

Col Rowlett

~~TOP SECRET - CREAM~~

COPY NO: 47.

FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
TECHNICAL CONFERENCE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S.-BRITISH
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT
11TH - 27TH MARCH, 1946.

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-08-2010 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended. ST56834

TECHNICAL CONFERENCE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S.-BRITISH
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENT -
11th - 27th MARCH, 1946.

INTRODUCTION

1. The following arrangements governing the collaboration between the Washington and London COMINT (SIGINT) Centres have been agreed between STANCIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD, in implementation of and as Appendices to the U.S. - British Communication Intelligence Agreement of 5th March, 1946.
2. None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of that Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.
3. The object of these arrangements is to ensure that the maximum advantage is obtained from available personnel and facilities.
4. In accordance with these arrangements, each party will make available to the other, continuously, currently and without request, all raw traffic, COMINT items and Technical Matter acquired or produced, and all pertinent information concerning its activities, priorities and available facilities.
5. In addition, each party will maintain liaison personnel at the other's Centre.
6. The two parties will also effect such standardisation of technical terminology, lay-out, procedure and organisation as may be possible.
7. As a result of the close collaboration thus established and by means of continual suggestion, mutual agreement and mutual arrangement as to changes made there will be effected a continuous elimination of unwanted duplication, although the activities undertaken by each party shall be as basically suited to its own needs.
8. Each party may call upon the other for assistance when necessary and such requests will be met whenever practicable.
9. All possible division of labour between the Centres will be made. It is the intention of both parties to effect a fuller integration of effort gradually.
10. It is, however, agreed that this intention cannot be implemented to the best advantage until the telecommunications available for COMINT purposes are adequate to ensure the sufficiently rapid receipt by each Centre of results from the other's commitments.
11. For this reason, it is agreed that early provision of adequate COMINT communication facilities is essential. Such communications are necessary, furthermore, to provide for emergencies and to permit the development of operational techniques for the handling of new types of transmission.
12. For the same reason, and because the present situation regarding safe-hand routes across the Atlantic is unsatisfactory, each party will keep trans-Atlantic mail facilities and requirements under review and will take full advantage of any improvement made in sea and air mails.
13. Each party will provide the other with two or more copies of all reports, ~~submitted in accordance with the appendices~~ and similar documents submitted in accordance with the appendices.

14. All arrangements are subject to review. Those establishing the exchange of material may be modified by mutual agreement if experience shows that too great a proportion of the personnel available is being employed thereon.

15. These arrangements will become effective on approval by STANCIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD in accordance with para. 12 of the U.S. British Communication Intelligence Agreement.

APPENDIX A.

TERMS TO BE USED

1. CHANNEL: A unit or sub-division of a circuit will be known as a channel.
2. CIRCUIT: A telecommunications system between two points will be known as a circuit.
3. COMINT ITEM: Any item of Special Intelligence or of Traffic Intelligence which is distributed or released by a COMINT Centre will be known as a COMINT item.
4. COMINTSUM: A summary or commentary based on related COMINT items, which may interpret those items in the light of one another or of information from other sources, will be known as a COMINTSUM.
5. COMMENT: Information appended to COMINT items either in elucidation or elucidation, or in expansion of the information contained therein, will be known as a comment.
6. DECRYPT: A foreign communication which has passed through the stages of cryptanalysis and decryption and is in its original language prior to translation will be known as a decrypt.
7. DIGRAPH: A two character group will be known as a digraph.
8. EXTRACT: A translation in part only of a decrypt or plain text will be known as an extract.
9. GIST: A statement of the essential substance of a decrypt or plain text or an abridged version of a translated text or extract will be known as a gist.
10. HEADING: Communication instructions for the delivery of a foreign communication, such as call-signs, serial numbers, external addresses, delivery instructions, indications of priority, group counts, date/time of origin, etcetera, will be known as a heading.
11. LANGUAGE EQUIVALENT: A word or phrase and its proposed or agreed rendering in English as found in a Supplemental Glossary will be known as a Language Equivalent.
12. PLAIN TEXT: An unencrypted foreign communication will be known as a plain text.
13. POSITION: The total assemblage of equipment used as a unit for an interception or transcription purpose will be known as a position.
14. SCANNING: The process of examining decrypts or plain texts to determine if they shall be issued and, if so, in what form and with what priority, will be known as scanning.
15. SUPPLEMENTAL GLOSSARY: A list prepared by a COMINT Centre containing the proposed or agreed renderings in English of words or phrases which, though appearing in Standard Dictionaries, have additional meanings not given in those dictionaries, and of words or phrases of which the meanings are not to be found in a Standard Dictionary, will be known as a Supplemental Glossary.

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None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of the Basic Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.

16. TRANSLATED TEXT: A translation of a decrypt or plain text will be known as a translated text.
17. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: A remark or remarks added to a translated text, extract or gist by the translator, in expansion, clarification or annotation of his rendering of the text, will be known as a translator's note.

(It differs from a "Comment" in that it should not bear upon the Intelligence implications of the text).

APPENDIX B

PRINCIPLES OF
U.S. - BRITISH COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE
SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the security and dissemination of Communication Intelligence issued by or under the authority of STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD and other appropriate officials of the Governments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such regulations may vary in accordance with the requirements of the Parties, Agencies, Departments, and Ministries to whom they are designed to apply, but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect. To ensure uniform interpretation of what constitutes such accord, each party shall forward all such regulations to the other for information.

DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES

2. Communication Intelligence (COMINT) is the name given to products derived from the work of agencies, the operations of which are co-ordinated by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD and which study radio transmissions and other communications not originated by United States or British authorities. The terms Communication Intelligence (COMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) are synonymous. Communication Intelligence is divided into two categories, as follows:
 - (a) Special Intelligence
 - (b) Traffic Intelligence
3. Special Intelligence is that Communication Intelligence which results from the decryption of the texts or substance of encrypted communications. Communications Intelligence obtained from plain language messages may, on occasion, be classed as Special Intelligence. Special Intelligence is designated by the code word CREAM.
4. Traffic Intelligence is that Communication Intelligence which results from analyses of communication networks, procedure signals, call signs, D/F bearings and other technical aids, i.e. Communication Intelligence obtained from intercepted communications by all means short of the actual decoding or decyphering of the texts or substance of those communications. Communication Intelligence obtained from plain language messages is normally included in the Traffic Intelligence category. Traffic Intelligence is designated by the code word IVORY.
5. If Communication Intelligence obtained by the processes described in para. 4 above clearly reflects the use of information derived from encrypted messages, it shall be classed as Special Intelligence.
6. In time of war or national emergency it may be found necessary to sub-divide both Special Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence into smaller categories in order to permit certain classes of Communication Intelligence (comprised of which would not endanger the more important sources) to be distributed to special agencies and lower echelons of military forces which, for security reasons, would not normally receive other Communication Intelligence.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

7. The value of Communication Intelligence in war and in peace cannot be over-estimated; conservation of the source is of supreme importance.

None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of the Basic Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.

APPENDIX B


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It is essential, therefore, that the dissemination accorded to all related or resultant information be strictly controlled and limited. The physical security of related documents is not alone sufficient; it is essential that all references to its existence either direct or indirect be avoided except among those to whom the knowledge is necessary for the proper performance of their duties. The time limit for the safeguarding of Communication Intelligence never expires.

8. Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who is a current recipient of Special Intelligence or who is engaged on its production shall, without special authority,
 - (a) In time of war or national emergency be committed to a hazardous undertaking which might subject him to capture by the enemy or a third party,
 - (b) in time of peace be assigned to or be engaged in surreptitious activities which might reasonably be expected to place him in a position where he might be forced to submit to questioning by a third party.
9. Although from time to time reports of alleged Communication Intelligence activities may be broadcast or published, it is of the utmost importance that complete and absolute silence on such matters be maintained by those who have ever been connected with the Comint organisation, and by all individual recipients of Communication Intelligence, whether past or present, unless they are freed from this obligation by unmistakable and categorical order.
10. In time of war, the full value of Communication Intelligence cannot be realised unless operational use is made of it. However, when action is contemplated in the light of Communication Intelligence, the possibility of compromising the source shall always be borne in mind and this danger shall always be weighed against the military advantage to be gained. A minor advantage is not sufficient ground for risking the compromise of any Communication Intelligence source. When the decision is made to take action based on Communication Intelligence, studied effort shall be made to ensure that such action cannot be attributed to Communication Intelligence alone. In every case, unless the senior officer concerned, after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, considers it completely impracticable, action against a specific target revealed by Communication Intelligence shall be preceded by appropriate reconnaissance or other suitable deceptive measures to which the enemy can reasonably be expected to attribute the action.
11. In time of peace the principle that the conservation of Communication Intelligence sources is a paramount consideration affecting any action taken in the light of Communication Intelligence shall be rigidly upheld.
12. The principle of dissemination is based on "the need to know". Each item of Communication Intelligence shall therefore be made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties and who have been appropriately "indoctrinated". Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of "indoctrinated" persons to an absolute minimum. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the other party's COMINT agencies or to the products, or knowledge of the existence thereof, unless he be approved by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD as appropriate and be properly indoctrinated.
13. It is recognised that both Parties will produce Special Intelligence which, by virtue of its source or content, will require exceptional

safeguards and which should, therefore, be limited strictly in dissemination to the highest level only (see para. 19 below).


14. Except in categories and individual cases agreed upon from time to time by STANCIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD, personnel to be "indoctrinated" as recipients of Communication Intelligence or assigned to Communication Intelligence duties shall be the subjects of special security enquiries.
15. STANCIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD shall maintain complete lists of persons currently "indoctrinated" for Special Intelligence in their respective Governments.
16. STANCIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD shall keep each other fully informed of the Departments, Ministries, Agencies, Offices, Headquarters and Commands receiving Special Intelligence and of the approximate number of "indoctrinated" persons in each.



18. Communication Intelligence shall never under any circumstances or in any form be disseminated to any Ministry, Department, Agency, Organisation, Office, or individual from which or from whom it might reasonably be expected to find its way, officially or extra-officially, into the possession of any person or group who could use it for commercial competition or commercial gain or advantage.


CLASSIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES

19. Special Intelligence. Special Intelligence is classified TOP SECRET. The words TOP SECRET and the code word CREAM shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of this class of Communication Intelligence. This rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from Special Intelligence.



The term "SPECIAL CREAM" will be used instead of the code word CREAM by either party to indicate that it has applied the specially limited dissemination referred to in para. 13 above.

20. Traffic Intelligence. Traffic Intelligence is classified SECRET. The word SECRET and the code word IVORY shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of this class of Communication Intelligence, unless TOP SECRET CREAM appears on the same sheet. This rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from Traffic Intelligence.



21. Technical Matter. Technical matter appertaining to the production of Special Intelligence is normally classified TOP SECRET and designated CREAM. Technical matter appertaining to the production of Traffic Intelligence is normally classified SECRET and designated IVORY. The appropriate classification and code word shall appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses the existence of such technical matter.
22. Raw traffic. Raw traffic (i.e. intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes) is normally classified CONFIDENTIAL, except where a higher classification is mutually agreed upon.
23. Technical success. Communications among cognizant officials of the British and U.S. Governments which reveal actual success, progress or processes in the production of Special Intelligence or Traffic Intelligence in specific instances or fields shall bear the appropriate code word designations even though they do not themselves reveal Communication Intelligence as such.
24. Code Words. The code word CREAM and all that it implies bears the TOP SECRET classification. The code word IVORY and all that it implies bears the SECRET classification. These code words and their implications shall not be made known to "non-indoctrinated" persons, nor shall these code words be used in their code word sense in the presence of "non-indoctrinated" persons.
25. Documents. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of [redacted] below, documents containing Communication Intelligence and technical matter shall remain exclusively in the possession of persons who have been appropriately "indoctrinated", secure from examination by "non-indoctrinated" persons.
26. Plain Language Transmissions. Special Intelligence and TOP SECRET technical matter shall not be transmitted in plain language (unencrypted) except as follows:
- (a) Sealed, by safe-hand channels over routes specifically approved by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD. Such approval will be the exception where such routes involve air or land transport over the territory of a third party.
 - (b) Via completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to Agencies or Offices producing or utilizing Communication Intelligence of the appropriate categories.
 - (c) Via external landlines only as specifically approved by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD in each instance.
27. Traffic Intelligence and Secret or Confidential technical matter shall not be transmitted in plain language (unencrypted) except as follows:
- (a) As provided in para. 26 above.
 - (b) By protected postal channels over routes approved by STANCIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD.

Note: The above restrictions on the conveyance of confidential material over the territory of a third party may be relaxed at the discretion of STAN/CIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD to permit unencrypted raw traffic (classified Confidential) being conveyed by air or land transport over territory belonging to a third party provided that the raw traffic has not been originated by nationals belonging to that third party.

28. Encrypted Transmissions. Except in circumstances contemplated in para. 17 above:-

- (a) Special Intelligence and TOP SECRET technical matter transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels or cyphers expressly provided for these subjects, and in no other.

Such channels or cyphers shall possess at least the security of the CCH and shall be approved by STAN/CIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD.

- (b) Traffic Intelligence and SECRET technical matter transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels or cyphers expressly provided for these subjects or in the highest grade cypher available.

29. Transmission of Raw Traffic. Cryptographic channels or cyphers for the transmission of "raw traffic" shall be agreed upon from time to time by STAN/CIB and the LONDON SIGINT BOARD.

EXCEPTIONS

30. The guiding principle of the expression "the need to know" shall be rigidly upheld in all circumstances. However, certain limited exceptions from other provisions of those principles shall be recognised:

- (a) With the approval of STAN/CIB or the LONDON SIGINT BOARD dissemination need not be confined to "indoctrinated" persons, and the applicable code word will not be employed in connection with the exchange use and dissemination contemplated in the following instances:-

- (1) Certain D/F fixes and bearings graded CONFIDENTIAL.
- (2) Certain categories and series of plain language intercepts from [redacted] circuits graded CONFIDENTIAL.
- (3) Certain categories and series of plain language intercepts from military circuits graded SECRET, provided the source is disguised.

- (b) A Centre engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence may, without encrypting the appropriate code word in the encrypted text, transmit TOP SECRET and SECRET technical matter over cryptographic channels or cyphers expressly and exclusively provided for such technical matter.

- (c) A Centre engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence may, at the discretion of the Senior Officer concerned, after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, omit the classification and the appropriate code word from its worksheets and similar documents used within the Centre, or used between the Centre and its Interception and D/F stations in its technical operations.

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APPENDIX C

COLLECTION AND EXCHANGE OF RAW MATERIAL.

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION OF INTERCEPTION FACILITIES.

1. A comprehensive report, concerning all interception facilities installed and available for use, whether or not such facilities are in use, will be exchanged on 1st July, 1946, and thereafter at six monthly intervals.

2. The report will be arranged to provide information to cover the following items, where applicable, for each interception and direction-finding station:

- (a) Full information on the following general lines regarding morse and non-morse intercept and transcription position.
 - (i) Numbers and types of single receiver manual speed positions.
 - (ii) " " " " " " high speed positions.
 - (iii) " " " " double " manual speed positions.
 - (iv) " " " " " " high speed positions.
 - (v) " " " " diversity receiving positions.
 - (vi) " " " " tape transcription positions.
 - (vii) " " " " recording positions.
 - (viii) " " " " non-morse terminal positions.
 - (ix) " " " " any other special positions not listed.
- (b) Direction finding equipment.
 - (i) Number.
 - (ii) Type.
 - (iii) Frequency range.
- (c) Transmitter identification equipment.
 - (i) Number.
 - (ii) Type.
- (d) Frequency measuring equipment.
 - (i) Number.
 - (ii) Type.

None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of the Basic Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.

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- (o) Antennae.
 - (i) Number.
 - (ii) Type.
 - (iii) Directivity.
 - (iv) Frequency to which cut.
- (f) Aerial Exchange/Multicouplers.
 - (i) Number.
 - (ii) Type.
 - (iii) Frequency range.
- (g) Enumeration and use of equipment fitted for control of interception within a station.
- (h) Specialised test equipment.
 - (i) Number.
 - (ii) Description, and use.
- (i) Enumeration of any specialised furniture.
- (j) Enumeration of any miscellaneous specialised equipment.

3. The six-monthly reports (para. 1 above) will also include notes on the shortcomings, maintenance, proposed modifications and any other significant operational characteristics of the equipment. Notes on new equipment under development may be included.

DIVISION OF INTERCEPTION TASKS AND OF SEARCH PROGRAMMES.

4. Specific initial allocation of intercept tasks and of search programmes is impracticable for the following reasons:-

- (a) Lack of adequate communications for exchange of raw traffic.
- (b) Instability of the situation regarding personnel and reception facilities during demobilisation and reorganisation period.
- (c) Lack of knowledge of relevant problems pending further General Search.

5. Some actual division of interception tasks exists notwithstanding para. 4 above, due to geographical considerations:-

- (a) Service Circuits. In general American stations cover circuits and British stations those though there are some minor unwanted duplications yet to be eliminated.

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TOP SECRET "COMINT"APPENDIX C.

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- (b) Service Circuits other than [redacted] British Stations cover the great majority of these circuits which are now being intercepted.

6. No division of interception tasks is practicable in the following fields until adequate communications for the exchange of raw material are provided:

- (a) [redacted] Circuits.
(b) [redacted] Circuits where 90 per cent duplication exists.

7. The future division of Intercept coverage and search falls naturally according to the locations and nature of intercept facilities. There will be co-ordination between the parties in the form of continuous elimination, by mutual agreement, of unwanted duplication and of continuous suggestion and mutual agreement as to changes. All such co-ordination depends upon the provision of adequate telecommunications for the exchange of raw traffic.

8. The basis for the continuous co-ordination involved will be an exchange of monthly reports on coverage. The forms for these reports are shown as Exhibit 1 [redacted] and Exhibit 2 [redacted]

9. The [redacted] will be despatched by the 25th day of the month previous to which it applies. The [redacted] will be despatched by the 10th day of the month succeeding that to which it applies.

10. Reports will first be exchanged to cover the month of May 1946.

11. The London Sigint Centre will arrange for the production and distribution of the printed forms referred to in paragraph 8 above.

EXCHANGE OF REPORTS, FREQUENCY INFORMATION AND GENERAL SEARCH RESULTS


12. Information pertinent to the data listed in the "T.M." Case Book (ICB) including additions, deletions, modifications, other information relative to intercept control and all other relevant information developed by search will be exchanged by signal at least [redacted]

13. Each party will examine and standardise the form in which the information described in para. 12 above is promulgated within its own organisation. After this has been done both parties will adopt a common form for the reports conveying this information.

STANDARDISED DESIGNATION OF INTERCEPT TARGETS [redacted]


~~TOP SECRET "CREAM"~~

APPENDIX C



~~TOP SECRET "CREAM"~~

APPENDIX C



EXCHANGE OF RAW TRAFFIC

20. As soon as it can be arranged each party will furnish to the other as promptly as practicable without request and as a matter of routine, one copy of every item of raw traffic collected or acquired by its operating agencies, regardless of source. Either party may request specially rapid delivery, or additional copies, of specific categories of raw traffic and each shall endeavour to meet the needs of the other in this respect.


21. The ideal means of conveying raw traffic, from the standpoint of speed and maximum utilisation of manpower, is telecommunications. Therefore the procurement, maintenance and utilisation of telecommunications from intercept points to Centres, and between Centres, will be promoted and encouraged by each party to the utmost extent of its means.

22. All raw traffic, whether or not exchanged by radio, will be exchanged via regular liaison channels or such other routes as may be agreed upon.

23. In so far as practicable raw traffic exchanged will be in the forms contained in paras 25 to 33 below. Departures from this form will be eliminated as soon as possible.


24. The inclusion of a case number in an item of raw traffic will not be deemed to show evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes and therefore the material may still be classified "Confidential".

STANDARDISATION OF RAW TRAFFIC FORMAT.*



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APPENDIX C.




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~~TOP SECRET "CREAM"~~

APPENDIX C.

Exhibit 1.




TOP SECRET "CREAM"

APPENDIX C.

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EXHIBIT 1.



~~TOP SECRET "CREAM"~~

APPENDIX C.

Exhibit 2.

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
APPENDIX C.

Exhibit 2.

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN~~

APPENDIX G.

Exhibit 3.




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TOP SECRET "C.N.W."

APPENDIX C.

Exhibit 4.




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APPENDIX 'C'


Exhibit 4.



TOP SECRET "CREAM"

APPENDIX C.

Exhibit 5.



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~~TOP SECRET "C.E.S."~~

APPENDIX C.

Exhibit 6.


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~~TOP SECRET NOVA~~

APPENDIX C.

Exhibit 6.



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
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~~TOP SECRET "ORCA"~~

APPENDIX C.

Exhibit 7

APPENDIX C
Exhibit 8



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EO 1.4.(d)

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APPENDIX G.

Exhibit 9


~~TOP SECRET CREAM~~

APPENDIX D



CO-ORDINATION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

1. The division of responsibility in traffic analysis follows, to some extent, the division of intercept duties. It is not practicable, at this stage, to define further the division of responsibility in this subject though this may be desirable at a later date. In the meantime there will be a full exchange, through regular liaison channels, of all written reports on Traffic Analysis which are prepared by the various traffic analysis and intercept control groups.



3. In general the division of work must fall naturally according to the locations of D/F and intercept stations, and the intercept tasks and search programs undertaken by each centre.
4. Collaboration between the parties in the field of D/F shall be in the form of requests from any centre direct to any other for bearings and fixes on specified targets.



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None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of the Basic Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.

APPENDIX E

CO-ORDINATION OF, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON,
CRYPTANALYSIS AND ASSOCIATED TECHNIQUES


1. ALLOCATION OF TASKS. Allocation of major tasks, conferring a one-sided responsibility, is undesirable and impracticable until adequate communications are established. For the present, however, such division of tasks as is possible will be attempted. In addition collaboration between the parties will take the form of continuous elimination, by mutual agreement, of unwanted duplication and continuous suggestion and mutual arrangement as to the undertaking of new tasks and changes in the status of old ones.

OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

~~TOP SECRET "CREAM"~~

APPENDIX E.

- 2 -




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APPENDIX E

Exhibit 1.

SYSTEM NOMENCLATURE



DGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)


~~TOP SECRET ORCON~~

→ SLDNKT

APPENDIX 3

Exhibit 1.

- 2 -



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~~TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE~~

GA
O 1.4.(c)
O 1.4.(d)


- 3 -

APPENDIX E
Annexure A(2)
Exhibit 1

TABLE A

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


~~TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE~~

- 4 -

APPENDIX E
Annexure A(2)
Exhibit 1

TABLE B



19th May, 1950

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~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY - NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE~~

APPENDIX E
Annexure .. (2)
Exhibit 1

TABLE E [Contd.]

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OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

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~~TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY~~
~~NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE~~

- 6 -

APPENDIX E
Annexure I(2)
Exhibit 1

TABLE B [Contd.]

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19th May, 1950

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~~TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY~~
~~NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE~~



OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

- 7 -

APPENDIX E
Annexure A(2)
Exhibit 1

TABLE C

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19th May, 1950

~~TOP SECRET~~




OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

~~TOP SECRET "CREAM"~~

APPENDIX E.

Exhibit 2.




OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

~~TOP SECRET "CREAM"~~

APPENDIX E.

Exhibit 2.

- 2 -




r.

OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

~~TOP SECRET "SREAN"~~

APPENDIX E

Exhibit 2.




OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EQ 1.4.(d)

~~TOP SECRET "CREW"~~

APPENDIX E

Exhibit 2

- 4 -




OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

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APPENDIX E.


Exhibit 3.



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APPENDIX E.

Exhibit 3.



APPENDIX F.

EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

AND

CO-ORDINATION AND TRANSLATION.

EXCHANGE OF DECRYPTS, TRANSLATIONS AND ASSOCIATED PRODUCTS.

1. Decrypts of foreign communications will not be exchanged between the COMINT Centres in London and Washington, except as provided in paragraph 6 of Appendix E or as may be arranged for cryptanalytic or other technical reasons, but any decrypt or series of decrypts will be made available on specific request by one Centre to the other, if not prohibitively inconvenient.
2. As the Centres will probably be unable to translate all decrypts or plain texts in full or even in extract, each will carry out a process of scanning such as to meet its own COMINT requirements. The liaison officers will therefore be free to scan this material to ensure that any particular interests of their own party are being served.
3. Translation will be assumed to be in full unless labelled "gist" or "extract".
4. If either party considers that decrypts or plain texts serve its intelligence needs without translation, such decrypts or plain texts will be regarded by the other as if they were translated texts and their exchange between the Centres will be precisely the same as that of translated texts and extracts (see paragraph 6 below). It is the intention of each party to limit such cases to the minimum.
5. Comments will be clearly distinguishable as such and will be prefaced by the word "comment".
6. All translated texts, extracts, gists (unless excepted by paragraph 7 below), items of Traffic Intelligence and comments appended thereto, will be exchanged between the COMINT Centres in Washington and London continuously, currently and without request unless otherwise arranged in specific instances. Such exchange, complete or partial, will be effected by radio when specifically requested by the parties and in addition a complete exchange will be effected with the least possible delay through the regular liaison channels.
7. Gists which are made by a Centre for its own use but not issued will not be exchanged but will be at the disposal of the liaison officers who may ask for such decrypts or plain texts as may be required.
8. All COMINTSUMS will be exchanged between the producing Centres in Washington and London, whenever they are issued and without request.
9. The London SIGINT Centre will be the channel through which all COMINT items produced by the other British Commonwealth Centres (except Ottawa), will be forwarded to the Washington COMINT Centre and through which the same materials produced by the Washington COMINT Centre will be forwarded, whenever appropriate, to other British Commonwealth recipients, (except Canadian).

None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of the Basic Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.

10. The Washington COMINT Centre will be the channel through which all COMINT items produced by British Commonwealth Centres will be forwarded, whenever appropriate, to U.S. recipients.

DIVISION OF LABOUR IN TRANSLATION.

11. Each Centre will undertake such scanning and translation tasks as are suited to its own requirements and those of its recipients. Any exception will be by prior agreement between the Centres.

12. The continuous exchange between the Centres of their translated material will allow either party to eliminate unwanted duplication in translation.

STANDARDISATION OF TRANSLATION FORM.

13. To avoid ambiguity and to promote ease of reading, reference and reporting, it will be the aim of the Centres in Washington and London to adopt a standard style and layout for headings, translated texts, lists, extracts, comments and translators' notes.

14. To that end the London SIGINT Centre will prepare a proposed style and layout which will be introduced with such modifications as necessary as soon as it has been considered by the U.S. technical specialists concerned.

STANDARDISATION OF TRANSLATION CONTENT.

15. To eliminate discrepancies in translation and to obtain standardisation in translation terminology, each Centre will at once compile and forward to the other a list of the dictionaries and works of linguistic reference which it currently accepts as standard for the languages with which it is concerned, and will continue to forward such information as necessary.

16. Each Centre will, and without request, furnish to the other, continuously, currently and without request, copies of all Supplemental Glossaries and other compilations which it prepares as a result of and for use in its translation processes. The materials thus exchanged will be the basis for continuous discussion between the Centres with a view to increasing standardisation. The Centres will aim to agree from time to time, on one or the other as the deciding authority in a specific language field.

17. In order to develop a common standard of validity-grading in language equivalents, each Centre will inform the other of the significance of such gradings as it currently uses in its Supplemental Glossaries.

APPENDIX G

EXCHANGE OF COLLATERAL MATERIAL

DEFINITION

1. Paragraph 2 of the British - U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement specifies that the Agreement governs the relations of the contracting parties "in Communication Intelligence matters only".
2. In the same paragraph it is agreed that the exchange of such collateral material as is applicable for technical purposes and is not prejudicial to national interests will, however, be effected between the COMINT Centres in both countries.
3. In accordance with this paragraph, collateral material is defined as that material from any source other than COMINT which, though of assistance to the COMINT Centres (i.e. "applicable for technical purposes"), is not directly a Communication Intelligence matter.
4. Consequently, material listed in paragraph 3(a) (2) and (6) of the Agreement, though obtained from sources other than Communication Intelligence, is not collateral material because it is directly a Communication Intelligence matter. The exchange of such material will be unrestricted, except as provided in paragraph 3(b) of the Agreement.
5. Similarly, information concerning COMINT methods and techniques, which are developed by the COMINT Centres under U.S. or British patent, is not collateral material, and its exchange is governed by paragraph 4 of the Agreement.

EXCHANGE.

6. Collateral material available for technical purposes to the COMINT Centre of one party will be made available (through the machinery of liaison) to the other Centre, unless precluded by paragraph 2 of the basic Agreement or unless there is objection by the Ministry, Department, Agency, Office or person which originally made the collateral material available or which bears the responsibility for the control thereof.

None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of the Basic Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.

APPENDIX H

ARRANGEMENTS TO BE MADE FOR COMINT COMMUNICATIONS

1. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ORGANISATION REQUIRED. Provision will be made for exclusive and readily extensible telecommunications between Centres and between Centres and their outlying stations. Except for certain D/F requirements, tone type equipment should be provided as soon as available. This is necessary in order to make possible the rapid flow of all types of raw traffic from the points of interception to the several Centres; the rapid exchange of all types of raw traffic, technical matter and Communication Intelligence between the Centres; and the efficient control of interception coverage, with consequent reduction in wasteful duplication.
2. INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF TERMINALS. The terminals of circuits intended exclusively to carry COMINT traffic will normally be installed, maintained and operated by the appropriate U.S. or British Commonwealth authority on whose territory the terminals are situated.
3. PARTICULAR CIRCUITS TO BE ESTABLISHED. The following will be set up:-
 - (a) The London - Oshawa circuit will be maintained, operated and controlled by U.K. authorities and converted to channelized radioteletype at the earliest practicable time. London will control. U.S. authorities will operate the Washington terminal, maintain the Oshawa - Washington landline, and provide facilities for relay to the London SIGINT liaison unit in Washington.
 - (b) A London - Washington radioteletype circuit will be established and two channels thereof will be allocated exclusively to COMINT traffic. This circuit will be operated by the appropriate U.S. or British authority on whose territory the terminal is situated, with Washington controlling.
 - (c) The Melbourne - Honolulu circuit will be re-established and channelized, and will be operated by the appropriate U.S. or British Commonwealth authority on whose territory the terminal is situated, with Honolulu controlling.
4. STANDARD PROCEDURE AND OPERATING SIGNALS. Standard Procedure and operating Signals will be introduced for combined use. The current combined Procedure and Operating Signals will be adopted initially subject to minor modifications which may be found necessary and mutually agreed from time to time to meet special COMINT requirements. In addition, the U.S. authorities will undertake the preparation of a Combined COMINT Communications Manual, which will be adopted for use when approved by the LONDON SIGINT BOARD AND STANCIB.
5. COMMON CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS. Common cryptographic aids will be used for Combined COMINT communications. Initially COM, SIGCUM, one-time tape (SIGTOT), and one-time pads will be used. The matter of cryptographic aids will be kept continuously under review with the object of maintaining and increasing security and of facilitating communications.

None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of the Basic Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.

APPENDIX H

6. COMMUNICATIONS LIAISON. A representative of the London Sigint Board and a representative of STANCIB will be given the specific duty of keeping under review COMINT communications problems and of raising and advising on such problems as they occur.
7. PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT. The provision of equipment will be by mutual assistance where necessary and practicable and as agreed in each specific case.
8. USE OF UNLEASED CABLES. Unleased commercial cables will be used for transmission of COMINT traffic only as a communications emergency measure.
9. TRANS-ATLANTIC BAG ROUTES. The trans-Atlantic bag routes will be kept under review with the object of taking full advantage of improved sea and air services.
10. USE OF MICROFILM. All Centers will be equipped to handle microfilm so that it may be available for use when it is not practicable to send the original material.

APPENDIX I

LIAISON AND
CHANNELS FOR EXCHANGE

LIAISON PERSONNEL

1. Each party shall maintain, in the country of the other, a senior liaison official accredited to the other. All Communication Intelligence liaison matters in each country shall be under the cognizance and control of the senior Communication Intelligence liaison official in that country.
2. Upon agreement between STIC/CIB and the London SIGLINT Board, additional liaison personnel may be accredited, and working groups may be assigned, to operating agencies of either party by the other. All such additional liaison personnel shall be under the control and direction of the senior liaison official.
3. Suitable office facilities will be made available as necessary by the party to whom the liaison officials are accredited.
4. Liaison officials of one party shall normally have unrestricted access to those parts of the other's operating agencies which are engaged directly in the production of Communication Intelligence, except such parts thereof which contain unexchangeable information. The points of contact of liaison officials within operating agencies for requests and inquiries shall be as determined, established and delimited by the party to which they are accredited.
5. In addition to the above regularly assigned personnel, visits by selected personnel for short periods of time to deal with special problems will be encouraged.

CHANNELS FOR EXCHANGE.

6. Requests by a party or its agencies for information or material shall be made by that party via its senior liaison official accredited to the other. Normally the other party's senior liaison official shall be kept informed of such requests.
7. The senior liaison official acting through the proscribed channels and points of contact, shall receive whatever pertinent information or material is made available to him, and shall forward it, normally via channels under the control of his own country. The receiving party shall give the senior liaison official of the providing party, whatever share in the distribution and utilization of the information as may be agreed upon locally.

None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of the Basic Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.

8. However, the routine exchange of COMINT material may be effected as mutually agreed directly between the Centres over communication channels jointly and exclusively maintained for COMINT purposes. In addition, it is contemplated that channels for continuous conference and arrangement directly between technical sections may be established.

9. No provision of paragraph 7 above shall be construed as preventing either party from accommodating the other by transporting materials for the other party.

10. Each party shall normally assist the other's senior liaison official by making available to him facilities for packaging and preparing material for transportation. Each party shall, to the extent of facilities operated by or available to it, assist the other's senior liaison official with safe-hand and other transportation within its own country.

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4 DEC 1947

17

APPENDIX JINTERPRETATION OF
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
U.S.- BRITISH COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTINTRODUCTION

Consequent on meetings held in December 1947 between USCIB and the Director LSIC representing the London Signal Intelligence Board, the following interpretations to certain paragraphs of the British-U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement, dated March, 1946, and of the appendices thereto are hereby agreed to by USCIB and LSIB and will become Appendix J to the aforementioned Agreement.

INTERPRETATIONS

1. It is understood that the LSIB will not initiate or pursue any contact with any nation of the British Commonwealth on Sigint matters other than with the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand (with each of which agreements already exist) without first obtaining the views of USCIB. (It is noted that at the present time LSIB does not envisage any collaboration with Commonwealth Nations other than the above.)
2. It is noted that the Melbourne Sigint Center (LSIC) is, in contrast to the Communications Branch at Ottawa, not a purely national Centre. It is and will continue to be a joint U.K. - Australian - New Zealand organization, manned by an integrated staff.
3. It is noted that a pre-requisite for collaboration by Canada, Australia and New Zealand with U.K. was an unequivocal acceptance of the provisions of the "Explanatory Instructions and Regulations Concerning the Handling of Signal Intelligence (IRSIG)" which has already been given by the Sigint Governing Bodies of the Nations concerned and that continued collaboration is dependent upon their adherence to these regulations.
4. It is the intention of LSIB to obtain from the Sigint authorities of the collaborating Dominions formal assurance that they will abide by the terms of paragraphs 5, 8, and 9 of the British-U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement and of paragraph 5 of Appendix E to that agreement. Such assurance will be transmitted to USCIB from LSIB.

4 DEC 1947

APPENDIX J

5. LSIB will notify USCIB of the present assignment of cryptanalytic tasks for MSIC and will notify USCIB in advance before authorizing any new or altered cryptanalytic tasks for that Center.

6. Both USCIB and LSIB will:

- (a) Not pass to any of the collaborating Dominion Centers COMINT items originated by agencies of the other party without the consent of that party, except as laid down in paragraphs 7(c) and (d) below or as may be from time to time mutually agreed.
- (b) Pass to the collaborating Dominions via the agreed channels only such technical matter and portions of the Status reports as are deemed by the originating agency to be relevant to the agreed tasks upon which each Dominion is engaged.

7. USCIB takes note that, as regards LSIB's policy towards the integrated Center at Melbourne, LSIB intends in future:

OGA
EO 1.4.(c)
EO 1.4.(d)

- (a) To give every encouragement and assistance to pursue [redacted] as the main cryptanalytic task of the Center together with minor tasks of local interest.
- (b) To employ Melbourne-controlled interception stations (some of which are U.K. manned) on tasks to which they are best suited by reason of their location, which inevitably include [redacted]
- (c) To pass to MSIC (in order that MSIC may carry out (a) above), the technical and background matter relevant to these tasks, whether it be obtained from U.S. or British sources, except matter of U.S. origin designated by U.S. authorities as for U.K. use only.
- (d) To pass to MSIC for its internal use only (and to enable that Center to carry out (b) above) the necessary technical matter required for such interception control, whether obtained from British or U.S. traffic analysis or cryptanalysis sources, except matter of U.S. origin designated by U.S. authorities as for U.K. use only.