  and the most prominent self-proclaimed expert on Syria,[12]  have lost the powerful leverage they had on American governmental and public opinion just a short while ago.  The latest polls show almost 3 out of 4 Americans believe the current threat against the Syrian government is “unwise.”[13]

It has surprised me that President Obama and the conservative Gulf states have managed to keep both feet firmly planted in opposite camps:   while generally opposing Muslims of all varieties and singling out some of their most significant groups as terrorists affiliated with al-Qaida, they have supported them with weapons, money and training.

To my mind, more significant is the general recognition that, just as in Libya where we similarly supported a rebellion against a government,[14] the rebels have little or no capacity to form a stable successor government if, with American, European and conservative Arab governments, they manage to overthrow the Asad regime.  In contrast, as I have pointed out, the Russian position is straightforward:  they are worried about the possible effect of the Syrian Muslim rebels on the 1 in 6 Russians who is a Muslim and some of whose relatives is now engaged in Syria. So, understandably, while still locked in a struggle against their own dissidents in Chechnya, the Russians aim to weaken insurgents in Syria.

The Russian position comes down to the simple argument that the Syrian government must be enabled to survive.  The American position is more vague but repeated statements and the work of the CIA to equip and train the rebels suggest that the Obama Administration is determined at least not to allow the Syrian government to win.  Does this mean that the Administration wants the rebels to win?   It appears so.  In this event, what we have is a proxy war imposed on top of a civil war, and that could go on for a generation or more.

But,  speaking as an old policy planner, it does not seem to me that there is a clear strategy that could define what would be meant by the rebels winning.  I propose to deal with this conundrum in my next essay.  First, let us look at the insurgents.

7.   Who Are the Insurgents and What do they Want?

The short answer is that despite frequent assertions to the contrary, we still know little about the insurgents.  They have not one but hundreds – by some accounts as many as 1,200 —  conflicting organizations of which only one, Jabhat an-Nusri, seems to have organizational and doctrinal cohesion.  The guess is that the total number of combatants may be upwards of 70,000 to 100,000.  While I have no access to intelligence reports my study of what I have called Violent Politics[15] suggests  that the most radical groups usually win in the internecine struggle.  Thus, my bet would be on the Jabhat an-Nusra, a self-proclaimed affiliate or partner to al-Qaida,  rather than on the diffuse and disorganized Free Syrian Army.

The Free Syrian Army is presumably largely made up of Syrian farmers who lost their their livelihood in the several-year-long drought that devastated the farm lands.    Now out of work and destitute, they are the foot soldiers of the insurgency.

Apparently different from them in motivation and objective are the largely foreign contingent of Jabhat an-Nusra.  What little is known of them suggests that they came to Syria because they believe that its struggle is their struggle.  And, as I have written previously,[16] they have been inspired by the Egyptian theologian Sayid Qutub to aim not only at a “free” Syria but a free Muslim community, an ummah or even a sort of restored caliphate.  Is theirs a feasible goal?

8.   Predictable Results of a Collapse of the Syrian State

American policy was aimed, apparently without adequate attention to the consequences, at the destruction of the Asad regime.  Russian policy, as I have laid out, aims in the other direction, the preservation of the Syrian government more or less as now constituted.   At the present time, the Russian policy is in the ascendant, but there are powerful forces in America, Western Europe and the Middle East behind the American initiative.  I will now suggest what might be the result of each line action.  I begin with the Obama objective.

The Obama administration seems to believe that some sort of amalgamation of the rebels and the government can take place; yet, at the same time, it has constantly emphasized its charge that the Asad regime is criminal and must be degraded or replaced.  I have yet to see any indication of who could effect its demise and on what terms how such a successor could make a deal with the insurgents. Much blood has been spilt and the desire for vengeance is apparently very strong among both government forces and the rebels.  While it is never wise to say that the two sides cannot be reconciled, an amalgamation seems to me to be the least likely outcome.

More likely, if the central government is destroyed, is some sort of balkanization.  That is to say, a de facto break up of the country into several ethno-religious blocs.[17]

Consider this prediction briefly in terms of the Syrian historical experience:  Under the Ottoman empire, what is now Syria was divided into provinces (Turkish: pashaliks) so there would seem to be a precedent for some form of division, but this misleading for two reasons:  first, the Ottoman system was politically, ethnically and religious permissive in ways that are alien of modern statecraft.  In the four centuries of Ottoman rule, each community ran its own affairs with the state interfering only to ensure the collection of  taxes. Contribution by individuals to the community tax was levied by the leaders or councils of each community, not by the government.  Moreover, what happened inside each community was considered its, rather than the empire’s, affair.  So Jews ran Jewish schools; Druze ran Druze schools; Alawis ran Alawi schools; and  the various sects of Christians each ran their own schools.   Each community took care of  its own health needs and generally administered its own law and custom.  That lax system of government is mandated in the Quran.  But, after the imposition of the Western concept of the state, such community structure (Turkish: milliyet) is only a distant memory.  Moreover, even the religious fundamentalists and certainly the more radical insurgents apparently no longer feel governed by the Quranic injunction to allow non-Muslims to live by their own codes and in peace.

Whether or not such a system might be theologically or politically acceptable today, it would not work in practice since the several communities have become much more  mixed than in Ottoman times.  To judge by their proclamations, at least the more radical part of the insurgency would try to impose upon all the Syrians a centralized Islamic legal and cultural system.   In areas under such control, the members of the previously “protected” communities will either emigrate, convert or be eliminated.  We see and hear signs of this already in reference to the Alawis and the Christians.

Thus, almost certainly,  a “balkanization” of Syria will greatly add to the number of internal and external refugees.  Moreover, in that part of Syria that falls under the control of the Jabhat an-Nusra, strenuous efforts will be made to carry a jihad further afield.  Initially, a common cause will be found with the Iraqi Sunni community which is restive under the yoke of the American-imposed and Iranian-supported Shia regime.  Further ties will be taken up with radical Muslim groups in Libya, Egypt, the Gulf states, Afghanistan, Pakistan and even further afield.  In short, the turmoil we are now seeing will be greatly increased and more widely spread.

Contrariwise, the results of Russian policy are likely to be an increase in the power and determination of the Syrian government.   It is no more democratic than the rebel groups, but it is more ethnically tolerant:  although Alawi dominated, it includes even at the top level numbers of Muslims and Christians.  Whether or not this liberal or tolerant aspect of the regime continues will depend, I suggest, largely on how long the war continues, how bitter it becomes and whether or not serious efforts are made to improve the economy.  Thus, much will depend on the Russian program.

Whether or not the aim of the Russian government is humanitarian is beside the point:  with its back protected, this or any other Syrian government will naturally seek to achieve its own salvation, security and “victory.”  Such, after all, is the aim of nationalism.

This is all short or middle term;  the long-term needs of the Syrian people for peace and security, for jobs and food, and for hope will go unmet as long as the civil war lasts.  The long-term needs to cope with a rising number of stomachs to be fed as resources of good land and water decline will not even be addressed much less solved.  The bill to put Syria back together again can only be guessed.  My hunch, based on what we have seen in Iraq, is on the order of a trillion dollars.  And I see no sources for such an amount.  But, if the war is not stopped and stopped soon, the amount needed will multiply.

And Syria is only the focal point of these problems.  A dynamism has been set in motion that will affect all Syria’s immediate neighbors first and then others.  If the war continues, the regional prognosis can only be chaos.   Among the first to be affected will be Lebanon which, always a fragile conglomeration, can easily fall back into civil war;  then Turkey, apparently so strong and stable, will come under increasing pressure from the Kurds who will have been encouraged by their new autonomy in Syria.  Their challenge will likely increase the rigidity and oppressiveness of the state.  Jordan, after half a century, must have nearly used up its nine lives; and the Palestinians, having effectively lost what is left of their homeland, are likely to be driven away yet again.  Not to go on, let me just predict that the already unstable area  will throb with anger, frustration, armed conflict, terrorism and revanchism.  Even those who wish to support Israel must realistically consider how this gated community can find happiness in such a slum.

I end with a teaser:  as I used to do for our government, I am now at work on a policy paper in which I will address what might be done to head off or at least ameliorate these dire projections.

William R. Polk , Sunday, September 15, 2013
(Published with permission of the author)

Islamist Groups Declare Opposition to National Coalition and US Strategy
By Aron Lund for Syria Comment
Sept. 24, 2013

[Updates & additional commentary added to the end of the post]

Abdelaziz Salame, the highest political leader of the Tawhid Brigade in Aleppo, has issued a statement online where he claims to speak for 13 different rebel factions. You can see the video or read it in Arabic here. The statement is titled “communiqué number one” – making it slightly ominous right off the bat – and what it purports to do is to gut Western strategy on Syria and put an end to the exiled opposition.

The statements has four points, some of them a little rambling. My summary:

• All military and civilian forces should unify their ranks in an “Islamic framwork” which is based on “the rule of sharia and making it the sole source of legislation”.
• The undersigned feel that they can only be represented by those who lived and sacrificed for the revolution.
• Therefore, they say, they are not represented by the exile groups. They go on to specify that this applies to the National Coalition and the planned exile government of Ahmed Touma, stressing that these groups “do not represent them” and they “do not recognize them”.
• In closing, the undersigned call on everyone to unite and avoid conflict, and so on, and so on.

The following groups are listed as signatories to the statement.

1. Jabhat al-Nosra
2. Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement
3. Tawhid Brigade
4. Islam Brigade
5. Suqour al-Sham Brigades
6. Islamic Dawn Movement
7. Islamic Light Movement
8. Noureddin al-Zengi Battalions
9. Haqq Brigade – Homs [See update below]
10. Furqan Brigade – Quneitra [See update below]
11. Fa-staqim Kama Ummirat Gathering – Aleppo
12. 19th Division
13. Ansar Brigade

Who are these people?

The alleged signatories make up a major part of the northern rebel force, plus big chunks also of the Homs and Damascus rebel scene, as well as a bit of it elsewhere. Some of them are among the biggest armed groups in the country, and I’m thinking now mostly of numbers one through five. All together, they control at least a few tens of thousand fighters, and if you trust their own estimates (don’t) it must be way above 50,000 fighters.

Most of the major insurgent alliances are included. Liwa al-Tawhid, Liwa al-Islam and Suqour al-Sham are in both the Western- and Gulf-backed Supreme Military Council (SMC a.k.a. FSA) and the SILF, sort-of-moderate Islamists. Ahrar al-Sham and Haqq are in the SIF, very hardline Islamists. Jabhat al-Nosra, of course, is an al-Qaida faction. Noureddin al-Zengi are in the Asala wa-Tanmiya alliance (which is led by quietist salafis, more or less) as well as in the SMC. And so on. More groups may join, but already at this stage, it looks – on paper, at least – like the most powerful insurgent alliance in Syria.

What does this mean?

Is this a big deal? Yes, if the statement proves to accurately represent the groups mentioned and they do not immediately fall apart again, it is a very big deal. It represents the rebellion of a large part of the “mainstream FSA” against its purported political leadership, and openly aligns these factions with more hardline Islamist forces.

That means that all of these groups now formally state that they do not recognize the opposition leadership that has been molded and promoted by the USA, Turkey, France, Great Britain, other EU countries, Qatar, and – especially, as of late – Saudi Arabia.

That they also formally commit themselves to sharia as the “sole source of legislation” is not as a big a deal as it may seem. Most of these factions already were on record as saying that, and for most of the others, it’s more like a slight tweak of language. Bottom line, they were all Islamist anyway. And, of course, they can still mean different things when they talk about sharia.

Why now? According to a Tawhid Brigade spokesperson, it is because of the “conspiracies and compromises that are being forced on the Syrian people by way of the [National] Coalition”. So there.

Mohammed Alloush of the Islam Brigade (led by his relative, Mohammed Zahran Alloush), who is also a leading figure in the SILF alliance, was up late tweeting tonight. He had a laundry list of complaints against the National Coalition, including the fact that its members are all, he says, “appointed”, i.e. by foreign powers. He also opposed its planned negotiations with the regime. This may have been in reference to a (widely misinterpreted) recent statement by the Coalition president Ahmed Jerba. Alloush also referred to the recent deal between the National Coalition and the Kurdish National Council, and was upset that this will (he thinks) splinter Syria and change its name from the Syrian Arab Republic to the Syrian Republic.

Is this a one-off thing?

The fellow from the Tawhid Brigade informed me that more statements are in the making. According to him, this is not just an ad hoc formation set up to make a single point about the National Coalition. He hinted that it’s the beginning of a more structured group, but when I asked, he said it has no name yet. On the other hand, Abdulqader Saleh – Tawhid’s powerful military chief – referred to it on Twitter as al-Tahaluf al-Islami or the Islamic Alliance, but that may have been just descriptive, rather than a formal name.

Mohammed Alloush also wrote on Twitter, somewhat ambiguously, that the member groups have their own offices and political bureaus, and there’s a political program different from the National Coalition.  He, too, hinted that there’s more coming: “wait for the announcement of the new army”.

Who’s missing?

These are of course not all the rebels; far from it. Dozens or hundreds of small and local groups are missing from this alliance, just like they’ve been missing from every other alliance before it. Some really big groups are also not in there, like the Farouq Battalions or the Ahfad al-Rasoul Brigades, both of them quite closely aligned with the SMC and the National Coalition.

Most notably, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham – Syria’s most querulous al-Qaida faction – is absent from the list. Given the recent surge in tension between the Islamic State and other factions, that seems significant. Does it mean the new coalition is in fact aimed at isolating the Islamic State, while also upping its own Islamist credentials? Striking a kind of third way between the Western-backed SMC and its al-Qaida rival? Maybe. The question then remains, what should we make of Jabhat al-Nosra being included, which is also an al-Qaida group.

In either case, the Northern Storm Brigade – which was routed by the Islamic State in its home town of Aazaz just recently – has quickly expressed support for the new coalition. In a statement posted online, they fell over themselves to explain how they’ve always been all about implementing sharia law. This is of course, how shall I put it, not true. The Northern Storm Brigade leaders are, or so the story goes, a bunch of ex-smugglers from Aazaz, with no particularly clear ideological agenda. They’ve allied with the West to the point of hosting John McCain for a photo op – and as we know, he waltzed out of that meeting firmly convinced that the rebels are all proponents of secular democracy.

No: the reason that the Northern Storm Brigade has suddenly gone all Islamist is that they desperately seek protection from Tawhid, after being beaten up by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Perhaps they also figure that this alliance might be the only thing big and mean enough to actually crush the Islamic State. Size, money and momentum are the things to look for in Syrian insurgent politics – ideology comes fourth, if even that. That’s also why this statement seems so important.

On the other hand, the statement is in no way hostile to the ISIS. It might in fact suit them pretty well, since it weakens the hand of the Western-backed camp and adds weight to Islamist demands. When I asked a representative of Tawhid, he said the reason they’re not on the list of signatories is just because they’re not members. If they want to, and share the principles, they could join. The members already present will decide.

Is it just a local thing?

There’s also not that much of a presence from the Syrian south. The Furqan Brigade is an exception – founded in Kanaker, and now stretching from the western Ghouta to Quneitra. Then you have the Islam Brigade in Damascus, the Homsi Haqq Brigade, and so on. Generally speaking, however, this list of names has a heavy northern flavor to it, specifically Aleppine.

On the scanned original statement, there’s even an addition of “Aleppo” next to the name of “Abdullah al-Shami”, who signed for Jabhat al-Nosra. The Tawhid spokesperson, again, says that this doesn’t mean they only signed on for the Aleppo branch. He insists that the alliance is intended for all of Syria. I guess we’ll find out.

Are you sure about this?

No, I’m not sure about this. There’s always good reason to be cautious about Syria’s notoriously unstable opposition politics. Things like these will shift quicker than you can say يسقط بشار. The wind could easily turn again, signatory groups could drop out, foreign funders could put the squeeze on groups that have not grasped the magnitude of what they just said.

That sort of thing already happened once, in Aleppo in November 2012, when Tawhid, Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and many other groups signed a statement denouncing the then-newly formed National Coalition. I wrote about it for Carnegie at the time. The difference between then and now is that the November 2012 statement seems to have been very poorly anchored, and basically sprung on everyone by Jabhat al-Nosra who (I heard) gathered local commanders and had them sign a statement without consulting their top leadership properly. So it fell apart very quickly.

This time – we’ll see.

— Aron Lund

UPDATE, Sep. 25, 2013:

Lots of media have now reported on the joint statement based mainly on this blog post. Unfortunately, some have shed all the “what if” and caution. Only a few seem to have bothered to contact any of the Syrians who are actually involved to hear their take on the story, despite the fact that several of these groups go to great lengths to communicate directly with reporters, through websites and Facebook pages and spokespersons available by phone, Facebook, Twitter, and Skype, in Arabic, English and sometimes even French.

Instead, many commenters ran with the idea of a radical group called the “Islamic Coalition” (or “Alliance”) that has been formed to oppose the West. I don’t think this is true, at least not yet.

While this may be more than just a statement, it is not – as far as we know – an organized structure at all. It is a “bloc” or an “alliance” mainly in the sense that several groups now share a position and may continue to collaborate politically. It could evolve into something more substantial in the future, but there’s nothing to indicate that an organization has been formed at this moment. There is no common leadership, no spokesperson, no known structure, no website, no logotype, no political program. There’s just a statement – a very important one, I think, but that in itself doesn’t make it an organization.

In fact, I contacted the Tawhid Brigade spokesperson I talked to earlier, who had spoken of this as a gathering (tajammou) or bloc (takattul) that might have more lasting significance. He says there is so far nothing in the way of a common organization. He explicitly denied that it is anything like the SILF or SIF insurgent alliances. There will be more statements, but at this stage he seems to say it’s really only a position paper by the 11 or 13 (see below) factions involved. He didn’t exclude that their cooperation could evolve further, into a more structured type of alliance, but said this hadn’t happened yet, and if so, it might involve different participants.

When I pointed out that Abdulqader Saleh’s rather offhand comment on Twitter using the phrase “Islamic Alliance” or “Islamic Coalition” (al-tahaluf al-islami) could be interpreted as the name of a new group, and that this version is now gaining currency in the media, he responded “it could become that, but so far there’s nothing”.

So, my point is, there’s really no need to jump to conclusions here. I get the sense that these groups may be planning to call for a new revolutionary leadership at some point, but they haven’t formed one themselves. At the end of the day, only the people involved can explain what they mean, and I hope they make an effort to do so. If there are more statements coming, maybe these will clear up the confusion.

Also, people have e-mailed me to say that two of the groups included on the list of signatories above are not mentioned in either the video statement by Abdulaziz Salame or the scanned copy of the declaration. The groups in question are the Haqq Brigade of Homs and the Furqan Brigades of Quneitra.

That’s true. I copied and translated my list from a text version on the Tawhid Brigade website. That text has since been altered to fall in line with the signed copy and the video statement, removing the names of both groups. According to the Tawhid Brigade spokesman, both Furqan and Haqq were part of the drafting process and are verbally in agreement with the statement, but he says they were not present for the signing ceremony. It’s perhaps best to let these groups clarify their position themselves. In either case, leaving them out would certainly give the group of signatories an even stronger northern and Aleppine flavor.

— Aron Lund

A friend of Syria Comment chimes in with her/his take on the statement and its ramifications:

So how often are they planning on getting together with AlQaeda to discuss common concerns?

They specifically indicated that this is statement 1, a very clear indication of it being the first of many to come.

Regardless of what the structure behind this statement is, all i see is a signature by AlQaeda in Syria above the signatures of the major rebel factions, on a document that list common concerns and goals that go beyond fighting the regime and calls for Islamic rule. How will western governments justify supporting these groups to their people with the existence of such statement?

If you take out Liwaa al tawhid, Liwaa al islam, Suqor al sham and Ahrar al sham, what exactly is left of the revolution? Liwaa al Tawhid paved the way for the fall of Aleppo and is the main force there, Liwaa al islam is the main force in Damascus…These groups are not “part of” the Syrian revolution, they are the Syrian revolution.

I still haven’t seen anything about the regional powers take on this, if the Saudis/Turk don’t approve of it, i wouldn’t be surprised if they’re now pulling their weight to force a reversal by the signees. Which would explain attempts to play down the implications.

The National Coalition responds:

Anas al-Abdeh, a member of the National Coalition’s political office, and himself an Islamist, says in statement on the NC website that the timing of the statement was unfortunate, since the NC is currently sending a delegation to the UN to “win friends”. He also argues that the statement “does not represent the most important battalions of the Free Syrian Army on the ground, since there are many big battalions that have not signed this statement”.

He says everyone must understand that the future Syrian state must be decided by the people through elections “and no one has the right to force his tutelage upon the Syrian people or declare the type of rule or the law that it will be ruled by. Of course, the people who seek this may convince the Syrian people after the liberation from the regime, but not now.”

He complained that this will increase the splintering of the opposition, and said the NC must maintain a dialogue with the factions involved – except Jabhat al-Nosra – to understand what they are worried about and take that into concern. He adds that it was a mistake to let Jabhat al-Nosra sign the statement, since it is an al-Qaeda faction and has “an agenda which is not Syrian, and it is opposed to the national project”. Abdeh concluded by saying the government of Ahmed Touma must now get to work inside Syria.

A Case Study of “The Syrian Resistance,” a Pro-Assad Militia Force

by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi for Syria Comment

Much has been written of the variety of factions and fragmentation on the rebel side of the Syrian civil war, but comparatively little analysis exists of the various pro-Assad militias, commonly known as shabiha, who as Aron Lund notes can be Sunni, Alawite, Kurdish, or Christian. Here, I intend to examine one such group called al-Muqāwama as-Sūrīya (“The Syrian Resistance”—TSR), under the leadership of a Turkish-born Alawite by the name of Mihrac Ural, also known as Ali Kayali. (Previous posts on Syria Comment dealing with Ural/Kayali include those found here and here.)

TSR had prior to the uprising and civil war operated under the name of “Popular Front for the Liberation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta,” referring to the strip of land around Hatay in southern Turkey with a substantial Alawite population, the loss of which has never truly been accepted by Syria. Since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, however, the group adopted TSR as interchangeable with its original name, and is confining operations entirely within Syria, with headquarters in Latakia.

Ostensibly, in line with many other self-declared liberation groups (e.g. the Basque Country’s ETA, and the early Kurdish PKK which established links with Hafez al-Assad through Kayali), TSR’s ideology is Marxist-Leninist, with particular reverence accorded to the symbol of communist resistance, Che Guevara.

Figure 1: Screenshot of a speech by Kayali on the anniversary of the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Note the background portrait featuring Bashar al-Assad, Che Guevara, and Kayali himself.

Figure 2: Photo of Kayali with Che Guevara in the background.

The concept of Syrian nationalism also features heavily in TSR’s public discourse and rhetoric, tied in with the Assad regime’s promotion of ‘resistance’ to Western imperialism. Thus, in a statement to me from TSR’s press office, I was told that TSR does not get involved in “internal politics, the penal code, disputes or disagreements.” Rather, “our problem is with the foreign enemy and with the terrorists who want to destroy our nation.”

Concomitant with the Syrian nationalist image is the claim from the press office that “our members are from the various fabrics of Syria, from all the religions, sects and ethnicities. We fight together.” Similarly, in an interview with me, Kayali emphasized that TSR supposedly has supporters among “Ahl as-Sunnah” and Christians.

In the context of messaging, songs unique to TSR—with lyrics featuring distinctive Syrian dialect—have played a key role. For instance, one song recently released to the accompaniment of oud includes the lyrics: “We are the men of Muqāwama, we are not content with bartering…we want to uproot terrorism.” At the same time the group has not forgotten the aspirations for the liberation of Alexandretta, as this song also features the line: “Antioch is resting in my heart.” Here is another song released by TSR combining motifs of protecting the waṭan of Syria while referencing Alexandretta. Further, here is a TSR song entitled “We are the men of the Syrian Resistance.” Opening lyrics include, “We are the men of the sun. We are from the people….Your people, Syria, are resistance.” Many of these songs feature a familiar slogan from Kayali: “Syria will never bow.”

However, beneath this image of Syrian nationalism and leftist ideology lies a more narrow sectarian emphasis on defending the Alawite and Twelver Shi’a communities. Despite the admiration shown for the atheist Che Guevara, Kayali himself cares deeply about his religious heritage and is in this respect similar to most Turkish Alawites who have generally clung to their religious traditions in contrast to the multi-faceted nature of Alawite identity in Syria (see my articles here and here on this matter). Indeed, in his interview with me, Kayali spoke at length of Alawite reverence for the ‘Ahl al-Bayt’: that is, the household of Prophet Mohammed and his descendants.

Besides the widely circulated footage of Kayali from earlier this year in which he apparently calls for the necessity of cleansing Sunni areas on the coastline (most notably Baniyas), Kayali is also frequently shown in TSR media output appearing with Alawite sheikhs, one of whom was the well-known Muwaffaq al-Ghazal, who enjoyed close ties with Kayali and was later killed by Jabhat al-Nusra as part of the “Eye for an Eye” revenge operations announced by Sheikh Abu Mohammed al-Jowlani against Alawite villages in retaliation for the chemical weapons attacks in East Ghouta.

Figure 3: From left to right in a recent meeting at TSR’s Latakia headquarters: Kayali, an unidentified Alawite sheikh, and Ali Haider, who heads the government-aligned Syrian Social Nationalist Party and current minister for National Reconciliation.

Looking at TSR’s range of operations is also relevant here. In fact, it is sometimes thought that TSR is not a meaningful military force on the ground in Syria, but this perception must be corrected. According to Kayali and one other TSR fighter, TSR has participated in operations against rebels in Latakia, the Homs area (where sectarian warfare has played a key element in the fighting), the al-Ghab plain (an area of fertile land east of Latakia and covering parts of Hama and Idlib governorates), Jisr ash-Shughur in Idlib, and the two Twelver Shi’a villages of Nubl and Zaharā in Aleppo Governorate, from which TSR has also drawn recruits.

Of these areas of operation, Latakia is of course the most relevant. Here is a video from last month of Kayali rallying TSR fighters in rural Latakia. Kayali addresses his fighters as “the true Syrians” and speaks of their opponents- from Jabhat al-Nusra and the Free Army- as “foreigners,” who have “no religion, faith, book, or Lord.” Rather, they are “these kuffar [Islamic term for disbelievers], these takfiri Salafists.” These remarks, in pronouncing takfīr on the Salafi militants, clearly frame the struggle in religious terms. Kayali also speaks of the necessity of defending the women and the elderly.

Figure 4: Ali Kayali rallies his men in rural Latakia last month.

As Kayali put it to me, the fighters leading the rebel offensive on Latakia in the summer were primarily from Chechnya, Afghanistan [i.e. Afghan Arab veterans and the like], the Maghreb, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf area. Kayali’s testimony is corroborated by examination of the claimed mujahideen martyrs during the Latakia offensive, whose sole aim was to score a psychological victory against the Assad regime by ethnically cleansing Alawites and capturing Assad’s ancestral village Qardaḥa by Eid (as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham’s [ISIS] leader had hoped).

Despite the mujahideen’s initial successes in capturing numerous Alawite villages and apparently being only several miles away from Qardaḥa, pro-Assad forces ultimately pushed back and by mid-August, jihadi circles began circulating messages to pray for the mujahideen as the offensive ultimately failed, with fighting now confined to the Jabal al-Akrād area. Below is a list of claimed jihadi martyrs from the Latakia offensive (‘Liberation of the Coast’), which Kayali tells me also cost hundreds of Alawite lives (not necessarily in large-scale massacres of villages).

Figure 5: Abu Ashraf al-Tunisi, a Tunisian fighter for ISIS.

Figure 6: Abu Rahmat al-Lībī, a Libyan fighter for ISIS.

Figure 7: Abu Ayyub al-Tunisi, a Tunisian fighter for ISIS.

Figure 8: Abd al-Hakim al-Alaiwi, a Saudi fighter for ISIS.

Figure 9: Abu Turab al-Lībī, a Libyan fighter for ISIS.

Figure 10: Abdullah ash-Shishani, a Chechen fighter for ISIS but also claimed for the ISIS front-group Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa Anṣār.

Figure 11: Abu al-Waleed al-Tunisi, Tunisian fighter for ISIS.

Figure 12: Two Libyan fighters in the lush forests of rural Latakia as part of the mujahideen offensive. According to Anṣār ash-Sharī’a supporters from Tripoli (Libya), the two men are from the northwestern Libyan town of Zāwīya.

Figure 13: Photo of Latakia forestry taken by the Libyan Shari’a official for the ISIS-front group Katiba al-Muhajireen: Abu Ṭalḥa al-Lībī.

Nubl and Zaharā are also relevant in this context because both towns have come under bombardment at the hands of ISIS mujahideen. Following the ISIS-led capture of Mannagh airbase in August, a video emerged showing a large convoy of ISIS fighters preparing to head out to besiege Nubl and Zaharā.

Figure 14: The ISIS convoy on its way to Nubl and Zaharā following the capture of Mannagh airbase.

This month, another video emerged showing the ISIS banner flying on a barren outpost in the Nubl area. The area itself looks deserted, and one might feel tempted to conclude that ISIS has conquered the village. However, Kayali tells me that this is not the case.

Figure 15: The ISIS banner on an outpost in the Nubl area.

The claimed numbers of both TSR members as well as martyrs still need to be scrutinized. The fighter for TSR whom I interviewed claimed that the group has “thousands” of members. This figure may invite doubt, but the number of claimed martyrs—as conveyed to me by both this fighter and Kayali—seems relatively modest and reasonable: 30. In fact, Kayali sent me his database of martyrs for TSR so far. I reproduce it below:

The above list comprises 27 martyrs for TSR: the casualties are largely concentrated in the defense of Alawite areas of Latakia. A more recent martyrdom was announced this month for the group (see photo below with further images).

Figure 16: “Martyr of the Homeland and the Syrian Resistance: Aamer Mahmoud Ṭaha.” His death was announced on 9 September 2013. He was killed while fighting rebels in the Jabal Arbaeen area of Idlib. His brother Ibrahim was wounded in the same clashes and subsequently taken to a hospital in Latakia.

Figure 17: Portraits of the 27 martyrs from the above database.

Figure 18: Close-up photo of Basil Nasir, from the opening of a lengthy video of his funeral that was held on 31 March, the day after his death.

Figure 19: Mourners hold Basil’s portrait and wave the flag of Syria.

Figure 20: Close-up photo of Nawar Adil Reyhan from a video made by a TSR supporter.

As Syria continues to fragment, one can expect that a breakdown in centralized command structures will also happen on the regime side, allowing for the continued growth of groups like TSR. Indeed, anecdotal evidence already suggests the possibility that shabiha figures are managing imports through the Mediterranean coastline for distribution among the populations in pro-Assad areas. Examining in greater detail the activities of the pro-Assad militias is therefore more important than ever.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. Follow on Twitter at @ajaltamimi