Arthur Leon Judson (February 17, 1881, Dayton, Ohio – January 28, 1975, Rye, New York) was an artists' manager who also managed the New York Philharmonic and Philadelphia Orchestra. He co-founded the Handel Society of New York with entrepreneur James Grayson in 1966.

Early life[link]

Judson studied violin beginning at the age of eight, and continued his studies for one year as a teenager with the composer, conductor, violinist Max Bendix and the violinist Leopold Lichtenberg in New York. At the age of nineteen, he became the dean of the music department at Denison University, Granville, Ohio from 1900 to 1907. In 1903 at Denison, he performed the Richard Strauss Violin Sonata in what he called the first public performance in the United States. He returned to New York in 1907 to attempt a recital career. He also spent eight years on the staff of Musical America magazine, serving as advertising manager and critic. Disillusioned of a concert career (he said of this time "I was a good violinist, but no Kreisler or Heifetz"), Judson was pleased to be offered a lucrative management career.

Orchestra manager and artists' manager[link]

A benefit of Judson's Musical America job was traveling to hear concerts and meeting the people who performed or attended the concerts. Judson was therefore already known for his knowledge of music and judgment on musicians of quality when he was appointed as the manager of the Philadelphia Orchestra in July 1915. Within months, he launched Concert Management Arthur Judson, Inc. in Philadelphia to manage artists, and commuted daily to his New York office where he set up a second artists’ management office. With three partners, he organized the Judson Radio Program as another venue for his artists in 1926. His attempt to get an exclusive contract with David Sarnoff at the National Broadcasting Company for the radio program failed. Judson and his partners therefore purchased a low-power station owned by the Atlantic Broadcasting Company and by January 27, 1927 signed up a network of sixteen stations known as the United Independent Broadcasters to carry his program. William S. Paley purchased this network on September 25, 1927 and it became the Columbia Broadcasting System, with Judson as the second largest stockholder.

In 1930, Judson became the president of Columbia Concerts Corporation (which is now Columbia Artists Management). William S. Paley was chairman of the board. Judson amalgamated seven independent concert bureaus in what would become known as the "Judson Empire". These were the Wolfsohn Music Bureau, Haensel and Jones, The Metropolitan Musical Bureau, Evans and Salter, American Opera Company, and the Community Concert Service of Ward French. Also included in this amalgamation was Concert Management Arthur Judson. The new company managed 125 artists and organizations, approximately two-thirds of the top musicians in America.

Judson managed the Philadelphia Orchestra from 1915 to 1935 and the New York Philharmonic from 1922 to 1956.

Judson's zenith was reached between 1930 and 1935 when he simultaneously managed the New York Philharmonic, Philadelphia Orchestra, instituted and managed the summer New York Stadium concert series at Lewisohn Stadium 1920-1943 in New York and the summer Robin Hood Dell concerts in Philadelphia 1930-1935 as well as serving as president of Columbia Concerts Corporation. He also was the advisory manager of the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra for five years (1924–1928). As an impresario, he advised many other organizations. When Theodore Spiering, conductor of the Oregon Symphony, suddenly died in 1925 the orchestra called Judson. His recommendation, Willem van Hoogstraten, was hired. When the Minneapolis Symphony (now the Minnesota Orchestra) needed a conductor in 1931, Judson recommended Eugene Ormandy. Judson also recommended the successors to Ormandy in Minneapolis: Dimitri Mitropoulos and Antal Doráti. Some likened the Minneapolis orchestra to Judson's "farm team".

Judson was not only big in the music world, he was also a physically big man described as six foot four, 200 pounds, possessing a massive head, barrel chest, and also huge hands useful for his favorite pastime of chopping wood. He had a ruddy complexion which he explained as a "permanent rage" induced by dealing with artists. He was impeccably groomed and worked standing at a high antique desk while he smoked cigars. He was surrounded by steel engravings, shelves of books, antique furnishings, and old pewter. He was always available to walk across the street to Carnegie Hall to listen to an audition. He was extremely choosy when it came to pianists and violinists, accepting very few. He considered himself a "disappointed conductor" but made up for this by conducting the 100-piece summer orchestra at Ocean Grove, New Jersey, beginning in 1898.

The Community Artists series made it possible for communities to obtain high quality artists without having to assume high financial risks since the concerts were prepaid. Artists had more opportunities too, but in return they paid a 20 percent commission to Judson's Columbia Concerts Corporation and another 20 percent to Community Artists. Many artists believed they were being exploited and not promoted. The only other company in this field, NBC Artists Service (which opened in 1928), shared the market and did not compete with Judson.

In 1939 Judson was called before the Federal Communications Commission to testify. This was described in a highly unflattering Time magazine article on February 6, 1939 titled "Chain-Store Music". Readers were surprised to learn that music was organized just like any other business. Salesmen toured the country selling musicians to 376 communities involved in the Community Artists series. In order to get the big name artists, lesser known commodities also had to be purchased. There was plenty to choose from in the catalog: Columbia Concerts Corporation controlled two-thirds of the nation's musical artists and conductors. Impending government investigations into the concert management monopoly caused William S. Paley to resign as chairman of the board and sell his interests to Judson in 1941. CBS and NBC also sold their agencies to their directors to avoid monopoly investigations. Judson renamed the company Columbia Artists Management. NBC became the National Concert Artists Corporation.

There were some musicians Judson did not represent. One was the conductor Artur Rodziński. Judson attempted to stop Rodzinski from taking over the Cleveland Orchestra in 1933 (an attempt that failed). Judson succeeded in stopping Rodzinski from taking over the New York Philharmonic in 1936. In 1947, Rodzinski who had finally become the conductor of the New York Philharmonic with Judson's short-term assistance battled with Judson over hiring and programming. Addressing the board, he called Judson (who was present) "a dictator who made musical progress impossible". Rodzinski requested that the orchestra board then choose between himself and Judson The board sided with Judson. Rodzinski also lost his next job as conductor of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra over programming disputes, purportedly due to the influence of Judson.

Two other conductors who believed Judson damaged their careers were Eugène Aynsley Goossens and Otto Klemperer. Goossens decided, after twelve years, he no longer needed to pay Judson a commission. Judson forced him to pay in an out-of-court settlement, and then dumped him. Klemperer, engaged by Judson for the first fourteen weeks of the New York Philharmonic's 1935-1936 season made the "mistake" of programming Gustav Mahler's Symphony No. 2 over Judson's objections. Judson thereafter abandoned Klemperer.

Strained relations with a major conductor and the impropriety and conflict of interest in managing artists and orchestras which then hired the same artists caused Judson to resign his orchestra management positions. He announced his resignation as Philadelphia's manager on October 8, 1934 (which became effective May 31, 1935). The cause was increasingly strained relations with its conductor Leopold Stokowski. Although the two collaborated in later years, Stokowski said at the time "Mr. Judson is not my manager". New York Time's music critic Howard Taubman's article "The New York Philharmonic—What's Wrong and Why?" appeared on April 29, 1956. Taubman alleged over-hiring of Columbia artists at the New York Philharmonic and may have encouraged the seventy-five year old Judson to resign from that post.

One singer Arthur Judson did not represent (but probably should have) was Margaret Truman, daughter of President Harry S. Truman. In 1948, Margaret's agent, James A. Davidson, listened to her complaints about getting few bookings. She learned from Davidson that concerts in the U.S. were largely controlled by Columbia and the National Concert Artists Corporation. Margaret told her father what she had heard, and the president requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigate. In October 1955, the United States Department of Justice filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Columbia along with three other defendants were charged with restraint of interstate trade and commerce in the booking of artists, and also with monopolizing organized audience associations. The agencies pleaded no contest and were forced to release their monopoly position. By this time, Arthur Judson had been replaced at Columbia by Ward French.

Amongst the artists Judson presented and represented: Ruth St. Denis, Marian Anderson, John Barbirolli, Robert Casadesus, Van Cliburn, Clifford Curzon, Todd Duncan, Nelson Eddy, Benjamino Gigli, Mischa Elman, Zino Francescatti, Gary Graffman, Jascha Heifetz, Vladimir Horowitz, Jose Iturbi, Lorin Maazel, Yehudi Menuhin, Eugene Ormandy, Lily Pons, Fritz Reiner, Rudolf Serkin and Helen Traubel.

Awards included being elected an officer in the French Academy, 1920; an honorary Doctorate in Music from Denison University, 1931, and the Order of the Academie des Beaux Arts, 1941.

References[link]

There is no published biography for Arthur Judson, and there is also no collection of Arthur Judson papers. Norman Lebrecht's book offers by far the most details on the man.

• "Arthur Judson Dies at 93; Leading Concert Manager". New York Times, January 29, 1975.
• "Chain-Store Music". Time, February 6, 1939
• Chasins, Abram. (1979) Leopold Stokowski: A Profile. New York, Hawthorn Books.
• Horowitz, Joseph. (2005) Classical Music in America: A History of Its Rise and Fall. New York, W. W. Norton & Co.
• Judson, Arthur (Leon) in Current Biography Yearbook (1945). New York, H.W. Wilson.
• Lebrecht, Norman. (1997) Who Killed Classical Music? Maestros, Managers, and Corporate Politics. New York, Carol Pub. Group.
• "Manager Resigns in Stokowski Rift". New York Times, May 30, 1935.
• "Orchestra Confirms Judson's Resignation". New York Times, October 26, 1934.
• Rodzinski, Halina. (1976) Our Two Lives. New York, Scribner.
• Rosenberg, Donald. (2000) The Cleveland Orchestra Story "Second to None". Cleveland, Gray and Co.
• Taubman, Howard "The New York Philharmonic - What's Wrong and Why?" New York Times, April 29, 1956

External links[link]

Biography portal

• Arthur Judson at Find a Grave

Eugene Ormandy (November 18, 1899 – March 12, 1985) was a Hungarian-born conductor and violinist.

Early life[link]

Born Jenő Blau in Budapest, Hungary, Ormandy began studying violin at the Royal National Hungarian Academy of Music (now the Franz Liszt Academy of Music) at the age of five. He gave his first concerts as a violinist at age seven and, studying with Jenő Hubay, graduated at 14 with a master's degree. In 1920, he obtained a university degree in philosophy. In 1921, he moved to the United States of America. Around this time Blau changed his name to "Eugene Ormandy," "Eugene" being the equivalent of the Hungarian "Jenő." Accounts differ on the origin of "Ormandy"; it may have either been Blau's own middle name at birth,^[1] or his mother's.^[2] He was first engaged by conductor Erno Rapee, a former Budapest friend and fellow Academy graduate, as a violinist in the orchestra of the Capitol Theatre in New York City, a 77-player ensemble which accompanied silent movies. He became the concertmaster within five days of joining and soon became one of the conductors of this group. Ormandy also made 16 recordings as a violinist between 1923 and 1929, half of them using the acoustic process.

Arthur Judson, the most powerful manager of American classical music during the 1930s, greatly assisted Ormandy's career. When Arturo Toscanini was too ill to conduct the Philadelphia Orchestra in 1931, Judson asked Ormandy to stand in. This led to Ormandy's first major appointment as a conductor, in Minneapolis.

Career[link]

Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra[link]

Ormandy served until 1936 as conductor of the Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra, now the Minnesota Orchestra. During the depths of the Great Depression, RCA Victor contracted Ormandy and the Minneapolis Symphony for many recordings. A clause in the musicians' contract required them to earn their salaries by performing a certain number of hours each week (whether it be rehearsals, concerts, broadcasts, or recording). Since Victor did not need to pay the musicians, it could afford to send its best technicians and equipment to record in Minneapolis. Recordings were made between January 16, 1934, and January 16, 1935. There were several premiere recordings made in Minneapolis: John Alden Carpenter's Adventures in a Perambulator; Zoltán Kodály's Háry János Suite; Arnold Schoenberg’s Verklärte Nacht and a specially commissioned recording of Roy Harris's American Overture based on "When Johnny Comes Marching Home". Ormandy's recordings also included readings of Anton Bruckner's Symphony No. 7 and Mahler's Symphony No. 2, which became extremely well known.

The Philadelphia Orchestra[link]

Ormandy's 44-year tenure with the Philadelphia Orchestra began in 1936 and became the source of much of his lasting reputation and fame. Two years after his appointment as associate conductor under Leopold Stokowski, he became its music director. (Stokowski continued to conduct some concerts in Philadelphia until 1941; he returned as a guest conductor in 1960.) As music director, Ormandy conducted from 100 to 180 concerts each year in Philadelphia. Upon his retirement in 1980, he was made conductor laureate.

Ormandy was a quick learner of scores, often conducting from memory and without a baton. He demonstrated exceptional musical and personal integrity, exceptional leadership skills, and a formal and reserved podium manner in the style of his idol and friend, Arturo Toscanini.^{[citation needed]} One orchestra musician complimented him by saying: "He doesn't try to conduct every note as some conductors do."^{[citation needed]} Under Ormandy's direction the Philadelphia Orchestra continued the lush, legato style originated by Stokowski and for which the orchestra was well known. Ormandy's conducting style was praised for its opulent sound, but also was criticized for supposedly lacking any real individual touch.

Ormandy was particularly noted for conducting late Romantic and early 20th century music. He particularly favored Bruckner, Debussy, Dvořák, Ravel, Richard Strauss, Tchaikovsky, Sibelius, and transcriptions of Bach. His performances of Beethoven, Brahms, Haydn, and Mozart were considered less successful by some critics, especially when he applied the lush, so-called "Philadelphia Sound" to them. On the other hand, Donald Peck, principal flute of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, reports that a fellow flutist was won over when Ormandy conducted the Chicago in Beethoven's Ninth Symphony; he told Peck that it was the greatest Ninth he had ever heard. ^[3] He was particularly noted as a champion of Sergei Rachmaninoff's music, conducting the premiere of his Symphonic Dances and leading the orchestra in the composer's own recordings of three of his piano concertos in 1939-40. He also directed the American premiere of several symphonies by Dmitri Shostakovich. He made the first recording of Deryck Cooke's first performing edition of the complete Mahler Tenth Symphony, which many critics praised. His recording of Camille Saint-Saëns' Third Symphony received stellar reviews and is held in high regard. He also performed a great deal of American music and gave many premières of works by Samuel Barber, Paul Creston, David Diamond, Howard Hanson, Walter Piston, Ned Rorem, William Schuman, Roger Sessions, Virgil Thompson, and Richard Yardumian.

The conductor Kenneth Woods ranked Ormandy 14th of the "Real Top 20 of Conducting," saying, "Critics hate Ormandy. It must be the first “fact” they teach at critic school- always work in an Ormandy slam into every article your write. Record collectors hate him, too. I just don’t get it. The film of him looks pretty impressive- classical and classy conducting technique, not at all showy. His Philadelphia Orchestra was the only real rival to Karajan’s Berlin for sonic beauty in the 50s-70s, but was also a tighter and more versatile band." ^[4] .^[5]

In 1947, Ormandy appeared in the feature film Night Song in which he conducted Leith Stevens' Piano Concerto, with Arthur Rubinstein as soloist.

The Philadelphia Orchestra under Ormandy's direction frequently performed outside of Philadelphia, in New York and other American cities, and undertook a number of foreign tours. During a 1955 tour of Finland, Ormandy and many of the Orchestra's members visited the elderly composer Jean Sibelius at his country estate; Ormandy was photographed with Sibelius and the picture later appeared on the cover of his 1962 stereo recording of the composer's first symphony. During a 1973 tour of the People's Republic of China, the Orchestra performed to enthusiastic audiences that had been isolated from Western classical music for many decades.

Ormandy and the Philadelphia Orchestra, as well as smaller ensembles composed of its members, often collaborated with Richard P. Condie (and later Jerold Ottley) and the Mormon Tabernacle Choir to produce many recordings still considered definitive today, most notably the Grammy- winning recording of the Peter Wilhousky arrangement of the Battle Hymn of the Republic.

After Ormandy officially retired as music director of the Philadelphia Orchestra in 1980, he served as a guest conductor of other orchestras and made a few recordings.

Ormandy died in Philadelphia on March 12, 1985. His papers, including his marked scores and complete arrangements, fill 501 boxes in the archives of the University of Pennsylvania Library.

Guest appearances[link]

He also appeared as a guest conductor with many other orchestras. In November 1966, he recorded a highly memorable and idiomatic rendition of Antonín Dvořák's New World Symphony with the London Symphony Orchestra. This and a recording in July 1952, which he conducted anonymously with the Prades Festival Orchestra with Pablo Casals in the Robert Schumann Cello Concerto, represented his only commercial recordings made outside the U.S. In December 1950 he directed New York's Metropolitan Opera in a fondly-remembered production of Johann Strauss' Die Fledermaus in English, which also was recorded. In 1978, he conducted the New York Philharmonic in a performance of Sergei Rachmaninoff's Piano Concerto No. 3, with Vladimir Horowitz as soloist for a live recording.

Awards and honors[link]

• In honor of Ormandy's vast influence on American music and the Philadelphia performing arts community, on December 15, 1972 he was awarded the prestigious University of Pennsylvania Glee Club Award of Merit.^[6] Beginning in 1964, this award "established to bring a declaration of appreciation to an individual each year that has made a significant contribution to the world of music and helped to create a climate in which our talents may find valid expression."
• The Presidential Medal of Freedom by Richard M. Nixon in 1970
• The Ditson Conductor's Award for championing American music in 1977
• Appointed by Queen Elizabeth II an honorary Knight of the British Empire in 1976
• Awarded the Kennedy Center Honors in 1982
• He was a recipient of Yale University's Sanford Medal.^[7]

Recordings[link]

Eugene Ormandy's many recordings spanned the acoustic to the electrical to the digital age. From 1936 until his death, Ormandy made hundreds of recordings with the Philadelphia Orchestra, spanning almost every classical-music genre. Writing in Audoin (1999), Richard Freed wrote: "Ormandy came about as close as any conductor anywhere to recording the "Complete Works of Everybody," with more than a few works recorded three and four times to keep up with advances in technology and/or to accommodate a new soloist or to commemorate a move to a new label."

Thomas Frost, the producer of many of Ormandy's Columbia recordings, called Ormandy "...the easiest conductor I've ever worked with—he has less of an ego problem than any of them... Everything was controlled, professional, organized. We recorded more music per hour than any other orchestra ever has."^{[citation needed]} In one day, March 11, 1962, Ormandy and the Philadelphia recorded Sibelius's Symphony No. 1; the Semyon Bogatyryov arrangement of Tchaikovsky's Symphony No. 7 (for which Ormandy had given the Western hemisphere premiere performance); and Delius's On Hearing the First Cuckoo in Spring.

Curiously, the orchestra's performing venue at the Academy of Music (Philadelphia) was seldom employed for recording, because record producers believed that its dry acoustics were less than ideal. Moreover, Ormandy felt that the remodeling of the Academy of Music in the mid-1950s had ruined its acoustics. The Philadelphia Orchestra instead recorded in the ballroom of Philadelphia's Broadwood Hotel/Philadelphia Hotel, the Philadelphia Athletic Club at Broad and Race Streets, and in Town Hall/Scottish Rite Cathedral on North Broad Street near the Franklin Parkway. The latter venue featured a 1692 seat auditorium with bright resonant acoustics that made for impressive-sounding "high fidelity" recordings. A fourth venue was the Old Met (Metropolitan Opera House) used for later RCA recording sessions.

Recordings were produced for the following record labels: RCA Victor Red Seal (1936 to 1942), Columbia Masterworks Records (1944 to 1968), RCA Victor Red Seal (1968 to 1980) and EMI/Angel Records (1977-on). Three very late albums were also recorded for Telarc (1980) and Delos (1981) His first digital recording was an April 16, 1979 performance of Bela Bartok's Concerto for Orchestra for RCA.^[8]

He recorded for RCA in Minneapolis (in 1934 and 1935), too, and continued with the label until 1942, when an American Federation of Musicians ban on recordings caused the Philadelphia Orchestra to switch to Columbia, which had reached an agreement with the union in 1944, before RCA did so. Among his first recordings for Columbia was a spirited performance of Borodin's Polovtsian Dances. Ormandy conducted his first stereophonic recordings in 1957; these were not the orchestra's first stereo recordings because Leopold Stokowski had conducted experimental sessions in the early 1930s and multi-track recordings for the soundtrack of Walt Disney's 1940 feature film Fantasia. In 1968, Ormandy and the Philadelphia Orchestra returned to RCA; among their first projects was a new performance of Tchaikovsky's Sixth symphony, the Pathetique.

His recordings of Camille Saint-Saëns' Symphony No. 3 'Organ' are considered among the best ever produced. Fanfare Magazine made this remark of the recording with renowned organist Virgil Fox: "This beautifully played performance outclasses all versions of this symphony." The Telarc recording of the symphony with Michael Murray (organist) is also highly praised. [1]

Ormandy was also famous for being an unfailingly sensitive concerto collaborator. His recorded legacy includes numerous first-rate collaborations with Arthur Rubinstein, Claudio Arrau, Vladimir Ashkenazy, Vladimir Horowitz, Rudolf Serkin, David Oistrakh, Isaac Stern, Leonard Rose, Itzhak Perlman, Emil Gilels, Van Cliburn, Emanuel Feuermann, Robert Casadesus, Yo-Yo Ma, Sergei Rachmaninoff and others.

Recording premieres[link]

World premiere recordings made by the Philadelphia Orchestra under Ormandy's baton included:

• Gustav Mahler, Symphony No. 10. Columbia, November 1965. First commercial recording of all five movements, using Deryck Cooke's performing version;
• Sergei Prokofiev, Alexander Nevsky, Jennie Tourel (mezzo-soprano), Westminster Choir. RCA Victor, May 1945;
• Prokofiev, Symphony No. 6. Columbia, January 1950;
• Prokofiev, Symphony No. 7. Columbia, April 1953;
• Dmitri Shostakovich, Cello Concerto No. 1, Mstislav Rostropovich (cello). Columbia, November 1959.

Ormandy also conducted the premiere American recordings of Paul Hindemith's Mathis der Maler symphony, Carl Orff's Catulli Carmina (which won the Grammy Award for Best Classical Choral Performance in 1968), Shostakovich's Symphonies 4, 13, 14, and 15, Carl Nielsen's Symphonies 1 & 6, Anton Webern's Im Sommerwind, Krzysztof Penderecki's Utrenja, and Gustav Mahler's Symphony No. 10.

Ormandy also commissioned a version of Mussorgsky's Pictures at an Exhibition which he and the Philadelphia Orchestra could call their own, since the Ravel arrangement was at that time still very much the property of Serge Koussevitzky, who had commissioned it, made its first recording with the Boston Symphony, and published the score. So Ormandy asked Lucien Cailliet (1891–1984), the Philadelphia Orchestra's 'house arranger' and a member of its woodwind section, to provide a new orchestration of Pictures at an Exhibition and he conducted its premiere on 5 February 1937, recording it for RCA Victor later that same year. (It has been reissued on CD by Biddulph.) However, Ormandy eventually returned to the Ravel arrangement and recorded it three times (1953, 1966 and 1973).

Other distinguished recordings[link]

Among the Ormandy/Philadelphia recordings which are widely-regarded as "cream of the crop" include (year of recording included):

• Bartók - Piano Concerto No. 3 (with György Sándor, 1946, Columbia Masterworks, reissued on CD in 2002 by Pearl)
• Debussy - La demoiselle élue (1947, Sony/Masterworks Heritage, with Bidu Sayão and Rosalind Nadell
• Delius - Orchestral works (1961–1962, Sony, an offbeat yet excellent album including Brigg Fair, Dance Rhapsody No. 2, and On Hearing the First Cuckoo in Spring)
• Holst - The Planets (1975, RCA)
• Liszt - Piano Concerto No. 1 (1952, Sony/Grand Répertoire, with Claudio Arrau) (recorded in one single take)
• Mahler - Symphony No. 10 early arr. by Deryck Cooke (1965, Sony/Masterworks Portrait)
• Nielsen - Symphony No. 6 (1966, Sony)
• Orff - Carmina Burana (1960, Sony)
• Prokofiev - Symphony No. 5 (1957, Sony)
• Prokofiev - Symphony No. 6 (1961, Columbia Masterworks, not yet available on CD)
• Rachmaninoff - Symphonic Dances (1960, Sony)
• Rachmaninoff- Symphony No. 2 (1973, RCA)
• Ravel - Piano Concerto for the Left Hand (with Robert Casadesus, 1947, Sony/Masterworks Heritage)
• Shostakovich - Symphony No. 4 (1963, Sony)
• Shostakovich - Symphony No. 13 "Babi Yar" (with Tom Krause and the Mendelssohn Choir of Philadelphia, * 1970, RCA, CD available only in Japan)
• Shostakovich - Symphony No. 14 (with Phyllis Curtin and Simon Estes, 1971, RCA, CD available only in Japan)
• Shostakovich - Symphony No. 15 (1972, RCA)
• Sibelius - Symphony No. 4 (1954, Sony)
• Sibelius - Four Symphonic Poems from the Kalevala (also known as the Lemminkäinen Suite (1978, EMI)
• Richard Strauss - Ein Heldenleben (1960, Sony)
• Strauss - Don Quixote with Lorne Munroe (solo cello) and Carleton Cooley (solo viola) (1961, Sony)
• Tchaikovsky - Violin Concerto in D (with Itzhak Perlman, 1978, EMI)
• Tchaikovsky - Symphony No. 4 (1963, Sony)
• Tchaikovsky - Symphony No. 5, (1959, Sony)
• Tchaikovsky - Symphony No. 6, "Pathetique" (1960, Sony)
• Tchaikovsky - The Nutcracker (excerpts), (1963, Sony)

Notable Reissues

• The Original Jacket Collection: Eugene Ormandy [10 Discs] (2008, Sony BMG Masterworks)^[9]

References[link]

This article includes a list of references, related reading or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. Please improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (April 2009)

• Ardoin, John (1999). The Philadelphia Orchestra: A Century of Music. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. ISBN 1-56639-712-X. 
• Kupferberg, Herbert (1969). Those Fabulous Philadelphians. New York: C. Scribner's Sons. OCLC 28276. 
• American Record Guide: Eugene Ormandy. Washington: Heldref Publications. November/December 1999. pp. 68. OCLC 23874797. 

External links[link]

• Eugene Ormandy at Allmusic
• Eugene Ormandy at the University of Pennsylvania Library

William Primrose

William Primrose CBE (23 August 1904 – 1 May 1982) was a Scottish violist and teacher.

Biography[link]

Primrose was born in Glasgow and studied violin initially. In 1919 he moved to study at the then Guildhall School of Music in London.^[1] On the urging of the accompanist Ivor Newton,^[2] Primrose moved to Belgium to study under Eugène Ysaÿe, who encouraged him to take up the viola instead. In 1930, he joined Warwick Evans, John Pennington, and Thomas Petre as the violist in the London String Quartet. The group dissolved in 1935. In 1937, he began playing in the NBC Symphony Orchestra under Arturo Toscanini. When it was rumored that Toscanini would leave the Symphony in 1941, Primrose resigned. His career as a soloist took off when he started touring with Richard Crooks. He later signed with Arthur Judson, an influential concert manager. In 1946, he was the soloist in the first recording of Berlioz's Harold in Italy.

In 1944 he had commissioned a viola concerto from Béla Bartók. This was left incomplete at Bartók's death in 1945, and had to wait four years for its completion by Tibor Serly. Primrose was the soloist in the world premiere performance of the concerto, on 2 December 1949.

In 1950 Benjamin Britten wrote for him Lachrymae based on the song by Dowland.^[3]

In 1953 he was made a Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) by Queen Elizabeth II.

Primrose was known for his tremendous technique. When he performed Paganini's violin caprices on viola, Mischa Elman is said to have exclaimed, "It must be easier on viola!" Primrose wrote many transcriptions and arrangements for viola, often technically dazzling, including "La Campanella" (from Paganini's second violin concerto) and the famous Nocturne from Borodin's second string quartet, the latter "out of jealousy" for the cello's long melodic lines.

William Primrose died from cancer in Provo, Utah on 1 May 1982. His large collection of annotated viola scores became the nucleus for the William Primrose International Viola Archive at the Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University. For his contribution to the recording industry, Primrose has a star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame at 6801 Hollywood Boulevard in Los Angeles.

Teaching[link]

Later in his life, Primrose became a noted teacher, writing several books on viola playing and teaching widely in Japan, Australia (where Richard Tognetti was one of his students)^[4] and the USA, occasionally at the University of Southern California (with Jascha Heifetz), the Juilliard School, Eastman School of Music, Indiana University Jacobs School of Music, Brigham Young University, and the Curtis Institute of Music. Some of his notable students include Canadian violinist Albert Pratz, former principle of the Los Angeles Philharmonic Alan de Veritch, Los Angeles Philharmonic violist Jerry Epstein, and Olympic Music Festival founder and violist Alan Iglitzin. In 1972, he published his memoirs, A Walk on the North Side.

The Primrose International Viola Competition, created in 1979 in honor of William Primrose, was the first international music competition for viola players.

The Primrose Amati viola[link]

For the first part of his career, Primrose played an Amati viola, formerly owned by his father.^[5] The ex-Primrose Amati is now owned by Roberto Díaz, who is currently the president of the Curtis Institute of Music and recorded a CD of Primrose's transcriptions for Naxos Records. Prior to the recording, the viola was inspected and was found to have had adjustments of questionable workmanship, which were subsequently repaired. Primrose had noted that the viola had a wolf tone and did not project easily. He was also known to have owned and played on at least one viola by William Moennig Jr. of Philadelphia.

The Primrose Guarneri viola[link]

In 1951 Primrose sold his Amati viola and in 1954 he purchased the 1697 ex-Lord Harrington Guarneri viola now known as the ex-Primrose.^[6] This viola is one of three known Guarneri family violas. It bears an original label of Andrea Guarneri who died in 1698 but experts believe that the work is that of his son Joseph Guarneri 'filius Andrea' who inherited his father's workshop.^[7] The ex-Primrose Guarneri is now owned by Ulrich Fritze who has played the viola during his 30 year tenure as principal violist of the Berlin Philharmonic.^[8]

Works[link]

• The Art and Practice of Scale playing on the Viola
• Technique is Memory. A method for violin and viola players based on finger patterns, etc.
• Walk on the north side: Memoirs of a violist

Notes[link]

External links[link]

• An article on Primrose from BYU Magazine
• Primrose Archive at Brigham Young University
• William Primrose's Discography

Robert McNamara
Official portrait photograph (1961)
8th United States Secretary of Defense
In office January 21, 1961 – February 29, 1968
President	John F. Kennedy Lyndon B. Johnson
Deputy	Roswell Gilpatric Cyrus Vance Paul Nitze
Preceded by	Thomas S. Gates, Jr.
Succeeded by	Clark Clifford
5th President of the World Bank Group
In office April 1968 – June 1981
Preceded by	George David Woods
Succeeded by	Alden W. Clausen
Personal details
Born	Robert Strange McNamara June 9, 1916 San Francisco, California
Died	July 6, 2009(2009-07-06) (aged 93) Washington, D.C.
Political party	Republican[1][2]
Spouse(s)	Margaret Craig (1940–1981) Diana Masieri Byfield (2004–2009)
Alma mater	University of California, Berkeley Harvard Business School
Religion	Presbyterian
Signature
Military service
Service/branch	United States Army Air Forces
Years of service	1943 – 1946
Rank	Lieutenant Colonel
Awards	Legion of Merit
[3]

Robert Strange McNamara (June 9, 1916 – July 6, 2009)^[4] was an American business executive and the eighth Secretary of Defense, serving under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson from 1961 to 1968, during which time he played a large role in escalating the United States involvement in the Vietnam War.^[5] Following that, he served as President of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981. McNamara was responsible for the institution of systems analysis in public policy, which developed into the discipline known today as policy analysis.^[6]

Prior to public service, McNamara was one of the "Whiz Kids" who helped rebuild Ford Motor Company after World War II, and briefly served as Ford's President before becoming Secretary of Defense.

Early life and career[link]

Robert McNamara was born in San Francisco, California.^[3] His father was Robert James McNamara, sales manager of a wholesale shoe company. His mother was Clara Nell Strange McNamara.^[7][8] His father's family was Irish and in about 1850, following the Great Irish Famine, had emigrated to Massachusetts and later to California.^[9] He graduated from Piedmont High School in Piedmont, California in 1933 where he was president of the Rigma Lions boys club^[10] and earned the rank of Eagle Scout. He graduated from the University of California, Berkeley in 1937 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in economics with minors in mathematics and philosophy. He was a member of Phi Gamma Delta fraternity,^[11] was elected to Phi Beta Kappa his sophomore year and earned a varsity letter in crew. He was also a member of the UC Berkeley's Order of the Golden Bear which was a fellowship of students and leading faculty members formed to promote leadership within the student body. He earned an MBA from Harvard Business School in 1939.

After graduating from Harvard Business School, McNamara worked a year for the accounting firm Price Waterhouse in San Francisco. In August 1940 he returned to Harvard to teach accounting in the business school and became the highest paid and youngest assistant professor at that time. Following his involvement there in a program to teach analytical approaches used in business to officers of the United States Army Air Forces, he entered the USAAF as a captain in early 1943, serving most of World War II with its Office of Statistical Control. One major responsibility was the analysis of U.S. bombers' efficiency and effectiveness, especially the B-29 forces commanded by Major General Curtis LeMay in India, China and the Mariana Islands.^[12] McNamara established a statistical control unit for XX Bomber Command and devised schedules for B-29s doubling as transports for carrying fuel and cargo over The Hump. He left active duty in 1946 with the rank of lieutenant colonel and with a Legion of Merit.

President of Ford Motor Company[link]

In 1946, Charles "Tex" Thornton, a colonel under whom McNamara had served, put together a group of officers from his AAF Statistical Control operation to go into business together. Thornton had seen an article in Life magazine portraying Ford as being in dire need of reform. Henry Ford II, himself a World War II veteran from the Navy, hired the entire group of 10, including McNamara.

The "Whiz Kids", as they came to be known, helped the money-losing company reform its chaotic administration through modern planning, organization and management control systems. Whiz Kids origins: Because of their youth, combined with asking lot of questions, Ford employees initially and disparagingly, referred to them as the "Quiz Kids". In a remarkable "turning of the tables", these Quiz Kids rebranded themselves as the "Whiz Kids" and backed-up their new moniker with performance driven results. Starting as manager of planning and financial analysis, he advanced rapidly through a series of top-level management positions.

McNamara was a force behind the wildly popular Ford Falcon sedan, introduced in the fall of 1959— a small, simple and inexpensive-to-produce counter to the large, expensive vehicles prominent in the late 1950s. McNamara placed a high emphasis on safety: the Lifeguard options package introduced the seat belt (a novelty at the time)^{[citation needed]} and a dished steering wheel which help prevent the driver's being impaled on the steering column.^[13]

After the Lincoln line's very large 1958, 1959 and 1960 models proved unpopular, McNamara pushed for smaller versions, such as the 1961 Lincoln Continental — now an icon among 1960s automobiles.

On November 9, 1960, McNamara became the first president of Ford from outside the Ford family. He received substantial^[vague] credit for Ford's postwar success.

Secretary of Defense[link]

President John F. Kennedy and McNamara, 1962

United States Civil Defense booklet Fallout Protection commissioned by McNamara

After his election in 1960, President-elect John F. Kennedy first offered the post of Secretary of Defense to former secretary Robert A. Lovett; Lovett declined but recommended McNamara. Kennedy then sent Sargent Shriver to approach him regarding either the Treasury or the Defense cabinet post less than five weeks after McNamara had become president at Ford. McNamara immediately rejected the Treasury position but eventually accepted Kennedy's invitation to serve as Secretary of Defense.

According to Special Counsel Ted Sorensen, Kennedy regarded McNamara as the "star of his team, calling upon him for advice on a wide range of issues beyond national security, including business and economic matters."^[14] McNamara became one of the few members of the Kennedy Administration to work and socialize with Kennedy, and he became so close to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy that he served as a pallbearer at the younger Kennedy's funeral in 1968.^[15]

Initially, the basic policies outlined by President Kennedy in a message to Congress on March 28, 1961, guided McNamara in the reorientation of the defense program. Kennedy rejected the concept of first-strike attack and emphasized the need for adequate strategic arms and defense to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies. U.S. arms, he maintained, must constantly be under civilian command and control, and the nation's defense posture had to be "designed to reduce the danger of irrational or unpremeditated general war". The primary mission of U.S. overseas forces, in cooperation with allies, was "to prevent the steady erosion of the Free World through limited wars". Kennedy and McNamara rejected massive retaliation for a posture of flexible response. The U.S. wanted choices in an emergency other than "inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation", as the president put it. Out of a major review of the military challenges confronting the U.S. initiated by McNamara in 1961 came a decision to increase the nation's "limited warfare" capabilities. These moves were significant because McNamara was abandoning President Dwight D. Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation in favor of a flexible response strategy that relied on increased U.S. capacity to conduct limited, non-nuclear warfare.

He also created the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1961^[16] and the Defense Supply Agency.

The Kennedy administration placed particular emphasis on improving ability to counter communist "wars of national liberation", in which the enemy avoided head-on military confrontation and resorted to political subversion and guerrilla tactics. As McNamara said in his 1962 annual report, "The military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. The political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination." In practical terms, this meant training and equipping U.S. military personnel, as well as such allies as South Vietnam, for counterinsurgency operations.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, McNamara served as a member of EXCOMM and played a large role in the Administration's handling and eventual defusing of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He was a strong proponent of the blockade option over a missile strike and helped persuade the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree with the blockade option.

Increased attention to conventional strength complemented these special forces preparations. In this instance he called up reserves and also proceeded to expand the regular armed forces. Whereas active duty strength had declined from approximately 3,555,000 to 2,483,000 between 1953 (the end of the Korean War) and 1961, it increased to nearly 2,808,000 by June 30, 1962. Then the forces leveled off at around 2,700,000 until the Vietnam military buildup began in 1965, reaching a peak of nearly 3,550,000 by mid-1968, just after McNamara left office.^[17]

Other steps[link]

McNamara took other steps to increase U.S. deterrence posture and military capabilities. He raised the proportion of Strategic Air Command (SAC) strategic bombers on 15-minute ground alert from 25% to 50%, thus lessening their vulnerability to missile attack. In December 1961, he established the United States Strike Command (STRICOM). Authorized to draw forces when needed from the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), the Tactical Air Command, and the airlift units of the Military Air Transport Service and the military services, Strike Command had the mission "to respond swiftly and with whatever force necessary to threats against the peace in any part of the world, reinforcing unified commands or… carrying out separate contingency operations." McNamara also increased long-range airlift and sealift capabilities and funds for space research and development. After reviewing the separate and often uncoordinated service efforts in intelligence and communications, McNamara in 1961 consolidated these functions in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Communications Agency (the latter originally established by Secretary Gates in 1960), having both report to the secretary of defense through the JCS. The end effect was to remove the Intelligence function from the control of the military and to put it under the control of the Secretary of Defense. In the same year, he set up the Defense Supply Agency to work toward unified supply procurement, distribution, and inventory management under the control of the Secretary of Defense rather than the uniformed military.

McNamara's institution of systems analysis as a basis for making key decisions on force requirements, weapon systems, and other matters occasioned much debate. Two of its main practitioners during the McNamara era, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, described the concept as follows: "First, the word 'systems' indicates that every decision should be considered in as broad a context as necessary… The word 'analysis' emphasizes the need to reduce a complex problem to its component parts for better understanding. Systems analysis takes a complex problem and sorts out the tangle of significant factors so that each can be studied by the method most appropriate to it." Enthoven and Smith said they used mainly civilians as systems analysts because they could apply independent points of view to force planning. McNamara's tendency to take military advice into less account than had previous secretaries and to override military opinions contributed to his unpopularity with service leaders. It was also generally thought that Systems Analysis, rather than being objective, was tailored by the civilians to support decisions that McNamara had already made.^{[citation needed]}

The most notable example of systems analysis was the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) instituted by United States Department of Defense Comptroller Charles J. Hitch. McNamara directed Hitch to analyze defense requirements systematically and produce a long-term, program-oriented Defense budget. PPBS evolved to become the heart of the McNamara management program. According to Enthoven and Smith, the basic ideas of PPBS were: "the attempt to put defense program issues into a broader context and to search for explicit measures of national need and adequacy"; "consideration of military needs and costs together"; "explicit consideration of alternatives at the top decision level"; "the active use of an analytical staff at the top policymaking levels"; "a plan combining both forces and costs which projected into the future the foreseeable implications of current decisions"; and "open and explicit analysis, that is, each analysis should be made available to all interested parties, so that they can examine the calculations, data, and assumptions and retrace the steps leading to the conclusions." In practice, the data produced by the analysis was so large and so complex that while it was available to all interested parties, none of them could challenge the conclusions.^{[citation needed]}

Among the management tools developed to implement PPBS were the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), the Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM), the Readiness, Information and Control Tables, and the Development Concept Paper (DCP). The annual FYDP was a series of tables projecting forces for eight years and costs and manpower for five years in mission-oriented, rather than individual service, programs. By 1968, the FYDP covered ten military areas: strategic forces, general purpose forces, intelligence and communications, airlift and sealift, guard and reserve forces, research and development, central supply and maintenance, training and medical services, administration and related activities, and support of other nations.

The DPM—intended for the White House and usually prepared by the systems analysis office—was a method to study and analyze major defense issues. Sixteen DPMs appeared between 1961 and 1968 on such topics as strategic offensive and defensive forces, NATO strategy and force structure, military assistance, and tactical air forces. OSD sent the DPMs to the services and the JCS for comment; in making decisions, McNamara included in the DPM a statement of alternative approaches, force levels, and other factors. The DPM in its final form became a decision document. The DPM was hated by the JCS and uniformed military in that it cut their ability to communicate directly to the White House.^{[citation needed]} The DPMs were also disliked because the systems analysis process was so heavyweight that it was impossible for any service to effectively challenge its conclusions.^{[citation needed]}

The Development Concept Paper examined performance, schedule, cost estimates, and technical risks to provide a basis for determining whether to begin or continue a research and development program. But in practice, what it proved to be was a cost burden that became a barrier to entry for companies attempting to deal with the military. It aided the trend toward a few large non-competitive defense contractors serving the military. Rather than serving any useful purpose, the overhead necessary to generate information that was often in practice ignored resulted in increased costs throughout the system.^{[citation needed]}

The Readiness, Information, and Control Tables provided data on specific projects, more detailed than in the FYDP, such as the tables for the Southeast Asia Deployment Plan, which recorded by month and quarter the schedule for deployment, consumption rates, and future projections of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.

ABM[link]

Toward the end of his term McNamara also opposed an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system proposed for installation in the U.S. in defense against Soviet missiles, arguing the $40 billion "in itself is not the problem; the penetrability of the proposed shield is the problem."^[18] Under pressure to proceed with the ABM program after it became clear that the Soviets had begun a similar project, McNamara finally agreed to a "light" system which he believed could protect against the far smaller number of Chinese missiles. However, he never believed it was wise for the United States to move in that direction because of psychological risks of relying too much on nuclear weaponry and that there would be pressure from many directions to build a larger system than would be militarily effective.^[19]

He always believed that the best defense strategy for the U.S. was a parity of mutually assured destruction with the Soviet Union. An ABM system would be an ineffective weapon as compared to an increase in deployed nuclear missile capacity.

Cost reductions[link]

McNamara's staff stressed systems analysis as an aid in decision making on weapon development and many other budget issues. The secretary believed that the United States could afford any amount needed for national security, but that "this ability does not excuse us from applying strict standards of effectiveness and efficiency to the way we spend our defense dollars…. You have to make a judgment on how much is enough." Acting on these principles, McNamara instituted a much-publicized cost reduction program, which, he reported, saved $14 billion in the five-year period beginning in 1961. Although he had to withstand a storm of criticism from senators and representatives from affected congressional districts, he closed many military bases and installations that he judged unnecessary to national security. He was equally determined about other cost-saving measures.^[20] But in the end, most of the cost savings were illusionary. Every base he closed resulted in a new construction project elsewhere to expand another base, relocation of forces projects and other related spending. The actual cost savings through consolidation of installations was often minimal or in some cases negative.^{[citation needed]}

Due to the nuclear arms race, the Vietnam War buildup and other projects, total obligational authority (TOA) increased greatly during the McNamara years. Fiscal year TOA increased from $48.4 billion in 1962 to $49.5 billion in 1965 (before the major Vietnam increases) to $74.9 billion in 1968, McNamara's last year in office. Not until FY 1984 did DoD's total obligational authority surpass that of FY 1968 in constant dollars.

Program consolidation[link]

One major hallmark of McNamara's cost reductions was the consolidation of programs from different services, most visibly in aircraft acquisition, believing that the redundancy created waste and unnecessary spending. McNamara directed the Air Force to adopt the Navy's F-4 Phantom and A-7 Corsair combat aircraft, a consolidation that was quite successful. Conversely, his actions in mandating a premature across-the-board adoption of the untested M16 rifle proved catastrophic when the weapons began to fail in combat. McNamara tried to extend his success by merging development programs as well, resulting in the TFX dual service F-111 project. It was to combine Air Force requirements for an air superiority fighter and tactical bomber. His experience in the corporate world led him to believe that adopting a single type for different missions and service would save money. He insisted on the General Dynamics entry over the DOD's preference for Boeing because of commonality issues. Though heralded as a fighter that could do everything (fast supersonic dash, slow carrier and short airfield landings, tactical strike, and even close air support), in the end it involved too many compromises to succeed at any of them. The Navy version was drastically overweight and difficult to land, and eventually canceled after a Grumman study showed it was incapable of matching the abilities of the newly revealed Soviet MiG-23 and MiG-25 aircraft. The F-111 would eventually find its niche as a tactical bomber and electronic warfare aircraft with the Air Force.

However, many analysts believe that even though the TFX project itself was a failure, McNamara was ahead of his time as the trend in fighter design has continued toward consolidation — the F-16 Falcon and F/A-18 Hornet emerged as multi-role fighters, and most modern designs combine many of the roles the TFX would have had. In many ways, the Joint Strike Fighter is seen as a rebirth of the TFX project, in that it purports to satisfy the needs of three American Air arms (as well as several foreign customers), fulfilling the roles of strike fighter, carrier-launched fighter, V/STOL, and close air support (and drawing many criticisms similar to those leveled against the TFX).

Vietnam War[link]

McNamara at a cabinet meeting, 1967.

During President John F. Kennedy's term, while McNamara was Secretary of Defense, America's troops in Vietnam increased from 900 to 16,000 advisers,^[21] who were not supposed to engage in combat but rather to train the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

The Truman and Eisenhower administrations had committed the United States to support the French and native anti-Communist forces in Vietnam in resisting efforts by the Communists in the North to unify the country, though neither administration established actual combat forces in the war. The U.S. role—initially limited to financial support, military advice and covert intelligence gathering—expanded after 1954 when the French withdrew. During the Kennedy administration, the U.S. military advisory group in South Vietnam steadily increased, with McNamara's concurrence, from 900 to 16,000.^[21] U.S. involvement escalated after the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in August 1964, involving a falsely reported attack on two U.S. destroyers by North Vietnamese naval vessels.^[22] McNamara was instrumental in presenting this event to Congress and the public as a pretext for escalation. The Vietnam War came to claim most of McNamara's time and energy.

President Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes on North Vietnamese naval bases and Congress approved almost unanimously the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the president "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression."

In 1965, in response to stepped up military activity by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam and their North Vietnamese allies, the U.S. began bombing North Vietnam, deployed large military forces and entered into combat in South Vietnam. McNamara's plan, supported by requests from top U.S. military commanders in Vietnam, led to the commitment of 485,000 troops by the end of 1967 and almost 535,000 by June 30, 1968. The casualty lists mounted as the number of troops and the intensity of fighting escalated. McNamara put in place a statistical strategy for victory in Vietnam. He concluded that there were a limited number of Viet Cong fighters in Vietnam and that a war of attrition would destroy them. He applied metrics (body counts) to determine how close to success his plan was.

McNamara with Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt at The Pentagon in July 1966.

Although he was a prime architect of the Vietnam War and repeatedly overruled the JCS on strategic matters, McNamara gradually became skeptical about whether the war could be won by deploying more troops to South Vietnam and intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam, a claim he would publish in a book years later. He also stated later that his support of the Vietnam War was given out of loyalty to administration policy. He traveled to Vietnam many times to study the situation firsthand and became increasingly reluctant to approve the large force increments requested by the military commanders.

McNamara said that the Domino Theory was the main reason for entering the Vietnam War. In the same interview he stated, "Kennedy hadn't said before he died whether, faced with the loss of Vietnam, he would [completely] withdraw; but I believe today that had he faced that choice, he would have withdrawn."^[23]

Social equity[link]

To commemorate President Harry S Truman's signing an order to end segregation in the military McNamara issued Directive 5120.36 on July 26, 1963. This directive, Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, dealt directly with the issue of racial and gender discrimination in areas surrounding military communities. The directive declared, "Every military commander has the responsibility to oppose discriminatory practices affecting his men and their dependents and to foster equal opportunity for them, not only in areas under his immediate control, but also in nearby communities where they may live or gather in off-duty hours." (para. II.C.)^[24] Under the directive, commanding officers were obligated to use the economic power of the military to influence local businesses in their treatment of minorities and women. With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the commanding officer could declare areas off-limits to military personnel for discriminatory practices.^[25]

Departure[link]

A 1968 Cabinet meeting with Dean Rusk, President Johnson and McNamara

McNamara wrote of his close personal friendship with Jackie Kennedy, and how she demanded that he stop the killing in Vietnam.^[26] As McNamara grew more and more controversial after 1966 and his differences with the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff over Vietnam strategy became the subject of public speculation, frequent rumors surfaced that he would leave office. In an early November 1967 memorandum to Johnson, McNamara's recommendation to freeze troop levels, stop bombing North Vietnam and for the U.S. to hand over ground fighting to South Vietnam was rejected outright by the President. McNamara's recommendations amounted to his saying that the strategy of the United States in Vietnam which had been pursued to date had failed. McNamara later stated he "never heard back" from Johnson regarding the memo. Largely as a result, on November 29 of that year, McNamara announced his pending resignation and that he would become President of the World Bank. Other factors were the increasing intensity of the anti-war movement in the U.S., the approaching presidential campaign in which Johnson was expected to seek re-election, and McNamara's support — over the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — of construction along the 17th parallel separating South and North Vietnam of a line of fortifications running from the coast of Vietnam into Laos. The President's announcement of McNamara's move to the World Bank stressed his stated interest in the job and that he deserved a change after seven years as Secretary of Defense, longer than any of his predecessors or successors.

Others give a different view of McNamara's departure from office. For example, Stanley Karnow in his book "Vietnam: A History" strongly suggests that McNamara was asked to leave by the President. McNamara himself expressed uncertainty about the question.^[27]

McNamara left office on February 29, 1968; for his efforts, the President awarded him both the Medal of Freedom^[28] and the Distinguished Service Medal.

Shortly after McNamara departed the Pentagon, he published "The Essence of Security", discussing various aspects of his tenure and position on basic national security issues. He did not speak out again on defense issues or Vietnam until after he left the World Bank.

World Bank President[link]

McNamara served as head of the World Bank from April 1968 to June 1981, when he turned 65.^[29] In his 13 years at the Bank, he introduced key changes, most notably, shifting the Bank's focus toward targeted poverty reduction. He negotiated, with the conflicting countries represented on the Board, a spectacular^{[peacock term]} growth in funds to channel credits for development, in the form of health, food, and education projects. He also instituted new methods of evaluating the effectiveness of funded projects. One notable project started during McNamara's tenure was the effort to prevent river blindness.^[29]

The World Bank currently has a scholarship program under his name.^[30]

As World Bank President, McNamara declared at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group that countries permitting birth control practices would get preferential access to resources.

Post-World Bank activities and assessments[link]

In 1982 McNamara joined several other former national security officials in urging that the United States pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in Europe in the event of hostilities; subsequently he proposed the elimination of nuclear weapons as an element of NATO's defense posture.

In 1993, Washington journalist Deborah Shapley published a 615-page biography of Robert McNamara entitled Promise and Power: the Life and Times of Robert McNamara. The last pages of her book made clear that while Ms. Shapley deeply admired certain aspects of McNamara the man, and the public servant, she had seen first-hand his need to manipulate the truth, as well as to tell it. Shapley concluded her book with these words: "For better and worse McNamara shaped much in today's world -- and imprisoned himself. A little-known nineteenth century writer, F.W. Boreham, offers a summation: `We make our decisions. And then our decisions turn around and make us.'"

McNamara's memoir, In Retrospect, published in 1995, presented an account and analysis of the Vietnam War from his point of view. According to his lengthy New York Times obituary, "[h]e concluded well before leaving the Pentagon that the war was futile, but he did not share that insight with the public until late in life. In 1995, he took a stand against his own conduct of the war, confessing in a memoir that it was 'wrong, terribly wrong.'" In return, he faced a "firestorm of scorn" at that time.^[3]

The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara is a 2003 Errol Morris documentary consisting mostly of interviews with Robert McNamara and archival footage. It went on to win the Academy Award for Documentary Feature. The particular structure of this personal account is accomplished with the characteristics of an intimate dialog. As McNamara explains, it is a process of examining the experiences of his long and controversial period as the United States Secretary of Defense, as well as other periods of his personal and public life. In this documentary he referred to the Vietnam War and he said, "None of our allies supported us. Not Japan, not Germany, not Britain or France. If we can't persuade nations with comparable values of the merit of our cause, we'd better reexamine our reasoning."

The eleven lessons explored in the documentary are:

1. Empathize with your enemy
2. Rationality will not save us
3. There's something beyond oneself
4. Maximize efficiency
5. Proportionality should be a guideline in war
6. Get the data
7. Belief and seeing are both often wrong
8. Be prepared to reexamine your reasoning
9. In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil
10. Never say never
11. You can't change human nature.

McNamara maintained his involvement in politics in his later years, delivering statements critical of the Bush administration's 2003 invasion of Iraq.^[31] On January 5, 2006, McNamara and most living former Secretaries of Defense and Secretaries of State met briefly at the White House with President Bush to discuss the war.^[32]

McNamara has been portrayed or fictionalized in several films;^[33] and in at least one popular video game.^[34].

Personal life[link]

McNamara married Margaret Craig, his teenage sweetheart, on August 13, 1940. Margaret McNamara, a former teacher, used her position as a Cabinet spouse to launch a reading program for young children, Reading Is Fundamental, which became the largest literacy program in the country. She died of cancer in 1981.

The couple had two daughters and a son. The son Robert Craig McNamara, who as a student objected to the Vietnam War, is now a walnut and grape farmer in California.^[35] He is the owner of Sierra Orchards in Winters, California. Daughter Kathleen McNamara Spears is a forester with the World Bank.^[36] The second daughter is Margaret Elizabeth Pastor.^[3]

In the Errol Morris documentary, McNamara reports that both he and his wife were stricken with polio shortly after the end of World War II. Although McNamara had a relatively short stay in the hospital, his wife's case was more serious and it was concern over meeting her medical bills that led to his decision to not return to Harvard but to enter private industry as a consultant at Ford Motor Company.

When working at Ford Motor Company, McNamara resided in Ann Arbor, Michigan rather than the usual auto executive domains of Grosse Pointe, Birmingham, and Bloomfield Hills. He and his wife sought to remain connected with a university town (the University of Michigan) after their hopes of returning to Harvard after the war were put on hold.

In 1961 he was named Alumnus of the Year by the University of California, Berkeley.^[37]

On September 29, 1972, a passenger on the ferry to Martha's Vineyard recognized McNamara on board and attempted to throw him into the ocean. McNamara declined to press charges. The man remained anonymous, but was interviewed years later by author Paul Hendrickson,^[38] who quoted the attacker as saying, "I just wanted to confront (McNamara) on Vietnam."

After his wife's death, McNamara dated Katharine Graham, with whom he had been friends since the early 1960s. Graham died in 2001.

In September 2004, McNamara wed Diana Masieri Byfield, an Italian-born widow who had lived in the United States for more than 40 years. It was her second marriage. She was married for more than three decades to Ernest Byfield, a former OSS officer and Chicago hotel heir whose mother, Gladys Tartiere, leased her 400 acres (1.6 km²), Glen Ora estate in Middleburg, Virginia to John F. Kennedy during his presidency.^[39][40]

McNamara was, at the end of his life, a life trustee on the Board of Trustees of the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), a trustee of the Economists for Peace and Security, and an honorary trustee for the Brookings Institution.

McNamara died in his sleep at his home in Washington, D.C. early in the morning on July 6, 2009. He was 93.^[41]

See also[link]

United States Army portal

• List of California Institute of Technology trustees
• List of Presidential Medal of Freedom recipients
• List of United States political appointments that crossed party lines
• Project Dye Marker
• The Fog of War

Works[link]

• (1968) The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. New York, Harper & Row, 1968; London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1968. ISBN 0-340-10950-5.
• (1973) One hundred countries, two billion people: the dimensions of development. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973. ASIN B001P51NUA^[42]
• (1981) The McNamara years at the World Bank: major policy addresses of Robert S. McNamara, 1968-1981; with forewords by Helmut Schmidt and Léopold Senghor. Baltimore: Published for the World Bank by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. ISBN 0-8018-2685-3.
• (1985) The challenges for sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: 1985.
• (1986) Blundering into disaster: surviving the first century of the nuclear age. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. ISBN 0-394-55850-2 (hardcover); ISBN 0-394-74987-1 (pbk.).
• (1989) Out of the cold: new thinking for American foreign and defense policy in the 21st century. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. ISBN 0-671-68983-5.
• (1992) The changing nature of global security and its impact on South Asia. Washington, DC: Washington Council on Non-Proliferation, 1992.
• (1995) In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. (with Brian VanDeMark.) New York: Times Books, 1995. ISBN 0-8129-2523-8; New York: Vintage Books, 1996. ISBN 0-679-76749-5.
• (1999) Argument without end: in search of answers to the Vietnam tragedy. (Robert S. McNamara, James G. Blight, and Robert K. Brigham.) New York: Public Affairs, 1999. ISBN 1-891620-22-3 (hc).
• (2001) Wilson’s ghost: reducing the risk of conflict, killing, and catastrophe in the 21st century. (Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight.) New York: Public Affairs, 2001. ISBN 1-891620-89-4.

References[link]