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The United Nations, with its headquarters in New York City, is the largest international diplomatic organization.

Diplomacy (from Latin diploma, meaning an official document, which in turn derives from the Greek δίπλωμα, meaning a folded paper/document) is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of groups or states. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations^[1] through the intercession of professional diplomats with regard to issues of peace-making, trade, war, economics, culture, environment and human rights. International treaties are usually negotiated by diplomats prior to endorsement by national politicians. In an informal or social sense, diplomacy is the employment of tact to gain strategic advantage or to find mutually acceptable solutions to a common challenge, one set of tools being the phrasing of statements in a non-confrontational, or polite manner.

The scholarly discipline of diplomatics, dealing with the study of old documents, derives its name from the same source, but its modern meaning is quite distinct from the activity of diplomacy.

History[link]

Asia[link]

Ancient China[link]

One of the earliest realists in international relations theory was the 6th century BC military strategist Sun Tzu (d. 496 BC), author of The Art of War. He lived during a time in which rival states were starting to pay less attention to traditional respects of tutelage to the Zhou Dynasty (c. 1050–256 BC) figurehead monarchs while each vied for power and total conquest. However, a great deal of diplomacy in establishing allies, bartering land, and signing peace treaties was necessary for each warring state, and the idealized role of the "persuader/diplomat" developed.^[2]

From the Battle of Baideng (200 BC) to the Battle of Mayi (133 BC), the Han Dynasty was forced to uphold a marriage alliance and pay an exorbitant amount of tribute (in silk, cloth, grain, and other foodstuffs) to the powerful northern nomadic Xiongnu that had been consolidated by Modu Shanyu. After the Xiongnu sent word to Emperor Wen of Han (r. 180–157) that they controlled areas stretching from Manchuria to the Tarim Basin oasis city-states, a treaty was drafted in 162 BC proclaiming that everything north of the Great Wall belong to nomads' lands, while everything south of it would be reserved for Han Chinese. The treaty was renewed no less than nine times, but did not restrain some Xiongnu tuqi from raiding Han borders. That was until the far-flung campaigns of Emperor Wu of Han (r. 141–87 BC) which shattered the unity of the Xiongnu and allowed Han to conquer the Western Regions; under Wu, in 104 BC the Han armies ventured as far Fergana in Central Asia to battle the Yuezhi who had conquered Hellenistic Greek areas.

Portraits of Periodical Offering, a 6th-century Chinese painting portraying various emissaries; ambassadors depicted in the painting ranging from those of Hephthalites, Persia to Langkasuka, Baekje(part of the modern Korea), Qiuci, and Wo (Japan).

The Koreans and Japanese during the Chinese Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD) looked to the Chinese capital of Chang'an as the hub of civilization and emulated its central bureaucracy as the model of governance. The Japanese sent frequent embassies to China in this period, although they halted these trips in 894 when the Tang seemed on the brink of collapse. After the devastating An Shi Rebellion from 755 to 763, the Tang Dynasty was in no position to reconquer Central Asia and the Tarim Basin. After several conflicts with the Tibetan Empire spanning several different decades, the Tang finally made a truce and signed a peace treaty with them in 841.

In the 11th century during the Song Dynasty (960–1279), there were cunning ambassadors such as Shen Kuo and Su Song who achieved diplomatic success with the Liao Dynasty, the often hostile Khitan neighbor to the north. Both diplomats secured the rightful borders of the Song Dynasty through knowledge of cartography and dredging up old court archives. There was also a triad of warfare and diplomacy between these two states and the Tangut Western Xia Dynasty to the northwest of Song China (centered in modern-day Shaanxi). After warring with the Lý Dynasty of Vietnam from 1075 to 1077, Song and Lý made a peace agreement in 1082 to exchange the respective lands they had captured from each other during the war.

Long before the Tang and Song dynasties, the Chinese had sent envoys into Central Asia, India, and Persia, starting with Zhang Qian in the 2nd century BC. Another notable event in Chinese diplomacy was the Chinese embassy mission of Zhou Daguan to the Khmer Empire of Cambodia in the 13th century. Chinese diplomacy was a necessity in the distinctive period of Chinese exploration. Since the Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD), the Chinese also became heavily invested in sending diplomatic envoys abroad on maritime missions into the Indian Ocean, to India, Persia, Arabia, East Africa, and Egypt. Chinese maritime activity was increased dramatically during the commercialized period of the Song Dynasty, with new nautical technologies, many more private ship owners, and an increasing amount of economic investors in overseas ventures.

During the Mongol Empire (1206–1294) the Mongols created something similar to today's diplomatic passport called paiza. The paiza were in three different types (golden, silver, and copper) depending on the envoy's level of importance. With the paiza, there came authority that the envoy can ask for food, transport, place to stay from any city, village, or clan within the empire with no difficulties.

From the 17th century the Qing Dynasty concluded a series of treaties with Czarist Russia, beginning with the Treaty of Nerchinsk in the year 1689. This was followed up by the Aigun Treaty and the Convention of Peking in the mid-19th century.

As European power spread around the world in the 18th and 19th centuries so too did its diplomatic model, and Asian countries adopted European diplomatic systems.

Ancient India[link]

Rama and Lakshmana Receive Envoys, Page from a Dispersed Ramayana Series, ca. 1634.

Ancient India, with its kingdoms and dynasties, had a long tradition of diplomacy. The oldest treatise on statecraft and diplomacy, Arthashastra, is attributed to Kautilya (also known as Chanakya)^{[citation needed]}, who was the principal adviser to Chandragupta Maurya, the founder of the Maurya dynasty who ruled in the 3rd century BC, (whose capital was Patliputra, today's Patna, the chief city of Bihar state). Arthashastra is a complete work on the art of kingship, with long chapters on taxation and on the raising and maintenance of armies. It also incorporates a theory of diplomacy, of how in a situation of mutually contesting kingdoms, the wise king build alliances and tries to checkmate his adversaries. The envoys sent at the time to the courts of other kingdoms tended to reside for extended periods of time, and Arthashastra contains advice on the deportment of the envoy, including the trenchant suggestion that 'he should sleep alone'. The highest morality for the king is that his kingdom should prosper. It is also good to note that Lord Krishna, in the epic Mahabharata, acted as a divine diplomat and statesman between the Kuru and Pandava dynasties.

Modern Asia[link]

Diplomatic Personnel

Diplomatic relations within the Early Modern era of Asia were depicted as an environment of prestige and Status. It was maintained that one must be of noble ancestry in order to represent an autonomous state within the international arena. Therefore the position of diplomat was often revered as an element of the elitist class within Asia. A state's ability to practice diplomacy has been one of the underlying defining characteristics of an autonomous state. It is this practice that has been employed since the conception of the first city-states within the international spectrum. Diplomats in Asia were originally sent only for the purpose of negotiation. They would be required to immediately return after their task was completed. The majority of diplomats initially constituted the relatives of the ruling family. A high rank was bestowed upon them in order to present a sense of legitimacy with regards to their presence. Italy, the Ottoman Empire, and China were the first real states that perpetuated environments of diplomacy. During the early modern era diplomacy evolved to become a crucial element of international relations within the Mediterranean and Asia.

Europe[link]

Ancient roots[link]

The ability to practice diplomacy is one of the defining elements of a state, diplomacy has been practiced since the inception of civilization. In Europe, diplomacy begins with the first city-states formed in ancient Greece. Diplomats were sent only for specific negotiations, and would return immediately after their mission concluded. Diplomats were usually relatives of the ruling family or of very high rank in order to give them legitimacy when they sought to negotiate with the other state.

The origins of diplomacy are in the strategic and competitive exchange of impressive gifts, which may be traced to the Bronze Age and recognized as an aspect of Homeric guest-friendship.^[3] Thus diplomacy and trade have been inexorably linked from the outset. "In the framework of diplomatic relations it was customary for Byzantine emperors and Muslim rulers, especially the 'Abbāsids and the Fātimids, as well as for Muslim rulers between themselves, to exchange precious gifts, with which they attempted to impress or surpass their counterparts," remarks David Jacoby, in the context of the economics of silk in cultural exchange among Byzantium, Islam and the Latin West:^[4] merchants accompanied emissaries, who often traveled on commercial ships. At a later date, it will be recalled that the English adventurer and trader Anthony Sherley convinced the Persian ruler to send the first Persian embassy to Europe (1599–1602).

Ancient Greece[link]

The Greek City States on some occasions sent envoys to each other in order to negotiate specific issues, such as war and peace or commercial relations, but did not have diplomatic representatives regularly posted in each other's territory. However, some of the functions given to modern diplomatic representatives were in Classical Greece filled by a proxenos, who was a citizen of the host city having a particular relations of friendship with another city – a relationship often hereditary in a particular family.

Ancient Rome[link]

This section requires expansion.

Modern Europe[link]

In Europe, early modern diplomacy's origins^[5] are often traced to the states of Northern Italy in the early Renaissance, with the first embassies being established in the 13th century. Milan played a leading role, especially under Francesco Sforza who established permanent embassies to the other city states of Northern Italy. Tuscany and Venice were also flourishing centres of diplomacy from the 14th century onwards. It was in the Italian Peninsula that many of the traditions of modern diplomacy began, such as the presentation of an ambassador's credentials to the head of state.

From Italy the practice was spread to other European regions. Milan was the first to send a representative to the court of France in 1455. However, Milan refused to host French representatives fearing espionage and that the French representatives would intervene in its internal affairs. As foreign powers such as France and Spain became increasingly involved in Italian politics the need to accept emissaries was recognized. Soon the major European powers were exchanging representatives. Spain was the first to send a permanent representative; it appointed an ambassador to the Court of England in 1487. By the late 16th century, permanent missions became customary. The Holy Roman Emperor, however, did not regularly send permanent legates, as they could not represent the interests of all the German princes (who were in theory all subordinate to the Emperor, but in practice each independent).

During that period the rules of modern diplomacy were further developed. The top rank of representatives was an ambassador. At that time an ambassador was a nobleman, the rank of the noble assigned varying with the prestige of the country he was delegated to. Strict standards developed for ambassadors, requiring they have large residences, host lavish parties, and play an important role in the court life of their host nation. In Rome, the most prized posting for a Catholic ambassador, the French and Spanish representatives would have a retinue of up to a hundred. Even in smaller posts, ambassadors were very expensive. Smaller states would send and receive envoys, who were a rung below ambassador. Somewhere between the two was the position of minister plenipotentiary.

Diplomacy was a complex affair, even more so than now. The ambassadors from each state were ranked by complex levels of precedence that were much disputed. States were normally ranked by the title of the sovereign; for Catholic nations the emissary from the Vatican was paramount, then those from the kingdoms, then those from duchies and principalities. Representatives from republics were ranked the lowest (which often angered the leaders of the numerous German, Scandinavian and Italian republics). Determining precedence between two kingdoms depended on a number of factors that often fluctuated, leading to near-constant squabbling.

French diplomat Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord is considered one of the most skilled diplomats of all time.

Ambassadors, nobles with little foreign experience and no expectation of a career in diplomacy, needed to be supported by large embassy staff. These professionals would be sent on longer assignments and would be far more knowledgeable than the higher-ranking officials about the host country. Embassy staff would include a wide range of employees, including some dedicated to espionage. The need for skilled individuals to staff embassies was met by the graduates of universities, and this led to a great increase in the study of international law, modern languages, and history at universities throughout Europe.

At the same time, permanent foreign ministries began to be established in almost all European states to coordinate embassies and their staffs. These ministries were still far from their modern form, and many of them had extraneous internal responsibilities. Britain had two departments with frequently overlapping powers until 1782. They were also far smaller than they are currently. France, which boasted the largest foreign affairs department, had only some 70 full-time employees in the 1780s.

The elements of modern diplomacy slowly spread to Eastern Europe and Russia, arriving by the early 18th century. The entire edifice would be greatly disrupted by the French Revolution and the subsequent years of warfare. The revolution would see commoners take over the diplomacy of the French state, and of those conquered by revolutionary armies. Ranks of precedence were abolished. Napoleon also refused to acknowledge diplomatic immunity, imprisoning several British diplomats accused of scheming against France.

After the fall of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna of 1815 established an international system of diplomatic rank. Disputes on precedence among nations (and therefore the appropriate diplomatic ranks used) persisted for over a century until after World War II, when the rank of ambassador became the norm. In between that time, figures such as the German Chancellor Otto von Bismark were renowned for international diplomacy.

Middle East[link]

Ancient Egypt, Canaan, and Hittite Empire[link]

Some of the earliest known diplomatic records are the Amarna letters written between the pharaohs of the Eighteenth dynasty of Egypt and the Amurru rulers of Canaan during the 14th century BC. Following the Battle of Kadesh in c. 1274 BC during the Nineteenth dynasty, the pharaoh of Egypt and ruler of the Hittite Empire created one of the first known international peace treaties which survives in stone tablet fragments.^[6]

Ottoman Empire[link]

A French ambassador in Ottoman dress, painted by Antoine de Favray, 1766, Pera Museum, Istanbul.

Relations with the government of the Ottoman Empire (known to Italian states as the Sublime Porte) were particularly important to Italian states.^[7] The maritime republics of Genoa and Venice depended less and less upon their nautical capabilities, and more and more upon the perpetuation of good relations with the Ottomans.^[7] Interactions between various merchants, diplomats, and religious men between the Italian and Ottoman empires helped inaugurate and create new forms of diplomacy and statecraft. Eventually the primary purpose of a diplomat, which was originally a negotiator, evolved into a persona that represented an autonomous state in all aspects of political affairs. It became evident that all other sovereigns felt the need to accommodate themselves diplomatically, due to the emergence of the powerful political environment of the Ottoman Empire.^[7] One could come to the conclusion that the atmosphere of diplomacy within the early modern period revolved around a foundation of conformity to Ottoman culture.

Diplomatic immunity[link]

The sanctity of diplomats has long been observed. This sanctity has come to be known as diplomatic immunity. While there have been a number of cases where diplomats have been killed, this is normally viewed as a great breach of honour. Genghis Khan and the Mongols were well known for strongly insisting on the rights of diplomats, and they would often wreak horrific vengeance against any state that violated these rights.

Diplomatic rights were established in the mid-17th century in Europe and have spread throughout the world. These rights were formalized by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which protects diplomats from being persecuted or prosecuted while on a diplomatic mission. If a diplomat does commit a serious crime while in a host country he may be declared as persona non grata (unwanted person). Such diplomats are then often tried for the crime in their homeland.

Diplomatic communications are also viewed as sacrosanct, and diplomats have long been allowed to carry documents across borders without being searched. The mechanism for this is the so-called "diplomatic bag" (or, in some countries, the "diplomatic pouch"). While radio and digital communication have become more standard for embassies, diplomatic pouches are still quite common and some countries, including the United States, declare entire shipping containers as diplomatic pouches to bring sensitive material (often building supplies) into a country.

In times of hostility, diplomats are often withdrawn for reasons of personal safety, as well as in some cases when the host country is friendly but there is a perceived threat from internal dissidents. Ambassadors and other diplomats are sometimes recalled temporarily by their home countries as a way to express displeasure with the host country. In both cases, lower-level employees still remain to actually do the business of diplomacy.

Diplomats as a guarantee[link]

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In the Ottoman Empire, the diplomats of Persia and other states were seen as a guarantee of good behavior. If a nation broke a treaty or if their nationals misbehaved the diplomats would be punished. Diplomats were thus used as an enforcement mechanism on treaties and international law. To ensure that punishing a diplomat mattered rulers insisted on high-ranking figures. Diplomats as a guarantee were also employed sometimes in pre-modern Europe and other parts of Asia.

Diplomacy and espionage[link]

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Diplomacy is closely linked to espionage or gathering of intelligence. Embassies are bases for both diplomats and spies, and some diplomats are essentially openly acknowledged spies. For instance, the job of military attachés includes learning as much as possible about the military of the nation to which they are assigned. They do not try to hide this role and, as such, are only invited to events allowed by their hosts, such as military parades or air shows. There are also deep-cover spies operating in many embassies. These individuals are given fake positions at the embassy, but their main task is to illegally gather intelligence, usually by coordinating spy rings of locals or other spies. For the most part, spies operating out of embassies gather little intelligence themselves and their identities tend to be known by the opposition. If discovered, these diplomats can be expelled from an embassy, but for the most part counter-intelligence agencies prefer to keep these agents in situ and under close monitoring.

The information gathered by spies plays an increasingly important role in diplomacy. Arms-control treaties would be impossible without the power of reconnaissance satellites and agents to monitor compliance. Information gleaned from espionage is useful in almost all forms of diplomacy, everything from trade agreements to border disputes.

Diplomatic resolution of problems[link]

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Various processes and procedures have evolved over time for handling diplomatic issues and disputes.

Arbitration and mediations[link]

Nations sometimes resort to international arbitration when faced with a specific question or point of contention in need of resolution. For most of history, there were no official or formal procedures for such proceedings. They were generally accepted to abide by general principles and protocols related to international law and justice.

Sometimes these took the form of formal arbitrations and mediations. In such cases a commission of diplomats might be convened to hear all sides of an issue, and to come some sort of ruling based on international law.

In the modern era, much of this work is often carried out by the International Court of Justice at The Hague, or other formal commissions, agencies and tribunals, working under the United Nations. Below are some examples.

• Hay-Herbert Treaty Enacted after the United States and Britain submitted a dispute to international mediation about the US-Canadian border.

Conferences[link]

Other times, resolutions were sought through the convening of international conferences. In such cases, there are fewer ground rules, and fewer formal applications of international law. However, participants are expected to guide themselves through principles of international fairness, logic, and protocol.

Some examples of these formal conferences are:

• Congress of Vienna (1815) – After Napoleon was defeated, there were many diplomatic questions waiting to be resolved. This included the shape of the map of Europe, the disposition of political and nationalist claims of various ethnic groups and nationalities wishing to have some political autonomy, and the resolution of various claims by various European powers.
• The Congress of Berlin (June 13 – July 13, 1878) was a meeting of the European Great Powers' and the Ottoman Empire's leading statesmen in Berlin in 1878. In the wake of the Russo-Turkish War, 1877–78, the meeting's aim was to reorganize conditions in the Balkans.

Negotiations[link]

Sometimes nations convene official negotiation processes to settle an issue or dispute between several nations which are parties to a dispute. These are similar to the conferences mentioned above, as there are technically no established rules or procedures. However, there are general principles and precedents which help define a course for such proceedings.

Some examples are

• Camp David accord Convened in 1978 by President Jimmy Carter of the United States, at Camp David to reach an agreement between Prime Minister Mechaem Begin of Israel and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. After weeks of negotiation, agreement was reached and the accords were signed, later leading directly to the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979.
• Treaty of Portsmouth Enacted after President Theodore Roosevelt brought together the delegates from Russia and Japan, to settle the Russo-Japanese War. Roosevelt's personal intervention settled the conflict, and caused him to win the Nobel peace prize.

Diplomatic recognition[link]

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Diplomatic recognition is an important factor in determining whether a nation is an independent state. Receiving recognition is often difficult, even for countries which are fully sovereign. For many decades after its becoming independent, even many of the closest allies of the Dutch Republic refused to grant it full recognition. Today there are a number of independent entities without widespread diplomatic recognition, most notably the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Since the 1970s, most nations have stopped officially recognizing the ROC's existence on Taiwan, at the insistence of the People's Republic of China. Currently, the United States and other nations maintain informal relations through de facto embassies, with names such as the American Institute in Taiwan. Similarly, Taiwan's de facto embassies abroad are known by names such as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. This was not always the case, with the US maintaining official diplomatic ties with the ROC, recognizing it as the sole and legitimate government of all of China until 1979, when these relations were broken off as a condition for establishing official relations with Communist China.

The Palestinian National Authority has its own diplomatic service, however Palestinian representatives in most Western countries are not accorded diplomatic immunity, and their missions are referred to as Delegations General.

Other unrecognized regions which claim independence include Abkhazia, Transnistria, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Lacking the economic and political importance of Taiwan, these nations tend to be much more diplomatically isolated.

Though used as a factor in judging sovereignty, Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states, "The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states."

Informal diplomacy[link]

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Informal diplomacy (sometimes called Track II diplomacy) has been used for centuries to communicate between powers. Most diplomats work to recruit figures in other nations who might be able to give informal access to a country's leadership. In some situations, such as between the United States and the People's Republic of China a large amount of diplomacy is done through semi-formal channels using interlocutors such as academic members of thinktanks. This occurs in situations where governments wish to express intentions or to suggest methods of resolving a diplomatic situation, but do not wish to express a formal position.

Track II diplomacy is a specific kind of informal diplomacy, in which non-officials (academic scholars, retired civil and military officials, public figures, social activists) engage in dialogue, with the aim of conflict resolution, or confidence-building. Sometimes governments may fund such Track II exchanges. Sometimes the exchanges may have no connection at all with governments, or may even act in defiance of governments; such exchanges are called Track III.

On some occasion a former holder of an official position continues to carry out an informal diplomatic activity after retirement. In some cases, governments welcome such activity, for example as a means of establishing an initial contact with a hostile state of group without being formally committed. In other cases, however, such informal diplomats seek to promote a political agenda different from that of the government currently in power. Such informal diplomacy is practiced by former US Presidents Jimmy Carter and (to a lesser extent) Bill Clinton and by the former Israeli diplomat and minister Yossi Beilin (see Geneva Initiative).

Paradiplomacy[link]

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Paradiplomacy refers to the international relations conducted by subnational, regional, local or non-central governments. The most ordinary case of paradiplomatic relation refer to co-operation between bordering political entities. However, interest of federal states, provinces, regions etc., may extend over to different regions or to issues gathering local governments in multilateral fora worldwide. Some non-central governments may be allowed to negotiate and enter into agreement with foreign central states.

Cultural diplomacy[link]

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Cultural diplomacy (the science of diplomacy between cultures) has existed as a practice for centuries. Explorers, travelers, teachers and artists can be all considered examples of informal ambassadors or early cultural diplomats. The establishment of regular trade routes enables a frequent exchange of information and cultural gifts between traders and government representatives.



Such deliberate efforts of cultural exchange can be identified as early examples of cultural diplomacy. Indeed, any person interacting with different cultures, in the past as today, facilitates an important form of cultural exchange. The practices that this individual implements are an integral part of the science of cultural diplomacy. 



A starting definition of Cultural Diplomacy is offered by the American political scientist and author, Milton C. Cummings, in his description of cultural diplomacy as:

“the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding”. 



This cultural exchange can take place in fields including art, sport, literature, music, science and the economy. Such exchange implies communication and respect between the cultures involved, based on a sounder understanding of respective values and a reduced susceptibility to stereotypes. The potential of such an improved knowledge is to enable improved interaction and cooperation.



Cultural diplomacy is the initiation or facilitation of such exchanges with an aim to yielding long-term benefits, whether they promote national interests, build relationships, enhance socio-cultural understanding or promote trade and foreign investments.

Small state diplomacy[link]

Small state diplomacy is receiving increasing attention in diplomatic studies and international relations. Small states are particularly affected by developments which are determined beyond their borders such as climate change, water security and shifts in the global economy. Diplomacy is the main vehicle by which small states are able to ensure that their goals are addressed in the global arena. These factors mean that small states have strong incentives to support international cooperation. But with limited resources at their disposal, conducting effective diplomacy poses unique challenges for small states.^[8]

Diplomatic training institutions[link]

The Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at 53/2 Ostozhenka Street in Moscow.

• Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism/School of International Relations, University of Southern California
• Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy, The Australia National University, Canberra, Australia
• Institute for European Business Administration, Belgium
• DiploFoundation, Malta/Geneva
• Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK
• Centre for Politics and Diplomatic Studies, University of Leicester, UK
• College of Europe
• Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
• Kuwait Diplomatic Institute (KDI)
• Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
• Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts
• Foreign Service Academy
• Foreign Service Institute, George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Arlington, Virginia
• Foreign Service Institute India
• Foreign Service Institute of the Philippines
• International School of Geneva
• Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations
• Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
• Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nacion – Diplomatic Academy of Argentina
• Instituto del Servicio Exterior "Manuel Maria de Peralta" – Diplomatic Academy of Costa Rica
• Instituto Matías Romero, Mexico City
• Institute of Diplomacy & Foreign Relations (IDFR), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
• Istituto Diplomatico - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy
• Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado, USA
• Lancaster University, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion
• Moscow State Institute of International Relations
• Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'
• Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
• Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland
• Rio Branco Institute, the diplomatic academy of the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil
• Royal United Services Institute
• School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC
• United Nations International School of Hanoi
• United Nations International School
• University for Peace
• Vienna International School
• Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC
• Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, South Orange, New Jersey
• Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, New Jersey
• Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute, Sri lanaka

See also[link]

References[link]

Further reading[link]

• Black, Jeremy. A History of Diplomacy (U. of Chicago Press, 2010) ISBN 978-1-86189-696-4
• Berridge, G. R. Diplomacy: Theory & Practice, 3rd edition, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2005, ISBN 1-4039-9311-4
• Cunningham, George. Journey to Become a Diplomat: With a Guide to Careers in World Affairs FPA Global Vision Books 2005, ISBN 0-87124-212-5
• Dorman, Shawn, ed. Inside a U.S. Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America by American Foreign Service Association, Second edition February 2003, ISBN 0-9649488-2-6
• Callieres, Francois De. The Practice of Diplomacy (1919)
• Fischer, Roger and Ury, William L. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (1991)
• Hill, Henry Bertram. The Political Testament of Cardinal Richeleiu: The Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections (1964)
• Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy (Walgreen Foundation Lectures) (1985)
• Kissinger, Henry. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problem of Peace: 1812-1822 (1999)
• Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy (1999)
• Kurbalija J. and Slavik H. eds. Language and Diplomacy DiploProjects, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Malta, 2001, ISBN 99909-55-15-8. The volume contains collection of paper presented at the international conference. (See [1])
• Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy Dover Publications, ISBN 978-0-486-25570-5
• Metternich, Clemens von. Mettetnich: The Autobiography, 1773-1815 (2005)
• Nicolson, Sir Harold George. Diplomacy (1988)
• Nicolson, Sir Harold George. The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822 (2001)
• Nicolson, Sir Harold George. The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (1977)
• Nierenberg, Gerard The Art of Negotiating
• Rana, Kishan S. and Jovan Kurbalija, eds. Foreign Ministries: Managing Diplomatic Networks and Optimizing Value DiploFoundation, 2007, ISBN 978-99932-53-16-7
• Rana, Kishan S. The 21st Century Ambassador: Plenipotentiary to Chief Executive DiploFoundation,2004, ISBN 99909-55-18-2
• Roeder, Larry W. "Diplomacy, Funding and Animal Welfare", Springer, Hamburg, 2011
• Ernest Satow. A Guide to Diplomatic Practice by , Longmans, Green & Co. London & New York, 1917. A standard reference work used in many embassies across the world (though not British ones). Now in its fifth edition (1998) ISBN 0-582-50109-1
• Wicquefort, Abraham de. The Embassador and His Functions (2010)

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Diplomacy

Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Diplomacy

• U.S. Dept. of State Foreign Affairs Handbook - Using Diplomatic Notes
• Frontline Diplomacy: The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training — American diplomats describe their careers on the American Memory website at the Library of Congress
• The International School of Protocol & Diplomacy MA Programme and Seminars and Workshops in protocol, diplomacy and cross cultural communication
• Book and articles about different topics regarding Diplomacy

Daryl Copeland is a Canadian analyst, author, speaker and educator specializing in diplomacy, international policy, public management and global issues. Copeland's institutional affiliations include the University of Toronto's Munk Centre for International Studies as a Senior Fellow,^[1] and the USC Center on Public Diplomacy as a Research Fellow.

Career[link]

Copeland grew up in downtown Toronto, and received his formal education at the University of Western Ontario (Gold Medal, Political Science; Chancellor's Prize, Social Sciences) and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Canada Council Special MA Scholarship).

From 1981 to 2009 Copeland served as a Canadian diplomat with postings in Thailand, Ethiopia, New Zealand and Malaysia. During the 1980s and 1990s, he was elected a record five times to the Executive Committee of the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers. From 1996-99 he was National Program Director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Toronto and Editor of Behind the Headlines, Canada’s international affairs magazine. In 2000, he received the Canadian Foreign Service Officer Award.^[2]

While working for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Ottawa, Copeland served as Deputy Director for International Communications; Director for Southeast Asia; Senior Advisor, Public Diplomacy; Director of Strategic Communications Services; and, Senior Advisor, Strategic Policy and Planning.

Copeland serves as a peer reviewer for Canadian Foreign Policy, the International Journal, and The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, and is a member of the Editorial Board of the journal Place Branding and Public Diplomacy.

Book[link]

Copeland is the author of Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations, released in July, 2009.

Bibliography[link]

Copeland, Daryl (2009). Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations, Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 978-1-58826-655-2

See also[link]

• University of Toronto's Munk Centre for International Studies
• University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy
• Guerrilla Diplomacy

References[link]

As of this edit, this article uses content from "Daryl Copeland | USC Center on Public Diplomacy | Center Bios", which is licensed in a way that permits reuse under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License, but not under the GFDL. All relevant terms must be followed.

External links[link]

• Daryl Copeland's site and book blog Guerrilla Diplomacy

Joseph Nye

Born	(1937-01-19) January 19, 1937 (age 75) South Orange, New Jersey
Era	International relations theory
Region	Western Philosophers
School	Neoliberal institutionalism
Main interests	International security, interdependence, globalization
Notable ideas	Soft power/hard power/smart power, complex interdependence
Influenced by Stanley Hoffmann

Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr. (born January 19, 1937) is the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory neoliberalism, developed in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. Together with Keohane, he developed the concepts of asymmetrical and complex interdependence. They also explored transnational relations and world politics in an edited volume in the 1970s. More recently, he pioneered the theory of soft power. His notion of "smart power" became popular with the use of this phrase by members of the Clinton administration, and more recently the Obama Administration.^[1] Nye is currently University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, and previously served as dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He also serves as a Guiding Coalition member for the Project on National Security Reform.

The 2011 TRIP survey of over 1700 international relations scholars ranks Joe Nye as the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past twenty years.^[2]

In 2011, he was named by Foreign Policy magazine to its list of top global thinkers.^[3]

Life and career[link]

Education[link]

Nye graduated summa cum laude from Princeton University, where he was vice-president of the Colonial Club, a columnist for The Daily Princetonian, and a member of the American Whig–Cliosophic Society's Debate Panel.^[4] After studying Philosophy, Politics and Economics as a Rhodes Scholar in Exeter College at Oxford University, obtained his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard. He attended Morristown Prep (now the Morristown-Beard School) in Morristown, New Jersey and graduated in 1954.

Career[link]

Nye originally joined the Harvard faculty in 1964, serving as Director of the Center for International Affairs and as Associate Dean of Arts and Sciences. From 1977-1979, Nye was Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology and chaired the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In 1993 and 1994 he was chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which coordinates intelligence estimates for the President. Nye also served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Clinton Administration, and was considered by many to be the preferred choice for National Security Advisor in the 2004 presidential campaign of John Kerry. He is widely recognized as one of the foremost liberal thinkers on foreign policy, and is seen by some as the counter to renowned Harvard conservative Samuel P. Huntington.

In 2005, Nye was voted one of the ten most influential scholars of international relations in the USA.^[5]

He is the co-chair of the Center for a New American Security Cyber Security Project,^[6] on the Advisory board of the USC Center on Public Diplomacy as well as on the International Editorial Board of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, the editorial board of Foreign Policy, the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Guiding Coalition of the Project on National Security Reform, the Advisory Board of Carolina for Kibera, and the Board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has been awarded the Woodrow Wilson Prize by Princeton University and the Humphrey Prize by the American Political Science Association. In 2005 he was awarded the Honorary Patronage of the University Philosophical Society of Trinity College Dublin and in 2007 he was awarded an honorary degree by King's College London.

Nye has published many works in recent years, the most recent being The Future of Power (2011, ISBN 978-1-58648-891-8), Understanding International Conflicts, 7th ed (2009), The Powers to Lead (2008), The Power Game: A Washington Novel (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), and The Paradox of American Power (2002). Nye coined the term soft power in the late 1980s and it first came into widespread usage following a piece he wrote in Foreign Policy in the early 1990s. He is the chairman of the North American branch of the Trilateral Commission.^[7]

Personal[link]

Nye and his wife, Molly Harding Nye, have three adult sons.^[8]

References[link]

External links[link]

• Column archive at Project Syndicate
• Appearances on C-SPAN
• Joseph Nye on Charlie Rose
• Joseph Nye at TED Conferences
• Joseph Nye at the Internet Movie Database
• Works by or about Joseph Nye in libraries (WorldCat catalog)
• Conversations with History interview with Harry Krelsler at the UC Berkeley Institute of International Studies in April 1998
• 'Joseph Nye - Viet Nam 2010' Coffee is soft power of Vietnam
• 'Talking Power', interview in the Oxonian Review in March 2005
• 'Joseph Nye on Teaching America to be more British', interview with Theory Talks in May 2008
• 'How Soft is Smart?', interview on the US Presidential Election in Guernica Magazine in October 2008
• Nye's profile, he is Chairman of the North American Group of the Trilateral Commission
• Nye's profile at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he is a board member
• Nye's profile at Harvard University, where he is Distinguished Service Professor and Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations
• Video (with mp3 available) of discussion with Nye and Daniel Drezner on Bloggingheads.tv
• Audio: Joseph Nye in conversation on the BBC World Service discussion programme The Forum
• Soft Power, Smart Power and Intelligent Power A lecture in honor of Joseph Nye
• Interview in The Global Scholar Knowledge Initiative (GSKI)

This biographical article needs additional citations for verification. Please help by adding reliable sources. Contentious material about living persons that is unsourced or poorly sourced must be removed immediately, especially if potentially libelous or harmful. (January 2010)

Emil Constantinescu
3rd President of Romania
In office 29 November 1996 – 20 December 2000
Preceded by	Ion Iliescu
Succeeded by	Ion Iliescu
Personal details
Born	(1939-11-19) 19 November 1939 (age 72) Tighina, Romania, now in the Republic of Moldova
Nationality	Romanian
Political party	Romanian Democratic Convention before being elected Acţiunea Populară (2001-2008) and National Liberal Party (since 2008)
Spouse(s)	Nadia Ileana Constantinescu
Profession	Professor of Geology
Religion	Romanian Orthodoxy
Signature

Emil Constantinescu (Romanian pronunciation: [eˈmil konstantiˈnesku]; born November 19, 1939) was President of Romania from 1996 to 2000.

He graduated from the law school of the University of Bucharest, and subsequently started a career as a geologist. Beginning in 1966, Constantinescu taught in the Geology Faculty of the University of Bucharest, where he also became Propaganda Secretary of the local organisation of the Romanian Communist Party.

After the Romanian revolution in 1989, Constantinescu became a founding member and vice president of the Civic Alliance. He was the acting chairman of the Romanian Anti-Totalitarian Forum, the first associative structure of the opposition in Romania, which was transformed into a political and electoral alliance - the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR).

In 1992 he was elected president of the University of Bucharest, and became CDR's candidate for president. He lost the election to the incumbent, Ion Iliescu, after a second round.

He remains, however, heavily involved in politics through working for many NGOs, both in Romania and internationally. Emil Constantinescu is the current president of the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy Academy for Cultural Diplomacy,^[1][2] of the Association of Citizenship Education, of the Romanian Foundation for Democracy and also the founding president of the Institute for Regional Cooperation and Conflict Prevention (INCOR). He is also a member of the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy advisory board.

He and his wife Nadia, a former legal adviser whom he married in 1964, have a son, Dragoş, and a daughter, Norina, along with two grandchildren.

President of Romania[link]

Political and economic issues[link]

This section contains information which may be of unclear or questionable importance or relevance to the article's subject matter. Please help improve this article by clarifying or removing superfluous information.

After winning a November 17 runoff against Ion Iliescu, Constantinescu was sworn in as president on November 29 and appointed Victor Ciorbea, the mayor of Bucharest, as Prime Minister of Romania. The government was formed by a coalition of political alliances and parties: the CDR, USD and UDMR.

In 1997, Romania began with great expectations. Initially, support for the new government was high, and a large segment of the population favored change. In February 1997, the Ciorbea government initiated its "shock therapy" programme, however the reform proved difficult: given the slow pace of privatisation and the stagnation during the previous government, the government's attempt to restructure the state industries was fitful, and the pace of privatisation was slowed. Blaming the old bureaucratic structures, Ciorbea launched a drive to streamline the various departments from the top down. These changes were promptly attacked as "political purges" by the opposition parties.

The reason for the delaying reforms can be explained by the lack of homogeneity and consensus of the coalition formed of three political alliances: the right-wing CDR, the socialist-leaning USD, and the Hungarian minority UDMR party. Widespread disagreement and tension surfaced within each of the three groupings, as well as between them, and nearly every political formation was plagued by infighting and rifts.

This perpetual friction slowed down the lawmaking process, producing constant delays in adopting laws by Parliament, and forced the Cabinet to resort to "emergency ordinances" to speed it up. This made many Romanians feel that the normal democratic process was circumvented. Coalition solidarity manifested, however, when the government rejected the flurry of no-confidence and nonbinding motions initiated by the opposition, such as the one introduced in mid-December that would have held the government responsible for the plummeting living standards.

Presidential styles of Emil Constantinescu
Reference style	Preşedintele (President)
Spoken style	Preşedintele (President)
Alternative style	Domnia Sa/Excelenţa Sa (His Excellency)

By August, the government had admitted that living standards were still falling, and announced the closing of 14 loss-making state enterprises. A government reshuffle was attempted, but was only completed on 2 December, and it succeeded in only plunging the coalition into a severe crisis once two key PD ministers resigned from the cabinet. One-third of the ministerial posts, including finance, reform, and industry and commerce, were affected. A privatization ministry was created to replace several institutions with overlapping responsibilities. Only days later, however, the Cabinet was again plunged into crisis when the two UDMR ministers boycotted meetings to protest the coalition's failure to permit education of the country's large Magyar minority in the Hungarian language in all subjects. Foreign Minister Adrian Severin of the Democratic Party (PD, the leading force in the USD) resigned on December 23 after he claimed that some party leaders and media directors were working for foreign secret services. Another PD minister, Traian Băsescu, had to quit the Ministry of Transportation on December 29 for criticizing the Cabinet.

The crisis ended only when Ciorbea resigned on March 30, 1998, both as Prime Minister of Romania and Mayor of Bucharest.

By this time, dissatisfaction with government policies was rising. This led to a wave of protests by workers, students, and others that peaked in October. Former president Ion Iliescu's Party of Social Democracy in Romania split in June, and in December the new Alliance for Romania proclaimed itself "a third force" in the political arena.

A new government, headed by Prime Minister Radu Vasile took office on April 15, pledging to accelerate economic reforms, including privatization of major state firms, and sharply reduce state bureaucracy. However, the 1998 budget was delayed until 26 May, and this delay reduced foreign investors' credibility. The same year, revelations about government corruption surfaced in the form of a cigarettes-smuggling scandal in April. Finance Minister Daniel Dăianu warned mid-July that the budget deficit might exceed the 3.6% envisaged, and threatened to resign if the government followed through on a deal with Bell Helicopter Textron to purchase 96 helicopters in order to help modernize the armed forces. Dăianu was abruptly dismissed on September 23.

By early June new government crises were looming. The UDMR threatened to leave the coalition if the education law was not changed to allow the operation of a state-run Hungarian-language university. Also in June, a new scandal forced several senior officials to resign because of alleged links with the former communist secret service.

Against growing hostility among the Romanian populace, the Hungarian language university issue was brought up again in September, with a UDMR ultimatum. A compromise was reached, allowing for a "multicultural solution" (Hungarian and German).

On October 19 Privatization Minister Sorin Dimitriu resigned under criticism for the slow pace of economic reforms. On December 23, two days after the parliament had rejected a no-confidence motion presented by the leftist-nationalist opposition, the Cabinet decided to restructure itself, cutting the number of ministries from 24 to 17. Finally, on December 28, the government signaled that it was prepared to speed up economic reforms by allowing the State Property Fund to initiate legal action to close 30 loss-making state companies.

In January 1998 the miners attempted to unseat the government, angry at the reduction of government subsidies. The situation ended once Miron Cozma, the leader of the miners, was arrested on February 14.

This crisis revealed that a heterogeneous four-party coalition, broadly in agreement about aligning the country with the West but divided over personal rivalries and policy details, lacked control over key parts of a bureaucracy unreformed since communist times. The fact that crowds greeted the miners on their march showed that the government's austerity measures were deeply resented, mostly in regions dependent on heavy industries earmarked for closure. International agencies had made economic assistance conditional on the closure of loss-making plants. Also, the economic upturn expected to follow after decades of privation still failing to happen, support for the opposition party PSDR rose.

With an eye to EU requirements, Romania had met a $2 billion debt service due in mid-1999 but at a cost of depleting its foreign exchange reserves. The privatization agency earned praise abroad in 1999 for quickening the pace of sell-offs in a country where 80% of the economy was still in state hands. It was assailed, however, along with other reformers, by private television stations whose influence had soared as the reputation of politicians slumped.

At the year's end, Radu Vasile resigned, and was replaced as Prime Minister by Mugur Isărescu, governor of the central bank since 1990. He had only a few months to draw up an economic strategy for the period 2000–06 in order to prepare Romania for accession to the European Union (EU). Isărescu won praise for persuading the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR), the main opposition party, to endorse a policy committing Romania to a steady shift toward a market economy. Enjoying a runaway lead in the opinion polls, the PDSR was committed to an economic strategy drawn up in conjunction with officials from the EU, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

A modest recovery at the beginning of 2000 suffered a setback by a severe drought, and a subsequent bad harvest, requiring costly imports of grain and foodstuffs.

Foreign policy[link]

Emil Constantinescu and Bill Clinton in Bucharest during the US president's 1997 visit

The government's foreign policy was seen as a strong point. It adopted a pro-Western stance, and early in its mandate launched a diplomatic offensive to improve the image of Romania abroad. President Constantinescu received senior foreign officials, including French President Jacques Chirac (February 1997) and U.S. President Bill Clinton (July 1997). Joining NATO and the European Union were proclaimed Romania's top foreign policy priorities. With these objectives in mind, Romania sought to improve relations with its neighbours and signed a basic treaty with Ukraine in June. The country was nonetheless passed over in the first wave of expansion by both NATO and the EU.

In March 1998 Constantinescu attended the London conference of European Union member states and candidates, and in July he took advantage of a nine-day visit in the U.S. to argue before a joint session of Congress that his country played a key role in Balkan stability and should therefore be admitted to NATO. In October Romania agreed to allow limited access to its air space in the event of NATO military intervention in the Serbian province of Kosovo.

On 7–9 May 1999, Pope John Paul II visited Romania.

After the presidency[link]

Emil Constantinescu speaking at the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy Conference

The CDR government's and Constantinescu's presidency were marred by an economic recession. Nevertheless, his presidency is now credited with ending the Mineriads, a reform of the banking system, and with attracting the first major foreign investments in Romania. With dashed expectations of an immediate improvement in daily life, Romanians exhibited strong disillusionment with the major parties and politicians, with the Greater Romania Party gaining the 2nd place in the 2000 elections.^[3] A disenchanted Emil Constantinescu, who lost popularity and had failed to fulfill his reformist agenda announced on July 17 that he would not run for a second term. He temporarily withdrew from political life at the end of his term in November 2000. Constantinescu's direction in foreign affairs continued however after the comeback of Ion Iliescu in 2000. Eventually, Romania joined NATO in 2004.

The former President returned to the political scene in 2002 as head of the Acţiunea populară (People's Action) party, which eventually joined the merged into the National Liberal Party in 2008.^{[citation needed]} Constantinescu has occasionally criticized the policies of the 2004-2009 president, Traian Băsescu, accusing him of authoritarian tendencies,^[4] and supported Crin Antonescu in the first round of the 2009 presidential elections.^[5]

He is a frequent speaker at the Oslo Freedom Forum and in 2010 presented the Oslo Freedom Forum with a presidential medal.[1] He is also a member of the international advisory council of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation.^[6]

World Justice Project[link]

Emil Constantinescu is on the Board of Directors of the World Justice Project.^[7] The World Justice Project works to lead a global, multidisciplinary effort to strengthen the Rule of Law for the development of communities of opportunity and equity.^[8]

Honours and awards[link]

•  Norway : Grand Cross of the Order of St. Olav (1999)
•  Austria : Great Star of Honour for Services to the Republic of Austria (1999)
•  Denmark : Order of the Elephant (2000)
•  Croatia : Grand Order of King Tomislav ("For outstanding contribution to the promotion of friendship and the development of mutual cooperation between the Republic of Romania and the Republic of Croatia."- June 16, 2000)
•  Slovakia : Grand Cross (or 1st Class) of the Order of the White Double Cross (2000)^[9]
•  Denmark : Order of the Dannebrog

References[link]

Bibliography

• Ion Alexandrescu, Stan Stoica, România după 1989. Mică enciclopedie, Editura Meronia, Bucureşti, 2005
• Tom Gallagher, Furtul unei naţiuni. România de la comunism încoace, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2004
• Dan Pavel, Iulia Huia, <<Nu putem reuşi decît împreună.>> O istorie analitică a Convenţiei Democratice, 1989-2000, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2003

Henry Kissinger
56th United States Secretary of State
In office September 22, 1973 – January 20, 1977
President	Richard Nixon Gerald Ford
Deputy	Kenneth Rush Robert S. Ingersoll Charles W. Robinson
Preceded by	William P. Rogers
Succeeded by	Cyrus Vance
8th US National Security Advisor
In office January 20, 1969 – November 3, 1975
President	Richard Nixon Gerald Ford
Preceded by	Walt Rostow
Succeeded by	Brent Scowcroft
Personal details
Born	Heinz Alfred Kissinger (1923-05-27) May 27, 1923 (age 89) Fürth, Bavaria, Germany[1]
Political party	Republican
Spouse(s)	Ann Fleischer (1949-64) Nancy Maginnes (1974-present)
Alma mater	City College of New York Harvard University
Profession	Diplomat, political scientist, businessman, writer
Religion	Judaism
Signature
Military service
Service/branch	US Army
Rank	Sergeant
Unit	970th Counter Intelligence Corps

Heinz Alfred "Henry" Kissinger ( /ˈkɪsɪndʒər/;^[2] born May 27, 1923) is a German-born American writer, political scientist, diplomat, and businessman. A recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, he served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. After his term, his opinion was still sought by many subsequent presidents and many world leaders.

A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, orchestrated the opening of relations with the People's Republic of China, and negotiated the Paris Peace Accords, ending American involvement in the Vietnam War. Various American policies of that era, including the bombing of Cambodia, remain controversial to many.

Kissinger is still a controversial figure today.^[3] He is the founder and chairman of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm.

Early life[link]

Kissinger was born Heinz Alfred Kissinger in Fürth, Bavaria, Germany in 1923 during the Weimar Republic to a family of German Jews. His father, Louis Kissinger (1887–1982) was a schoolteacher. His mother, Paula (Stern) Kissinger (1901–1998), was a homemaker. Kissinger has a younger brother, Walter Kissinger. The surname Kissinger was adopted in 1817 by his great-great-grandfather Meyer Löb, after the Bavarian spa town of Bad Kissingen.^[4] As a youth, Heinz enjoyed playing soccer, and even played for the youth side of one of the nation's best teams at the time, SpVgg Fürth.^[5] In 1938, fleeing Nazi persecution, his family moved to New York.

Kissinger spent his high school years in the Washington Heights section of upper Manhattan as part of the German Jewish immigrant community there. Although Kissinger assimilated quickly into American culture, he never lost his pronounced Frankish accent, due to childhood shyness that made him hesitant to speak.^[6][7] Following his first year at George Washington High School, he began attending school at night and worked in a shave brush factory during the day.^[6]

Following high school, Kissinger enrolled in the City College of New York, studying accounting. He excelled academically as a part-time student, continuing to work while enrolled. His studies were interrupted in early 1943, when he was drafted into the U.S. Army.^[8]

Army experience[link]

Kissinger underwent basic training at Camp Croft in Spartanburg, South Carolina, where he was naturalized upon arrival. The Army sent him to study engineering at Lafayette College, Pennsylvania, but the program was cancelled, and Kissinger was reassigned to the 84th Infantry Division. There, he made the acquaintance of Fritz Kraemer, a fellow immigrant from Germany who despite the age difference, noted Kissinger's fluency in German and his intellect, and arranged for him to be assigned to the military intelligence section of the division. Kissinger saw combat with the division, and volunteered for hazardous intelligence duties during the Battle of the Bulge.^[9]

During the American advance into Germany, Kissinger, only a private, was put in charge of the administration of the city of Krefeld, owing to a lack of German speakers on the division's intelligence staff. Within eight days he had established a civilian administration.^[10] Kissinger was then reassigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps, with the rank of Sergeant. He was given charge of a team in Hanover assigned to tracking down Gestapo officers and other saboteurs, for which he was awarded the Bronze Star.^[11] In June 1945, Kissinger was made commandant of a CIC detachment in the Bergstrasse district of Hesse, with responsibility for de-Nazification of the district. Although he possessed absolute authority and powers of arrest, Kissinger took care to avoid abuses against the local population by his command.^[12]

In 1946, Kissinger was reassigned to teach at the European Command Intelligence School at Camp King, continuing to serve in this role as a civilian employee following his separation from the Army.^[13][14]

Academic career[link]

Henry Kissinger received his A.B. degree summa cum laude in political science at Harvard College in 1950, where he lived in Adams House and studied under William Yandell Elliott.^[15] He received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at Harvard University in 1952 and 1954, respectively. In 1952, while still at Harvard, he served as a consultant to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board.^[16] His doctoral dissertation was titled "Peace, Legitimacy, and the Equilibrium (A Study of the Statesmanship of Castlereagh and Metternich)."

Kissinger remained at Harvard as a member of the faculty in the Department of Government and at the Center for International Affairs. He became Associate Director of the latter in 1957. In 1955, he was a consultant to the National Security Council's Operations Coordinating Board.^[16] During 1955 and 1956, he was also Study Director in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He released his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy the following year.^[17] From 1956 to 1958 he worked for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund as director of its Special Studies Project.^[16] He was Director of the Harvard Defense Studies Program between 1958 and 1971. He was also Director of the Harvard International Seminar between 1951 and 1971. Outside of academia, he served as a consultant to several government agencies, including the Operations Research Office, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Department of State, and the Rand Corporation, a think-tank.^[16]

Keen to have a greater influence on US foreign policy, Kissinger became a supporter of, and advisor to, Nelson Rockefeller, Governor of New York, who sought the Republican nomination for President in 1960, 1964 and 1968.^[18] After Richard Nixon won the presidency in 1968, he made Kissinger National Security Advisor.

Foreign policy[link]

Kissinger being sworn in as Secretary of State by Chief Justice Warren Burger, September 22, 1973. Kissinger's mother, Paula, holds the Bible upon which he was sworn in while President Nixon looks on.

Kissinger served as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under President Richard Nixon, and continued as Secretary of State under Nixon's successor Gerald Ford.^[19]

A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. In that period, he extended the policy of détente. This policy led to a significant relaxation in U.S.-Soviet tensions and played a crucial role in 1971 talks with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. The talks concluded with a rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and the formation of a new strategic anti-Soviet Sino-American alignment. He was awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for helping to establish a ceasefire and U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The ceasefire, however, was not durable.^[20] As National Security Advisor, in 1974 Kissinger directed the much-debated National Security Study Memorandum 200.

[edit] Détente and the opening to China

As National Security Advisor under Nixon, Kissinger pioneered the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, seeking a relaxation in tensions between the two superpowers. As a part of this strategy, he negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (culminating in the SALT I treaty) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Negotiations about strategic disarmament were originally supposed to start under the Johnson Administration but were postponed in protest to the invasion by Warsaw Pact troops of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Kissinger, shown here with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, negotiated rapprochement with the People's Republic of China

Kissinger sought to place diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union. He made two trips to the People's Republic of China in July and October, 1971 (the first of which was made in secret) to confer with Premier Zhou Enlai, then in charge of Chinese foreign policy. The USC U.S.-China Institute has collected documents relating to the diplomatic efforts between 1969 and 1971 that led to this successful trip.^[21] According to Kissinger's book, "The White House Years", the first secret China trip was arranged through Pakistan's diplomatic and Presidential involvement that paved the way to initial vital contact with the Chinese, since the Americans were unable to communicate directly with the Chinese leaders because of earlier cold relations.

This paved the way for the groundbreaking 1972 summit between Nixon, Zhou, and Communist Party of China Chairman Mao Zedong, as well as the formalization of relations between the two countries, ending 23 years of diplomatic isolation and mutual hostility. The result was the formation of a tacit strategic anti-Soviet alliance between China and the United States.

While Kissinger's diplomacy led to economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides and the establishment of Liaison Offices in the Chinese and American capitals, with serious implications for Indochinese matters, full normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China would not occur until 1979, because the Watergate scandal overshadowed the latter years of the Nixon presidency and because the United States continued to recognize the government of Taiwan.

Vietnam War[link]

Kissinger's involvement in Indochina started prior to his appointment as National Security Adviser to Nixon. While still at Harvard, he had worked as a consultant on foreign policy to both the White House and State Department. Kissinger says that "In August 1965... [Henry Cabot Lodge], an old friend serving as Ambassador to Saigon, had asked me to visit Vietnam as his consultant. I toured Vietnam first for two weeks in October and November 1965, again for about ten days in July 1966, and a third time for a few days in October 1966... Lodge gave me a free hand to look into any subject of my choice". He became convinced of the meaninglessness of military victories in Vietnam, "...unless they brought about a political reality that could survive our ultimate withdrawal".^[22] In a 1967 peace initiative, he would mediate between Washington and Hanoi.

Kissinger, April 29, 1975

Nixon had been elected in 1968 on the promise of achieving "peace with honor" and ending the Vietnam War. In office, and assisted by Kissinger, Nixon implemented a policy of Vietnamization that aimed to gradually withdraw US troops while expanding the combat role of the enabling South Vietnamese Army so that it would be capable of independently defending its government against the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, a Communist guerrilla organization, and North Vietnamese army (Vietnam People's Army or PAVN). Kissinger played a key role in a secret bombing campaign in Cambodia to disrupt PAVN and Viet Cong units launching raids into South Vietnam from within Cambodia's borders and resupplying their forces by using the Ho Chi Minh trail and other routes, as well as the 1970 Cambodian Incursion and subsequent widespread bombing of Cambodia. The bombing campaign contributed to the chaos of the Cambodian Civil War, which saw the forces of dictator Lon Nol unable to retain foreign support to combat the growing Khmer Rouge insurgency that would overthrow him in 1975.^[23][24] Documents uncovered from the Soviet archives after 1991 reveal that the North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1970 was launched at the explicit request of the Khmer Rouge and negotiated by Pol Pot's then second in command, Nuon Chea.^[25] The American bombing of Cambodia killed an estimated 40,000 combatants and civilians.^[26] Pol Pot biographer David Chandler argues that the bombing "had the effect the Americans wanted – it broke the Communist encirclement of Phnom Penh,"^[27] while Christopher Hitchens asserts that the bombing may have increased recruitment for the Khmer Rouge.

Along with North Vietnamese Politburo Member Le Duc Tho, Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on December 10, 1973, for their work in negotiating the ceasefires contained in the Paris Peace Accords on "Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," signed the January previous.^[20] Tho rejected the award, telling Kissinger that peace had not been really restored in South Vietnam.^[28] Kissinger wrote to the Nobel Committee that he accepted the award "with humility."^[29][30] The conflict continued until an invasion of the South by the North Vietnamese Army resulted in a North Vietnamese victory in 1975 and the subsequent progression of the Pathet Lao in Laos towards figurehead status.

1971 India-Pakistan War[link]

Aboard Air Force One, Kissinger expresses delight at being named TIME Magazine's "Man of the Year," along with President Richard Nixon, 1972

Under Kissinger's guidance, the United States government supported Pakistan in the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. Kissinger was particularly concerned about the expansion of Soviet influence in South Asia as a result of a treaty of friendship recently signed by India and the USSR, and sought to demonstrate to the People's Republic of China (Pakistan's ally and an enemy of both India and the USSR) the value of a tacit alliance with the United States.^[31]

In recent years, Kissinger has come under fire for private comments he made to Nixon during the Bangladesh-Pakistan War in which he described then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as a " bitch" and a "witch". He also said "The Indians are bastards," shortly before the war.^[32] Kissinger has since expressed his regret over the comments.^[33]

Israeli policy and Soviet Jewry[link]

According to notes taken by H. R. Haldeman, Nixon "ordered his aides to exclude all Jewish-Americans from policy-making on Israel," including Kissinger.^[34] One note quotes Nixon as saying “get K. [Kissinger] out of the play — Haig handle it."^[34]

In 1973, Kissinger did not feel that pressing the Soviet Union concerning the plight of Jews being persecuted there was in the interest of US foreign policy. In conversation with Nixon shortly after a meeting with Golda Meir on March 1, 1973, Kissinger stated, “The emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union is not an objective of American foreign policy, and if they put Jews into gas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern. Maybe a humanitarian concern.”^[35] Kissinger argued, however:

"That emigration existed at all was due to the actions of "realists" in the White House. Jewish emigration rose from 700 a year in 1969 to near 40,000 in 1972. The total in Nixon's first term was more than 100,000. To maintain this flow by quiet diplomacy, we never used these figures for political purposes....The issue became public because of the success of our Middle East policy when Egypt evicted Soviet advisers. To restore its relations with Cairo, the Soviet Union put a tax on Jewish emigration. There was no Jackson-Vanik Amendment until there was a successful emigration effort. Sen. Henry Jackson, for whom I had, and continue to have, high regard, sought to remove the tax with his amendment. We thought the continuation of our previous approach of quiet diplomacy was the wiser course....Events proved our judgment correct. Jewish emigration fell to about a third of its previous high."^[36]

1973 Yom Kippur War[link]

Documents show that former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger delayed telling President Richard Nixon about the start of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 to keep him from interfering. On October 6, 1973, the Israelis informed Kissinger about the attack at 6 a.m.. Kissinger waited about 3 and a half hours passed before he informed Nixon.^[37]

In 1973, Kissinger negotiated the end to the Yom Kippur War, which had begun on October 6, 1973 when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Kissinger has published lengthy and dramatic telephone transcripts from this period in the 2002 book Crisis. One week later, under Nixon's direction, and against Kissinger's initial opposition,^[38] the US military conducted the largest military airlift in history to aid Israel on October 12, 1973. US action contributed to the 1973 oil crisis in the United States and its Western European allies, which ended in March 1974.

On October 31, 1973, Egyptian foreign minister Ismail Fahmi (left) meets with Richard Nixon (middle) and Henry Kissinger (right), about a week after the end of fighting in the Yom Kippur War

Israel regained the territory it lost in the early fighting and gained new territories from Syria and Egypt, including land in Syria east of the previously captured Golan Heights, and additionally on the western bank of the Suez Canal, although they did lose some territory on the eastern side of the Suez Canal that had been in Israeli hands since the end of the Six Day War. Kissinger pressured the Israelis to cede some of the newly captured land back to its Arab neighbours, contributing to the first phases of Israeli-Egyptian non-aggression. The move saw a warming in US–Egyptian relations, bitter since the 1950s, as the country moved away from its former independent stance and into a close partnership with the United States. The peace was finalized in 1978 when U.S. President Jimmy Carter mediated the Camp David Accords, during which Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for an Egyptian agreement to recognize the state of Israel.

Latin American policy[link]

Ford and Kissinger conversing on grounds of the White House, August 1974

The United States continued to recognize and maintain relationships with non-left-wing governments, democratic and authoritarian alike. John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress was ended in 1973. In 1974, negotiations about new settlement over Panama Canal started. They eventually led to the Torrijos-Carter Treaties and handing the Canal over to Panamanian control.

Kissinger initially supported the normalization of United States-Cuba relations, broken since 1961 (all U.S.–Cuban trade was blocked in February 1962, a few weeks after the exclusion of Cuba from the Organization of American States because of US pressure). However, he quickly changed his mind and followed Kennedy's policy. After the involvement of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces in the liberation struggles in Angola and Mozambique, Kissinger said that unless Cuba withdrew its forces relations would not be normalized. Cuba refused.

Intervention in Chile[link]

Chilean Socialist Party presidential candidate Salvador Allende was elected by a plurality in 1970, causing serious concern in Washington, D.C. due to his openly socialist and pro-Cuban politics. The Nixon administration authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to encourage a military coup that would prevent Allende's inauguration, but the plan was not successful.^[39] The extent of Kissinger's involvement in or support of these plans is a subject of controversy.^[40]

United States-Chile relations remained frosty during Salvador Allende's tenure, following the complete nationalization of the partially U.S.-owned copper mines and the Chilean subsidiary of the U.S.-based ITT Corporation, as well as other Chilean businesses. The U.S. claimed that the Chilean government had greatly undervalued fair compensation for the nationalization by subtracting what it deemed "excess profits". Therefore, the U.S. considered (but never actually implemented)^[41] economic sanctions against Chile. The CIA also provided funding for the mass anti-government strikes in 1972 and 1973.

The CIA, acting under the approval of the 40 committee (which Kissinger chaired), was involved in various covert actions in Chile during this period: It tried to buy off the Chilean Congress to prevent Allende's appointment, worked to sway public opinion against him to prevent his election, and financed protests designed to bring the country to a stand-still and make him resign. The most expeditious way to prevent Allende from assuming office was somehow to convince the Chilean congress to confirm Jorge Alessandri as the winner of the election. Once elected by the congress, Alessandri—a party to the plot through intermediaries—was prepared to resign his presidency within a matter of days so that new elections could be held. This first, nonmilitary, approach to stopping Allende was called the Track I approach.^[39] The CIA's second approach, the Track II approach, was designed to encourage a military overthrow. CIA agents told senior Chilean military officials that "the United States intended to cut military assistance to Chile unless they moved against Allende."^[42]

The first attempt to engineer a military overthrow of Allende occurred in 1970. The CIA had been in contact with two groups of coup plotters, one group run by retired General Roberto Viaux and a second by active-duty General Camilo Valenzuela. The CIA had attempted to stop Viaux's group from moving forward until it had joined forces with Valenzuela's group. Both groups were attempting to remove Chilean general René Schneider, due to his support for military non-intervention in politics, and thus the appointment of Allende. The Church hearings found that the CIA gave weapons to a group of men who it knew had attacked him twice before, ostensibly as a test of loyalty so that the CIA would remain privy to their information, but that the weapons provided and the group thereby armed (Valenzuela's group) were not the ones who actually killed him (Viaux's group). On June 11, 1971, Kissinger and Nixon said the following in a private conversation:

Kissinger: —when they did try to assassinate somebody, it took three attempts—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —and he lived for three weeks afterwards.^[43]

There are two possible interpretations of these remarks: a) Kissinger was telling the President that a military coup could not succeed in Chile because there were no officers both willing and able to carry one out; or b) the two men were mocking the CIA's squeamishness about killing Schneider.^[43]

The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its investigation of the matter, concluded that since the machine guns supplied to Valenzuela had not actually been employed in the killing, and since General Viaux had been officially discouraged by the CIA a few days before the murder, there was therefore "no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction." This view has been disputed by writer Christopher Hitchens.^[44]

A Chilean Supreme Court investigation accused Allende of support of armed groups, torture, illegal arrests, muzzling the press, confiscating private property, and not allowing people to leave the country.^[45]

On September 11, 1973, Allende died during a military coup launched by Army Commander-in-Chief Augusto Pinochet, who became President.^[46] A document released by the CIA in 2000 titled "CIA Activities in Chile" revealed that the CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts of the CIA or US military, even though many were known to be involved in notorious human rights abuses,^[47] until Democratic challenger Jimmy Carter defeated President Gerald Ford in 1976.

On September 16, 1973, five days after Pinochet had assumed power, the following exchange about the coup took place between Kissinger and President Nixon:

Nixon: Nothing new of any importance or is there?

Kissinger: Nothing of very great consequence. The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course the newspapers are bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown.

Nixon: Isn't that something. Isn't that something.

Kissinger: I mean instead of celebrating – in the Eisenhower period we would be heroes.

Nixon: Well we didn't – as you know – our hand doesn't show on this one though.

Kissinger: We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [garbled] created the conditions as great as possible.

Nixon: That is right. And that is the way it is going to be played.^[48]

In 1976, Kissinger cancelled a letter that was to be sent to Chile warning them against carrying out any political assassinations. Orlando Letelier was then assassinated in Washington, D.C. with a car bomb on September 21, 1976, the day the letter was to be sent.^[49] In an Aug. 30, 1976 memo, Shlaudeman discussed the possibility that the U.S. ambassador in Uruguay might be endangered by delivering a warning against assassination. The U.S. ambassador to Chile, David H. Popper, said that Pinochet might take as an insult any inference that he was connected with assassination plots.^[50]

Kissinger has evaded legal summons by investigators in France, Spain, Chile and Argentina seeking to question him regarding his role in the disappearances of numerous citizens of the US and other nations, in regard to his involvement to Operation Condor.^[51] These included requests in 2001 by Chilean High Court judge Juan Guzmán, and Argentine judge Rodolfo Canicoba, which were both ignored by Kissinger.^[52][53] On May 28, 2001, police visited Kissinger at the Ritz Hotel, Paris and handed him a warrant, issued by Judge Roger LeLoire, requesting his testimony in the matter of 5 French citizens who had disappeared in Pinochet's Chile. Kissinger refused, referred the matter to the State Department, and left for Italy the next day, however the summons still stands.^[54]

In addition to these summons, two cases against Kissinger were filed and dismissed. On September 10, 2001, the family of General Schneider initiated a civil action in federal court in Washington, DC, by claiming that Kissinger gave the agreement to murder Schneider because he had refused to endorse plans for a military coup against Allende. As part of the suit Schneider's two sons attempted to sue Kissinger and then-CIA director Richard Helms for $3 million. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the case based on sovereign and diplomatic immunity, as well as the political question doctrine.^[55] On November 13, 2002, 11 individuals who suffered grave human rights violations following the bloody coup that placed Pinochet in power brought suit against Henry Kissinger, the United States government, and Michael Vernon Townley for crimes against humanity, forced disappearance, torture, arbitrary detention, and wrongful death. The suit alleged that Henry Kissinger knowingly provided practical assistance and encouragement to the Chilean repressive regime before, during, and after the coup, with reckless disregard for the lives and well-being of the victims and their families. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the case based on the same grounds as Schneider vs. Kissinger.^[56]

Intervention in Argentina[link]

Kissinger took a similar line as he had toward Chile when the Argentinian military, led by Jorge Videla, toppled the democratic government of Isabel Perón in 1976 with a process named as "National Reorganization Process" by the military, with which they consolidated power, launching brutal reprisals and "disappearances" against political opponents. During a meeting with Argentinian foreign minister César Augusto Guzzetti, Kissinger assured him that the United States was an ally, but urged him to "get back to normal procedures" quickly before the U.S. Congress reconvened and had a chance to consider sanctions.^[57]

Africa[link]

In 1974 a leftist military coup overthrew the Caetano government in Portugal in the Carnation Revolution. The National Salvation Junta, the new government, quickly granted Portugal's colonies independence. Cuban troops in Angola supported the left-wing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its fight against right-wing UNITA and FNLA rebels during the Angolan Civil War (1975–2002). Kissinger supported FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, and UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgencies, as well as the CIA-supported^{[citation needed]} invasion of Angola by South African troops. The FNLA was defeated and UNITA was forced to take its fight into the bush. Only under Reagan's presidency would U.S. support for UNITA return.

In September 1976 Kissinger was actively involved in negotiations regarding the Rhodesian Bush War. Kissinger, along with South Africa's Prime Minister John Vorster, pressured Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to hasten the transition to black majority rule in Rhodesia. With FRELIMO in control of Mozambique and even South Africa withdrawing its support, Rhodesia's isolation was nearly complete. According to Smith's autobiography, Kissinger told Smith of Mrs. Kissinger's admiration for him, but Smith stated that he thought Kissinger was asking him to sign Rhodesia's "death certificate". Kissinger, bringing the weight of the United States, and corralling other relevant parties to put pressure on Rhodesia, hastened the end of minority-rule.^{[citation needed]}

East Timor[link]

The Portuguese decolonization process brought US attention to the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, which lies within the Indonesian archipelago and declared its independence in 1975. Indonesian president Suharto was a strong US ally in Southeast Asia and began to mobilize the Indonesian army, preparing to annex the nascent state, which had become increasingly dominated by the popular leftist FRETILIN party. In December 1975, the day before the invasion, Suharto discussed the invasion plans during a meeting with Kissinger and President Ford in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta. Both Ford and Kissinger made clear that US relations with Indonesia would remain strong and that it would not object to the proposed annexation. US arms sales to Indonesia continued, and Suharto went ahead with the annexation plan.

Later roles[link]

Kissinger meeting with President Ronald Reagan in the White House family quarters, 1981

Shortly after Kissinger left office in 1977, he was offered an endowed chair at Columbia University. There was significant student opposition to the appointment, which eventually became a subject of significant media commentary. ^[58][59] Columbia cancelled the appointment as a result.

Kissinger was then appointed to Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.^[60] Kissinger published a dialogue with the Japanese religious leader, Daisaku Ikeda, On Peace, Life and Philosophy.^[61] He taught at Georgetown's Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service for several years in the late 1970s. In 1982, with the help of a loan from the international banking firm of E.M. Warburg, Pincus and Company,^[18] Kissinger founded a consulting firm, Kissinger Associates, and is a partner in affiliate Kissinger McLarty Associates with Mack McLarty, former chief of staff to President Bill Clinton.^[62] He also serves on board of directors of Hollinger International, a Chicago-based newspaper group,^[63] and as of March 1999, he also serves on board of directors of Gulfstream Aerospace.^[64]

In 1978, Kissinger was named chairman of the North American Soccer League board of directors.^[65] From 1995 to 2001, he served on the board of directors for Freeport-McMoRan, a multinational copper and gold producer with significant mining and milling operations in Papua, Indonesia.^[66] In February 2000, then-president of Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid appointed Kissinger as a political advisor. He also serves as an honorary advisor to the United States-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce.

From 2000 - 2006, Kissinger served as chairman of the board of trustees of Eisenhower Fellowships. In 2006, upon his departure from Eisenhower Fellowships, he received the Dwight D. Eisenhower Medal for Leadership and Service.^[67]

Kissinger at the World Economic Forum's 'India Economic Summit', November, 2008, New Delhi

Role in U.S. foreign policy[link]

Kissinger left office when a Democrat, former Governor of Georgia Jimmy Carter, defeated Republican Gerald Ford in the 1976 presidential elections. Kissinger continued to participate in policy groups, such as the Trilateral Commission, and to maintain political consulting, speaking, and writing engagements. Along with David Rockefeller, he was instrumental in convincing President Carter to allow the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi into the United States to receive medical treatment, "a decision that led directly to the Iranian hostage crisis."^[18]

In 2002, President George W. Bush appointed Kissinger to chair a committee to investigate the September 11 attacks.^{[citation needed]} Kissinger stepped down as chairman on December 13, 2002 rather than reveal his client list, when queried about potential conflicts of interest.

The Balkans[link]

In several articles of his and interviews that he gave during the Yugoslav wars, he criticized the United States' policies in the Balkans, among other things for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state, which he described as a foolish act.^[68] Most importantly he dismissed the notion of Serbs, and Croats for that part, being aggressors or separatist, saying that "they can't be separating from something that has never existed".^[69] In addition, he repeatedly warned the West of inserting itself into a conflict that has its roots at least hundreds of years back in time, and said that the West would do better if it allowed the Serbs and Croats to join their respective countries.^[69]

This Kissinger position and statements provoked a large number of articles and was subjected to criticism in numerous books and studies by prominent authors such as Christopher Hitchens, Andras Riedlmayer, Michael A. Sells, Noel Malcolm, Norman Cigar, Rabia Ali, Lawrence Lifschultz.

Nonetheless, Kissinger shared similarly critical views on Western involvement in Kosovo. In particular, he held a disparaging view of the Rambouillet Agreement:

The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that any Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form.

—Henry Kissinger, Daily Telegraph, June 28, 1999

However, as the Serbs did not accept the Rambouillet text and NATO bombings started, he opted for a continuation of the bombing as NATO's credibility was now at stake, but dismissed the usage of ground forces, claiming that it was not worth it.^[70]