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TABULAR COMPARISON OF APPENDICES TO U.S.—BRITISH COMINT AGREEMENT

(As approved at 1946 and 1948 U.S.—British Technical Comint Conferences)

(C24597-1) 70 H/48

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TABULAR COMPARISON OF 1946 AND 1948 APPENDICES TO THE

U.S. - BRITISH COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

Distribution

47

	Internal	<u>.</u>	Ext	xternal		
	13	Director	1	Director-General		
~	-14	A.D.	2	Rear Admiral Longley-Cook, D.N.I.		
	15	A.D.(P)	_3_	Captain Waymouth, D.S.D.		
	16	A.D.(C)	ζĻ	Major General Packard, D.M.I.		
	17	A.D.(0)	5	Major General Vullaumy, D. of Sigs		
	18 - 19	S.S.B.	6	Arr Vice Marshal Pendred, A.C.A.S.(I)		
	20	Colonel Marr-Johnson	7	All Vice Marshal Theak, D.G. of Sigs		
	21	U.S.L.O.	8	Mr. W.G. Hayter, Foreign Office		
	22 - 41	U.S. Agencies	9	Commander G. Affleck-Graves, D.S.D.9		
	42	T	10	Colonel Scott, D.D.Y.		
	43	S	11	Group Captain Fagan D.D.S.(B)		
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TABULAR COMPARISON OF 1946 AND 1948 APPENDICES TO THE

U.S. - BRITISH COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT

The 1948 Appendices are shown paragraph by paragraph on the left hand side of each page; the corresponding paragraphs of 1946 Appendices (or an appropriate comment) are shown on the right hand side of each page.



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COMPARATIVE TABLE: INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION TO 1948 APPENDICES

- 1. The following arrangements governing the collaboration between the U.S. and British Comint Agencies have been agreed between USCIB and LSIB in implementation of and as Appendices to the U.S. British Comint Agreement of 5th March, 1946.
- 2. None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of that agreement but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.
- 3. The object of these arrangements is to ensure that raximum advantage is obtained from the combined available personnel and facilities of both parties.
- 4. In accordance with these arrangements, each party will continue to make available to the other, continuously, currently, and without request, all raw traffic, Comint items and technical matter acquired or produced, and all pertinent information concerning its activities, priorities and facilities, both present and planned, subject only to the provise contained in paragraphs 3(b) and 4(b) of the Agreement.
- 5. In addition, each party will continue to maintain liaison personnel at the agency or agencies of the other party.
- 6. The two parties will continue to effect such standardisation e.g. of technical terminology, layout, procedure and organisation as may be possible.

INTRODUCTION TO 1946 APPENDICES

- 1. The following arrangements governing the collaboration between the Vashington and London COMINT (SIGINT) Centres have been agreed between STANCIB and the LOMDON SIGINT BOARD, in implementation of and as Appendices to the U.S. British Communication Intelligence Agreement of 5th March, 1946.
- 2. None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of that Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.
- 3. The object of these arrangements is to ensure that the maximum advantage is obtained from available personnel and facilities.
- 4. In accordance with these arrangements, each party will make available to the other, continuously, currently and without request, all raw traffic, COMINT items and Technical Matter acquired or produced, and all pertinent information concerning its activities, priorities and available facilities.
- 5. In addition, each party will maintain liaison personnel at the other's Centre.
- 6. The two parties will also effect such standardisation of technical terminology, layout, procedure and organisation as may be possible.

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INTRODUCTION TO 1948 APPENDICES

- By the close collaboration thus established, and by means of suggestion, agreement, and arrangement as to changes to be made, the two parties will continue to effect elimination of unnecessary duplication in order to ensure the maximum exploitation of foreign communications. However, the activites undertaken by each party must be basically suited to its own needs and therefore neither is in a position to accept any formal and fixed commitments for the allocation of specific tasks to their respective agencies. Such an allocation would prevent the shifting of emphasis to tasks which those agencies may themselves wish to undertake or which they may be required to undertake by the consumers of their products. But it is agreed that an informal and flexible allocation of tasks. subject to alteration by either party at need and sometimes without prior notification, is possible and desirable, that where one party accepts the informal allocation of a specific task it will make available, by radio when desired by the recoiving party, the end-products of that task, that, if the party which accepts an informal allocation is compelled to relinquish it, it will inform the other party as soon as possible; and that, in the event of either party giving up a task to the other, every endeavour will be made by the surrendering party to maintain its intercept coverage on the task surrendered if that party has been obtaining unique material.
- 8. Each party may call upon the other for assistance when necessary and such requests will be met whenever practicable.

INTRODUCTION TO 1946 APPENDICES

As a result of the close collaboration thus established and by means of continual suggestion, mutual agreement and mutual arrangement as to changes made there will be effected a continuous elimination of unwanted duplication, although the activities undertaken by each party shall be as basically suited to its own needs.

- 8. Each party may call upon the other for assistance when necessary and such requests will be met whenever practicable.
- 9. All possible division of labour between the Centres will be made. It is the intention of both porties to effect a fuller integration of effort gradually.

[Subject matter of 1946 paragraph 9 transferred to paragraph 7 in 1948 Introduction].









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INTRODUCTION TO 1948 APPENDICES

9. Although progress has been made in the provision of adequate Comint telecommunication facilities, it is agreed that each party will continue to keep under review this, and the associated problem of safe hand routes for the passage of Comint material of all kinds, and will take all reasonable steps towards further improvement.

- 10. The two partness have foreseen the need for joint emergency plans, ready to be put into operation at or before an outbreak of hostilities with a third party.
- 11. Each party will provide the other with two or more copies of all reports mentioned in the following appendices and of such-like documents.

INTRODUCTION TO 1946 APPENDICES

- 10. It is, however, agreed that this intention cannot be implemented to the best advantage until the telecommunications available for COMINT purposes are adequate to ensure the sufficiently rapid receipt by each Centre of results from the other's commitments.
- 11. For this reason, it is agreed that early provision of adequate COMINT communication facilities is essential. Such communications are necessary, furthermore, to provide for emergencies and to permit the development of operational techniques for the handling of new types of transmission.
- 12. For the same reason, and because the present situation regarding safehand routes across the Atlantic is unsatisfactory, each party will keep trans—Atlantic rail facilities and requirements under review and will take full advantage of any improvement made in sea and air mails.

[No corresponding item in 1946 Introduction].

13. Each party will provide the other with two or more copies of all reports mentioned in the Appendices and of such-like documents





INTRODUCTION TO 1948 APPENDICES

- 12. All arrangements are subject to review and to modification by agreement.
- 13. These arrangements will become effective on approval by USCIB and LSIB, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the U.S. British Comint Agreement.
- 14. Annex A to this Introduction shows how the Appendices to the U.S. British Communication Intelligence Agreement, as produced at the U.S. British Technical Conference of March, 1946, have been ratified or superseded by the Appendices agreed at the 1948 Technical Conference, and which of the latter are now.

INTRODUCTION TO 1948 APPENDICES

- 14. All arrangements are subject to review. Those establishing the exchange of material may be modified by mutual agreement if experience shows that too great a proportion of the personnel available is being employed thereon.
- 15. These arrangements will become effective on approval by STANCIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD in accordance with paragraph 12 of the U.S. British Communication Intelligence Agreement.

[No corresponding item in 1946 Introduction].



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APPENDIX A: TERMS TO BE USED

1948 Appendix A unchanged from 1946 Appendix A.

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COMPARATIVE TABLE APPENDIX B

PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

(Note codewords which appeared in the 1946 Appendix have been deleted)

1948 APPENDIX B

INTRODUCTION

- 1. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the security and dissemination of Communication Intelligence issued by or under the authority of USCIB or LSIB and other appropriate officials of the Governments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such regulations may vary in accordance with the requirements of the Parties, Agencies, Departments and Ministries to whom they are designed to apply, but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect. To ensure uniform interpretation of what constitutes such accord, each party shall forward all such regulations to the other for information.
- 2. It is recognised that, while the following principles are in general of universal application, certain of those primarily applicable to peacetime must be modified in time of war or emergency, to ensure that the maximum operational benefit consistent with security is derived from the source. Provision is made hereunder for the necessary modifications. In time of war or emergency, or exceptionally as agreed by USCIB and ISIB, Emergency Regulations embodying the emergency principles contained herein shall be brought into force by the respective parties.

1946 APPENDIX B

INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the security and dissemination of Communication Intelligence issued by or under the authority of STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD and other appropriate officials of the Governments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such regulations may vary in accordance with the requirements of the Parties, Agencies, Departments, and Ministries to whom they are designed to apply, but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect. To ensure uniform interpretation of what constitutes such accord, each party shall forward all such regulations to the other for information.

[No corresponding item in 1946 Appendix B].

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1948 APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES

- Communication Intelligence (COMINT) is the name given to products derived from the work of agencies, the operations of which are co-ordinated by USCIB and LSIB and which study radio transmissions and other communications not originated by United States or British authorities. The terms Communication Intelligence (COMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) are synonymous. Communication Intelligence is divided into two categories, as follows
 - (a) Special Intelligence.
 - (b) Traffic Intelligence.
- Special Intelligence is
 - (a) that Communication Intelligence which results from -
 - (1) the decryption of texts in whole or in part (except as provided in paragraph 5(b) below).

1946 APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES

- Communication Intelligence (COMINT) is the name given to products derived from the work of agencies, the operations of which are co-ordinated by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD and which study radio transmissions and other communications not originated by United States or British authorities. The terms Communication Intelligence (COMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) are synonymous. Communication Intelligence is divided into two categories, as follows
 - Special Intelligence
 - Traffic Intelligence
- Special Intelligence is that Communication Intelligence which results from the decryption of the texts or substance of encrypted communications. Communication Intelligence obtained from plain language messages may, on occasion, be classed as Special Intelligence. Special Intelligence is designated by the code word

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4. [Continued]

- (iv) the interception of certain types of transmission as may be specified by USCIB and LSIB,
- (v) plan texts as provided in paragraph 6 below,
- (b) that Traffic Intelligence which .-
 - (1) indicates success in the production of Special Intelligence as defined in paragraph 4(a) above; or
 - (11) is, in the case of individual items, specifically upgraded to Special Intelligence by either party if it is considered that its content is such as to warrant this action.

1946 APPENDIX B

5. If Communication Intelligence obtained by the processes described in paragraph 4 clearly reflects the use of information derived from encrypted messages, it shall be classed as Special Intelligence.

[No corresponding item in 1946 Appendix B]

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- 5. <u>Traffic Intelligence</u> is that Communication Intelligence which results from
 - (a) the study of procedure signals, call signs, message headings, D/F bearings and other externals of communications (except as provided in paragraph 4(a) (lil) above),
 - (b) the decryption of the whole or parts of communications in codes or cyphers of such low security grading that they are specifically classed as Traffic Intelligence by USCIB and ISIB, or

Traffic Intelligence shall be designated by a separate codeword agreed on from time to time by USCIB and LSIB.

6. Communication Intelligence derived from plain texts (including R/T) may be classed by USCIB and LSIB as either Special Intelligence or Traffic Intelligence according to the needs of either and preferably after agreement between them except that, in time of emergency, plain texts derived from tactical Armed Forces circuits shall be treated as Traffic Intelligence.

1946 APPENDIX B

4. Traffic Intelligence is that Communication Intelligence which results from analyses of communication networks, procedure signals, call signs, D/F bearings and other technical aids, i.e. Communication Intelligence obtained from intercepted communications by all means short of the actual decoding or decyphering of the texts or substance of these communications. Communication Intelligence obtained from plain language messages is normally included in the Traffic Intelligence category. Traffic Intelligence is designated by the code word

[Plain Text was covered in the 1946 Appendix by paragraphs 3 and 4].

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In time of war or emergency, or exceptionally as agreed by USCIB and LSIB, the Traffic Intelligence category as defined in paragraph 5 above shall be extended to include the products of certain field and medium-grade cyphers which shall be downgraded from Special Intelligence, and, if required Traffic Intelligence may then be subdivided into separate categories in order to permit tactical Communication Intelligence (the compromise of which would not endanger the more important sources) to be disseminated to special agencies and lower ochelons of the Armed Forces. In order to prepare for this contingency, mutually agreed lists shall be prepared and maintained in current status by USCIB and ISIB to indicate which field and medium-grade cyphers fall within the provisions of this paragraph. In the event that it is found necessary to subdivide Traffic Intelligence as contemplated above, it may be necessary to institute an additional Traffic Intelligence codeword to permit differentiation in the dissemination of the products of medium- and low-grade cyphers.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

8. The value of Communication Intelligence in war and in peace cannot be over-estimated, conservation of the source is of supreme importance. It is essential, therefore, that the dissemination accorded to all related or resultant information be strictly controlled and limited. The physical security of related documents is not alone sufficient, it is essential that all reference to its existence either direct or indirect be avoided except among those to whom the knowledge is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. The time limit for the safeguarding of Communication Intelligence never expires.

1946 APPENDIX B

6. In time of war or national emergency it may be found necessary to sub-divide both Special Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence into smaller categories in order to permit certain classes of Communication Intelligence (compromise of which would not endanger the more important sources) to be distributed to special agencies and lower echelons of military forces which, for security reasons, would not normally receive other Communication Intelligence.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

7. The value of Communication Intelligence in war and in peace cannot be over-estimated, conservation of the source is of supreme importance. It is essential, therefore, that the dissemination accorded to all related or resultant information be strictly controlled and limited. The physical security of related documents is not alone sufficient, it is essential that all references to its existence either direct or indirect be avoided except among those to whom the knowledge is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. The time limit for the safeguarding of Communication Intelligence never expires.

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- 9. Every effort shall be made to ensure that, unless special authority is given
 - (a) in time of peace, no person who is a current recipient of Special or Traffic Intelligence or who is engaged in its production shall be assigned to or be engaged in activities which might reasonably be expected to place him in a position where he might be forced to submit to questioning by a third party;
 - (b) in time of war or in a state of emergency, no porson who is a current recipient of Special Intelligence or who is engaged in its production shall be committed to a hazardous undertaking which might subject him to capture by the enemy or a third party.

It is considered, on the basis of present communications techniques, that a person who has ceased to be a recipient or producer of Communication Intelligence should not be so assigned or committed before the lapse of a period of one year in the case of Special Intelligence, or of three months in the case of Traffic Intelligence

10. It is of the utmost importance that complete and absolute silence on all Communication Intelligence matters be maintained by those who have ever been connected with the Communication Intelligence organisation, and by all individual recipients of Communication Intelligence, whether past or present, unless they are freed from this obligation by unmistakeable and categorical order of proper

1946 APPENDIX B

- 8. Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who is a current recipient of Special Intelligence or who is engaged on its production shall, without special authority,
 - (a) in time of war or national emergency be committed to a hazardous undertaking which might subject him to capture by the enemy or a third party,

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(b) in time of peace be assigned to or be engaged in surreptitious activities which might reasonably be expected to place him in a position where he might be forced to submit to questioning by a third party.

[No corresponding item in 1946 Appendix B]

9. Although from time to time reports of alleged Communication Intelligence activities may be broadcast or published, it is of the utmost importance that complete and absolute silence on such matters be maintained by those who have ever been connected with the Comint organisation, and by all individual recipients of Communication Intelligence, whether past or present, unless they

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10. [Continued]

authority as shall be designated by the respective parties. If at any time indiscreet matter referring to Communication Intelligence is broadcast or published, even by prominent people, this does not free those other persons who are, or have ever been, producers or recipients of Communication Intelligence from maintaining absolute silence, and special precautions may have to be taken.

In time of war, the full value of Communication 11. Intelligence cannot be realised unless operational use is made of it. However, before the decision is made to take action based on Communication Intelligence, studied effort shall be made to ensure that such action cannot be attributed to this source alone. In every case, unless completely impracticable, action against a specific target rovealed by Communication Intelligence shall be preceded by appropriate recommandance or other suitable cover to which the energy can reasonably be expected to attribute the action. Any action taken in the absence of such safeguards must be considered in the light of the possibility of compromising the source. The extent of military advantage to be gained must be weighed carefully against the risk of losing the particular source and related Communication Intelligence sources and against the effect of such a loss on other Commands and on future operations. Only after it has been decided that the overall military advantage to be gained clearly outweighs the irretrievable loss which would probably result from a compromise of the source should action be taken in the absence of suitable cover.

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9. [Continued]

are freed from this obligation by unmistakeable and categorical order.

In time of war, the full value of Communication Intelligence cannot be realised unless oporational use is made of it. However, when action is contemplated in the light of Communication Intelligence, the possibility of compromising the source shall always be borne in mind and this danger shall always be weighed against the military advantage to be gained. A minor advantage is not sufficient ground for risking the compromise of any Communication Intelligence source. When the decision is made to take action based on Communication Intelligence, studied effort shall be made to ensure that such action cannot be attributed to Communication Intelligence alone. In every case, unless the senior officer concerned, after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, considers it completely impracticable, action against a specific target revealed by Communication Intelligence shall be preceded by appropriate reconnaissance or other suitable deceptive measures to which the enemy can reasonably be expected to attribute the action.



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- 12. When action as contemplated in paragraph 11 above is finally ordered, particular care shall be taken on all occasions to ensure that personnol who may become engaged with the enemy in the course of such action are given only the minimum information, with no unnecessary detail.
- 13. In time of peace the principle that the conservation of Communication Intelligence sources is a paramount consideration affecting any action taken in the light of Communication Intelligence shall be rigidly upheld.
- 14. The principle of dissemination is based on "the need to know". Each item of Communication Intelligence shall therefore be made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties and who have been appropriately indoctrinated. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of indoctrinated persons to an absolute minimum.
- 15. Any Intelligence including in whole or in part items from Communication Intelligence sources is to be handled in accordance with these regulations.

1946 APPENDIX B

[No corresponding item in 1946 Appendix B] EQ 1.4.(c) EQ 1.4.(d)

- 11. In time of peace the principle that the conservation of Communication Intelligence sources is a paramount consideration affecting any action taken in the light of Communication Intelligence shall be rigidly upheld.
- 12. The principle of dissemination is based on "the need to know". Each item of Communication Intelligence shall therefore be made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties and who have been appropriately "indoctrinated". Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of "indoctrinated" persons to an absolute minimum. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the other party's COMINT agencies or to the products, or knowledge of the existence thereof, unless he be approved by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD as appropriate and be properly indoctrinated.

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15. [Continued]

- 16. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the other party's Comint agencies or to the products, or knowledge of the existence thereof, unless he be approved by his parent agency or Board and be properly indoctrinated.
- It is recognised that both parties will produce Special 17. Intelligence which by virtue of its source or content will require exceptional safeguards and which should therefore be limited strictly in dissemination. Such Special Intelligence will fall anto two categories
 - (a) individual items which must be restricted in dissemination to the highest level only. The procedure in such cases will be as prescribed in paragraph 22 below.
 - (b) particular classes of Comint which it is necessary to restrict to limited categories of personnel. Such a class may, with the consent of USCIB or LSTB as appropriate, be indicated by an agreed subsidiary codeword.

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[See last sentence of paragraph 12 (above) of 1946 Appendix B].

It is recognised that both Parties will produce Special 13. Intelligence which, by virtue of its source or content, will require exceptional safeguards and which should, therefore, be limited strictly in disscrimation to the highest level only (see paragraph 19 below).

[No corresponding items in 1946 Appendix B].

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17. [Continued]

It is for the originating party to request that the other party should afford similarly restricted distribution to such individual items or classes of Communication Intelligence.

- 18. Except in categories and individual cases agreed upon from time to time by USCIB and LSIB, personnel to be indoctrinated as recipients of Communication Intelligence or assigned to Communication Intelligence duties shall be the subject of special security enquiries. However, in time of war or emergency, exceptional occasions may arise when it is considered essential for an individual to take up his duties before the special security enquiries can be completed. In such cases, the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the authority of such senior officers or officials as are designated by the respective parties. In all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure that special security enquiries are completed as soon as possible after indoctrination.
- 19. USCIB and LSIB shall maintain complete lists of persons currently indoctrinated for Special Intelligence under their respective Governments.
- 20. USCIB and ISIB shall keep each other fully informed of the Departments, Ministries, Agencies, Offices, Headquarters and Commands receiving Special Intelligence and of the approximate number of indoctrinated persons in each.

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14. Except in categories and individual cases agreed upon from time to time by STANCIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD, personnel to be "indoctrinated" as recipients of Communication Intelligence or assigned to Communication Intelligence duties shall be the subjects of special security enquiries.

- 15. STANCIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD shall maintain complete lists of persons currently "indoctrinated" for Special Intelligence in their respective Governments.
- 16. STANCIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD shall keep each other fully informed of the Departments, Ministries, Agencies, Offices, Headquarters and Commands receiving Special Intelligence and of the approximate number of "indoctrinated" persons in each.



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21. Communication Intelligence shall never under any circumstances or in any form be disseminated to any Ministry, Department, Agency, Organisation, Office, or individual from which or from whom it might reasonably be expected to find its way, officially or extra-officially, into the possession of any person or group who could use it for commercial competition or commercial gain or advantage.

CLASSIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES

22. Special Intelligence. Special Intelligence is classified TOP SECRET. The words TOP SECRET and the appropriate codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains, or discloses the existence of, this class of Communication Intelligence. This rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from Special Intelligence.

In order to indicate that the specially limited dissemination referred to in paragraph 17(a) above has been applied, either party will prefix the Special Intelligence codeword with the word "Special".

23. Traffic Intelligence. Traffic Intelligence is classified SECRET. The word SECRET and the Traffic Intelligence codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of this class of Communication Intelligence, unless TOP SECRET and the appropriate Special Intelligence codeword appear on the same sheet. This rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from Traffic Intelligence.

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18. Communication Intelligence shall never under any circumstances or in any form be disseminated to any Ministry, Department, Agency, Organisation, Office, or individual from which or from whom it might reasonably be expected to find its way, officially or extra-officially, into the possession of any person or group who could use it for commercial competition or commercial gain or advantage.

CLASSIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES

19. Special Intelligence. Special Intelligence is classified TOP SECRET. The words TOP SECRET and the code word shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of this class of Communication Intelligence. This rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from Special Intelligence.

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"SPECIAL" will be used instead of the code ford by either party to indicate that it has applied the specially limited dissemination referred to in paragraph 13 above.

20. Traffic Intelligence. Traffic Intelligence is classified SECRET. The word SECRET and the code word shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of this class of Communication Intelligence, unless TOP SECRET [codeword as in paragraph 19 above] appears on the same sheet. This rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from Traffic Intelligence.

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24. Codewords. The Special Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence codewords used as such bear the TOP SECRET and SECRET classification respectively. These codewords and their implications shall not be made known to non-indoctrinated persons, nor shall these codewords be used in their codeword sense in the presence of non-indoctrinated persons.

25. Technical Matter. Technical matter appertaining to the production of Special Intelligence is normally classified TOP SECRET and designated by the appropriate codeword. Technical matter appertaining to the production of Traffic Intelligence is normally classified SECRET and designated by the Traffic Intelligence codeword. The appropriate classification and codeword shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of such technical matter.

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20. [Continued]

24. Code Words. The code word [as in paragraph 19 above] and all that it implies bears the TOP SECRET classification. The code word [as in paragraph 20 above] and all that it implies bears the SECRET classification. These code words and their implications shall not be made known to "non-indoctrinated" persons, nor shall these code words be used in their code word sense in the presence of "non-indoctrinated" persons.

21. Technical Matter. Technical matter appertaining to the production of Special Intelligence is normally classified TOP SECRET and designated Technical matter appertaining to the production of Traffic Intelligence is normally classified SECRET and designated The appropriate classification and code word shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of such technical matter.

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- 26. Raw Traffic. Raw traffic (i.e. intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes) is normally classified CONFIDENTIAL, except where a higher classification is mutually agreed upon. The inclusion of a case-number in an item of raw traffic shall not be deemed to show evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes
- 27. Technical Success. Communications among cognizant officials of the British and U.S. Governments which reveal actual success, progress or processes in the production of Special Intelligence or Traffic Intelligence in specific instances or fields shall bear the appropriate codeword designations even though they do not themselves reveal Communication Intelligence as such.
- 28. <u>Documents</u>. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of paragraphs 15 above and 29(a) below, documents containing Communication Intelligence and technical matter shall remain exclusively in the custody of persons who have been appropriately indoctrinated, secure from examination by non-indoctrinated persons.
- 29. Special Intelligence and TOP SECREF technical matter shall not be transmitted in plain language (unencrypted) except as follows
 - (a) sealed, by safe-hand channels over routes specifically approved by USCIB or ISIB. Such approval will be the exception where such routes involve air or land transport over the territory of a third party.

1946 APPENDIX B

- 22. Raw traffic. Raw traffic (i.e. intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes) is normally classified CONFIDENTIAL, except where a higher classification is mutually agreed upon.
- 23. Technical success. Communications among cognizant officials of the British and U.S. Governments which reveal actual success, progress or processes in the production of Special Intelligence or Traffic Intelligence in specific instances or fields shall bear the appropriate code word designations even though they do not themselves reveal Communication Intelligence as such.
- 25. Documents. Except as umplicitly involved in the operation 26(a) below documents containing Communication Intelligence and technical matter shall remain exclusively in the possession of persons who have been appropriately "indoctrinated", secure from examination by "non-indoctrinated" persons.
- 26. Plain Language Transmissions. Special Intelligence and TOP SECRET technical matter shall not be transmitted in plain language (unencrypted) except as follows
 - (a) sealed, by safe-hand channels over routes specifically approved by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD. Such approval will be the exception where such routes involve air or land transport over the territory of a third party,

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1948 APPENDIX B

29. [Continued]

- (b) via completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to Agencies or Offices producing or utilising Communication Intelligence of the appropriate categories,
- (c) via completely protected external landlines only as specifically approved by USCIB or LSIB in each instance.
- 30. Traffic Intelligence and SECRET technical matter shall not be transmitted in plain language (unencrypted) except as follows.
 - (a) as provided in paragraph 29 above,
 - (b) by protected postal channels over routes approved by USCIB or LSIB.
- 31. Raw Traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL and CONFIDENTIAL technical matter shall not be transmitted unencrypted except as follows
 - (a) as provided in paragraphs 29 and 30 above,
 - (b) via external landlines only as specifically approved by USCIB or ISIB in each instance,

1946 APPENDIX B

26. [Continued]

- (b) via completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to Agencies or Offices producing or utilizing Communication Intelligence of the appropriate categories.
- (c) via external landlines only as specifically approved by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD in each instance.
- 27. Traffic Intelligence and SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL technical matter shall not be transmitted in plain language (unencrypted) except as follows
 - (a) as provided in paragraph 26 above,
 - (b) by protected postal channels over routes approved by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD.
 - Note The above restrictions on the conveyance of confidential material over the territory of a third party may be relaxed at the discretion of STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD to permit unencrypted raw traffic (classified CONFIDENTIAL) being conveyed by air or land transport over territory belonging to a third party provided that the raw traffic has not been originated by nationals belonging to that third party.

OGA EO 1.4.(c) EO 1.4.(d)

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1948 APPENDIX B

31. [Continued]

- (c) in the case of raw traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL only, the restrictions on the conveyance of CONFIDENTIAL material over the territory of a third party may be relaxed at the discretion of USCIB or LSIB to permit such transport by air or land. Such relaxation will be the exception in the case of raw traffic originated by nationals of the third party in question.
- 32. Except in circumstances contemplated in paragraph 15 above
 - (a) Special Intelligence and TOP SECRET technical matter transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels or ciphers expressly provided for these subjects:
 - (b) Traffic Intelligence and SECRET technical matter transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels or ciphers expressly provided for these subjects, those listed in paragraph 32(a) above, or in the highest grade cipher available,
 - (c) however, in the case of or similarly secure ciphers, the transmission of Communication Intelligence, TOP SECRET and SECRET technical matters and raw traffic over the same channel is authorized, provided that such channels are reserved for these subjects exclusively.

1946 APPENDIX B

29. Transmission of Raw Traffic. Cryptographic channels or cyphers for the transmission of "raw traffic" shall be agreed upon from time to time by STANCIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD.

- 28. Encrypted Transmissions. Except in circumstances contemplated in paragraph 17 above
 - (a) Special Intelligence and TOP SECRET technical matter transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special crytographic channels or cyphers expressly provided for these subjects, and in no other.
 - Such channels or cyphers shall possess at least the security of the CCM and shall be approved by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD.
 - (b) Traffic Intelligence and SECRET technical matter transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels or cyphers expressly provided for these subjects or in the highest grade cypher available.

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1948 APPENDIX B

EXCEPTIONS

- 33. The guiding principle of the expression "the need to know" shall be rigidly upheld in all circumstances. However, certain limited exceptions from other provisions of these principles shall be recognised
 - (a) with the approval of USCIB or LSIB, dissemination need not be confined to indoctrinated persons, and the applicable codeword need not be employed in connection with the exchange use and dissemination contemplated in the following instances
 - (1) certain D/F fixes and bearings graded CONFIDENTIAL,
 - (2) certain categories and series of plain text messages between commercial firms passed on international links which must be graded at least CONFIDENTIAL,
 - (b) an Agency engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence may, at the discretion of the Somior Officer concerned, after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, omit the classification and the appropriate codewords from its worksheets and similar documents used within the Agency or within Interception or D/F stations in technical operations. The classification may be emitted from raw traffic passed between Agencies, or from Intercept and D/F stations to Agencies;

1946 APPENDIX B

EXCEPTIONS

- 30. The guiding principle of the expression "the need to know" shall be rigidly upheld in all circumstances. However, certain limited exceptions from other provisions of these principles shall be recognised
 - (a) with the approval of STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD dissemination need not be confined to "indoctrinated" persons, and the applicable code word will not be employed in connection with the exchange use and dissemination contemplated in the following instances

OGA EO 1.4.(c) EO 1.4.(d)

- (1) certain D/F fixes and bearings graded CONFIDENTIAL,
- (2) certain categories and series of plain language intercepts from circuits graded CONFIDENTIAL,
- (3) certain categories and series of plain language intercepts from military curcuits graded SECRET, provided the source is disguised.

[Note Sub-paragraph 30(a)(3) omitted from 1948 Appendix B]



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1948 APPENDIX B

33. [Continued]

(c) forecasts or conclusions derived in whole or in part from analyses of maps on which Special Weather Intelligence is plotted may be issued to flying personnel and to other personnel who are not indoctrinated, but only in such form as can give no indication whatever of the source.

1946 APPENDIX B

30. [Continued]

(b) a Centre engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence may, without encrypting the appropriate code word in the encrypted text, transmit TOP SECRET and SECRET technical matter over cryptographic channels or cyphers expressly and exclusively provided for such technical matter,

[Note paragraph 30(b) omitted from 1948 Appendix B].

(c) a Centre engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence may, at the discretion of the Senior Officer concerned, after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, omit the classification and the appropriate code word from its worksheets and similar documents used within the Centre, or used between the Centre and its Interception and D/F stations in its technical operations.

[No corresponding item in 1946 Appendix B].





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COMPARATIVE TABLE APPENDIX D

COORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS INFOHMATION

(Note: the new Appendix D contains items which were covered in paragraphs 4-13 of the 1946 Appendix C and in the 1946 Appendix D)

1948 APPENDIX D

CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

- 1. It will be the joint objective of the parties to ensure that the required field of traffic analysis problems is covered as thoroughly as possible but general rules cannot be laid down for the division of T/A responsibility between the two parties.
- 2. With this objective in view, unproductive duplication of detailed work will be eliminated and it is recognised that the best method of furthering this process of elimination is to exchange information wherever possible in the form of partly or fully processed material.
- 3. Published reports on Traffic Analysis will always be made available to the other party.

1946 APPENDIX D AND PARAGRAPHS 4-13 INCLUSIVE OF 1946 APPENDIX C

CO-ORDINATION OF, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

[Note. extracted from 1946 Appendix D].

CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

1. The division of responsibility in traffic analysis follows, to some extent, the division of intercept duties. It is not practicable, at this stage, to define further the division of responsibility in this subject though this ray be desirable at a later date. In the meantime there will be a full exchange, through regular liaison channels, of all written reports on Traffic analysis which are prepared by the various traffic analysis and intercept control groups.

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1948 APPENDIX D

- Where the exchange of published reports is inadequate the requirements for a more detailed exchange will be stated. These requirements will be satisfied as far as possible from the material being currently produced e.g. work sheets, log digests, daily diagrams and other predigested material but both parties will endeavour to meet any additional requirements by modifying the form or content of these partly—processed reports.
- 5. Where in any specific case the exchange of material provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 above is inadequate either party may request copies of the unprocessed logs or chatter sheets. Such requests will be satisfied within the limits of the resources available.
- 6. The method of exchange in all cases will be by radio or by bag according to the nature and urgency of the material.
- 7. In order to facilitate the exchange of material a degree of standardisation will be aimed at in the use of names or abbreviations to describe T/A features, e.g., transmission-systems, call-sign systems, procedure codes, traffic types etc.
- 8. The methods used to indicate validity should be extended from their present limited application to all suitable T/A material, so that the weight of evidence attached to the component elements of any T/A conclusion may be assessed on a common basis.

1946 APPENDIX D AND PARACRAPHS 4-13 INCLUSIVE OF 1946 APPENDIX C

[No corresponding items in 1946 Appendices]

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1948 APPENDIX D

CO-CRDINATION OF HTERCEPT CONTROL

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1946 APPENDIX D AND PARAGRAPHS 4-13 INCLUSIVE OF 1946 APPENDIX O

DIVISION OF INTERCEPTION TASKS AND OF SEARCH PROGRAMMES

[Note. extracted from 1946 Appendix C]

4. Specific initial allocation of intercept tasks and of search programmes is impracticable for the following reasons.

- (a) Lack of adequate communications for exchange of raw traffic
- (b) Instability of the situation regarding personnel and reception facilities during demobilisation and reorganisation period.
- (c) Lack of knowledge on relevant problems pending further General Scarch.

5. Some actual division of interception tasks exists not at that and ing paragraph 4 above, due to geographical considerations.

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(b) Service Circuits other than British stations cover the great majority of these circuits which are now being intercepted.



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1948 APPENDIX D

CO-ORDINATION OF INTERCEPT CONTROL [Contamued]

- 9. The objective of both parties will be to ensure that the total intercept resources available are used so as to give as efficient cover as is possible to the whole field of intercept tasks required by them both. There will be co-ordination between the parties to eliminate any avoidable duplication by continuous suggestion as to changes and by mutual agreement. Some duplication of cover may remain necessary to secure complete and accurate interception, or for training purposes, or where the arrangement for the exchange of T/A information and raw material cannot meet both parties! requirements.
- 10. The basis for the continuous co-ordination involved will be an exchange of reports consisting of.
 - (1) reports on intercept results or more frequently as is required)
 - (11) lists of tasks allotted to stations or weekly basis as is required)
 - (III) information on major changes in the cover situation (exchanged by signal).

1946 APPENDIX D AND PARAGRAPHS 4-13 INCLUSIVE OF 1946 APPENDIX C

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- 7. The future division of Intercept coverage and search falls naturally according to the locations and nature of intercept facilities. There will be co-ordination between the parties in the form of continuous elimination, by mutual agreement, of unwanted duplication and of continuous suggestion and mutual agreement as to changes. All such co-ordination depends upon the provision of adequate tolecommunications for the exchange of raw traffic.
- 8. The besis for the continuous co-ordination involved will be an exchange of monthly reports on coverage. The forms for these reports are shown in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 DGA EO 1.4.(c)
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1948 APPENDIX D

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1946 APPENDIX D AND PARAGRAPHS 4-13 INCLUSIVE OF 1946 APPENDIX C

9. The wall be despatched by the 25th day of the month previous to which it applies. The vill be despatched by the 10th day of the month succeeding that to which it applies.

10. Reports will first be exchanged to cover the month of May 1946.

11. The London Signet Centre will arrange for the production and distribution of the printed forms referred to in paragraph 8 above.

EXCHANGE OF REPORTS, FREQUENCY INFORMATION AND GENERAL SEARCH RESULTS

OGA EO 1.4.(c) EO 1.4.(d)

13. Each party will examine and standardise the form in which the information described in paragraph 12 above is promulgated within its own organisation. After this has been done both parties will adopt a common form for the reports conveying this information.

[Paragraphs 9 - 13 above omitted from 1948 Appendix D or covered by paragraph 10 of that appendix]

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1948 APPENDIX D

CO-ORDINATION OF EFFORT ON D/F,

- 11. In general the division of work must fall naturally according to the locations of D/F and intercept stations, and the intercept tasks and search programmes undertaken by each party.
- 12. Collaboration between the parties in the field of D/F shall be in the form of:
 - (1) requests from any agency direct to any other for bearings and fixes on specified targets, and
 - (11) the exchange of results.

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1946 APPENDIX D AND PARAGRAPHS 4-13 INCLUSIVE OF 1946 APPENDIX C

CO-ORDINATION OF DIRECTION FINDING AND FACILITIES
[Note: extracted from 1946 Appendix D]
2. D/F and facilities available are listed in the report described under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Appendix C.
3. In general the division of work must fall naturally according to the locations of D/F and intercept stations, and the intercept tasks and search programmes undertaken by each centre.
4. Collaboration between the parties in the field of D/F shall be in the form of requests from any centre direct to any other for bearings and fixes on specified targets.
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COMPARATIVE TABLE: APPENDIX E

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CO-ORDINATION OF AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON CRYPTANALYSIS AND ASSOCIATED TECHNIQUES

1948 APPENDIX E



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1948 APPENDIX E

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1948 APPENDIX E

1946 APPENDIX E

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COMPARATIVE TABLE: APPENDIX F

EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AND CO-ORDINATION IN TRANSLATION

1948 APPENDIX F

- l. Decrypts of foreign communications will not be exchanged between the two parties except as provided in paragraph 6 of. Appendix E or as may be arranged for cryptanalytic or other technical reasons, out any decrypt or series of decrypts will be made available on specific request by one party to the other, if not prohibitively inconvenient.
- 2. Scorning, translating and exchanging material in the field is covered in Appendix K. In other fields as the Agencies will probably be smable to translate all decrypts, plain toxis or R/T intropets in full or even in extract, each will carry out a process of scanning such as to meet its own requirements. The liaison officers will therefore be free to scan this material to ensure that any particular interests of their own party are being served.
- 3. Translations will be assumed to be in full unless labelled "gist" or "extract".
- 4. If either party considers that decrypts or plain texts serve its intelligence needs without translation, such decrypts or plain texts will be regarded by the other as if they were translated texts and their exchange between the Agencies will be precisely the same as that of translated texts and extracts (see paragraph 6 below). It is the intention of each party to limit such cases to the minimum.

1946 APPENDIX F

- L. Decrypts of foreign communications will not be exchanged between the COMINT Centres in London and Washington, except as provided in paragraph 6 of Appendix E or as may be arranged for cryptanalytic or other technical reasons, but any decrypt or series of decrypts will be made available on specific request by one Centre to the other, if not prohibitively inconvenient.
- 2. As the Centres will probably be unable to trans_acc all decrypts or plain texts in full or even in extract, each will carry out a process of scarning such as to meet its own COMINI requirements. The liaison officers will therefore be free to scal this material to ensure that any particular interests of their own party are being served,
- 3. Translations will be assumed to be in full unless labelled "gist" or "extract".
- If either party considers that decrypts or plain texts serve its intelligence needs without translation, such decrypts or plain texts will be regarded by the other as if they were translated texts and their exchange between the Centres will be precisely the same as that of translated texts and extracts (see paragraph 6 below). It is the intention of each party to limit such cases to the minimum.



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1948 APPENDIX · F

- 5. Comments will be clearly distinguishable as such and will be prefaced by the word "comment".
- 6. Unless excepted in Appendix K, all translated texts, extracts, gists (unless excepted by paragraph 7 below), items of Traffic Intelligence and comments appended thereto, will be exchanged continuously, currently and without request unless otherwise arranged in specific instances. Such exchange, complete or partial, will be effected by radio when specifically requested by the parties and in addition a complete exchange will be effected with the least possible delay through the regular liaison channels.
- Gasts which are made by an agency for its own use but not issued will not be exchanged but will be at the disposal of the liaison officers who may ask for such decrypts or plain texts as may be required.
- 8. All Comintsums will be exchanged whenever they are issued and Without request.
- 9. LSIC will be the channel through which all Communication Intelligence items produced by the other British Commonwealth Agencies (except Ottawa) will be forwarded to the U.S. Agencies and through which the same materials produced by the U.S. Agencies will be forwarded, whenever appropriate, to other British Cormonwealth recipients, (except Canadian).

1946 APPENDIX F

- 5. Comments will be clearly distinguishable as such and will be prefaced by the word "comment".
- All translated texts, extracts, gists (unless excepted by paragraph 7 below), items of Traffic Intelligence and comments appended thereto, will be exchanged between the COMINT Centres in Vashington and London continuously, currently and without request unless otherwise arranged in specific instances. Such exchange, complete or partial, will be effected by radio when specifically requested by the parties and in addition a complete exchange will be effected with the least possible delay through the regular liaison channels.
- 7. Gists which are made by a Centre for its own use but not issued will not be exchanged but will be at the disposal of the liaison officers who may ask for such decrypts or plain texts as may be required.
- 8. All COMINTSUMS will be exchanged between the producing Centres in Washington and London, whenever they are issued and without request.
- 9. The London SIGINT Centre will be the channel through which all COMINT items produced by the other British Commonwealth Centres (except Ottawa), will be forwarded to the Washington COMINT Centre and through which the same materials produced by the Washington COMINT Centre will be forwarded, whenever appropriate to other British Commonwealth recipients, (except Canadian).



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1948 APPENDIX F

10. The U.S. Agencies will be the channel through which all Communication Intilligence items produced by British Commonwealth Agencies will be forwarded, whenever appropriate, to U.S. recipients.

DIVISION OF LABOUR IN TRANSLATION

- 11. Each Agency will undertake such scanning and translation tasks as are suited to its own requirements and those of its recipients. Any exception will be by prior agreement.
- 12. The continuous exchange of translated material will allow either party to eliminate unwanted duplication in translation.

STANDARDISATION OF TRANSLATION FORM

13. To avoid ambiguity and to promote ease of reading, reference and recording, it will be the aim of the U.S. and British Agencies to adopt a standard style and layout for headings, translated texts, gists, extracts, comments and translators! notes.

1946 APPENDIX F

10. The Washington COMINT Centre will be the channel through which all COMINT items produced by British Commonwealth Centres will be forwarded, whenever appropriate, to U.S. recipients.

DIVISION OF LABOUR IN TRANSLATION

- 11. Each Centre will undertake such scanning and translation tasks as are suited to its own requirements and those of its recipients. Any exception will be by prior agreement between the Centres.
- 12. The continuous exchange between the Centres of their translated material will allow either party to eliminate unwanted duplication in translation.

STANDARDISATION OF TRANSLATION FORM

- 13. To avoid ambiguity and to promote ease of reading, reference and recording, it will be the aim of the Centres in washington and London to adopt a standard style and layout for headings, translated texts, gists, extracts, comments and translators, notes.
- 14. To that end the London SIGINT Centre will prepare a proposed style and layout which will be introduced with such modifications as are necessary as soon as it has been considered by the U.S. technical specialists concerned.

[Note: paragraph 14 cmitted from 1948 Appendix F]

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1948 APPENDIX F

STANDARDISATION OF TRANSLATION CONTENT

14. Each Agency will furnish to the other, continuously, currently and without request, copies of all Supplemental Glossaries and other compilations which it prepares as a result of and for use in its translation processes. The materials thus exchanged will be the basis for continuous discussion between the agencies with a view to increasing standardisation.

15. In order to develop a common standard of validitygrading in language equivalents, each Agency will inform the other
of the significance of such gradings as it currently uses in its
Supplemental Glossaries.

1946 APPENDIX F

ST. IDARDISATION OF TRANSLATION CONTENT

15. To eliminate discrepancies in translation and to obtain standardisation in translation terminology, each Centre will at once compile and forward to the other a list of the dictionaries and works of linguistic reference, which it currently accepts as standard for the languages with which it is concerned, and will continue to forward such information as necessary.

[Note: paragraph 15 omitted from 1948 Appendix F]

16. Each Centre will furnish to the other, continuously, currently and without request, copies of all Supplemental Glossaries and other compilations which it prepares as a result of and for use in its translation processes. The materials thus exchanged will be the basis for continuous discussion between the Centres with a view to increasing standardisation. The Centres will aim to agree from time to time on one or the other as the deciding authority in a specific language field.

[Note, last sentence of paragraph 16 omitted from 1946 Appendix F]

17. In order to develop a common standard of validitygrading in language equivalents, each Centre will inform the other
of the significance of such gradings as it currently uses in its
Supplemental Glossaries.

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APPENDIX G EXCHANGE OF COLLATERAL MATERIAL

1948 appendix unchanged from 1946 Appendix

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COMPARATIVE TABLE APPENDIX H

COMMUNICATIONS

1948 APPENDIX H

TELECOMIUNICATIONS ORGANISATION REQUIRED

1. Exclusive and readily extensible telecommunications between Agencies, and between Agencies and their outlying stations will be maintained in order to make possible the rapid flow of all types of raw traffic from the points of interception to the several Agencies, the rapid exchange of all types of raw traffic, technical matter and Communication Intelligence between the Agencies, and the efficient control of interception coverage.

INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF TERMINALS

2. The terminals of circuits or channels intended exclusively to carry Comint traffic between the British Commonwealth and the United States will be installed, maintained and operated as arranged by the appropriate Comint Authorities of the countries concerned and, although normally such terminals will be installed, maintained and operated by the appropriate U.S. or British Commonwealth authority on whose territory the terminals are situated this will not be obligatory.

1946 APPENDIX H

TELECOTOUNICATIONS ORGANISATION REQUIRED

1. Provision will be made for exclusive and readily extensible telecommunications between Centres and between Centres and their outlying stations. Except for certain D/F requirements, tone type equipment should be provided as soon as available. This is necessary in order to make possible the rapid flow of all types of raw traffic from the points of interception to the several Centres, the rapid exchange of all types of raw traffic, technical matter and Communication Intelligence between the Centres, and the efficient control of interception coverage, with consequent reduction in wasteful duplication.

INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF TERMILL'IS

2. The terminals of circuits intended exclusively to carry COMINT traffic will normally be installed, maintained and operated by the appropriate U.S. or British Commonwealth authority on whose territory the terminals are situated.

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1948 APPENDIX H

TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES

- 3. (a) The United Kingdom authorities in conjunction with the Canadian authorities will make the following radio teletype channels available exclusively for Comint traffic between the United Kingdom and the North American continent
 - (1) from the Foreign Office U K./Canada circuit ~ 2 channels,
 - (11) from the R.A.F./R C.A.F. U.K./Canada circuit 2 channels,
 - (b) the United States authorities will be responsible for providing land line facilities between Canada on the one hand and the United States Agencies and the London Signit Laison Unit in the U.S.A. on the other.
 - (c) the Canadian authorities vill be asked to take responsibility for providing the following
 - (1) facilities for switching the Foreign Office U.K./Canada circuit to the United States land line network:
 - (11) facilities for switching the R.A.F./R.C.A.F. U.K./Canada circuit to the Canadian Comint Agency,

1946 APPENDIX H

PARTICULAR CIRCUITS TO BE ESTABLISHED

- 3. The following will be set up
 - (a) the London Oshawa circuit will be maintained, operated and controlled by U.K. authorities and converted to channelized radioteletype at the earliest practicable time. London will control. U.S. authorities will operate the Washington terminal, maintain the Oshawa Washington landline, and provide facilities for relay to the London SIGINT liaison unit in Washington,

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1948 APPENDIX H

[Continued]

- (111) emergency facilities for switching the Foreign Office U.K./Canada circuit to the Canadian Comint Agency and the R.A.F./R C.A.F. U.K./Canada circuit to the United States land line network, to provide communication in the event of breakdown of one or other of the radio channels,
- (d) in addition to the facilities provided by 3(a) above, a minimum of two channels of the Londonderry Washington circuit will be allocated exclusively to Comint traffic. This circuit will be operated, in accordance with paragraph 2, above, by the United States and/or British as may be mutually arranged,

(c) both parties recommend that in those areas which are potentially operational, facilities be established for the direct transmission of raw material from the intercept stations operated by one party to a designated agency or station of the other party.

On the specific request of one party the other party agrees to make every endeavour to provide these facilities, which if and then provided, will be brought into operational use as mutually agreed,

1946 APPENDIX H

3. [Continued]

- (b) a London Washington radioteletype circuit will be established and two channels thereof will be allocated exclusively to COMINT traffic. This circuit will be operated by the appropriate U.S. or British cuthority on whose territory the terminal is situated, with Washington conscolling,
- (c) the Melbourne Honolulu circuit will be reestablished and channelized, and will be operated by the appropriate U.S. or British Commonwealth authority on whose territory the terminal is situated, with Honolulu controlling. [No corresponding item in 1948 Appendix H]

[No corresponding item in 1946 Appendix H]





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1948 APPENDIX H

3. [Continued]

(f) on-demand "quick exchange" communication facilities will be provided between the United Kingdom and Washington as may be mutually arranged.

PROCEDURE AND OPERATING SIGNALS

4. Procedure and operating signals appropriate to a particular circuit will be used

COMMON CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS

5. Common cryptographic aids will be used for combined Comint communications. The matter of cryptographic aids will be kept continuously under review with the object of maintaining and increasing security and of facilitating communications.

1946 APPENDIX H

[No corresponding item in 1946 Appendix H]

STANDARD PROCEDURE AND OPERATING SIGNALS

4. Standard Procedure and Operating Signals will be introduced for combined use. The current combined Procedure and Operating Signals will be adopted initially subject to minor modifications which may be found necessary and mutually agreed from time to time to meet special COMENT requirements. In addition, the U.S. authorities will undertake the preparation of a Combined COMINT Communications Manual, which will be adopted for use when approved by the LONDON SIGINT BOARD and STINCIB.

COLT'ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS

5. Common cryptographic aids will be used for combined COMINT communications. Initially CCM, SIGCUM, one-time type (SIGTOT), and one-time pads will be used. The matter of cryptographic aids will be kept continuously under review with the object of maintaining and increasing security and of facilitating communications.





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1948 APPENDIX H

COMMUNICATIONS LIAISON

6. A representative of the Director, LSIC., and a representative of the Co-ordinator of Joint Operations, U.S. Agencies, will be given the specific duty of keeping under review Comint communications problems and of raising and advising on such problems as they occur

PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT

7. The provision of equipment will be by mutual assistance where necessary and practicable and as agreed in each specific case.

USE OF UNLEASED CABLES

8. Unleased commercial cables will not be used for the transmission of unencrypted raw material except as a dominum cations emergency measure.

BAG ROUTES

9. Bag routes will be kept under review with the object of taking full advantage of improved sea and air services.

USE OF MICROFILM

10. All agencies will be equipped to handle microfilm so that it may be available for use when it is not practicable to send the original material.

1946 APPENDIX H

COMMUNICATIONS LIAISON

6. A representative of the London Signit Board and a representative of STANCIB will be given the specific duty of keeping under review COMINT communications problems and of raising and advising on such problems as they occur.

PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT

7. The provision of equipment will be by rutual assistance where necessary and practicable and as agreed in each specific case.

USE OF UNLEASED CABLES

8. Unleased cormercial cables will be used for transmission of COMINT traffic only as a communications ereigency measure.

TRANS-ATLANTIC BAG ROUTES

9. The trans-Atlantic bag routes will be kept under review with the object of taking full advantage of improved sea and air services.

USE OF MICROFILM

10. All centres will be equipped to handle microfilm so that it may be available for use when it is not practicable to send the original material.

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COMPARATIVE TABLE APPENDIX I

LIAISON AND METHODS OF EXCHANGE

1948 APPENDIX I

LIAISON PERSONNEL

- 1. Each party shall maintain, in the country of the other, a senior liaison officer accredited to the other. Such officers shall be responsible each in the country to which he is accredited for all liaison matters.
- 2. Upon agreement between USCIB and LSIB, additional liaison personnel may be accredited, and vorking groups may be assigned, to agencies of either party by the other. All such additional liaison personnel shall be under the control and direction of the senior liaison officer.
- 3. Suitable office facilities will be made available as necessary by the party to whom the limited officers are accredited.
- Liaison officers of one party shall normally have unrestricted access to those parts of the other's agencies which are engaged directly in the production of Comint, except such parts thereof which contain unexchangeable information. The points of contact of liaison officers within agencies for requests and inquiries shall be as determined, established and delimited by the party to which they are accredited.

1946 APPENDIX I

LIAISON PERSONNEL

- Lack party shall maintain, in the country of the other, a senior liaison official accredited to the other. All communication Intelligence liaison matters in each country shall be under the cognizance and control of the senior Communication Intelligence liaison official in that country.
- 2. Upon agreement between STANCIB and the London SIGINT Board, additional liaison personnel may be accredited, and working groups may be assigned, to operating agencies of either party by the other. All such additional liaison personnel shall be under the control and direction of the senior liaison official.
- 3. Suitable office facilities will be made available as necessary by the party to whom the liaison officials are accredited.
- Liaison officials of one party shall normally have unrestricted access to those parts of the other's operating agencies which are engaged directly in the production of Communication Intelligence, except such parts thereof which contain unexchangeable information. The points of contact of liaison officials within operating agencies for requests and inquiries shall be as determined, established and delimited by the party to which they are accredited.

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5. In addition to the above regularly assigned personnel, visits by selected personnel for short periods of time to deal with special problems will be encouraged.

METHODS OF EXCHANGE

Requests by one party for information or material shall be made by that party via its senior liaison officer who shall act through prescribed liaison charmels. The senior liaison officer of the requesting party shall forward whatever information or material is made available to him, normally by means of facilities under the control of his own country. Normally the senior liaison officer of the providing party shall be kept informed.

[Above paragraph of 1948 Appendix I corbines paragraph 6 and first sentence of paragraph 7 of 1946 Appendix I].

7. When the request by one party is for information or material to be supplied as a matter of routine procedure, the supply, after the initial request, may be direct between the parties by means of facilities available to the senior liaison officer of the requesting party. The senior liaison officers of both parties shall be kept fully informed of all such routine exchanges and shall be given access to the information or material as may be agreed locally.

1946 APPENDIX I

5. In addition to the above regularly assigned personnel, visits by selected personnel for short periods of time to deal with special problems will be encouraged.

CHANNELS FOR EXCHANGE

- 6. Requests by a party or its agencies for information or material shall be made by that party via its senior liaison official accredited to the other. Normally the other party's senior liaison official shall be kept informed of such requests.
- 7. The senior liaison official acting through the prescribed channels and points of contact, shall receive whatever pertinent information or material is made available to him, and shall forward it, normally via channels under the control of his own country. The receiving party shall give the senior liaison efficial of the providing party, whatever share in the distribution and utilization of the information as may be agreed upon locally.
- 8. However, the routine exchange of COMINT material may be effected as mutually agreed directly between the Centres over commication channels jointly and exclusively maintained for COMINT purposes. In addition, it is contemplated that channels for continuous conference and arrangement directly between technical sections may be established.

[Above paragraph of 1946 Appendix I is covered by paragraphs 7 and 8 of 1948 Appendix I].





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1946 APPENDIX I

1948 APPENDIX I

- 8. Exceptionally, technical exchanges between the parties may be effected directly over "on demand" quick exchange communication channels jointly and exclusively maintained for that purpose. But the use of these direct channels will be kept to the minimum and in each case the senior liaison officers of the two parties will be kept informed.
- 9. No provision of paragraphs 6 and 7 above shall be construed as preventing either party from accommodating the other by transporting or communicating material for the other party.
- 10. Each party shall normally assist the other's senior liaison officer by making available to him facilities for packaging and preparing material for transportation. Each party shall, to the extent of facilities operated by or available to it, assist the other's senior liaison officer with safe-hand and other transportation within its own country.
- 9. No provision of paragraph 7 above shall be construed as preventing either party from accommodating the other by transporting materials for the other party.
- 10. Each party shall normally assist the other's senior liaison official by making available to him facilities for packaging and preparing material for transportation. Each party shall, to the extent of facilities operated by or available to it, assist the other's senior liaison official with safe-hand and other transportation within its own country.









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APPENDIX J INTERPREPATION OF CEPTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

1948 Appendix J unchanged from 1946 Appendix J except for footnote to paragraph 4 stating that Chairman LSIB transmitted the required assurance to Chairman USCIB in SB/409 of 17th February 1948.

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No corresponding Appendix in 1946

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COMPAR'TIVE TABLE APPENDIX L

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES PRODUCTION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

(Note the 1948 appendix L contains items which were covered in paragraphs 1 - 3 of the 1946 Appendix C)

1948 APPENDIX L

INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT FACILITIES AND PRODUCTION

- 1. A comprehensive report (to be known as the Annual Technical Report) concerning
 - (1) all interception facilities installed and available for use at intercept and D/F stations, whether or not such facilities are in use,
 - (11) details of the numbers, types and descriptions of intercept equipment under contract and/or in production, together with probable delivery dates,

will be exchanged annually. Reports are to show the position as at 1st July in each year, and should normally be exchanged by 1st August.

2. Section I of the Report will be arranged to provide information to cover the items set out in paragraph 3 for each Intercept and D/F Station. Types, makes and numbers (and where applicable, normal and maximum speeds) of equipment should be included. No attempt has been made to lay down an exact format for the Report, as such a format might soon become out of date, and might prevent flexibility.

1946 APPENDIX C PARAGRAPHS 1 - 3

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON INTERCEPTION FACILITIES

1. A comprehensive report, concerning all interception facilities installed and available for use, whether or not such facilities are in use, will be exchanged on 1st July, 1946, and thereafter at six monthly intervals.

2. The report will be arranged to provide information to cover the following items, where applicable, for each interception and direction-finding station



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1948 APPENDIX L

3. A. HAND SPEED MORSE EQUIPMENTS

- (1) Single Positions (H/F)
- (11) Single Positions (L/F)
- (111) Single Positions (All-wave)
- (iv) Double Positions (H/F or All-wave)
- (v) Which of the above (i) to (iv) are capable of double or triple diversity working
- (v1) Which of the above (1) to (1v) are fitted with wire, tape or wax recorders.

B. HIGH SPEED MORSE EQUIPMENTS

- (1) Single Positions (H/F)
- (11) Single Positions (L/F)
- (111) Single Positions (All-wave)
- (av) Double Positions (H/F or All-wave)
- (v) Which of the above (1) to (1v) are capable of double or triple diversity working
- (vi) Types of recording (i.e. undulator) apparatus
- (VII) Types of recording bridge fitted, and whether capable of accepting frequency shift trans-
- (viii) Any other High Speed equipment.

1946 APPENDIX C PARAGRAPHS 1 - 3

2. [Continued]

- (a) full information on the following general lines regarding morse and non-morse intercept and transcription position,
 - (1) numbers and types of single receiver manual speed positions
 - (11) numbers and types of single receiver high speed positions
 - (111) numbers and types of double receiver manual speed positions
 - (iv) numbers and types of double receiver high speed positions
 - (v) numbers and types of diversity receiving positions
 - (v1) numbers and types of tape transcription positions
 - (vii) numbers and types of recording positions





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1948 APPENDIX L

3. [Continued]

- C. TELEGRAPHIC PRINTING EQUIPMENTS
 - (1) Single Channel Radio Teleprinter (International)
 - (11) Single Channel Radio Teleprinter (National)
 - (111) Multi-channel or Multiplex T/P (International)
 - (1v) 3-channel T/P (National)
 - (v) 2-channel Baudot
 - (v1) 6 and 9-channel Baudot
 - (vii) (1) to (vi) above refer to 5 unit systems. Equipments fitted for any other systems (6, 7-unit ctc.)
- D. V.H/F AND U.H/F EQUIPMENTS
- E. FACSIMILE OR PICTURE EQUUPMENTS
- F. HELLSCHREIBER EQUIPMENTS
- G. DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENTS

Whether fixed or mobile.

2.	(a)	[Contanued

(vill) numbers and types of non-morse terminal positions

1946 APPENDIX C PARAGRAPHS 1 - 3

[No corresponding item in 1946 Appendix C]

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- (b) Direction finding equipment
 - (1) number
 - (11) type
 - (111) frequency range

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1948 APPENDIX L

- 3. [Continued]
 - H. TRANSMITTER IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENTS
 - I. FREQUENCY NEASURING EQUIPMENTS
 - J. AERIALS

Information to include number, types, whother used in diversity, frequency to which cut, directivity, associated amplification equipment.

K. AERIAL EXCHANGES

1946 APPENDIX C PARAGRAPHS 1 - 3

- 2. [Continued]
 - (c) Transmitter identification equipment
 - (1) number
 - (11) type
 - (d) Frequency measuring equipment
 - (1) number
 - (11) type
 - (e) Antennae
 - (1) number
 - (11) type
 - (111) directivity
 - (iv) frequency to which cut
 - (f) Aerial Exchange/Multicouplers
 - (1) number
 - (11) type
 - (111) frequency range

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1948 APPENDIX L

- 3. [Continued]
 - L. CONTROL EQUIPMENT

Details and use of equipment fitted for control of interception within a station.

M. SPECIALISED TEST EQUIPMENT

Not to include standard maintenance equipment for general usc.

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- N. AUDIO FYEQUENCY RECORDING EQUIPMENT
- 0.
- P. ANY OTHER SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
- Q. SHORICOMINGS EXPERIENCED ON OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT

1946 APPENDIC C PARAGRAPHS 1

- 2. [Continued]
 - (g) enumeration and use of equipment fitted for control of intercoption within a station,
 - (r) specialised test equipment.
 - (1) number
 - (11) description and use
 - (1) enumeration of any specialised furniture,
 [No corresponding item in 1948 Ampendix L]

[No corresponding item in 1946 Appendix C]

- (j) enumeration of any miscellaneous specialised equipment,
- (a) (ix) numbers and types of any other special positions not listed

[No corresponding item in 1946 Appendix C]

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1948 APPENDIX L

3. [Continued]

R. SPECIAL MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS, IF ANY

Notes.

- (1) a Single Position may consist of 2 or more receivers, used in diversity, or in order to increase the frequency range,
- (11) a Double Position is one at which a single operator can cover two ends of a duplex circuit, where this is possible.

INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

- 4. (a) Intercept Equipment Reports will be exchanged twice yearly on 1st March and 1st November. These Reports will be in two sections
 - (1) Equipment under development. This to include details of all projects on which development is being conducted together with a statement of the object to be attained.
 - (11) Research and Development trends. This to include a statement of all outstanding problems together with an indication of trends in research and development aimed at their solution. In the event that no work is contemplated on certain specific

1946 APPENDIX C PARAGRAPHS 1 - 3

3. The six-monthly reports (paragraph 1 acove) will also include notes on the shortcomings, maintenance, proposed modifications and any other significant operational characteristics of the equipment. Notes on new equipment under development may be included.

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1948 APPENDIX L

4. [Continued]

(11) [continued]

problems, these problems should nevertheless be listed amongst those current,

(b) Technical Notes will be exchanged as and when necessary on specific subjects. These notes to be designed primarily for the information of personnel actually engaged on engineering and research and development work on interception equipment. These notes also to include data on signal analysis, frequency lists, and other material associated with intercept problems.

1946 APPENDIX C PARAGRAPHS 1 - 3

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COMPARATIVE TABLE APPENDIX M

EXCHANGE OF RAW MATERIAL AND STANDARDISATION OF RAW MATERIAL FORMAT

(Note: the 1948 appendix M contains atems which were covered in paragraphs 20-33 of the 1946 Appendix C)

1948 APPENDIX K

EXCHANGE OF RAT MATERIAL

1. Except as otherwise agreed in Appendix K each party will furnish to the other as promptly as practicable without request and as a matter of routine, one copy of every item of rai traffic collected by its operating agencies, regardless of source. Either party may request expedited delivery, or additional copies, of specific categories of raw traffic, and each shall endeavour to meet the needs of the other in this respect.

2. In so far as practicable raw traffic exchanged will be in the forms contained in paragraphs 4 - 9 below.

1946 APPENDIX C PARAGRAPHS 20-33

EXCHANGE OF RAW TRAFFIC

20. As soon as it can be arranged each party will furnish to the other as promptly as practicable without request and as a matter of routine, one copy of every item of law traffic collected as acquired by its operating agencies, regardless of source. Either party may request specially rapid delivery, or additional copies, of specific categories of raw traffic and each shall endeavour to meet the needs of the other in this respect.

21. The ideal means of conveying raw traffic, from the standpoint of speed and maximum utilisation of manpower, is telecommunications. Therefore the procurement, maintenance and utilisation of telecommunications from intercept points to Centres, and between Centres, will be promoted and encouraged by each party to the utmost extent of its means.

22. All raw traffic, whether or not exchanged by radio, will be exchanged via regular liaison channels or such other routes as may be agreed upon.

[Contents of paragraphs 21 and 22 in 1946 Appendix C commatted from 1948 Appendix M]

23. In so far as practicable raw traffic exchanged will be in the forms contained in paragraphs 25 to 33 below. Departures from this form will be eliminated as soon as possible

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1946 APPENDIX C PARAGRAPHS 20-33

1948 APPENDIX M

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The inclusion of a case-number in an item of raw traffic will not be deemed to show evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes (paragraps 26 of Appendix B refers), and therefore the material may still be classified "Confidential".

The inclusion of a case-number in an item of raw traffic will not be deemed to show evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes and therefore the material may still be classified "Confidential".

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