Indonesian rupiah
Rupiah Indonesia
Indonesian rupiah banknotes denominations (current circulating banknotes)
ISO 4217 code	IDR
Central bank	Bank Indonesia
Website	www.bi.go.id
Official user(s)	Indonesia
Unofficial user(s)	East Timorde facto 1
Inflation	3.65%
Source	Bank Indonesia, June 2009
Subunit
1/100	sen (obsolete)2
Symbol	Rp
Coins
Freq. used	Rp 100, Rp 200, Rp 500
Rarely used	Rp 50, Rp 1000
Banknotes
Freq. used	Rp 1000, Rp 2000, Rp 5000, Rp 10 000, Rp 20 000, Rp 50 000, Rp 100 000
Printer	Perum Peruri3
Website	www.peruri.co.id
Mint	Perum Peruri3
Website	www.peruri.co.id
1) Although East Timor officially declared US Dollar notes and Centavo coins as its currency, a significant number of merchants and markets throughout the country accept Indonesian Rupiah for payment along with Australian Dollars.[1] 2) The sub-unit, sen, is now of little relevance due to its very low value. Prices and amounts of money are written as RpX.XXX,00 (note that decimal separator in Indonesia is comma) or more popularly RpX.XXX,-. Most price tags denote prices as RpX.XXX only (note that as the 25 rupiah coin is the smallest coin in use, rounding will often take place in supermarkets where are items are not necessarily priced in multiples of 25 rupiah). However, sen still exists in financial reports and bank statements. 3) Perum Peruri is an acronym of Perusahaan Umum Percetakan Uang Republik Indonesia (English: Money Printing Public Company of the Republic of Indonesia)

The rupiah (Rp) is the official currency of Indonesia. Issued and controlled by the Bank of Indonesia, the ISO 4217 currency code for the Indonesian rupiah is IDR. Informally, Indonesians also use the word "perak" ('silver' in Indonesian) in referring to rupiah. The rupiah is subdivided into 100 sen, although inflation has rendered all coins and banknotes denominated in sen obsolete.

The Riau islands and the Indonesian half of New Guinea (Irian Barat) had their own variants of the rupiah, but these were subsumed into the national rupiah in 1964 and 1971 respectively (see Riau rupiah and West New Guinea rupiah).

Current legal tender[link]

The current rupiah consists of coins from 25 rupiah up to 1000 rupiah (1 rupiah are officially legal tender but are effectively worthless and are not circulated), and from banknotes of 1000 rupiah up to 100,000 rupiah. With US$1 generally worth about 9,000 rupiah (November 2011), the largest Indonesian banknote is therefore worth approximately US$11.10.

Coins[link]

There are presently two series of coins in circulation: aluminium, bronze and bi-metallic coins from 1991–1998 and light-weight aluminium coins from 1999 onwards. Due to the low value and general shortage of small denomination coins (below 100 rupiah), it is common to have amounts rounded up (or down) or to receive sweets in lieu of the last few rupiah of change in supermarkets and stores.^[2]

Indonesian rupiah coins [3]
Image		Value	Series	Diameter	Thickness	Weight	Material	Obverse	Reverse	Availability
Obverse	Reverse
		Rp 50	1999	20 mm	2 mm	1.36 g	Aluminium	Garuda Pancasila	Kepodang Bird and coin value	Medium
		Rp 100	1999	23 mm	2 mm	1.79 g			Palm Cockatoo Bird and coin value	High
		Rp 200	2003	25 mm	2.3 mm	2.38 g			Bali Starling Bird and coin value
		Rp 500	1991	24 mm	1.8 mm	5.29 g	Aluminium Bronze		Jasmine Flower and coin value	Low
			1997		1.83 mm	5.34 g				Medium
			2003	27 mm	2.5 mm	3.1 g	Aluminium			High
		Rp 1,000	1993	26 mm	2 mm	8.6 g	Bi-metal, nickel and aluminium bronze		Palm Tree and coin value	Low
			2010	24.15 mm	1.6 mm	4.5 g	Nickel plated steel	Garuda Pancasila and coin value	Angklung and Gedung Sate	High (mintage 719 million)[citation needed]

Banknotes[link]

Currently circulating Indonesian banknotes date from 2000 (1000 rupiah), 2001 (5000 rupiah), 2004 (20000 and 50000) rupiah, 2005 (10000 and 100000 rupiah), 2009 (the new 2000 rupiah), and 2010 (revised version of the 10000) rupiah. The 1998–1999 notes have no longer been legal tender since 31 January 2008 (but will be exchangeable until 31 January 2018 at Bank Indonesia). Earlier notes are also no longer legal tender, due to the lack of security features and association with the Suharto regime^{[citation needed]}, but could be exchanged in Bank Indonesia offices until August 20, 2010.^[4]

As the smallest current note is worth approximately US$0.10, even small transactions such as bus fares are typically conducted with notes, and the 1,000 rupiah note is far more common than the 1,000 rupiah coin. The government initially announced that this would change, with a 2000 rupiah note to replace the 1000 rupiah, with that denomination replaced by a coin.^[5] After a long delay, this proposal was revised so that the 2000 rupiah banknotes was launched by BI (Bank Indonesia) on 9 July 2009, with the banknotes circulating as legal tender from 10 July 2009,^[6] but without withdrawing the 1000 rupiah note.

Due to the low value of the (older series) notes below 1000 rupiah, although they are no longer being circulated, some remain in use in increasingly poor condition, as low denomination 'uang pasar' (literally market money), outside the banking system for use in informal transactions.

Security features[link]

Collection of 50,000 rupiah bills clearly displaying the security threads.

• The materials of the banknotes basically are long fibres from any kind of wood, or a mix of different types of wood. However, the preferable material is the Abaca fibre, which is naturally plentiful in Indonesia and is believed to increase the durability of the banknotes. The banknotes are made with the process of heating, to create a unique type of pulp.
• The minimum security features for naked eyes are watermarks, electrotypes and security threads with color fibres. In addition to this, extra features may be included, such as holograms, Irisafe, iridescent stripes, clear windows, metameric windows and gold patches.
  • Watermark and Electrotype are made by controlling the gap of density of the fibres which create certain images for the banknotes. This is done to raise the quality of the notes from the aesthetic view.
  • Security threads are put in the middle of the note's materials so horizontal and vertical lines are shown from top to bottom. The threads also can be made with many variations such as the materials, size, color and design.
  • Intaglio Printing are put in the denomination numbers in the banknote,to make the blind people recognize the real money.

• The 2010 10,000 rupiah introduced several new security features: use of EURion constellation rings, rainbow printing designed to change colour when viewed from different angles.

History[link]

This unreferenced section requires citations to ensure verifiability.

800–1942 – Javanese, Chinese, Dutch colonial money[link]

The first coin-like products found in Indonesia date from the ninth Century Buddhist Sailendra dynasty and were produced in Indonesia until the twelfth century: gold and silver massa (emas is the modern Indonesian word for 'gold') and kupang. Also used in this period were 'Mutisalah', strings of beads of Indo-Pacific origins, produced by the Sumatran Srivajaya empire, which spread to Borneo, Java and to the eastern Indonesian islands in the 13th century.^[8] In the eastern islands those beads are saved as heirlooms until the present, using Chinese-made beads after the defeat of Srivajaya. The Majapahit empire, which became predominant in Java and Sumatra from the late 13th Century, received, with the arrival of Chinese traders, holed copper coins known as cash. These were later mimicked in Indonesia using tin or lead.

When Europeans began arriving in Indonesia they brought with them gold coins from Portugal and Venice and silver Spanish dollars from Mexico, Peru and Bolivia, the latter becoming the predominant trade coin in the archipelago for several hundred years. The Dutch East India Company was granted a trade monopoly over the Indies in 1600 and under the leadership of Jan Pieterszoon Coen gained effective government over the territory around Batavia on Java, their capital, with an area of influence that increased over time, and which was eventually expanded by Dutch conquest into the 20th century to include nearly all of what is now Indonesia.

The Dutch East India Company in the 17th century imported chiefly silver coin, in the form of Dutch small silver 1, 2, and 6 stuiver coins, as well as the Spanish dollar (the most popular trade coin) and Dutch trade coinage. They helped provide smaller change by selling tin to the cash mints, but generally did not produce or import it themselves.

Due to a lack of tin supply, in 1724 the Company began to produce its own copper coins, 'VOC'-branded duit coins, which were minted in six provinces of The Netherlands and imported in vast numbers over the 18th and into the 19th century. There were intermittent efforts at VOC-branded silver coinage, but mostly imported Dutch and Spanish silver, which had a higher value in the Indies, was used. Although most coin was imported, (chiefly) silver and also some gold 'rupee' coins were minted locally in the 18th and early 19th century.

The first bank paper appeared with the formation of the De Bank Courant en Bank van Leening in 1752, and a number of issues were made over the next sixty years, which all tended to lose value over time due to lack of coin to back the paper.

The VOC went bankrupt in 1800 and the territories were nationalised by the then government, the Batavian Republic, which issued its own duits and made an issue of silver gulden coins in 1802. Duits were minted in large numbers in Surabaya between 1814 and 1840 from silver imported from the Netherlands. In 1854, the Netherlands Indies Guilder/Gulden was decimalised, the duit replaced by the cent and a series of coins from ½ cent up to ¼ gulden was issued, all minted in The Netherlands. Larger denominations – ½, 1 and 2½ gulden in silver, and 5 and 10 gulden in gold – were of regular Dutch issue and circulated alongside the lower denominated Indies coinage. This same series of coinage continued to be issued until independence in 1945.

The government put a stop to the inflationary bank paper with an issue of government paper in 1815, withdrawn on June 30, 1861. De Javasche Bank, the central bank of the Netherlands Indies, eventually to become Bank Indonesia, was established in 1828, subject to much stricter regulation than previous banks, and remained solvent.

1942–1949 Japanese invasion, and Indonesian independence – the dawn of hyperinflation in Indonesia[link]

The Japanese invasion[link]

One Gulden note, Japanese occupation currency, Dutch East Indies

In 1942, the Japanese invaded the Netherlands Indies, taking control of the whole country and Netherlands New Guinea by March 1942. On their invasion ships, they brought their own issue of the local money, the gulden. They liquidated the banks, including 'De Javasche Bank' and voided debt obligations.^[9] The notes issued by 'De Japansche Regeering' (the Japanese government) would be legal tender from March 1942 (although the existing notes remained valid), with notes printed from 1 cent to 10 gulden, by the new (as of April 1942) circulating bank Nanpo Kaihatsu Ginko.

The Japanese money was supposed to have the same value as the old Dutch money, with the old money to be recalled from use, but the invaders soon printed excessive quantities of money, and it was quickly apparent that hyperinflation was in progress, and hence people hoarded the Dutch money. By the end of the War, the Japanese had caused a massive increase in the paper money supply, which was 230 million gulden pre-war, to several billion post-war. This, plus the actions of the post-war Dutch administration, caused massive inflation and damage to the stability and economy of the country.

As their occupation continued, by 1944 the Japanese had determined that their long-term strategic interests were best furthered by encouraging Indonesian nationalism, and so it issued a second series of notes printed in Indonesian language, the Netherlands Indies roepiah.

Existing stocks of notes remained in use by the new Indonesian government until they had printed their own money in 1946, while the notes actually continued to be printed until early 1946 in parts of Eastern Indonesia (where the Nationalists did not have control), as a temporary measure until the Dutch had re-established their pre-war administration across the scattered islands.

Dutch/Allied re-occupation[link]

The Dutch government, which was in exile in London, had been making preparations for the end of the war, whereupon it hoped to regain control over its colony. In order to do so, in recognition of the fundamentally altered financial conditions under which they would be issued, it was anticipated that a governmental issue would be needed, in view of the weakened position of the private De Javasche Bank, which had previously been issuing banknotes.

The notes were ordered in December 1942, printed in the USA by the Security Bank Note Printing Company. The notes were dated 'March 1943' and labelled as 'Nederlandsch-Indische Gouvernementsgulden' printed in Dutch, along with the additional Indonesian text indicating the denomination of the notes and the word 'roepiah'. Denominations were 50 sen to 500 gulden.

At the end of the war, the Allies 'Netherlands Indies Civil Administration' (army), began to retake control of the old East Indies. It began issuing the 1943-dated money (the 'NICA gulden'), starting from 1944 in New Guinea, and subsequently in Maluku and Borneo, both of which were recaptured before the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945. In areas under NICA control, pre-war Dutch notes were demonetized. Despite the fact that NICA had control over the outer parts of Indonesia, its authority to dictate the value of money was limited by the economic weakness of the administration and of The Netherlands itself. As a compromise NICA re-monetized the pre-war notes of 10 gulden and below, higher-valued notes were not re-issued to reduce the inflationary effect of having the pre-war currency as well as new NICA money in circulation.

After the Japanese surrender the administration was given official control of the institutions of the country by the Allies, and DJB, which had survived the war better than expected, was reincorporated on 10 October 1945.

Although the military action of the Allies in Eastern Indonesia and Kalimantan (Borneo) had introduced the NICA gulden into circulation in those areas, the transition back to Dutch control did not go smoothly in the main islands of Java and Sumatra and Allied military action gained control only over a few coastal enclaves, where Japanese money was used, large quantities of which were in storage by the Japanese.

The 'uang merah' ('red money' (the 10 rupiah note was red, and there may also be a reference to blood, as the money was unpopular with the Indonesian revolutionaries)) faced nationalist opposition to the principle of money issued by the Dutch, exarcebated by the fact that in spite of stated intentions to adopt a less colonial stance post-war, the notes had been printed in Dutch with a large picture of the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina.

When the first NICA money appeared in Java, Sukarno issued an immediate decree, of October 2, 1945, to declare that the NICA notes were illegal.

Lacking the control needed to issue money effectively, the Dutch determined that it would be inadvisable to issue NICA money in the towns of Java and Sumatra and prohibited their import.

With Japanese still acting as local government in Java and Sumatra, it was necessary for NICA to preserve the value of the Japanese money as much as possible, since it was the only means for them to pay the bills incurred in maintaining order. In many cases, the Japanese were instructed to simply print more money, and the amount of Japanese currency in circulation continued to increase rapidly: the Japanese-originated inflation continued with increased pace. By February 1946, 2 billion Japanese money out of 2.5 billion captured in the state printers, had been spent, a vast sum against the entire pre-war circulation of less than 500 million gulden.

Due to the dwindling supplies of money, destruction of the printing plates at the main printers for re-issue, and disquiet amongst European forces at payment in Japanese money, which was losing value constantly, it was finally decided to issue the NICA gulden in Java on 6 March 1946. Pre-war notes of 5 gulden and below only were to retain validity, and the Japanese money was to be exchanged at a rate of 33 to 1.

This action enraged the Indonesians, who imposed a 5-year prison sentence on its use. One army regiment even went as far as to execute people carrying the money, hoisting their bodies in public with the money pinned onto them.

Due to the difficulties associated with using the money, the supply of food and basic goods from the Republican interior was poor, and the NICA money by June 1946 had fallen to a black market value of just 10 of the Japanese money (which was still the preferred money throughout Java), despite Dutch attempts to enforce the rate.

The first Indonesian rupiah – in Java[link]

Although the Republican government was firmly opposed to the use of the Dutch NICA money, seeing its exclusion as an important tool in the fight with the Dutch, the issue of its own money was slightly more considered.

After their October 2 proclamation on NICA money, it declared the next day that Japanese money as well as pre-NICA Dutch money would be legal tender in the Republic, with both holding the same value, despite the greatly inflated quantity of Japanese money circulating, reflecting in part the fact that the Dutch money was no longer backed by gold reserves, the gold having been evacuated in the early part of the war.

The Indonesians had been advised by the British that an issue of Indonesian money would be financial and political suicide, but their resolve was firm. Their first notes, dated 1945, were in preparation when the Indonesian printing works and all the money in it was seized by the Allies (which at this point included in the British, tasked with restoring order) in their successful assault on Jakarta in January 1946.

The printing plates survived the attack and with the Dutch decision to finally introduce the NICA gulden to Java in March 1946 seen as an offensive act the Indonesians pressed ahead with the reprinting, an act spurred, as with the Dutch, by the dwindling supplies of Japanese money from the vaults of the banks in the cities they controlled (approximately 600 million Japanese roepiah).

With Indonesian resources increasingly poorly matched against the Dutch, and only the small G. Kolff & Co Malang printers at their disposal to print the money, printing of the money took several months, to July 1946.

The Republican government declared that the new central bank of Indonesia would be Bank Negara Indonesia, established on 5 July 1946, occupying the offices of De Javasche Bank in Yogyakarta, the stronghold of the republic.

The Indonesian rupiah was first issued by proclamation of October 3, 1946. In the year or so prior, the Japanese money had been a vital conduit of Republican goods to the Dutch enclaves, but the decree brought this to an end: all Japanese money was to be deposited with Republic banks by October 30, 1946. Providing the depositors could account for how the money was obtained, they would be entitled to new new 'Oeang Republik Indonesia' (ORI) at the rate of 50 Japanese rupiah to 1 rp ORI. Outstanding debts were revalued according to their date of origin, with debts arising prior to 1943 (before the Japanese-induced inflation) converted at par, debts from 1943–1945 at 20 to 1, and those arising that year at the same 50 to 1 ratio.

This deflationary policy had been derived from the Dutch geldzuivering of Dutch Minister of Finance Pieter Lieftinck (later Executive Director of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)), who had trained Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (who had returned to Indonesia along with many other educated Indonesians after the War) in economics at university in The Netherlands. As in The Netherlands, each citizen was to be issued with 1 rp to kick-start the circulation of new money. Undeposited money after October was declared worthless.

One rupiah of the new money was said to be worth 0.5 grams of gold, a similar rate to the pre-war Dutch currency (which contained 3 grams of fine gold in the 5 gulden and 6 in the 10 gulden coin), although this was not backed by metal reserves, merely a proclamation of purchasing power.

Due to a fear that the deposited money would not be returned, there was panic buying of goods in the days following the decree, and prices of food (in Japanese money) soared by up to 30 times, with the black market exchange rate to the NICA gulden rising to 120 to 1.

With the end of Japanese money in the main Republican stronghold in Java as a conduit between the Republican interior and Dutch enclaves, the Dutch were forced to act, ending the exchange of Japanese money on October 30, 1946, to avoid a flood of unexchanged Japanese money being brought for exchange with NICA gulden. Thus in Java at this point two currencies circulated, the 1943-dated Dutch NICA gulden, in Dutch-controlled areas, and the 1945-dated ORI in the Indonesian enclaves.

The Indonesian resistance was highly fragmented, strongest in rural villages, and lacking the ability to supply money across its extent, the Japanese money continued to be used in Banten, West Java, as well as all of republican Sumatra.

There was never an official exchange rate between NICA gulden and Indonesian rupiah, but with popular support for the rupiah strong, 1 ORI rupiah was initially valued at 5 NICA gulden. The currency, however, depreciated fast, falling to 2 gulden within 1 week, as the market gauged fair value, and by the end of 1946 to par. By March 1947, it was worth half a gulden, and by July 0.3 gulden. This inflation was caused by the Republican government, which was printing money to meet its obligations in the face of limited income of its own. By January 1947, 310 million rupiah had been printed in republican Java alone, half the entire pre-war gulden money supply.

Due to the limited printing capacity of the government, it focused printing on 100 rupiah notes. Limited supply of smaller notes meant that the 100 rupiah notes were worth less than a combination of smaller notes. Rampant forgery only served to exacerbate the inflation of the Indonesian money.

Despite laws put in place to stop hoarding of goods, confidence in the currency could not be maintained. In Jakarta, the Indonesian money was worth even less than elsewhere, as a consequence of the demand for NICA-denominated imported goods. Republican attempts to maintain the value of Indonesian money (which was largely backed by the supply of rice from inner Java) could only slow, rather than stop, its decline.

Over the years of the Indonesian revolution, three further issues of banknotes followed, all printed in Yogyakarta, two in 1947 alone, with a fourth, much more limited in number, being issued in 1948.

Dutch money of 1947–1949[link]

New money was issued by the Dutch from July 1947, in the form of fully Dutch/Indonesian bilingual gulden/roepiah notes from 'De Javasche Bank'. These notes were dated 1946, and consisted of 5 (violet), 10 (violet), 25 (red) gulden notes.

The supply of these soon exhausted, and the administration remonetized all of the pre-War DJB and government money as well, circulating unissued paper still stored in the vaults. This caused a 50% increase in the amount of money in circulation from 1947 to 1949. The administration also issued bronze and silver coins in the original pre-war denominations, minted from 1943 to 1945 in the USA, but due to inflation, the coins were worth more as scrap, and many were melted into household goods and silver artefacts. As a result, it issued treasury notes instead, from December 1, 1947, in 10 and 25 sen denominations. These notes were successful as they were in Indonesian (with Dutch and Indonesian on the reverse) and stated to have been issued by 'Indonesia' (being NICA), and continued to be utilised by the Indonesian government even after independence, until 1951, when Indonesia acquired its first coins.

Local banknotes of Republic of Indonesia, 1947–1949[link]

As the Republican government never had effective control of Indonesia beyond Java, from 1947 it legislated on 26 August 1947 that regional outposts in Sumatra and Java could issue their own money to replace the Japanese money, with exchange for true ORI envisaged when peacetime eventually enabled it, in part to inhibit the circulation of NICA gulden. At least thirty different towns and districts in Sumatra issued their own money, with around a dozen towns in Java doing so, starting with Banten in December 1947.

The notes were marked with the place of issue and were in different designs from the national money.

1949–1958: Recognition of independence, and the new 'Indonesian rupiah'[link]

1950–1952 Indonesian independence recognised[link]

In November 1949, the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference held in The Hague, brokered peace and recognition independence for the Indonesian state, as the Republik Indonesia Serikat (United States of Indonesia), a federation of states consisting of the Republic of Indonesia (republican Java and Sumatra), along with fifteen other states.

The accord provided that The Netherlands was to retain economic influence over the republic until Indonesia had paid the debt run up by NICA in fighting the war with Indonesia. It was agreed that private Dutch-owned De Javasche Bank was to be restored as the central bank of Indonesia, despite resentment among Indonesian nationalists, the Indonesian-established BNI becoming a development bank.^[10]

A brief issue of notes was issued by the "Republic Indonesia Serikat", from June 1950, consisting of 5 and 10 rupiah notes, but with the merger of the separate states into the Republic of Indonesia in March and April 1950, with the formal declaration of the unitary Republic of Indonesia confirmed on 17 August 1950, this money was short-lived.

The Sjafruddin cut[link]

The new "Republik Indonesia Serikat" decided to address the amount of money circulating (due to the treaty the government was required to accept the NICA gulden as legal tender as well), which had reached 3.9 billion rupiah. A bewildering variety of money was in circulation, including local and national rupiah, Japanese, pre-war, and NICA Dutch monies.

Due to the large amount of currency, the minister of finance, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, sought to reduce the money supply by one half.^[11] This reform was decreed from 19 March 1950. People were to cut all of their notes of 5 gulden and up in half, with the left half to be replaced with new banknotes, and the right half for a government bond with a 3% coupon. In addition, half of all bank deposits over 400 rupiah were also to be forcibly used to buy the government bonds.

As part of the exchange, local and Republik Indonesia money was also demonetized, with all old Republik Indonesia notes no longer valid after 1 May 1950. 125 Rp of the first "Republik Indonesia" rupiah (issued in Java) was exchanged for 1 Rp of new DJB notes. Higher exchange rates were in place for local currencies, some of which had been heavily devalued by the over-printing of money by the army. The recently devalued Rupiah Baru of Aceh were exchangeable at 1.75 to 1.

1951: Nationalisation of De Javasche Bank – transformation to Bank Indonesia[link]

Due to the desire to remove the influence of the DJB, which was dominated by Dutch and felt to be an unwanted foreign influence on the country, and to inflamed tensions caused by the refusal of the Dutch to transfer the territory of Dutch New Guinea to the Republic, the government moved to nationalize the Dutch bank. This action, announced on 30 April 1951, involved the repeal of the old Java Bank Law of 1922, preventing non-Dutch citizens from owning shares in the bank, and negotiations with the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The purchase was agreed at 120% of the value of the bank (which was valued at 9 million Dutch gulden), with Dutch opinion holding that the bank was properly an Indonesian asset, and hence nationalisation was a valid action. The nationalisation was completed on 15 December 1951, with DJB becoming a government institution of Indonesia.

In addition to this act of nationalisation, on 3 October 1951, the republic passed an Emergency Act on valid currency, in order to repeal the Indische Muntwet Act of 1912, which still governed valid currency in Indonesia. The consequence of the new Act was that old Dutch coins would be void for payment,^[12] and Indonesian rupiah coins would be issued with values of 1, 5, 10, 25, and 50 sen under the remit of the Indonesian government. Low-denomination Dutch banknotes were to be withdrawn in due course. This Act saw the first Republik Indonesia money being issued, of 1 and 2½ rupiah denominations, continuing the split between denominations of under 5 gulden and 5 and above between state and central bank intitiated by the Dutch.

1953–1958: Bank Indonesia born[link]

In order that it could discontinue the issue of the resented 'De Javasche Bank' money, the government completed the Indonesianisation of DJB, with the bank becoming Bank Indonesia on 1 July 1953 via the Principal Act on Bank Indonesia 1953. The bank had responsibility for the issue of banknotes of 5 rupiah and above (as had DJB), and the first Bank Indonesia money appeared from 1953.

1959–1965: currency devaluation and spiralling inflation[link]

The economy was ravaged by inflation, prices had tripled from 1953 to 1959, and Soekarno wanted to devalue the currency. Disagreement over this policy led to the end of Loekman Hakim as Governor of Bank Indonesia on 31 July 1959: He was replaced by Soetikno Slamet.

With the unwilling ex-governor replaced, the official exchange rate was devalued on August 1, 1959 by 75% from 11.4 to 45 to the US$ (the unofficial rate was around half of that, and it had been 3.8 to the dollar in 1949). In addition, the 500 Rp and 1000 Rp notes were devalued 90% on 24 August 1959 to 50 and 100 Rp. The actual notes affected were the '1946' 500 gulden, and the '1952' culture and the 'animal' notes of 500 and 1000rp notes.

Thus, as of September 1959, the largest note in circulation Indonesia was of 100 rupiah.

1965-1991: the 1000 to 1 revaluation of the rupiah[link]

Rampant inflation, which was 27% in 1961, but jumped to 174% in 1962, by 1965 was 600%, had seen the largest denomination banknote increase 100-fold, from 100 rupiah in September 1959, to 1000 rupiah in May 1960, to 5,000 in October 1963 and finally 10,000 rupiah in August 1964. As a result, during the Indonesian political turmoil of 1965, the 'new rupiah' was introduced on 13 December 1965, at a rate of 1000 of the old unit.^[13] The price index at the end of 1965 had been calculated at 363 times higher than in 1958, and prices had risen approximately seven times over the previous 12 months.^[14] In real terms (i.e. with inflation taken into account), a labourer in Jakarta was estimated to have earned 40 per cent of his earnings in 1958.^[15] Although the devaluation in notes was 1,000 to 1, prices were reckoned to fall by only 10 times.^[16]

This devaluation had the side-effect of unifying the Indonesian Rupiah with the Riau rupiah (the Irian Barat rupiah lasted until 1971).^[17] Denominations of the new rupiah ranged from 1 sen (worthless even at issue) up to 100 rupiah, with 500 and 1000 rupiah added soon after.

By 1968 the Suharto New Order had been established, and Bank Indonesia, as of 1968 was given sole right to issue banknotes (including notes below 5 rupiah) as well as coins (which had previously been the issue of the central government), which it did in a range from 1 to 1000 rupiah.^[17] In 1970, Indonesia added 5000 and 10000 rupiah banknotes to the range in 1970, while, with inflation finally under control, coinage was re-introduced, starting at 1 rupiah, and ranging up to 100 rupiah. September 1975 saw sub-100 rupiah notes permanently withdrawn from circulation.

1992-1999: before and after the financial crisis[link]

By 1992, the rupiah was worth less than one fifth of what it had been worth when the 10,000 rupiah note had been introduced in 1970, and so a 20,000 rupiah note was produced, then the largest note ever seen in Indonesia.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 reduced the rupiah's value by over 80% in a few months and was a major factor in the overthrow of President Suharto's government. The rupiah had traded at about 2000–3000 rupiah per 1 USD, but reached a low of 16,800 rupiah per dollar in June 1998. The currency, which had been relatively stable in prior years, had its value destroyed. The government did not take any action to demonetise or revalue the banknotes, "Direksi 1998" merely redesigned the 10,000 and 20,000 rupiah notes.

"Direksi 1999" saw a new Soepratman design for the 50,000 rupiah, replacing the commemorative note of Suharto, who had resigned after more than 30 years as Indonesia's president in the wake of the crisis.

The banknote lineup was extended with a new denomination of 100,000 rupiah in 1999, by then worth about US$12.

500 million notes of the 100,000 rupiah polymer note were printed, to all be issued within a month of November 1999.^[18] This was part of Indonesia's millennium bug preparations, lest there should be a great demand for cash after the new year. Polymer was chosen because, according to Bank Indonesia, plastic would be harder to counterfeit and would last longer. However, the notes were not popular in banks as counting machines were unable to count them accurately and there have been issues with the money sticking to one another due to the heat of the machine, and Indonesia has reverted to the use of paper notes.

2000–2005: redesigns to all of Indonesia's denominations of banknotes[link]

"Direksi 2000" brought a new 1,000 rupiah note, with the 100 and 500 rupiah notes having been discontinued due to the dramatic devaluation of Indonesia's currency.

"Direksi 2001" redesigned the 5,000 rupiah, while "Direksi 2004" brought an end to the polymer 100,000 rupiah notes, replacing with a paper design, as well the issue of a new more secure 20,000 rupiah note.

The most recent changes to Indonesian money were "Direksi 2005", which re-designed the 10,000 and 50,000 rupiah note.

Plan to redenominate rupiah[link]

In August 2010 Bank Indonesia proposed to redenominate the rupiah by truncating the last three zero digits (dividing by 1000). The redenomination is meant to simplify daily transactions, which often run into millions of rupiah. The plan under consideration would be completed by 2015 at the soonest, but more likely by 2020. It would reduce the exchange rate with the US dollar from about 9,000 rupiah to 9.^[19] The plan has raised public concern that the monetary policy may devalue the currency. Bank Indonesia Governor Darmin Nasution immediately announced that the planned redenomination of the national currency would not inflict any financial losses as the measure would only strike a few zeros from the current denominations.^[20]

Exchange Rate and inflation[link]

The rupiah has been subject to high inflation for most of its existence (which as an internationally recognised currency should be dated to 1950). Various attempts have been made to maintain the value of the currency, all were abandoned.

1946–1949 revolutionary period[link]

In the period from October 1946 to March 1950 Indonesian currency had no international recognition. Its value was determined on the black market.

1949–1965 foreign exchange restrictions[link]

The exchange rate determined upon independence in 1949 was 3.8 rupiah to one US$. Lembaga Alat-Alat Pembajaran Luar Negeri Publication #26 of March 11, 1950 (effective March 13) established the Foreign Exchange Certificate System.^[12] By the trade in certificates an export rate of 7.6rp and an import rate of 11.4rp was established.

The FECS was scrapped on 4 January 1952, by which time the government had been able to reduce its deficit by 5.3 billion rupiah through the exchange differential. The system was scrapped because domestic prices were being determined by the import rate, which were hurting profits from exports earned at the lower rate. Hence the effective 7.6/11.4rp exchange rate reverted to 3.8rp.

The ending of what amounted to an export tariff severely damaged government revenues, and as of 4 February 1952, the rupiah was officially devalued to 11.4rp, with export tariffs of 15–25% on commodities that Indonesia was strong in. Weaker commodities were not subject to tariffs, and from 1955 were actually given a premium of 5–25% to boost their export.

In order to control foreign exchange, the government brought in a number of measures. 40% of the foreign exchange requirements of importers were required to be paid to the government from April 1952, while as from September 1952 the government decided to provide only a limited amount of foreign exchange, made available every four months. These foreign exchange restrictions, designed to provide the government with much needed reserves meant that some companies were operating at as low as 20% of capacity, due to lack of needed imported materials.

Further foreign exchange restrictions were introduced over 1953–1954, with April 1953, the foreign exchange downpayment was increased to 75%, except for raw materials at 50%. Foreign companies and their workers were placed under restrictions as to the amount of foreign exchange that could be sent home, with the amounts allowed out subject to fees of 66⅔%. As of November 1954, exporters were required to sell 15% of their foreign exchange earned to the government.

An increasingly complex set of tariffs on imports were unified in September 1955 with a set of Extra Import Duties, requiring downpayments to the government of 50%, 100%, 200%, or 400% of the value of the goods.

The official 11.4 rp rate, which massively overvalued the rupiah, was a major incentive to black market traders, and also contributed to anti-Java feeling, given that those producing raw materials on the large material-rich outer islands were not receiving fair value from their goods due to the exchange rate, diverting funds to the government Java. The black-market rate at the end of 1956 was 31rp, falling to 49rp at the end of 1957, and 90rp by the end of 1958.

In response to Sumatra and Sulawesi refusing to hand over their foreign exchange, in June 1957 a new system for foreign exchange was introduced: exporters received export certificates (BE) representing the foreign currency earned and could sell them to importers on the free market (but subject to a 20% tax). This effectively created a freely floating rupiah. The price of the certificates quickly reached 332% of face by April 1958, i.e., 38rp, a rate at which the government chose to end the free market, fixing the price at 332% of face value.

The currency devaluation of large notes in 1959 saw the official exchange rate devalued to 45rp as of August 1959. Despite this, the fundamental issues with the fixed exchange rate system and severe import controls (which saw cotton mills running at only 11% of capacity due to lack of imported raw materials) were not addressed, and smuggling grew, often backed by the army, while assets were moved offshore by overinvoicing.

The government maintained price controls over goods and raw materials, with the official oil price unchanged 1950–1965.

After the 1959 devaluation, inflation, which had been running at a relatively high 25% per annum 1953–1959 really took off, with rates over 100% in 1962, 1963, and 1964, and 600% in 1965. Despite the official 45rp to 1 US$ rate, two further export certificate trading systems, of March 1962 – May 1963, and then from April 1964 onwards, showed premiums of 2,678% July 1962 (1205rp effective rate), 5,100% August 1965 (2295rp) and 11,100% in November 1965 (4995rp).^[21]

1966–1971 stabilization and growth[link]

The last demonetization of rupiah notes occurred in late 1965, at which time inflation was ravaging the economy: exports had dropped 24% 1959–1965, GDP growth was below population growth, and the foreign exchange reserves had fallen by over 90%. Inflation in 1965 was 635%. In late 1965, the 'new rupiah' was brought in, at 1000 to 1 to the old currency. The official exchange rate was set initially at 0.25rp to 1 US$ as of 13 December 1965, a rate that did not represent reality, as the multiple exchange rate system remained in place for the time being.

This was followed by the emergence of Suharto, who as of 11 March 1966 acquired executive control of Indonesia.

Suharto quickly made economic changes, establishing his 'New Order', with economic policy set by the Berkeley Mafia, his team of US-educated neoclassical economists. The policy began to be set out in November 1966, following the reaching of agreement with Indonesia's creditors in October 1966 on debt relief and loan restructuring. Economic policies were put in place to require adequate bank reserves, ending subsidies on consumer goods, end import restrictions, and to devalue the rupiah.

The 1966–1970 stabilization program was a great success, resulting in higher economic growth, boosting legal exports (which grew 70% in US$ terms over the period), and increasing output (for instance the price of oil rose 250 times when the 1950 prices were abandoned, incentivising new exploration). By 1971 inflation had fallen to just 2%.

Despite the liberalisation efforts, Indonesia still had multiple exchange rates. A more realistic exchange rate was finally established of 378 (new) rupiah to 1 US$ as of April 1970. In August 1971 the exchange rate was devalued slightly, to 415rp to the US$.

Fixed rate period 1971–1978[link]

The 415 rupiah exchange rate to the US dollar, which had been established in August 1971 was fixed by government intervention in the currency market, buying and selling currency as needed.^[22]

Despite the fixed rate, the failure of the rice crop in 1972, exarcebated by high world rice prices, and underordering by the government rice cartel, along with rising commodity prices caused inflation to rise above 20% in 1972, peaking at over 40% in 1974. The M1 money supply increased sharply over the period due to lax credit controls, which was channeled towards favoured groups, such as pribumi (non-Chinese Indonesians), as well as corrupt government-linked businesses.^[23]

Despite the high inflation of the period, the exchange rate, which had essentially been preserved using the country's oil exports, was maintained at 415 rupiah until 15 November 1978.

Managed float period 1978–1997[link]

1978–1986 devaluations[link]

By 1978, the combination of a fall in oil prices and a decrease in foreign reserves meant that the rupiah was devalued 33% to 625rp to 1 US$ on 16 November 1978 (although prices had increased nearly fourfold over the period).

The government abandoned the fixed exchange rate, and altered economic policy to a form of a managed float. The exchange rate was published each day. At the point of devaluation (November 1978), the trade-weighted real (local price adjusted) effective exchange rate (REER) of the rupiah ^[23] against major world currencies was just over twice as high as it was in 1995 (prior to the Asian economic crisis, and free fall of the rupiah), i.e. the rupiah was highly overvalued at this point. By March 1983, the managed float had brought only an 11% fall in three and a half years to 702rp.

The continued overvaluation of the rupiah meant that Indonesia was beginning to suffering a trade deficit, as well as falling foreign exchange reserves. The government responded by devaluing the currency on 30 March by 28% to 970rp.

At this time the 1980s oil glut put the Indonesian economy was under pressure, with exports uncompetitive as a result of the overvalued currency, and oil contributing less as a result of lower global prices. On 1 June 1983, 'Pakjun 1983' brought deregulation of the banking system, and the end of the meaningless 6% official deposit rate, with a more market-based financial system. Credit ceilings were removed. Interest rates, initially 18%, remained above 15% over the period.

By September 1986 the currency had been allowed to steadily fall to 1134 rupiah, a rate which had largely maintained purchasing power over the period. Despite this, the currency was devalued 30% on 12 September 1986 to 1664 rupiah to 1 US$. As in 1983, this had been intended to boost the balance of trade: oil prices, $29 in 1983, fell by 50% in 1986 alone, to below $9 per barrel.

Thus in the period from 1978 to 1986, the real exchange rate of the Indonesian rupiah fell by more than 50%, providing significant boosts to the competitivity of Indonesia's exports.

October 1986 – June 1997: US$ real exchange parity[link]

Although the devaluations of 1978, 1983 and 1986 had each successfully boosted the competitiveness of exports, devaluations have a destabilizing effect, and the September 1986 devaluation was the last carried out by Indonesia.

According to research,^[24] despite an official 7-currency exchange basket, empirical evidence suggests that the rupiah was controlled by Bank Indonesia against the US$ alone, and indeed since the 1986 devaluation, the currency maintained near-constant purchasing power against the dollar up until the 1997 crisis, the steady fall of the rupiah against the dollar essentially representing the delta of Indonesian inflation above US inflation; hence, by June 1997 the rupiah had fallen from its post-devaluation rate of 1664rp to 2350rp, an annualized decline of slightly over 3%.

Asian Financial Crisis (and response) 1997–1999[link]

First stage of the crisis – limited initial falls[link]

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 began in Thailand, where the Thai Baht, fixed at 25 THB to 1 USD, came under attack in May 1997. By 2 July 1997 Thailand abandoned its defence of the baht, allowing it to float freely.

Indonesia, which had massive foreign reserves and was seen as having a strong economy, responded on July 11, 1997, by widening its exchange rate band from 8 to 12%. Indonesia had taken similar actions previously, in December 1995 from 2 to 3%, in response to the Mexican financial crisis, and in June and September 1996 from 3 to 5% and then 5 to 8%. These actions had been successful in the past in defending the rupiah, but on this occasion there was a more serious crisis of confidence.

The rupiah fell 7% immediately, with foreign money quick to leave the country, with investor confidence in Indonesia shaken (due to previous deregulations, much of the Indonesian stockmarket was owned by foreign investors). Local confidence in the currency was also undermined as the population decided to follow suit, selling rupiah for dollars.

The spot rate soon fell below the selling rate (i.e. outside the 12% exchange rate band), and despite Bank Indonesia's attempts to intervene, it soon abandoned the managed float, leaving the rupiah to float freely on August 14, 1997.

The rate, 2436 on July 11, was 2663 on August 14, and 2955 on August 15: a 12% fall. Government debt (Bank Indonesia Certificates or SBI) rose from 12% to 30%, and overnight call rates reached 81% (per annum).

Response to the falls – crisis[link]

At this stage the crisis was a limited one: while the currency had fallen, the extent of the fall did not look to be catastrophic. The government announced its response in September: the banking sector was to be restructured, government projects would be cancelled, and some banks were supported with liquidity from the government.

The government reduced the SBI rate three times in September to around 20%. As of 24 September, the exchange rate still lingered around 3000, at 2990.

The government response to the crisis sent mixed messages, with falling interest rates doing nothing to support confidence in the rupiah, and the rupiah continued to be sold, as companies who had been borrowing heavily in dollars had to meet their obligation. By October 4, the rupiah had collapsed a further 19%, falling to 3690 rupiah. The rupiah had now lost a third of its value, and there was now a full-blown 'krisis' in Indonesia.

On 8 October with the rupiah at 3640, the government decided to seek the support of the IMF. The rupiah fluctuated in the 3300–3650 range during October awaiting the IMF's response.

The response was announced on 1 November 1997. Sixteen small and insolvent banks would be closed, with a small market share of only 2.5%. Deposits would be underwritten up to 20 million rupiah (90% of all depositors had less than this in the bank). Private banks would be subject to improved monitoring, and some state banks would be merged.

The rupiah immediately gained almost 10% against the dollar, to around 3300, as the markets signalled their approval.

Soon after, however, confidence began to fall. The IMF response had only been published in summary form from the government and Bank Indonesia, and the choice of the sixteen banks being closed appeared arbitrary, and the details of the thirty-four others subject to special measures was not announced.

The deposit guarantee of 20 million rupiah was seen as inadequate, and funds were moved from private to state banks, exchanged for dollars, or transferred offshore, as confidence in the plan began to evaporate.

The rupiah steadily weakened from the middle of November, standing at 3700 rupiah at the end of the month. In December the crisis turned into a disaster. Much of the Indonesian economy was controlled (indeed, in 2008, much of it still is) by relatives of the President Suharto, and of the sixteen banks to be liquidated, PT Bank Andromeda was 25% owned by Bambang Trihatmodjo, the second son of Suharto, PT Bank Jakarta was part-owned by Probosutedjo, the President's half-brother, and PT Bank Industri was 8% owned by the President's second daughter, Siti Hediati Prabowo.^[25]

The President and his family were opposed to the reforms, with Bambang Trihatmodjo beginning legal action against the government to keep his bank, particularly as directors of the insolvent banks were, if culpable, to be added to a Disgraced Persons List, ineligible to work in the banking sector. Although the bank had violated its BMPK (credit limit), Bambang was given permission by Bank Indonesia to buy Bank Alfa, another bank, seen by many as a reward for withdrawing his lawsuit. In effect, the failed bank was reopened under a different name.

It was clear that the cronyism and corruption of Indonesia was winning over IMF reforms. The rupiah fell from 4085 to 5650 in the space of a single week. By the middle of the month, half the banking system, 154 banks, had suffered bank runs. By Christmas Eve the rupiah stood at 5915: a fall of 60% since July.

The New Year saw the rupiah begin at 5447. On January 15 a second Letter of Intent was signed with the IMF, agreeing an accelerated reform package in return for $43 billion of aid. The rupiah had strengthened from an all-time low of 9100 on 23 January to 7225 on 15 January, but it soon became clear Suharto had no intention of fulfilling the agreement. The rupiah plummeted by more than 50%, bottoming out at 14800 on January 23. The amount of liquidity pumped into the banking system was by now over 60 trillion rupiah, causing money supply increases and worsening inflation.

The government announced a rescue package on 26 January,^[26] ensuring that the government would guarantee all existing deposits. The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency was set up with the goal of merging, closing, or recapitalising (before sale) banks.

Fifty-four banks (four state, fifty private), representing nearly 40% of the sector were placed under IBRA supervision in February 1998, with a resulting strengthening of the rupiah to 7400.

Despite the improvements, it was not long before confidence was undermined again, as Suharto discussed a currency board, the IBRA head was replaced, and political instability increased. The currency fell to around 10000.

Indonesia began to take more drastic action, doubling its SBI rates to 45% (increasing the cost of its lending), and in April, having signed a third Letter of Intent with the IMF, the IBRA took over the major private banks, twinning the banks with state banks, and suspending the owners' control. The rupiah, which had strengthened to around 8000, depreciated in the wake of the Jakarta riots of May 1998, and in particular the run on the Bank Central Asia, Indonesia's largest private bank that ensued, causing the bank to be taken over by IBRA on 29 May. The SBI rate was increased to 70% in the wake of massive inflation.

The end of Suharto's rule brought a new President, Jusuf Habibie, to power on 21 May 1998. Little action was seen immediately, and by 17 June the rupiah had bottomed out at 16800 rupiah.

A fourth Letter of Intent was signed with the IMF, on June 25, 1998, which was refusing to provide aid due to breaches of its original agreement. The IMF agreed to provide an immediate $5 billion of aid to cover basic necessities.

Audits of the banks that had been taken over showed massive bad debts, exceeding 55%. Further audits showed that the other banks were also fundamentally weak. Banking reform continued through to 1999, with the merger of 4 state banks in October 1998, into Bank Mandiri, the closure of 38 banks in March 1999, recapitalisation of 9, and take over of 7 more. By this point total bank capital had reached negative 245 trillion rupiah. 23 further banks were recapitalised in May, and in October 1999 Bank Mandiri itself was recapitalised. Interest rates fell steadily in 1999, to an SBI of 13.1% in October. The rupiah finished the year at 7900 to the US Dollar.

Despite the fall of the currency of about 70% from June 1997 to December 1998, inflation of 60–70% (which caused riots, and the end of the Suharto regime after 30 years in power) in 1998 meant that the real exchange rate fell only slightly.

Rupiah since 1999: relative stability[link]

The rupiah declined from its relatively strengthened position at the end of the financial crisis, with the rupiah seeing in the century at 7,050 to the US$, but declining to 9,725 by the end of 2000, and reaching a low of 12,069 on 27 April 2001. The currency strengthened to 8,500 later in 2001, but ended 2001 at 10,505. March 2002 saw the currency break below 10,000, from which point the currency maintained a rate in the 8000s and 9000s until August 2005, and in the latter half of that year, the trading range extended towards 11,000, but ending the year just below 10,000. 2006 and 2007 saw the currency trade in a relatively narrow range against the US$ (which itself was depreciating against other currencies), of 8500–9900. This trend continued into 2008, with the currency trading between 9000 and 9500.^[27]

The Financial crisis of 2007–2008 with the collapse in the commodities market saw the US$ gain strongly against currencies backed by weakening commodities exports. With palm oil and rubber prices falling from their peak by more than half, the rupiah came under pressure, Bank Indonesia spent $7 billion of its $57 billion reserves in October defending the currency.^[28] Despite this, the rupiah slipped below 10,000 on 23 October for the first time since 2005, and then below 11,000 on 2 November, a mark last reached in 2001. On November 13, Bank Indonesia introduced new regulations requiring foreign currency purchases over $100,000 a month to be backed by documentation of an underlying transaction and a tax number. The rupiah closed below 12,000 for the first time since 1998 on 20 October, with intraday lows below 13,000 hit. Subsequently, however, the cut in the Federal Reserve rate to 0–0.25% and Bank Indonesia support for the currency, saw the rupiah strengthen slightly to a range around 11,000.

The catastrophic damage to the rupiah caused in 1997–1998 severely damaged confidence in the currency. Even though the rupiah is freely convertible currency, it is still regarded as a risky currency to hold. As of 1 January 2011 (2011 -01-01)^[update], one United States dollar is worth approximately 9,000.00 Indonesian rupiah,^[27] and it was one of the least valued currency unit in the world.

2013 – revaluation[link]

Darmin Nasution, the incoming governor of Bank Indonesia stated the central bank is studying revaluing its currency by removing two or three zeros from the rupiah.^[29]

See also[link]

	Indonesia portal
	Numismatics portal

• Netherlands Indies gulden
• Netherlands New Guinean gulden
• West Irian rupiah
• Riau rupiah
• Economy of Indonesia
• Least valued currency unit

References[link]

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Banknotes of Indonesia

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Coins of Indonesia

• Indonesian language site describing post-1945 Indonesian money from a collector's perspective
• English language site with a number of articles on Indonesian money
• Daily Rupiah exchange rates from other currencies (Bank Indonesia rates)
• Rupiah exchange rates from various Indonesian Banks
• Polymer Notes – Indonesia
• Indonesian Government Security Printing and Minting Corp. (PERURI)
• Cash payment instruments (Bank Indonesia)
• Information on Rupiah (expat.or.id)

Rhoma Irama
Background information
Birth name	Raden Irama
Born	(1946-12-11) December 11, 1946 (age 65) Tasikmalaya, West Java, Indonesia
Genres	Dangdut
Occupations	Musician, songwriter, actor
Instruments	Vocals, guitar
Years active	1967–present
Associated acts	Soneta Group, Ridho Rhoma
Website	http://www.rajadangdut.com

Raden Irama (born December 11, 1946, in Tasikmalaya, West Java), most commonly known as Rhoma Irama, is an Indonesian dangdut musician and occasional actor. During the height of his stardom in the 1970s, he became the self-proclaimed Raja Dangdut (King of Dangdut) with his group Soneta.^[1]

Prior to his a pilgrimage to Mecca, he was known as Oma Irama. He is a member of aristocrat class of Sundanese from both his father, Raden Burdah Anggawirya, and mother, R.H. Tuti Juariah.^[2]

Beginnings[link]

Oma Irama's first bands were known as Tornado and Gayhand, and covered Western rock and roll music of Paul Anka, Andy Williams, and The Beatles.^[3]

In the late 1960s Oma Irama, sang orkes Melayu and also some pop Indonesia. In 1968 he joined the group Orkes Melayu Purnama in 1968. This group pioneered elements of the dangdut style within orkes Melayu music - the drum was changed to double drum, the electric guitar's role was expanded, and the suling, or bamboo flute, adopted a style reminiscent of Bollywood music. He also recorded pop Indonesia music during this period with the Zaenal Combo and Galaksi, while the album 'Ingkar Janji' was recorded in 1969 with Orkes Melayu Chandraleka.

Once Oma broke from recording with the Purnama Group, he formed Orkes Melayu Soneta (named for the English word sonnet), which became the first dangdut group in 1970. The subtitle, 'the sound of Moslems' was added in 1973.

The group featured Oma Irama and Elvy Sukaesih as singers, both solo, and duets. Their first album, 'Volume 01', 'Begadang' ('Stay up all night'), released in 1973, featured 4 songs by Oma Irama, three by Elvy, and three duets. The song featured a topless Oma Irama wearing tight trousers and holding an electric guitar. His choice of pose showed the influence on his music of Western hard rock bands, influences which also found their way into his music - orkes Melayu was in his opinion was too soft, too acoustic, too polite, and unable to compete against the power and energy of rock music, and so the music was electrified, with keyboard, two electric guitars, electric bass, as well as the traditional suling and gendang. He has stated that he took his guitar style from Richie Blackmore of Deep Purple. In addition to Western and Malay influences, Hindi composers were credited for some of the band's songs.

The Begadang album ranked #11 on Rolling Stone Indonesia's "150 Greatest Indonesian Albums of All Time" list.^[4] Furthermore, the main single "Begadang" reached at number 24 on the magazine's "150 Greatest Indonesian Songs of All Time" list.^[5]

His 1973 hit Terajana, one of the best-known dangdut songs of all time, was the first to use the newly coined, and arguably derogatory, term dangdut, distinguishing the Javanese orkes Melayu music, heavily influenced by Indian Bollywood records, henceforth dangdut, from the established orkes Melayu, associated with North Sumatran Malays.

Once Soneta was established in the early 70's, Oma changed his name to Rhoma and went on a decade long run of successful hit records and films, all of which starred Rhoma playing himself while performing all of his hits. He wrote the classics "Kareta Malam" and "Kuda Lumping" which were sung by Elvy Sukaesih.

Performing live, he adopted many of the props of stadium rock, including large audiences, powerful soundsystems, complex sets, fireworks, flashing lights, and smoke machines.

Haji[link]

Following his 1975 hajj, he took the name Rhoma Irama, which is an abbreviation of "Raden Haji Oma Irama" (Raden is an aristocracy title for Javanese and Sundanese cultures). Following this pilgrimage, he took on a more explicitly Islamic moral tone, adopting Islamic dress, shorter hairstyles, and ejecting band members who consumed alcohol or had extra-marital sex. He also resolved that his music should instruct, and not merely entertain, a form of jihad waged through music. Themes in his music included extra-marital sex, government corruption, drugs, and gambling.^[3] The song haram for instance, warns against both drugs and gambling.

Rhoma Irama campaigned for Islamic party PPP from 1977 to 1982, and as a result he was banned from state television and radio by the Suharto regime, which was at that time enforcing separation of religion and state, and some of his songs were also banned from sale. The ban was lifted in 1988, and with Suharto himself moving towards Islam in the 1990s, dangdut became of the establishment.

His 1982 movie Perjuangan dan Doa (Struggle and Prayer) as described as the world's first Islamic rock musical movie.

In recent years Rhoma Irama has campaigned against Inul Daratista a dangdut star popular for her suggestive dancing, acting as head of composers' union PIMMA to ban her from singing any of their compositions.

Discography[link]

Pre Soneta[link]

• Djangan Kau Marah
• Di Rumah Sadja
• Di Dalam Bemo
• Biarkan Aku Pergi
• Anak Pertama
• Djenggo
• In Dan Dip
• Pemburu

With OM Soneta[link]

• Dangdut
• Surat Terakhir
• Berbulan Madu
• Gelandangan
• Joget
• Janda Kembang
• Tiada Lagi

With Soneta Group (Volume Series)[link]

• Soneta Vol-1 Begadang (1973)
• Soneta Vol-2 Penasaran (1974)
• Soneta Vol-3 Rupiah (1975)
• Soneta Vol-4 Darah Muda (1975)
• Soneta Vol-5 Musik (1976)
• Soneta Vol-6 135.000.000 (1977)
• Soneta Vol-7 Santai (1977)
• Soneta Vol-8 Hak Azazi (1978)
• Soneta Vol-9 Begadang 2 (1979)
• Soneta Vol-10 Sahabat (1980)
• Soneta Vol-11 Indonesia (1980)
• Soneta Vol-12 Renungan Dalam Nada (1981)
• Soneta Vol-13 Emansipasi Wanita (1983)
• Soneta Vol-14 Judi (1989)
• Soneta Vol-15 Gali Lobang Tutup Lobang (1989)
• Soneta Vol-16 Bujangan (1994)

Movie Soundtrack Albums[link]

• Oma Irama Penasaran
• Gitar Tua Oma Irama
• Darah Muda
• Begadang
• Berkelana I
• Berkelana II
• Raja Dangdut
• Camelia
• Cinta Segitiga
• Perjuangan dan Doa
• Melodi Cinta
• Badai di Awal Bahagia
• Sebuah Pengorbanan
• Cinta Kembar
• Pengabdian
• Satria Bergitar
• Kemilau Cinta di Langit Jingga
• Menggapai Matahari I
• Menggapai Matahari II
• Nada-Nada Rindu
• Bunga Desa
• Jaka Swara
• Nada dan Dakwah
• Tabir Biru
• Dawai 2 Asmara

Rhoma Irama Solo Albums[link]

• Pemilu (1982)
• Lebaran (1984)
• Persaingan (1986)
• Haji (1988)
• Modern (1989)
• Haram (1990)
• Salawat Nabi (1991)
• Kehilangan Tongkat (1993)
• Rana Duka (1994)
• Stress (1995)
• Baca (1995)
• Viva Dangdut 1996
• Mirasantika (1997)
• Reformasi (1998)
• Euforia (2000)
• Syahdu (2001)
• Asmara (2003)
• Jana Jana (2008)
• Azza(2010)

Filmography[link]

• Oma Irama Penasaran (1976)
• Gitar Tua Oma Irama (1977)
• Darah Muda (1977)
• Rhoma Irama Berkelana I (1978)
• Rhoma Irama Berkelana II (1978)
• Begadang (1978)
• Raja Dangdut (1978)
• Cinta Segitiga (1979)
• Camelia (1979)
• Perjuangan dan Doa (1980)
• Melody Cinta Rhoma Irama (1980)
• Badai di Awal Bahagia (1981)
• Sebuah Pengorbanan (1982)
• Satria Bergitar (1984)
• Pengabdian (1984)
• Kemilau Cinta di Langit Jingga (1985)
• Menggapai Matahari I (1986)
• Menggapai Matahari II (1986)
• Nada-nada Rindu (1987)
• Bunga Desa (1988)
• Jaka Swara (1990)
• Nada dan Dakwah (1991)
• Tabir Biru (1994)
• Dawai 2 Asmara (2010)
• Sajadah Ka'bah (2011)

References[link]

External links[link]

• "Hips Don't Lie: A pop singer and a potentially violent culture war in the world's biggest Muslim state.", "The Wall Street Journal", April 3, 2007

Rupiah Banda
President of Zambia
In office 29 June 2008 – 23 September 2011 Acting: 29 June 2008 – 2 November 2008
Vice President	George Kunda
Preceded by	Levy Mwanawasa
Succeeded by	Michael Sata
Vice President of Zambia
In office 9 October 2006 – 2 November 2008
President	Levy Mwanawasa
Preceded by	Lupando Mwape
Succeeded by	George Kunda
Personal details
Born	(1937-02-13) 13 February 1937 (age 75) Gwanda, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)
Political party	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
Spouse(s)	Hope Mwansa Makulu (Deceased) Thandiwe Banda
Alma mater	Addis Ababa University Lund University Wolfson College, Cambridge
Religion	Anglicanism[1]

Rupiah Bwezani Banda (born 13 February 1937) is a Zambian politician who was President of Zambia from 2008 to 2011.

During the Presidency of Kenneth Kaunda, Banda held important diplomatic posts and was active in politics as a member of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Years later, he was appointed as Vice-President by President Levy Mwanawasa in October 2006, following the latter's re-election.^[2] He took over Mwanawasa's presidential responsibilities after Mwanawasa suffered a stroke in June 2008,^[3] and following Mwanawasa's death in August 2008, he became acting President. As the candidate of the governing Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), he narrowly won the October 2008 presidential election, according to official results.^[4]

Opposition leader Michael Sata defeated Banda in the September 2011 presidential election, and Sata accordingly succeeded Banda as President on 23 September 2011.^[5]

Early life and diplomacy[link]

Banda was born in the town of Miko, Gwanda, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe); his parents had come from Northern Rhodesia to find employment prior to his birth, and he was sponsored by a local Dutch Reformed Church preacher (and later, the family of B. R. Naik) to continue his education into adulthood. He became involved in politics when he joined the youth wing of the UNIP in 1960. Banda married his first wife, Hope Mwansa Makulu (deceased), in 1966 and the couple had three sons together. Banda also has two sons from previous relationships and a set of fraternal twins from his current marriage.

He was the UNIP's representative in Northern Europe in the early 1960s,^[6] and in 1965 he was appointed as Zambia's Ambassador to Egypt (the United Arab Republic). While there, he became friends with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, and the decision to allow UNITA to open offices in Lusaka at that time has been attributed to Banda's influence.^[7] Banda became Ambassador to the United States on April 7, 1967.^[8] He served as Ambassador to the U.S. for about two years, then returned to Zambia to serve as Chief Executive of the Rural Development Corporation for about two years and subsequently as General Manager of the National Agriculture Marketing Board for a similar length of time. He was then appointed as Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and while in this position he also headed the U.N. Council for Namibia. After about a year at the U.N., he was appointed to the Zambian Cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs.^[6] During his brief stint as Foreign Minister (1975–1976^[9]), Banda was occupied by the task of attempting to broker a cease-fire in Angola.^[6]

Politics[link]

Banda was elected as a Member of Parliament for Munali Constituency in 1978 and was re-elected to that seat in 1983. Although he was defeated in the 1988 election, he took the issue to court. He also served for a time as Minister of State for Mines.^[6]

In 1991, he was defeated in Munali Constituency by Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) candidate Ronald Penza. Although he initially intended to run again for the seat in the 1996 election, he supported the UNIP's boycott of the election.^[6]

After President Mwanawasa was re-elected in September 2006, he appointed Banda as Vice-President on October 9, 2006 along with a new cabinet. He later joined the MMD after his appointment.^[10] Banda's appointment was widely viewed as a means of rewarding eastern Zambians for supporting the MMD in the election, as this was the first time that easterners had done so.^[2]

Prior to a planned summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August 2007, Banda was sent by Mwanawasa to improve relations with neighboring Zimbabwe following Mwanawasa's criticism of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe.^[11]

As acting president[link]

After Mwanawasa suffered a stroke while attending an African Union summit in Egypt on June 29, 2008, Banda became acting President.^[3] He subsequently delivered a series of optimistic but vague updates on Mwanawasa's health. These updates were greeted with widespread skepticism, but Banda insisted that he had "no reason to lie".^[12]

As Vice-President, Banda also acted as the leader of government business in the National Assembly; however, when the National Assembly met on August 5, 2008, following Mwanawasa's stroke, Banda appointed the Minister of Defense, George Mpombo, to lead the government's parliamentary business instead.^[13]

Mwanawasa never recovered from his stroke and died while still hospitalized in Paris on August 19, 2008. Expressing "immense grief and deep sorrow", Banda announced his death to the nation and declared a seven-day period of national mourning, urging Zambians to "remain calm and mourn our President with dignity".^[14] Banda officially took over as acting President prior to a new presidential election, which according to the constitution should be called within 90 days of Mwanawasa's death.^[15]

Banda filed an application to stand as the candidate of the MMD on August 26, 2008. On the same day, the MMD in Eastern Province released a statement in support of Banda's candidacy.^[16] The MMD National Executive Committee chose Banda as the party's presidential candidate in a secret ballot on September 5. He had been widely expected to win, and he received 47 votes against 11 for Ngandu Magande, the Minister of Finance. On this occasion, Banda promised to "unite the party and the entire nation" and to "continue implementing [Mwanawasa's] programs".^[17]

The presidential by-election was held on October 30. Initial results showed Banda's main challenger, Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front (PF), in the lead, but as votes from rural areas were counted, Banda steadily closed the gap and ultimately overtook Sata. Final results on November 2 showed Banda with 40% of the vote against 38% for Sata. Banda was sworn in at State House on the same day, using his speech on the occasion to call for unity. The PF alleged fraud and refused to recognize Banda's victory, while Sata's supporters rioted in Lusaka and Kitwe.^[4]

Presidency[link]

Banda with Brazilian President Lula da Silva (left).

As President, Rupiah Banda is focused on economic development, travelling abroad to promote Zambian trade to other world leaders. In December 2010 he travelled to Egypt to meet with President Hosni Mubarak.^[18]

In mid-2009 it was announced that the MMD National Executive Committee had chosen Banda as the party's candidate for the 2011 presidential election. Some criticized this, arguing that the nomination process should be open to other candidates; Mpombo, the Defense Minister, resigned from his post in July 2009 while criticizing the process as undemocratic. President Banda has since welcomed others to challenge him for the nomination at the MMC Conventions taking place across the country.^[19]

After taking office, Banda dismantled much of the anticorruption effort put into place by his predecessor, Mwanawasa.^[20]

Defeat[link]

Michael Sata, leader of the opposition Patriotic Front, defeated Bwezani Banda in the September 2011 presidential election, ending his three year long presidency.^[5]

References[link]

External links[link]

• Campaign Website
• Wayback Machine: Archived 2007 biography of Rupiah Banda from "Famous Zambians" Geocities website
• Long interview with Rupiah Banda

v t e Presidents of Zambia Kenneth Kaunda Frederick Chiluba Levy Mwanawasa Rupiah Banda Michael Sata Italics denote acting Presidents

v t e Vice-Presidents of Zambia • Reuben Kamanga(1964–1967) • Simon Kapwepwe (1967–1970) • Mainza Chona (1970–1973) • No such post between 1973–1991. Replaced with Secretary General of Ruling Party and Prime Minister • Levy Mwanawasa (1991–1994) • Godfrey Miyanda (1994–1997) • Christon Tembo (1997–2001) • Enoch Kavindele (2001–2003) • Nevers Mumba (2003–2004) • Lupando Mwape (2004–2006) • Rupiah Banda (2006–2008) • George Kunda (2008–2011) • Guy Scott (2011–present)