Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Part of the Indo-Pakistani Wars
Date August – September 23, 1965 Location Indian subcontinent Result United Nations mandated ceasefire.[1] No permanent territorial changes (see Tashkent Declaration).
Belligerents
India	Pakistan Supported by Iran[2]
Commanders and leaders
PM Lal Bahadur Shastri Gen J.N Chaudhuri Lt.Gen. Harbakhsh Singh ACM Arjan Singh Maj.Gen. Gurbaksh Singh	Pres. Ayub Khan Gen Muhammad Musa VAdm S.M. Ahsan AM Noor Khan MGen Tikka Khan Gen Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik Iftikhar Janjua Gen Abdul Ali Malik
Strength
720 Tanks[3] 186 Centurions[4] 346 Shermans[3] 90 AMX[3][4] 90 PT-76[3] 628 Artillery[4] 66x 3.7"How[4] 450x 25pdr[4] 96x 5.5"[4] 16x 7.2"[4] 700,000 Infantry[3]	150 aircraft 756 Tanks[4] 352 Pattons[4] 308 Shermans[4] 96 Chaffees[4] 552 Artillery[4] 72x105mm How[4] 234X25pdr[4] 126x155mm How[4] 48x8" How[4] 72x3.7" How[4] POK Lt Btys[4] 260,000 Infantry[3]
Casualties and losses
Neutral claims[5][6] 3,000 men[5] At least 175 tanks[5] 60–75 aircraft[5] 540 km2 (210 mi2) of territory lost (primarily in Rann of Kutch)[7][8] Indian claims 59 aircraft lost[9] 322 km2 territory lost[10] Pakistani claims 8,200 men killed or captured[10] 110,[11] 113[10] aircraft destroyed 500 tanks captured or destroyed [10] 2602,[12] 2575 km2[10] territory gained	Neutral claims[5] 3,800 men[5] 200 tanks[5] 20 aircraft[5] Over 1,840 km2 (710 mi2) of territory lost (primarily in Sialkot, Lahore, and Kashmir sectors)[7][8] Pakistani claims 19 aircraft lost Indian claims 5259 men killed or captured [10] 43,[9] 73 aircraft destroyed [10] 471 tanks destroyed [10] 1920,[13] 1078 km2 [10] gained

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and September 1965 between Pakistan and India. This conflict became known as the Second Kashmir War fought by India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Kashmir, the first having been fought in 1947. The war began following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India.^[14] The five-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.^[1]

Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the International Border between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of British India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations. Many details of this war, like those of other Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear.^[1]

Pre-war escalation[link]

A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war.

Since Partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues. Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956 which ended with India regaining control over the disputed area.^[15] Pakistani patrols began patrolling in territory controlled by India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both countries on each others posts on 8 April 1965.^[15][16] Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded 350 square miles (900 km²) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 3,500 square miles (9,100 km²).^[17]

After its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962.^[18] Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement by means of a covert infiltration, codenamed Operation Gibraltar^[19] The Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, however, their presence reported by local Kashmiris,^[20] and the operation ended in a complete failure.

The war[link]

On August 5, 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on August 15.^[18]

Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army, General Muhammad Musa visiting the captured Khemkaran Railway Station, India

Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass, 8 km into Pakistan-Administered Kashmir.

On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that "Hindu morale" (as he called Indian Army) won't stand more than two hard attacks at the right time and place;^[21][22][23] although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed, as per his biographer Altaf Gauhar and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass.^[21][24] Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theater of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south.

Lt. Col. Hari Singh of the India's 18th Cavalry posing outside a captured Pakistani police station (Barkee) in Lahore District.

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on September 6, marking an official beginning of the war.^[25] On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the Pakistani counter attack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.

The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured^[26] the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment^[27] to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.

Destroyed or abandoned Pakistani Patton and Sherman tanks on display near Khem Karan. About 97 Pakistani tanks were either destroyed or captured by India during the Battle of Asal Uttar.^[28][29]

On September 8, 1965, a company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at Munabao – a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometres from Jodhpur. Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the post has now been christened – the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station. On September 10, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed.^[30]

On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armoured Division, labeled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armoured Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar.

The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of September 10 lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning – "Real Answer", or more appropriate English equivalent – "Fitting Response"). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it didn't see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength.

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 miles² (1,800 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (550 km²) of Indian territory. The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors,^[31] while Pakistani land gains were primarily south in deserts opposite to Sindh and in Chumb sector near Kashmir in north.^[32]

Aerial warfare[link]

The F-86 Sabre was a front-line fighter of the PAF.

The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since independence. Though the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s, that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict.

The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunter, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict the PAF was out-numbered by around 5:1.^[33]

The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet aeroplanes. It has been widely reported that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF, but according to some experts this is untrue because the IAF's MiG-21, Hawker Hunter and Folland Gnat fighters actually had higher performance than their PAF counter-part, the F-86 Sabre.^[34] Although the IAF's de Havilland Vampire fighter-bombers were outdated in comparison to the F-86 Sabre, the Hawker Hunter fighters were superior in both power and speed to the F-86 according to Air Cdre (retired) Sajjad Haider, who led the PAF's No.19 Squadron in combat during the war.

According to the Indians, the F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer."^[35] The PAF's F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the PAF". However, according to Sajjad Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the region."^[36] In combat the starfighter was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter.^[37][38] Yet it zoomed into an on going dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, successfully broke off the fight and caused the Gnats to egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur and was captured by the Pakistan Army. The pilot claimed that most of his equipment failed and even if he could get some chance on that, the star-fighters snuffed it.^[39][40] This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi. Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, was of view that Gnat was no "Sabre Slayer" when it came to dog fighting.^[40]

The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59.^[41] According to one independent source, the PAF flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.^[42]

Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China within 10 days of the beginning war.^{[citation needed]} But this could be explained by the 5:1 disparity in numbers faced by the PAF.^[34]

"India retained much of its air force in the East, against the possibility of Chinese intervention, and as a result the air forces were quite evenly balanced in the West."^[43]

"The PAF lost some 25 aircraft (11 in air combat), while the Indians lost 60 (25 in air combat). This was an impressive result, but it was simply not good enough. Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent. Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three week's fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India's losses totalling 15 percent. Air superiority was not achieved, and were unable to prevent IAF fighter bombers and reconnaissance Canberras from flying daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus 1965 was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority.^[43]

Tank battles[link]

Tanks of 18th Cavalry (Indian Army) on the move during the 1965 Indo-Pak War.

The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.^[44] Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.^[45] The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.^[46]

At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions – the latter being in the process of formation.

The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hodson's Horse), the 16th Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.

Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour,^[47] Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar;^[48][49] they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Assal Uttar.

After Indians breached the Madhupur canal on September 11, the Khem Karan counter-offensive was halted, affecting Pakistan’s strategy substantially.^[21] Although India's tank formations experienced some results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armoured Division and supporting units, was brought to a grinding halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda.^[50] Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such as India's 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda.

The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.^[49] However, in the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse.^{[citation needed]}

Naval hostilities[link]

Naval operations did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965. On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy under the command of Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station coastal down of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Operation Dwarka, as it is known, is a significant naval operation of the 1965 war^[51][52][53] contested as a nuisance raid by some.^[54][55] The attack on Dwarka caused the Indian Navy led to questions being asked in India's parliament^[56] and subsequent post-war modernization and expansion, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115 crores.^[57][58]

According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.^[59] Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.^[60]

Covert operations[link]

The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases.^[61] On September 7, 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Chief of Army Staff General Muhammad Musa, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields(Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster".^[61] Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians^[62] The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation^[63]

Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.^[64]

India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers.^[65] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory,^[63] but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.^[66]

Assessment of losses[link]

India and Pakistan make widely divergent claims about the damage they inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims.

Neutral assessments[link]

There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most of these assessments agree that India had a upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. Some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below —

• According to the Library of Congress Country Studies conducted by the Federal Research Division of the United States^[76] –

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.

• TIME magazine reported that India held 690 mi² of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 mi² of Indian territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan. Additionally, Pakistan had lost almost half its armour temporarily.^[77] The article further elaborates,

Severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N.

• Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book "South Asia in world politics"^[78] –

The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time United Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.

• In his book "National identity and geopolitical visions",^[79] Gertjan Dijkink writes –

The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.

• An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert's India,^[80] summarizing the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965,

In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.

• In his book titled The greater game: India's race with destiny and China, David Van Praagh wrote^[7] –

India won the war. It gained 1,840 km² (710 sq mi) of Pakistani territory: 640 km² (250 sq mi) in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 km² (180 sq mi) of the Sailkot sector; 380 km² (150 sq mi) far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 km² (140 sq mi) on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 km² (210 sq mi) of Indian territory: 490 km² (190 sq mi) in the Chhamb sector and 50 km² (19 sq mi) around Khem Karan.

• Dennis Kux's "India and the United States estranged democracies" also provides a summary of the war,^[81]

Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.

• BBC reported that the war served game changer in Pakistani politics,^[82]

The defeat in the 1965 war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition. This became a surge after his protege, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, deserted him and established the Pakistan People's Party.

• "A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947" by Robert Johnson mentions^[8] –

India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of 720 square miles (1,900 km²) of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 square miles (570 km²) of its own.

• An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's "Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment"^[83] –

A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.

• English historian John Keay's "India: A History" provides a summary of the 1965 war^[84] –

The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate.

• Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book "Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan"^[85] –

Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory.

• Newsweek magazine, however, praised the Pakistani military's ability to hold of the much larger Indian Army.^[86]

By just the end of the week, in fact, it was clear that the Pakistanis were more than holding their own.

Ceasefire[link]

The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than February 25, 1966.

With declining stockpiles of ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared the war tilting in India's favor. Therefore, they quickly accepted the ceasefire in Tashkent.^[87] Despite strong opposition from Indian military leaders, India bowed to growing international diplomatic pressure and accepted the ceasefire.^[87] On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day.

India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the declaration of the ceasefire. As a consequence, the public outcry in India against the ceasefire declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress.^[88] The ceasefire was criticized by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The protests led to student riots.^[89] Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war – which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India – and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains.^[90] Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief titled "The Myth of 1965 Victory",^[91] allegedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book were bought by Pakistan Army to prevent publication because the topic was "too sensitive".^[92][93]

India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India.^[94] In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On October 10, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala.^[95] A Pakistani Army Auster was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani army captain and on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters.

The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Intelligence failures[link]

Strategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate —

Indian miscalculations[link]

Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.

The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition.

Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.^[67]

Pakistani miscalculations[link]

The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars.

The Pakistani Army also failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would order an attack on the southern sector in order to open a second front. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead using them to support penetrating into Kashmir.

"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani commentators criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. These critics claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all-out war. Despite progress being made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24-hour lull ensued the replacement, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and successfully oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticized Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar, which was doomed to fail, and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war. Malik threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, but later dropped the idea for fear of being banned.^[96]

Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game – conducted in March 1965, at the Institute of Defence Analysis, USA. The exercise concluded that, in the event of a war with India, Pakistan would win.^[97][98] Other authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... the 1965 war was a shock".^[99]

Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF during the war, Nur Khan, later said that the Pakistan Army, and not India, should be blamed for starting the war.^[100][101] However propaganda in Pakistan about the war continued; the war was not rationally analyzed in Pakistan,^[102][103] with most of the blame being heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war, when then East Pakistan was invaded by India and seceded from West Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh.

Involvement of other nations[link]

Pakistan and the United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation in 1959 under which the United States agreed to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.^[104] However, following the start of the 1965 war, the United States was of the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan's fault and therefore, it cut all military supplies to the country.^[76] However, Pakistan did receive significant support from Iran, Indonesia and People's Republic of China.^[76]

Both before and during the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and had invariably admonished India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962. There were also reports of Chinese troop movements on the Indian border to support Pakistan.^[105] As such, India agreed to the UN mandate in order to avoid a war on both borders.

India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members. Despite close relations between with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral than most other nations during the war and even invited both nations to talks that it would host in Tashkent.^[106][107]

Aftermath[link]

India[link]

Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir.^[108] In its October 1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war^[109] —

Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.

In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian premier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.^[110]

While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticized for their failure to effectively deploy India's superior armed forces so as to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan.^[111] In his book "War in the modern world since 1815", noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan "lost heavily" during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates^[112] —

India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks.

As a consequence, India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the triservices of the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks.

China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict in support of Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons.^[113] Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict which irked India.^[114] At the same time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India.^[115] These developments led to a significant change in India's foreign policy – India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India.^[116] From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports were from the Soviet Union.^[117] After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far.^[118]

Pakistan[link]

At the conclusion of the war, many Pakistanis considered the performance of their military to be positive. September 6 is celebrated as Defence Day in Pakistan, in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force, in particular, was praised.

However, the Pakistani government was accused by foreign analysts of spreading disinformation among its citizens regarding the actual consequences of the war.^[119] In his book "Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies", S.M. Burke writes^[78] —

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength.

Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as critical breakthroughs were not made.^[120] Several Pakistani writers criticized the military's ill-founded belief that their "martial race" of soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in the war.^[121][122] Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote^[123] –

The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in a blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.

Pakistan airforce on the other hand gained a lot of credibility and reliability among Pakistan military and international war writers for successful defence of lahore and other important areas of Pakistan and heavy retaliation to India on the next day. The alertness of the airforce was also related to the fact that some pilots were scrambled 6 times in less than an hour on indication of Indian air raids. Pakistan airforce along with the army is celebrated for on Defence day and Airforce day in commemoration of this in Pakistan (September 6 and 7 respectively).^[34][124]

Moreover, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the war and, more importantly, failed to achieve its goal of capturing Kashmir; this result has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan.^{[125][126][127]}

Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was also criticized in Pakistan, though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Political leaders were also criticized. Following the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority – if not invincibility – of its armed forces,^[128] but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war, created a political liability for Ayub.^[129] The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition.^[82]

One of the most far reaching consequences of the war was the wide-scale economic slowdown in Pakistan.^[130][131] The cost of the 1965 war put an end to the impressive period economic growth Pakistan had experienced during early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defence spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting tremendous strain on Pakistan's economy. By 1970–71, defence spending comprised a whopping 55.66% of government expenditure.^[132]

Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides,^[18] leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States.^[133] After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.

Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh),^[99] particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir.^[134] Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir.^[135] In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector,^[136] although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrenghted infantry division (14 Division), sixteen planes and no tanks.^[137] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation War and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

Military awards[link]

Battle honours[link]

After the war, a total of number of 16 battle honours and 3 theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian Army, the notable amongst which are:^[138]

Gallantry awards[link]

For bravery, the following soldiers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries, the Indian award Param Vir Chakra and the Pakistani award Nishan-e-Haider:

India

• Company Quarter Master Havildar Abdul Hamid (Posthumous)
• Lieutenant-Colonel Ardeshir Burzorji Tarapore (Posthumous)

Pakistan

• Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed (Posthumous)

See also[link]

• Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
• Post–World War II air-to-air combat losses

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• First & Further reflections on the second Kashmir War (South Asia series) – 2 books by Louis Dupree.
• Gupta, Hari Ram (1967). India-Pakistan war, 1965. 1 (1 ed.). Hariyana Prakashan. ISBN B0006FFBK8. http://books.google.com/books?id=3jAxNbn1tkEC&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Mohan, Jagan; Chopra, Samir (2005) [2005]. The India Pakistan Air War of 1965 (1 ed.). Manohar Publishers. ISBN 81-7304-641-7. http://books.google.com/books?id=Bz9uAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Berindranath, Dewan (1966). The war with Pakistan: A pictorial narration of the fifty days which rocked the sub-continent. Asia Press. http://books.google.com/books?id=rtdOAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Ismail Siddiqui, Muhammad (1983). Die to live: A selection of short stories based on the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war (1 ed.). Wajidalis. ISBN B0006EL2OI. http://books.google.com/books?id=bZ-QGAAACAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An army, its role and rule: a history of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil, 1967–1999. RoseDog Books. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3. http://books.google.com/books?id=B2saAAAACAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. United Book Press. ISBN 0-87003-214-3, 0-87003-223-2. http://books.google.com/books?id=nYppZ_dEjdIC&lpg=PP1&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=&f=false. 
• Singh, Lt. Gen. Harbaksh (1991). War despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict, 1965. Lancer InterConsult, Inc. ISBN 81-7062-117-8. http://books.google.com/books?id=pBpuAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Praval, Maj K C (2009). Indian Army after Independence. Lancer InterConsult, Inc. ISBN 1-935501-10-0. http://books.google.com/books?id=wA1xPgAACAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Asghar Khan, Mohammed (1979). The first round: Indo-Pakistan War, 1965. Islamic Information Services. ISBN 0-906041-11-2. http://books.google.com/books?id=FJ7cAAAACAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Faruquii, Ahmad (2003). Rethinking the national security of Pakistan: the price of strategic myopia. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 0-7546-1497-2. http://books.google.com/books?id=ElHfAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Singh, Bhupinder (1982). 1965 war, role of tanks in India-Pakistan war. B.C. Publishers. ISBN B0000CQ9GQ. http://books.google.com/books?id=6DDHAAAAIAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Brines, Russell (1968). The Indo-Pakistan Conflict. Pall Mall P. ISBN 0-269-16232-1. http://books.google.com/books?id=BfxtAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 
• Fricker, John (1979). Battle for Pakistan: the air war of 1965. Ian Allan. ISBN 0-7110-0929-5. http://books.google.com/books?id=RPttAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s. 

Sources and external links[link]

• Indo-Pak war of ‘65. Who really started it?
• WTF – Indo-Pak war of ‘65. Why did we go to war?
• IAF Combat Kills – 1965 war,(Center for Indian Military History)
• Mohammed Muhammad Musa (1983). My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965. Wajidalis. 
• United States Library of Congress Country Studies – India
• Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the 1965 War with Pakistan
• Story of Pakistan
• GlobalSecurity.org Indo-Pakistan War 1965
• Pakistan Columnist AH Amin analyzes the war.
• Grand Slam – A Battle of lost Opportunities, Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin – very detailed roll of events and analysis
• A Critical Look at the 1965 Operations, Air Chief Marshall (retd) PC Lal – dispassionate analysis
• The India-Pakistan War, 1965: 40 Years On – From Rediff.com
• Lessons of the 1965 War from Daily Times (Pakistan)
• Pak Army's Kargil like disaster of 1965 – South Asia Tribune
• Spirit of ’65 & the parallels with today – Ayaz Amir
• Air Commodore Syed Sajjad Haider on 1965 war and surrounding events

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Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
Part of Indo-Pakistani Wars and Bangladesh Liberation War
Date 3–16 December 1971 Location Eastern front: East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Western front: India-West Pakistan border Result Decisive[1][2][3] Indian victory. Eastern front: Pakistani forces surrender. Western front: India declares unilateral ceasefire after Pakistani surrender in the east.[4] Territorial changes Secession of East Pakistan as the independent state of Bangladesh.
Belligerents
India East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Mukti Bahini Unofficially supported by:  Soviet Union	Pakistan Unofficially supported by:  United States  People's Republic of China
Commanders and leaders
Gen Sam Manekshaw Lt.Gen. J.S. Arora Lt.Gen. G.G. Bewoor Lt.Gen. K. P. Candeth Lt.Gen. Sagat Singh Adm S. M. Nanda ACM Pratap Lal	Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan LGen Gul Hassan Khan LGen Tikka Khan LGen A. A. K. Niazi  LGen Abdul Ali Malik LGen Akhtar Hussain Malik Iftikhar Janjua VAdm Muzaffar Hassan AM Abdul Rahim Khan
Strength
500,000 troops	365,000 troops
Casualties and losses
3,843 killed[5] 9,851 wounded[5] 1 Frigate 1 Naval Plane[6][7] Indian Okha harbour damaged/fueling facilities destroyed.[8] Damage to western Indian airfields.[9][10][11] Pakistani Claims 130 IAF Aircraft[12][13] Indian Claims 45 IAF Aircraft[14]	9,000 killed[15] 4,350 wounded 97,368 captured 2 Destroyers[16] 1 Minesweeper[16] 1 Submarine[17][18] 3 Patrol vessels 7 Gunboats Pakistani main port Karachi facilities damaged/fuel tanks destroyed[16][19] Pakistani airfields damaged and cratered[20] Pakistani Claims (add the fig here) Indian Claims 94 PAF Aircraft[14]

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a military conflict between India and Pakistan. Indian, Bangladeshi and international sources consider the beginning of the war to be Operation Chengiz Khan, Pakistan's 3 December 1971 pre-emptive strike on 11 Indian airbases.^[21][22] Lasting just 13 days it is considered one of the shortest wars in history.^[23][24]

During the course of the war, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed on the eastern and western fronts. The war effectively came to an end after the Eastern Command of the Pakistani Armed Forces signed the Instrument of Surrender,^[25] on 16 December 1971 following which East Pakistan seceded as the independent state of Bangladesh. Between 90,000 and 93,000 members of the Pakistan Armed Forces including paramilitary personnel were taken as Prisoners of War by the Indian Army^[26][27] It is estimated that between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 civilians were killed in Bangladesh, and up to four hundred thousand women raped by the Pakistani armed forces,^[28] especially Hindus.^[29][30] As a result of the conflict, a further eight to ten million people fled the country at the time to seek refuge in neighbouring India.^[31]

Background[link]

The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation war, a conflict between the traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the majority East Pakistanis.^[16] The Bangladesh Liberation war ignited after the 1970 Pakistani election, in which the East Pakistani Awami League won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan and secured a simple majority in the 313-seat lower house of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament of Pakistan). Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented the Six Points to the President of Pakistan and claimed the right to form the government. After the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to yield the premiership of Pakistan to Mujibur, President Yahya Khan called the military, dominated by West Pakistanis, to suppress dissent.^[32][33]

Mass arrests of dissidents began, and attempts were made to disarm East Pakistani soldiers and police. After several days of strikes and non-cooperation movements, the Pakistani military cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. The Awami League was banished, and many members fled into exile in India. Mujib was arrested on the night of 25–26 March 1971 at about 1:30 a.m. (as per Radio Pakistan’s news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West Pakistan. The next action carried out was Operation Searchlight, an attempt to kill the intellectual elite of the east.^[28]

On 27 March 1971, Ziaur Rahman, a major in the Pakistani army, declared the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Mujibur.^[34] In April, exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile in Baidyanathtala of Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force, defected to the rebellion. Bangladesh Force namely Mukti Bahini consisting of Niyomito Bahini (Regular Force) and Gono Bahini (Guerilla Force) was formed under the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) General Mohammad Ataul Ghani Osmany.^[35]

India's involvement in Bangladesh Liberation War[link]

The Pakistan army conducted a widespread genocide against the Bengali population of East Pakistan,^[36] aimed in particular at the minority Hindu population,^[29][37] leading to approximately 10 million^[29][38] people fleeing East Pakistan and taking refuge in the neighbouring Indian states.^[36][39] The East Pakistan-India border was opened to allow refugees safe shelter in India. The governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee camps along the border. The resulting flood of impoverished East Pakistani refugees placed an intolerable strain on India's already overburdened economy.^[37]

General Tikka Khan earned the nickname 'Butcher of Bengal' due to the widespread atrocities he committed.^[21] General Niazi commenting on his actions noted 'On the night between 25/26 March 1971 General Tikka struck. Peaceful night was turned into a time of wailing, crying and burning. General Tikka let loose everything at his disposal as if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own misguided and misled people. The military action was a display of stark cruelty more merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and Baghdad by Chengiz Khan and Halaku Khan... General Tikka... resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched earth policy. His orders to his troops were: 'I want the land not the people...' Major General Farman had written in his table diary, "Green land of East Pakistan will be painted red". It was painted red by Bengali blood.'^[40]

The Indian government repeatedly appealed to the international community, but failing to elicit any response,^[41] Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 27 March 1971 expressed full support of her government for the independence struggle of the people of East Pakistan. The Indian leadership under Prime Minister Gandhi quickly decided that it was more effective to end the genocide by taking armed action against Pakistan than to simply give refuge to those who made it across to refugee camps.^[39] Exiled East Pakistan army officers and members of the Indian Intelligence immediately started using these camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas.^[42]

The mood in West Pakistan had also turned increasingly jingoistic and militaristic against East Pakistan and India. By the end of September, an organised propaganda campaign, possibly orchestrated by elements within the Government of Pakistan, resulted in stickers proclaiming Crush India becoming a standard feature on the rear windows of vehicles in Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Lahore and soon spread to the rest of West Pakistan. By October, other stickers proclaimed Hang the Traitor in an apparent reference to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.^[43]

India's official engagement with Pakistan[link]

Objective[link]

Illustration showing military units and troop movements during operations in the Eastern sector of the war.

By November, war seemed inevitable. Throughout November, thousands of people led by West Pakistani politicians marched in Lahore and across West Pakistan, calling for Pakistan to Crush India.^[44][45] India responded by starting a massive buildup of Indian forces on the border with East Pakistan. The Indian military waited until December, when the drier ground would make for easier operations and Himalayan passes would be closed by snow, preventing any Chinese intervention. On 23 November, Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan and told his people to prepare for war.^[46]

On the evening of 3 December Sunday, at about 5:40 p.m.,^[47] the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) launched a pre-emptive strike on eleven airfields in north-western India, including Agra which was 300 miles (480 km) from the border. During this attack the Taj Mahal was camouflaged with a forest of twigs and leaves and draped with burlap because its marble glowed like a white beacon in the moonlight.^[48]

This preemptive strike known as Operation Chengiz Khan, was inspired by the success of Israeli Operation Focus in the Arab-Israeli Six Day War. But, unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967 which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew no more than 50 planes to India.^[49][50]

In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held that the air strikes were a declaration of war against India^[51][52] and the Indian Air Force responded with initial air strikes that very night. These air strikes were expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning and thereafter which followed interceptions by Pakistanis anticipating this action.^[4][9]

This marked the official start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the immediate mobilisation of troops and launched the full-scale invasion. This involved Indian forces in a massive coordinated air, sea, and land assault. Indian Air Force started flying sorties against Pakistan from midnight.^[9][16][48] The main Indian objective on the western front was to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian soil. There was no Indian intention of conducting any major offensive into West Pakistan.^[47]

Naval hostilities[link]

Pakistan's PNS Ghazi sank off the fairway buoy of Visakhapatnam near the eastern coast of India, making it the first submarine casualty in the waters around the Indian subcontinent.

Naval reconnaissance submarine operations were started by the Pakistan Navy on both eastern and western front.^{[citation needed]} In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy, under the command of Vice Admiral S.N. Kohli, successfully attacked Karachi's port in Operation Trident^[16] on the night of 4–5 December,^[16] using missile boats, sinking Pakistani destroyer PNS Khyber and a minesweeper PNS Muhafiz; PNS Shah Jahan was badly damaged.^[16] 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict. Operation Trident was followed by Operation Python^[16] on the night of 8–9 December,^[16] in which Indian missile boats attacked the Karachi port, resulting in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships.^[16]

In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command, under Vice Admiral Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistani Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was deployed, and its Sea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan^[53] including Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar. Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarine PNS Ghazi, which sank en route under mysterious circumstances off Vishakapatnam's coast^[54][55] reducing Pakistan's control of Bangladeshi coastline.^[18] But on 9 December, the Indian Navy suffered its biggest wartime loss when the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor sank the frigate INS Khukri in the Arabian Sea resulting in a loss of 18 officers and 176 sailors.^[56]

The damage inflicted on the Pakistani Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the coast guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels, and large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships – Anwar Baksh, Pasni and Madhumathi –^[57] and ten smaller vessels were captured.^[58] Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka.^[59] According to one Pakistan scholar, Tariq Ali, the Pakistan Navy lost a third of its force in the war.^[60]

Air operations[link]

After the initial preemptive strike, PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation. As the war progressed, the Indian Air Force continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones,^[61] but the number of sorties flown by the PAF gradually decreased day-by-day.^[62] The Indian Air Force flew 4,000 sorties while its counterpart, the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel.^[16] This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF High Command to cut its losses as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict.^[63] Though PAF did not intervene during the Indian Navy's raid on Pakistani naval port city of Karachi, it retaliated with bombing the Okha harbour destroying the fuel tanks used by the boats that attacked.^[8][12][64]

In the east, the small air contingent of Pakistan Air Force No. 14 Sqn was destroyed, putting the Dhaka airfield out of commission and resulting in Indian air superiority in the east.^[16]

Attacks on Pakistan

While India's grip on what had been East Pakistan tightened, the IAF continued to press home attacks against Pakistan itself. The campaign settled down to series of daylight anti-airfield, anti-radar and close-support attacks by fighters, with night attacks against airfields and strategic targets by B-57s and C-130 (Pakistan), and Canberras and An-12s (India). The PAF's F-6s were employed mainly on defensive combat air patrols over their own bases, but without air superiority the PAF was unable to conduct effective offensive operations, and its attacks were largely ineffective. During the IAF's airfield attacks one US and one UN aircraft were damaged in Dacca, while a Canadian Air Force Caribou was destroyed at Islamabad, along with US military liaison chief Brigadier General Chuck Yeager's USAF Beech U-8 light twin.

Sporadic raids by the IAF continued against Pakistan's forward air bases in the West until the end of the war, and large scale interdiction and close-support operations, and were maintained. The PAF played a more limited part in the operations, and were reinforced by F-104s from Jordan, Mirages from an unidentified Middle Eastern ally (probably Libya) and by F-86s from Saudi Arabia. Their arrival helped camouflage the extent of Pakistan's losses. Libyan F-5s were reportedly deployed to Sargodha, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F-5s from Saudi Arabia.

Hostilities officially ended at 14:30 GMT on 17 December, after the fall of Dacca on 15 December. India claimed large gains of territory in West Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war), though the independence of Pakistan's East wing as Bangladesh was confirmed. India flew 1,978 sorties in the East and about 4,000 in the West, while PAF flew about 30 and 2,840. More than 80 percent of the IAF's sorties were close-support and interdiction, and about 65 IAF aircraft were lost (54 losses were admitted), perhaps as many as 27 of them in air combat. Pakistan lost 72 aircraft (51 of them combat types, but admitting only 25 to enemy action). At least 16 of the Pakistani losses, and 24 fell in air combat (although only 10 air combat losses were admitted, not including any F-6s, Mirage IIIs, or the six Jordanian F-104s which failed to return to their donors). But the imbalance in air losses was explained by the IAF's considerably higher sortie rate, and its emphasis on ground-attack missions. On the ground Pakistan suffered most, with 8,000 killed and 25,000 wounded while India lost 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded. The losses of armoured vehicles were similarly imbalanced. This represented a major defeat for Pakistan.^[65]

Ground operations[link]

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Pakistan attacked at several places along India's western border with Pakistan, but the Indian army successfully held their positions.^{[citation needed]} The Indian Army quickly responded to the Pakistan Army's movements in the west and made some initial gains, including capturing around 5,500 square miles (14,000 km²)^[66][67] of Pakistan territory (land gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistani Punjab and Sindh sectors was later ceded in the Simla Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill).

On the eastern front, the Indian Army joined forces with the Mukti Bahini to form the Mitro Bahini ("Allied Forces"); Unlike the 1965 war which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy adopted was a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan.

Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, who commanded the eighth, twenty-third, and fifty-seventh divisions, led the Indian thrust into East Pakistan. As these forces attacked Pakistani formations, the Indian Air Force rapidly destroyed the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dhaka airfield out of commission. In the meantime, the Indian Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan.

The Indian campaign employed "blitzkrieg" techniques, exploiting weakness in the enemy's positions and bypassing opposition, and resulted in a swift victory.^[68] Faced with insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military capitulated in less than a fortnight. On 16 December, the Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan surrendered.

Surrender of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan[link]

The Instrument of Surrender of Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan was signed at Ramna Race Course in Dhaka at 16.31 IST on 16 December 1971, by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Officer Commanding-in-chief of Eastern Command of the Indian Army and Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi, Commander of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. As Aurora accepted the surrender, the surrounding crowds on the race course began shouting anti-Niazi and anti-Pakistan slogans.^[69]

India took approximately 90,000 prisoners of war, including Pakistani soldiers and their East Pakistani civilian supporters. 79,676 prisoners were uniformed personnel, of which 55,692 were Army, 16,354 Paramilitary, 5,296 Police, 1000 Navy and 800 PAF.^[70] The remaining prisoners were civilians – either family members of the military personnel or collaborators (razakars). The Hamoodur Rahman Commission report instituted by Pakistan lists the Pakistani POWs as follows: Apart from soldiers, it was estimated that 15,000 Bengali civilians were also made prisoners of war.^[71]

Foreign involvement[link]

United States and Soviet Union[link]

The Blood Telegram

The Soviet Union sympathised with the Bangladeshis, and supported the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini during the war, recognising that the independence of Bangladesh would weaken the position of its rivals—the United States and China. The USSR gave assurances to India that if a confrontation with the United States or China developed, it would take counter-measures. This assurance was enshrined in the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty signed in August 1971.^[72]

The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger feared Soviet expansion into South and Southeast Asia.^[73] Pakistan was a close ally of the People's Republic of China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating a rapprochement and where he intended to visit in February 1972. Nixon feared that an Indian invasion of West Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination of the region, and that it would seriously undermine the global position of the United States and the regional position of America's new tacit ally, China. In order to demonstrate to China the bona fides of the United States as an ally, Nixon sent military supplies to Pakistan, routing them through Jordan and Iran,^[74] while also encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to Pakistan. The Nixon administration also ignored reports it received of the "genocidal" activities of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, most notably the Blood telegram. This prompted widespread criticism and condemnation both by Congress and in the international press.^[36][75][76]

Then-US ambassador to the United Nations George H.W. Bush—later 41st President of the United States—introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan. It was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The following days witnessed a great pressure on the Soviets from the Nixon-Kissinger duo to get India to withdraw, but to no avail.^[77]

It has been documented that President Nixon requested Iran and Jordan to send their F-86, F-104 and F-5 fighter jets in aid of Pakistan.^[78]

When Pakistan's defeat in the eastern sector seemed certain, Nixon deployed a carrier battle group led by the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal. The Enterprise and its escort ships arrived on station on 11 December 1971. According to a Russian documentary, the United Kingdom deployed a carrier battle group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle to the Bay,^[72][79] although this is unlikely as the Eagle was decommissioned at Portsmouth, England in January 1972.

On 6 and 13 December, the Soviet Navy dispatched two groups of cruisers and destroyers and a submarine armed with nuclear missiles from Vladivostok;^[72] they trailed U.S. Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean from 18 December 1971 until 7 January 1972. The Soviets also had a nuclear submarine to help ward off the threat posed by USS Enterprise task force in the Indian Ocean.^[80][81]

China[link]

As a long-standing ally of Pakistan, the People's Republic of China reacted with alarm to the evolving situation in East Pakistan and the prospect of India invading West Pakistan and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Believing that just such an Indian attack was imminent, Nixon encouraged China to mobilise its armed forces along its border with India to discourage it. The Chinese did not, however, respond to this encouragement, because unlike the 1962 Sino-Indian War when India was caught entirely unaware, this time the Indian Army was prepared and had deployed eight mountain divisions to the Sino-Indian border to guard against such an eventuality.^[82] China instead threw its weight behind demands for an immediate ceasefire.

When Bangladesh applied for membership to the United Nations in 1972, China vetoed their application^[83] because two United Nations resolutions regarding the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war and civilians had not yet been implemented.^[84] China was also among the last countries to recognise independent Bangladesh, refusing to do so until 31 August 1975.^[85][83]