This article refers to the theoretical discipline. For international studies see International relations

International relations theory is the study of international relations from a theoretical perspective; it attempts to provide a conceptual framework upon which international relations can be analyzed.^[1] Ole Holsti describes international relations theories act as a pair of coloured sunglasses, allowing the wearer to see only the salient events relevant to the theory. An adherent of realism may completely disregard an event that a constructivist might pounce upon as crucial, and vice versa. The three most popular theories are realism, liberalism and constructivism.^[2]

International relations theories can be divided into "positivist/rationalist" theories which focus on a principally state-level analysis, and "post-positivist/reflectivist" ones which incorporate expanded meanings of security, ranging from class, to gender, to postcolonial security. Many often conflicting ways of thinking exist in IR theory, including constructivism, institutionalism, Marxism, neo-Gramscianism, and others. However, two positivist schools of thought are most prevalent: realism and liberalism; though increasingly, constructivism is becoming mainstream.^[3]

Introduction[link]

The study of International relations as theory can be traced to E.H. Carr's "The Twenty Years' Crisis" which was published in 1939 and to Hans Morgenthau's "Politics Among Nations" published in 1948.^[4] International relations as a discipline is believed to have emerged after the First World War with the establishment of a Chair of International Relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth.^[5] Early international relations scholarship in the Interwar years focused on the need for the balance of power system to be replaced with a system of collective security. These thinkers were later described as "Idealists".^[6] The leading critique of this school of thinking was the "realist" analysis offered by Carr.

Realism[link]

Thucydides author of The Peloponnesian War is considered one of the earliest "realist" thinkers.^[7]

Realism or political realism^[8] has been the dominant theory of international relations since the conception of the discipline.^[9] The theory claims to rely upon an ancient tradition of thought which includes writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Rousseau. Early realism can be characterized as a reaction against interwar idealist thinking. The outbreak of World War II was seen by realists as evidence of the deficiencies of idealist thinking. There are various strands of modern day realist thinking. However, the main tenets of the theory have been identified as statism, survival, and self-help.^[9]

• Statism: Realists believe that nation states are the main actors in international politics.^[10] As such it is a state-centric theory of international relations. This contrasts with liberal international relations theories which accommodate roles for non-state actors and international institutions. This difference is sometimes expressed by describing a realist world view as one which sees nation states as billiard balls, liberals would consider relationships between states to be more of a cobweb.

• Survival: Realists believe that the international system is governed by anarchy, meaning that there is no central authority.^[8] Therefore, international politics is a struggle for power between self-interested states.^[11]

• Self-help: Realists believe that no other states can be relied upon to help guarantee the state's survival.

Realism makes several key assumptions. It assumes that nation-states are unitary, geographically-based actors in an anarchic international system with no authority above capable of regulating interactions between states as no true authoritative world government exists. Secondly, it assumes that sovereign states, rather than IGOs, NGOs or MNCs, are the primary actors in international affairs. Thus, states, as the highest order, are in competition with one another. As such, a state acts as a rational autonomous actor in pursuit of its own self-interest with a primary goal to maintain and ensure its own security—and thus its sovereignty and survival. Realism holds that in pursuit of their interests, states will attempt to amass resources, and that relations between states are determined by their relative levels of power. That level of power is in turn determined by the state's military, economic, and political capabilities.

Some realists (human nature realists)^[12] believe that states are inherently aggressive, that territorial expansion is constrained only by opposing powers, while others (offensive/defensive realists)^[13] believe that states are obsessed with the security and continuation of the state's existence. The defensive view can lead to a security dilemma where increasing one's own security can bring along greater instability as the opponent(s) builds up its own arms, making security a zero-sum game where only relative gains can be made.

Neorealism[link]

Neorealism or structural realism^[14] is a development of realism advanced by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics. It is, however, only one strand of neorealism. Joseph Grieco has combined neo-realist thinking with more traditional realists. This strand of theory is sometimes called "modern realism".^[15] Waltz's neorealism contends that the effect of structure must be taken into account in explaining state behavior. Structure is defined twofold as a) the ordering principle of the international system which is anarchy and b) the distribution of capabilities across units. Waltz also challenges traditional realism's emphasis on traditional military power, instead characterizing power in terms of the combined capabilities of the state.^[16]

Liberalism[link]

Kant's writings on perpetual peace were an early contribution to Democratic peace theory.^[17]

The precursor to liberal international relations theory was "idealism". Idealism (or utopianism) was a term applied in a critical manner by those who saw themselves as 'realists', for instance E. H. Carr.^[18] Idealism in international relations usually refers to the school of thought personified in American diplomatic history by Woodrow Wilson, such that it is sometimes referred to as "Wilsonianism." Idealism holds that a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. For example, an idealist might believe that ending poverty at home should be coupled with tackling poverty abroad. Wilson's idealism was a precursor to liberal international relations theory, which would arise amongst the "institution-builders" after World War II.

Liberalism holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behavior. Unlike realism, where the state is seen as a unitary actor, liberalism allows for plurality in state actions. Thus, preferences will vary from state to state, depending on factors such as culture, economic system or government type. Liberalism also holds that interaction between states is not limited to the political/security ("high politics"), but also economic/cultural ("low politics") whether through commercial firms, organizations or individuals. Thus, instead of an anarchic international system, there are plenty of opportunities for cooperation and broader notions of power, such as cultural capital (for example, the influence of films leading to the popularity of the country's culture and creating a market for its exports worldwide). Another assumption is that absolute gains can be made through co-operation and interdependence—thus peace can be achieved.

The democratic peace theory argues that liberal democracies have never (or almost never) made war on one another and have fewer conflicts among themselves. This is seen as contradicting especially the realist theories and this empirical claim is now one of the great disputes in political science. Numerous explanations have been proposed for the democratic peace. It has also been argued, as in the book Never at War, that democracies conduct diplomacy in general very differently from nondemocracies. (Neo)realists disagree with Liberals over the theory, often citing structural reasons for the peace, as opposed to the state's government. Sebastian Rosato, a critic of democratic peace theory points to America's behavior towards left-leaning democracies in Latin America during the Cold War to challenge democratic peace.^[19] One argument is that economic interdependence makes war between trading partners less likely.^[20] In contrast realists claim that economic interdependence increases rather than decreases the likelihood of conflict.

Neoliberalism[link]

Neoliberalism, liberal institutionalism or neo-liberal institutionalism^[21] is an advancement of liberal thinking. It argues that international institutions can allow nations to successfully cooperate in the international system.

Post-Liberalism[link]

Post-liberal theory argues that within the modern, globalized world, states in fact are driven to cooperate, in order to ensure security and sovereign interests. The departure from classical liberal theory is most notably felt in the re-interpretation of the concepts of Sovereignty and Autonomy. Autonomy becomes a problematic concept, shifting away from a notion of freedom of self-determination and agency to a heavily responsibility and duty laden concept. Importantly, autonomy is linked to a capacity for good governance. Similarly, sovereignty also experiences a shift from a right to a duty. In the global economy, International organisations hold sovereign states to account, leading to a situation where sovereignty is co-produced among 'sovereign' states. The concept becomes a variable capacity of good governance and can no longer be accepted as an absolute right. One possible way to interpret this theory, is the idea that in order to maintain global stability and security and solve the problem of the anarchic world system in International Relations, no overarching, global, sovereign authority is created. Instead, states collectively abandon some rights for full autonomy and sovereignty.^[22]

Constructivism[link]

The standing of constructivism as an international relations theory increased after the fall of the Berlin wall (pictured) and Communism in Eastern Europe^[23] as this was something not predicted by the existing mainstream theories.^[24]

Constructivism or social constructivism^[25] has been described as a challenge to the dominance of neo-liberal and neo-realist international relations theories.^[26] Michael Barnett describes constructivist international relations theories as being concerned with how ideas define international structure, how this structure defines the interests and identities of states and how states and non-state actors reproduce this structure.^[27] The key tenet of constructivism is the belief that "International politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities." Constructivism argues that international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures which give meaning to the material world.^[28] The theory emerged out of debates concerning the scientific method of international relations theories and theories role in the production of international power.^[29] Emanuel Adler states that constructivism occupies a middle ground between rationalist and interpretative theories of international relations.^[28]

The failure of either realism or liberalism to predict the end of the Cold War boosted the credibility of constructivist theory. Constructivist theory criticises the static assumptions of traditional international relations theory and emphasize that international relations is a social construction. Constructivism is a theory critical of the ontological^[30] basis of rationalist theories of international relations. Whereas realism deals mainly with security and material power, and liberalism looks primarily at economic interdependence and domestic-level factors, constructivism most concerns itself with the role of ideas in shaping the international system (indeed it is possible there is some overlap between constructivism and realism or liberalism, but they remain separate schools of thought). By "ideas" constructivists refer to the goals, threats, fears, identities, and other elements of perceived reality that influence states and non-state actors within the international system. Constructivists believe that these ideational factors can often have far-reaching effects, and that they can trump materialistic power concerns. For example, constructivists note that an increase in the size of the US military is likely to be viewed with much greater concern in Cuba, a traditional antagonist of the US, than in Canada, a close US ally. Therefore, there must be perceptions at work in shaping international outcomes. As such, constructivists do not see anarchy as the invariable foundation of the international system,^[31] but rather argue, in the words of Alexander Wendt, that "anarchy is what states make of it".^[32] Constructivists also believe that social norms shape and change foreign policy over time rather than security which realists cite.

Marxism and Critical Theory[link]

Antonio Gramsci's writings on the hegemony of capitalism have inspired Marxist international relations scholarship

Marxist and Neo-Marxist international relations theories are structuralist paradigms which reject the realist/liberal view of state conflict or cooperation; instead focusing on the economic and material aspects. Marxist approaches argue the position of historical materialism and make the assumption that the economic concerns transcend others; allowing for the elevation of class as the focus of study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. A sub-discipline of Marxist IR is Critical Security Studies. Gramscian approaches rely on the ideas of Italian Antonio Gramsci whose writings concerned the hegemony that capitalism holds as an ideology. Marxist approaches have also inspired Critical Theorists such as Robert W. Cox who argues that "Theory is always for someone and for some purpose".^[33]

One notable Marxist approach to international relations theory is Immanuel Wallerstein's World-system theory which can be traced back to the ideas expressed by Lenin in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of capitalism. World-system theory argues that globalized capitalism has created a core of modern industrialized countries which exploit a periphery of exploited "Third World" countries. These ideas were developed by the Latin American Dependency School. "Neo-Marxist" or "New Marxist" approaches have return to the writings of Karl Marx for their inspiration. Key "New Marxists" include Justin Rosenberg and Benno Teschke. Marxist approaches have enjoyed a renaissance since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

Criticisms of Marxists approaches to international relations theory include the narrow focus on material and economic aspects of life.

Feminism[link]

Feminist approaches to international relations became popular in the early 1990s. Such approaches emphasises that women's experiences continue to be excluded from the study of international relations.^[34] International Relations Feminists who argue that gender relations are integral to international relations focus on the role of diplomatic wives and marital relationship that facilitate sex trafficking. Early feminist IR approaches were part of the "Third Great Debate" between positivists and post-positivists. They argued against what they saw as the positivism and state-centrism of mainstream international relations. Christian Reus-Smit argues that these approaches did not describe what a feminist perspective on world politics would look like.

The feminist international relations scholar Jacqui True differentiates between empirical feminism, analytical feminism and normative feminism. Empirical feminism sees women and gender relations as empirical aspects of international relations. It is argued that mainstream international relations emphasis on anarchy and statecraft mean that areas of study that make the reproduction of the state system possible are marginalized.^[35] Analytical feminism claims that the theoretical framework of international relations has a gender bias. Here gender refers not to the "biological" differences between men and women but the social constructs of masculine and feminine identity.^[36] It is claimed that in mainstream international relations masculinity is associated with objectivity. Analytical feminists would see neo-realisms dislike of domestic explanations for explaining interstate behaviour as an example of this bias. Normative feminist sees theorizing as part of an agenda for change.

Criticisms of feminist international relations theory include its portrayal of third world women.^[37]

Green Theory[link]

Alternative approaches[link]

English School[link]

The 'English School' of international relations theory, also known as International Society, Liberal Realism, Rationalism or the British institutionalists, maintains that there is a 'society of states' at the international level, despite the condition of 'anarchy' (literally the lack of a ruler or world state). Despite being called the English School many of the academics from this school were neither English or from the United Kingdom. A great deal of the work of the English School concerns the examination of traditions of past international theory, casting it, as Martin Wight did in his 1950s-era lectures at the London School of Economics, into three divisions: 1. Realist or Hobbesian (after Thomas Hobbes), 2. Rationalist (or Grotian, after Hugo Grotius), 3. Revolutionist (or Kantian, after Immanuel Kant).In broad terms, the English School itself has supported the rationalist or Grotian tradition, seeking a middle way (or via media) between the 'power politics' of realism and the 'utopianism' of revolutionism. The English School reject behavioralist approaches to international relations theory.

Functionalism[link]

Functionalism is a theory of international relations that arose principally from the experience of European integration. Rather than the self-interest that realists see as a motivating factor, functionalists focus on common interests shared by states. Integration develops its own internal dynamic: as states integrate in limited functional or technical areas, they increasingly find that momentum for further rounds of integration in related areas. This "invisible hand" of integration phenomenon is termed "spill-over." Although integration can be resisted, it becomes harder to stop integration's reach as it progresses. This usage, and the usage in functionalism in international relations, is the less commonly used meaning of the term functionalism.

More commonly, however, functionalism is a term used to describe an argument which explains phenomena as functions of a system rather than an actor or actors. Immanuel Wallerstein employed a functionalist theory when he argued that the Westphalian international political system arose to secure and protect the developing international capitalist system. His theory is called "functionalist" because it says that an event was a function of the preferences of a system and not the preferences of an agent. Functionalism is different from structural or realist arguments in that while both look to broader, structural causes, realists (and structuralists more broadly) say that the structure gives incentives to agents, while functionalists attribute causal power to the system itself, bypassing agents entirely.

State Cartel Theory[link]

State cartel theory in international relations is derived from an old institutional theory of economics, from the theory of private or enterprise cartels. It has a German background, because Germany was formerly the land of highest developed economic cartels and the motherland of classical cartel theory. State cartel theory uses a mix of methods ranging from positivist data evaluation to critical socioeconomic analyses or reflexive methods like criticism of thinking or ideology. Among the other theories of International Relations, State cartel theory has most in common with Functionalism in international relations. A bit more than the latter, state cartel theory has its focus on a theory of international organizations.

Post-structuralism[link]

Post-structuralism differs from most other approaches to international politics because it does not see itself as a theory, school or paradigm which produces a single account of the subject matter. Instead, post-structuralism is an approach, attitude, or ethos that pursues critique in particular way. Post-structuralism sees critique as an inherently positive exercise that establishes the conditions of possibility for pursuing alternatives.

Post-modernism[link]

Post-modernist approaches to international relations are critical of metanarratives and denounces traditional IR's claims to truth and neutrality.^[38]

Postcolonialism[link]

Postcolonial International relations scholarship posits a critical theory approach to International relations (IR), and is a non-mainstream area of international relations scholarship. Post-colonialism focuses on the persistence of colonial forms of power and the continuing existence of racism in world politics.^[39]

Evolutionary perspectives[link]

Evolutionary perspectives, such as from evolutionary psychology, have been argued to help explain many features of international relations. Humans in the ancestral environment did not live in states and likely rarely had interactions with groups outside of a very local area. However, a variety of evolved psychological mechanisms, in particular those for dealing with intergroup interactions, are argued to influence current international relations. These include evolved mechanisms for social exchange, cheating and detecting cheating, status conflicts, leadership, ingroup and outgroup distinction and biases, coalitions, and violence. Evolutionary concepts such as inclusive fitness may help explain seeming limitations of a concept such as egoism which is of fundamental importance to realist and rational choice international relations theories.^[40][41]

See also[link]

• International legal theory
• Intermediate Region
• List of scholarly journals in international relations
• Human security
• Foreign interventionism
• Glossary of international relations theory terms
• Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• Baylis, John; Steve Smith; and Patricia Owens. The Globalisation of World Politics, OUP, 4th ed 2008
• Burchill, et al. eds. Theories of International Relations, 3rd edition, Palgrave 2005, ISBN 1-4039-4866-6
• Chernoff, Fred. Theory and Meta-Theory in International Relations: Concepts and Contending Accounts, Palgrave Macmillan
• Guilhot Nicolas, ed. The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory (2011)
• Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, Columbia University Press.
• Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations
• Srenson, Robert, and Georg Sorensen (2006) Introduction to International Relations: theories and approaches. Oxford, OUP, 3rd ed
• Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics
• Waltz, Kenneth. Man, the State, and War, Columbia University Press.
• Weber, Cynthia. International Relations Theory. A Critical Introduction, 2nd edition, Taylor & Francis 2004, ISBN 0-415-34208-2
• Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press

External links[link]

• Articles by IR Theorists
• Theory Talks Interviews with key IR theorists
• The Martin Institute
• A Discussion and Overview of IR Theory and its Historical Roots at American University

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'International Relations' (I.R.) (occasionally referred to as international studies, (I.S.) although the two terms are not perfectly synonymous) is the study of relationships between countries, including the roles of states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). It is both an academic and public policy field, and can be either positive or normative as it both seeks to analyze as well as formulate the foreign policy of particular states. It is often considered a branch of political science (especially after 1988 UNESCO nomenclature), but an important sector of academia prefer to treat it as an interdisciplinary field of study. Aspects of international relations have been studied for thousands of years, since the time of Thucydides, but IR became a separate and definable discipline in the early 20th century.^[1]

Apart from political science, IR draws upon such diverse fields as economics, history, international law, philosophy, geography, social work, sociology, anthropology, criminology, psychology, gender studies, and cultural studies / culturology. It involves a diverse range of issues including but not limited to: globalization, state sovereignty, international security, ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic development, global finance, terrorism, organized crime, human security, foreign interventionism and human rights.

History[link]

The history of international relations can be traced thousands of years ago; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, for example, consider the interaction of ancient Sumerian city-states, starting in 3,500 BC, as the first fully-fledged international system.^[2]

The official portraits of King Władysław IV dressed according to French, Spanish and Polish fashion reflects the complex politics of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Thirty Years' War

The history of international relations based on sovereign states is often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, a stepping stone in the development of the modern state system. Prior to this, the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Contrary to popular belief, Westphalia still embodied layered systems of sovereignty, especially within the Holy Roman Empire.^[3] More than the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 is thought to reflect an emerging norm that sovereigns had no internal equals within a defined territory and no external superiors as the ultimate authority within the territory's sovereign borders. A simple way to view this is that sovereignty says, "I'm not allowed to tell you what to do and you are not allowed to tell me what to do."^{[citation needed]}

The centuries of roughly 1500 to 1789 saw the rise of the independent, sovereign states, the institutionalization of diplomacy and armies. The French Revolution added to this the new idea that not princes or an oligarchy, but the citizenry of a state, defined as the nation, should be defined as sovereign. Such a state in which the nation is sovereign would thence be termed a nation-state (as opposed to a monarchy, or a religious state). The term republic increasingly became its synonym. An alternative model of the nation-state was developed in reaction to the French republican concept by the Germans and others, who instead of giving the citizenry sovereignty, kept the princes and nobility, but defined nation-statehood in ethnic-linguistic terms, establishing the rarely if ever fulfilled ideal that all people speaking one language should belong to one state only. The same claim to sovereignty was made for both forms of nation-state. (It is worth noting that in Europe today, few states conform to either definition of nation-state: many continue to have royal sovereigns, and hardly any are ethnically homogeneous.)

The particular European system supposing the sovereign equality of states was exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia via colonialism and the "standards of civilization". The contemporary international system was finally established through decolonization during the Cold War. However, this is somewhat over-simplified. While the nation-state system is considered "modern", many states have not incorporated the system and are termed "pre-modern".

Further, a handful of states have moved beyond insistence on full sovereignty, and can be considered "post-modern". The ability of contemporary IR discourse to explain the relations of these different types of states is disputed. "Levels of analysis" is a way of looking at the international system, which includes the individual level, the domestic state as a unit, the international level of transnational and intergovernmental affairs, and the global level.

What is explicitly recognized as International Relations theory was not developed until after World War I, and is dealt with in more detail below. IR theory, however, has a long tradition of drawing on the work of other social sciences. The use of capitalizations of the "I" and "R" in International Relations aims to distinguish the academic discipline of International Relations from the phenomena of international relations. Many cite Sun Tzu's The Art of War (6th century BC), Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War (5th century BC), Chanakya's Arthashastra (4th century BC), as the inspiration for realist theory, with Hobbes' Leviathan and Machiavelli's The Prince providing further elaboration.

Similarly, liberalism draws upon the work of Kant and Rousseau, with the work of the former often being cited as the first elaboration of democratic peace theory. Though contemporary human rights is considerably different than the type of rights envisioned under natural law, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius and John Locke offered the first accounts of universal entitlement to certain rights on the basis of common humanity. In the twentieth century, in addition to contemporary theories of liberal internationalism, Marxism has been a foundation of international relations.

Study of IR[link]

Flags of the member states of the United Nations

Initially, international relations as a distinct field of study was almost entirely British-centered. IR only emerged as a formal academic ‘discipline’ in 1918 with the founding of the first ‘chair’ (professorship) in IR - the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth, University of Wales (now Aberystwyth University^[4]), from an endowment given by David Davies, became the first academic position dedicated to IR. This was rapidly followed by establishment of IR at US universities and Geneva, Switzerland. In the early 1920s, the London School of Economics' department of International Relations was founded at the behest of Nobel Peace Prize winner Philip Noel-Baker, and was the first institute to offer a wide range of degrees in the field. Furthermore, the International History department at LSE, developed as primarily focused on the history of IR in the early modern, colonial and Cold War periods..

The first university entirely dedicated to the study of IR was the Graduate Institute of International Studies (now the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), which was founded in 1927 to form diplomats associated to the League of Nations, established in Geneva some years before. The Graduate Institute of International Studies offered one of the first Ph.D. degrees in international relations. Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service is the oldest international relations faculty in the United States, founded in 1919. The Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago was the first to offer a graduate degree, in 1928.

Theory[link]

Epistemology and IR theory[link]

IR theories can be roughly divided into one of two epistemological camps: "positivist" and "post-positivist". Positivist theories aim to replicate the methods of the natural sciences by analysing the impact of material forces. They typically focus on features of international relations such as state interactions, size of military forces, balance of powers etc. Post-positivist epistemology rejects the idea that the social world can be studied in an objective and value-free way. It rejects the central ideas of neo-realism/liberalism, such as rational choice theory, on the grounds that the scientific method cannot be applied to the social world and that a 'science' of IR is impossible.

A key difference between the two positions is that while positivist theories, such as neo-realism, offer causal explanations (such as why and how power is exercised), post-positivist theories focus instead on constitutive questions, for instance what is meant by 'power'; what makes it up, how it is experienced and how it is reproduced. Often, post-positivist theories explicitly promote a normative approach to IR, by considering ethics. This is something which has often been ignored under 'traditional' IR as positivist theories make a distinction between 'facts' and normative judgments, or 'values'.

During the late 1980s and the 1990s, debate between positivists and post-positivists became the dominant debate and has been described as constituting the Third "Great Debate" (Lapid 1989).

Positivist Theories[link]

Realism[link]

Realism focuses on state security and power above all else. Early realists such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau argued that states are self-interested, power-seeking rational actors, who seek to maximize their security and chances of survival. Cooperation between states is a way to maximize each individual state's security (as opposed to more idealistic reasons). Similarly, any act of war must be based on self-interest, rather than on idealism. Many realists saw World War II as the vindication of their theory.

It should be noted that classical writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Theodore Roosevelt, are often cited as "founding fathers" of realism by contemporary self-described realists.^{[citation needed]} However, while their work may support realist doctrine, it is not likely that they would have classified themselves as realists (in this sense of the term). Realists are often split up into two groups: Classical or Human Nature Realists (as described here) and Structural or Neorealists (below).

Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. To improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, persons will challenge them only at the risk of failure. Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion-between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.

The placement of Realism under positivism is far from unproblematic however. E.H. Carr's 'What is History' was a deliberate critique of positivism, and Hans Morgenthau's aim in 'Scientific Man vs Power Politics' - as the title implies - was to demolish any conception that international politics/power politics can be studied scientifically.

Liberalism/idealism/Liberal Internationalism[link]

Liberal international relations theory arose after World War I in response to the inability of states to control and limit war in their international relations. Early adherents include Woodrow Wilson and Norman Angell, who argued vigorously that states mutually gained from cooperation and that war was so destructive as to be essentially futile.

Liberalism was not recognized as a coherent theory as such until it was collectively and derisively termed idealism by E. H. Carr. A new version of "idealism" that focused on human rights as the basis of the legitimacy of international law was advanced by Hans Köchler.

Neoliberalism[link]

Neoliberalism seeks to update liberalism by accepting the neorealist presumption that states are the key actors in international relations, but still maintains that non-state actors (NSAs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) matter. Proponents such as Maria Chattha argue that states will cooperate irrespective of relative gains, and are thus concerned with absolute gains. This also means that nations are, in essence, free to make their own choices as to how they will go about conducting policy without any international organizations blocking a nation's right to sovereignty.

Neoliberalism also contains an economic theory that is based on the use of open and free markets with little, if any, government intervention to prevent monopolies and other conglomerates from forming. The growing interdependence throughout and after the Cold War through international institutions led to neo-liberalism being defined as institutionalism, this new part of the theory being fronted by Robert Keohane and also Joseph Nye.

Regime Theory[link]

Regime theory is derived from the liberal tradition that argues that international institutions or regimes affect the behavior of states (or other international actors). It assumes that cooperation is possible in the anarchic system of states, indeed, regimes are by definition, instances of international cooperation.

While realism predicts that conflict should be the norm in international relations, regime theorists say that there is cooperation despite anarchy. Often they cite cooperation in trade, human rights and collective security among other issues. These instances of cooperation are regimes. The most commonly cited definition of regimes comes from Stephen Krasner. Krasner defines regimes as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations."^{[cite this quote]}

Not all approaches to regime theory, however are liberal or neoliberal; some realist scholars like Joseph Greico have developed hybrid theories which take a realist based approach to this fundamentally liberal theory. (Realists do not say cooperation never happens, just that it is not the norm; it is a difference of degree).

Post-positivist/reflectivist theories[link]

International society theory (the English school)[link]

International society theory, also called the English School, focuses on the shared norms and values of states and how they regulate international relations. Examples of such norms include diplomacy, order, and international law. Unlike neo-realism, it is not necessarily positivist. Theorists have focused particularly on humanitarian intervention, and are subdivided between solidarists, who tend to advocate it more, and pluralists, who place greater value in order and sovereignty. Nicholas Wheeler is a prominent solidarist, while Hedley Bull and Robert H. Jackson are perhaps the best known pluralists.

Social Constructivism[link]

Social Constructivism encompasses a broad range of theories that aim to address questions of ontology, such as the Structure and agency debate, as well as questions of epistemology, such as the "material/ideational" debate that concerns the relative role of material forces versus ideas. Constructivism is not a theory of IR in the manner of neo-realism, but is instead a social theory which is used to better explain the actions taken by states and other major actors as well as the identities that guide these states and actors.

Constructivism in IR can be divided into what Hopf (1998) calls 'conventional' and 'critical' constructivism. Common to all varieties of constructivism is an interest in the role that ideational forces play. The most famous constructivist scholar, Alexander Wendt noted in a 1992 article in International Organization (later followed up by a book, Social Theory of International Politics (1999)), that "anarchy is what states make of it". By this he means that the anarchical structure that neo-realists claim governs state interaction is in fact a phenomenon that is socially constructed and reproduced by states.

For example, if the system is dominated by states that see anarchy as a life or death situation (what Wendt terms a "Hobbesian" anarchy) then the system will be characterised by warfare. If on the other hand anarchy is seen as restricted (a "Lockean" anarchy) then a more peaceful system will exist. Anarchy in this view is constituted by state interaction, rather than accepted as a natural and immutable feature of international life as viewed by neo-realist IR scholars.

Critical Theory[link]

Critical international relations theory is the application of 'critical theory' to international relations. Proponents such as Andrew Linklater, Robert W. Cox and Ken Booth focus on the need for human emancipation from States. Hence, it is "critical" of mainstream IR theories that tend to be state-centric.

Marxism[link]

Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories of IR reject the realist/liberal view of state conflict or cooperation; instead focusing on the economic and material aspects. It makes the assumption that the economy trumps other concerns; allowing for the elevation of class as the focus of study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. Thus, the period of colonialism brought in sources for raw materials and captive markets for exports, while decolonialization brought new opportunities in the form of dependence.

Linked in with Marxist theories is dependency theory which argues that developed countries, in their pursuit of power, penetrate developing states through political advisors, missionaries, experts, and MNCs to integrate them into the capitalist system in order to appropriate natural resources and foster dependence.

Marxist theories receive scant attention in the United States where no significant socialist party ever existed. It is more common in parts of Europe and is one of the most important theoretic contributions of Latin American academia, for example through Liberation theology.

Leadership Theories[link]

Interest Group perspective[link]

Interest Group theory posits that the driving force behind state behavior is sub-state interest groups. Examples of interest groups include political lobbyists, the military, and the corporate sector. Group theory argues that although these interest groups are constitutive of the state, they are also causal forces in the exercise of state power.

Strategic Perspective[link]

Strategic Perspective is a theoretical approach that views individuals as choosing their actions by taking into account the anticipated actions and responses of others with the intention of maximizing their own welfare.

Inherent bad faith model in international relations and political psychology[link]

The "inherent bad faith model" of information processing is a theory in political psychology that was first put forth by Ole Holsti to explain the relationship between John Foster Dulles’ beliefs and his model of information processing.^[5] It is the most widely studied model of one's opponent.^[6] A state is presumed to be implacably hostile, and contra-indicators of this are ignored. They are dismissed as propaganda ploys or signs of weakness. Examples are John Foster Dulles’ position regarding the Soviet Union, or Israel’s initial position on the Palestinian Liberation Organization.^[7]

Poststructuralist theories[link]

Poststructuralist theories of IR developed in the 1980s from postmodernist studies in political science. Post-structuralism explores the deconstruction of concepts traditionally not problematic in IR, such as 'power' and 'agency' and examines how the construction of these concepts shapes international relations. The examination of 'narratives' plays an important part in poststructuralist analysis, for example feminist poststructuralist work has examined the role that 'women' play in global society and how they are constructed in war as 'innocent' and 'civilians'.

Examples of post-positivist research include:

• Feminisms ("gendering" war)
• Postcolonialism (challenges the euro-centrism of IR)
• Post-realism (focuses on IR theory as scientific and political rhetoric)

Concepts in international relations[link]

Conjuncture[link]

In decision making in international relations, the concept of Conjuncture (international relations), together with freedom of action and equality are important elements. Decision makers must take into account the set of international conditions in taking initiatives that would create different types of responses.

Systemic level concepts[link]

International relations is often viewed in terms of levels of analysis. The systemic level concepts are those broad concepts that define and shape an international milieu, characterised by Anarchy.

Power[link]

Darkest blue countries most often considered to be superpowers, dark blue countries most often considered to be great powers, pale blue countries most often considered to be middle powers, and palest blue countries also sometimes considered to be middle powers.^[8]

The concept of power in international relations can be described as the degree of resources, capabilities, and influence in international affairs. It is often divided up into the concepts of hard power and soft power, hard power relating primarily to coercive power, such as the use of force, and soft power commonly covering economics, diplomacy and cultural influence. However, there is no clear dividing line between the two forms of power.

Polarity[link]

Polarity in International Relations refers to the arrangement of power within the international system. The concept arose from bipolarity during the Cold War, with the international system dominated by the conflict between two superpowers, and has been applied retrospectively by theorists. However, the term bipolar was notably used by Stalin who said he saw the international system as a bipolar one with two opposing powerbases and ideologies. Consequently, the international system prior to 1945 can be described as multi-polar, with power being shared among Great powers.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had led to what some would call unipolarity, with the United States as a sole superpower. However, due to China's continued rapid economic growth (in 2010 it became the world's second largest economy), combined with the respectable international position they hold within political spheres and the power that the Chinese Government exerts over their people (consisting of the largest population in the world), there is debate over whether China is now a superpower or a possible candidate in the future.

Several theories of international relations draw upon the idea of polarity.
The balance of power was a concept prevalent in Europe prior to the First World War, the thought being that by balancing power blocs it would create stability and prevent war. Theories of the balance of power gained prominence again during the Cold War, being a central mechanism of Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism. Here, the concepts of balancing (rising in power to counter another) and bandwagonning (siding with another) are developed.

Hegemonic stability theory (developed by Robert Gilpin) also draws upon the idea of Polarity, specifically the state of unipolarity. Hegemony is the preponderance of power at one pole in the international system, and the theory argues this is a stable configuration because of mutual gains by both the dominant power and others in the international system. This is contrary to many Neorealist arguments, particularly made by Kenneth Waltz, stating that the end of the Cold War and the state of unipolarity is an unstable configuration that will inevitably change.

This can be expressed in Power transition theory, which states that it is likely that a great power would challenge a hegemon after a certain period, resulting in a major war. It suggests that while hegemony can control the occurrence of wars, it also results in the creation of one. Its main proponent, A.F.K. Organski, argued this based on the occurrence of previous wars during British, Portuguese and Dutch hegemony.

Interdependence[link]

Many advocate that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependence; the mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Advocates of this point to growing globalization, particularly with international economic interaction. The role of international institutions, and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles in the international system, reinforces ideas that relations are characterized by interdependence.

Dependency[link]

NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Dependency theory is a theory most commonly associated with Marxism, stating that a set of Core states exploit a set of weaker Periphery states for their prosperity. Various versions of the theory suggest that this is either an inevitability (standard dependency theory), or use the theory to highlight the necessity for change (Neo-Marxist).

Systemic tools of international relations[link]

• Diplomacy is the practice of communication and negotiation between representatives of states. To some extent, all other tools of international relations can be considered the failure of diplomacy. Keeping in mind, the use of other tools are part of the communication and negotiation inherent within diplomacy. Sanctions, force, and adjusting trade regulations, while not typically considered part of diplomacy, are actually valuable tools in the interest of leverage and placement in negotiations.
• Sanctions are usually a first resort after the failure of diplomacy, and are one of the main tools used to enforce treaties. They can take the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions and involve the cutting of ties and imposition of barriers to communication or trade.
• War, the use of force, is often thought of as the ultimate tool of international relations. A widely accepted definition is that given by Clausewitz, with war being "the continuation of politics by other means". There is a growing study into 'new wars' involving actors other than states. The study of war in International Relations is covered by the disciplines of 'War Studies' and 'Strategic studies'.
• The mobilization of international shame can also be thought of as a tool of International Relations. This is attempting to alter states' actions through 'naming and shaming' at the international level. This is mostly done by the large human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International (for instance when it called Guantanamo Bay a "Gulag"),^[9] or Human Rights Watch. A prominent use of was the UN Commission on Human Rights 1235 procedure, which publicly exposes state's human rights violations. The current Human Rights Council has yet to use this Mechanism
• The allotment of economic and/or diplomatic benefits. An example of this is the European Union's enlargement policy. Candidate countries are allowed entry into the EU only after the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria.

Unit-level concepts in international relations[link]

As a level of analysis the unit level is often referred to as the state level, as it locates its explanation at the level of the state, rather than the international system.

Regime type[link]

It is often considered that a state's form of government can dictate the way that a state interacts with others in the international system.

Democratic Peace Theory is a theory that suggests that the nature of democracy means that democratic countries will not go to war with each other. The justifications for this are that democracies externalise their norms and only go to war for just causes, and that democracy encourages mutual trust and respect.

Communism justifies a world revolution, which similarly would lead to peaceful coexistence, based on a proletarian global society. the power politics is also considered

Revisionism/Status quo[link]

States can be classified by whether they accept the international status quo, or are revisionist, i.e. want change. Revisionist states seek to fundamentally change the rules and practices of international relations, feeling disadvantaged by the status quo. They see the international system as a largely western creation which serves to reinforce current realities. Japan is an example of a state that has gone from being a revisionist state to one that is satisfied with the status quo, because the status quo is now beneficial to it.

Religion[link]

It is often considered^{[by whom?]} that religion can have an effect on the way a state acts within the international system. Religion is visible as an organising principle particularly for Islamic states, whereas secularism sits at the other end of the spectrum, with the separation of state and religion being responsible for the Liberal international relations theory.

Individual or sub-unit level concepts[link]

The level beneath the unit (state) level can be useful both for explaining factors in International Relations that other theories fail to explain, and for moving away from a state-centric view of international relations.

• Psychological factors in International Relations - Evaluating psychological factors in international relations comes from the understanding that a state is not a 'black box' as proposed by Realism, and that there may be other influences on foreign policy decisions. Examining the role of personalities in the decision making process can have some explanatory power, as can the role of misperception between various actors. A prominent application of sub-unit level psychological factors in international relations is the concept of Groupthink, another is the propensity of policymakers to think in terms of analogies.
• Bureaucratic politics - Looks at the role of the bureaucracy in decision making, and sees decisions as a result of bureaucratic in-fighting, and as having been shaped by various constraints.
• Religious, Ethnic, and secessionist groups - Viewing these aspects of the sub-unit level has explanatory power with regards to ethnic conflicts, religious wars, transnational diaspora (diaspora politics) and other actors which do not consider themselves to fit with the defined state boundaries. This is particularly useful in the context of the pre-modern world of weak states.
• Science, Technology and International Relations- How science and technology impact the global health, business, environment, technology, and development.
• International political economy, and economic factors in international relations.^[10]
• International political culturology – Looks at how culture and cultural variables impact in international relations.^[11][12][13]

Institutions in international relations[link]

The United Nations Secretariat Building at the United Nations headquarters in New York City.

International institutions form a vital part of contemporary International Relations. Much interaction at the system level is governed by them, and they outlaw some traditional institutions and practices of International Relations, such as the use of war (except in self-defence).

As humanity enters the Planetary phase of civilization, some scientists and political theorists^[who?] see a global hierarchy of institutions replacing the existing system of sovereign nation-states as the primary political community. They argue that nations are an imagined community that cannot resolve such modern challenges as the “Dogville” effect (strangers in a homogeneous community), the legal and political status of stateless people and refugees, and the need to address worldwide concerns like climate change and pandemics.

Futurist Paul Raskin has hypothesized that a new, more legitimate form of global politics could be based on “constrained pluralism.” This principle guides the formation of institutions based on three characteristics: irreducibility, where some issues must be adjudicated at the global level; subsidiarity, which limits the scope of global authority to truly global issues while smaller-scope issues are regulated at lower levels; and heterogeneity, which allows for diverse forms of local and regional institutions as long as they meet global obligations.

Generalist Inter-State Organizations[link]

• United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is an international organization that describes itself as a "global association of governments facilitating co-operation in international law, international security, economic development, and social equity"; It is the most prominent international institution. Many of the legal institutions follow the same organizational structure as the UN.

• OIC

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is an international organization consisting of 57 member states. The organisation attempts to be the collective voice of the Muslim world (Ummah) and attempts to safeguard the interests and ensure the progress and well-being of Muslims.

• African Union
• ASEAN
• Arab League
• CIS
• European Union
• G8
• G20
• League of Nations
• Organization of American States

Economic institutions[link]

The World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C.

• Asian Development Bank
• African Development Bank
• Inter-American Development Bank
• International Monetary Fund
• Islamic Development Bank
• World Bank
• World Trade Organization

International legal bodies[link]

Human rights[link]

• European Court of Human Rights
• Human Rights Committee
• Inter-American Court of Human Rights
• International Criminal Court
• International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
• International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
• United Nations Human Rights Council

Legal[link]

• African Court of Justice
• European Court of Justice
• International Court of Justice
• International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

Regional security arrangements[link]

NATO E-3A flying with USAF F-16s in a NATO exercise.

• CSCAP
• GUAM
• Maritime security regime
• NATO
• SCO
• SAARC
• UNASUR

See also[link]

This "see also" section may contain an excessive number of suggestions. Please ensure that only the most relevant suggestions are given and that they are not red links, and consider integrating suggestions into the article itself. (May 2012)

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: International relations

• Ahidnâme
• Branding National Myths and Symbols
• Capitulation (treaty)
• Center for Global Public Relations (in North Carolina in the US)
• Confidence-building measures
• Confidence-building measures in South America
• Continental union
• Democracy promotion
• Development criticism
• Diplomacy Monitor, a tool for tracking Internet-based public diplomacy
• Diplomatic history
• Intermediate Region
• e-International Relations, leading student-run website on global governance, International Relations and diplomacy
• Global Relations Forum
• Global Studies
• Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, MA and PhD programmes in International Relations
• National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, MA and PhD programmes in Security and International Studies and Developmental Studies
• History of ideas
• Human condition
• Human history
• Human nature
• Human security
• Intercultural competence
• List of international relations institutes and organisations
• List of international relations schools
• List of scholarly journals in international relations
• Moral syncretism
• Political Realism
• Think Tank

References[link]

Notes

Further reading[link]

Theory[link]

• Norman Angell The Great Illusion (London: Heinemann, 1910)
• Hedley Bull Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977)
• Robert Cooper The Post-Modern State
• Goodin, Robert E., and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds. A New Handbook of Political Science (1998) ch 16-19 pp 401–78 excerpt and text search
• Robert Keohane After Hegemony
• Hans Köchler, Democracy and the International Rule of Law. Vienna/New York: Springer, 1995
• Andrew Linklater Men and citizens in the theory of international relations
• Reinhold Niebuhr Moral Man and Immoral Society 1932
• Joseph Nye Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs Ltd 2004
• Paul Raskin The Great Transition Today: A Report from the Future
• J. Ann Tickner Gender in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992)
• Kenneth Waltz Man, the State, and War
• Kenneth Waltz Theory of International Politics (1979), examines the foundation of By Bar
• Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars 1977
• Alexander Wendt Social Theory of International Politics 1999
• J. Martin Rochester Fundamental Principles of International Relations (Westview Press, 2010)

Textbooks[link]

• Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (2011)
• Mingst, Karen A., and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft. Essentials of International Relations (5th ed. 2010)
• Nau, Henry R. Perspectives on International Relations: Power, Institutions, Ideas (2008)
• Roskin, Michael G., and Nicholas O. Berry. IR: The New World of International Relations (8th ed. 2009)

History of international relations[link]

• New Cambridge Modern History (13 vol 1957-79), thorough coverage from 1500 to 1900
• Black, Jeremy. A History of Diplomacy (2010)
• Calvocoressi, Peter. World Politics since 1945 (9th Edition, 2008) 956pp excerpt and text search
• E. H. Carr Twenty Years Crisis (1940), 1919–39
• Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500-2000 (1987), stress on economic and military factors
• Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy (1995), not a memoir but an interpretive history of international diplomacy since the late 18th century
• Schroeder, Paul W. The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (Oxford History of Modern Europe) (1994) 920pp; history and analysis of major diplomacy
• Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 (1954) (Oxford History of Modern Europe) 638pp; history and analysis of major diplomacy
• Stéphane Beaulac: “The Westphalian Model in defining International Law: Challenging the Myth”, Australian Journal of Legal History Vol. 9 (2004), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AJLH/2004/9.html
• Krasner, Stephen D.: “Westphalia and all that” in Judith Goldstein & Robert Keohane (eds): Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1993), pp.235-264

Joseph Nye

Born	(1937-01-19) January 19, 1937 (age 75) South Orange, New Jersey
Era	International relations theory
Region	Western Philosophers
School	Neoliberal institutionalism
Main interests	International security, interdependence, globalization
Notable ideas	Soft power/hard power/smart power, complex interdependence
Influenced by Stanley Hoffmann

Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr. (born January 19, 1937) is the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory neoliberalism, developed in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. Together with Keohane, he developed the concepts of asymmetrical and complex interdependence. They also explored transnational relations and world politics in an edited volume in the 1970s. More recently, he pioneered the theory of soft power. His notion of "smart power" became popular with the use of this phrase by members of the Clinton administration, and more recently the Obama Administration.^[1] Nye is currently University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, and previously served as dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He also serves as a Guiding Coalition member for the Project on National Security Reform.

The 2011 TRIP survey of over 1700 international relations scholars ranks Joe Nye as the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past twenty years.^[2]

In 2011, he was named by Foreign Policy magazine to its list of top global thinkers.^[3]

Life and career[link]

Education[link]

Nye graduated summa cum laude from Princeton University, where he was vice-president of the Colonial Club, a columnist for The Daily Princetonian, and a member of the American Whig–Cliosophic Society's Debate Panel.^[4] After studying Philosophy, Politics and Economics as a Rhodes Scholar in Exeter College at Oxford University, obtained his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard. He attended Morristown Prep (now the Morristown-Beard School) in Morristown, New Jersey and graduated in 1954.

Career[link]

Nye originally joined the Harvard faculty in 1964, serving as Director of the Center for International Affairs and as Associate Dean of Arts and Sciences. From 1977-1979, Nye was Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology and chaired the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In 1993 and 1994 he was chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which coordinates intelligence estimates for the President. Nye also served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Clinton Administration, and was considered by many to be the preferred choice for National Security Advisor in the 2004 presidential campaign of John Kerry. He is widely recognized as one of the foremost liberal thinkers on foreign policy, and is seen by some as the counter to renowned Harvard conservative Samuel P. Huntington.

In 2005, Nye was voted one of the ten most influential scholars of international relations in the USA.^[5]

He is the co-chair of the Center for a New American Security Cyber Security Project,^[6] on the Advisory board of the USC Center on Public Diplomacy as well as on the International Editorial Board of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, the editorial board of Foreign Policy, the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Guiding Coalition of the Project on National Security Reform, the Advisory Board of Carolina for Kibera, and the Board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has been awarded the Woodrow Wilson Prize by Princeton University and the Humphrey Prize by the American Political Science Association. In 2005 he was awarded the Honorary Patronage of the University Philosophical Society of Trinity College Dublin and in 2007 he was awarded an honorary degree by King's College London.

Nye has published many works in recent years, the most recent being The Future of Power (2011, ISBN 978-1-58648-891-8), Understanding International Conflicts, 7th ed (2009), The Powers to Lead (2008), The Power Game: A Washington Novel (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), and The Paradox of American Power (2002). Nye coined the term soft power in the late 1980s and it first came into widespread usage following a piece he wrote in Foreign Policy in the early 1990s. He is the chairman of the North American branch of the Trilateral Commission.^[7]

Personal[link]

Nye and his wife, Molly Harding Nye, have three adult sons.^[8]

References[link]

External links[link]

• Column archive at Project Syndicate
• Appearances on C-SPAN
• Joseph Nye on Charlie Rose
• Joseph Nye at TED Conferences
• Joseph Nye at the Internet Movie Database
• Works by or about Joseph Nye in libraries (WorldCat catalog)
• Conversations with History interview with Harry Krelsler at the UC Berkeley Institute of International Studies in April 1998
• 'Joseph Nye - Viet Nam 2010' Coffee is soft power of Vietnam
• 'Talking Power', interview in the Oxonian Review in March 2005
• 'Joseph Nye on Teaching America to be more British', interview with Theory Talks in May 2008
• 'How Soft is Smart?', interview on the US Presidential Election in Guernica Magazine in October 2008
• Nye's profile, he is Chairman of the North American Group of the Trilateral Commission
• Nye's profile at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he is a board member
• Nye's profile at Harvard University, where he is Distinguished Service Professor and Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations
• Video (with mp3 available) of discussion with Nye and Daniel Drezner on Bloggingheads.tv
• Audio: Joseph Nye in conversation on the BBC World Service discussion programme The Forum
• Soft Power, Smart Power and Intelligent Power A lecture in honor of Joseph Nye
• Interview in The Global Scholar Knowledge Initiative (GSKI)

John J. Mearsheimer

John J. Mearsheimer
Born	1947
Era	International relations theory
Region	Western Philosophers
School	Neorealism
Main interests	International security, nuclear security, balance of power
Notable ideas	Offensive realism
Influenced by Kenneth Waltz, Hans Morgenthau, Samuel P. Huntington

John J. Mearsheimer (born December 1947) is an American professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is an international relations theorist. Known for his 2001 book on offensive realism, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer became better known for co-authoring with Stephen Walt the New York Times Best Seller The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007). His 2011 book Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics is described as cataloging "the kinds of lies nations tell each other."^[1] According to an interview with Mearsheimer in The Boston Globe, the lesson of the book is: "Lie selectively, lie well, and ultimately be good at what you do."^[2]

Early years[link]

Mearsheimer was born in December 1947 in Brooklyn, New York. He was raised in New York City until the age of eight, when his parents moved his family to Croton-on-Hudson, New York, a suburb located in Westchester County.^[3]

When he was 17, Mearsheimer enlisted in the U.S. Army. After one year as an enlisted member, he chose to attend the United States Military Academy at West Point. He attended West Point from 1966–1970. After graduation, he served for five years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force.^[4][5]

In 1974, while in the Air Force, Mearsheimer earned a Masters Degree in International Relations from the University of Southern California. He subsequently entered Cornell University and in 1980 earned a Ph.D. in government, specifically in international relations. From 1978–1979, he was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.; from 1980–1982, he was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs. During the 1998–1999 academic year, he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.^[3]

University of Chicago[link]

Since 1982, Mearsheimer has been a member of the faculty of the Department of Political Science Faculty at the University of Chicago.^[6] He became an associate professor in 1984, a full professor in 1987, and was appointed the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in 1996. From 1989-1992, he served as chairman of the department. He also holds a position as a faculty member in the Committee on International Relations graduate program, and is the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy.^[7]

Mearsheimer’s books include Conventional Deterrence (1983) which won the Edgar S. Furniss Jr. Book Award, Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy] (co-editor, 1985); Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988); The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), which won the Joseph Lepgold Book Prize; The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007); and Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (2011). His articles have appeared in academic journals like International Security and popular magazines like The London Review of Books. He has written op-ed pieces for The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Chicago Tribune.^[7]

Mearsheimer has won several teaching awards. He received the Clark Award for Distinguished Teaching when he was a graduate student at Cornell in 1977, and he won the Quantrell Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching at the University of Chicago in 1985. In addition, he was selected as a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar for the 1993-1994 academic year. In that capacity, he gave a series of talks at eight colleges and universities. In 2003, he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.^[7]

John Mearsheimer is the leading proponent of a branch of realist theory in international relations called offensive realism which maintains that states are not satisfied with a given amount of power, but seek hegemony for security.^{[citation needed]}

Conventional deterrence[link]

Mearsheimer's first book Conventional Deterrence (1983) addresses the question of how decisions to start a war depend on the projected outcome of military conflict. In other words, how do decision makers' beliefs about the outcome of war affect the success or failure of deterrence? Mearsheimer's basic argument is that deterrence is likely to work when the potential attacker believes that a successful attack will be unlikely and costly. If the potential attacker, however, has reason to believe the attack will likely succeed and entail low costs, then deterrence is likely to break down. This is now widely accepted to be the way the principle of deterrence works. Specifically, Mearsheimer argues that the success of deterrence is determined by the strategy available to the potential attacker. He lays out three strategies. First, a war-of-attrition strategy, which entails a high level of uncertainty about the outcome of war and high costs for the attacker. Second, a limited-aims strategy, which entails less risks and lower costs. And, third, a blitzkrieg strategy, which provides a way to defeat the enemy rapidly and decisively, with relatively low costs. For Mearsheimer, failures in the modern battlefield are due mostly to the potential attacker's belief that it can successfully implement a blitzkrieg strategy in which tanks and other mechanized forces are employed swiftly to effect a deep penetration and disrupt the enemy's rear.^[8] The other two strategies are unlikely to lead to deterrence failures because they would entail a low probability of success accompanied by high costs (war of attrition) or limited gains and the possibility of the conflict turning into a war of attrition (limited aims). If the attacker has a coherent blitzkrieg strategy available, however, an attack is likely to ensue, as its potential benefits outweigh the costs and risks of starting a war.^[9]

Besides analyzing cases from World War II and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Mearsheimer extrapolates implications from his theory for the prospects of conventional deterrence in Central Europe during the late Cold War. Here, he argues that a Soviet attack is unlikely because the Soviet military would be unable to successfully implement a blitzkrieg strategy. The balance of forces, the difficulty of advancing rapidly with mechanized forces through Central Europe, and the formidable NATO forces opposing such a Soviet attack made it unlikely, in Mearsheimer's view, that the Soviets would start a conventional war in Europe.^[10]

Nuclear proliferation[link]

In 1990 Mearsheimer published an essay^[11] where he predicted that Europe would revert to a multipolar environment similar to that in the first half of the Twentieth century if American and Soviet forces left following the end of the Cold War.

In this essay and in the 1993 article in Foreign Affairs "The case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent]",^[12] he argued that to reduce the dangers of war, the United States should encourage Germany and Ukraine to develop a nuclear arsenal, while working to prevent the rise of hyper-nationalism. Mearsheimer presented several possible scenarios for a post-Cold-War Europe from which American and Russian forces had departed. He believed that a Europe with nuclear proliferation was most likely to remain at peace, because without a nuclear deterrent Germany would be likely to once more try to conquer the continent (See pages 32–33).^[11] Mearsheimer argued that it would be strategically unwise for Ukraine to surrender its nuclear arsenal (remnants of the soviet stockpile). However, in 1994 Ukraine consented to rid of its entire former Soviet nuclear stockpile, a process that was complete by 1996. When challenged on the former assertion at a lecture given to the International Politics department at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth, he maintained that in spite of European integration and expansion, he still believed that his predictions would come true if the United States military left Europe.^[13]

Also, in op-ed pieces written in 1998 and 2000 for The New York Times, Mearsheimer defended India's right to acquire nuclear weapons. In support of this position, he argued that India has good strategic reasons to want a nuclear deterrent, especially in order to balance against China and Pakistan, guaranteeing regional stability. He also criticized United States counter-proliferation policy towards India, which he considered unrealistic and harmful to American interests in the region.^[14]

Offensive realism[link]

John Mearsheimer is the leading proponent of offensive realism. It is a structural theory which, unlike the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, blames security competition among great powers on the anarchy of the international system, not on human nature. In contrast to another structural realist theory, the defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz, offensive realism maintains that states are not satisfied with a given amount of power, but seek hegemony for security.^{[citation needed]} Mearsheimer summed this view up in his 2001 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics:

Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive.^[15]

In this world, there is no such thing as a status quo power, since according to Mearsheimer, "A great power that has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to behave more aggressively, because it has the capability as well as the incentive to do so." He has also dismissed democratic peace theory, which claims that democracies never or rarely go to war with one another.

Although Mearsheimer does not believe it is possible for a state to become a global hegemon, he believes states seek regional hegemony. Furthermore, he argues that states attempt to prevent other states from becoming regional hegemons, since peer competitors could interfere in a state's affairs. States which have achieved regional hegemony, such as the U.S., will act as offshore balancers, interfering in other regions only when the great powers in those regions are not able to prevent the rise of a hegemon. In a 2004 speech, Mearsheimer praised the British historian E. H. Carr for his 1939 book The Twenty Years’ Crisis and argued that Carr was correct when he claimed that international relations was a struggle of all against all with states always placing their own interests first.^[16] Mearsheimer maintained that Carr’s points were still as relevant for 2004 as for 1939, and went on to deplore what he claimed was the dominance of “idealist” thinking about international relations among British academic life^[16]

Gulf War[link]

In January and early February 1991, Mearsheimer published two op-eds in the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times arguing that the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces should be quick and lead to a decisive US victory, with less than 1,000 American casualties. This view countered the conventional wisdom at the start of the war, that predicted a conflict lasting for months and costing thousands of American lives. Mearsheimer's argument was based on several points. First, the Iraqi Army was a Third World military, unprepared to fight mobile armored battles. Second, US armored forces were better equipped and trained. Third, US artillery was also far better than its Iraqi counterpart. Fourth, US airpower, unfettered by the weak Iraqi air force, should prove devastating against Iraqi ground forces. Fifth and finally, the forward deployment of Iraqi reserves boded ill for their ability to counter US efforts to penetrate the Iraqi defense line along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. These predictions came true in the course of the war.^[17][18]

Israel lobby[link]

In March 2006, Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, academic dean and professor of International Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, published a Harvard University Kennedy School of Government working paper^[19] and a London Review of Books article^[20] discussing the power of the Israel lobby in shaping the foreign policy of the United States. They define the Israel lobby as "a loose coalition of individuals and organizations who actively work to steer US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction". They emphasize that it is not appropriate to label it a "Jewish lobby", because not all Jews feel a strong attachment to Israel and because some of the individuals and groups who work to foster U.S. support for Israel are not Jewish; according to Mearsheimer and Walt, Christian Zionists play an important role. Finally, they emphasize that the lobby is not a cabal or a conspiracy but simply a powerful interest group like the National Rifle Association or the farm lobby. Their core argument is that the policies that the lobby pushes are not in the United States' national interest, nor ultimately that of Israel. Those pieces generated extensive media coverage and led to a wide-ranging and often heated debate between supporters and opponents of their argument.

Mearsheimer and Walt subsequently turned the article into a book also called The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy which was published in August 2007. The book has been translated into twenty-one languages and published in twenty-one countries^{[citation needed]}, and has become a widely popular, if controversial, work. Mearsheimer and Walt traveled extensively throughout the United States and overseas to talk about the book.

Statements on Israeli wars and a Palestinian state[link]

Mearsheimer was critical of Israel’s war against Lebanon in the summer of 2006. He argued that Israel’s strategy was "doomed to fail" because it was based on the "faulty assumption" that Israeli air power could defeat Hezbollah, which was essentially a guerrilla force. The war, he argued, was a disaster for the Lebanese people, as well as a "major setback" for the United States and Israel.^[21] The lobby, he said, played a key role in enabling Israel’s counterproductive response by preventing the United States from exercising independent influence.^[22]

Mearsheimer was also critical of Israel’s offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip that began in December 2008. He argued that it would not eliminate Hamas’s capability to fire missiles and rockets at Israel, and that it would not cause Hamas to end its fight with Israel. In fact, he argued that relations between Israel and the Palestinians were likely to get worse in the years ahead.^[23]

Mearsheimer emphasizes that the only hope for Israel to end its conflict with the Palestinians is to end the occupation and allow the Palestinians to have their own state in Gaza and the West Bank. Otherwise, Israel is going to turn itself into an "apartheid state." That would be a disastrous outcome not only for Israel, but also for the United States and especially the Palestinians.^[24]

The "Future of Palestine" lecture[link]

In April 2010, Mearsheimer delivered the Hisham B. Sharabi Memorial Lecture at the Palestine Center in Washington, DC, which he titled "The Future of Palestine: Righteous Jews vs. the New Afrikaners." He argued that "the two-state solution is now a fantasy" because Israel will incorporate the Gaza Strip and the West Bank into a "Greater Israel", which would become an apartheid state. This state, according to Mearsheimer, would not be politically viable, most American Jews would not support it, and it would eventually become a democratic bi-national state, politically dominated by its Palestinian majority. He suggested that "American Jews who care deeply about Israel" could be divided into three categories: the "new Afrikaners" who will support Israel even if it is an apartheid state, "righteous Jews," who believe that individual rights are universal, and apply equally to Jews and Palestinians, and the largest group who he called the "great ambivalent middle". He concludes that most of the "great ambivalent middle" would not defend an apartheid Israel because "American Jews are among the staunchest defenders of traditional liberal values" resulting in the "new Afrikaners" becoming increasingly marginalized over time. Mearsheimer stated that he "would classify most of the individuals who head the Israel lobby’s major organizations as "'new Afrikaners'" and specifically listed Abraham Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League, David Harris of the American Jewish Committee, Malcolm Hoenlein of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Ronald Lauder of the World Jewish Congress, Morton Klein of the Zionist Organization of America; as well as "businessmen" like Sheldon Adelson, Lester Crown, and Mortimer Zuckerman and "media personalities" like Fred Hiatt, Charles Krauthammer, Bret Stephens and Martin Peretz.^[25]

China[link]

Mearsheimer asserts that China's rise will be unpeaceful^[26] and that the US will seek to contain China and prevent it from achieving regional hegemony.^{[27][28][29][30]} He believes that China will attempt to dominate the Asia-Pacific region just as the U.S. dominates the western hemisphere. The motivation for doing so would be to gain a position of overwhelming security and superiority against its neighbours which it sees as potential challengers to its status.^[31] Additionally, he maintains that the US will attempt forming a balancing coalition that consists primarily of India, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia to counter the growing strength and power projection capabilities of China.^[32] He points to increased alliances and warming US-Vietnam and US-India relations as evidence of this.^[33][34]

He also asserts that Australia should be concerned with China's accretion of power because it will lead to an intense security competition between the China and the US. Arguing that China is implementing the militarily aggressive philosophy of the US naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan who argued for Sea control and decisive battle.^[31]

Lying in International Politics[link]

Mearsheimer wrote the first book that systematically analyzes lying in international politics. He argues in Why Leaders Lie (Oxford University Press, 2011) that leaders lie to foreign audiences as well as their own people because they think it is good for their country. For example, he maintains that President Franklin D. Roosevelt lied about the Greer incident in August 1941, because he was deeply committed to getting the United States into World War II, which he thought was in America's national interest.

His two main findings are that leaders actually do not lie very much to other countries, and that democratic leaders are actually more likely to lie to their own people than autocrats.^[35] Thus, he starts his book by saying that it is not surprising that Saddam Hussein did not lie about having WMD—he truthfully said he had none—but that George Bush and some of his key advisors did lie to the American people about the threat from Iraq. Mearsheimer argues that leaders are most likely to lie to their own people in democracies that fight wars of choice in distant places, which is another way of saying the United States and Britain as well. He says that it is difficult for leaders to lie to other countries because there is not much trust among them, especially when security issues are at stake, and you need trust for lying to be effective. He says that it is easier for leaders to lie to their own people because there is usually a good deal of trust between them.

Mearsheimer argues that there are five types of international lies: inter-state lies, fear-mongering, strategic cover-ups, nationalist myths, and liberal lies. He explains the reasons why leaders pursue each of these different kinds of lies. He also says that international lying can have negative effects, and there he emphasizes "blowback," which is where telling international lies helps cause a culture of deceit at home, and "backfiring," which is where telling a lie leads to a failed policy. He also emphasizes that there are two other kinds of deception besides lying: "concealment,” which is where a leader remains silent about an important matter, and "spinning," which is where a leader tells a story that emphasizes the positive and downplays or ignores the negative. Mearsheimer does not consider the moral dimension of international lying; he looks at it simply from a utilitarian perspective.

See also[link]

• Great Powers
• Hegemony
• Realism in international relations
• Political power
• Power projection

Books[link]

• Conventional Deterrence (1983)
• Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988)
• The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)
• The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007)
• Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (2011)

References[link]