General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (Punjabi, Urdu: محمد ضياء الحق; August 12, 1924 – August 17, 1988), was the 4th Chief Martial Law Administrator and the sixth President of Pakistan from July 1977 to his death in August 1988. Distinguished by his role in the Black September in Jordan military operation in 1970, he was appointed Chief of Army Staff in 1976 by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after Bhutto forcefully retired seven senior lieutenant-generals who were tainted with their role in the East-Pakistan war in order to bring and promote Zia to four star rank.[1] After widespread civil disorder, he planned and overthrew ruling Prime Minister Bhutto in a bloodless coup d'état on July 5, 1977, code name Fair Play, and became the state's third military ruler to impose martial law.[2] Zia's idea of religious conservatism in Pakistan became the primary line of his military government.[3] Throughout the 1980s, Zia managed to consolidate more and more power in his hands, gradually putting down all opposition groups in Pakistan.[4]
He initially ruled as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), but later installed himself as the President of Pakistan in September 1978.[5] As both President and CMLA, Zia forcefully crushed the secular-communist and socialist democratic struggle led by the eldest daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto. Zia abandoned the previous economical policies of Bhutto, and replaced them with capitalism and privatization of the major industries of Pakistan that had been nationalized by Bhutto in 1970s. The Pakistan economy became one of the fastest growing economies in South Asia.[6] However, during this period of economic and social change, Zia curbed and violently dealt with the political rivals in 1980s.[7] His reign is often regarded as a period of mass military repression in which hundreds of thousands of political rivals, minorities, and journalists were executed or tortured, including Pakistan Army's senior general officers convicted in coup-d'état plots against his regime.[7]
Zia's major domestic initiatives included the consolidation of the nuclear development, which was initiated by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; the restarting of the space program as spin-off of the nuclear project, denationalization and deregulation and the state's Islamization.[7] His tenure saw the disbanding of the Baloch insurgency. His endorsement of the Pakistan Muslim League (the founding party of Pakistan) initiated its mainstream revival.[1] However, he is most remembered for his foreign policy; the subsidizing of the Mujahideen movement during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which led to the Soviet-Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan Socialist Republic. Zia entered into an undeclared secret war with Soviet Afghanistan and its ally Soviet Union. Zia authorized secret funding and expansion of intelligence operations in Pakistan and abroad, initially focusing on anti-communist operations. He was described by some as a "fundamentalist Sunni dictator".[8]
Zia died along with several of his top generals and admirals and the then United States Ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Lewis Raphel in a suspicious air crash near Bahawalpur (Punjab) on 17 August 1988.
Zia was born in Jalandhar, British India,[9] in 1924 as the second child of Muhammad Akbar, who worked in the Army GHQ in Delhi and Simla, prior to the partition of Pakistan from British colonial rule in 1947.
He completed his initial education in Simla and then attended St. Stephen's College, Delhi for his graduate degree. After graduation from St. Xavier College, Zia joined the British Indian Army in 1943.
He married Shafiq Jahan in 1950–51.[10]
Shafiq Zia died on January 5, 1996.[11] Zia is survived by his sons, Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq,[12] (born 1953), who went into politics and became a cabinet minister in the government of Nawaz Sharif, and Anwar-ul-Haq (born 1950)[13][14][15] and his daughters, Zian[16][17] (also Zain)[18] (born 1972),[19] a special needs child, and Rubina Salim, who is married to a Pakistani banker and has been living in the United States since 1980,[20][21] and daughter Quratulain Zia who currently lives in London, and is married to Pakistani doctor, Adnan Majid.[22]
Zia was commissioned in the British Indian Army in a cavalry regiment on May 12, 1943 and served against Nazi Germany and its allies in World War II. After Pakistan gained its independence, Zia joined the newly formed Pakistan Army as a Major. His regiment was now the Guides Cavalry Frontier Force Regiment. He was trained in the United States in 1962–1964 at the US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After that, he returned to take over as Directing Staff (DS) at Command and Staff College, Quetta.[23] During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, Zia was a tank commander.[24]
Zia was stationed in Jordan from 1967 to 1970 as a Brigadier, helping in the training of Jordanian soldiers, as well as leading the training mission into battle during the Black September operations as commander of Jordanian 2nd Division, a strategy that proved crucial to King Hussein's remaining in power. By 1973, then Major General Zia was commanding the 1st Armoured Division at Multan.[23]
He was then promoted as Lieutenant General and was appointed commander of the II Strike Corps at Multan in 1975. It was during this time that Zia invited Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the Colonel-in-Chief of the Armoured Corps at Multan, using his tailor to stitch the Blue Patrols of his size. The next day, Bhutto was requested to climb a tank and engage a target, where the target was quite obviously hit. After the function, Zia met Bhutto, placed his hand on the Qur'an and said, "You are the saviour of Pakistan and we owe it to you to be totally loyal to you".[1]
On March 1, 1976, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto approved then-3 star general Lieutenant-General Zia as Chief of Army Staff and to be elevated to 4 star rank.[25] This promotion was ahead of a number of more senior officers.[26] This promotion was highly controversial but had political motives for Bhutto, who saw Zia as firmly religious and an apolitical military figure who had distaste of politics.[27] This was the same motives and move made by future Prime minister Nawaz Sharif who promoted Pervez Musharraf based on his political ambitious, as Chief of Army Staff, but met the same fate as Bhutto in 1999 (although he was not executed).[27]
At the time of his nominating the successor to the outgoing Chief of Army Staff General Tikka Khan, the Lieutenant Generals in order of seniority were, Muhammad Shariff, Muhammed Akbar Khan, Aftab Ahmed Khan, Azmat Baksh Awan, Agha Ibrahim Akram, Abdul Majeed Malik, Ghulam Jilani Khan, and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. But, Bhutto chose the most junior, superseding seven more senior lieutenant-generals.[28] However, the senior most at that time, Lieutenant-General Mohammad Shariff, though promoted to General, was made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, a constitutional post akin to President Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry.[29] Zia never called Bhutto as "Mr. Prime Minister", but relied on the term Sir while referring to Bhutto.[26]
Prime Minister Bhutto began facing considerable criticism and increasing unpopularity as his term progressed, the democratic socialists alliance who had previously allied with Bhutto began to diminish as time progresses.[2] Initially targeting leader of the opposition Vali Khan and his opposition National Awami Party (NAP), also a socialist party. Despite the ideological similarity of the two parties, the clash of egos both inside and outside the National Assembly became increasingly fierce, starting with the Federal governments decision to oust the NAP provincial government in Balochistan Province for alleged secessionist activities[30] and culminating in the banning of the party and arrest of much of its leadership after the death of a close lieutenant of Bhutto's, Hayat Sherpao, in a bomb blast in the frontier town of Peshawar.
Dissidence also increased within the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and the murder of a leading dissident Ahmed Raza Kasuri's father led to public outrage and intra-party hostility as Bhutto was accused of masterminding the crime. Powerful PPP leaders such as Ghulam Mustafa Khar openly condemned Bhutto and called for protests against his regime. The political crisis in the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan intensified as civil liberties remained suspended, and an estimated 100,000 troops deployed there were accused of abusing human rights and killing large numbers of civilians.[31]
On January 8, 1977 a large number of opposition political parties grouped to form the Pakistan National Alliance[31] (PNA). Bhutto called fresh elections, and PNA participated fully in those elections. They managed to contest the elections jointly even though there were grave splits on opinions and views within the party. The PNA faced defeat but did not accept the results, alleging that the election was rigged. They proceeded to boycott the provincial elections. Despite this, there was a high voter turnout in the national elections; however, as provincial elections were held amidst low voter turnout and an opposition boycott, the PNA declared the newly-elected Bhutto government as illegitimate.
General Zia had been long planning to impose the Martial law and end of Bhutto's government since 1976, soon when he became chief of army staff.[32] On multiple occasions, Zia deliberately conceal intelligence information and misguided Bhutto on various political matters.[32] Soon, all the opposition leaders called for the overthrow of Bhutto's regime.[2] Political and civil disorder intensified, which led to more unrest.[33] Bhutto imposed martial law in major cities including Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad. However, a compromise agreement between Bhutto and opposition was ultimately reported.[26] This compromise theory was however probably a later day addition as a major PPP armed rally was in the offing.[26] Zia planned a the Coup d'état carefully as he knew Bhutto had integral intelligence in the Pakistan Armed Forces, and many officers, including Chief of Air Staff General Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Major-General Tajammul Hussain Malik, GOC of 23rd Mountain Division, Major-General Naseerullah Babar, DG of Directorate-General for the Military Intelligence (DGMO) and Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, were loyal to Bhutto.[26] Meanwhile, intelligence unit and army formations were placed in Prime minister secretariat who kept an eye on Bhutto's movement, tapping the phone calls and keeping the records of invitees of Prime minister secretariat.[26] General Zia's closest ally, General K.M. Arif had tried to meet with Bhutto on various attempts, but such actions were thwarted by Zia.[26] Finally, on April 5, 1977, Arif succeeded to secretly meet with Bhutto, revealing the plot against Bhutto. Bhutto remained unconvinced and did not believed and reportedly said: "How could his protege General Zia would do such things to him?", Bhutto dismissed General Arif later.[32]
| “ |
Zia's planning was excellent and well-rehearsed from every inch of the situation... Zia wanted to became an undisputed leader... Bhutto was tied up and had given no single chance to protect himself from Zia's planning and his motives.... |
” |
|
—Fakhruddin Ebrahim, [26]
|
To remove this intelligence, Zia secretly contracted with the active duty British SAS army officers to maintain a staff course for the Army personnel while Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mohammad Shariff quietly removed naval personnel loyal to Bhutto and his government from the Navy's active duty.[26] Zia ordered Bhutto's loyal officers to attend a staff and command course and none of the officers were allowed to leave the course until the midnight.[26] Meanwhile, Zia with his close officers, including Admiral Mohammad Shariff, then-Chaiman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, arranged the coup in the evening.[26] On July 5, 1977, before the announcement of any agreement, Bhutto and members of his cabinet were arrested by troops of Military Police under the order of Zia by the evening.[31] Bhutto tried to call Zia but all telephone lines were disconnected and an army officer appeared in the Prime minister secretariat to arrest Bhutto.[32] After realizing General Arif's warnings were no hoax and the coup had been taken place, the weeping officer reportedly told Bhutto that he was sorry but has been forced to perform such "unpleasant task".[32]
General Zia and his military government portrayed the coup as a "spontaneous response to a difficult situation", but his response was a complete contradiction. Soon after the coup, General Zia told the British journalist Edward Behr of Newsweek:
I (Zia) am the only man who took this decision
[Fair Play] .... And I did so on 1700
Hrs on 4[th] July after hearing the press statements that talks and negotiation between
Mr. Bhutto and the
opposition had broken down. Had an agreement been reached between them, I certainly would never had done it....
—General Zia-ul-Haq,
statement given to Newsweek,
[27]
However, General Zia's Chief of Army Staff General Khalid Mahmud Arif contradicted Zia's statement when Arif noted that the coup was planned already, and the senior leadership of Pakistan Armed Forces had solid information.[27] Therefore, Arif met with Bhutto on emergency basis, stressing and urging Bhutto to "rush the negotiation with the opposition".[27] By General Arif and independent expert's accounts, the talks were not broken down even though the coup was very much offing. General Zia further argued that Fair Play against Bhutto had been necessitated by the prospect of civil war that Bhutto had been planning to distribute the weapons to his supporters.[27] However, General Arif strongly rejected Zia's remarks on Bhutto and citing the evidences that no weapons were found or recovered at the any of party's election office, therefore the military junta did not prosecute Bhutto on the charge of planning civil war.[27]
Immediately, the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mohammad Shariff validated the coup, announcing his and the navy's strong support for General Zia-ul-Haq and his military government.[27] But, the Chief of Air Staff General Zulfikar Ali Khan remains unsupported while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Muhammad Shariff remains neutral, while he silently expressd his support to Prime minister Zulfikar Bhutto.[27] In 1978, Zia pressured President Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry to appoint General Anwar Shamim as Chief of Air Staff; and Admiral Caramatt Nazi as Chief of Naval Staff in 1979.[34] On Zia's recommendation, President Illahi appointed Admiral Mohammad Shariff as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hence making the Admiral the highest ranking officer and principle military adviser who overlooks the all inter-services, including the Chiefs of Staff of the respected forces.[34] In 1979, the Chiefs of Army, Navy, and the Air Force, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated the coup as constitutional and legal under the war-torn circumstances, pledging their support to General Zia-ul-Haq as well.[27]
The United States, notably the President Ronald Reagan's Administration, was a staunch sponsor of Zia's military regime and was the major ally of Pakistan's conservative military.[35] Reagen administration declared Zia's regime as the "Front-line" ally of the United States in the fight against the Communism.[35] American legislators and senior officials most notable were Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Charlie Wilson, Joanne Herring, and the civilian intelligence officers Michael Pillsbury and Gust Avrakotos, and senior U.S. military officials General John William Vessey, General Herbert M. Wassom, and had been long associated with the Zia military regime where they had made frequent trips to Pakistan advising on expanding the idea of establishment in the political circle of Pakistan.[35] Nominally, the American conservatism influenced General Zia-ul-Haq to adopt his idea of religious conservatism as the primary line of his military government, forcefully enforcing the Islamic and other religious practices in the country.[35]
The socialist orientation had greatly alarmed the capitalist forces in Pakistan and as well as brought a clinging bell tolls alarm to the United States who feared the loss of Pakistan as an ally in the cold war.[27] Many of Pakistan's political scientists and historians widely suspected that the riots and coup against Zulfi Bhutto was orchestrated with help of Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Government because United States growing fear of Bhutto's socialist policies which were seen as sympathetic towards the Soviet Union and had built a bridge that allowed Soviet Union to involved in Pakistan, and had access through Pakistan's warm water port; something that the United States was unable to gain access since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947.[35][36] Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark widely suspected the United States' involvement in bringing down the Bhutto's government, and publicly accused the United States' Government after attending the trial.[36] On other hand, the United States refused any involvement in Bhutto's fall, and argued that it was Bhutto who had alienated himself over the five years.[27] While witnessing the dramatic fall of Bhutto, one U.S. diplomat in American Embassy in Islamabad wrote that:
During Bhutto's five years in Pakistan's helm, Bhutto had retained an emotional hold on the poor masses who had votoed him overwhelmingly in 1970s general elections. At the same time, however, [B]hutto had many enemies. The [socialist economics] and
nationalization of major private industries during his first two years on office had badly upsets the
Business circles... An ill-considered decision to take over the wheat-milling, rice-husking, sugar mills, and cotton-gaining, industries in July of 1976 had angered the small business owners and traders. Both leftists— socilists and communists, intellectuals, students, and trade unionists— felt betrayed by Bhutto's shift to centre-right wing conservative economics policies and by his growing collaboration with powerful feudal lords, Pakistan's traditional power brokers. After 1976, Bhutto's aggressive authoritarian personal style and often high-handed way of dealing with political rivals, dissidents, and opponents had also alienated many....
After assuming power as Chief Martial Law Administrator, Zia shortly appeared in national television, PTV promising to hold new and neutral parliamentary elections within the next 90 days[27] and to hand over power to the civilian representatives of the nation.[27] He also stated that the Constitution of Pakistan had not been abrogated, but temporarily suspended.[27] Zia did not trusted the civilian institutions and legislators to ensure country's integrity and sovereignty[27] therefore, in October 1977, he announced the postponement of the electoral plan and decided to start an accountability process for the politicians.[37] In television, Zia strongly defended his decision for postponing the elections and demanded that "scrutiny of political leaders who had engaged in malpractice in the past".[37] Thus, the PNA adopted its policy of "retribution first, elections later".[37] Zia's policy severely tainted his credibility as many, both domestically and internationally, saw the broken promise as malicious.[26] Another motive was that Zia widely suspected that once out of power the size of PPP rallies swell and a better performance in elections was possible.[27] This led to request for postponement of elections by the right-wing militarists as well as left-wing intellectuals, formerly allied with Bhutto, which displaced Bhutto in the first place.[27] Zia dispatched an intelligence unit, known as ISI's Political Wing, sending Brigadier-General Taffazul Hussain Siddiqiui, to Bhutto's native Province, Sindh, to asses whether people would accept a martial law.[27] The Political Wing also contacted the several right-wing militarists and conservatives, promising an election, with PNA power-sharing the government with Zia.[27] Zia successfully divided and separated the secular forces from right-wing militarists and conservatives, and later purged each member of secular front.[27] The election was imaginably formed with two active-duty generals ad two retired generals, one of them being infamous Major-General (retired) Rao Farman Ali who used the same genocidal practices on secular intellectuals as he did in 1970s.[27]
A Disqualification Tribunal was formed, and several individuals who had been Members of Parliament were charged with malpractice and disqualified from participating in politics at any level for the next seven years.[37] A white paper document was issued, incriminating the deposed Bhutto government on several counts.[37]
It is reported by senior officers that when Gen. Zia met federal secretaries for the first time as leader of the country after martial law, he said that "He does not possess the Charisma of Bhutto, personality of Gen. Ayub or the legitimacy of Liaquat Ali Khan" thereby implying how can he be marketed.[27]
Nusrat Bhutto, the wife of the deposed Prime Minister, filed a suit against Zia's military regime, challenging the validity of the July 1977 military coup. The Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled, in what would later be known as the Doctrine of Necessity (not to be confused with the 1954 Doctrine of necessity) that, given the dangerously unstable political situation of the time, Zia's overthrowing of the Bhutto government was legal on the grounds of necessity. The judgement tightened the general's hold on the government. When Bhutto appeared personally to argue his appeal in the supreme court, he almost affirmed his concurrence with the judges present for not letting off a judgement without imposing some conditions on ruling military government.
Despite the dismissal of most of the Bhutto government, President Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry was persuaded to continue in office as a figurehead.[38] After completing his term, and despite Zia's insistence to accept an extension as President, Chaudhry resigned, and Zia took the office of President of Pakistan on September 16, 1978. Thus his position was cemented as the undisputed ruler of the country. Over the next six years, Zia issued several decrees which amended the constitution and greatly expanded his power. Most significantly, the Revival of Constitution of 1973 Order granted Zia the power to dissolve the National Assembly virtually at will.
Soon the martial law was imposed, Zia called for a meeting of senior statesmen and officers of Pakistan Armed Forces.[38] On his first day of meeting which was called at an early morning, statesmen and officers were shocked when looking at him and described Zia as lacked of intelligence, and had possessed no "personality charisma" as compared to Bhutto and had "no intellectual property" that would gravitate people towards him like Bhutto, who would attract people's attention by his intellectual, physical appearance, and Bhutto's Westernized dressing.[38] Unlike Bhutto who would appeared in decent Westernized clothing and always had joy in his face while meeting the journalists, state officials and members of society; General Zia would appeared in a well ironed military uniform which he wore on a regular basis, military badges that was conferred to him during his long service, and a strict face posture while giving interviews.[38] General Zia rarely smiled and, often seeing saluting at the people while attending the public or political functions.[38] Comparing Bhutto to Zia, Bhutto always chaired meetings with good mood, no matter how serious the situation was, and often seen cared about family matters of others, while serious decision would also be made.[38] With Zia, meetings were often short but intense and decisions would he made in matter of minutes, although Zia was a good listener.[38] Nonetheless, Zia's image was perfected as "tyrant, cold person" and was best suited as an "ideal military dictator", often perpetrated in Western movies.[38] Roedad Khan's book "Pakistan- A Dream Went Sour", Roedad Khan, who served as Secretary-General for the Internal Security summed up that:
(Zia).. wanted to become an
Amir, a ridicule concept which died centuries ago. 'If he (Zia) had his way, (Zia) would have taken [Pakistan] back to the
Middle Ages.... [Zia] had no idea of law or [constitution] or the requirements of a [modern] governments'.
In the words of Aftab Kazie and Roedad Khan, Zia hated Bhutto and had used inappropriate language and insults to describe Bhutto and his colleagues.[39][40][41] On April 4, 1979, the former elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged, after the Supreme Court upheld the death sentence as passed by the Lahore High Court.[42] The Supreme Court ruled four to three in favor of execution. The High Court had given him the death sentence on charges of the murder of the father of Ahmed Raza Kasuri, a dissident PPP politician.[42] Despite many clemency appeals from foreign leaders requesting Zia to commute Bhutto's death sentence, Zia dismissed the appeals and upheld the death sentence.[42] The hanging of an elected prime minister by a military was condemned by the international community and by lawyers and jurists across Pakistan.[42] Bhutto's trial was highly controversial.[42][42]
Bhutto's last personal appearance and utterances in the supreme court were not merely a long defence of his conduct he also made some matters clear.[26] He mentioned the words of "heir" for his son "Mir Murtaza Bhutto".[26] He made some remark which indicated that he has views similar to a Sunni, though he was Shia albeit a non-practicing one. He also effectively cast doubt on the reliability of star witnesses against him i.e. Masood Mahmood who was a UK-trained lawyer and not merely a police officer and FSF chief. He mentioned repeatedly Lahori Ahmedi connection of Masood Mahmood in his testimony.[26] He repeatedly brought the subject of his maltreatment in the death cell.[26] Bhutto made it abundantly clear, even though indirectly that he wanted either freedom or death, not some thing in between, and appreciated Khar and his lawyer Yahya Bakhtiar.[26]
Bhutto's another lawyer Abdul Hafiz Pirzada filed a petition for the release of Bhutto's colleague Mubashir Hassan and Bhutto itself.[26] The Supreme Court concluded that Bhutto's execution can be revered by the President, and Hassan's case is being dealt with by Military Justice Court led by Zia; therefore, the civilian courts have no jurisdiction over that hearing.[26] Pirzada submitted the request to Chief of Army Staff Directorate, but Zia claimed that the request application had been gone missing.[26] Therefore, Zia upheld the sentence and Bhutto was executed. Shattered and disturbed Pirzada departed to United Kingdom and did not returned to Pakistan until the democracy was returned in 1988.[26] It was not until 2000, when the Pakistan media published its report that the application was found in the record section (Directorate-General for the Military History) at the Generals Combatant Headquarter (GHQ).[26] The application was made public domain when General Pervez Musharraf declassified much of the 1970s secret documentations.
The Zia regime largely made use of installing high-profile military generals to carte blanche provincial administration under martial law. Zia's Guides Cavalry comrade and foul-mouth Lieutenant-General Fazhle Haque was appointed Martial Law Administrator of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province.[43] Lieutenant-General Fazle Haque was considered a strong vocal General and a strong man. General Haque was the commander of the XI Corps, and commanding-general officer of the Army elements responsible for fighting a secret war against Soviet Union.[43]
The second appointment was of Lieutenant-General S.M. Abbasi who was appointed Martial Law Administrator of Sindh Province; his tenure too saw civil disorder amid student riots.[43] By contrast, third martial law administrator appointment of Lieutenant-General Ghulam Jilani Khan to the Punjab Province made much headway in beautifying Lahore[43] extending infrastructure, and muting political opposition.[43] The ascent of Navaz Sharif to Chief Minister of Punjab was largely due to General Jilani's sponsorship.[44] Perhaps most crucially, final and fourth martial law administrator appointment was then-Lieutenant-General Rahimuddin Khan.[43] Lieutenant-General Rahimuddin Khan was appointed to the post of Martial Law Administrator of Balochistan Province saw the disbanding of the Baloch insurgency, the containment of Afghan Mujahideen, as well as the construction of nuclear test sites in the Chagai District.[43]
Zia's tenure saw the influx of heroin,[43] sophisticated weaponry, and countless refugees in from neighbouring Afghanistan.[43] Law and order deterioration was worse after he appointed Mr. Junejo as Prime minister in 1985.[43]
General Zia was highly benefited with the extremely capable martial law administrators who previously had worked with the military governments of General Yahya Khan and Field Marshal Ayub Khan. One of the notable officers that had worked with him were General Khalid Mahmud Arief, Chief of Army Staff, and Admiral Mohammad Shariff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.[34] Admiral Shariff and General Arif were highly capable and had experience in military government-ruling operations in General Yahya Khan's regime who remained General Zia' confidential members.[34][45] Both Admiral Sharif and General Arif handled the matters efficiently if the matters were out of control by General Zia. In 1979, General Zia influenced on Navy's Promotion Board several times after he succeeded first in the appointment of Admiral Caramatt Nazi as Chief of Naval Staff in 1979, and Admiral Tarik Kamal Khan, also Chief of Naval Staff, in 1983.[34] On his request, then-President Fazal Illahi Chaudhry approved the appointment of General Anwar Shamim as Chief of Air Staff and following President's resignation, General Zia appointed Shamim as the Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator.[34] In the matters of serious national security, General Zia had take the Chief of Air Staff and Chief of Naval Staff in confidence after he discussed the matters with the respected chiefs of Staff.[34] General Zia's appointment in inter-services were highly crucial for his military government and pre-emptive measure to ensure the continuous loyalty of Navy and Air Force to General Zia-ul-Haq and his new military government, with many naval and air force officers were given high government position by General Zia.[34]
As like the previous military governments, General Zia completely disbanded the idea of "Parliamentary democracy" after he banned all political parties in Pakistan; and many political infrastructure built by Zulfikar Bhutto was destroyed, hampered, and non-existed by the 1980s. However, a new system was still needed to administer the country where issues of government policies were demanding speeding solutions. In the absence of a parliament, Zia decided to set up an alternative system, Majlis-e-Shoora, in 1980. Most of the members of the Shoora were intellectuals, scholars, ulema, journalists, economists, and professionals in different fields. The Shoora was to act as a board of advisors to the President. Zia decided to replace "Parliamentary democracy" system to Soviet-like mind idea of "technocracy" and all 284 members of the Shoora were to be nominated by the President, also known as a technocracy or government of technocrats.
Amongst technocrats included in Zia's cabinet was Dr. Asad who increased the oil production of the country manyfold. Many members of this Shoora later joined other parties after his death. Zia's parliament and his military government reflect the idea of "military-bureaucratic technocracy" (MBT) where professionals, engineers, and high-profile military officers were initially part of his military government. His strong hate for the politicians led the promotion of bureaucratic-technocracy which was seen a strong weapon of countering the politicians and their political strongholds. Senior statesman and technocrats were included physicist-turned diplomat Agha Shahi, jurist Schariefuddin Perzada, corporate leader Navaz Scharif, economist Mahbub ul Haq, and senior statesman Aftab Kazie, Roedad Khan, and chemist-turned diplomat Ghulam Ishaq Khan were a few of the leading technocratic figures in his military government.
|
|
This article or section appears to contradict itself. Please see the talk page for more information. (January 2011) |
After Bhutto's death, the momentum for holding the elections began to mounted, and the international pressure further forced General Zia to hold elections in the country. But before handing over the power to the public representatives, Zia-ul-Haq decided to secure his position as the head of state. A referendum was held on December 19, 1984 and the option was to elect or reject the General as the future President. According to the official result, more than 95% of the votes were cast in favour of Zia, thus he was elected as President for the next five years. However, they were marred by allegations of widespread irregularities and technical violations of the laws and ethics of democratic elections[citation needed]. Also, despite pressure from the government to vote, only 10% of those eligible to vote did so[citation needed]. Zia had the overwhelming majority of the votes cast, but in reality the referendum was an embarrassing failure.[46]
After being elected President, Zia decided to hold elections in the country in February 1985 on a non-party basis.[4] Most of the opposing political parties decided to boycott the elections but election results showed that many victors belonged to one party or the other. To make things easier for himself, the General nominated the Prime Minister from amongst the Members of the Assembly. To many, his nomination of Muhammad Khan Junejo as the Prime Minister was because he wanted a simple person at the post who would act as a puppet in his hands.[4] Before handing over the power to the new Government and lifting martial law, Zia got the new legislature to retroactively accept all of Zia's actions of the past eight years, including his coup of 1977[citation needed]. He also managed to get several amendments passed, most notably the Eighth Amendment, which granted "reserve powers" to the president to dissolve the National Assembly.[4] However, this amendment considerably reduced the power he'd previously granted himself to dissolve the legislature, at least on paper.[4] The text of the amendment permitted Zia to dissolve the Assembly only if the Cabinet had been toppled by a vote of no confidence and it was obvious that no one could form a government or the government could not function in a constitutional manner.[4]
On December 25, 1979, the Soviet Union (USSR) intervened [in Afghanistan]].[47] Following this invasion, Zia chaired a meeting and was asked by several cabinet members to refrain from interfering in the war, owing to the vastly superior military power of the USSR.[47] Zia, however, was ideologically opposed to the idea of communism taking over a neighboring country, supported by the fear of Soviet advancement into Pakistan, particularly Balochistan, in search of warm waters, and made no secret about his intentions of monetarily and militarily aiding the Afghan resistance (the Mujahideen) with major assistance from the United States.[47]
During this meeting, Director-General of the ISI then-Lieutenant-General Akhtar Abdur Rahman advocated for the idea of covert operation in Afghanistan by arming the Islamic extremist.[47] During this meeting, General Rahman was heard saying: "Kabul must burn! Kabul must burn!",[47] and mastered the idea of proxy war in Afghanistan.[47] After this meeting, Zia authorized this operation under General Rahman, and it was later merged with Operation Cyclone, a programme funded by the United States and the CIA.[47]
In November 1982, General Zia traveled to the Soviet Union to attend the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev, then-General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[26] Soviet President Andrei Gromyko and the new Secretary-General Yuri Andropov met with Zia where a brief meeting took place at the Kremlin.[26] The Soviet Union and the new Secretary General Yuri Andropov were angry at Pakistan's covert involvement in the support of Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union and her satellite state, Afghanistan, and expressed his indignation to the General.[26] Then General Zia took his hand and told him that, "Mr. Secretary General... Believe me, Pakistan wants nothing but good and healthy relations with the Soviet Union".[26] According to Andrei Gromyko, Zia's sincerity had caught off guards and in the meeting, everyone believed him but sadly found out that his words were not followed by his actions.[26]
While there, Indira Gandhi compared the personality of Zia to Bhutto's while she summed up that Bhutto was intelligent, caring, and global experience that would reflect in his face.[26] But with Zia, the tyranny could easily been seen on his face.[26]
Zia reversed many of Bhutto's foreign policy initiatives by first establishing stronger links with the United States, Japan, and the Western world.[48] Zia broken off relations with the Socialist state and State capitalism became his major economic policy. Ironically, Zia directly dealt with the Israel, working to build covert relations with Israel, allowing the country to actively participate in Soviet war in Afghanistan. Helped by ISI, the Mossad channeled Soviet reversed engineered weapons to Afghanistan.[48] In Charlie Wilson's own word, Zia reported to have remarked to Israeli intelligence service: "Just don't put any stars of David on the boxes".[48]
Under Zia, the previous ruler Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's nationalisation policies were slowly reversed[citation needed], and gradual privatisation took place[citation needed]. Zia greatly favoured egalitarianism and industrialisation. Between 1977 and 1986, the country experienced an average annual growth in the GNP of 6.8%, one of the highest in the world at that time.
One of the earliest initiative took by General Zia in 1977, was to militarized the integrated atomic energy programme which was founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972.[49] During the first stages, the programme was under the control of Bhutto and the Directorate for Science, under Science Advisor Dr. Mubashir Hassan, was heading the civilian committee that supervised the construction of the facilities and laboratories.[49] This atomic bomb project had no boundaries with Munir Khan and Abdul Qadeer Khan leading their efforts separately whom they had report to Bhutto and his science adviser dr. Mubashir Hassan who had little interest in this atomic bomb project.[49] Major-General Zahid Ali Akbar, an engineering officer, had little role in the atomic project; General Zia responded by taking over the programme under the military control and disbanded the civilian directorate when he ordered the arrest of dr. Mubashir Hassan.[49] This whole giant nuclear energy project was transferred into the complete administrative hands of Major-General Akbar who was soon made the Lieutenant-General and Engineer-in-Chief of Corps of Engineers to deal with the authorities whose cooperation was required.[49] General Akbar consolidated the entire project by placing the scientific research under the military control, setting boundaries and goals.[49] General Akbar proved to be an extremely capable officer in the matters of science and technology when he aggressively led the development of nuclear weapons under Munir Ahmad Khan and Abdul Qadeer Khan in matters of five years.[49]
By the time, Zia assumed the control, research facilities fully became functional and the 90% of the work on atom bomb project was completed[49] Both the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) had ingeniously built the extensive research infrastructure initiated by Bhutto.[49] General Akbar's office was soon shifted at the Army Combatant Generals Headquarter (GHQ) and guided General Zia on key matters of nuclear science and the atomic bomb production, and was the first engineering officer to have acknowledge General Zia about the success of this energy project into the fully matured programme.[49] On the recommendation of Akbar, Zia approved the appointment of Munir Ahmad Khan as the scientific director of the atomic bomb project, as Zia was convinced by Akbar that civilian scientists under Munir Khan's directorship were at their best to counter the international pressure.[49]
This was proved when the PAEC conducted the cold-fission test of a fission device, codename Kirana-I on March 11, 1983 at the Weapon-Testing Laboratories-I, under the leadership of weapon-testing laboratory's director dr. Ishfaq Ahmad.[49] Lieutenant-General Zahid Akbar went to GHQ and notified General Zia about the success of the this test.[49] The PAEC responded by conducting several cold-tests throughout the 1980s, a policy also continued by Benazir Bhutto in 1990s.[49]
Unlike Bhutto who faced rogue criticism and faced a heated diplomatic war with the United States throughout the 1970s, General Zia took different diplomatic approaches to counter the international pressure.[49] From 1979 to 1983, the country was made a subject of attack by international organization for not signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); General Zia deftly neutralized international pressure by tagging Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme to the nuclear designs of neighboring Indian nuclear programme.[49] General Zia, with the help of Munir Ahmad Khan and Agha Shahi, Foreign Minister, drew a five-point proposal as a practical rejoinder to world pressure on Pakistan to sign the NPT; the points including the renouncing of the use of nuclear weapons.[50]
| “ |
(sic)...Either General Zia did not know the facts about country's atomic bomb project... Or General Zia was the "most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met...." |
” |
|
—Vernon Walters, 1981, [51]
|
Following the success of Operation Opera— an Israeli Air Force strike to sabotage the Iraqi nuclear programme in 1981— amid suspicion grew in Pakistan that Indian Air Force had similar plans for Pakistan.[52] In private meeting with General Anvär Schamiem, then-Chief of Air Staff, General Zia had notified General Schamiem that Indian Air Force had plans to infiltrate in Pakistan's nuclear energy project, citing the solid evidences.[52] Due to weak Air Force, General Shamim felt that the air force was unable to divert such attacks, therefore, General Shamim advised General Zia to use diplomacy through Munir Ahmad Khan to divert the attacks.[52] At Vienna, Munir Ahmad Khan met with Raja Ramanna notified his counter-part that such attack would provoked a nuclear war between two countries.[53] In meantime, General Shamim decided to start the program to acquire the advanced F-16 Falcons and A-5 Fanton jets for Pakistan Air Force.[52] General Shamim launched the Operation Sentinel- a counter operation that thwarted the Israeli Air Force attempt to sabotage Pakistan's nuclear energy project— forced Indian Premier Indira Gandhi to held talks with Pakistan on nuclear issues and directed a high delegation to Pakistan where both countries pledged not to assist or attack each others facilities.[52] In 1985, following the induction of F-16 Falcons and A-5 Fantons, General Shamim commissioned the Air Force Strategic Command to protect and battle the weapons of mass destruction.[52]
In 1977, Zia ultimately adopted the policy of "Nuclear opacity" to deliberately denied the sensitive atomic bomb programmes.[51] This policy of nuclear ambiguity was adopted after witnessing the success of Israel's nuclear program and on multiple occasions Zia's break his words and promises concerning the nature of country's atomic bomb project.[51] On nuclear policy issues, Zia deliberately misguided the United States and concealed classified information from the outside world.[51] The United States trusted Zia's sincerity and his promises made by him to United States; Zia gave his words and assurances to the United States not to produced weapon-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) above a 5% level.[51] However, the Deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency Vernon Walter confronted Zia on his secret trip to Pakistan in October 1981. Confronted with the evidences, General Zia acknowledged that the information "must be true," but then denied everything, leading Walters to conclude that: "either Zia "did not know the facts" or was the "most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met...".[51]
Soon after the coup, the clandestine nuclear energy project was no longer a secret to the outside world.[49] Part of his strategy was to promotion of nuclear proliferation in anti-western states (such as North Korea, Iran, and communist China) to aid in their own nuclear ambition, in order to divert the international attention which was difficult.[49] In 1981, General Zia contracted with China when he sent the sensitive weapon-grade uranium to China and also built the centrifuge laboratory which increasingly enchanced the Chinese nuclear programme.[49] This act encouraged dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan who allegedly tried to aidin Libyan nuclear program but because the ties were strained, Khan was warned of serious consequences.[49] This policy was envisaged that this would deflect international pressure on these countries and Pakistan would be spared the international community's wrath.[54]
After General Zia's death, his successor General Mirza Aslam Beg, as Chief of Army Staff, encouraged Khan and gave him a free hand to work with some like-minded nations such as North Korea, Iran and Libya which also wanted to pursue their nuclear ambitions for a variety of reasons. In 2004, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's dismissal from the nuclear weapons programme was considered a face saving exercise by the Pakistan Armed Forces and political establishment under the then Chief of Army Staff and President General Pervez Musharraf.[55] Zia's nuclear proliferation policy had deep impact on the world, especially anti-western states, most nominally North Korea and Iran. In the 2000s (decade), North Korea soon would followed the same suit after it was targeted by international community for its on-going nuclear program. In the 2000s (decade), North Korea attempted to aid in Syrian and Iranian nuclear program in 1990s.[49] The North Korean connection to Syrian nuclear program was exposed in 2007 by Israel in its successful strategic operation, Orchard, which resulted in sabotaging the Syrian nuclear program as well as death of 10 senior North-Korean scientists who were aiding to build the nuclear program.
Even though General Zia had removed the Bhutto sentiment in the nuclear energy project, General Zia did not completely disband Bhutto's policy on nuclear weapons.[49] After the retirement of General Akbar, General Zia transferred the control of the nuclear weapons program to Bhutto's close aide Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.[49] Soon, General Zia promoted Khan as the technical director of the entire programme as well as returned to post of Science Adviser by appointing Munir Ahmad Khan as his adviser.[49] With the support of handpicked civilian Prime minister Muhammad Juneijo, General Zia sanctioned the launch of the 50MW heavy water plutonium production reactor, known as Khushab-I, at Khushab in 1985.[49] General Zia also took initiatives to launched the space projects as spin-off to nuclear project.[49] Zia appointed nuclear engineer Salim Mehmud as the Administrator of the Space Research Commission.[56] Zia also launched the work on country's first satellite, Badr-1, a military satellite.[56] In 1987, General Zia launched the clandestine aerospace project, Integrated Missile Research Programme General Anwar Shamim in 1985 and later under Lieutenant-General Talat Masood in 1987.[57]
Zia's international standing greatly rose after his declaration to fight the Soviet invaders. Pakistan – United States relations took a much more positive turn. U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, cut off U.S. aid to Pakistan on the grounds that Pakistan had not made sufficient progress on the nuclear issue. Then, on December 25, 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and Carter offered Pakistan $325 million in aid over three years. Zia rejected this as "peanuts."[58] Carter also signed the finding in 1980 that allowed less than $50 million a year to go to the Mujahideen. After Ronald Reagan came to office, defeating Carter for the US Presidency in 1980, all this changed, due to President Reagan's new priorities and the unlikely and remarkably effective effort by Congressman Charles Wilson (D-TX), aided by Joanne Herring, and CIA Afghan Desk Chief Gust Avrakotos to increase the funding for Operation Cyclone. Aid to the Afghan resistance, and to Pakistan, increased substantially, finally reaching $1 billion. The United States, faced with a rival superpower looking as if it were to create another Communist bloc, now engaged Zia to fight a US-aided war by proxy in Afghanistan against the Soviets.
Zia now found himself in a position to demand billions of dollars in aid for the Mujahideen from the Western states, famously dismissing a United States proposed $325 million aid package as "peanuts". Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and Special Service Group now became actively involved in the conflict, and in cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Army Special Forces supported the armed struggle against the Soviets.
In 1981, Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter as President of the United States. Reagan was completely against the Soviet Union and its Communist satellites, dubbing it "the evil empire". Reagan now increased financial aid heading for Pakistan. In 1981, the Reagan Administration sent the first of 40 F-16 jet fighters to the Pakistanis. But the Soviets kept control of the Afghan skies until the Mujahideen received Stinger missiles in 1986. From that moment on, the Mujahideen's strategic position steadily improved.
The Soviets declared a policy of national reconciliation. In January they announced that a Soviet withdrawal was no longer linked to the makeup of the Afghan government remaining behind. Pakistan, with the massive extra-governmental and covert backing from the largest operation ever mounted by the CIA and financial support of Saudi Arabia, therefore, played a large part in the eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988.
The war left deep scars to the Pakistan's society with the menace of Kalashnikov (AK-47 assault rifle) culture spreading all over the country.[59] It is estimated that there are currently 20 million firearms in Pakistan, which has a population of about 175 million (as of July 2010) i.e., almost every ninth person has a firearm, most likely an automatic one.[60] The rise of the illicit drug trade and its spread through Pakistan to the rest of the world increased tremendously during the Soviet-Afghan war. Afghanistan's drug industry began to take off after the Soviet invasion in 1979. Desperate for cash with which to buy weapons, various elements in the anti-Communist resistance turned to the drug trade. This was tolerated if not condoned by their American sponsors such as the CIA.[61]
It was thought by some leading ISI officials then assisting Mujaheedin led war that converting raw opium to heroin is a technology which was not known to illiterate Afghans and was taught by CIA or some others with advanced technology as later was easy to smuggle and earn cash for resistance.
Two Afghan Mujahideen groups later morphed into Jihadist outfits in the shape of Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the early 1990s. The Pakistan and United States trained Arab and Afghan fighters later in 2001 initiated a Jihad against United States in 2001 and against Pakistan in 2004. The links of the spectacular and deadly events of September 11 were deeply rooted in the Soviet-Afghan war. Osama bin Laden invested his inherited money into the Soviet-Afghan war to fight the 'infidel communist power' and was abetted by CIA, ISI, US and Pakistani military establishments for over 10 years.[62] For its turn in Pakistan, the war in West Pakistan, hampered the Pakistan's economy, dismantle the civil society, and as well as resulted 3,000 deaths for Pakistan's Armed Forces. General Zia's morphed Jihadist furthered shocked country's pillars, and faced a wave of suicide bombings from the period 2007 to 2011, resulting in more than 30,000 civilian deaths in Pakistan.
The Islamic conservatism and the Islamic state became Zia's primary policy of his military government.[27] Intensified Islamic policies to radicalize the country had The West worried.[27] The secular-socialist orientation and socialist economics process was an attempt to upset to Pakistan's order of operation on a routine life, as Zia maintained.[27] General Zia rejected Bhutto's philosophy and was reported to highly hostile of Bhutto's philosophical rationale, "Food, clothing, and shelter".[27] General Zia defended his policies in an interview in 1979 given to British journalist Ian Stephens, as he puts it.
The basis of Pakistan was Islam. The basis of Pakistan were Muslims in the subcontinent are a separate culture. It was the
[Two-Nation Theory] that carved out of the Subcontinent as Pakistan.... Mr. [Zulfikar] Bhutto's way of flourishing way of
This Society was by eroding its moral fiber. Mr. Bhutto.. eroded the moral fiber of the society by pitching students against teachers, children against their parents, landlord against tenants, workers against mill owners. Pakistan is not incapable of economic production. It is because Pakistanis have been made to believe that one can earn without working.... We are going back to Islam not by choice but by the force of circumstances. It is not I or my [military] government that is imposing Islam. It was the 99 percent of people wanted; the street violence against Bhutto reflected the people's desire of wanting— just as the campaign for
Pakistan Movement. I am just giving the people [of Pakistan] what they want.
—General Zia-ul-Haq
interview giving in 1979 to Ian Stephens,
[27]
On December 2, 1978, on the occasion of the first day of the Hijra to enforce the Islamic system in Pakistan in a nationwide address, Zia accused politicians of exploiting the name of Islam: "Many a ruler did what they pleased in the name of Islam."[3] After assuming power, the government began a program of public commitment to enforce Nizam-e-Mustafa (Islamic System), a significant turn from Pakistan's predominantly Anglo-Saxon law, inherited from the British. As a preliminary measure to establish an Islamic society in Pakistan, Zia announced the establishment of Sharia Benches.[3] To many secular and communist forces, Zia cynically manipulated Islam for the survival of his own regime.[3] In 1983, Nusrat Bhutto reasoned General Zia's policies as she puts it:
The (scream) and the horrors of 1971 war..... are (still) alive and vivid in the hearts and the minds of people of [Pakistan]...Therefore, General Zia insanely.... used the "Islam [Card]".... to ensure the survival of his own regime....
—Nusrat Bhutto, former First Lady of Pakistan,
[3]
The hybridization of Pakistan penal code with Islamic laws was not an easy work.[7] Two very different logics lay underneath both.[7] PPC was kingly law, Haddood is a religious and community-based law. Under the Offenses Against Property (Hudood Ordinance) Ordinance 1979, the punishment of imprisonment or fine, or both, as provided in the existing Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) for theft, was substituted by the amputation of the right hand of the offender from the joint of the wrist by a surgeon.[7] For robbery, the right hand of the offender from the wrist and his left foot from the ankle should be amputated by a surgeon. Hudood (حدود, also transliterated Hadud, Hudud; plural for Hadh, حد, limit, or restriction) is the word often used in Islamic social and legal literature for the bounds of acceptable behaviour. Although the punishments were imposed, the due process, witnesses and prosecution system remained un-Islamic Anglo-Saxon.[7] As in Islamic law Hudud can only be given if four witnesses saw the crime happen, in reality hardly anyone can be punished by Islamic Hud laws as very rarely can the conditions for punishment be met.[7]
Under the Zina Ordinance, the provisions relating to adultery were replaced so that the women and the man guilty will be flogged, each of them, with one hundred lashes, if unmarried.[7] And if they are married they shall be stoned to death provided the proof required for hadd is met.[7] That is four Muslim adult male witnesses of good repute to the act of penetration or a voluntary confession in a competent court of law.[7] The Zina Ordinance is fraught with legal ambiguities and the major flaw in this law is the fact that no distinction is made between adultery and rape. Rape is considered no more heinous a crime than zina.[7] The demarcation line between the two offences is so thin in practice, that when a woman comes into the court with a case of rape, she risks being convicted of zina herself, if she cannot prove the rape.[7] The onus of providing proof in a rape case rests with the woman herself.[7] If she is unable to prove her allegation, bringing the case to court is considered equivalent to a confession of sexual intercourse without lawful marriage.[7] Thus this ordinance has been criticized by human rights and women's rights activists, lawyers and politicians over the years, but so far no attempt at repeal has been successful.[63]
In legal terms, (Islamic law being usually referred to as Sharia, شريعة) the term is used to describe laws that define a certain level of crime classification.[7] Crimes classified under Hudud were the most severe of crimes, such as murder, theft, and adultery.[7] There were minor differences in views between the four major Sunni madh'habs about sentencing and specifications for these laws. It is often argued that, since Sharia is God's law and states certain punishments for each crime, they were immutable. It has been argued by some that the Hudud portion of Sharia is incompatible with humanism or human rights. Although the Hud punishments were imposed, the Islamic law of evidence was not implemented and remained British in origin.[7]
Drinking of wine (i.e. all alcoholic drinks) was not a crime under the PPC.[7] In 1977, however, the drinking and selling of wine by Muslims was banned in Pakistan and the sentence of imprisonment of six months or a fine of Rs. 5000/-, or both, was provided in that law. This ban on drinking was promulgated by Bhutto as he tried to soothen the tide of street Islamization drive called Nizam-e-Mustafa in his last days.[7]
Pakistan's college of unreliable witnesses and unscientific manner of investigations and very young secular law judges meant that Haddood too did not work like the secular PPC law before it. The Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) were amended, through ordinances in 1980, 1982 and 1986 to declare anything implying disrespect to the Islamic prophet Muhammad, Ahl al-Bayt (family members of Muhammad), Sahabah (companions of Muhammad) and Sha'ar-i-Islam (Islamic symbols), a cognizable offence, punishable with imprisonment or fine, or with both.
Zia attempted to Islamize science in Pakistan and appointed Muslim fundamentalist administrators to enforce the pseudo-science.[64] At first, the policy was changed by Zia on nuclear development.[64] Zia argued that Pakistan's atomic bomb is a property of Islamic Ummah, a theory that Bhutto had earlier avoided to keep the Pakistan sentiment strong and alive in scientists while developing the program.[64] Saudi Arabia was the sole financier of the program, and Zia unofficially told Saudis that "Our achievements are your achievements", and later helped building the Saudi nuclear programme. This prompted Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan to send the designs of centrifuges to Libya to aide in their nuclear program as part of Zia's vision.[64] Mainstream Islamic theories became common part in Science lectures rather than mathematically given prove, as Hoodbhoy noted.[64] Even in 1979, Salam used the Islamic theories while explaining the forces of nature and Zia's regime supported the scientific community to promote science more theoretically using Islamic theories rather than actual mathematical proving of the scientific problems.[64]
Zia changed the entire educational system in the country, under a general drive towards Islamization, started the process of historical revisionism in earnest and exploited this initiative. 'The Pakistan's establishment taught their children right from the beginning that this state was built on the basis of religion – that's why they don't have tolerance for other religions and want to wipe out all of them.'.[65]
At the end, Zia's controversial policies slowed down the progress of science in the country and attributed his dearth to militant Islam in Pakistan and the promotion of pseudoscience by Muslim fundamentalists in Pakistani schools and universities.[64]
Another addition to the laws was Ordinance XX of 1984.[7] Under this, the Ahmadiyya were barred from calling themselves Muslims, or using Islamic terminology or practising Islamic rituals. This resulted in classifying the Ahmadiyya Community of Pakistan into a minority group in law. Zia was also considered anti-Shia,[66] as Zia’s regime saw vicious persecution unleashed against the Shias, who form 20 percent of Pakistan's population in addition to the persecution levied against smaller sects such as the Ahmadiyyas.[67] Further during his reign many Shia Muslim personalities and politicians were killed, most prominently the judicial killing of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.[68]
Zia did not throw Ahmedis from Army but Ahmedis who were declared minority in Bhutto's era were unhappy and regained prominent positions after Zia's death as PPP got power again.[7] Zia's only open clash with Shia Ulema was over Zakat (charity) distribution related issues. A book called "Profiles of intelligence" documents that event as written and resolved by a Shia military officer of ISI by the regime.[7]
Zia promulgated Ordinance XX on April 26, 1984, banning members of the Ahmadiyya community from performing some of their religious ceremonies and prayers.[69] He declared "This Ordinance may be called the Anti-Islamic Activities of the Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984". Although before Zia's rule, in 1974 Pakistan's National Assembly under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it was declared that Ahmadis are classified as non-Muslims for the definition of the law.[70] But it was not sufficient in stopping the missionary activities of the Ahmadiyya community. Article 298-C of the new law states "Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 'Ahmadis' or by any other name), who, directly or indirectly, poses himself as Muslim, or calls, or refers to his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine."[71][72]
Ironically, Zia had deep respect for Abdus Salam— a Nobel Laureate in Physics— and had conferred with him with Order of Imtiaz in 1979. Zia also allowed Salam to have deliver lectures in Physics at the Islamabad University, and sanctioned an Award as national decoration after his name. Salam continued his ties with Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and its associated personalities, but Zia had refrained Salam from participating in any experiment in the laboratories of Pakistan.[73] Since the military regime of Zia unleashed a wave of persecution in the 1980s, violence against the Ahmadiyya community has never really ceased.[7] Ahmadis continue to be killed and injured, and have their homes and businesses burned down in anti-Ahmadi attacks. The authorities continue to arrest, jail and charge Ahmadis for blasphemy and other offenses because of their religious beliefs. In several instances, the police have been complicit in harassment and the framing of false charges against Ahmadis, or stood by in the face of anti-Ahmadi violence.[74]
The land of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) was awarded to the occupants by Zia ul Haq. The controversial figureheads Abdul Aziz Ghazi and Abdul Rashid Ghazi of Jamia Hafsa had special relations with Zia ul Haq and those links were further enhanced by his son Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq during his term as a minister of religious affairs. The former head of Lal Masjid, Maulana Abdullah who was famous for speeches on Jihad (Holy war), is said to be very close to Zia ul Haq.[75]
As time passed, the legislature wanted to have more freedom and power and by the beginning of 1988, rumors about the differences between Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo and Zia were rife.
It is said by some that Zia-Junejo rift was encouraged by late Mahboob-ul-Haq and Junejo's insistence on signing Geneva pact without deciding the composition of next government of Afghanistan before Soviet withdrawal. Junejo also gave Benazir a seat next to him in parleys before that. Junejo did not strengthen the Islamization drive and rather weakened it. His era led to serious disturbances in Karachi and ultimately Karachi went into Shia control of MQM from clutches of Sunnis Jamaat-e-Islami.
Ojhri Camp blast had irreversibly weakened Zia versus Junejo. Junejo with western support could not strike Zia. Zia struck first.
On May 29, 1988, Zia dissolved the National Assembly and removed the Prime Minister under article 58(2)b of the amended Constitution. Apart from many other reasons, Prime Minister Junejo's decision to sign the Geneva Accord against the wishes of Zia, and his open declarations of removing any military personnel found responsible for an explosion at a munitions dump at Ojhri Camp, on the outskirts of army headquarters in Rawalpindi, earlier in the year, proved to be some of the major factors responsible for his removal.
Zia played the Islam card to defend himself and the generals against any accusations of misrule and corruption[citation needed]. However since the media in Pakistan was brutally gagged in his days[citation needed], none of his corruption could be documented and brought to the limelight by the print media. When accused of trying to cover-up the Ojhri Camp incident, on May 29, 1988, he invoked an amendment that he had recently added to the Pakistani Constitution that allowed him to dismiss the Prime Minister, dissolve the National Assembly and all provincial assemblies – basically, the entire legislative portions of the government outside of the Presidency. Zia's loyalists in the military were called to form an interim government. Zia justified his actions and diverted attention from his corruption[citation needed] by focusing on how the further Islamization of Pakistan had been negligently delayed by Junejo and his government.
Zia promised to hold elections in 1988 after the dismissal of Junejo government. He said that he would hold elections within the next 90 days. The late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter Benazir Bhutto had returned from exile earlier in 1986, and had announced that she would be contesting the elections. With Bhutto's popularity somewhat growing, and a decrease in international aid following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Zia was in an increasingly difficult political situation.
General Zia as Chief Martial Law Administrator and later President, consolidated near-absolute power in 1970s and 1980s. The Purge that occurred in 1977 to 1979 and re-started in 1983, as a reaction to Zia's policies, the populist Movement for the Restoration of Democracy was born and soon gained popularity in Pakistan's smaller, poorer provinces, especially in Bhutto's home province, Sindh. General Zia responded by violently dealing with his political opponents and journalists as well as minorities. Indira Gandhi, Indian PM raised concerns over this brutality and violation of human rights at the hands of Pakistan's military dictatorship (Dawn August 14, 1983).[22]
Many senior military officers such as General Zulfikar Ali Khan and Major-General Tajammul Hussain Malik were convicted for treason, followed a small scale purging of Pakistan Army officers sympathetic to Bhutto. Zia curbed the Communist Party by illegally abducting Jam Saqi and Nazeer Abbasi for a secret trial. Both Abbasi and Saqi were tortured and killed while interrogating process into the hands of ruthless Brigadier-General Imtiaz Ahmad. The public lynching and flagellation became common for senior journalists and politicians who suffered at the hands of General Zia. This absolute act further radicalized the society where intolerance for other people was reached to maximum. Zia's torture and purge forced minorities to fled the country such as Major-General Eric Hall, director of Pakistan's space weapons program. The senior leadership of People's National Party took the refuge in neighboring Afghanistan and India, while many political workers went missing and either killed. One of the notable case was the hijacking of Pakistan International Airlines's Boeing 720 in 1981. ISI quickly founded that the Al-Zulfikar was behind this plot which resulted in killing of one military pilot. The leaders of this ring Salamullah Tipu was murdered in Kabul Prison; others were abducted by the ISI. The head of the KHAD, Mohammad Najibullah was also involved in this plot, but soon paid the price at the hands of the Taliban in 1996 when he was brutally beaten and publicly hanged in the roads of Kabul.
Soon this incident, Zia also began to hunt down the Al-Zulfiqar— a leftist organization founded by Bhutto's children. The brutal poisoning and death of Shahnawaz Bhutto, Bhutto's youngest son, is widely suspected to done under Zia's orders, though there are no evidences for this claim. Zia's persecution of Bhutto's family, forced Benazir, Sanam and Murtaza Bhutto to hide in Arab world, notably Syria who provided the government-sanctioned houses to the Bhutto family.
Zia died in a plane crash on August 17, 1988. After witnessing a US M1 Abrams tank demonstration in Bahawalpur, Zia had left the small town in the Punjab province by C-130 Hercules aircraft. Shortly after a smooth takeoff, the control tower lost contact with the aircraft. Witnesses who saw the plane in the air afterward claim it was flying erratically, then nosedived and exploded on impact. In addition to Zia, 31 others died in the plane crash, including Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, close associate of Zia, Brigadier Siddique Salik, the American Ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Lewis Raphel and General Herbert M. Wassom, the head of the U.S. Military aid mission to Pakistan.[76][77] Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Senate Chairman announced Zia's death on radio and TV. The manner of his death has given rise to many conspiracy theories.[78] There is speculation that America, India, the Soviet Union (as retaliation for US-Pakistani supported attacks in Afghanistan) or an alliance of them and internal groups within Zia's military were behind the attack.[79][80]
A board of inquiry was set up to investigate the crash. It concluded 'the most probable cause of the crash was a criminal act of sabotage perpetrated in the aircraft'. It also suggested that poisonous gases were released which incapacitated the passengers and crew, which would explain why no Mayday signal was given.[81]
Maj Gen (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, claimed later that reports of Israeli and Indian involvement in Ziaul Haq’s plane crash were only speculations and he rejected the statement that was given by former president Ghulam Ishaq Khan that the presidential plane was blown up in the air. Durrani stated that Zia's plane was destroyed while landing.[82]
Grave stone of Zia's grave
His funeral was held on August 19, 1988 in Islamabad. Also in attendance was his successor President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who had earlier officially announced Zia's death in a nationwide address.
Zia has been portrayed in English language popular culture a number of times including:
- Zia is the basis for the character General Hyder in Salman Rushdie's novel Shame (1983), which describes Zia's long-lasting relationship with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (here known as Iskander Harrapa), the president whom he would later overthrow and "put to death".
- ^ a b c Amin, Abdul Hafiz. "Remembering Our Warriors: Babar The Great". Interview with Major-General baber. Defence Journal of Pakistan. http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/apr/babar.htm. Retrieved 2011.
- ^ a b c Story of Pakistan. "Ouster of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto" (PHP). http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A143. Retrieved November 7, 2006.
- ^ a b c d e Haqqani, His Excellency and State Amabassador of Pakistan to the United States of America, dr. Hussain (2005). Pakistan: between mosque and military. Washington D.C.: United Book Press. pp. 400. ISBN [[Special:BookSources/978-0-87000-214-1|978-0-87000-214-1]]. http://books.google.com/books?id=nYppZ_dEjdIC&pg=PA132&dq=zia+ul+haq&hl=en&ei=y1vDTv2NE4aSiALKppTYCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=book-thumbnail&resnum=2&ved=0CEAQ6wEwAQ#v=onepage&q=zia%20ul%20haq&f=false.
- ^ a b c d e f GoPak, Government of Pakistan. "The Eight Amendment". Constitution of Pakistan. http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/8amendment.html. Retrieved November 16, 2011.
- ^ Rafiq Dossani (2005). Prospects for Peace in South Asia. Stanford University Press. pp. 46–50. ISBN 978-0-8047-5085-1.
- ^ Khanna, Sushil Khanna. "The Crisis in the Pakistan Economy". Sushil Khanna. http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv8n1/pakistan.htm. Retrieved November 16, 2011.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x Michael Heng Siam-Heng, Ten Chin Liew (2010). State and Secularism: Perspectives from Asia§General Zia-ul-Haq and Patronage of Islamism. Singapore: World Scientific. pp. 360. ISBN [[Special:BookSources/978-981-4282-37-1|978-981-4282-37-1]]. http://books.google.com/books?id=9cCtsWb9hoYC&pg=PA202&dq=zia+ul+haq&hl=en&ei=y1vDTv2NE4aSiALKppTYCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=book-thumbnail&resnum=10&ved=0CGkQ6wEwCQ#v=onepage&q=zia%20ul%20haq&f=false.
- ^ "Pakistan's abused Ahmadis". The Economist (London). January 13, 2010. http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=15266768. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ Ḥaqqānī, Husain (2005). Pakistan: between mosque and military. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 112. ISBN 0-87003-214-3.
- ^ Khalid Hasan (March 16, 2008). "POSTCARD USA: The Pakistani flying carpet". Daily Times (Lahore). http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C03%5C16%5Cstory_16-3-2008_pg3_3. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "Gone but not forgotten". The News. http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/spedition/sp_news15/p58_2.htm. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq". Nndb.com. http://www.nndb.com/people/443/000111110/. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ Over 80 killed in Lahore attacks F.P. Lahore Office[dead link]
- ^ Book: President of Pakistan, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq: January–December 1985
- ^ "Funeral of Zia ul Haq". Storyofpakistan.com. June 1, 2003. http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A112&Pg=3. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "Zia's daughter is here". The Tribune (Chandigarh). http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040628/edit.htm#7. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "Shatrughan reminisces ties with Zia". The Tribune (Chandigarh). March 21, 2006. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050804/world.htm#5. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "Umeed-e-Noor's efforts for special children lauded". Paktribune.com. http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=177902. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "In Mumbai, she sends out a prayer for peace". Cities.expressindia.com. http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=89332. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "US eliminated my father, charges Zia’s daughter". Fact.com.pk. http://www.fact.com.pk/archives/may/feng/zia.htm. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "Zia through a daughter’s eyes". Khalidhasan.net. March 28, 2004. http://www.khalidhasan.net/2004/03/28/zia-through-a-daughter%E2%80%99s-eyes/. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq". Ijazulhaq.com. http://ijazulhaq.com/zia/biogrophy1.html. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ a b A.H. Amin. "Interview with Brig (retd) Shamim Yasin Manto" Defence Journal, February 2002
- ^ The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia By Devin T. Hagerty Published by MIT Press, 1998, ISBN 0-262-58161-2, pp 114
- ^ In the summer of 1976, General Zia, who had superseded seven senior senior lieutenant-generals, told Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: "Sir, I am so grateful to you for appointing me Chief of Army Staff. Not only myself, but may future generations will be eternally grateful to you for singling me out for such a great honor, and this is a favour which I can never forget." The Herald, July 1992
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac Anthony Hyman, Muhammed Ghayur, Naresh Kaushik (1989). Pakistan, Zia and after§Zia The Ringmaster. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications. pp. 130. ISBN 81-7017-253-5. http://books.google.com/books?id=cjPgESaC-7sC&pg=PR5&dq=zia+ul+haq&hl=en&ei=8lvDTvaqJKORiALZg9ncCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=book-thumbnail&resnum=9&ved=0CF4Q6wEwCDgK#v=onepage&q=zia%20ul%20haq&f=false.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan:Between Mosque and Military; §From Islamic Republic to Islamic State. United States: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 2005). pp. 395 pages. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1. http://books.google.com/books?id=nYppZ_dEjdIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Pakistan:Between+Mosque+and+Military&hl=en&ei=wc78TunTDOSpiQKV7OjgBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=book-thumbnail&resnum=1&ved=0CDgQ6wEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=true.
- ^ Ardeshir Cowasjee, "The general's generals" Daily Dawn, June 29, 1995
- ^ A.H. Amin "Remembering Our Warriors: Maj Gen (Retd) Tajammal Hussain Malik" Defence Journal, September 2001
- ^ Militarism and the State Pakistan: Military Intervention by Eqbal Ahmed (Le Monde Diplomatique, October 1977)[dead link]
- ^ a b c US Country Studies. "Zulfikar Ali Bhutto" (PHP). http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/20.htm. Retrieved November 7, 2006.
- ^ a b c d e Anthony Hyman (1988). Pakistan: Zia and After..... London U.K.: Asia Publishing House (September 1988). pp. 30-50; 160. ISBN 978-0-948724-12-1. http://books.google.com/books?id=cjPgESaC-7sC&pg=PA30&dq=General+Zia+planning+was+excellent+to+remove+Bhutto&hl=en&sa=X&ei=poePT4GeEc3ZiQLCpaWDAw&ved=0CD0QuwUwAA#v=onepage&q=General%20Zia%20planning%20was%20excellent%20to%20remove%20Bhutto&f=true.
- ^ Mazari, Sherbaz(2000) A Journey into disillusionment
- ^ a b c d e f g h Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (1980). Strategic analysis: The Naval dictatorship. University of California: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses., 1980. http://books.google.com/books?id=zTcsAAAAIAAJ&q=admiral+karamat+rehman+niazi&dq=admiral+karamat+rehman+niazi&hl=en&ei=XUXsTtbvCbHMiQKn3Mn_Aw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=book-thumbnail&resnum=2&ved=0CD8Q6wEwAQ.
- ^ a b c d e Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Press. pp. 695 pages. ISBN 1-59420-007-6. http://books.google.com/books?id=ToYxFL5wmBIC&dq=%22ghost+wars+the+secret+history+of+the+cia+afghanistan+and+bin+laden+from+the+soviet+invasion+to+september+10+2001%22&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0.
- ^ a b Panhwar, Member of Sindh Provincial Assembly., Sani (April 5, 1979). "CIA Sent Bhutto to the Gallows". The New York Time (article published in 1979) and Sani H. Panhwar, member of Sindh Provincial Assembly and Party representative of Pakistan People's Party.. http://sixhour.com/cia_sent%20bhutto_to_the_gallows.htm. Retrieved August 23, 2011. ""I [Ramsey Clark] do not believe in conspiracy theories in general, but the similarities in the staging of riots in Chile (where the CIA allegedly helped overthrow President Salvadore Allande) and in Pakistan are just too close, Bhutto was removed from power in Pakistan by force on July 5, after the usual party on the 4th at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, with U.S. approval, if not more, by General Zia-ul-Haq. Bhutto was falsely accused and brutalized for months during proceedings that corrupted the Judiciary of Pakistan before being murdered, then hanged. As Americans, we must ask ourselves this: Is it possible that a rational military leader under the circumstances in Pakistan could have overthrown a constitutional government, without at least the tacit approval of the United States?"."
- ^ a b c d e PML. "Pakistan Muslim League". PML Public Press. Pakistan Muslim League. http://elections.com.pk/candidatedetails.php?id=6887. Retrieved 29 December 2011.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Khan, Roedad (1997). Pakistan - A Dream Gone Sour. Oxford University Press. p. 263. ISBN 978-0-19-577776-5. http://books.google.com/books?id=sHbw0pX9tLIC&q=Zulfikar+Ali+Bhutto&dq=A+dream+gone+sour&source=gbs_word_cloud_r&cad=6.
- ^ Khan, Roedad. "Pakistan- A Dream Gone Sour". Colonel Athar Hussain Ansari, PAF. Roedad Khan. http://www.defencejournal.com/dec98/pakdream.htm. Retrieved November 16, 2011. ""What is a constitution? It is a booklet with twelve or ten pages. I can tear them away and say that tomorrow we shall live under a different system. Today, the people will follow wherever I lead. All the politicians including the once mighty Mr. Bhutto and his [Scumbag] friends will follow me with tails wagging...." General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977"
- ^ "Zia describing Bhutto.". Saudi Press Agency. Saudi Press Agency. http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Muhammad_Zia-ul-Haq. Retrieved November 16, 2011. ""I hate anybody projecting as a leader ... if you want to serve the Islamic Ummah and Humanity, do it as a humble person. Amongst Muslims we are all Muslim brothers ... not leaders..."
- ^ Khan, Roedad. "Zia's attitude towards Bhutto and his friends". ""It is either his neck or mine! ... I have not convicted him or his friend [Mubashir Hassan], and if they hold him guilty, my God, I am not going to let him off!"
- ^ a b c d e f Lyon, Peter Lyon (2008). Conflict between India and Pakistan: an encyclopedia. California: Library of Congress, United States. pp. 276. ISBN 978-1-57607-713-9. http://books.google.com/books?id=vLwOck15eboC&pg=PA177&dq=zia+ul+haq&hl=en&ei=y1vDTv2NE4aSiALKppTYCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=book-thumbnail&resnum=1&ved=0CDoQ6wEwAA#v=onepage&q=zia%20ul%20haq&f=false.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Arif, PA, General (retired) Khalid Mahmood (1995). Working with Zia: Pakistan's power politics, 1977-1988. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1995. pp. 435 pages. ISBN 978-0-19-577570-9. http://books.google.com/books?id=26TjAAAAMAAJ&q=working+with+Zia&dq=working+with+Zia&hl=en&ei=LFrDToOWKsnjiALez8TTCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAA.
- ^ Nawaz Sharif Profile on WikiMir source of original citation
- ^ Shahid Javed Burki. "Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood (Westview Publishers, 1999)"
- ^ The History and Culture of Pakistan, Nigel Kelly ISBN 1-901458-67-9
- ^ a b c d e f g Yousaf, PA, Brigadier General (retired) Mohammad (1991). Silent soldier: the man behind the Afghan jehad General Akhtar Abdur Rahman. Karachi, Sindh: Jang Publishers, 1991. pp. 106 pages. http://books.google.com/books?id=cAoNAAAAIAAJ&q=Silent+soldier:+The+man+behind+the+Afghan+Jehad+by+Mohammad+Yousaf&dq=Silent+soldier:+The+man+behind+the+Afghan+Jehad+by+Mohammad+Yousaf&hl=en&ei=q3bDTuTyK473sQKDy_GZCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=book-thumbnail&resnum=1&ved=0CDQQ6wEwAA.
- ^ a b c Editorial. "Tricky diplomacy". Jul 31st 2003. The Economist. http://www.economist.com/node/1957930. Retrieved 4 January 2012.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z Rahman, Shahidur (1999). Long Road to Chagai§ The General and the Atomic Toy. Oxford, Islamabad, and New York: Printwise Publications. pp. 135–144. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
- ^ Mia, Zia. South Asian cultures of the bomb: atomic publics and the state in India and Pakistan. New York: Oxford Press University.
- ^ a b c d e f Wikileaks. "Reagan admin swallowed Gen Zia’s lies on nuclear weapons". Apr 27, 2012-- declassified information archive, 1981. First post. http://www.firstpost.com/world/regan-admin-swallowed-gen-zias-lies-on-nuclear-weapons-291618.html. Retrieved 28 April 2012.
- ^ a b c d e f Shamim, Anwar (2010). Cutting Edge PAF: A Former Air Chief's Reminiscences of a Developing Air Force§ Critical Years: Intelligence and Deception. Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: Vanguard Books. pp. 320–351. ISBN 978-969-402-540-7..
- ^ Schbir, Usmann. "Munir Ahmad Khan: Pakistan's nuclear supremo". Pakistan Military Consortium.
- ^ Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. by Gaurav Kampani,February 23, 2004
- ^ The Man Who Sold the Bomb, Time.com Sunday, Feb 6, 2005
- ^ a b Mehmud, PhD (Nuclear Engineering), Salim. "Pakistan and Earth Observational System (EOS(". Dr. Salim Mehmud, former administrator of Space Research Commission. Salim Mehmud (Nuclear engineer, PhD).
- ^ Lodi, Lieutenant General Safdar F.S. (May 1998). "Pakistan's Missile Technology". Head of Integrated Missile Research and Development Programme (IMRDP). Defence Journal of Pakistan.
- ^ The Bear Trap, Brig. Muhammad Yousuf
- ^ Pakistan's Kalashnikov Culture and the CIA-ISI-Saudi Axis, By Alex Constantine
- ^ Guns in Pakistan
- ^ The Afghanistan Drug Trade, Forbes.com by Richard McGill Murphy October 16, 1997
- ^ US lowers net worth of Osama bin Laden, By Katherine Pfleger Shrader, Associated Press writer, September 2, 2004
- ^ "Rape of the Law". Newslinemagazine.com. October 5, 2003. http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2003/10/rape-of-the-law/. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ a b c d e f g Hoodbhoy, PhD (Nuclear physics), Pervez Amerali. "The Islamic Failure". Dr. Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy. Dr. Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Professor of Particle and Nuclear physics at the Quaid-e-Azam University and senior scientist at the National Center for Nuclear Physics. http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=4244. Retrieved August 10, 2011.
- ^ Khan, Afnan (May 18, 2009). "The threat of Pakistan's revisionist texts". The Guardian (London). http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/may/18/pakistan-textbooks-religious-extremism.
- ^ "Shia Power and the West". Prospect.org. http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=shia_power_and_the_west. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "Shia-Sunni Tensions Surface on Campus". Ipsnews.net. http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39432. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "The Martyrdom of Benazir Bhutto". Huffington Post. January 3, 2008. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/parvez-sharma/the-martyrdom-of-benazir-_b_79560.html. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "Pakistan Penal Code, Religious and Ahmadi-specific Laws". Thepersecution.org. http://www.thepersecution.org/50years/paklaw.html. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, PART XII – Miscellaneous, Chapter 5. Interpretation, Article 260(3)". Thepersecution.org. May 23, 2001. http://www.thepersecution.org/50years/constatus.html. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ SOAS: The case of Zaheer-ud-din v. The State and its impact on the fundamental right to freedom of religion[dead link]
- ^ Banyan (June 10, 2010). "'We decide whether you're Muslim or not'". The Economist (blog) (London). http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/06/state_persecution_and_pakistans_ahmadi_sect?page=1. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ Shahidur Rahman (1999). Long road to Chagai§ Professor Abdus Salam and Zia. Islamabad, Oxford: Printwise Punblications. pp. 132–135.
- ^ Ali Dayan Hasan, senior South Asia researcher (May 31, 2010). "Human Rights Watch: Pakistan: Massacre of Minority Ahmadis". Hrw.org. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/05/31/pakistan-massacre-minority-ahmadis?tr=y&auid=6441196. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ "Profile: Islamabad's Red Mosque". BBC News. July 27, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6503477.stm.
- ^ Foreign affairs Pakistan by Pakistan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (MOFA, 1988)
- ^ "Plea in court to revive C-130 crash case" Business Recorder, April 22, 1996
- ^ "Editorial: Another clue into General Zia's death". Daily Times (Lahore). December 4, 2005. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2005%5C12%5C04%5Cstory_4-12-2005_pg3_1. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- ^ Bone, James; Hussain, Zahid (August 16, 2008). "As Pakistan comes full circle, a light is shone on leader's death". The Times (London): p. 40.
- ^ Hamilton, Dwight. "Terror Threat: International and Homegrown terrorists and their threat to Canada", 2007
- ^ The History and Culture of Pakistan by Nigel Kelly. ISBN 1-901458-67-9
- ^ Durrani, Mahmud Ali (September 14, 2009). "Pakistan started war with India in 1965". Daily Times (Lahore). http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C09%5C14%5Cstory_14-9-2009_pg7_25. Retrieved November 3, 2011.
- ^ Mohammed Hanif (May 2008). A Case of Exploding Mangoes. Knopf. ISBN 0-307-26807-1.
- ^ Greg Cox (July 2001). The Rise and Fall of Khan Noonien Singh, Volume One. Pocket Books. ISBN 0-671-02127-3.
|
|
|
Domestic
initiatives |
|
|
|
| Administration |
|
|
National
parties |
|
Allies
|
|
|
|
Opposition
|
|
|
|
Platform
successors
|
|
|
|
Foreign
front |
|
Involvement
in events
|
|
|
|
Opposition
|
|
|
|
Aligned entities
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Italics indicate military rulers
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1940s |
|
|
| 1950s |
|
|
| 1960s |
|
|
| 1970s |
|
|
| 1980s |
|
|
| 1990s |
|
|
| Foreign policy |
|
|
| Ideologies |
|
|
| Organizations |
|
|
| Propaganda |
|
|
| Races |
|
|
| See also |
|
|
|
|
|
