Chinese Civil War
People's Liberation Army attacking government defensive positions in Shangtang
Date Encirclement Campaigns; April 1927 – December 1936 Intermittent clashes; January 1941 – July 1945 Full-scale war; March 1946 – May 1950 Cross-strait shellings and insurgency operations in Western China; 1950–1979 War declared over by the ROC in 1991[1] Location China Status Communist military victory in mainland China People's Republic of China established on mainland China Government of the Republic of China relocated to Taipei No armistice or peace treaty signed[2][3]
Belligerents
Nationalist Party of China Republic of China After 1949:  Republic of China on Taiwan	Communist Party of China Soviet China After 1949:  People's Republic of China
Commanders and leaders
Chiang Kai-shek Bai Chongxi Chen Cheng Li Zongren Yan Xishan He Yingqin	/ Mao Zedong / Zhu De / Peng Dehuai / Lin Biao / He Long
Strength
4,300,000 (July 1945)[4] 3,650,000 (June 1948) 1,490,000 (June 1949)	1,200,000 (July 1945)[4] 2,800,000 (June 1948) 4,000,000 (June 1949)
Casualties and losses
1928–1936: ~2,000,000 Military Casualties 1945–1949: ~1-3 million dead [5]

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The Chinese Civil War (1927–1950) was a civil war fought between the Kuomintang (KMT), the governing party of the Republic of China, and the Communist Party of China (CPC),^[6] for the control of China which eventually led to China's division into two Chinas, Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan and People's Republic of China (PRC) in Mainland. The war began in April 1927, amidst the Northern Expedition,^[7] and essentially ended when major active battles ceased in 1949–1950. However there is debate on whether the war has officially ended. The conflict continues in the form of military threats and political and economic pressure, particularly over the political status of Taiwan. The continued tension is described in cross-Strait relations. The Chinese Civil War is the third largest war ever fought in history, behind World War I and World War II.

The war represented an ideological split between the Nationalist KMT, and the Communist CPC. In mainland China today, the last three years of the war (1947–1949) are more commonly known as the War of Liberation, or alternatively the Third Internal Revolutionary War (第三次国内革命战争). In Taiwan, the war was also known as the Counter-insurgency War against Communists (戡亂戰爭) before 1991 or commonly the Nationalist-Communist Civil War (國共內戰) in both sides.

The civil war continued intermittently until the Second Sino-Japanese War led the two parties to form a Second United Front. Japan's campaign was defeated in 1945, marking the end of World War II, and China's full-scale civil war resumed in 1946. After four more years, 1950 saw the cessation of major military hostilities—with the newly founded People's Republic of China controlling mainland China (including Hainan Island, a sub-division region of Guangdong Province at the time until 1988), and the Republic of China's jurisdiction being restricted to Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy, Matsu and several outlying islands. It is observed that the Yan'an Rectification Movement that remolded the Chinese Communist Party, the June 1946 ceasefire called by United States special envoy George Marshall that disrupted Nationalist China's efforts to defeat the Communists in Northeast China, the worsening social and economic problems in Nationalist controlled areas, the handover of the captured artillery from Kanto Army to the People's Liberation Army by the Soviet troop (as footnoted in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 505), and the inconsistent American aid to the Nationalists all contributed to the downfall of the Republic of China in Mainland China in less than 5 years.

To this day, since no armistice or peace treaty has ever been signed, the PRC still actively claims Taiwan as part of its territory and continues military threats against Taiwan, the ROC also has a mutual claim on mainland China, and both continue the fight over diplomatic recognition, there is debate on whether the Civil War has legally ended.^[8] The war of weapons has given way to a war of words. Today, the war (such as it is) occurs on the political and economic fronts in the form of cross-Strait relations. The People's Republic threatens the ROC with a military invasion if the ROC officially declares independence for Taiwan by changing its name to and gaining international recognition as the Republic of Taiwan. Today, the de facto separate states on the two sides of the Taiwan strait have close economic ties.^[9]

Background[link]

The Qing Dynasty, the last of the ruling Chinese dynasties, collapsed in 1911.^[9] China was left under the control of several major and lesser warlords in the Warlord era. To defeat these warlords, who had seized control of much of Northern China, the anti-monarchist and national unificationist Kuomintang party and its leader Sun Yat-sen, sought the help of foreign powers.

Sun Yat-sen's efforts to obtain aid from the Western democracies were ignored, however, and in 1921 he turned to the Soviet Union. For political expediency, the Soviet leadership initiated a dual policy of support for both Sun and the newly established Communist Party of China, which would eventually found the People's Republic of China. Thus the struggle for power in China began between the KMT and the CPC.

In 1923, a joint statement by Sun and Soviet representative Adolph Joffe in Shanghai pledged Soviet assistance for China's unification.^[10] The Sun-Joffe Manifesto was a declaration for cooperation among the Comintern, KMT and the Communist Party of China.^[10] Comintern agent Mikhail Borodin arrived in China in 1923 to aid in the reorganization and consolidation of the KMT along the lines of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPC joined the KMT to form the First United Front.^[4]

In 1923, Sun Yat-sen sent Chiang Kai-shek, one of Sun's lieutenants from his Tongmeng Hui days, for several months' military and political study in Moscow.^[11] By 1924, Chiang became the head of the Whampoa Military Academy, and rose to prominence as Sun's successor as head of the KMT.^[11]

The Soviets provided much of the studying material, organization, and equipment including munitions for the academy.^[11] The Soviets also provided education in many of the techniques for mass mobilization. With this aid Sun Yat-sen was able to raise a dedicated "army of the party," with which he hoped to defeat the warlords militarily. CPC members were also present in the academy, and many of them became instructors, including Zhou Enlai who was made a political instructor of the academy.^[12]

Communist members were allowed to join the KMT on an individual basis.^[10] The CPC itself was still small at the time, having a membership of 300 in 1922 and only 1,500 by 1925.^[13] The KMT in 1923 had 50,000 members.^[13]

Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and KMT-CPC split[link]

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army, emerged from the Northern Expedition as the leader of China.

In early 1927; the KMT-CPC rivalry led to a split in the revolutionary ranks. The CPC and the left wing of the KMT had decided to move the seat of the KMT government from Guangzhou to Wuhan, where communist influence was strong.^[13] But Chiang and Li Zongren, whose armies defeated warlord Sun Chuanfang, moved eastward toward Jiangxi. The leftists rejected Chiang's demand and Chiang denounced the leftists for betraying Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People by taking orders from the Soviet Union. According to Mao Zedong, Chiang's tolerance of the CPC in the KMT camp decreased as his power increased.^[14]

On April 7, Chiang and several other KMT leaders held a meeting arguing that communist activities were socially and economically disruptive, and must be undone for the national revolution to proceed. As a result of this, on April 12, Chiang turned on the CPC in Shanghai. The KMT was purged of leftists by the arrest and execution of hundreds of CPC members.^[15] It was directed by General Bai Chongxi. This was called the April 12 Incident or Shanghai Massacre by the CPC.^[16]

The massacre widened the rift between Chiang and Wang Jingwei's Wuhan. Attempts were made by CPC to take cities such as Nanchang, Changsha, Shantou, and Guangzhou. An armed rural insurrection, known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising was staged by peasants, miners and CPC members in Hunan Province led by Mao Zedong.^[17] The uprising was unsuccessful.^[17] There were now three capitals in China: the internationally recognized republic capital in Beijing,^[18] the CPC and left-wing KMT at Wuhan,^[19] and the right-wing KMT regime at Nanjing, which would remain the KMT capital for the next decade.^[18]

The CPC had been expelled from Wuhan by their left-wing KMT allies, who in turn were toppled by Chiang Kai-shek. The KMT resumed the campaign against warlords and captured Beijing in June 1928.^[20] Afterwards most of eastern China was under the Nanjing central government's control, and the Nanjing government received prompt international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China. The KMT government announced in conformity with Sun Yat-sen, the formula for the three stages of revolution: military unification, political tutelage, and constitutional democracy.^[21]

Encirclement Campaigns and the Long March (1927–1937)[link]

During the 1920s, Communist Party of China activists retreated underground or to the countryside where they fomented a military revolt, beginning the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927.^[22] They combined the force with remnants of peasant rebels, and established control over several areas in southern China.^[22] The Guangzhou commune was able to control Guangzhou for three days and a "soviet" was established.^[22] KMT armies continued to suppress the rebellions.^[22] This marked the beginning of the ten year's struggle, known in mainland China as the "Ten Year's Civil War" (Traditional Chinese: 十年內戰 Simplified Chinese:十年内战 Pinyin:Shínían Nèizhàn). It lasted until the Xi'an Incident when Chiang Kai-shek was forced to form the Second United Front against the invading Japanese.

A Communist leader addressing Long March survivors.

In 1930 the Central Plains War broke out as an internal conflict of the KMT. It was launched by Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Wang Jingwei. The attention was turned to root out remaining pockets of Communist activity in a series of encirclement campaigns. There were a total of five campaigns.^[23] The first and second campaigns failed and the third was aborted due to the Mukden Incident. The fourth campaign (1932–1933) achieved some early successes, but Chiang’s armies were badly mauled when they tried to penetrate into the heart of Mao’s Soviet Chinese Republic. During these campaigns, the KMT columns struck swiftly into Communist areas, but were easily engulfed by the vast countryside and were not able to consolidate their foothold.

Finally, in late 1934, Chiang launched a fifth campaign that involved the systematic encirclement of the Jiangxi Soviet region with fortified blockhouses.^[24] Unlike in previous campaigns in which they penetrated deeply in a single strike, this time the KMT troops patiently built blockhouses, each separated by five or so miles to surround the Communist areas and cut off their supplies and food source.^[24]

In October 1934, the CPC took advantage of gaps in the ring of blockhouses (manned by the troops of a warlord ally of Chiang Kai-shek's, rather than the KMT themselves) to escape Jiangxi. The warlord armies were reluctant to challenge Communist forces for fear of wasting their own men, and did not pursue the CPC with much fervor. In addition, the main KMT forces were preoccupied with annihilating Zhang Guotao's army, which was much larger than Mao's. The massive military retreat of Communist forces lasted a year and covered what Mao estimated as 12,500 km (25,000 Li), and was known as the famous Long March.^[25]

The march ended when the CPC reached the interior of Shaanxi. Zhang Guotao's army, which took a different route through northwest China, was largely destroyed by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Muslim ally, the Ma clique. Along the way, the Communist army confiscated property and weapons from local warlords and landlords, while recruiting peasants and the poor, solidifying its appeal to the masses. Of the 90,000-100,000 people who began the Long March from the Soviet Chinese Republic, only around 7,000-8,000 made it to Shaanxi.^[26] The remnants of Zhang's forces eventually joined Mao in Shaanxi, but with his army destroyed, Zhang, even as a founding member of the CPC, was never able to challenge Mao's authority. Essentially, the great retreat made Mao the undisputed leader of the Communist Party of China.

The Kuomintang used Khampa soldiers to battle the Communist Red Army as it advanced, and to undermine local warlords who often refused to fight Communist forces to conserve their own strength. 300 "Khampa bandits" were enlisted into the Kuomintang's Consolatory Commission military in Sichuan, where they were part of the effort of the central government of China to penetrated and destabilize the local Han warlords such as Liu Wenhui. The Chinese government sought to exercise full control over frontier areas against the warlords. Liu had refused to battle the Communists to conserve his army. The Consoltary Commission forces were used to battle the Communist Red Army, but were defeated when their religious leader was captured by Communist forces.^[27]

Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945)[link]

The government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was severely weakened in power by the Second Sino-Japanese War.

During the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek, who saw the CPC as a greater threat, refused to ally with the CPC to fight against the Japanese Imperial Army. Chiang preferred to unite China by eliminating the warlords and CPC forces first. Chiang believed that he was still too weak to launch an offensive to chase out Japan and that China needed time for a military build-up. Only after unification would it be possible for the KMT to mobilize a war against Japan. So he would rather ignore the discontent and anger among Chinese people at his policy of compromise with the Japanese, and urged Zhang and Yang to carry out suppression of the CPC efficiently.ref "On December 12, 1936, KMT Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek and forced him to a truce with the CPC. The incident became known as the Xi'an Incident.^[28] Both parties suspended fighting to form a Second United Front to focus their energies and fighting against the Japanese.^[28] In 1937, Japanese launched its full scale invasion of China and its well-equipped troops overran KMT defenders in north and coastal China.

The alliance of CPC and KMT was in name only.^[29] Unlike the KMT troops, CPC shunned conventional warfare and instead engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. The level of actual cooperation and coordination between the CPC and KMT during World War II was at best minimal.^[29] In the midst of the Second United Front, the CPC and the KMT were still vying for territorial advantage in "Free China" (i.e. areas not occupied by the Japanese or ruled by Japanese puppet governments such as Manchukuo and the Reorganized National Government of China).^[29]

The situation came to a head in late 1940 and early 1941 when there were major clashes between the Communist and KMT forces. In December 1940, Chiang Kai-shek demanded that the CPC’s New Fourth Army evacuate Anhui and Jiangsu Provinces. Under intense pressure, the New Fourth Army commanders complied. In 1941 the New Fourth Army Incident led to several thousand deaths in the CPC.^[30] It also ended the Second united front formed earlier to fight the Japanese.^[30]

In general, developments in the Second Sino-Japanese War were to the advantage of the CPC, as their guerilla war effort had won them popular support within the Japanese-occupied areas while the KMT's burden to defend China against main Japanese assaults due to its status as the legal government of China proved costly to Chiang Kai-shek and his troops. In 1944 Japan launched its last major offensive, Operation Ichigo, against the KMT that severely weakened Chiang Kai-shek's forces.^[31]

Immediate post-war clashes (1945–1946)[link]

From left to right: US diplomat Patrick J. Hurley, Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Ch'ün, Wang Shi Jie (王世杰), Mao Zedong

Under the terms of the Japanese unconditional surrender dictated by the United States, Japanese troops were ordered to surrender to KMT troops and not to the CPC present in some of the occupied areas.^[32] In Manchuria, however, where the KMT had no forces, the Japanese surrendered to the Soviet Union. Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the Japanese troops to remain at their post to receive the Kuomintang and not surrender their arms to the communists.^[32]

The first post-war peace negotiation was attended by both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong in Chongqing from August 28, 1945 to October 10, 1945.^[33] Both sides stressed the importance of a peaceful reconstruction, but the conference did not produce any concrete result.^[33] Battles between the two sides continued even as the peace negotiation was in progress, until the agreement was reached in January 1946. However, large campaigns and full scale confrontations between the CPC and Chiang's own troops were temporarily avoided.

In the last month of World War II in East Asia, Soviet forces launched the mammoth Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation to attack the Japanese in Manchuria and along the Chinese-Mongolian border.^[34] This operation destroyed the fighting capability of the Kwantung Army and left the USSR in occupation of all of Manchuria by the end of the war. Consequently, the 700,000 Japanese troops stationed in the region surrendered. Later in the year, Chiang Kai-shek realized that he lacked the resources to prevent a CPC takeover of Manchuria following the scheduled Soviet departure. He therefore made a deal with the Russians to delay their withdrawal until he had moved enough of his best-trained men and modern material into the region. KMT troops were then airlifted by the United States to occupy key cities in North China, while the countryside was already dominated by the CPC. The Soviets spent the extra time systematically dismantling the extensive Manchurian industrial base (worth up to 2 billion dollars) and shipping it back to their war-ravaged country.^[35]

The truce fell apart in June 1946, when full scale war between CPC and KMT broke out on June 26. China then entered a state of civil war that lasted more than three years.^[36]

Fighting in mainland China (1946–1950)[link]

Background and disposition of forces[link]

By the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the balance of power in China's civil war had shifted in favor of the Communists. Their main force grew to 1.2 million troops, with a Militia of 2 million. Their "Liberated Zone" contained 19 base areas, including 1/4 of the country's territory and 1/3 of its population; this included many important towns and cities. Moreover, the Soviet Union turned over all of their captured Japanese weapons and a substantial amount of their own supplies to the Communists, who received Northeastern China from the Soviets as well.^[37]

In March 1946, despite repeated requests from Chiang, the Soviet Red Army under the command of general Malinovsky continued to delay pulling out of Manchuria while he secretly told the CPC forces to move in behind them, because Stalin wanted Mao to have firm control of at least the northern part of Manchuria before the complete withdrawal of the Soviets,^[38] which led to full-scale war for the control of the Northeast. These favourable conditions also facilitated many changes inside the Communist leaders: the more hard-line and firmer force finally gained the upper hand and defeated the opportunists.^[37]

Although General Marshall stated that he knew of no evidence that the CPC were being supplied by the Soviet Union,^[39] the CPC were able to capture a large number of weapons abandoned by the Japanese, including some tanks but it was not until large numbers of well trained KMT troops surrendered and joined the communist forces that the CPC were finally able to master the hardware.^[40] But despite the disadvantage in military hardware, the CPC's ultimate trump card was its land reform policy. The CPC continued to make the irresistible promise in the countryside to the massive number of landless and starving Chinese peasants that by fighting for the CPC they would be able to take farmland from their landlords.^[41] This strategy enabled the CPC to access an almost unlimited supply of manpower to use in combat as well as provide logistic support, despite suffering heavy casualties throughout many civil war campaigns. For example, during the Huaihai Campaign alone the CPC were able to mobilize 5,430,000 peasants to fight against the KMT forces.^[42]

After the war with the Japanese ended, Chiang Kai-shek quickly moved KMT troops to newly liberated areas to prevent Communist forces from receiving the Japanese surrender.^[37] The United States airlifted many KMT troops from central China to the Northeast (Manchuria). President Truman was very clear about what he described as "using the Japanese to hold off the Communists". In his memoirs he writes:

Using the pretext of "receiving the Japanese surrender", business interests within the KMT government occupied most of the banks, factories and commercial properties, which had previously been seized by the Japanese Imperial Army.^[37] They also recruited troops at a brutal pace from the civilian population and hoarded supplies, preparing for a resumption of war with the Communists. These hasty and harsh preparations caused great hardship for the residents of cities such as Shanghai, where the unemployment rate rose dramatically to 37.5%.^[37]

The United States strongly supported the Kuomintang forces. Over 50,000 Marines were sent to guard strategic sites, and 100,000 US troops were sent to Shandong. The US equipped and trained over 500,000 KMT troops, and transported KMT forces to occupy newly liberated zones, as well as to contain Communist controlled areas.^[37] American aid included substantial amounts of both new and surplus military supplies; additionally, loans worth hundreds of millions of dollars were made to the KMT.^[44] Within less than 2 years after the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT had received 4.43 billion dollars from the US - most of which was military aid.^[37]

Outbreak of War[link]

With the breakdown of talks, all-out war resumed. This stage is referred to in mainland China and Communist historiography as the "War of Liberation" (Chinese: 解放战争; pinyin: Jiěfàng Zhànzhēng). On 20 July 1946, Chiang Kai-shek launched a large-scale assault on Communist territory with 113 brigades (1.6 million troops).;^[37] this marked the final phase of the Chinese Civil War.

Knowing their disadvantages in manpower and equipment, the CPC executed a "passive defense" strategy. They avoided the strong points of the KMT army, and were prepared to abandon territory in order to preserve their forces. In most cases, the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. They also attempted to wear out the KMT forces as much as possible. This tactic seemed to be successful; after a year, the power balance became more favorable to the CPC. They wiped out 1.12 million KMT troops, while their strength grew to about 2 million men.^[37]

The PLA enters Beijing in the Pingjin Campaign and control the later capital of PRC

In March 1947, the KMT achieved a symbolic victory by seizing the CPC capital of Yan'an.^[45] Soon after, the Communists counterattacked; on 30 June 1947, CPC troops crossed the Huanghe river and moved to Dabie Mountains area, restored and developed the Central Plain. Concurrently, Communist forces in Northeastern China, North China and East China began to counter attack as well.^[37]

By late 1948 the CPC eventually captured the northern cities of Shenyang and Changchun and seized control of the Northeast after struggling through numerous set-backs while trying to take the cities, with the decisive Liaoshen Campaign.^[46] The New First Army, regarded as the best KMT army, had to surrender after the CPC conducted a deadly 6-month siege of Changchun that resulted in more than 150,000 civilian deaths from starvation.^[47]

The capture of large KMT formations provided them with the tanks, heavy artillery, and other combined-arms assets needed to prosecute offensive operations south of the Great Wall. By April 1948 the city of Luoyang fell, cutting the KMT army off from Xi'an.^[48] Following a fierce battle, the CPC captured Jinan and Shandong province on September 24, 1948. The Huaihai Campaign of late 1948 and early 1949 secured east-central China for the CPC.^[46] The outcome of these encounters were decisive for the military outcome of the civil war.^[46]

The Pingjin Campaign resulted in the Communist conquest of northern China lasting 64 days from November 21, 1948, to January 31, 1949.^[49] The People's Liberation Army suffered heavy casualties from securing Zhangjiakou, Tianjin along with its port and garrison at Dagu and Beiping.^[49] The CPC brought 890,000 troops from the Northeast to oppose some 600,000 KMT troops.^[48] There were 40,000 CPC casualties at Zhangjiakou alone. They in turn killed, wounded or captured some 520,000 KMT during the campaign.^[49]

Monument in memory of the crossing of the Yangtze in Nanjing

After the three decisive Liaoshen, Huaihai and Pingjin campaigns, the CPC wiped out 144 regular and 29 non-regular KMT divisions, including 1.54 million veteran KMT troops. This effectively smashed the backbone of the KMT army.^[37]

On 21 April, Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River. On 23 April and they captured the KMT's capital, Nanjing.^[25] The KMT government retreated to Canton (Guangzhou) until October 15, Chongqing until November 25, and then Chengdu before retreating to Taiwan on December 10. By late 1949, the People's Liberation Army was pursuing remnants of KMT forces southwards in southern China, and only Tibet was left.

In addition, the Ili Rebellion was a Soviet backed revolt by the Second East Turkestan Republic against the KMT from 1944-1949 as the Mongolians in the People's Republic were in a border dispute with the Republic of China. A Chinese Muslim Hui cavalry regiment, the 14th Tungan Cavalry regiment, was sent by the Chinese government to attack Mongol and Soviet positions along the border during the Pei-ta-shan Incident.^[50][51]

Several last-ditch attempts by the Kuomintang to use Khampa soldiers against the Communists in southwest China were set up. The Kuomintang formulated a plan where 3 Khampa divisions would be assisted by the Panchen Lama to oppose the Communists.^[52] Kuomintang intelligence reported that some Tibetan tusi chiefs and the Khampa Su Yonghe controlled 80,000 troops in Sichuan, Qinghai, and Tibet. They hoped to use them against the Communist army.^[53]

Establishment of the People's Republic and the Kuomintang retreat to Taiwan[link]

Mao Zedong proclaiming the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949.

On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China with its capital at Beiping, which was renamed Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek and approximately 2 million Nationalist Chinese retreated from mainland China to the island of Taiwan.^[54] There remained only isolated pockets of resistance, notably in Sichuan (ending soon after the fall of Chengdu on December 10, 1949) and in the far south.

A PRC attempt to take the ROC controlled island of Quemoy was thwarted in the Battle of Kuningtou halting the PLA advance towards Taiwan.^[55] In December 1949, Chiang proclaimed Taipei, Taiwan, the temporary capital of the Republic of China and continued to assert his government as the sole legitimate authority in China.

The Communists' other amphibious operations of 1950 were more successful: they led to the Communist conquest of Hainan Island in April 1950, capture of Wanshan Islands off the Guangdong coast (May–August 1950) and of Zhoushan Island off Zhejiang (May 1950).^[56]

Relationship between the two sides since 1950[link]

Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall in response to a Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the United States initially showed no interest in supporting Chiang's government in its final stand. Things changed radically with the onset of the Korean War in June 1950. At this point, allowing a total Communist victory over Chiang became politically impossible in the United States, and President Harry S Truman ordered the United States Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent the ROC and PRC from attacking each other.^[57]

In June 1949, the ROC declared a "closure" of all mainland China ports and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships. The closure covered from a point north of the mouth of Min river in Fujian province to the mouth of the Liao river in Manchuria.^[58] Since mainland China's railroad network was underdeveloped, north-south trade depended heavily on sea lanes. ROC naval activity also caused severe hardship for mainland China fishermen.

"Forget not that you're in Jǔ" - a rock in Quemoy Island with Chiang Kai-shek's admonition to ROC fighters not to retreat, and to retake the mainland

After losing mainland China, a group of approximately 12,000 KMT soldiers escaped to Burma and continued launching guerrilla attacks into south China during the Kuomintang Islamic Insurgency in China (1950–1958). Their leader, General Li Mi, was paid a salary by the ROC government and given the nominal title of Governor of Yunnan. Initially, the United States supported these remnants and the Central Intelligence Agency provided them with aid. After the Burmese government appealed to the United Nations in 1953, the U.S. began pressuring the ROC to withdraw its loyalists. By the end of 1954, nearly 6,000 soldiers had left Burma and Li Mi declared his army disbanded. However, thousands remained, and the ROC continued to supply and command them, even secretly supplying reinforcements at times.

After the ROC complained to the United Nations against the Soviet Union supporting the PRC, the UN General Assembly Resolution 505 was adopted on February 1, 1952 to condemn the Soviet Union.

Though viewed as a military liability by the United States, the ROC viewed its remaining islands in Fujian as vital for any future campaign to defeat the PRC and retake mainland China. On September 3, 1954, the First Taiwan Strait crisis began when the PLA started shelling Quemoy and threatened to take the Dachen Islands.^[58] On January 20, 1955, the PLA took nearby Yijiangshan Island, with the entire ROC garrison of 720 troops killed or wounded defending the island. On January 24 of the same year, the United States Congress passed the Formosa Resolution authorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands.^[58] The First Taiwan Straits crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment. The crisis was brought to a close during the Bandung conference.^[58]

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis began on August 23, 1958 with air and naval engagements between the PRC and the ROC military forces, leading to intense artillery bombardment of Quemoy (by the PRC) and Amoy (by the ROC), and ended on November of the same year.^[58] PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the United States rejected Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to bomb mainland China artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also provided amphibious assault ships to land supplies, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On September 7, the United States escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships and the PRC refrained from firing.

Despite the end of the hostilities, the two sides have never signed any agreement or treaty to officially end the war.

By 1984, PRC and ROC had public contacts with each other and cross-straits trade and investment has been growing ever since. Although the Taiwan straits remain a potential flash point, regular direct air links were established in 2009.^[9]

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96 escalated tensions between both sides when the PRC tested a series of missiles not far from Taiwan although, arguably, Beijing ran the test to shift the vote in favor of the KMT, already facing a challenge from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party which did not agree with the "One China Policy" shared by the CPC and KMT.^[59]

With the election in 2000 of the Democratic Progressive Party candidate Chen Shui-bian, a party other than the KMT gained the presidency for the first time in Taiwan. The new president did not share the Chinese nationalist ideology of the KMT and CPC. This led to tension between the two sides although trade and other ties such as the 2005 Pan-Blue visit continued to increase.

Since the election of President Ma Ying-Jeou (KMT) in 2008, significant warming of relations has resumed between Taipei and Beijing with high level exchanges between the ruling parties of both states such as the Chen-Chiang summit series.

Commanders during the Civil War[link]

Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang)[link]

• Chiang Kai-shek (Commander-in-chief)
• Tsou Hong Da (Chief Commander of Navy)
• Wang Yaowu
• Chen Cheng
• Yee Kuang Han
• Fu Zuoyi
• Li Zongren
• Liu Chih
• Sun Li-jen
• Du Yuming
• Wang Sheng
• Xue Yue
• Bai Chongxi

Chinese Communist Party[link]

• Mao Zedong (Commander-in-chief)
• Zhu De
• Zhou Enlai
• Lin Biao
• Peng Dehuai
• Chen Yi
• Liu Bocheng
• Nie Rongzhen

Warlords[link]

• Zhang Zuolin (also known as Ch'ang Tso-Lin), killed in a train bombing by the Japanese, his son Zhang Xueliang took over his lands.
• Zhang Xueliang, son of Zhang Zuolin, in the Xian Incident, he and Yang Hu Cheng forced Chiang Kai-shek to end his war against the Communists and ally with them against the Japanese. He was then jailed by Chiang until 1989.
• Feng Yuxiang, changed his support to KMT in 1925, then fought them in 1930 Central Plains War and lost. Organized the Chahar People's Anti-Japanese Army in cooperation with north China Communists and changed again to CPC in 1945 and visited the USSR.
• Yan Xishan, ruled Shanxi Province until 1948.
• Ma clique, a family of warlords who ruled Qinghai, Gansu and Ningxia from the 1910s until 1949.
• Chen Jitang governed the province of Guangdong where he made significant contributions in terms of modernization and education. He later became part of Chiang's Nationalist Government and finished his life as the "Strategic Adviser of the President" in Taiwan, where he died in 1954.

List of Chinese Civil War weapons[link]

Handguns

• Mauser C96 (Chinese copy), Nationalists, warlords, Communists
• Browning Hi-Power, Nationalists, Communists
• Luger P08, Nationalists
• Nambu Type 14, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 26, Nationalists, Communists
• Nambu Type 94, Nationalists, Communists
• Nagant M1895, Communists
• Tokarev TT-30/TT-33, Communists
• Colt M1911/A1 (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists

Rifles

• Type 24 rifle, Nationalists, warlords, Communists
• ZH-29 rifle, Nationalists
• Hanyang Type 88, Nationalists, warlords, Communists
• Gewehr 98, Nationalists, warlords, Communists
• Mauser Karabiner 98 kurz, Nationalists
• vz. 24, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 38 Rifle, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 2 Rifle, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 38 Cavalry Rifle, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 99 Rifle, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 97 Sniper Rifle, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 44 Cavalry Rifle, Nationalists, Communists
• Mosin-Nagant M1891/30, M1938, M1944, Communists
• Tokarev SVT-38, SVT-40, Communists
• M1 Garand (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists
• M1 Carbine (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists
• M1903 Springfield (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists
• M1941 Johnson rifle (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists
• M1917 Enfield rifle (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists
• Mondragón F-08, Nationalist, Communists
• Lee-Enfield SMLE Rifle No.4 Mk.1, Nationalists

Submachine Guns

• MP18 (Chinese copy), Nationalists, warlords, Communists
• SIG MKMS, warlords
• Thompson M1928, M1928A1, M1, M1A1 (U.S Lend Lease, later local produced Chinese copies), Nationalists
• PPSh-41, Communists
• PPS-43, Communists
• M3/A1 'Grease Gun' (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists, Communists
• M50 Reising submachine gun (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists
• Sten, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 100 submachine gun, Nationalists, Communists

Machine Guns

• ZB vz.26 (purchashed in large quantity from Czechoslovakia), Nationalists, warlords, Communists
• Madsen machine gun (Multi-caliber), warlords, Nationalists, Communists
• MG 34, Nationalists, warlords, Communists
• Type 11 Light Machine Gun, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 96 Light Machine Gun, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 97 Light Machine Gun, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 99 Light Machine Gun, Nationalists, Communists
• M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists
• FN BAR, Nationalists
• Bren light machine gun, Nationalists
• Lahti-Saloranta M/26, Nationalists
• DP-28 Light Machine Gun, Communists
• Browning M1919 Medium Machine Gun (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists

Heavy Machine Guns

• Chinese Type 24 Heavy Machine Gun (Chinese copy of MG 08), Nationalists, warlords, Communists
• MG08,Nationalists,Warlords,Communists
• Browning M1917A1 Heavy Machine Gun (Chinese copy), Nationalists
• Browning M2 Heavy Machine Gun (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists
• Type 92 Heavy Machine Gun, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 1 Heavy Machine Gun, Nationalists, Communists
• Type 3 Heavy Machine Gun, Nationalists, Communists
• DShK 1938 Heavy Machine Gun, Communists
• Maxim PM1910 Machine Gun, Communists
• SG-43 Goryunov, Communists

Anti-Tank Weapons

• PaK 36, Nationalists, Communists
• PTRD-41 Bolt-action Anti-Tank Rifle, Communists
• PTRS-41 Semi-Automatic Anti-Tank Rifle, Communists
• Rocket Launcher, M1/A1 "Bazooka" (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists
• ZiS-2, Communists
• ZiS-3, Communists

Grenades

• Model 24 grenade (Chinese copies) Communists, warlords, Nationalists
• F1 Fragmentation Hand Grenade, Communists
• RGD-33 Fragmentation Hand Grenade, Communists
• Mk.2 Fragmentation Hand Grenade (U.S Lend Lease), Nationalists

Misc

• Dadao, Nationalists, Communists

Notes[link]

External links[link]

• Chronology of Civil War in China^{[dead link]}
• "Armored Car Like Oil Tanker Used by Chinese" Popular Mechanics, March 1930 article and photo of armoured train of Chinese Civil War
• THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE HUAI-HAI CAMPAIGN
• bjorge huai.pdf
• Chinese Civil War 1945–1950
• Postal Stamps of the Chinese Post-Civil War Era
• Topographic maps of China Series L500, U.S. Army Map Service, 1954-

Aftermath of the Battle of Gettysburg, American Civil War, 1863

A civil war is a war between organized groups within the same nation state or republic,^[1] or, less commonly, between two countries created from a formerly united nation state.^[2] The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve independence for a region, or to change government policies.^[1] The term is a calque of the Latin bellum civile which was used to refer to the various civil wars of the Roman Republic in the 1st century BC.

A civil war is a high-intensity conflict, often involving regular armed forces, that is sustained, organized and large-scale. Civil wars may result in large numbers of casualties and the consumption of significant resources.^[3]

Civil wars since the end of World War II have lasted on average just over four years, a dramatic rise from the one-and-a-half year average of the 1900-1944 period. While the rate of emergence of new civil wars has been relatively steady since the mid-19th century, the increasing length of those wars resulted in increasing numbers of wars ongoing at any one time. For example, there were no more than five civil wars underway simultaneously in the first half of the 20th century, while over 20 concurrent civil wars were occurring at the end of the Cold War, before a significant decrease as conflicts strongly associated with the superpower rivalry came to an end. Since 1945, civil wars have resulted in the deaths of over 25 million people, as well as the forced displacement of millions more. Civil wars have further resulted in economic collapse; Burma (Myanmar), Uganda and Angola are examples of nations that were considered to have promising futures before being engulfed in civil wars.^[4]

Definition[link]

Remains of a T-62 tank after rebels enter Addis Ababa at the end of the Ethiopian Civil War, 1991

James Fearon, a scholar of civil wars at Stanford University, defines a civil war as "a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies".^[1] Ann Hironaka further specifies that one side of a civil war is the state.^[3] The intensity at which a civil disturbance becomes a civil war is contested by academics. Some political scientists define a civil war as having more than 1000 casualties,^[1] while others further specify that at least 100 must come from each side.^[5] The Correlates of War, a dataset widely used by scholars of conflict, classifies civil wars as having over 1000 war-related casualties per year of conflict. This rate is a small fraction of the millions killed in the Second Sudanese Civil War and Cambodian Civil War, for example, but excludes several highly publicized conflicts, such as The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the struggle of the African National Congress in Apartheid-era South Africa.^[3]

Based on the 1000 casualties per year criterion, there were 213 civil wars from 1816 to 1997, 104 of which occurred from 1944 to 1997.^[3] If one uses the less-stringent 1000 casualties total criterion, there were over 90 civil wars between 1945 and 2007, with 20 ongoing civil wars as of 2007.^[1]

Further definitions[link]

Battle of Tewkesbury (1471) of the Wars of the Roses in England

The Geneva Conventions do not specifically define the term "civil war". They do, however, describe the criteria for acts qualifying as "armed conflict not of an international character", which includes civil wars. Among the conditions listed are four requirements:^[6][7]

• The party in revolt must be in possession of a part of the national territory.
• The insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over the population within the determinate portion of the national territory.
• The insurgents must have some amount of recognition as a belligerent.
• The legal Government is "obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military."

Causes of civil war in the Collier-Hoeffler Model[link]

Scholars investigating the cause of civil war are attracted by two opposing theories, greed versus grievance. Roughly stated: are conflicts caused by who people are, whether that be defined in terms of ethnicity, religion or other social affiliation, or do conflicts begin because it is in the economic best interests of individuals and groups to start them? Scholarly analysis supports the conclusion that economic and structural factors are more important than those of identity in predicting occurrences of civil war.^[8]

A comprehensive studies of civil war was carried out by a team from the World Bank in the early 21st century. The study framework, which came to be called the Collier-Hoeffler Model, examined 78 five-year increments when civil war occurred from 1960 to 1999, as well as 1,167 five-year increments of "no civil war" for comparison, and subjected the data set to regression analysis to see the effect of various factors. The factors that were shown to have a statistically significant effect on the chance that a civil war would occur in any given five-year period were:^[9]

Availability of finance

An economic dependence on commodities, such as diamonds being mined by these children in Sierra Leone, is correlated with an increased risk of civil war. (See also blood diamond.)

A high proportion of primary commodities in national exports significantly increases the risk of a conflict. A country at "peak danger", with commodities comprising 32% of gross domestic product, has a 22% risk of falling into civil war in a given five-year period, while a country with no primary commodity exports has a 1% risk. When disaggregated, only petroleum and non-petroleum groupings showed different results: a country with relatively low levels of dependence on petroleum exports is at slightly less risk, while a high-level of dependence on oil as an export results in slightly more risk of a civil war than national dependence on another primary commodity. The authors of the study interpreted this as being the result of the ease by which primary commodities may be extorted or captured compared to other forms of wealth, for example, it is easy to capture and control the output of a gold mine or oil field compared to a sector of garment manufacturing or hospitality services.^[10]

A second source of finance is national diasporas, which can fund rebellions and insurgencies from abroad. The study found that statistically switching the size of a country's diaspora from the smallest found in the study to the largest resulted in a sixfold increase in the chance of a civil war.^[10]

Armed Arab volunteers during the 1947-1948 civil war in the British Mandate of Palestine

Opportunity cost of rebellion

Higher male secondary school enrollment, per capita income and economic growth rate all had significant effects on reducing the chance of civil war. Specifically, a male secondary school enrollment 10% above the average reduced the chance of a conflict by about 3%, while a growth rate 1% higher than the study average resulted in a decline in the chance of a civil war of about 1%. The study interpreted these three factors as proxies for earnings foregone by rebellion, and therefore that lower foregone earnings encourages rebellion.^[10] Phrased another way: young males (who make up the vast majority of combatants in civil wars) are less likely to join a rebellion if they are getting an education and/or have a comfortable salary, and can reasonably assume that they will prosper in the future.

Low per capita income has been proposed as a cause for grievance, prompting armed rebellion. However, for this to be true, one would expect economic inequality to also be a significant factor in rebellions, which it is not. The study therefore concluded that the economic model of opportunity cost better explained the findings.^[9]

Military advantage

Communist soldiers during the Battle of Siping, Chinese Civil War, 1946

High levels of population dispersion and, to a lesser extent, the presence of mountainous terrain increased the chance of conflict. Both of these factors favor rebels, as a population dispersed outward toward the borders is harder to control than one concentrated in a central region, while mountains offer terrain where rebels can seek sanctuary.^[10]

Grievance

Most proxies for "grievance" - the theory that civil wars begin because of issues of identity, rather than economics - were statistically insignificant, including economic equality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization. Only ethnic dominance, the case where the largest ethnic group comprises a majority of the population, increased the risk of civil war. A country characterized by ethnic dominance has nearly twice the chance of a civil war. However, the combined effects of ethnic and religious fractionalization, i.e. the more chance that any two randomly chosen people will be from separate ethnic or religious groups the less chance of a civil war, were also significant and positive, as long as the country avoided ethnic dominance. The study interpreted this as stating that minority groups are more likely to rebel if they feel that they are being dominated, but that rebellions are more likely to occur the more homogeneous the population and thus more cohesive the rebels. These two factors may thus be seen as mitigating each other in many cases.^[11]

Population size

The various factors contributing to the risk of civil war rise increase with population size. The risk of a civil war rises approximately proportionately with the size of a country's population.^[9]

Time

The more time that has elapsed since the last civil war, the less likely it is that a conflict will recur. The study had two possible explanations for this: one opportunity-based and the other grievance-based. The elapsed time may represent the depreciation of whatever capital the rebellion was fought over and thus increase the opportunity cost of restarting the conflict. Alternatively, elapsed time may represent the gradual process of healing of old hatreds. The study found that the presence of diaspora substantially reduced the positive effect of time, as the funding from diasporas offsets the depreciation of rebellion-specific capital.^[11]

Other causes[link]

Evolutionary psychologist Satoshi Kanazawa has argued that an important cause of intergroup conflict may be the relative availability of women of reproductive age. He found that polygyny greatly increased the frequency of civil wars but not interstate wars.^[12] Gleditsch et al. did not find a relationship between ethnic groups with polygyny and increased frequency of civil wars but nations having legal polygamy may have more civil wars. They argued that misogyny is a better explanation than polygyny. They found that increased women's rights were are associated with less civil wars and that legal polygamy had no effect after women’s rights were controlled for.^[13]

Duration of civil wars[link]

Ann Hironaka, author of Neverending Wars, divides the modern history of civil wars into the pre-19th century, 19th century to early 20th century, and late 20th century. In 19th century Europe, the length of civil wars fell significantly, largely due to the nature of the conflicts as battles for the power center of the state, the strength of centralized governments, and the normally quick and decisive intervention by other states to support the government. Following World War II the duration of civil wars grew past the norm of the pre-19th century, largely due to weakness of the many postcolonial states and the intervention by major powers on both sides of conflict. The most obvious commonality to civil wars are that they occur in fragile states.^[14]

Civil wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries[link]

An artillery school set up by the anti-socialist "Whites" during the Finnish Civil War, 1918

Civil wars through the 19th century to early 20th century tended to be short; the average length of a civil war between 1900 and 1944 was one and half years.^[15] The state itself was the obvious center of authority in the majority of cases, and the civil wars were thus fought for control of the state. This meant that whoever had control of the capital and the military could normally crush resistance. If a rebellion failed to quickly seize the capital and control of the military for itself, it was normally doomed to a quick destruction. For example, the fighting associated with the 1871 Paris Commune occurred almost entirely in Paris, and ended quickly once the military sided with the government.^[16]

The power of non-state actors resulted in a lower value placed on sovereignty in the 18th and 19th centuries, which further reduced the number of civil wars. For example, the pirates of the Barbary Coast were recognized as de facto states because of their military power. The Barbary pirates thus had no need to rebel against the Ottoman Empire, who were their nominal state government, to gain recognition for their sovereignty. Conversely, states such as Virginia and Massachusetts in the United States of America did not have sovereign status, but had significant political and economic independence coupled with weak federal control, reducing the incentive to secede.^[17]

The two major global ideologies, monarchism and democracy, led to several civil wars. However, a bi-polar world, divided between the two ideologies, did not develop, largely due the dominance of monarchists through most of the period. The monarchists would thus normally intervene in other countries to stop democratic movements taking control and forming democratic governments, which were seen by monarchists as being both dangerous and unpredictable. The Great Powers, defined in the 1815 Congress of Vienna as the United Kingdom, Habsburg Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia, would frequently coordinate interventions in other nations' civil wars, nearly always on the side of the incumbent government. Given the military strength of the Great Powers, these interventions were nearly always decisive and quickly ended the civil wars.^[18]

There were several exceptions from the general rule of quick civil wars during this period. The American Civil War (1861–1865) was unusual for at least two reasons: it was fought around regional identities, rather than political ideologies, and it was ended through a war of attrition, rather than over a decisive battle over control of the capital, as was the norm. The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) was exceptional because both sides of the war received support from intervening great powers: Germany, Italy, and Portugal supported opposition leader Francisco Franco, while France and Russia supported the government^[19] (see proxy war).

Civil wars since 1945[link]

In the 1990s, about twenty civil wars were occurring concurrently during an average year, a rate about ten times the historical average since the 19th century. However, the rate of new civil wars had not increased appreciably; the drastic rise in the number of ongoing wars after World War II was a result of the tripling of the average duration of civil wars to over four years.^[20] This increase was a result of the increased number of states, the fragility of states formed after 1945, the decline in interstate war, and the Cold War rivalry.^[21]

Following World War II, the major European powers divested themselves of their colonies at an increasing rate: the number of ex-colonial states jumped from about 30 to almost 120 after the war. The rate of state formation leveled off in the 1980s, at which point few colonies remained.^[22] More states also meant more states in which to have long civil wars. Hironaka statistically measures the impact of the increased number of ex-colonial states as increasing the post-WWII incidence of civil wars by +165% over the pre-1945 number.^[23]

While the new ex-colonial states appeared to follow the blueprint of the idealized state - centralized government, territory enclosed by defined borders, and citizenry with defined rights -, as well as accessories such as a national flag, an anthem, a seat at the United Nations and an official economic policy, they were in actuality far weaker than the Western states they were modeled after.^[24] In Western states, the structure of governments closely matched states' actual capabilities, which had been arduously developed over centuries. The development of strong administrative structures, in particular those related to extraction of taxes, is closely associated with the intense warfare between predatory European states in the 17th and 18th centuries, or in Charles Tilly's famous formulation: "War made the state and the state made war".^[25] For example, the formation of the modern states of Germany and Italy in the 19th century is closely associated with the wars of expansion and consolidation led by Prussia and Sardinia, respectively.^[25] The Western process of forming effective and impersonal bureaucracies, developing efficient tax systems, and integrating national territory continued into the 20th century; as late as World War I, some French military conscripts from rural regions were unable to name the country they were fighting for.^[26] Nevertheless, Western states that survived into the latter half of the 20th century were considered "strong" by simple reason that they had managed to develop the institutional structures and military capability required to survive predation by their fellow states.

A band of Ogaden National Liberation Front rebels in Ethiopia, 2006

In sharp contrast, decolonization was an entirely different process of state formation. Most imperial powers had not foreseen a need to prepare their colonies for independence; for example, Britain had given limited self-rule to India and Sri Lanka, while treating British Somaliland as little more than a trading post, while all major decisions for French colonies were made in Paris and Belgium prohibited any self-government up until it suddenly granted independence to its colonies in 1960. Like Western states of previous centuries, the new ex-colonies lacked autonomous bureaucracies, which would make decisions based on the benefit to society as a whole, rather than respond to corruption and nepotism to favor a particular interest group. In such a situation, factions manipulate the state to benefit themselves or, alternatively, state leaders use the bureaucracy to further their own self-interest. The lack of credible governance was compounded by the fact that most colonies were economic loss-makers at independence, lacking both a productive economic base and a taxation system to effectively extract resources from economic activity. Among the rare states profitable at decolonization was India, to which scholars credibly argue that Uganda, Malaysia and Angola may be included. Neither did imperial powers make territorial integration a priority, and may have discouraged nascent nationalism as a danger to their rule. Many newly independent states thus found themselves impoverished, with minimal administrative capacity in a fragmented society, while faced with the expectation of immediately meeting the demands of a modern state.^[27] Such states are considered "weak" or "fragile". The "strong"-"weak" categorization is not the same as "Western"-"non-Western", as some Latin American states like Argentina and Brazil and Middle Eastern states like Egypt and Israel are considered to have "strong" administrative structures and economic infrastructure.^[28]

A checkpoint manned by the Lebanese army and US Marines, 1982. The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) was characterized by multiple foreign interventions.

Historically, the international community would have targeted weak states for territorial absorption or colonial domination or, alternatively, such states would fragment into pieces small enough to be effectively administered and secured by a local power. However, international norms towards sovereignty changed in the wake of WWII in ways that support and maintain the existence of weak states. Weak states are given de jure sovereignty equal to that of other states, even when they do not have de facto sovereignty or control of their own territory, including the privileges of international diplomatic recognition and an equal vote in the United Nations. Further, the international community offers development aid to weak states, which helps maintain the facade of a functioning modern state by giving the appearance that the state is capable of fulfilling its implied responsibilities of control and order.^[29] The formation of a strong international law regime and norms against territorial aggression is strongly associated with the dramatic drop in the number of interstate wars, though it has also been attributed to the effect of the Cold War or to the changing nature of economic development. Consequently, military aggression that results in territorial annexation became increasingly likely to prompt international condemnation, diplomatic censure, a reduction in international aid or the introduction of economic sanction, or, as in the case of 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, international military intervention to reverse the territorial aggression.^[30] Similarly, the international community has largely refused to recognize secessionist regions, while keeping some states such as Cyprus and Taiwan in diplomatic recognition limbo. While there is not a large body of academic work examining the relationship, Hironaka's statistical study found a correlation that suggests that every major international anti-secessionist declaration increased the number of ongoing civil wars by +10%, or a total +114% from 1945 to 1997.^[31] The diplomatic and legal protection given by the international community, as well as economic support to weak governments and discouragement of secession, thus had the unintended effect of encouraging civil wars.

A fast attack boat of the rebel LTTE in Sri Lanka in 2003 passes the hulk of an LTTE supply ship that had been sunk by government aircraft, Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009)

There has been an enormous amount of international intervention in civil wars since 1945 that served to extend wars. While intervention has been practiced since the international system has existed, its nature changed substantially. It became common for both the state and opposition group to receive foreign support, allowing wars to continue well past the point when domestic resources had been exhausted. Superpowers, such as the European great powers, had always felt no compunction in intervening in civil wars that affected their interests, while distant regional powers such as the United States could declare the interventionist Monroe Doctrine of 1821 for events in its Central American "backyard". However, the large population of weak states after 1945 allowed intervention by former colonial powers, regional powers and neighboring states who themselves often had scarce resources. On average, a civil war with interstate intervention was 300% longer than those without. When disaggregated, a civil war with intervention on only one side is 156% longer, while intervention on both sides lengthens the average civil war by an addition 92%. If one of the intervening states was a superpower, a civil war is extended a further 72%; a conflict such as the Angolan Civil War, in which there is two-sided foreign intervention, including by a superpower (actually, two superpowers in the case of Angola), would be 538% longer on average than a civil war without any international intervention.^[32]

Effect of the Cold War[link]

The Cold War (1945–1989) provided a global network of material and ideological support that perpetuated civil wars, which were mainly fought in weak ex-colonial states, rather than the relatively strong states that were aligned with the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In some cases, superpowers would superimpose Cold War ideology onto local conflicts, while in others local actors using Cold War ideology would attract the attention of a superpower to obtain support. Using a separate statistical evaluation than used above for interventions, civil wars that included pro- or anti-communist forces lasted 141% longer than the average non-Cold War conflict, while a Cold War civil war that attracted superpower intervention resulted in wars typically lasting over three times as long as other civil wars. Conversely, the end of the Cold War marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 resulted in a reduction in the duration of Cold War civil wars of 92% or, phrased another way, a roughly ten-fold increase in the rate of resolution of Cold War civil wars. Lengthy Cold War-associated civil conflicts that ground to a halt include the wars of Guatemala (1960–1996), El Salvador (1979–1991) and Nicaragua (1970–1990).^[33]

See also[link]

• The Logic of Violence in Civil War
• War of Independence (disambiguation)
• Wars of national liberation

References[link]

Bibliography[link]

• Ali, Taisier Mohamed Ahmed and Robert O. Matthews, eds. Civil Wars in Africa: roots and resolution (1999), 322 pages
• Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Lynne Rienner, 2000).
• Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: civil war and development policy World Bank (2003) - 320 pages
• Collier, Paul; Sambanis, Nicholas, eds. (2005). Understanding Civil War:Evidence and Analysis. 1: Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. ISBN 978-0-8213-6047-7. http://books.google.com/books?id=OnGQQVuIBjgC&pg=PP1&dq=Understanding+Civil+War:Evidence+and+Analysis&cd=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false. 
• Collier, Paul; Sambanis, Nicholas, eds. (2005). Understanding Civil War:Evidence and Analysis. 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions. Washington, DC: The World Bank. ISBN 978-0-8213-6049-1. http://books.google.com/books?id=yNTQ-BDLPxIC&pg=PP1&dq=Understanding+Civil+War:Evidence+and+Analysis&cd=2#v=onepage&q=&f=false. 
• Stathis Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?" World Politics 54, no. 1 (2001): 99-118.
• David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton University Press, 1996).
• Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945--1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (summer 1995): pp 681–690.
• Andrew Mack, "Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (2002): pp. 515–525.
• David T. Mason and Patrick 3. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (fall 1996): 546-568.
• Patrick M. Regan. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (2000) 172 pages
• Stephen John and others., eds. Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (2002), 729 pages
• Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). ISBN 0-691-12383-7.
• Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton University Press, 2002),
• Elisabeth Jean Wood; "Civil Wars: What We Don't Know," Global Governance, Vol. 9, 2003 pp 247+ online version

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Civil wars

• Royal Air Force Doctrine - The Nature of War and Armed Conflict
• "What makes a civil war?", BBC News, 20 April 2006