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JOINT MEETING OF  
STATE-ARMY-NAVY COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE BOARD

AND

STATE-ARMY-NAVY COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE

27 February 1946

Present

STANCIB

Army Lieutenant General Hoyt S Vandenberg  
Brigadier General W Preston Corderman\*  
Captain Robert F. Packard\*

Navy Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis  
Rear Admiral Earl E Stone  
Lieutenant (j g) John F Callahan\*

STANCICC

Army. Brigadier General Carter W Clarke  
Brigadier General W Preston Corderman\*  
Colonel Harold G. Hayes  
Captain Robert F. Packard\*

Navy: Captain J. W. Wenger  
Captain J S. Harper  
Captain W R. Smedberg III  
Lieutenant (j g) John F Callahan\*

State Mr E. E. Huddleson

Also present.

Army Colonel Benjamin W Reckemeyer

Absent

State Mr. Alfred McCormack

\*Dual membership.

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Declassified and approved for  
release by NSA on 04-07-2010  
pursuant to E.O. 12958, as  
amended. ST56834

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A joint meeting of STANCIB-STANCICC was held at 1415 on 27 February 1946 in the office of Lieutenant General Vandenberg. General Vandenberg led the discussion of matters requiring consideration at this meeting.

Matters Requiring Consideration.

General Vandenberg stated that this meeting had been called in order to consider certain matters which had been referred to the Board by the U. S. Delegation to the British-U. S. Technical Conference. Making reference to a list of these matters (see Inclosure A), he suggested that their discussion be initiated by those Delegation members who were present for this meeting and who had primary interest therein.

Application of the Agreement as Regards the FBI (paragraph 1a of Inclosure A)

General Corderman outlined the proposal of the Delegation as regards the proper relationship between STANCIB, the London SIGINT Board, and the FBI. He noted that the recommendation that "STANCIB be furnished complete information on all the CREAM supplied to the FBI by the London SIGINT Board or other British communication intelligence activities" is consistent with the provisions of the Agreement which concern STANCIB's relation to the Dominions. Admiral Inglis indicated that this proposal is acceptable in view of the present situation. However, inasmuch as the exact relationship between the FBI and STANCIB may be determined prior to the conclusion of the Technical Conference, he suggested that the Delegation refrain from raising this question with the British during the early days of the Conference. He further suggested that arrangements regarding this matter should be retroactive so as to provide STANCIB information concerning the current commitments of GCCS to the FBI. Indicating that MIS would be interested to know the British commitments to the FBI running back to V-J Day, General Clarke inquired as to the specific date to which the arrangements should be made retroactive. Admiral Inglis stated that the Navy would require information regarding present and future commitments only. General Vandenberg indicated his feeling that the proposal of the Delegation constitutes an adequate basis for official agreement. However, he suggested that the Delegates endeavor to obtain additional specific information on an unofficial basis. All present were in agreement with his recommendation that the proposal be accepted and that it be considered to apply

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to current and future relationships between STANCIB, the London SIGINT Board, and the FBI.

Control over Dissemination and Protection for the Sources of CREAM (paragraph 1b of Inclosure A)

Captain Wenger referred the Board to the alternative texts of paragraph 3, Appendix A as prepared by the Delegates (see Inclosures B and C). The alternative versions represent the varying views of the Army and Navy members of the Delegation, and were therefore referred to the Board for policy decision. There ensued a discussion of the three major problems involved, i.e., (1) the extent to which subordinate field commanders will be given responsibility to make decisions regarding the use of CREAM in a tactical situation, (2) the need for a disciplinary policy to assure proper use of CREAM, and (3) the extent to which CREAM may be disseminated for use in lower echelons of command. General Vandenberg suggested that STANCIB authorize the dissemination of CREAM to subordinate commanders and that General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz be requested to render a decision which will provide a strong disciplinary policy regarding its proper use. Admiral Inglis indicated his feeling that any consideration of wartime dissemination and disciplinary measures is academic at present, and that, for purposes of peace-time operation, STANCIB should apply strict limitations upon dissemination. Citing the present situation in Yugoslavia as a case in point, General Vandenberg noted that the question of proper utilization of CREAM in a tactical or local situation will arise in peace as well as war. It was his feeling, therefore, that STANCIB must now delineate satisfactory procedures which will be applicable during both war time and peace. He recommended that STANCIB prepare proposed regulations concerning the dissemination of CREAM and a recommended policy regarding disciplinary action. The Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations should then be advised that a policy statement regarding strong disciplinary action is prerequisite to adequate dissemination. He further proposed that, if such action is acceptable, the Board should agree in principle to an extension of dissemination, and should direct STANCIB to prepare specific regulations and recommendations regarding disciplinary action. Indicating his agreement with this course of action, Admiral Stone noted that the final regulations should be prepared on the basis of the policy approved by General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz for dissemination and use with due emphasis on disciplinary policy.

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Admiral Inglis inquired whether the Board could determine a specific level below which subordinate field commanders would not be authorized to make decisions regarding the use of CREAM in a tactical situation. He was concerned that a subordinate commander with incomplete knowledge of the over-all strategic situation might use CREAM in such fashion as to jeopardize the activities of other field commanders. It was his feeling that the authority to make decisions regarding the use of CREAM should not be delegated lower than to theater commanders. General Vandenberg stated that, aside from intelligence personnel, CREAM should be passed to those who need it. Its proper use will depend largely on the adequacy of disciplinary measures applied. Noting that the Army members of the Delegation prefer the strict interpretation contained in Inclosure C, whereas the Navy members favor the less restrictive version presented in Inclosure B, General Corderman requested that the Board make a definite decision in terms of these two points of view. He recommended that, for purposes of discussion and agreement with the British, the Board accept the principle that decisions regarding the use of CREAM may be made by all commanders authorized to receive it. Captain Wenger indicated his agreement with General Corderman that field commanders will use any intelligence they have. The extent to which it is properly used will be determined primarily by the strength of disciplinary controls. Captain Wenger and Captain Smedberg cited the submarine activities and kamikaze raids in the Pacific as cases wherein the less strict interpretation of the Navy had been necessarily and successfully applied. Admiral Stone noted that the Navy policy as reflected in the current corrected edition of CSP 1805 resulted from considerable efforts to effect the proper balance between security and use of ULTRA during the Pacific War. General Vandenberg recommended that the Navy version be accepted by the Board with the understanding that it will be amended to add provisions for drastic disciplinary action. Admiral Stone stated that General Vandenberg's proposal is entirely acceptable to him.

Admiral Inglis inquired whether the proposed appendices include specific delineation of recipients and their responsibilities. Colonel Hayes pointed out that the appendix material prepared to date is intended to serve as a basis for agreement in principle with the British and is not considered to be a set of specific regulations. Indicating his agreement with Colonel Hayes, Captain Wenger noted that the version recommended by the Navy is based on the assumption that adequate specific regulations will be prepared consistent with the principles established therein. In view of this, Admiral Inglis indicated his acceptance of the Navy version

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with the understanding that subsequent regulations will provide specific definition of recipients and responsibilities. General Corderman stated his understanding that specific regulations will be prepared after the Conference. All present indicated agreement with his view that, for purposes of discussion at the Conference, STANCIB would prefer agreement based on Inclosure B, but would accept Inclosure C if necessary in reaching agreement with the British.

Extent to Which the British May Be Advised Regarding U. S. Intercept Facilities (paragraph 1c of Inclosure A).

General Corderman reported that a list of British intercept facilities had been received and that the British had requested that a similar list of U. S. facilities be made available to them. As regards [redacted] intercept stations and the proposed station in [redacted] he recommended that no written record thereof be made available to the British. However, he indicated his intention to inform Sir Edward Travis personally that STANCIB controls a few unlisted facilities. He further indicated that it might be advisable to mention the [redacted] station specifically. Admiral Inglis indicated his feeling that the unlisted stations should be mentioned in the written reply to the British although it should not be necessary to indicate their specific location. It was his feeling that this is necessary to fulfill our obligations for the exchange of information in accordance with the Agreement. A written statement in this matter would protect STANCIB against any possible feeling that STANCIB had failed to meet its obligation. Admiral Stone indicated his agreement with Admiral Inglis. There ensued a discussion regarding the necessity of exchanging this type of information within the provisions of the Agreement. General Corderman felt that, even though the Agreement may not specifically require that this information be made available, practical collaboration in intercept control requires that it be exchanged. It was agreed by all present that information regarding the existence of these "extra" facilities should be made available to the British in writing, but that it should be presented in the same manner as used by the British to indicate a small percentage of their facilities not specifically described as to location.

Extent of Direct Exchange and Liaison between ASA, Europe and GCCS as Regards [redacted] Problems:

General Corderman inquired as to the policy of the Board regarding direct liaison and exchange between ASA, Europe and

EO 1.4.(b)

EO 1.4.(c)

EO 1.4.(d)

NSA25X3

NSA25X6

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GCCS on [ ] problems. Admiral Inglis restated his views regarding [ ] exchange and indicated that collaboration on other problems need not be so carefully restricted. All present were in agreement that no special security restrictions need be applied to [ ] problems.

Admiral Inglis and Captain Smedberg left the meeting at this time.

Use of U. S. Equipment for the Additional Communication Channel Between Washington and London (paragraph 1d of Inclosure A)

Noting that the proposed Navy channel may be used to provide additional C. I. communications between Washington and London, Captain Wenger recommended that the Board accept the proposal of the Delegation in this matter. Admiral Stone suggested that, inasmuch as the proposed Navy channel had been initiated by the Navy to handle several categories of communications, the Navy rather than STANCIB should be considered responsible for furnishing the necessary equipment. He stated that the proposed equipment will be a four-channel Multiplex from the Navy Department to the Admiralty, including one channel from Op-20-G for the handling of C. I. traffic, one channel for general naval traffic, one channel for State Department traffic, and one channel for the use of the British Admiralty unit in Washington. The channel for C. I. communications may be extended from the Admiralty to GCCS, this extension to be provided by the British. U. S. equipment will be provided by loan rather than by lend-lease. Captain Harper recommended that, through the U. S. Delegation, STANCIB officially urge the Admiralty to accept the Navy plan. This proposal was accepted by the Board.

Pointing out the necessity of maintaining two channels of communication, General Corderman noted that the present channel through Canada should be retained as a British-controlled link. However, the U. S. will have to maintain the land line from Washington to Oshawa. He therefore recommended that STANCIB approve Army responsibility to maintain this circuit. All present indicated their approval of this recommendation.

Use of U. S. Cryptographic Equipment and Training Facilities for the Encipherment of C. I. Communications between U. S. and British Organizations (paragraph 1e of Inclosure A).

The Board accepted this proposal of the Delegation.

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Exchange of Technical Equipment

Making reference to that portion of paragraph 5, Appendix B (see Inclosure D), which concerns provisions for the exchange of technical equipment, Captain Wenger noted that this problem had been raised with the British in connection with the extent of the exchange of methods and techniques. Inasmuch as the Army and Navy will be limited in their exchange of technical equipment by commercial contracts and patent rights, he recommended that the Board approve this portion of the appendices as prepared by the Delegation. All present indicated their acceptance of these provisions.

Agenda Materials to be Forwarded to the British

STANCIB directed that, subsequent to final review by the Delegation as to form and content, the proposed U. S. Appendices to the Agreement be made available to Colonel Marr-Johnson for forwarding to the London SIGINT Board.

There being no further matters for consideration at this time the meeting was adjourned.

Respectfully,

ROBERT F. PACKARD  
JOHN F. CALLAHAN  
Secretariat, STANCIB-STANCICG

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INCLOSURE A

MATTERS REGARDING TECHNICAL CONFERENCE REFERRED TO  
STANCIB FOR CONSIDERATION

1. At its meeting on 26 February the STANCIB Delegation to the forthcoming Technical Conference decided that the following matters should be referred to STANCIB for policy decision or approval
  - a. The STANCIB Delegation will inform the London SIGINT Board of its inability to represent the FBI in matters requiring liaison with British agencies, excepting that STANCIB will represent all communication intelligence activities of the United States in fields other than [redacted]. The Delegation desires that STANCIB act as the channel via which the British communication intelligence activities will furnish CREAM information to the FBI, it has as its minimum requirement that STANCIB be furnished complete information on all the CREAM supplied to the FBI by the London SIGINT Board or other British communication intelligence activities.
  - b. Reference Paragraph 3 of Appendix A\*. -- The problem of controlling the dissemination and protecting the sources of CREAM intelligence is considered to be one of determining how far down in the echelons of command CREAM intelligence should be made available. It is believed that all commanders having access to CREAM intelligence should be authorized to determine whether the risks involved in its utilization are justified by the results to be gained thereby. A broad policy statement concerning the dissemination and safeguarding of CREAM is requested.
  - c. Reference Paragraph 5 of Appendix C\*. -- It is proposed that the existence of the [redacted] intercept stations and the proposed intercept station in [redacted] shall not be divulged to the London SIGINT Board as existing or proposed intercept facilities.
  - d. Reference Paragraph 1 of Appendix F\*. -- Will STANCIB furnish radio equipment to the London SIGINT Board Station near London for use in communication in Washington?

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- e. Reference Paragraph 4 of Appendix F\*.--Will STANCIB furnish cryptographic equipment for use by the London SIGINT Board and provide for the training of British personnel to operate such equipment?

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\*Paragraph references apply to the second version of Appendices A-G which were distributed to STANCIB-STANCICC on 27 February 1946.

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INCLOSURE B

PARAGRAPH 3, APPENDIX A

3 In time of war, the full effectiveness of Communication Intelligence cannot be realized unless operational use is made of it. However, when action is contemplated in the light of Communication Intelligence, the possibility of compromising the source must always be borne in mind and this danger must always be weighed against the military advantage to be gained. In general, momentary tactical advantage is not sufficient ground for risking the compromise of a Communication Intelligence source. When the decision is made to take action based on Communication Intelligence, studied effort must be made to ensure that such action cannot be attributed to Communication Intelligence alone. In every case, where at all practicable, action against a specific target revealed by Communication Intelligence shall be preceded by appropriate reconnaissance or other suitable deceptive measures to which the enemy can reasonably be expected to attribute the action.

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INCLOSURE C

ALTERNATIVE PARAGRAPH 3, APPENDIX A

3. When it is necessary to take action based on Communication Intelligence, the greatest possible care must be taken to ensure that the action cannot lead any representative of a foreign power to the conclusion that such action was inspired by Communication Intelligence. In war time the gaining of a temporary tactical advantage is an entirely insufficient reason for risking the compromise of a source of Special Intelligence, and any action based on Special Intelligence must be capable of being fully accounted for by other means such as reconnaissance, prisoner-of-war reports, agents' reports, etc., a suitable lapse of time being allowed before promulgation of action, if necessary.

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INCLOSURE D

EXTRACT FROM PARAGRAPH 5, APPENDIX B

. . . . The conveyance by one party to the other, pursuant to this paragraph, of a device or apparatus may take the form of a gift, loan, sale, rental, or rendering available, as may be agreed and arranged between the two parties in the specific instance. The fact that the disclosing party may have the privilege of using a method or technique, or a device or apparatus pertaining thereto, on a royalty-free basis shall not of itself relieve the receiving party of the obligation to pay royalties

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